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55th Congress, ) SENATE. < Doc. No. 62, 

3d Session. ) I Part 1 . 



A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN TOE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 



MESSAGE 



FROM THB 



'RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 



TRANSMITTING 



TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, 
ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. 



January 4, 1899.— Read ; treaty read the first time and referred 
to the Committee on Foreign Relatione, and, together with 
the Message and accompanying papers, ordered to be printed 
in confidence for the use of the Senate* 

January 11, 1899.— Injunction of secrecy removed. 

January 13, 1899.— Ordered printed. 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 






55th Congress, ) SENATE. c Doc. N< >, G2, 

3d Session. ) ( Pait 1. 



A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN TDE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 



MESSAGE 



FROM THE 



PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 



TRANSMITTING 






A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE 'UNITED STATES 

AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, 

ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. 



January 4, 1899. — Read; treaty read the first time and referred 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, together with 
the Message and accompanying papers, ordered to be printed 
in confidence for the use of the Senate. 

January 11, 1899. — Injunction of secrecy removed. 

January 13, 1899.— Ordered printed. 



WASHINGTON": 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 



£7. 



4803 




55th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Don. No. 02 

3d Session. ) ( Part 1. 



TEEATY OE PEACE BETWEEN TIIE UNITED STATES AND 



SPAIN. 






MESSAGE 

FROM THE 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 



TRANSMITTING 



PREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, 
SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS ON DECEMBER 10, 1893. 



uary-1, 1899. — Read; treaty read the first time and referred to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, and, together with the message and accompanying papers, 
ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate. 

January 11, 1899. — Injunction of secrecy removed. 

January 13, 1899.— Ordered printed. 



To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, with ;i view to its ratification, a treaty of pence 
between the United States and Spain, signed at the city of Paris on 
December 10, 1898; together with the protocols and papers indicated 
in the list accompanying the report of the Secretary of State. 

William McKinley. 
Executive Mansion, 

Washington, January 4, 1899. 



To the President: 

The undersigned, Secretary of State, lias the honor to lay before the 
President, with a view to its submission to the Senate if deemed proper, 
a treaty of peace concluded at Paris on December 10, 1898, between 
the United States and Spain. 

Accompanying the treaty are the protocols of the conferences of the 
Peace Commission at Paris, together with copies of statements made 
before the United States Commissioners, and other papers indicated in 
the inclosed list. 

Respectfully submitted. 

John Hay. 
Department of State, 

Washington, January 3, 1899. 



1 The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen 

2 Eegent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso 

3 XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the 

4 two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries : 

5 The President of the United States, 

6 William E. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George 

7 Gray, and Whitelaw Keid, citizens of the United States; 

8 And Her Majesty the Queen Kegent of Spain, 

9 Don Eugenio Montero Eios, president of the senate, DonBuen- 

10 aventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of 

11 the Crown; Don Jose" de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and asso- 

12 ciate justice of the supreme court; Don Wenceslao Eamirez de 

13 Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 

14 at Brussels, and Don Eafael Cerero, general of division; 

15 Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their 

16 full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, 

17 after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the fol- 

18 lowing articles: 

19 Aeticle I. 

20 Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title 

21 to Cuba. 

22 And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be 

23 occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long 

24 as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obli- 

25 gations that may under international law result from the fact 

26 of its occupation, for the protection of life and property. 



6 TREATY OF PEACE. 

27 Article II. 

28 Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Eico 

29 and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 

30 Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. 

31 Article III. 

32 Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as 

33 the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying 

34 within the following line: 

35 A Hue running from west to east along or near the twentieth 
3G parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the naviga- 

37 ble channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) 

38 to the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian 

39 of lougitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred 

40 and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of 

41 Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes 

42 (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees 

43 and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection 

44 with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees 

45 and thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence 
40 along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees 

47 and thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the par- 

48 allel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, 

49 thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty 

50 minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred 

51 and sixteenth (110th) degree meridian of longitude east of Green- 

52 wich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth 

53 (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred 

54 and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Green- 

55 wich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) 

56 degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of 

57 beginning. 

58 The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million 

59 dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of 
GO the ratifications of the present treaty. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 7 

Gl Article IV. 

63 The United States will, for tlie term of ten years from the dale 

63 of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit 

64 Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine 

65 Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the 

66 United States. 

67 Article V. 

68 The United States will, upon the signature of the present 

69 treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers 

70 taken as prisoners of war on the capture oi Manila by the 
VI American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be 

72 restored to them. 

73 Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the pres- 

74 ent treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the 

75 island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the 

76 Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto 

77 Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of 

78 August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions 

79 are completely executed. 

80 The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands 

81 and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Govern- 

82 ments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, 

83 guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, 

84 ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, 

85 belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines 

86 and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ord- 

87 nance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast 

88 defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six 

89 months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the 

90 treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase 

91 such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between 

92 the two Governments on the subject shall be reached. 



8 TREATY OF PEACE. 

93 Article VI. 

94 Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all 

95 prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for politi- 

96 cal offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the 

97 Philippines and the war with the United States. 

98 Eeciprocally, the United States will release all persons made 

99 prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to 

100 obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the 

101 insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. 

102 The Government of the United States will at its own cost return 

103 to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return 

104 to the United States, Cuba, Porto-Eico, and the Philippines, 

105 according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners 

106 released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under 

107 this article. 

108 Article VII. 

109 The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for 

110 indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Gov- 

111 eminent, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Govern- 

112 ment, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insur- 

113 rection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the 

114 present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of 

115 the war. 

116 The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its 

117 citizens against Spain relinquished in this article. 

118 Article VIII. 

119 In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of 

120 this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Eico 

121 and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and 

122 in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, bar- 

123 racks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable 

124 property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public 

125 domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. 



/ 



TREATY OF FEACE. 9 

126 And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, 

127 as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, 

128 cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by 

129 law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, 

130 of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, 

131 ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having 

132 legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid 

133 territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of what- 

134 soever nationality such individuals may be. 

135 The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, 

136 includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty 

137 relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peuin- 

138 sula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates 

139 to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished when- 

140 ever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally 

141 observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the 

142 archives of the islands above referred to. 

143 In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, 

144 are also included such rights as the Orown of Spain and its 

145 authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, 

146 executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, 

147 which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their 

148 inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- 

149 served, and private persons shall without distinction have the 

150 right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of 

151 the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of nota- 

152 rial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive 

153 or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands afore- 

154 said. 

155 Article IX. 

156 Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the ter- 

157 ritory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes 

158 her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove 

159 therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, 



10 TREATY OF PEACE. 

160 including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its 

161 proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their 

162 industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect 

163 thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case 

164 they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance 

165 to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within 

166 a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, 

167 a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in 

168 default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced 

169 it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which 

170 they may reside. 

171 The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of 

172 the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be deter- 

173 mined by the Congress. 

374 Article X. 

175 The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes 

176 or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of 

177 their religion. 

178 Article XI. 

179 The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by 

180 this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject 

181 in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts 

182 of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws 

183 governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear 

184 before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of 

185 the country to which the courts belong. 

186 Article XII. 

187 Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of 

188 ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain 

189 relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined accord- 

190 ing to the following rules: 

191 1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private 

192 individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 11 

193 and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of 

19-4 review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, 

195 and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in 

19G the territory within which such judgments should be carried 

197 out. 

198 2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the 

199 date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment 

200 before the court in which they may then be pending or in the 

201 court that may be substituted therefor. 

202 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the 

203 Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which 

204 by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its juris- 

205 diction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been 

206 rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the 

207 competent authority of the place in which the case arose. 

208 Article XIII. 

209 The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents 

210 acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Eico, 

211 the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the 

212 exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to 

213 be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not 

214 subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall 

215 continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for 

216 the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the 

217 exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. 

218 Article XIV. 

219 Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the 

220 ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which 

221 has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty. 

222 Article XV. 

223 The Government of each country will, for the term of ten 

224 years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the 

225 same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance 



12 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



230 

231 

232 



226 and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords 

227 to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. 

228 This article may at any time be terminated on six months' 

229 notice given by either Government to the other. 

Article XVI/ 

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty 
by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the 

233 time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination 

234 of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the 

235 island to assume the same obligations. 

236 Article XVII. 

237 The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the 

238 United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen- 

239 ate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Eegent of Spain; 

240 and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within 

241 six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. 

242 In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have 

243 signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. 

244 Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in 

245 the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety- 

246 eight. 



[SEAL 

[seal 
[seal 
[seal 
[seal 
[seal 
[seal 
[seal 
[seal 
[seal 



William R. Day 
Oushman K. Davis 
William P. Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 
eugenio montero rlos 
B. DE Abarzuza 
J. DE GARNICA 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 



55th Congress, ) SENATE. (Doo.No.C2 

3d Session. j (Pari 2. 



A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 



MESSAGE 



FROM THE 



PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 



TRANSMITTING 



A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 

AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, 

ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. 



ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. 



January 4, 1899. — Read; treaty read the first time and referred 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, together with 
the Message and accompanying papers, ordered to he printed 
in confidence for the use of the Senate. 

January 11, 1899. — Injunction of secrecy removed. 

January 13, 1899.— Ordered printed. 



WASHINGTON": 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 



LIST OF PAPERS. 



1. Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898. 

2. Protocols of the conferences at Paris (1 to 22). 

3. Peace protocol of August 12, 1898, and correspondence. 

4. Correspondence between the Department of State and the Embassy of France, 

at Washington, as representing the interests of Spain. 

5. Consular reports on Philippine affairs. 

6. Statement of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., October 4, 1898, before the United 

States Peace Commission at Paris, and accompanying papers. 

7. Memoranda concerning the situation in the Philippines, by Maj. Gen. F. V. Greene, 

U. S. V., and accompanying papers. 

8. Statement of Mr. John Foreman, October 8, 1898, before the United States Peace 

Commission at Paris. 

9. Statement of Commander E. B. Bradford, U. S. ST., October 14, 1898, before the 

United States Peace Commission at Paris. 

10. Statement of Gen. Charles A. Whittier, U. S. V., before the United States Peace 

Commission at Paris. * 

11. Preliminary report of Dr. George F. Becker, of the United States Geological 

Survey, on the geological and mineral resources of the Philippines. 

12. Data concerning the Philippiue Islands: Their history, people, geography, geol- 

ogy, resources, and strategic importance. 

13. A sketch of the economic condition of the Philippines, by Max L. Tornow. 

14. Protectorates, Colonies, and nonsovereign States. 

15. The Federated Malay States: A sketch of their growth and political arganiza- 

tion, by Francis B. Forbes. 

1 



TREATY OF PEACE OF DECEMBER 10, 1898. 



The United States of Amer- 
ica and Her Majesty the 
Queen Regent of Spain, in 
the Name of Her August Son 
Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to 
end the state of war now existing 
between the two countries, have 
for that purpose appointed as 
Plenipotentiaries : 

The President of the 
United States, 

William R. Day, Cushman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, and Whitelaw 
Reid, citizens of the United 
States; 

And Her Majesty the Queen 
Regent of Spain, 

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, 
President of the Senate, Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzuza, 
Senator of the Kingdom and ex- 
Minister of the Crown, Don Jose 
de Garnioa, Deputy to the Cortes 
and Associate Justice of the Su- 
preme Court; Don Wenceslao 
Ramikez de Villa- 13 rrutia, 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and 
Don Rafael Cerero, General 
of Division; 

Who, having assembled in Paris, 
and having exchanged their full 
powers, which were found to be in 
due and proper form, have, after 
discussion of the matters before 
them, agreed upon the following 
articles : 

Article I. 

Spain relinquishes all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 

And as the island is, upon its 
evacuation by Spain, to be occu- 



Los Estados Unidos de Ame- 
rica Y SJVT. la Reina Regente 

DE ESPANA, EN NOMBRE DE SU 

Augusto Huo Don Alfonso 
XIII, deseando poner termino ;il 
estado de guerra hoy existente 
eutre ambas Xaciones, han nom- 
brado con este objeto por sus Plen- 
ipotenciaros, a saber: 

El Presidente de los Esta- 
dos Unidos de America a 

William R. Day, Cushman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, y Whitelaw 
Reid, ciudadanos de los Estados 
Unidos; 

Y su Majestad la Reina Re- 
gente DE ESPANA, i. 

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, 
Presidente del S e n a d o. Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzi / a 
Senador del Reino, Ministro que 
ha sido de la Corona, Don Jos;: 
de Garnica, Diputado a Cortes, 
Magistrado del Tribunal supremo, 
Don Wenceslao Ramirez de 
Villa-Urrutia, Euviado Extra- 
ordinario y Ministro plenipoten- 
ciairo en Bruselas; y Don Rafael 
Cerero, General de division, 

Los cuales reunidos en Paris, 
despu£s de haberse comunicado 
sus plenos poderes que fueron ha- 
llados en buena y debida forma, y 
previa la discussion de las materias 
pendientes, han conveuido en los 
siguientes articulos : 

Articulo I. 

Espana renuncia todo derecho 
de soberania y propiedad sobre 
Cuba. 

En atencion a que dicha isja, 
cuando sua evacuada por Espana, 

s 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



pied by the United States, the 
United States will, so long as such 
occupation shall last, assume and 
discharge the obligations that may 
under international law result from 
the fact of its occupation, for the 
protection of life and uroperty. 



Article II. 

Spain cedes to the United States 
the island of Porto Rico and other 
islands now under Spanish sov- 
ereignty in the West Indies, and 
the island of Guam in the Marianas 
or Ladrones. 

Article III. 

Spain cedes to the United States 
the archipelago known as the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and comprehending 
the islands lying within the follow- 
ing line: 

A line running from west to east 
along or near the twentieth paral- 
lel of north latitude, and through 
the middle of the navigable chan- 
nel of Bachi, from the one hundred 
and eighteenth (118th) to the one 
hundred and twenty seventh 
(127th) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich, thence 
along the one hundred and twenty 
seventh (1.27th) degree meridian of 
longitude east of Greenwich to 
the parallel of four degrees and 
forty live minutes (4° 45') north 
latitude, thence along the parallel 
of four degrees and forty five 
minutes (4° 45') north latitude to 
its intersection with the meridian 
of longitude one hundred and nine- 
teen degrees and thirty five min- 
utes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, 
thence along the meridian of longi- 
tude one hundred and nineteen 
degrees and thirty five minutes 
(119° 35') east of Greenwich to the 
parallel of latitude seven degrees 
and forty minutes (7° 40') north, 
thence along the parallel of lati- 
tude seven degrees and forty min- 
utes (7° 40') north to its intersection 
with the one hundred and six- 



va a ser ocupada por los Estados 
Unidos, los Estados Unidos mien- 
tras dure su ocupacion, tomaran 
sobre si y cumpliran las obliga- 
ciones que por el hechode ocuparla, 
les imponeel Derecho Internacion- 
al, para la proteccion de vidas y 
haciendas. 

Articulo II. 

Espaha cede a los Estados Uni- 
dos la Isla de Puerto Rico y las 
deinas que estan ahora bajo su so- 
berania en las Indias Occidentales, 
y la Isla de Guam en el Archipie- 
lago de las Marianas 6 Ladrones. 

Articulo III. 

Espana cede a los Estados Uni- 
dos el archipiclago conocido por 
Islas Filipinas, que comprende las 
islas situadas dentro de las lineas 
siguientes : 

Una linea que corre de Oeste a 
Este, cerca del 20° paralelo de la- 
titud Norte, a traves de la mitad 
del canal navegable de Bachi, 
desde el 118° al 127° grados de 
longitud Este de Greenwich; de 
aqui a lo largo del cieuto veiutisiete 
(127) grado meridiano de longitud 
Este de Greenwich al paralelo cua- 
tro grados cuarenta y cinco minu- 
tos (4° 45') de latitud Norte; de 
aqui siguiendo el paralelo de cua- 
tro grados cuarenta y cinco minutos 
de latitud Norte (4° 45') hasta su 
intersection con el meridiano de 
longitud ciento diez y nueve grados 
y treiuta y cinco minutos (119° 35') 
Este de Greenwich; de aqui si- 
guiendo el meridiano de longitud 
ciento diez y nueve grados y treiuta 
y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de 
Greenwich, al paralelo de latitud 
siete grados cuarenta minutos (7° 
40') Norte; de aqui siguiendo 
el paralelo de latitud siete 
grados cuarenta minutos (7° 40') 
Norte, a su intersection con el 
ciento diez y seis (116°) grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, de aqui por una linea recta, a 
la intersection del deoimo grado 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



teenth (110th) degree meridian of 
longitude east of Greenwich, thence 
by a direct line to the intersection 
of the tenth (10th) degree parallel 
of north latitude with the one hun- 
dred and eighteenth (118th) degree 
m eridian of longitude east of Green- 
wich, and thence along the one 
hundred and eighteenth (118th) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich to the point of 
beginning. 

The United States will pay to 
Spain the sum of twenty million 
dollars ($20,000,000), within three 
months after the exchange of the 
ratifications of the present treaty. 

Article IV. 

The United States will, for the 
term of ten years from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications 
of the present treaty, admit Span- 
ish ships and merchandise to the 
ports of the Philippine Islands on 
the same terms as ships and mer- 
chandise of the United States. 

Article V. 

The United States will, upon the 
signature of the present treaty, 
send back to Spain, at its own cost 
the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- 
oners of war on the capture of 
Manila by the American forces. 
The arms of the soldiers in question 
shall be restored to them. 

Spain will, upon the exchange of 
the ratifications of the present 
treaty, proceed to evacuate the 
Philippines, as well as the island 
of Guam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners 
appointed to arrange for the evacu- 
ation of Porto Rico and other is- 
lands in the West Indies, under 
the Protocol of August 12, 1898, 
which is to continue in force till its 
provisions are completely executed. 

The time within which the evacu- 
ation of the Philippine Islands 
and Guam shall be completed shall 
be fixed by the two Governments. 



paralelo de latitud Norte, con el 
ciento diez y ocho (1 L8 ) grado me 
ridiano delongitud Este <l<- <i reen- 
wich, y de aqui siguiendoel ciento 
diezyocho grado (118°) meridiano 
de longitud Este de Greenwich, ;il 
punto en que comienza esta dc- 
marcacion. 



Los Estados Unidos pagaran u 
Espafia la sum a de veinte milliones 
de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de 
los tres mesesdes])U( ; s <U'l canje de 
ratificaciones del preseute tratado. 

Articulo IV. 

Los Estados Unidos durante el 
termino de diez alios a con tar desde 
el canje de la ratification del pre- 
seute tratado, admitiran en los puer- 
tos de las Islas Filipinas los buques 
y las mercancias espa holes, bajo las 
mismascondicionesque los buques 
y las mercancias de los Estados 
Unidos. 

Articulo V. 

Los Estados Unidos, al ser iir- 
mado el presente tratado, traspor- 
taran a Espaiia, a su costa, los 
soldados espaholes que hicieron 
prisioueros de guerra las faerzas 
Americanas al ser capturada Ma- 
nila. Las annas de estos soldados 
les seran devueltas. 

Espaiia, al canjearselas ratifica- 
ciones del presente tratado, proce- 
dera a evacuar las Islas Filipinas, 
asi como la de Guam, en condi- 
ciones semejantes a los acordadas 
porlasOomisionesnombradas para 
concertar la evacuacion de Puerto 
Eico y otras Islas en las Antillas 
Occidentals, segun el Protocolo 
de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que con- 
tinuara en vigor hasta que scan 
completamente cumplidas sus 
disposiciones. 

El termino dentro del cual - 
completada la evacuacion de las 
Islas Filipinas y la de Guam, sera 
fijado por ambos Gobiernos. Seran 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Stands of colors, uncaptured war 
vessels, small arms, guns of all 
calibres, with their carriages and 
accessories, powder, ammunition, 
livestock, and materials and sup- 
plies of all kinds, belonging to the 
land and naval forces of Spain in 
the Philippines and Guam, remain 
the property of Spain. Pieces of 
heavy ordnance, exclusive of field 
artillery, in the fortifications and 
coast defences, shall remain in 
their emplacements for the term 
of six months, to be reckoned from 
the exchange of ratifications of 
the treaty; and the United States 
may, in the mean time, purchase 
such material from Spain, if a sat- 
isfactory agreement between the 
two Governments on the subject 
shall be reached. 

Article VI. 

Spain will, upon the signature 
of the present treaty, release all 
prisoners of war, and all persons 
detained or imprisoned for politi- 
cal offences, in connection with the 
insurrections in Cuba and the 
Philippines and the war with the 
United States. 

Reciprocally, the United States 
will release all persons made pris- 
oners of war by the American 
forces, and will undertake to ob- 
tain the release of all Spanish 
prisoners in the hands of the in- 
surgents in Cuba and the Philip- 
pines. 

The Government of the United 
States will at its own cost return 
to Spain and the Government of 
Spain will at its own cost return 
to the United States, Cuba, Porto- 
Rico, and the Philippines, accord- 
ing to the situation of their re- 
spective homes, prisoners released 
or caused to be released by them, 
respectively, under this article. 

Article VII. 

The United States and Spain 
mutually relinquish all claims for 
indemnity, national and individ- 



propiedad de Espana banderas y 
estandartes, buques de guerra no 
apresados, armas portatiles, cano- 
nes de todos calibres con sus nion- 
tajes y accesorios, polvoras, muni- 
ciones, ganado, material y efectos 
de toda clase pertenecientes a los 
ejercitos de mar y tierra de Espana 
en las Filipinas y Guam. Las pie- 
zas de grueso calibre, que no sean 
artilleria de campaua, colocadas en 
las fortificaciones y en las costas, 
quedaran en sus emplazamentos 
por el plazo de seis meses a partir 
del canje de ratificaciones del pre- 
sente tratado, y los Estados Unidos 
podran, durante ese tiempo, com- 
prar a Espana dicho material, si am- 
bos Gobiernos llegan a un acuerdo 
satisfactorio sobre el particular. 

Articulo VI. 

Espafia al ser firmado el presente 
tratado, pondra en liberlad a todos 
los prisioneros de guerra y a todos 
los detenidos 6 presos por delitos 
politicos a consecuencia de las in- 
surrecciones en Cuba y en Filipinas 
y de la guerra con los Estados 
Unidos. 

Reciprocamente, los Estados Uni- 
dos pondran en libertad a todos los 
prisioneros de guerra hechos por 
las fuerzas Americanas, y gestiona- 
ran la libertad de todos los prisi- 
oneros espanoles en poder de los 
insurrectos de Cuba y Filipinas. 

El Gobierno de los Estados Uni- 
dos trasportara, por su cuenta a 
Espana, y el Gobierno de Espana 
trasportara por su cuenta a los 
Estados Unidos, Cuba, Puerto Rico 
y Filipinas, con arreglo a la situa- 
tion de sus respectivos hogares, los 
prisioneros que pongan 6 que hagan 
poner en libertad respectivamente, 
en virtud de este Articulo. 

Articulo VII. 

Espana y los Estados Unidos de 
America reuuncian mutuamente, 
por el presente tratado, a toda rec- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



ual, of every kind, of either Gov- 
ernment, or of its citizens or sub- 
jects, against the other Govern- 
ment, that may have arisen since 
the beginning of the late insurrec- 
tion in Cuba and prior to the ex- 
change of ratifications of the pres- 
ent treaty, including all claims for 
indemnity for the cost of the war. 



The United States will adjudi- 
cate and settle the claims of its 
citizens against Spain relinquished 
in this article. 

Article VIII. 

In conformity with the provisions 
of Articles I, II, and III of this 
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, 
and cedes in Porto Eico and other 
islands in the West Indies, in the 
island of Guam, and in the Philip- 
pine Archipelago, all the buildings, 
wharves, barracks, forts, struc- 
tures, public highways and other 
immovable property which, in con- 
formity with law, belong to the 
public domain, and as such belong 
to the Crown of Spain. 

And it is hereby declared that 
the relinquishment or cession, as 
the case may be, to which the pre- 
ceding paragraph refers, cannot in 
any respect impair the property or 
rights which by law belong to the 
peaceful possession of property of 
all kinds, of provinces, municipal- 
ities, public or private establish- 
ments, ecclesiastical or civic bod- 
ies, or any other associations hav- 
ing legal capacity to acquire and 
possess property in the aforesaid 
territories renounced or ceded, or 
of private individuals, of whatso- 
ever nationality such individuals 
may be. 

The aforesaid relinquishment or 
cession, as the case may be, includes 
all documents exclusively referring 
to the sovereignty relinquished or 
ceded that may exist in the ar- 
chives of the Peninsula. Where 
any document in such archives only 



lamaci6n de indemniziuion mi- 
cional 6 privada de cualquier 
genero de un Gobierno contra el 
otro, 6 de sus subditos 6 ciudada 
nos contra el otro Gobierno, que 
pueda haber surgido desde el co 
mienzo de la ultima insurrecci6n en 
Cuba y sea anterior al canje de 
ratificaciones del presente tratado, 
asi como a toda indemnizacion en 
concepto de gastos ocasiouados por 
la guerra. 

Los Estados Unidos juzgaran y 
resolveran las reclamation es de sus 
ciudadanos contra Espana, a que 
renuncia en este articulo. 

Articulo VIII. 

En cumplimiento de lo convenido 
en los Articulos I, II y III de este 
tratado, Espana renuncia en Cuba 
y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras 
islas de las ludias Occidentales, en 
la Isla de Guam y en el Archipiel- 
ago de las Filipinas, todos los edi- 
ficios, muelles, cuarteles, fortalezas, 
establetiinieutos, vias ptiblicas y 
demas bienes inmuebles que con 
arreglo a derecho son del dominio 
piiblieo, y como tal corresponden a 
la Corona de Espana. 

Queda por lo tanto declarado que 
esta renuncia 6 cesion, seguu el 
caso, a que se refiere el parrafo an- 
terior, en nada puede mermar la 
propiedad, 6 los derechos que cor- 
respondan, con arreglo a las leyes, 
al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes 
de todas clases de las provincias, 
municipios, establecimientos publi- 
cos 6 privados, corporation es civilea 
6 eclesiasticas, 6 de cualesquiera 
otras colectividades que tienen per- 
sonalidad juridica para adquirir y 
poseer bienes en los mencionados 
territorios renunciado 6 cedidos, y 
los de los individuos particulars, 
cualquiera que sea su national idad. 

Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun el 
caso, incluye todos los documents 
que se refieran exclusivamente a 
dicha soberauia renuuciada 6 ce- 
dida, que existan en los Archivos 
de la Peninsula. 

Cuaudo estos documentos exist- 



8 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



in part relates to sam sovereignty, 
a copy of such part will be furnished 
whenever it shall be requested. 
Like rules shall be reciprocally 
observed in favor of Spain in re- 
spect of documents in the archives 
of the islands above referred to. 



In the aforesaid relinquishment 
or cession, as the case may be, are 
also included such rights as the 
Crown of Spain and its authorities 
possess in respect of the official 
archives and records, executive as 
well as judicial, in the islands above 
referred to, which relate to said 
islands or the rights and property 
of their inhabitants. Such archives 
and records shall be carefully pre- 
served, and private persons shall 
without distinction have the right 
to require, in accordance with law, 
authenticated copies of the con- 
tracts, wills and other instruments 
forming part of notarial protocols 
or files, or which may be contained 
in the executive or judicial ar- 
chives, be the latter in Spain or in 
the islands aforesaid. 



Article IX. 

Spanish subjects, natives of the 
Peninsula, residing in the territory 
over which Spain by the present 
treaty relinquishes or cedes her 
sovereignty, may remain in such 
territory or may remove therefrom, 
retaining in either event all their 
rights of property, including the 
right to sell or dispose of such prop- 
erty or of its proceeds; and they 
shall also have the right to carry on 
their industry, commerce and pro- 
fessions, being subject in respect 
thereof to such laws as are appli- 
cable to other foreigners. In case 
they remain in the territory they 
may preserve their allegiance to the 
Crown of Spain by making, before 
a court of record, within a year from 
the date of the exchange of ratifi- 
cations of this treaty, a declaration 



entes en dichos Archivos, solo en 
parte correspond an 4 dicha sober- 
ania, se facilitaran copias de dicha 
parte, siempreque sean solicitadas. 
Reglas analogas habran reciproca- 
mente de observarse en favor de 
Espana, respecto de los documen- 
tos existentes en los Archivos de 
las Islas antes mencionades. 

En las antecitadas renuncia 6 
cesion, segun el caso, se hallan 
comprendidos aquellos derechos de 
la Corona de Espana y de sus Au- 
toridades sobre los Archivos y 
Registros oficiales, asi administra- 
tivos como judiciales de dichas 
islas, que se refieran a ellas y a los 
derechos y propiedades de sus hab- 
itantes. Dichos Archivos y Re- 
gistros deberan ser cuidadosa- 
mente conservados y los particu- 
lares sin exception, tendran derecho 
a sacar, con arreglo a las Leyes, 
las copias autorizadas de los con- 
tratos, testamentos y demas docu- 
mentos que formen parte de los 
protocolos notariales 6 que se cus- 
todien en los Archivos administra- 
tivos 6 judiciales, bien estos se 
hallen en Espana, 6 bien en las 
Islas de que se hace mention 
anteriormente. 

Articulo IX. 

Lossubditosesparioles,naturales 
de la Peninsula, residentesen el ter- 
ritorio cuya soberania Espana re- 
nuncia 6 cede por el presente tra- 
tado, podran permauecer en dicho 
territorio 6 marcharse de el, conser- 
vando en uno u otro caso todos sus 
derechos de propiedad, con inclu- 
sion del derecho devender 6 dis- 
poner de tal propiedad 6 de sus 
productos; y adeinas tendran el 
derecho de ejercer su industria, 
comercio 6 prafesion, sujet;indose 
4 este respecto a las leyes que sean 
aplicables 4 los dermis extrangeros. 
En el caso de que permanezcan en 
el territorio, podran conservar su 
nacionalidad espanola haciendo 
ante una oficina de registro, den- 
tro de un aiio despues del cambio 
de ratificaciones de este tratado, 



TREATY OP PEACE. 



of their decision to preserve such 
allegiance ; in default of which dec- 
laration they shall be held to have 
renounced it aud to have adopted 
the nationality of the territory in 
which they may reside. 

The civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of 
the territories hereby ceded to the 
United States shall be determined 
by the Congress. 

Article X. 

The inhabitants of the territories 
over which Spain relinquishes or 
cedes her sovereignty shall be se- 
cured in the free exercise of their 
religion. 

Article XI. 

The Spaniards residing in the 
territories over which Spain by 
this treaty cedes or relinquishes 
her sovereignty shall be subject in 
matters civil as well as criminal to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the country wherein they reside, 
pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- 
erning the same; and they shall 
have the right to appear before 
such courts, and to pursue the 
same course as citizens of the 
country to which the courts belong. 

Article XII. 

Judicial proceedings pending at 
the time of the exchange of ratifi- 
cations of this treaty in the terri- 
tories over which Spain relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
shall be determined according to 
the following rules: 

1. Judgments rendered either in 
civil suits between private individ- 
uals, or in criminal matters, before 
the date mentioned, and with re- 
spect to which there is no recourse 
or right of review under the Span- 
ish law, shall be deemed to be final, 
and shall be executed in due form 
by competent authority in the ter- 
ritory within which such judgments 
should be carried out. 



una declaracion de sn prop6sito 
de conservar dicha uacionalidad; 
a falta de esta declaracion, se con 
siderarfi que lian renunciado dicha 
uacionalidad y adoptado La del ter- 
ritorio en el cual pueden residir. 

Los derechos civiles y la condi- 
cion politica de los habitantes 
naturales de los territorios aqni 
cedidos a lo Estados dnidos se 
determinaran por el Congreso. 

Artjculo X. 

Los habitantes de los territorios 
cuya Soberania Espafia renuncia 6 
cede, tendran asegurado el libre 
ejercicio de su religion. 

Articulo XL 

Los espaiioles residentes en los 
territorios cuya soberania cede 6 
renuncia Espaiia por este tratado, 
estaran sometidos en lo civil y en 
lo criminal a les tribuuales del pais 
en que residan con arreglo a las 
leyes communes que regulen su 
competencia, pucliendo comparecer 
ante aquellos, en la misma forma y 
ampleando los mismos pro cedimi- 
entos que deban observar los eiu- 
dadanos del pais a que pertenezca 
el tribunal. 

Articulo XII. 

Los procedimientos judiciales 
pendientes al canjearse las ratifi- 
caciones de este tratado, en los 
territorios sobre los cuales EspaSa 
renuncia 6 cede su soberania, se 
determinaran con arreglo a las 
reglas siguientes: 

1. Las sentencias dictadas en 
causas civiles entre particulares <> 
en materia criminal, antes de la 
fechamencionada, y contra las cua- 
les no haya apelacion <> casacion 
con arreglo a las leyes espaBolas, 
seconsideraran coino tirmos. y <im mi 
ejecutadas en debida forma por la 
Autoridad competente en el tern- 
torio dentro del cual dichas senten- 
cias deban cumplirse. 



10 



TREATY OP PEACE. 



2. Civil suits between private in- 
dividuals which may on the date 
mentioned be undetermined shall 
be prosecuted to judgment before 
the court in which tbey may then 
be pending or in the court that 
may be substituted therefor. 

3. Criminal actions pending on 
the date mentioned before the Su- 
preme Court of Spain against citi- 
zens of the territory which by this 
treaty ceases to be Spanish shall 
continue under its jurisdiction un- 
til final judgment; but, such judg- 
ment having been rendered, the 
execution thereof shall be commit- 
ted to the competent authority of 
the place in which the case arose. 



Article XIII. 

The rights of property secured 
by copyrights and pateuts acquired 
by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, 
and in Porto Rico, the Philippines 
and other ceded territories, at the 
time of the exchange of the ratifi- 
cations of this treaty, shall con- 
tinue to be respected. Spanish sci- 
entific, literary and artistic works, 
not subversive of public order in 
the territories in question, shall 
continue to be admitted free of 
duty into such territories, for the 
period of ten years, to be reckoned 
from the date of the exchange of 
the ratifications of this treaty. 

Article XIV. 

Spain shall have the power to 
establish consular officers in the 
ports and places of the territories, 
the sovereignty over which has 
been either relinquished or ceded 
by the present treaty 

Article XV. 

The Government of each country 
will, for the term of ten years, ac- 
cord to the merchant vessels of the 
other country the same treatment 
in respect of all port charges, in- 
cluding entrance and clearance 



2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- 
ticulares que en la fecha mencio- 
nada no hayan sido juzgados, con- 
tin uaran su tramitacion ante el 
tribunal en que se halle el proceso, 
6 ante aquel que lo sustituya. 

3. Las acciones en materia crimi- 
nal pendientes en la fecha mencio- 
nada ante el Tribunal Supremo de 
Espana contra ciudadanos del terri- 
torio que segun este tratado deja de 
ser espanol, continuaran bajo su ju- 
risdiccion hasta que recaiga la sen- 
tencia definitiva; pero una vez dic- 
tada esa sentencia, su ejecucion 
sera encomendada a la Autoridad 
competente del lugar en que la 
action se suscito. 

ArtIculo XIII. 

Continuaran respetandose los de- 
rechos de propriedad literaria, ar- 
tistica e industrial, adquiridos por 
espaiioles en las Islas de Cuba y en 
las de Puerto llico, Filipinas y de- 
mas territories cedidos, al hacerse 
el canje de las ratificaciones de este 
tratado. Las obras espauolas cien- 
tificas, literarias y artisticas, que no 
sean peligrosas, para el orden pub- 
lico en dichos territorios, continu- 
aran entrando en los mismos, con 
franquicia de todo derecho de adua- 
na por un plazo de diez afios a con- 
tar desde el canje de ratificaciones 
de este tratado. 

Articulo XIV 

Espana podra establecer Agen- 
tes Consulares en los puertos y 
plazas de los territorios cuya re- 
nuncia y cesion es objeto de este 
tratado. 



Articulo XV. 

El Gobierno de cada pais conce- 
dera, por el termino de diez afios, 
a los buques mercantes del otro el 
mismo trato en cuanto a todos los 
derechos de puerto, incluyendo los 
de entrada y salida, de faro y 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



11 



dues, light dues, and tonnage 
duties, as it accords to its own 
merchant vessels, not engaged in 
the coastwise trade. 

This article may at any time be 
terminated on six months' notice 
given by either Government to the 
other. 



Article XYI. 

It is understood that any obli- 
gations assumed in this treaty by 
the United States with respect to 
Cuba are limited to the time of its 
occupancy thereof; but it will 
upon the termination of such occu- 
pancy, advise any Government 
established in the island to assume 
the same obligations. 

Article XVII 

The present treaty shall be rati- 
fied by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate thereof, and 
by Her Majesty the Queen Regent 
of Spain; and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Washington 
within six months from the date 
hereof, or eavlier if possible. 

In faith whereof, we, the respec- 
tive Plenipotentiaries, have signed 
this treaty and have hereunto 
affixed our seals. 

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 
tenth day of December, in the year 
of Our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and ninety-eight. 



SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 



William R. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
William P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 



tonelaje, que concede a bus propioa 
buques mercantes no empleados en 
el comercia de cabotaje. 

Este artfculo puede ser dennn- 
ciado en cualquier tiempo dando 
noticia previa deello cualquiera de 
los dos Gobiernos ;il oho con 
meses de anticipaci6n. 

Artictjlo XVI 

Queda entendido que cualquiera 
obligation aceptada en este tratado 
por los EstadosUnidoscon respecto 
a Cuba, esta limitada ;il tiempo que 
dure su ocupacion en esta isla, 
pero al terminar dicha ocupaci6n, 
aconsejaran al Gobieruo (pie se es- 
tablezca en la isla que acepte las 
mismas obligacioues. 

Articulo XVII 

El pasente tratado seraratificado 
por el Presidente de los Estados 
Unidos, de acuerdo y con la apro- 
bacion del Senado, Su Majestad la 
Reina Regente de Espaua ; y por y 
las ratificaciones se canjearan en 
Washington dentro del plazo de 
seis meses desde esta fecha, 6 antes 
si posible fuese. 

En fe de lo cual, los respectivos 
Plenipotentiaries firman y sellan 
este tratado. 

Hecho por duplicado en Paris a 
diez de Diciembre del aho mil ocho- 
cientos noventa y oeho. 

Eugenio Monteko Rfos 

[seal] 

B. DE ABARZTJZi 

[seal] 

j. de garnica 
[seal] 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
[seal] 

Rafael Cerero 
[seal] 



PEOTOCOLS OF THE CONFEEENCES AT PAEIS. 



Protocol No 1 



Protocolo No. 1. 



Conference of October 1, 1898. 

Present: On the part of the 
United States, Messrs : Day, Davis, 
Frye, Gray, Reid. 

On the part of Spain Messrs: 
Montero-Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia Cerero. 

There was present, as Secretary 
of the United States Commission, 
Mr. Moore, and as Interpreter of 
the same Commission, Mr. Fergus- 
son. 

Mr. Ojeda, Secretary of the 
Spanish Commission, not having 
arrived in Paris, his duties were, 
on motion of Mr. Montero Rios, 
the American Commissioners as- 
senting, discharged by Mr. Villa- 
Urrutia. 

The commissions and full power 
of the American Commissioners 
were exhibited to the Spanish Com- 
missioners and copies given to 
them. 

The commission of the American 
Secretary was also exhibited, and 
a copy furnished to the Spanish 
Commissioners. 

The commissions, which were 
also full powers, of the Spanish 
Commissioners were exhibited, and 
copies given to the American Com- 
missioners. 

It was resolved that the proto- 
cols of the Conferences should be 
kept in English and in Spanish by 
12 



Conferencia del 1° de Octubre 1898. 

Presentes por parte de los Esta- 
dos Unidos de America, los Se- 
nores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid. 

Por parte de Espaiia los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero. 

Asistian en calidad de Secretario 
de la Comision de los Estados Uni- 
dos, encargado de la redaction in- 
glesa del protocolo, Mr Moore, y 
como Interprete de dicha Comis- 
ion Mr Fergusson. 

No habiendo aun llegado a Paris 
el Secretario de la Comision Espa- 
nola, Seiior Ojeda, se presto a hacer 
sus veces, por mediacion del Sr. 
Montero Rios y con el asentimi- 
ento de los Comisarios Americanos, 
el Seiior Villa-Urrutia. 

Los nombramientos y plenipo- 
tencias de los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos fueron presentados a los 
Comisarios espanoles a quienes se 
entregaroncopias de los mismos. 

Tambien fue presentado el nom- 
bramiento del Secretario de la 
Comision Americana y hecha en- 
trega de una copia de el. 

Asimismo fueron presentados por 
los Comisarios Espanoles sus pleni- 
potencias de que se dieron copias 
a la Comision Americana. 

Se convino en que las Actas de la 
conferencia se redactasen en espa- 
iiol 6 ingles por los respectivos 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



13 



the respective Secretaries, and 
that in the event of a disagreement 
between them it should be settled 
by the Commissioners, to whom 
the protocols should always be 
submitted for approval. 

It was also resolved that the 
protocols should contain the prop- 
ositions presented by the Com- 
missioners and the action thereon, 
suppressing any record of the de- 
bates, in order that the discussions 
should be as full, frank, and 
friendly as was desired by all the 
Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
moved that the Commissioners on 
either side should have the right 
to file memoranda on points 
deemed by them to be of sufficient 
importance to warrant such action. 
On this motion no decision was 
reached. 

Upon the suggestion of Mr 
Montero Rios that an order of 
business be established by the 
Commission, Mr. Gray moved 
that a committee be appointed, to 
consist of a Commissioner on each 
side, to agree upon, frame and 
submit to the conference rules of 
procedure for the guidance thereof. 
The motion being agreed to, Mr. 
Gray and Mr. Villa-Urrutia were 
designated as the Committee, and 
requested to report to the Confer- 
ence at the next session, which it 
was resolved should be held on 
October 3, at 2 o'clock, p. m. 



The President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that he was 
charged by his Government to lay 
before the American Commission- 
ers a proposition, in limine and of 
a pressing nature, which he pre- 
sented in writing and of which a 
copy and translation are hereto 
annexed. Mr Day requested that 
it be read, which was done, the In- 
terpreter translating it into Eng- 
lish. Upon the conclusion of the 
reading, Mr Day said that the 



Secretarios, y que cuando n<> 
hubiese entre ellos acuerdo, re- 
solviese la conferencia, ;i cuya 
aprobacion habiau de ser siempre 
sometidas. 

Se acordo tambien que endichaa 
actas constasen las proposiciones 

que presentaran los Comisarios y 
los acuerdos que recayeran sobre 
las mismas, Buprimiendo en cambio 
cuanto se retiriese a su discusion 
para permitir que esta fuera tan 
amplia, tan franca y tan amistosa 
comos unos y otros Comisarios 
deseaban. 

Los Comisarios Espafloles pro- 
pusieron que los Comisarios de una 
u otra de las partes tuvieran el 
derecho de presentar Memoranda 
sobre aquellos puntos que por su 
importanciaentendieran que asi lo 
requerian. No se decidio nada 
sobre este punto. 

Indicada por el Sehor Montero 
Rios la conveuiencia de fijar el 
ordeu de los trabajos de la Comi- 
sion, propuso Mr Gray el nom- 
bramiento de dos delegados en 
representation de cada una de 
las partes para que, puestos de 
acuerdo, redacten y sometan a la 
Couferencia las reglas de procedi- 
miento a que esta deba ajustarse. 
Aprobada la proposition, fueron 
designados el Sr Villa- Urrutia 
y Mr Gray para la redaction did 
reglamento que habia de presen- 
tarse a la aprobacion de la con- 
ferencia en su proxima sesi.ni, 
acordandose que esta tuviera lugar 
el 3 de Octubre a las dos de la 
tarde. 

El Presidente de la Comisioii 
Espanola manifesto que tenia en- 
cargo de su Gobierno de presentar 
a los Comisarios Americanos eomo 
cuestion previa y de caracter nv- 
gente una motion que present* > p<»r 
escrito y cuya copia es anexa al 
Protocolo. Mr Day pidio que se 
diera de ella lectura, y asi lo hizo, 
traduciendola al ingles el Inter- 

Terminada la lectura declar6 Mr 
Day que los Comisarios Ameri- 



14 TREATY OF PEACE. 

American Commissioners would canos estudiarian dicha moci6n 

examine the proposition and reply y darian su respuesta en la sesion 

to it at the next session. proxima. 

William R. Day E Montero Rios 

Cushman K. Davis B de Abarzuza 

Wm. P. Frye J de Garnica 

Geo. Gray W R de Villa Urrutia 

Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero 

J. B. Moore. 



Annex to Protocol No. 1. 

Los Comisarios espaiioles para convenir con los Sehores Comisarios 
Americanos un Tratado de paz entre Espana y los Estados-Unidos de 
America tienen el honor de hacer presente a los Senores Comisarios 
Americanos lo siguiente: 

flabiendose convenido en el articulo 6° del Protocolo firmado en Wash- 
ington el 12 de Agosto ultimo por el Seiior Ministro de Estado del Gobi- 
erno federal y el Seiior Embajador de Francia en concepto de Plenipo- 
tenciario de Espana en que "al concluirse y firmarse aquel documento 
deberian ser suspendidas las hostilidades entre los dos paises" ; y siendo 
de este convenio inmediata y necesaria consecuencia que el Statu quo 
existente en aquel momento en Filipinas no habia de poder alterarse en 
perjuicio de ninguna de las dos Altas partes contratantes mientras 
hubiera de durar tal suspension de hostilidades, los Comisarios espaiioles 
eutienden que habiendo de ser el sobredicho Protocolo y su estricta 
observancia la base necesaria del Tratado de paz que estan llamados a 
convenir con los Senores Comisarios Americanos, estan en el caso de 
proponer y demandar a dichos Sefiores Comisarios que juntamente con 
los infrascritos se sirvan declarar que dicho Statu quo debe ser inmedia- 
tamente restablecido por la parte contratante que lo haya alterado 6 
que haya consentido 6 no impedido su alteracion en perjuicio de la otra. 

Y eutendiendo los Comisarios espaiioles que tal Statu quo fiie" alter- 
ado y continiia cada dia con mayor gravedad alterandose en perjuicio de 
Espana por los rebeldes tagalos que formaron durante la campafia y 
continuan formando una fuerza auxiliar de las tropas regulares Ameri- 
canas, demandan a los Senores Comisarios Americanos que juntamente 
con los infrascritos se sirvan declarar que las autoridades y jefes de las 
fuerzas Americanas en las Islas Filipinas deben proceder inmediata- 
mente a restablecer en su estricta y absoluta iutegridad aquel Statu quo 
en los territorios que ocupen y se abstengan de impedir por ningiin 
medio directo ni indirecto que las autoridades y fuerzas espaiiolas lo 
restablezcan en los territorios que no ocupan las de los Estados Unidos. 

Los Comisarios espaiioles se reservan volver a insistir sobre este 
asunto asi como sobre los derechos que a Espana pudieran corresponder 
por efecto de la indicada alteracion que ha sufrido y puede continuar 
sufriendo en Filipinas el Statu quo del 12 de Agosto ultimo hasta su 
restablecimiento. 

Esta conforme 

Emilio de Ojeda 



TREATY OF B EAOE. 1'. 

[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 1. 

The Spanish Commissioners to arrange with the American Oomniia 
sioners a treaty of peace between Spain and the United States of 
America, have the honor to lay before the American Commissioners the 
following: 

It having been agreed by Article VI of the Protocol signed in Wash 
iugton on August 12 last by the Secretary of State of the Federal Go^ 
eminent and the Ambassador of France acting as Plenipotentiary of 
Spain that "upon the conclusion and signing of tin's Protocol, hostili 
ties between the two countries shall be suspended"; and it being a 
direct and necessary consequence of this arrangement thai the statu 
quo at the time existing in the Philippines could not be altered to the 
prejudice of the two High Contracting Parties during the continuance 
of such suspension of hostilities, the Spanish Commissioners, under- 
standing that the Protocol aforesaid and its observance must be the 
necessary basis of the treaty of peace they are called upon to arrange 
with the American Commissioners, feel bound to propose and demand 
of the said Commissioners that jointly with the undersigned they be 
pleased to declare that the said statu quo must be immediately restored 
by the contracting party that may have altered the same, or that may 
have consented to or failed .to prevent its alteration to the prejudice of 
the other. 

And the Spanish Commissioners, understanding that such statu quo 
was altered and continues being altered with daily increasing gravity 
to the prejudice of Spain by the Tagalo rebels, who formed during the 
campaign and still form an auxiliary force to the regular American 
troops, demand of the American Commissioners that jointly with the 
undersigned they be pleased to declare that the authorities and officers 
of the American forces in the Philippine Islands must at once proceed 
fully and absolutely to restore the said statu quo in the territories they 
may occupy, and must abstain from preventing, by any means, direel 
or indirect, the restoration thereof by the Spanish authorities and forces 
in the territory not occupied by those of the United States. 

The Spanish Commissioners reserve the right to insist again upon this 
matter as well as upon the rights that may attach to Spain through I he 
effect of the said alteration which the statu quo of August 12 last has - 
fered or may continue to suffer in the Philippines until its restoration. 

True copy : ^ 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



Commissions and Full Powers Keferred to in the Fore 
going Protocol. 

COMMISSIONS OF AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 

William McKinley, President of the United States of America, 
to all who shall see these Presents, Greeting: 

Know Ye! That, reposing special trust and confidence in tne integ- 
rity and Ability of William E. Day, of Ohio, I do appoint hnr, i a Com- 
missioner Plenipotentiary of the United States, J n der ^e Piotocol 
signed at Washington of the twelfth day of August, 1898, to negoUat^ 
and conclude a Treaty of peace between the United States ana fopam, 



16 TREATY OF PEACE. 

and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of 
this commission, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments there- 
unto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the President of the 
•s^ United States. 

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, 
and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand at the city of Washington the 13th day of 
September in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and 
ninety eight, and the 123rd year of the Independence of the United 
States of America. 

Signed: William McKinley. 
By the President : 

Signed: J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary of State. 

The commissions of the other American Plenipotentiaries were in the 
same form, their names being as follows: 
Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota, 
William P. Frye, of Maine, 
George Gray, of Delaware, and 
Whitelaw Keid, of New York. 



FULL POWER OF AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 

William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to 
all who shall see these Presents, Greeting: 

Know Ye! That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integ- 
rity and Ability of the Honorable William R. Day, of Ohio, lately Secre- 
tary of State of the United States, the Honorable Cushman K. Davis, 
of Minnesota, a Senator of the United States, The Honorable William P. 
Frye, of Maine, a Senator of the United States, the Honorable George 
Gray, of Delaware, a Senator of the United States, and the Honorable 
Whitelaw Beid, of New York, lately Minister Plenipotentiary of the 
United States to France, I do appoint them jointly and severally to be 
Commissioners on the part of the United States under the Protocol 
signed at Washington on the twelfth day of August, 1898, to negotiate 
and conclude a Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, 
hereby empowering them jointly and severally to meet the Commission- 
ers appointed or to be appointed under said Protocol on behalf of Spain, 
and with them to negotiate and sign a Treaty of peace between the 
United States and Spain, subject to the ratification of their Govern- 
ment; and the said commission to hold and exercise during the pleasure 
of the President of the United States for the time being. 

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent 
and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand at the city of Washington this 13th day of 
September in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and 
ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundred and twenty-third. 

Signed: William McKinley. 

By the President : 

Signed: J. B. Moore. 

Acting Secretary of State. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1 7 

COMMISSIONS AND FULL POWERS OF SPANISH PLENIPOTENTIAB rBS. 

Don Alfonso XIII, por ,a gracia de Dios y la Conatitnci6n Rev de 
Espana y en su nombre y durante su menor edail J)o.\a Maim \ okia 
tina, Eeina Regente del Reino, 

Porcuanto ha Uegado el caso de celebrar entre Espafia y los Estadoa 
Unidos de America un tratado de paz; siendo necesario que al efecto 
autorice Yo debidamente a personas que merezcan Mi Real conflanza v 
concurriendo en Vos Don Eugenio Montero Rios, Caballero de la 
Insigne Orden del Toiaon de Oro, condeoorado con el Collar de la Real 




— iqi__ 

pueden apetercerse ; por tanto, He venido en elegiros y nombraroa, como 
por la presente Os elijo y nombro para que, en cumplimiento de lo eati- 
pulado en el Articulo quinto del Protocolo firmado en WaahiDgton el 
dia doce del mes de Agosto ultimo y revestido del caracterde Mi Pleni 
potenciario, conferencieis y convengais lo mas acertado y oportuno, en 
union de los demas Plenipotenciarios que, con esta misma fecha, ooui 
bro y con los que designe al propio objeto el Presidente de los EBtadoa 
Unidos. Y todo lo que asi conferencieis, convengais, trateis, concluyai - 
y firmeis lo doy desde abora por grato y rato, lo observare y cumplire', 
lo bare observar y cumplir como si por Mi misma lo hubiere confer- 
enciado, con venido tratado, concluido y firmado, para la cual Os doy 
Mi pleno poder en la mas amplia forma que de derecbo se requiera. V 
en fe de ello, He bechoa expedir la presente firmada de Mi inano. debida- 
mente sellada y refrendada del infrascrito Mi Ministro de E8tado. 
Dado en el Palacio de Madrid a veintidos de Septiembre de mil ocho- 
cientos noventa y ocbo. 

Firmado: Maria Cristina = 
El Ministro de Estado= 

Firmado=JuAN Manuel Sanchez 

y Gutierrez de Castro = 



[Translation.] 

Don Alfonso XTII, by tbe grace of God and the constitution King 
of Spain, and in bis name and during bis minority, Do.na Maria 
Cristina, Queen Regent of the Kingdom : 

Wbereas the occasion has arisen for the concluding between Spain 
and the United States of America of a Treaty of peace, and it being 
necessary that to such end I should duly confer authority upon per- 
sons who shall merit my royal confidence, and you, Don Eugenio 
Monteio Rios, Knight of the" Worthy Order of the Golden Fleece, 
decorated with the Collar of the Royal and distinguished Order of 
Charles 111, President of the Senate, ex-Minister of the Crown. ex- 
President of the Supreme Tribunal of Jus' ice, Academieian or the 
Moral and Political Sciences, embody the characteristics which _ meet 
the requirements of the case, I have therefore chosen and appointed, 
and by these piesents do choose and appoint you to the end that, pur- 
suant to the stipulations of Article V of the Protocol signed in Wash- 
ington of the twelfth day of the month of August last, and invested 
with the character of my Plenipotentiary, you may in unison with the 
T P 2 



18 TREATY OF PEACE. 

other Plenipotentiaries I have appointed under this date and those 
who may be designated by the President of the United States for the 
same purpose, confer and agree upon what may be best and most advis- 
able. And everything you may so confer and agree upon, negotiate, 
conclude and sign, I now confirm and ratify, I will observe and execute, 
will cause to be observed and executed, the same as if I myself had 
conferred and agreed upon, negotiated, concluded and signed it, for all 
of which I confer upon you ample authority to the fullest extent 
required by law. In witness whereof I have caused these presents to 
issue signed by my hand, duly sealed and attested by the undersigned, 
my Minister of State. 

Given in the Palace of Madrid on the twenty-second day of Septem- 
ber of eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. 

Signed: Maria Cristina. 

Signed: Juan Manuel SInchez y Gutierrez de Castro, 

Minister of State. 

The commissions and full powers of the other Spanish Plenipoten- 
tiaries were in the same form, their names and titles being as follows: 

Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and some- 
time Ambassador and Minister of the Crown; 

Don Jose de Garnica y Diaz, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Justice, Deputy of the Cortes, Member of the General Codification 
Commission, ex- Vice-President of the Congress of Deputies; 

Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Knight Grand Cross of 
the Royal Order of Isabel the Catholic, Knight Commander of the 
Royal and Distinguished Order of Charles III, decorated with the 
White Cross of the second class of Naval Merit, Grand Cross of the 
Dutch Lion of the Netherlands, Oak Crown of Luxemburg, the Maji- 
dieh of Turkey, Knight Commander of the Legion of Honor of France, 
of the Concepcion de Villaviciosa of Portugal, decorated with the 
Cross of the second class of the Bust of Bolivar, Knight of St-Maurice 
and St-Lazarus of Italy, of the Crown of Prussia, of the Crown of 
Christ of Portugal, Licentiate in civil and canonical law, and through 
competitive examination, in administrative law Academician Professor 
of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, my Minister 
Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians; 

Don Rafael Cerero y Saenz, General of Division, Ranking General 
of Engineers of the first Army Corps, Knight of the Grand Cross of 
the Orders of San Hermenegildo and of Military Merit, white insignia, 
decorated with the Cross of the third class of the Order of Military Merit, 
red insignia. 



COMMISSION OF AMERICAN SECRETARY. 

William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to 
all who shall see these presents, greeting: 

Know ye ! That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integrity 
and Ability of John Bassett Moore, of New York, I do appoint him Sec- 
retary and Counsel to the Commissioners of the United States appointed 
under the Protocol signed at Washington on the twelfth day of August, 
1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of peace between the United 
States and Spain, and do authorize and empower him to execute and 
fulfill the duties of this Commission, with all the powers, privileges, and 



TREATY OF TEACE. 



19 



emoluments thereunto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the 

President of the United States. 

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patenl 
and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand at the city of Washington, the L3th day of 
September in the year of Our Lord one thousand eighl hundred and 
ninety-eight, and the 123rd year of the Independence of the United 
States of America. 

Signed: William McKinlb . 
By the President: 

Signed: William E. Day, 

Secretary of State. 



Protocol No 2. 



Protocolo No. 2. 



Conference of October 3, 1898. Conferencia del 3 de Oetubrt <U 



Present: On the part of the 
United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, 
Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergus- 
son. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica 
Villa-Urrutia Cerero 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

Messrs. Gray and Villa-Urrutia, 
as a committee on procedure, re- 
ported that they had, after confer- 
ring together, decided that it was 
not advisable at present to recom- 
mend the adoption of any rules in 
addition to those already deter- 
mined upon or still under discus- 
sion. 

The question of annexing to the 
protocol memoranda on points of 
importance was then discussed. 

The Spanish Commissioners pro- 
posed that the Commissioners on 
either side should have the privi- 
lege of filing memoranda on points 
which they should deem to be of 
sufficient importance to j ustify such 
action, the memoranda so filed to 
be annexed to the protocols. 

The American Commissioners 
proposed that the right should be 
reserved to the Commissioners on 
either side to present memoranda 
on points which they might deem 
of sufficient importance to justify 



Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados Uuidos de America, los 
Sehores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte deEspana. los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza Garnica 
Villa-Urrutia Cerero. 

El protocolo de la sesi<m anterior 
fue leido y aprobado. 

Los Sehores Gray y Villa-Urru- 
tia como poneutes para foriuular 
las reglas de procedimiento, niani- 
festaron que despuesde haber con- 
ferenciado, habian decidido que no 
creian por ahora necesario reco 
mendar que se adoptasen otras 
las adicionales a las acordadas 
anteriormente y que aim se halla- 
ban sujetas & debate. 

Se discuti6 la cuesti6n de unir 
conio anexos al protocolo los Mem- 
orandums relativos a asuntos de 
importancia. 

Los Comisionados Espafioles pro- 
pusieron que los de ainbas Partes 
tuvieran facultad de presentar 
Memorandums sobre los puntos 
que creyeran de bastante impor- 
tancia para justificar tal determi- 
nation y que los Memorandums 
formasen parte del protocolo como 
anexos al mismo. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
propusieron que sedeberiareservar 
a los Comisionados de ambas jia rti s 
este derecho de presentar Memo- 
randums sobre puntos que se juz- 
gasen de bastante importancia p a r > 



20 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



them in so doing, the question of 
annexing such memoranda to the 
protocol to be determined in each 
case by the Joint Commission. 

No agreement having been 
reached, it was decided to refer 
the matter to the Secretaries for 
their consideration and adjust- 
ment, subject to the farther action 
of the Commission. 

The American Commissioners 
then read their reply to the com- 
munication presented by the Span- 
ish Commissioners at the first con- 
ference in relation to the preserva- 
tion of the status quo in the Philip- 
pines. A copy of the reply is 
hereto annexed. 

The Spanish Commissioners re- 
served the right to put in an an- 
swer to the reply at the next ses- 
sion. 

The Spanish Commissioners then 
asked for the opinion of the Ameri- 
can Commissioners on the order of 
business. 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they were ready with 
propositions as to matters deter- 
mined by the Protocol. 

The Spanish Commissioners said 
they were ready to receive them. 

The propositions, as hereto an- 
nexed, were then read, and a copy 
of them handed to the Spanish 
Commissioners. 

After the reading was completed, 
the Spanish Commissioners stated 
that they desired to examine the 
paper, and, if necessary, present 
amendments, and moved that an 
adjournment be taken until Friday. 

After discussion, it was agreed 
to adjourn to two o'clock, p. in., on 
Friday, October 7. 

William R. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
Wm. P. Frye 
Geo. Gray^ 
Whitelaw Reid. 
J. B. Moore. 



hacerlo asi', pero que Ja cuestion 
de unir tales Memorandums al pro- 
tocolo se resolveria en cad a caso 
|)or la Comision en pleno. 

No habiendose llegado a un 
acuerdo, se decidio encomendar 
el asunto al estudio y resolucion 
de los Secretaries, salvo la aproba- 
cion posterior de la Comision. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
leyeron luego su contestacion a la 
comunicacion presentada por los 
Comisionados Espanoles en la pri- 
mera conferencia relativa a la con- 
servation del statu quo en las Islas 
Filipiuas. Una copia de la con- 
testacion se acompana anexa a 
esta acta. 

Los Comisionades espanoles se 
reservan el derecho de contestar en 
la primera sesion. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles pro- 
ponen luego a los Comisionados 
Americanos que expongan su opin- 
ion acerca del orden que se seguira 
en los trabajos de la conferencia. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manifiestan que tienen preparadas 
proposiciones sobre asuntos deter- 
minados por el Protocolo. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles 
dicen que estan preparados para 
recibirlas. 

Las proposiciones que se in- 
cluyen anexas son leidas dandose 
copias de ellas a los Comisionados 
Espanoles. 

Despues de terminada la lectura 
los Comisionados Espanoles mani- 
fiestan que desean examinar el 
documento, y si lo creen necesario 
presentar enmiendas, y proponeu 
que se aplace la sesion hasta el 
Viernes. 

Despues de haberse discutido 
esto, se conviuo en levantar la 
sesion hasta las dos de la tarde del 
Viernes 7 de Octubre. 

E. Montero Rios 

B DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 






TREATY OP PEA.CE. 2 1 

Annex 1 to Protocol No. 2. 

The American Commissioners, having duly considered the communi- 
cation made to them in writing by the .Spanish Commissioners al their 
conference on the 1st instant, make the following answer: 

The American Commissioners concur in the opinion, which that com- 
mumcation is understood to convey, that the Protocol of August 12 
1898, embodies the conditions on which negotiations for peace have 
been undertaken. 

But in the proposal and demand of the Spanish Commissioners that 
the American Commissioners join them in a declaration thai the status 
quo existing at the time of the signature of the Protocol "must be 
immediately restored by the contracting party that may have altered 
the same, or that may have consented to or failed to prevent its altera- 
tion to the prejudice of the other ", as well as in the demand of the 
Spanish Commissioners that the American Commissioners join them in 
the declaration that the American authorities in the Philippines shall 
proceed to restore or else refrain from interfering with the effort of 
Spain to restore the status quo understood by the Spanish Commis- 
sioners to have been disturbed by the Tagalo rebels, who are described 
as an auxiliary to the American forces, the American Commissioners 
can see nothing but a proposal and demand to divert the conference 
from the object for which it has met to the consideration of a subject 
which properly belongs to the two Governments, and not to the < lorn- 
missioners here assembled. The American Commissioners do not 
intend to intimate that the proposal was made with this design, bur 
they think it evident that this would be the necessary result of its 
discussion. 

The topics embraced in the communication of the Spanish Commis- 
sioners were set forth in much detail in notes of the French Embassy 
in Washington to the Department of State of the United States of 
August 29 and September 3 and 11. To these notes the Department of 
State replied on September 5 and 10. An examination of these diplo- 
matic papers will show that they embraced contested matters of fact as 
well as contested matters of law. In respect of some of the questions 
of fact, is is probable that neither Government at present possesses 
full and accurate information; while, in respect of other questions of 
fact, the reports in the possession of the Spanish Government were bo 
entirely at variance with authentic information in the possession of the 
United States as to compel the conclusion that at least some of these 
reports were not of an official character. In respect of questions of 
law, the views of the two Governments were also at variance. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, with a view to prevent the 
diversion and failure of the present negotiations, as well as on the 
ground of a want of power, deem themselves obliged to reply that the 
questions involved in the present proposals and demands of the Span- 
ish Commissioners having heretofore been presented to the Govern- 
ment of the United States and answered in notes of the Department of 
State, any further demands as to military operations in the Philippines 
must be addressed by the Government of Spain to the Government of 
the United States at Washington, and consequently that they cannot 
join in the proposed declarations. 

True copy: J.B.Moore. 



22 treaty of peace. 

Annex 2 to Protocol No. 2. 

In entering upon negotiations for a treaty of peace, the natural pro- 
cedure is to follow the order ot the topics in the Protocol of August 12, 
1898, by which the United States and Spain agreed upon the terms on 
which they would enter upou the present negotiations. 

By Article I of the Protocol, Spain agrees to "relinquish all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba". 

With a view to the immediate execution of this engagement, steps 
have already been taken for the evacuation of the island, as provided 
by the Protocol. 

Only one thing remains to complete the legal formalities of the trans- 
action, and that is to embody in a treaty of peace an appropriate stipula- 
tion by which Spain relinquishes, according to the engagements of the 
Protocol, all claim of sovereignty and title. 

The American Commissioners therefore propose, as a part of the treaty 
of peace, the following article: 

"The Government of Spain hereby relinquishes all claim of sover- 
eignty over and title to Cuba. 

" In this relinquishment of sovereignty and title is included all claim 
to the public domain, lots and squares, vacant lands, public buildings, 
fortifications and the armaments thereof, and barracks and otber 
structures which are not private individual property. The archives, 
state papers, public records, and all papers and documents relative to 
the domain and sovereignty of the island and necessary or convenient 
for the government thereof, including all judicial and legal documents 
and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individ- 
uals the titles to property or other rights, are embraced in the foregoing 
relinquishment; but an authenticated copy of any of them that may be 
required will be given at any time to such officer of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment [as] may apply for it. The Government of Spain will likewise 
furnish an authenticated copy of any paper, record or document in the 
Spanish archives, home or colonial, or in the possession of the Spanish 
tribunals, home or colonial, relative to the domain and sovereignty of 
the island and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, or 
necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to prop- 
erty or other rights." 

By Article II of the Protocol, Spain agrees to "cede to the United 
States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish 
sovereignty in the "West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to 
be selected by the United States" . 

The Government of the United States having selected in the Ladrones 
the Island of Guam, the American Commissioners propose as the next 
article of the treaty of peace the following stipulation : 

"The Government of Spain hereby cedes to the United States the 
Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty 
in the West Indies, and also the Island of Guam, in the Ladrones. 

"In this cession is included all right and claim to the public domain, 
lots and squares, vacant lands, public buildings, fortifications and the 
armaments thereof, and barracks and other structures which are not 
private individual property. The archives, state papers, public records, 
and all papers and documents relative to the domain and sovereignty 
of the islands and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, 
including all judicial and legal documents and other public records 
necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to prop- 
erty or other rights, are embraced in the foregoing cession; but an 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



23 



authenticated copy of any of tlieni that may be required will be given 
at any time to such officer of the Spanish Government as may apply 
for it. The Government of Spain will likewise furnish an authenti- 
cated copy of any paper, record or document in the Spanish archives, 
home or colonial, or in the possession of the Spanish tribunals, home 
or colonial, relative to the domain and sovereignty of the islands and 
necessary or convenient for the government thereof, or necessary or 
convenient for securing to individuals the titles to property or other 
rights." 
True copy: 

J. B. Mookk. 



Protocol No. 3. 



Protocolo No. 3. 



Conference of October 7, 1898. Gonferencia del 7 de Octubre de 1898. 



Present On the part of the 
United States. Messrs. Day 
Davis Frye Gray Reid Moore 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain Messrs. 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza Garnica, 
Villa -Urrutia,, Cerero. 

Mr. Ojeda, having exhibited his 
commission and furnished a copy 
of it, assumed the duties of Secre- 
tary of the Spanish Commission. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

On the question of procedure 
referred to them at the last con- 
ference the Secretaries made the 
following report j 

"Where a proposition is presented 
and rejected, the side presenting 
it shall have the right to file a 
brief memorandum giving its rea- 
sons in support of such proposi- 
tion, and the other side shall have 
the right to file a brief reply, the 
written discussion to be confined 
to such memorandum and reply, 
which are to be annexed to the 
protocol." 

This report was adopted by unan- 
imous consent. 

The Spanish Commissionersthen 
presented, in pursuance of the res- 
ervation made by them at the last 
conference, a reply to the Ameri- 
can answer on the subject of the 
status quo in the Philippines, at 



Presentes. Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de America los 
Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Reid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana los Seiiores 
Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero. 

El Sr. Ojeda despues de haber 
presentado su nombramiento y 
dado copia de el, actuo en calidad 
de Secretario de la Comision Espa- 
nola. 

Se leyo y aprobo el acta de la 
sesion anterior. 

Respecto del procedimiento que 
habia de adoptarse y que en la 
ultima sesion se dejo a cargo de 
los Secretarios, estos informaron 
haber llegado al acuerdo siguiente : 

"Siempre que una proposicion 
sea preseutada y rechazada, la 
parte que la haya presentado ten- 
dril el derecho de anadir un breve 
Memorandum en que se expresen 
las razonesen queaquella sefunda, 
y la otra parte tendra el derecho 
de contestar en forma breve, limi- 
tandose dicha discusion por escrito 
al citado Memorandum y contes- 
tation queiran anexos al acta." 

El acuerdo anteriorfue unauime- 
mente aprobado. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- 
sentan en virtud de lareserva que 
hicieron en la ultima conferencia 
una contestation a la comunna 
cion de los Comisarios America new 
relativa al Statu quo en Filipmas, 



24 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



the same time stating that the 
reply was presented for the pur- 
pose of reserving the right to bring 
up the subject hereafter. 

The reply was received and filed ; 
copy and translation are hereto 
annexed. 

The Spanish Commissioners then 
presented, as an amendment to 
the American proposals, a set of 
articles, in Spanish, copy and 
translation of which are hereto 
annexed, in relation to Cuba and 
Porto Rico. 

The American Commissioners, in 
order to afford opportunity for the 
translation and consideration of 
the articles, moved that the con- 
ference be adjourned till Tuesday, 
October 11, at two o'clock, p. m. 

The conference was adjourned 
accordingly. 



manifestando al mismo tiempo que 
el objeto de dicha contestacion era 
el de reservar el derecho de pro- 
mover este asunto ulteriormeute. 

Dicho docnmento fue~ debida- 
mente recibido y su copia y tra- 
duction figuran como anexos al 
acta preseute. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- 
sentan a continuation, como enmi- 
enda a las proposicioues de los 
Americanos, el articulado que va 
adjunto, relativo a Cuba y Puerto 
Rico. 

Los Comisarios Americanos, a 
fin de disponer del tiempo necesa- 
rio para la traduction y considera- 
tion de dicho articulado, propusie- 
ron que la conferencia fuese apala- 
zada hasta el Martes 11 deOctubre. 

Se aprobo este acuerdo y se 
aplazo la proxima sesion hasta el 
dia 11 de Octubre a las 2 P. M. 



William R. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
Wm. P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 
John B. Moore. 



E Montero Rfos 
B de Abarzuza 

J DE GARNICA 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex 1 to Protocol No. 3. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados unidos. 



PROPOSICION. 

No. 2 (a). 

Los Comisarios espanoles se han enterado, con la detention que 
requiere la importancia del asunto, de la contestacion escrita en que los 
Comisarios americanos se niegan a aceptar la proposicibn que los espa- 
noles habiamos presentado en la sesion celebrada por los unos y los 
otros en 1° del corriente, para que se declarase por la conferencia, en 
pleno, que debia restablecerse el statu quo en Filipinas existente en 12 
de Agosto ultimo, en que se concluyo y firmo en Washington el proto- 
colo, cuyo articulo 6° contiene el acuerdo de suspender las hostilidades 
entre los dos paises. 

Vista esta contestacion, los Comisarios espanoles entienden que es de 
su deber hacer presente a los Sefiores Comisarios americanos, que si el 
statu quo existente en Filipinas en 12 de Agosto ultimo, lejos de resta- 
blecerse continua perturbandose cada vez mas, en perjuicio de Espana, 
el Gobierno de S M. C. y en su nombre sus Plenipotentiaries en 
esta conferencia, se reservan proveer, a lo que entiendan que exige el 



TREATY OF PEACE. 25 

derecho de Espaiia, una vez que no conciben como ha <!.- poder <•<■!<• 
braise el tratado de paz que estan encargados de convenir con los 
Seiiores Comisarios auiericanos sobre la indeclinable base del Protocolo 
de Washington de 12 de Agosto ultimo, si esta base se esta alterando 
constanteinente en una de sus partes y cada dia en mayor perjuicio de 
Espaiia. 

Paris, 7 de Octubre de 1898. 

Esta conforme 

Emilio d Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex 1 to Protocol Xo. 3. 

PROPOSITION. 

Xo. 2 (a). 

With the careful consideration the subject demands, the Spanish 
Commissioners have informed themselves of the written reply in which 
the American Commissioners decline to accept the proposition which 
the Spaniards presented at the session held by both Commissions on the 
1st instant, to the effect that the joint body declare that the statu 
quo existing in the Philippines on the 12th of August last, date of the 
concluding and signing in Washington of the Protocol, Article VI of 
which contains the agreement to suspend hostilities between the two 
countries, should be restored. 

In view of this reply, the Spanish Commissioners understand that 
it is their duty to make known to the American Commissioners that if 
the statu quo existing in the Philippines on August 12 lasr, far from 
being restored, continues to be disturbed to the prejudice of Spain, t he 
Government of Her Catholic Majesty, and in her name its plenipoten- 
tiaries in this conference, reserve the right to act as they may deem the 
rights of Spain shall require, since they cannot conceive how the treaty 
of peace they are charged with arranging with the American Com- 
missioners upon the immutable basis of the Protocol of Washington of 
August 12 last, can be concluded if this basis is being constantly 
altered in one of its parts, and continually to the greater prejudice of 
Spain. 

True copy: Emilio de Ojeda. 



Annex 2 to Protocol Xo. 3. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados 

TJNIDOS. 
ARTICTJLO 1°. 

Su Majestad la Reina Catolica en n ombre y representacion de 
Espaiia y constitucionalmente autorizada por las Cortes del Reino, 
renuncia a su soberania sobre la Isla de Cuba, transfiriendola a los 
Estados Unidos de America que la aceptan para que puedan a su vez 
transferirla oportunamente al pueblo cubano con las condiciones estab- 
lecidas en este tratado, ofreciendo los Estados Unidos que desde su 
ratification seran siempre y fielmente cuinplidas. 



26 treaty of peace. 

Articulo 2°. 

La remmcia y transfereucia que hace Su Majestad Catolica y que 
aceptan los Estados Unidos de America, compreude: 

1°. Todas las prerrogativas, atribuciones y derecbos que, como parte 
integrante de dicha Soberania, corresponden a Su Majestad Catolica 
sobre la Isla de Cuba y sus habitantes : 

2°. Todas las cargas y obligaciones de todas clases, pendientes al 
ratificarse este Tratado de paz, que la Corona de EspaBa y sus Autori- 
dades en la Isla de Cuba, bubieseu contraido legalmente eu el ejercicio 
de la soberania que renuncian y transfierer, y que, en tal concepto, 
fornian parte integrante de la misrna 

Articulo 3°. 

En cumplimieuto de lo conveuido en los dos articulos anteriores Su 
Majestad Catolica, en la representacion con que celebra este Tratado, 
renuucia y trausfiere a los Estados Unidos, que los aceptan, en el con- 
cepto sobredicho, todos los edificios, muelles, cuarteles, fortalezas, estab- 
leciuiieutos, vias piiblicas y demas bienes inmuebles que, con arreglo a 
derecho, son de dominio publico, y que como de tal dominio publico, 
corresponden a la Corona de Espana en la Isla de Cuba. 

Quedan por lo tan to exceptuados de esta renuncia ytransferenciatodos 
los bienes inmuebles radicantes en la Isla de Cuba que correspondan 
en el orden civil al Estado, en concepto de su propriedad patrimonial, 
asi como todos los derecbos y bienes de cualquiera clase que sean, que, 
basta la ratification del presente Tratado, bayan venido pacificamente 
poseyendo, en concepto de duenos, las Provincias, Municipios, Estab- 
lecimientos publicos 6 privados, Corporaciones eclesiasticas 6 civiles y 
cualesquiera otras colectividades que teugan legalmente personalidad 
juridica para adquirir y poseer bienes de la Isla de Cuba, y los particu- 
lares, cualquiera que sea su nacionalidad. 

Su Majestad Catolica renuncia tambien, y trausfiere a los Estados 
Unidos, a quien se le entregaran por el Gobierno Espaiiol, todos los 
documentos y titulos que se refieran exclusivamente 4 la soberania 
transferida y aceptada, que existan en los Arcbivos de la Peninsula. 
Habiendo de facilitarle copias cuando los Estados Unidos las reclamasen, 
de la parte correspondiente a dicba Soberania que contengan los demas 
documentos y titulos tambien relativos 4 otros asuntos agenos a la Isla 
de Cuba, que existan en los mencionados Arcbivos. Una regla analoga 
habra reciprocamente de observarse, a favor de Espana, respecto a los 
documentos y titulos agenos en todo 6 en parte a la Isla de Cuba que se 
hallen actualmente en sus Arcbivos y que interesen al Gobierno Espauol. 

Todos los Arcbivos y Eegistros oficiales, asi administrativos como 
judiciales, que estan a disposition del Gobierno de Espana y de sus 
autoridades en la Isla de Cuba, y que se refieran a la misma isla 6 a sus 
babitantes y a sus derecbos y bienes, que daran a disposicion de los 
Estados Unidos con los mismos derecbos y obligaciones con que hoy lo 
estan a disposicion del Gobierno Espanol y de dicbas sus Autoridades. 
Los particulares, asi espanoles como cubanos, tendran derecho 4 sacar, 
con arreglo a las leyes, las copias autorizadas de los contratos, testa- 
mentos y demas documentos que forman parte de los protocolos notari- 
ales 6 que se custodien en los Archivos administrativos y judiciales, 
bien estos se hallen en Espana 6 en la Isla de Cuba. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 27 

ARTI'CULO 4°. 

Para fijar las cargas y obligaciones de todasclases, que la Corona de 
Espafia cede y transfiere como parte de su soberania Robre la Isla de 
Cuba a los Estados Unidos, y que estos aceptan, se atendera" a" las doa 
reglas siguientes: 

Priniera. Las cargas y obligaciones que hayan de transferase, ban 
de haber sido establecidas en forma constitucional y en uso de sua 
legitimas atribuciones, por la Corona de Espafia, como soberana de la 
Isla de Cuba, 6 por sus Autoridades legitimas usando de las suyaj 
respectivas, antes de la ratification de este Tratado. 

Segunda. Su creation 6 constitution ha de haber sido par;) el 
servicio de la Isla de Cuba 6 con cargo a su Tesoro especial 

Arti'culo 5°. 

En virtud de lo dispuesto en el Arti'culo anterior quedan compren- 
didos en la sobredicha transferencia, las deudas cualquiera que sea su 
clase, cargas de justicia, sueldos 6 asignaciones de funcionarios asi 
civiles como eclesiasticos, que hayan de continuar prestando sus 
servicios en la Isla de Cuba, y pensiones de jubilation y retiro y de 
viudedad u horfandad con tal que en todas ellas concurran las dos cir- 
cunstancias prescritas en el Arti'culo anterior. 

Artictjlo 6°. 

Su Majestad Catolica, en nombre y representacion de Espafia, y con- 
stitucion almente autorizada por las Cortes del Peino, cede ;i los Estados 
Unidos de America y estos aceptan para simismos, la Soberania sobre 
la Isla de Puerto Rico y las demas que corresponden en la actualidad a 
la Corona de Espaiia en las Indias Occidentales. 

Artictjlo 7°. 

Esta cesion de la soberania sobre el territorio y habitantes de Puerto 
Pico y las demas islas menciouadas, se entiende que consists en la 
cesion de los derechos y obligaciones, bienes y documentos relativos a 
la Soberania de dichas islas, iguales A los que respecto a la renuncia y 
transferencia de la soberania de la Isla de Cuba, se definen en los 
Articulos 2° hasta el 5° inclusive de este Tratado. 

Esta coni'orme 

Emilio de Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex 2 to Protocol No. 3. 

Article I. 

Her Majesty the Catholic Queen, in the name and representation of 
Spain, and thereunto constitutionally authorized by the Cortes ot riie 
Kingdom, relinquishes her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba, trans- 
ferring it to the United States of America, which accept it. in order 
that they may in their turn transfer it at the proper time to the Cuban 



28 TREATY OF PEACE. 

people, upon tbe conditions established in this treaty, the United States 
promising hereby that as soon as they are ratified they will always be 
faithfully complied with. 

Article II. 

Tbe relinquishment and transfer made by Her Catholic Majesty, and 
accepted by the United States of America, embrace: 

1st. All the prerogatives, powers and rights, which, as an integral 
part of the sovereignty, belong to Her Catholic Majesty both over the 
Island of Cuba and over its inhabitants; 

2nd. All charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the 
time of the ratification of this treaty of peace, which the Crown of Spain 
and her authorities in the Island of Cuba may have contracted lawfully 
in the exercise of the sovereignty hereby relinquished and transferred, 
and which as such constitute an integral part thereof. 

Article III. 

In compliance with the provisions of the two preceding articles, Her 
Catholic Majesty, acting in tbe same representative character with 
which she has entered into this treaty, relinquishes and transfers to 
the United States, which accept them, upon the conditions above stated, 
all the buildings, wharves, barracks, fortresses, establishments, public 
ways of communication, and all other immovable property which 
according to law attaches to the public domain, and which so attaching 
belongs to the Crown of Spain in the Island of Cuba. 

All immovable property situated in the Island of Cuba which under 
the civil law belongs to the state as patrimonial property, and all rights 
and property of whatsoever kind, which up to the ratification of the 
present treaty have been peacefully enjoyed and held in ownership by 
provinces, municipalities, public and private establishments, ecclesi- 
astical and civil corporations, or any other collective bodies lawfully 
incorporated and having legal authority to acquire and hold property 
in the Island of Cuba, and by private individuals, whatsoever their 
nationality, are therefore excluded from the above relinquishment and 
tran ster. 

Her Catholic Majesty further relinquishes and transfers to the United 
States all right to the documents and papers exclusively relating to 
the sovereignty hereby relinquished and accepted, to be found in the 
archives of the Peninsula, said documents and papers to be delivered 
to the United States by the Spanish Government. Copies of such por- 
tions of other documents and papers relating to other subjects foreign 
to the Island of Cuba, but relating to the sovereignty aforesaid which 
may exist in the said archives, shall be given to the United States 
whenever desired. A similar rule shall be reciprocally observed in 
favor of Spain regarding documents and papers foreign, in whole or in 
part, to the Island of Cuba, which may be in the archives of the latter 
and of interest to the Spanish Government. 

All archives and official records, executive and judicial, which are at 
the disposal of the Government of Spain and its authorities . in the 
Island of Cuba, and which refer to the said island or its inhabitants, 
and to their rights and property, shall be at the disposal of the United 
States with the same rights and obligations as now attach to them 
while at the disposal of the Spanish Government and its said authori- 
ties. Private persons, Spaniards and Cubans alike, shall be entitled 
to make according to law authenticated copies of contracts, wills, and 



TREATY OF PEACE. 2!) 

other instruments forming part of the notarial registers and files or in 
the custody of the executive and the judicial archives, be the same 
either in Spain or in the Island of Cuba. 

Article IV. 

In order to establish the charges and obligations of all kinds which 
the Crown of Spain cedes and transfers as a part of its sovereignty 
over the Island of Cuba to the United States, and which the latter 
accept, the two rules following will be observed : 

First: The charges and obligations to be transferred must have been 
levied and imposed in constitutional form and in the exercise of its 
legitimate powers by the Crown of Spain, as the sovereign of tin- 
Island of Cuba, or by its lawful authorities in the exercise of their 
respective powers prior to the ratification of this treaty. 

Second: The creation or establishment of such charges <>r obliga- 
tions must have been for the service of the Island of Cuba, or charge- 
able to its own individual treasury. 

Article V. 

Pursuant to the provisions of the foregoing article, there shall be 
embraced in the said transfer all debts, of whatsoever kind, lawful 
charges, the salaries or allowances of all employes, civil and ecclesias- 
tical, who shall continue to render services in the Island of Cuba, and 
all pensions in the civil and military services and of widows and 
orphans; provided that they conform to the requirements prescribed 
in the foregoing article. 

Article VI. 

Her Catholic Majesty, in the name and representation of Spain, and 
thereunto constitutionally empowered by the Cortes of the Kingdom, 
cedes to the United States of America, and the latter accept for them- 
selves, the sovereignty over the Island of Porto Rico and the other 
islands now belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West Indies. 

Article VII. 

This cession of the sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of 
Porto Rico and the other islands mentioned, is understood to embrace 
the cession of the rights and obligations, property and documents 
relating to the sovereignty of the said islands, similar in all tilings to 
those which, with respect to the relinquishment and transfer ot the 
sovereignty of the Island of Cuba, are defined in Articles II to V , 
inclusive, of the treaty. 

True copy: Emilio de Ojeda. 



COMMISSION OF THE SPANISH SECRETARY. 

Excmo. Senor. 

S. M. el Key (q. D. g.) yen su nombre la Reina Regente del Reino, se 
ha servido expedir el Real Decreto siguiente: 

"Tomandoenconsideracion las especiales circumstancias que con- 
curren en Don Emilio de Ojeda, Mi Enviado Extraordinary y Ministro 



30 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Plenipotentiary cerca de S. M. Sheriffiana; En nombrede Mi Augusto 
Hijo el Key Don Alfonso Trece y como Reina Regente del Reino; Vengo 
en disponer que, conservando su cargo, pase a desempeuar las funciones 
de Secretario General de la Comision espafiola encargada de negociar 
en Paris el tratado de paz entre Espana y los Estos TJnidos de America. 

"Dado en Palacio a veiutiseis de Septiembre de mil ochocientos 
noventa y ocho. 

Maria Cristina. 

"El Presidente del Consejo de Ministros — 
"Praxedes Mateo Sagasta." 

Lo que traslado a V. E. para su conocimiento ***. 

Dios gue. a V. E. m. a. 

Madrid, 26 Septiembre de 1898. 

Sagasta. 

Seilor Don Emilio de Ojeda. 



[Translation.] 

Most Excellent Sir: 

H. M. the King (whom God preserve) and in his name the Queen 
Regent of the Kingdom has been pleased to issue the Royal Decree 
following: 

"Bearing in mind the special qualifications of Don Emilio de Ojeda, 
My Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near His Sher- 
ififlan Majesty, in the name of my August Son, the King Don Alfonso 
XIII, and as Queen Regent of the Kingdom, 1 will that, still retaining 
his office, he discharge the functions of Secretary General of the 
Spanish Commission entrusted with negotiating in Paris the Treaty of 
Peace between Spain and the United States of America. 

"Done at the Palace on the twenty-sixth of September, eighteen hun- 
dred and ninety-eight. 

"Maria Cristina. 
"Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, 

" President of the Council of Ministers." 

Which I transmit to Y. E. for your information ***. 

God preserve Y. E. many years. 



Madrid, September 26, 1898. 
Seiior Don Emilio de Ojeda. 



Sagasta. 



Protocol No. 4. Protocolo No. 4. 

Conference of October 11, 1898. Conferencia del 11 de Octubre de 

1898 

Present On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Es- 

United States. Messrs Day Davis tados Unidos de America los 

Frye Gray Reid Moore Fergus- Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 

son. Reid, Moore ,Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain. Messrs. Por parte de Espana. los Senores 

Montero Rios Abarzuza, Garnica, Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 

Villa-Urrutia Cerero Ojeda. Villa- Urn 1 tia, Cerero, Ojeda. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



31 



The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
presented a paper, copy of which 
is hereto annexed, in which they 
rejected the articles submitted by 
the Spanish Commissioners at the 
last session as an amendment to 
the proposals of the American 
Commissioners on the subject of 
the relinquishment by Spain of 
sovereignty over Cuba and the 
cession of Porto Eico and other 
islands in the West Indies, and the 
island of Guam in the Ladrones. 

The paper having been read in 
English and in Spauish, and the 
Spanish articles having been re- 
jected, the President of the Span- 
ish Commission on behalf of the 
Spanish Commissioners, presented 
under the rules a memorandum, 
setting forth their reasons in sup- 
port of their propositions. 

The American Commissioners 
inquired whether the Spanish Com- 
missioners considered their prop- 
ositions as finally rejected. 

The Spanish Commissioners re- 
plied that the rejection was set 
forth in the very terms of the 
American reply, and that the oc- 
casion had therefore arisen for the 
presentation of their memorandum ; 
but that, before filing the latter, 
they were ready and even preferred 
to discuss the subject of it orally, 
since this might result in an agree- 
ment and render the filing of the 
memorandum unnecessary. 

The American Commissioners 
said that the memorandum could 
be read, but that they reserved the 
right under the rules to make a 
written reply, and that any oral 
discussion into which they might 
enter was not to be considered as 
a waiver of that right. 

The memorandum, copy and 
translation of which are hereto an- 
nexed, was then read. 

The reading having been com- 
pleted, the American Commission- 
ers stated that their understand- 
ing of the situation was this — that, 



Fin'' leida y aprobada el aria de 
la scsion anterior. 

Los ComisariosAmericano8 pre- 
sentan una contestaci6n rechazan- 
do el articulado deTratado que lea 
entregaron los Comisarios Espafio- 
les en la scsion anterior como en- 
miendaal proyectodel Tratado que 
presentaron los Americanos en lo 
relativo a la renuncia de Espa 
la Soberania de Espanasobre( luba 
ya lacesidnde Puerto Ricoyotras 
islas en las Antillas asi como de la 
isla de Guam en el Archipiclago de 
las Ladrones. 

Se lee dicha contestation en 
ingles y en espanol. 

Rechazado el articulado espanol 
el Presidente de la Comisi6n es- 
panolaen nombre de dicha Comis- 
ion y en virtud del reglamento, 
presenta un Memorandum en que 
se consignan las razones en que 
fundaron su proposition 

La Comision americanapregunta 
si consideran los espanoles defini- 
tivamente rechazada su proposi- 
tion. 

La Comision espanola dice que el 
rechazo esta consignado en los pro- 
pios terminos de la contestation 
americana, y que por tanto era lle- 
gado el momento de presentar el 
Memorandum; peroque estono ol>- 
st ante esta ■dispuesta a discutiroral- 
mente el asunto antes de que se 
tome acta del Memorandum yhasta 
preferiria este curso, puesto que de 
llegarse a un acuerdo en la discu- 
sion podria prescindirse de la pre- 
sentation del Memorandum. 

Se admite la lectura del docu- 
mento, si bien los Comisarios anier- 
icanos se reservan el derecho, sea 
6 no lefdo 6 discutido oralmente, de 
contestar por escrito en la misma 
forma. 



Leese en ingles el Memorandum 
que va adjunto al acta presente. 

Los Comisarios Americanos mani- 

fiestan que en su sentir, habiendo 
sido rechazado el articulado pre- 
sentado por los Comisarios Espa- 



32 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



the articles presented by the Span- 
ish Commissioners having been re- 
jected, and the Spanish Commis- 
sioners having thereupon filed a 
memorandum under the rules, the 
American Commissioners were en- 
titled to make a written reply, and 
that the question now recurred on 
the articles proposed by the Amer- 
ican Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners de- 
clared that in their opinion the 
propositions on both sides had been 
rejected, and that both proposi- 
tions were before the Commission 
on an equal footing for oral dis- 
cussion. 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they were ready to 
hear the Spanish Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners sug- 
gested that, as the American Com- 
missioners wished to reply to the 
Spanish memorandum, it would be 
advisable to postpone the oral dis- 
cussion till the reply was before 
the Commission. 

To this the American Commis- 
sioners assented. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission then stated that from 
the rapid reading of the paper pre- 
sented by the American Commis- 
sioners at the opening of the ses- 
sion, tliey had derived the impres- 
sion that those Commissioners 
were laboring under a misappre- 
hension as to the stipulation in 
the Spanish articles touching 
Spain's relinquishment of sover- 
eignty over Cuba. In proposing 
that the sovereignty should be re- 
linquished to the United States in 
order that the latter might transfer 
it to the Cuban people, Spain had 
merely conformed to the letter and 
spirit of the joint resolution of the 
American Congress; but it was 
not her intention to impose upon 
the United States an obligation to 
make such transfer, as was shown 
by the fact that it was said in the 
articles that the United States 
"may" transfer the sovereignty, 
not that they were bound to do it. 



holes, y habiendo estos presentado 
el Memorandum al respecto, segun 
previene el reglamento, los Comi- 
sarios Americanos estan facultados 
para contestar por escrito y que 
por tan to la discusion debia versar 
ahora sobre los articulos propue- 
stos por los Americanos. 



Los Comisarios Espanoles decla- 
rarou que en su opinion habiendo 
sido rechazados ambos estaban en 
igual caso y debian discutirse a la 
vez ambos proyectos. 



Los Comisarios Americanos en 
vista de esto se manifestaron dis- 
puestos a oir los argumentos que 
tenian que aducir los Espanoles; 
pero estos teniendo en cuenta que 
los Americanos debian presentar 
una contestacon escrita propusie- 
rou aplazar la discusion oral hasta 
que les fuera conocido el coutenido 
de la respuesta Americana. 

Se convino en ello. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espahola manifesto que por la 
rapida lectura del documento 
Americano comentando el articu- 
lado presentado por la Comision Es- 
panola, habia el comprendido que 
los Comisarios Americanos habian 
sido inducidos en error al creer 
que en dicho articulado se exigia 
que los Estados Unidos al aceptar 
la renuncia en su favor de la Sobe- 
rania deEspaha sobre Cuba, hubie- 
ran de transmitirla al pueblo 
cubano. El Presidente an adio que 
al mencionar en dicho articulado 
que dicha renuncia la hacia Espafia 
" a fin de que los Estados Unidos 
puedan transferirla al pueblo cu- 
bano," Espaha se adaptaba al 
espiritu y a la letra de la joint- 
resolution del Congreso Americano, 
pero en el proyecto espaiiol no se 
imponia esta obligacion a los Esta- 
dos Unidos puesto que se decia que 
podian hacer la transferencia de la 
Soberania mas no que hubieran de 
tener la obligacion <ie hacerla. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

The American Commissioners re- Los Comisarios amoricano 

plied that the language employed testaron que en efecto 

in the article would, under the su impresibn que la re icia por 

American law, impress the relin- parte de Espana estaba liecha eo 

quishment with a trust. terminosquesegliulasleyesAmeri- 

canas implicaban una obligation 
fiduciaria. 

The Spanish Commissioners said La Comision Espanola con 

that if the phraseology would, que si tal era el sentido que 

under American law convey that las ley es American as podiau 

meaning, they would change it in buirle, se modificaria el texto eri el 

the sense in which they had just sentido que acababa de sugerir. 
suggested. 

The conference was adjourned to Se aplazo la conferencia hasta 

Friday, October 14, at two o'clock el Viernes 14 de Octubre ;i las dos 

p. m. P. M. 

William E. Day E. Montero Ri'os 

CusmiAN K. Davis B. de Abarzuza 

Wm. P Frye J. DE Garnica 

Geo. Gray W R de VillaUrrutia 

Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero 

John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex 1 to Protocol ~No. 4. 

The American Commissioners, when they presented in the conference 
of the 3rd instant a draft of articles for the relinquishment by Spain 
of sovereignty over and title to Cuba and for the cession of Porto 
Rico and other islands in the West Indies, and the Island of Guam in 
the Ladrones, stated that the disposition of these subjects was deter- 
mined by the Protocol of August 12, 1808. 

The two articles of the Protocol relating to these subjects are brief, 
and, as it seems to the American Commissioners, easy of comprehen- 
sion and readily to be carried into effect. 

They are: 

"Article I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and 
title to Cuba. 

"Article II. Spain will cede to the United States the island of 
Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the 
United States." 

The American Commissioners were careful, in the articles proposed 
by them, to express the relinquishment or cession, as the case might 
be, in the very words of the Protocol, merely adding thereto the usual 
subsidiary and incidental clauses touching public property and archives, 
with a view to making the treaty effectual, and preserving evidence of 
public and private property rights. 

The American Commissioners regret to find in the articles present! 
by the Spanish Commissioners on the 7th instant a departure from the 
terms of the Protocol in the following particulars: 

To the unconditional engagement of the Protocol to relinquish all 
claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, they have proposed 
conditions: , 

1. That Spain shall transfer her sovereignty over the island to tne 



34 TREATY OF PEACE. 

United States, and that the United States " shall in their turn tratsfer 
it at the proper time to the Cuban people." 

2. That this transfer shall be made upon the conditions to be estab- 
lished in the treaty between the United States and Spain. 

3. That the United States shall engage itself to Spain for the per- 
formance of these conditions. 

In place of the unconditional relinquishment agreed to in the Pro- 
tocol, it is proposed that the relinquishment now offered shall embrace 
all charges of every kind which Spain and her authorities in Cuba have 
lawfully contracted heretofore, and may hereafter contract, prior to the 
ratification of the treaty of peace; and these " charges and obliga- 
tions," past, present, and future, which it is proposed to "transfer" to 
the United States, are declared to include debts, civil and ecclesiastical 
salaries, and civil and military pensions, ostensibly in arrears, as well 
as yet to accrue. 

To the American Commissioners this appears to be not a proposition 
to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba", but in 
substance a proposition to " transfer " to the United States and in turn 
to Cuba a mass of Spanish charges and obligations.* 

It is difficult to perceive by what logic an indebtedness contracted 
for any purpose can be deemed part of the sovereignty of Spain over 
the Island of Cuba. In the article proposed it is attempted to yoke 
with the transfer of sovereignty an obligation to assume an indebted- 
ness arising out of the relations of Spain to Cuba. The unconditional 
relinquishment of sovereignty by Spain stipulated for in the Protocol 
is to be changed into an engagement by the United States to accept the 
sovereignty burdened with a large mass of outstanding indebtedness. 

It is proper to say that if during the negotiations resulting in the con- 
clusion of the Protocol Spain had proposed to add to it stipulations in 
regard to Cuba such as those now put forward, the proposal, unless 
abandoned, would have terminated the negotiations. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, speaking for their Govern- 
ment, must decline to accept the burden which it is now proposed shall 
be gratuitously assumed. 

The American Commissioners further observe that in article 3 of the 
draft there is a negative clause, by which property not belonging to 
the Crown of Spain is excepted from the proposed relinquishment and 
transfer of sovereignty. In one respect this exception appears to be 
unnecessary, and in another illogical. So far as it affects the question 
of legal title it is unnecessary, since such title, if not held by Spain, 
would not pass to the United States by Spain's transfer of sovereignty. 
On the other hand, so far as it affects the question of sovereignty, it is 
illogical, since the sovereignty, which includes the right of eminent 
domain, would, if excepted from the relinquishment, remain with Spain. 
We would thus have the singular spectacle of Spain relinquishing her 
sovereignty over property belonging to the Crown, but retaining it over 
all other property. 

Thus again we should witness the utter defeat of the explicit engage- 
ment in the Protocol that Spain would " relinquish all claim of sover- 
eignty over and title to Cuba." 

In the articles presented by the American Commissioners there were 
stipulations in relation to archives and official records, which stipula- 
tions were intended to secure, and, as the American Commissioners 
believe, would effectually secure, the object of preserving and of furnish- 

* See Protocol No. 5. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

ingto those in interest evidence of title to property in the islam 
question. 

In the articles submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, il is provided 
that documents and papers relating to sovereignty to be found in the 

archives of the Peninsula shall be furnished to the United States- also 
"copies of such portions of other documents and papers relating to 
other subjects foreign to the Island of Cuba and the sovereignty afore- 
said as may exist in the said archives." 

It is difficult for the Americans to understand this latter clause; per- 
haps its exact meaning is not conveyed in the English translation of 
the Spanish text. 

It is to be further observed that in the provisions of the Spanish 
articles relating to the furnishing of record evidence of titles to lands 
in Cuba and Porto Rico, it is stipulated that the archives and records 
shall be at the disposal of the United States "with the same rights 
and obligations as now attach to them while at the disposal of the 
Spanish Government and its said (insular) authorities." This restric- 
tion, the object of which is not perceived, would seem to limit the con- 
trol over archives and official records, after Spain's relinquishment of 
sovereignty, to the same power, both in kind and in extent, as was for- 
merly possessed by the Spanish Government. This appears to lie 
inconsistent with the right of control which every sovereign power 
should possess over its archives and official records. 

All the conditions and qualifications above referred to are by general 
reference incorporated in the articles relating to the cession of Porto 
Pico and other islands in the West Indies, and render these articles 
equally inadmissible. 

True Copy: 

J. B. Moore. 



Annex 2 to Protocol No. 4. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados 

TJN1DOS. 

Memorandum, en que se exponen sucintamente las razones 6 fundament"* 
del proyecto de articulos para el Tratado de Paz, relatives a la renuncia, 
por parte de Espana, de su Soberania en Cuba y Puerto liieo, que pre- 
sentan a la Gonferencia los Plenipotenciarios Espauoles. 

Los Plenipotenciarios Espaiioles aceptan elpensamiento generador 
delproyecto de articulo preseutado por los Senores Comisarios A men 
canos sobre la renuncia de Espana a su soberania en Cuba y la cesion 
de su soberania en Puerto Rico; pero les es imposible prestar el mismo 
asentimiento a lo dermis que en dicho proyecto se coutiene, ya porque 
entienden que parte de ello esta fuera del alcance que cabe dar a la 
renuncia y cesion sobredichas, ya porque tambien estas renuncia y 
cesion, tal como apareceu en aquel proyecto, no contienen bajo otros 
aspectos cuanto es indispensable que compreudan. 



LA RENUNCIA QUE HACE S. M. C. DE SU SOBERANfA EN LA ISLA DE CUBA ES INI "'" 
PENSABLE QUE SEA ACEPTADA POR EL PRESIDENTE DE LOS ESTADOS UNLDOS Dt 
AMERICA. 

El Gobierno de la Union americana nunca exigio al Gobierno espanol 
que abandonase la Soberania en Cuba, sino que la renuncxase para que 



36 TKEATY OF PEACE. 

la Isla fuese independiente. Asi consta en la correspondencia diplo- 
niatica que conserva el Gobierno de S. M. C. sobre las negociaciones 
entre Ainbas Altas Partes contratautes anteriores a la declaracion 
de guerra; Asi tambien las Camaras Americanas lo declararon en la 
resolucioa conjunta de 19 de Abril ultimo, aprobada despu^s por el 
Sefior Presidente de los Estados Unidos. El articulo primero de la 
citnda resolucion, dice: "que el pueblo de Cuba es y debe ser libre e 
independiente." 

Asi tainbien el Senor Secretario de Estado en Washington ordeno en 
20 del citado mes a su Ministro en Madrid, que lo comunicase al Gobi- 
erno espaiiol, empleando las inismas palabras del texto de aquella reso- 
lucion para que "Espafia renunciase inniediatamente su Autoridad y 
Gobieruo en la Isla de Cuba." 

Y asi finalmente se consigno en el Articulo 1° del Protocolo firinado 
en Washington en doce de Agosto pasado, cuyo Articulo 1°, segun el 
texto oficial, firmado en idioina francos, a la vez que el firmado en idioina 
ingles por los representantes de Ambas Altas Partes contratautes, 
dice asi : 

" Article I. L'Espague renoncera a toute pretention a sa souverai- 
nete et a tout droit sur Cuba," que literalmeute traducido al espaiiol 
equivale a lo siguiente: 

" La Espafia renunciard a toda pretension a su soberania y a todo 
derecbo sobre Cuba." 

Seria ofender la grande ilustraeion de los Sefiores Comisarios Ameri- 
canos tratar de demostrarles la esencial diferencia que, segiin la doctrina 
elemental del derecho publico iuternacional, y la jn'actica de las naciones, 
existe entre el abandono y la renuncia de la Soberania. 

El territorio abandonado tiene derecho para adquirirlo el j>riuier ocu- 
pante; el territorio renunciado pasa necesariamente a aquel a cuyo favor 
tiene que hacerse la renuncia. Y los Estados Unidos exigieron la de 
Espafia para el pueblo cubano a fin de que se constituyese independiente. 

Aunque es verdad que los Estados Unidos de America, en el caso 
presente, exigieron esto de Espana, exigieron tambien que tal renuncia 
habia de hacerse por su mediation. Los Estados Unidos habian de 
recibir la Isla de Cuba y conservarla en su poder teniendo su gobierno 
basta su pacification, " abrigando el proposito de dejar (no se puede 
dejar lo que no se tiene) el dominio y gobieruo de la Isla al pueblo de 
esta, una vez realizada dicha pacificacion." Asi solemnemente se 
consigno en el articulo 4° de la resolucion conjunta de las Camaras 
Americanas y en el despacho del Senor Ministro de Estado Americano a 
su Ministro en Madrid. Y si hasta la pacificacion de la Isla no ban de 
dejar su dominio y gobierno los Estados Unidos, es de toda evidencia 
que entretanto son ellos los que lo ban de conservar. 

Y efectivamente los Estados Unidos conservaron y conservan en su 
poder a Santiago de Cuba y los demas territorias de la Isla en que do- 
minan sus armas, sin haberlos entregado al pueblo cubano, por no tener 
todavia Gobierno que lo represente. Y en el Protocolo de Washington 
ya citado (articulo 4°), se acordo que la evacuaci6n de la Isla por las 
tropas espanolas y sus detalles se convendriau por una Comision mixta 
formada por Comisarios del Gobierno Espaiiol y Comisarios del 
Gobierno de Washington, pero no por Comisario del pueblo cubano. 

El Gobierno federal es pues, el que, necesariamente, tiene que aceptar 
la renuucia que hace el de Espafia a la soberania en la Isla, para con- 
servar esta Isla en su poder y gobernarla hasta que este paciticada, en 
cuyo caso, y no antes, segun sus propias resoluciones, es cuando se pro- 
ponen dejar la soberania de aquel territorio a disposicion del Gobierno 
que se constituya en Cuba. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 37 

IT. 

LACESl6x Y LA RENUNCIA OE LA SOBERANfA COMPRENPTCN I 

Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONES QUE LA CONSTITUYJ5N. 

El conceptode la Soberania de nn Estado nunca se ha confundidoen 
el inundo antiguo ni mucho menos en el mundo moderno v cristiano, eon 
el concepto del dominio civil y privado y menos ami con el del dominio 
del senor sobre el esclavo. 

El Soberano, es verdad que tiene prerrogativas y derechos Bobre el 
territorio y sus habitantes; pero estas prerrogativas y derechos le 
corresponden no para su satisfaccion ygoce, sino para el bnen gob erno 
y bienestar de los pueblos que estan a su soberania sometidos. Poi 
esta razon, los derechos del Soberano se convierten en obligaciones 
para con sus subditos. El Soberano tiene obligation de cuidar de su 
buen regimen y de su progreso y prosperidad. El Sob, Main, no es 
dueno de los impuestos y rentas que percibe <le sus subditos, para 
emplearlos y consurairlos en su propio y personal beneficio, sino para 
invertirlos en le satisfaccion de las necesidades piiblicas y en el bien- 
estar de aquellos. El cumplimien to de estas obligaciones es el funda- 
mento de la legitimidad de sus facultades para celebrar con terceras 
personas todas las convenciones y contraer todas las obligaciones que 
sean necesarias para procurarse los recursos precisos al buen regimen 
y gobieruo de sus subditos y atender el mejor servicio publico de loa 
misinos. 

Estas obligaciones subsisten desde que se contraen hasta que se rum- 
pi en. 

Y es de toda evidencia que si durante todo el tiempo intermedio entre 
la constitucion y el cumplimiento de una obligation de soberania, el 
Soberano la pierde por renuncia u otro titulo legitime, la obligi 
pendiente pasa corao parte iutegrante de la soberania misuma aquel 
que en ella le sucede. Seria contrario a la notion mas elemental de la 
justicia, € incompatible con el dictado de la couciencia universal de las 
gentes, que un Soberano perdiera sus derechos sobre el territorio y sus 
subditos y hubiera de continuar esto no obstante, sometido al cumpli- 
miento de las obligaciones que habia creado, exclusivamente, para su 
regimen y gobieruo. 

Estas maximas aparecen observadas por todas las naciones cnltas 
que no han querido atropellar los principios eternos de la justicia, 
incluso aquellas en que estas cesiones se hicieron por la fuerza de las 
annas y como premio de la victoria eu los Tratados sobre cesiones ter- 
ritoriales. Karo es el Tratado en que no ha pasado con el territorio 
cedido al nuevo Soberano una parte proporcional de las obligaciones 
generales del Estado cedente, que en la inayoria de los casos tenian la 
forma de deuda publica. 

Pero aun es mas claro el caso a que se renere la convention que ha de 
elaborar esta conferencia. Aqui no se trata de transferir, con la Sobe- 
rania de Cuba y Puerto Rico una parte proporcional de las obligacio- 
nes y cargas generales de la Metropoli, sino tan solo las obligaciones y 
cargas que son peculiares a las Islas que se ceden y transfleren. Cua 
no se trata de obligaciones de conjunto y comunes (\ todos los U 
ios sometidos al Soberano que las contrae. sino de obligaciones espe< 
al territorio mismo cedido y contraidas por sus legitimas Autorid; 
ni una sola vez, aun en aquellos Tratados en que el vencedor se ha 
trado mas despiadado con el vencido, han dejado de pasar con el terri- 
torio cedido sus i>ropias y peculiares cargas y obligaciones. Asi, 1 
considerarse como clausula casi obligada, la de que la ccsion del terri- 
torio lleva consigo la de las obligaciones y deudas depaxtamentales, 



38 TREATY OF PEACE. 

com un ales y en general hablando, peculiares al territorio de la cesion. 
El Gran Conquistador de este siglo no se atrevio jamas a violar esta 
regla de eterna justicia, en todos los Tratados que celebro con aquellos 
Soberanos, cuyos territories, en todo 6 en parte, convertia en premio de 
sus victorias. 

Pues bien, es de hacer constar, que la soberania de Espana jamas 
dejo de administrar separadamente de la Metropoli sus colonias en 
America, desde su descubrimiento. La America Espanola estuvo 
siempre gobernada desde la Capital de la Monarquia por un Consejo 
especial llamado de Indias que en nada intervenia en el regimen y go- 
bierno de la Peninsula, el cual corria a cargo del Consejo llamado de 
Castilla, 

Dividido el territorio descubierto por Colon y por otros ilustres explo- 
radores Espaiioles (que tan inmenso, aunque no siempre agradecido 
servicio ban prestado a la civilization) en Virreinatos y Capitanias 
Generales, cada uno de estos pequenos Estados recaudaba sns propios 
ingresos y cubria sus proprios gastos, 6 contraia para cubrirlos las obli- 
gaciones que las necesidades de su propio gobierno demandaban; y 
cuando alguno de estos territorios se hallaba en deficit permanente, 
como sucedia a la Isla de Cuba, la colonia bermana mas proxima acudia 
a su socorro. El Virreinato de Mejico desde 1766 basta 1S()C> auxilio a 
la Isla de Cuba anualmente con fuertes cantidades para sus atenciones 
de gobierno y para el desarrollo de su natural riqueza entonces inex- 
plotada, a cuyos gastos no podia, a la sazon, atender con sus recursos 
propios. Nada menos que 108 millones de pesos entraron en Cuba pro- 
cedentes de Mejico bajo tal concepto, durante aquel perfodo; conoci- 
£ndose estos auxilios en la administration colonial Espanola con el 
nombre de "situado de Mejico." 

En el siglo actual llevo Espana basta sus ultimas consecuencias este 
sistema de administracion separado e independiente de -ms colonias. 
El Ministerio de Ultramar era el departamento donde se concentraba 
esta administracion. Cada colonia tuvo anualmente su proprio pre- 
supuesto y sus deficits; cuando sus propios ingresos no eran bastautes 
para cubrir sus proprios gastos fueron atendidos j>or opera ciones espe- 
ciales de deuda consolidada, bipotecaria 6 ilotante para y por cuenta 
de la colonia en cuyo beneficio estas operaciones se bicierou. 

Y la separation entre la administracion de la Peninsula y la colonial 
fue, durante mucbo tiempo tan completa, que el personal de funcion- 
arios publicos i^ara los servicios adrainistrativos y judiciales de las 
colonias, era peculiar a las mismas, basta el punto deque estos funcion- 
arios no tenian aptitud legal para ser incluidos en los cuerpos gerarqui- 
cos similares de Espana, ni desemiienar en ella analogas funciones. 

Este regimen es bajo el que vino Espana administrando a Cuba hasta 
el momento presente. 

Sabemos bien que fuera de Espana se incurre en gravisimos errores, 
por efecto de no ser conocido el regimen colonial Espanol, pero es 
tiempo ya, y sobre todo es necesario, en la occasion presente, que estos 
errores se desvanezcan, contrastandolos con la verdad de los hecbos y 
con los preceptos de las leyes espanolas. Cuba y Puerto Eico nunca 
ban vivido dentro del presupuesto general de la Nation espariola ni 
en este figuraron jamas sus ingresos, ni se incluyeron sus gastos. Todas 
las obligaciones que esten pendientes y bayan sido legalmente creadas 
para el servicio de Cuba y Puerto Rico y a cargo de sus especiales 
Tesoros, siempre distintos y separados del Tesoro de la Peninsula, 
son obligaciones cubanas 6 puertorriquenas, es decir, obligaciones 
locales, que afectan unica y exclusivamente al territorio de las Islas y 
a sus habi tan tea. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

Lo dicho hasta aqui sobre la naturaleza de las obligacionea colo- 
niales y sobre los obligados a su cumplimiento, jamas lo ban der.cono- 
cido, (dicho sea en su honor), los pueblos Hispano-americanos. A.qaelloa 
conquistaron por su propio esfuerzo su independencia y la mayor parte 
de ellos antes que Espana la hubiera reconocido, habian, por leyes 
anteriores y solemncs de sus Camaras, declarado propiaa y como laa 
mas privilegiadas de todas las deudas, las que la Corona de Espai a 
habfa contraido durante su soberania, para el servicio de aquellos ter- 
ritorios, y se hallaban registradas en sus respectivos libros de Tesoi 

Son muy contadas las republicas hispano-amerieanas que aguardaron 
a hacer tan honrada declaration, a que la Metr6poli reconociei 
independencia, porque, como decian, la Republica Argentina en el Tra- 
tado que celebro con Espana en 21 de Septiembre de 1863, y la del 
Uruguay, en el que celebro en 19 de Julio de 1870, "asi como ellas 
adquirian los derechos y privilegios correspondientes a la Corona de 
Espana, contraian tambien todos sus deberes y obligaciones." 

jS"6tese que las Kepiiblicashispano -americanas, sin exception, recono- 
cieron e hicieron suyas estas deudas de cualquier close que fueran, 
detallandolas en el Tratado de paz con Bolivia de 21 de Julio de 1847, 
en que se dice que, "comprendian todos los creditos por pensiones, 
sueldos, suministros, anticipos, fletes, emprestitos forzosos, depositos, 
coutratos y cualquiera otra deuda, ya de guerra, ya anterior (\ <sta. que 
pesaren sobre aquellas Tesorerias, sieinpre que i)rocediesen de ordenes 
directas del Gobierno Espanol 6 de sus autoridades constituidas en 
aquellos territorios." 

Espano no reconocio la independencia de ningun Estado americano 
que antes hubiera sido colonia suya, sino con esta condicion, que 
aquellos Estados expontaneamente declararon en sus respectivos tra- 
tados, que era de perfecta justicia. 

Su derecho y su dignidad no le permiten reconocersin esta condicion, 
que ahora mas que antes, si cabe, coutinua siendo de justicia. la inde- 
pendencia de los pueblos cubano y puertoriqueno que estos no nan 
podido conquistar por su propio y exclusivo esfuerzo. 

Espana esta dispuesta a ceder la soberania de Puerto- Kico y demas 
Islas de las Indias Occidentales, y k renunciar 4 la Soberania de la Isla 
de Cuba, todo & favor de los Estados Unidos, que habran de aceptarla; 
poniendo 4 su disposicion esta Soberania en el estado en que aetual- 
mente la posee, y por lo tanto cou los derechos y las cargas que aetual- 
mente la constituyen. A esto se obligo en los articulos 1 ° y 2 del 
Protocolo flimado en Washington en 12 de Agosto ultimo y esto es lo 
que quiere cumplir con la mas exquisita lealtad en este Tratado. 

Estd conforme 

Emilio de Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex 2 to Protocol No. 4. 

Memorandum succinctly setting forth the grounds or reasons of Mepro- 
posed articles for the treaty of peace relating to the rehnqutshment oy 
Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Bico, presented to the 
conference by the Spanish Plenipotentiaries. 

The Spanish Plenipotentiaries accept the main idea of the V™V°f A 
article, as drafted by the American Commissioners, relatii ig r to the 
relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and tJie ce^ion ot 



40 TREATY OF PEACE. 

her sovereignty over Porto Eico ; but they are unable to concur in the 
remaining portions of said draft; because, on tne one hand, they under- 
stand that part thereof goes beyond the proper scope of said relinquish- 
ment and cession ; and because, on the other, the said relinquishment 
and cession as expressed in the said draft do not embody, in other ways, 
all that it is indispensable they should. 

I. 

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ACCEPT 
THE RELINQUISHMENT MADE BY HER CATHOLIC MAJESTY OF HER SOVEREIGNTY 
OVER THE ISLAND OF CUBA. 

The Government of the American Union never demanded that the 
Spanish Government abandon (abandonar) the sovereignty over Cuba, 
but that it relinquish (renunciar) the same, so that the island should 
become independent. It so appears from the diplomatic correspond- 
ence in the possession of the Government of Her Catholic Majesty 
relating to the negotiation between the two contracting parties prior to 
the declaration of war. It was also thus declared by the American 
Congress in the Joint Resolution of April 19 last, subsequently approved 
by the President of the United States. The first clause of that resolu- 
tion reads "that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free 
and independent." 

So also, on the 20th of the same month, did the Secretary of State in 
Washington instruct the American Minister in Madrid to say to the 
Spanish Government, using the identical language of the Joint Reso- 
lution, that u Spain should at once relinquish its authority and govern- 
ment in the Island of Cuba." 

And so, finally, was it set forth in Article I of the Protocol signed in 
Washington on the 12th of August last, the official text of which as 
signed in French and English by the representatives of the two High 
Contracting Parties reads as follows: 

"Article I ei . L'Espagne renoncera a toute pretention, a sa souve- 
rainete et a tout droit sur Cuba," which literally translated into Spanish 
is as follows: "Espafia renunciara a toda pretension a su soberania y 
a todo derecho sobre Cuba." 

To undertake to explain the essential difference which according to 
the elementary principles of public international law and the usage of 
nations exists between the abandonment (abandono) and the relinquish- 
ment (renuncia) of sovereignty, would be to offend the intelligence of 
the learned American Commissioners. 

Abandoned territories can of right be acquired by the first occupant, 
while relinquished, territories necessarily pass unto him to whom relin- 
quishment is made. And the United States demanded that Spain 
relinquish in order that the Cuban people might become independent. 

Although it is true that the United States of America demanded 
this of Spain in the present case, they also demanded that such relin- 
quishment must be made through tbem. The United States were to 
receive the Island of Cuba and retain the possession thereof, governing 
it until its pacification was secured, asserting its "determination to 
leave [no one can leave what he does not hold] the government and 
control of the island to its people, as soon as the said pacification is 
accomplished." So was it solemnly set forth in section 4 of the Joint 
Resolution of the American Congress and in the despatch of the Sec- 
retary of State to the American Minister at Madrid. And if the United 
States are not to leave the government and control of the island until 



TREATY OF PEACE. j ] 

tlie pacification thereof is accomplished, it is self-evident thai ii 
mean time the United States are called upon to administer the oi ■ 
retain the other. 

And in fact the United States held and continue to hold Santiago de 
Cuba and the other territories of the island where their arms are supreme 
without having delivered them over to the Cuban people, as the latter 
have not as yet any Government to represent them. And in the 
Protocol of Washington (Article IV) it was agreed thai the evacu 
of the island by the Spanish troops and the details thereof should be 
arranged and carried out by a mixed commission consisl ing of < !ommis- 
sioners appointed by the Washington Government and by the Spanish 
Government, but not of Commissioners appointed by the Cubans. 

The Federal Government is therefore the one which musl of nece 
accept the relinquishment made by Spain of her sovereignty over tin- 
island, so as to retain the latter under its control and government until 
it is pacified, in which event, and not before, according to its own decla- 
rations, it will leave the sovereignty over that territory at the disposal 
of the Government that may be constituted in Cuba. 

II. 

THE CESSION AND RELINQUISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY EMBRACES THE CESSION AND 
RELINQUISHMENT OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS CONSTITUTE 

The idea of the sovereignty of a state was never confounded in the 
ancient world, and much less in the modern and Christian world, with 
the idea of individual or private ownership. Much less still with the 
authority of the master over the slave. 

The sovereign, it is true, has prerogatives and rights over the terri- 
tory and its inhabitants; but these prerogatives and rights attach to 
him not for his own satisfaction and enjoyment but for the good gov- 
ernment and the welfare of the people subject to his rule. For this 
reason the rights of the sovereign become obligations with respect to 
his subjects. The sovereign is bound to see that they have good 
eminent and to their progress and prosperity. The sovereign is not 
the owner of the tax proceeds or of the revenues he receives from his 
subjects, to be used for his own personal benefit, but to meet with them 
all public necessities and attend to the public welfare. The fulfill 
of these obligations is the foundation of the legitimacy of his authority 
to enter into conventions and agreements of all kinds with third par- 
ties, to contract all the obligations necessary to raise means for the 
good administration of the government of his subjects, and to attend to 
the public service in the best possible manner. 

These obligations exist from the moment they are contracted until 
they are fulfilled. And it is perfectly self-evident that if during the 
period intervening between the assumption by a sovereign of an obli- 
gation and the fulfilment of the same, he shall cease to be bound thereby 
through relinquishment or any other lawful conveyance, the outstand- 
ing obligation passes as an integral part of the sovereignty itself to him 
who succeeds him. It would be contrary to the most elementary m 
of justice and inconsistent with the dictates of the universal eons. 
of mankind for a sovereign to lose all his rights over a territory and the 
inhabitants thereof, and despite this to continue bound by the obliga- 
tions he had contracted exclusively for their regime and government. 

These maxims seem to be observed by all cultured nations that are 
unwilling to trample upon the eternal principles of justice, including 
those in which such cessions were made by force of arms and as a r< 



42 TREATY OF PEACE. 

for victories through treaties relating to territorial cessions. Bare is 
the treaty in which, together with the territory ceded to the new sov- 
ereign, there is not conveyed a proportional part of the general obliga- 
tions of the ceding state, which in the majority of cases have been in 
the form of a public debt. 

But the case to which the convention to be framed by this conference 
refers is clearer still. It is not the purpose here to transfer, together 
with the sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico, a proportional part of 
the obligations and general charges of the mother country, but only 
the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands ceded 
and transferred. When not treating of general obligations common to 
all the territories subject to the sovereign contracting the same, but of 
the special obligations of the particular territories ceded which were 
contracted by its legitimate authorities, in no single case, not even in 
those treaties in which the victor has shown himself most merciless 
towards the vanquished, have the individual aud separate charges and 
obligations of a ceded territory failed to pass therewith. Thus it may 
be considered as an absolutely essential condition that the cession of 
territory carries with it the cession of the departmental, communal, and, 
generally speaking, individual obligations and debts of the ceded terri- 
' tory. The Great Conqueror of this century never dared to violate this 
rule of eternal justice in any of the treaties he concluded with those 
sovereigns whose territories he appropriated in whole or in part, as a 
reward for his victories. 

Very well; it must be recorded that the sovereignty of Spain never 
ceased to administer its colonies in America, from the time of the dis- 
covery, separate from the mother country. Spanish America was 
always governed from the capital of the monarchy by a special council 
called "Council of the Indies", which in no wise interfered in the regime 
and government of the Peninsula, which was under a council designated 
as the "Council of Castile". 

The territory discovered by Columbus and other illustrious Spanish 
explorers who have rendered such great though not always appreciated 
services to civilization being divided into vice-royalties and captaincies- 
general, each of these small states collected its own revenues and met 
its own expenses, or contracted obligations to meet the necessities of 
its own separate government; and when oue of these territories found 
itself with a permanent deficit, as was the case in the Island of Cuba, 
the nearest sister-colony came to its rescue. The Vice-royalty of Mex- 
ico from 1766 to 1806 annually assisted the Island of Cuba with heavy 
sums for its governmental needs and the development of its natural 
resources, at the time unexploited, which expenses it could not, at sucl 
time, meet from its own revenues. IsTot less thau 108 millions of pesos 
came into Cuba from Mexico during that period, this assistance being 
known in the Spanish colonial administration under the name of " Situ- 
ado de Mexico." 

During the present century Spain carried to the last extreme this 
system of the separate and independent administration of its colonies. 
The Ministry of the Colonies was the department where this adminis- 
tration was centered. Each colony had annually its own budget and 
deficits. When its own revenues were not sufficient to cover its own 
expenses, these were met by special operations in the way of consoli- 
dated, mortgage or floating debts, and were chargeable to the colony 
for whose benefit such operations were conducted. 

And the separation of the administration of the Peninsula and the 
colonies was for a long time so complete, that the body of publio 



TREATY OF PEACE. 43 

employees in the executive and judicial services of the eolonie 
separate and independent, to the extent that these employees had oot 
the legal capacity to be included in the similar hierarchical bodies of 
Spain, or to discharge therein like functions. 

This regime is the one under which Spain has been administering 
Cuba up to the present time. 

We are well aware that outside of Spain grave errors arc fallen into, 
owing to the Spanish colonial system being unknown; but it is high 
time and above all at this juncture is it necessary that these erro 
dissipated by comparing them with the actual facts and the provisions 
of Spanish laws. Cuba and Porto Rico have never been included in 
the general budget of the Spanish nation, nor have their revenues ever 
figured therein, which is also true of their expenditures. Alloutstand- 
ing obligations that have been legally contracted for the service of 
Cuba and Porto Pico, and which are chargeable to their individual 
treasuries, always distinct and separate from the treasury of the Penin- 
sula, are Cuban or Porto Pican obligations, that is, local obligations, 
solely and exclusively affecting the territory of the islands and then 
inhabitants. 

What has been said up to this point regarding the nature of the 
colonial obligations aud those bound thereby, has never been disre- 
garded (to their honor be it said) by the Spanish-American peoples. 
They achieved their independence through their own efforts, and the 
majority of them, before Spain had recognized it, had byprior and sol- 
emn act of their legislatures, declared as their own and as having pref- 
erence those debts which the Crown of Spain had contracted during 
the continuance of its sovereignty for the service of such territories, 
and which debts were recorded in their respective treasury books. 

Very few of the Spanish-American Republics delayed so honorable a 
declaration until the mother country had recognized their independence, 
as was said by the Argentine Republic in the treaty concluded with 
Spain on September 21, 1803, and by Uruguay, in that concluded on 
July 19, 1870 : " Just as they acquired the rights and privileges bel >nging 
to the Crown of Spain, they also assume all its duties and obligations. 

Note that the Spanish-American republics without exception i 
nized and assumed as their own these debts of every kind whatsoever, 
specifying them in the treaty of peace with Bolivia of duly 21, L847, 
wherein it is stated that they "include all debts for pensions, salaries, 
supplies, advances, transportation, forced loans, deposits, contracts, and 
any other debt incurred during war times or prior thereto, chargeable 
to said treasuries ; provided they were contracted by direct orders ot t lie 
Spanish Government or its constituted authorities m said territories. 
Spain did not recognize the independence of any American state 
which had previously been her colony save upon this condition, wine 
those states spontaneously incorporated in their respective treaties, as 
of right thev should. . .., . 

Iier right and her dignity will not permit her to recognize— without 
this condition, which now more than ever if possible is still just ana 
proper-the independence of the Cuban and Porto Rican peoples, wnic l. 
they have not been able to achieve by their own unaided ettorts. 

Spain is disposed to cede the sovereignty over Porto Pico and ot r 
islands of the West Indies, and to relinquish the sovereign ty « » « 

Island of Cuba, all in favor of the United States, which s 1,. 1 . u 
the same; she placing this sovereignty at their disposal m JJ e ^^ 10 ° 
in which she now holds it, and therefore, with the rights and | charges at 
present constituting it. She bound herself to this by Articles I and 11 



44 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



of the Protocol signed at Washington on August 12 last, and this is 
what she desires to carry out with the strictest faith in the present 
treaty. 
True copy: 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



Protocol No 5. 

Conference of October 14, 189S. 

Present: On the part of the 
United States: .Messrs . Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
presented a reply to the memoran- 
dum submitted by the Spanish 
Commissioners at the last session 
on the relinquishment of sover- 
eignty over Cuba and the transfer 
of debts. The paper was read, and 
a copy of it is hereto annexed. 

The Spanish Commissioners, re- 
ferring to the paper in which the 
American Commissioners rejected 
at the conference of the 11th in- 
stant the articles presented by the 
Spanish Commissioners at the con- 
ference of the 7th, on the subject 
of Cuba and Porto-Rico, called at- 
tention to the following sentence: 

"To the American Commission- 
ers this appears to be not a propo- 
sition to 'relinquish all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' 
but in substance a proposition to 
'transfer' to the United States and 
in turn to Cuba a mass of Spanish 
charges and obligations." 

The Spanish Commissioners de- 
sired a modification of this sen- 
tence on the ground that it might 
be thought to imply that they were 
not acting in good faith. 

The American Commissioners 
stated that in their opinion the 
sentence did not convey such an 



Protocolo No. 5. 

Conferencia del 14 de Octubre de 
1898. 

Preseutes. Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America los Se- 
horesDay, Davis, Frye,Gray, Reid, 
Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana los Seiior- 
es Montero Rios Abarzuza, Garn- 
ica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

El protocolo de la sesion ante- 
rior fue leido y aprobado. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
presentaron uno, contestation al 
Memorandum que los Comisiona- 
dos Espanoles sometieron en la 
ultima sesion acerca de la renuncia 
de la soberania sobre Cuba y la 
transferencia de sus deudas. El 
documento fue leido incluyendose 
una copia anexa a esta acta. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles, re- 
firiendose al escrito en el cual los 
Comisionados Americanos rechaza- 
ron en la Conferencia del dia 11 del 
corriente los articulos presentados 
por los Comisionados Espanoles en 
la conferencia del 7, acerca de 
Cuba y Puerto Rico, llamaron la 
atencion sobre la siguiente frase: 

"Creen los Comisionados Ameri- 
canos que esto no parece ser una 
proposition para renuuciar a toda 
pretension de soberania y a todo 
derecho sobre Cuba, sino mas bien 
una proposiciou para transferir a 
los Estados Unidos y estos a su vez 
a Cuba, una masa de cargas y obli 
gaciones espanolas." 

Los Comisionados espanoles pi- 
dieron la modification de esta frase 
fundandoseen que pudiera iinplicar 
que ellos no procedian de buena fe. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manifestaron que en su opinion la 
frase no tenia tal interpretation, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 






imputation, but, out of deference to 
the Spanish Commissioners, they 

altered it so as to read as follows: 
"To the American Commission- 
ers this appears to be not a propo- 
sition to 'relinquish all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' 
but in effect a proposition to ' trans- 
fer' to the United States and in 
turn to Cuba a mass of charges 
and obligations which, in the 
opinion of the American Commis- 
sioners, properly belong to Spain." 1 

This matter having been dis- 
posed of, the Spanish Commission- 
ers stated that, before proceeding 
with the discussion of the ques- 
tions under consideration, they de- 
sired it to be understood that, if 
certain articles should be agreed 
to, but in the end no treaty should 
be signed, the articles so agreed to 
should not in such case be taken 
.as expressing either Government's 
estimation of its just rights in re- 
spect of the subjects to which the 
articles related. 

The American Commissioners 
concurred in this view. 

The Joint Commission then pro- 
ceded to the oral discussion of the 
points discussed in the Spanish 
memorandum of October 11 and 
the American reply of to-day. 

After the discussion of the first 
point, — the question whether the 
sovereignty over Cuba should be 
relinquished to the United States — 
was exhausted, without any agree- 
ment having been reached upon it, 
the American Commissioners pro- 
posed to take up the second point, — 
the question whether charges and 
obligations constituted a part of 
the sovereignty and as such passed 
with it. 

The Spanish Commissioners sug- 
gested that if no agreement could 
be reached on the first point, it 
seemed te be needless to discuss 
the second. 

The American Commissioners, 
concurring in this view, proposed 
that, owing to the lateness of the 



pero que por deferencia 3 los Comi- 
sionados Espanoles,la modificaban 
en los terminos siguieu 

"Creen los Oomisionados Amer- 
icanos que esto no parece ser una 
proposition para renunciar :i toda 
pretension de soberania y ;i todo 
derecho sonic la [sla tleCuba,sino 
que en realidad es una proposici6n 
paratransferira Los Bstados Onidos 
yestos a Cuba una masa de cai 
y obligaciones que en opinion de 
los Comisionados Americanos per- 
tenecen realmente a Espana." 

Resuelto esto asunto, los Comi 
sionados Espafioles manifestaron 
que antes de proceder ;i la 'lis 
cusion de las cuestiones sometidas 
a estudio, deseaban que se estab- 
leciera, que si algunos articulos 
fuesen aprobados, pero que al final 
no se llegase a firmar un Tratado, 
tales articulos aprobados no de- 
berian en ningun caso ser conside- 
rados como expresando la opinion 
de cualquiera de los Gobic> 
sobre sus justos dereehos respecto 
a los asuutos a los cuales di< 
articulos se referian. 

Los Comisarios Americanos acep- 
taron esta proposicion. 

Luego la Comision procedid ;i la 
discusion oral de los puntos que se 
tratan en el Memorandum Esp; 
del 11 deoctubreya la contestation 
Americana presentada hoy. 

Y habieudose discutido, sin que 
se llegase a un acuerdo el primer 
punto, relativo a si la sober! 
sobre Cuba deberia renunciars 
favor de los Estados Unidos, los 
Comisarios Americanos propusie- 
ron continual- con el segundo 6 sea 
lacuestion de si lascargasy obliga- 
ciones constituian una parte de la 
soberania y como tales debian 
transmitirse con esta. 

Los Comisionados Espanoles in- 
dicaron que si no se podia llegar ;i 
un acuerdo en el primer punto, no 
parecia oportuno continual- la dis- 
cusion del segundo. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
opinaron de la misma manera y 
propusieron que dado lo avauzado 



46 TREATY OF PEACE. 

hour, the conference be adjourned de la liora, se aplazara la confer- 
to continue the discussion of the encia para continuar la discusion 
first point at the next session, which del primer pun to en la proxima 
should be held ou Monday, the 17th sesion, que se celebrar& el Lunes 17 
of October, at two o'clock, p. m. de Octubre a las dos de la tarde. 

The Spanish Commissioners Los Comisionados Espanoles ap- 

agreeing, the conference was ad- robaron esta mocion y en su con- 

journed accordingly. secuencia se suspendio la confer - 

encio. 

William R. Day E. Montero Rios 

Cushman K. Davis B. de Abarzuza 

Wm. P Frye J. DE Garnica 

Geo. Gray WE de Villa Urrutia 

Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero 

John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 5. 

The American Commissioners hereby present their reply to the mem- 
orandum which the Spanish Commissioners, under the rules of the 
Commission, submitted on the 11th instant, for the purpose of giving 
their reasons in support of the articles which the American Commis- 
sioners had rejected, in relation to Cuba and Porto Rico. 

I. 

The Spanish memorandum, referring to the demands of the United 
States before the war, to the joint resolution of Congress, and to the 
language of Article I of the Protocol of August 12, 1898, maintains 
that it is "imperative" that the United States "should accept the 
relinquishment made by Her Catholic Majesty of her sovereignty over 
the Island of Cuba". This contention is based upon the fact that in 
the various documents referred to the United States required Spain to 
"relinquish" her sovereignty, but did not demand that she "abandon" 
it. 

A distinction is thus made between a relinquishment and an abandon- 
ment; and it is argued that while " abandoned territories'''' become dere- 
lict, so that they may be acquired by the first occupant, " relinquished 
territories'''' necessarily pass to him to whom relinquishment is made. 

The American Commissioners are unable to admit that such a dis- 
tinction between the words in "question exists either in law or in com- 
mon use. 

The word "relinquish ', as defined m the English dictionaries, means 
"to give up the possession or occupancy of; withdraw from; leave;, 
abandon; quit." Again: "to renounce a claim to; resign; as, to relin- 
quish a debt." 

On the other hand, we find in that great monument of Spanish learn- 
ing, the law dictionary of Escriche (Biccionario de Legislation y Jurispru- 
dencia), under the word renunciar, which the Spanish memorandum 
declares to be the equivalent of the French word renoncer (used in 
Spain's version of the Protocol) and of the English word "relinquish", 
the following definition- "The voluntary giving up of a right exercised 
or expected to be exercised, or of a thing held or possessed or expected 
to be held or possessed." 



TREATY OF PEACE. IV 

Commenting upon this definition, Eseriche says: 

"The relinquishment differs from the cession in that the latter 
requires for its completion the concurrence of the wills of the gran 
and the grantee and a just cause for the transfer, while the foi me 
perfect with only the will of the relinquisher. The effecl of the relin- 
quishment is confined to the abdication or dropping of the right or 
thing relinquished. The effect of the cession is the conveyance of the 
right to the grantee." 

The distinction thus drawn, not between relinquishment and abandon- 
ment, which are treated both in English and in Spanish as practically 
the same, but between relinquishment and cession, is writ ten upon the 
face of the Protocol, which, while obligating Spain (Article I ) to " relin- 
quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,"' in the ue 
article requires her to "cede to the United States the Island of Porto 
Eico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 
Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the 
United States". 

If it were true, as maintained in the Spanish memorandum, that tin- 
act of relinquishment includes, and requires for its completion, the 
process of legal transfer from one hand to another, and thus const itutes 
in form and in effect a cession, it is obvious that the contracting par- 
ties, in framing the Protocol, employed, in stipulations which were 
deliberately separated and sharply contrasted, different words to 
express the same meaning. 

The American Commissioners understand the Spanish memorandum 
to maintain that their Government, prior to the war, demanded of Spain, 
in effect if not in words, the relinquishment of her sovereignty over 
Cuba to the United States. The Spanish memorandum doubtless refers 
to the demand a copy of which was communicated by the Secretary of 
State of the United States to the Spanish Minister at Washington on 
the 20th of April last. The precise words of this demand are "that 
the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and Govern- 
ment in the island of Cuba and Cuban waters": and the demand is 
accompanied by the declaration that the United States, in taking the 
step, "disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereign 
jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, 
and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the 
government and control of the island to its people under such tree and 
independent Government as they may establish". 

To this demand the United States required by a certain time k a lull 
and satisfactory response * * *, whereby the ends ot peace in < n 
slii 11 Vip 'i^mirprl 

From the demand thus fully set forth, the Spanish memorandum 
extracts the assertion by the United States of its determination "to 
leave the government and control of the island to its people, i 
omitting both what precedes and what follows, construes that asser- 
tion as a demand "that such relinquishment must be made tnroug 
them" (the United States). The demand as a whole, howeve 
and clearly excludes this construction. Not only is the assertioi 
ceded, in the same sentence, by an express disclaimer on the pare 01 
the United States of any disposition or intention to take the so\ e 
of the island, but the assertion itself includes an express decla 
a determination to allow the island to remain, after pacification, anaer 
such free and independent Government" as may be established i>\ 

To this construction of the demand we may apply a simple 



48 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Spain had answered that she would relinquish her sovereignty over 
the Island of Cuba, and had at the same time declared that it was not 
her intention to relinquish it to the United States, would anyone have 
imagined that she had failed to make "a full and satisfactory response" 
to the demand ? 

II. 

The second part of the Spanish memorandum is devoted to an argu- 
ment to maintain the proposition that "the cession and relinquishment 
of sovereignty embraces the cession and relinquishment of the rights 
and obligations constituting it." 

The American commissioners are not disposed to comment upon the 
indefiuiteness of this proposition, or upon the fallacies involved in 
treating the obligations which a sovereign may incur in the exercise of 
his sovereignty as a part of the sovereignty itself. National sovereignty 
(soherania national), as defined by high Spanish authority [Novisimo 
Diccionario enciclopedico de la lengua eastellana, por D. Delfiu Donadiu 
y Buignau, based on the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy), is "the 
right which a nation has of organizing the public powers in such a 
way as it may deem advisable." This right, though it includes the 
power to contract obligations, is in no sense composed of them. The 
thing done in the exercise of sovereignty is not a part of the sover- 
eignty itself; the power to create is not the thing created. Nor is it 
possible to shut our eyes to the fact that in the Spanish memorandum 
the term obligations is used indiscriminately in respect of two different 
things, namely, the duties which a sovereign as such owes to his sub- 
jects, and the debts which he may specially contract in the exercise of 
his sovereign power for his own purposes. 

With these preliminary observations, the American Commissioners 
proceed to the consideration of the specific matter before them. 

The American Commissioners note the declaration in the Spanish 
memorandum that there is no purpose now to transfer with the sover- 
eignty of Cuba and Porto Rico a proportional part of the national debt 
of Spain, but "only the obligations and charges attaching individually 
to the islands," which obligations and charges it likens to the local debts 
which pass with ceded territory. It appears, however, by the expla- 
nation given in the memorandum of the origin of these charges and 
obligations, and of the manner in which they were contracted, that they 
include the whole of what is commonly called the Cuban debt. The 
American Commissioners, therefore, while reaffirming their position as 
to the exclusion by the Protocol of any proposal for the assumption of 
such charges and obligations, will examine the subject in some of its 
aspects. 

It is true that the financial department of the Island of Cuba, com- 
mouly called the "Cuban Treasury," was not a branch of the Spanish 
Treasury, but it is equally true that it was accountable to the Spanish 
Secretary for the Colonies, the Ministro de Ultramar, and that it was 
managed by a body of officials appointed by the Crown, at whose head 
was a high functionary, called Intendente General de Hacienda. In each 
year a budget was made up by the Spanish Colonial Secretary on data 
furnished by the Intendente General, and this budget was submitted to 
and acted upon by the Cortes. If in any year the revenues collected 
in Cuba were insufficient to meet the burdens imposed upon them, the 
deficit was charged to the island, and formed a new item of the Cuban 
debt. It thus appears that the finances of the island were exclusively 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

controlled by the Spanish Government, and that the debt was in no 
sense created by Cuba as a province or department of Spain, or by the 
people of the island. In reality it is notorious that the denial to 
of any financial autonomy and of any power to prot 
the imposition by Spanish officials of enormous burdens for 
foreign and adverse to her interests, has been the most prolil 
of discontent in the island. The debt creating power, such 
monly belongs to communes or municipal corporations, m dele- 

gated to Cuba. Such a thing as a Cuban obligation, created by the 
island in the exercise of powers either inherent or delegated, is uu 
to the markets of the world. 

Having briefly sketched the system of financial administration 
respect to Cuba, we may consider the origin of the debt. 

Prior to 1S61 no so-called Cuban debt existed. 

The revenues of the island were as a rule far more than sufficie 
pay the expenses of its government, and produced in each year a sur- 
plus. This surplus was not expended for the benefit of the island, but 
was sent to Madrid. The surpluses thus disposed of amounted. 
1856 to 1861 inclusive, to upwards of $20,000,000. 

In 1864, in order to meet the national expenses of the attempt to 
"reincorporate" San Domingo into the Spanish dominions, and of the 
"expedition to Mexico", the Spanish authorities issued bonds to the 
amount of $3,000,000. Subsequently new loans were made, so that 
the so-called Cuban debt had swollen by 1888 to $18,000,000. 

In that year the ten years war for Cuban independence broke out, a 
war produced by causes so generally conceded to be just as to need do 
exposition on this occasion. All the expenses of this war were imposed 
upon Cuba, so that in 1880, according to a statement made at Madrid 
in that year by a Spanish Secretary for the Colonies, the so called 
Cuban debt amounted to upwards of $170,000,000. 

Subsequently the Spanish Government undertook to consolidate these 
debts, and to this end created in 1886 the so called Billetes MpoU 
de la Ida de Cuba, to the amount of 620,000,000 pesetas, or $124,000,000. 
The Spanish Government undertook to pay these bonds and the int< 
thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of the 
debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, '-the 
Spanish nation" (la Nation espanola) guaranteed their payment. The 
annual charge for interest and sinking fund on account of this debt 
amounted to the sum of 39,191,000 pesetas, or $7,838,200, which was 
disbursed through a Spanish financial institution, called the B 
Eispano- Colonial, which is said to have collected daily from the custom 
house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum of 
$33,339. 

In 1890 a new issue of bonds was authorized by the Spanish Govern- 
ment, to the amount, as it is understood, of 875,000,000 pesetas, or 
$175,000,000, with the same guarantee as before, apparently with a 
to refund the prior debt, as well as to cover any new debts contn 
between 1886 and 1890. It seems, however, that only a small number 
of these bonds had been disposed of when in February, 1895, the 
insurrection and movement for independence broke out. The Govern- 
ment of Spain then proceeded to issue these new bonds for th< 
of raising funds with which to suppress the uprising, so that I 
standing on January 1, 1898, amounted, according to published rep 
to 858,550,000 pesetas, or $171,710,000. In addition to these a further 
loan, known as the "Cuban War Emergency Loan", was, as the Ameri- 
T P 1 



50 TREATY OF PEACE. 

can Commissioners are advised, floated to the amount of 800,000,000 
pesetas, or $160,000,000, represented by what are called "five per cent 
peseta bonds ". 

Although it does not appear that any mention is made in these bonds 
of the revenues of Cuba, it is understood that they are regarded in 
Spain as properly constituting a part of the "Cuban Debt", together 
with various unliquidated debts, large in amount, incurred by the Span- 
ish authorities in opposing by arms the independence of Cuba. 

From no point of view can the debts above described be considered 
as local debts of Cuba or as debts incurred for the benefit*of Cuba. In 
no sense are they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They 
are debts created by the Government of Spain, for its own purposes 
and through its own agents, in whose creation Cuba had no voice. 

From the moral point of view, the proposal to impose them upon 
Cuba is equally untenable. If, as is sometimes asserted, the struggles 
for Cuban independence have been carried on and supported by a minor- 
ity of the people of the island, to impose upon the inhabitants as a 
whole the cost of suppressing the insurrections would be to punish the 
many for the deeds of the few. If, on the other hand, those struggles 
have, as the American Commissioners maintain, represented the hopes 
and aspirations of the body of the Cuban people, to crush the inhabit- 
ants by a burden created by Spain in the effort to oppose their inde- 
pendence, would be even more unjust. 

The American Commissioners deem it unnecessary, after what has 
been stated, to enter into an examination of the general references, 
made in the Spanish memorandum, to cases in which debts contracted 
by a state have, upon its absorption, been assumed by the absorbing 
state, or to cases in which, upon the partition of territory, debts con- 
tracted by the whole have been by special arrangement apportioned. 
They are conceived to be inapplicable, legally and morally, to the so- 
called "Cuban Debt", the burden of which, imposed upon the people of 
Cuba without their consent and by force of arms, was one of the prin- 
cipal wrongs for the termination of which the struggles for Cuban 
independence were undertaken. 

The American Commissioners have deemed it due to the Spanish 
Commissioners and to themselves to make these observations upon the 
general subject of Cuban "charges and obligations", apart from the 
special circumstances under which the present negotiations were begun. 
But, as they have heretofore stated, they consider the subject to be dis- 
posed of beyond all question by the Protocol. The suggestion that 
their government should assume, either for itself or for Cuba or Porto 
Eico, the burden of the "charges and obligations" now in question 
was not put forward during the negotiations that resulted in the con- 
clusion of that convention, nor, if it had been so put forward, would it 
have been for a moment entertained by the United States. 

From unselfish motives, of which it is unnecessary to make a renewed 
declaration, the Government of the United States, at great sacrifice of 
life and treasure, has prosecuted the conflict which followed its demand 
for the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba. 

One of the results of that conflict is the unconditional agreement, 
embodied in the first article of the Protocol, that Spain "will relin- 
quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". Upon the sim- 
ple fulfilment of that stipulation the American Commissioners are 
obliged to insist. 

True copy : 

John B. Moore, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Protocol No. 6. 
Conference of October 17, 1898. 

Present On the part of the 
United States Messrs. Day 
Davis Frye Gray Keid Moore 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain Messrs. 
Montero Bios Abarzuza Garnica 
Cerero. 

Messrs. Villa- Urrutia and Ojeda 
were absent because of illness. 



The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that, without 
making any formal protest, he de- 
sired to bring to the attention of 
the American Commissioners the 
fact that he had received from his 
Government a telegram referring to 
reports to the effect that two Ameri- 
can men-of-war were about to leave 
American ports with reenforce- 
ments of troops for the garrison at 
Manila, and that Spanish prison- 
ers in the possession of the Tag- 
alos are ill-treated. He would not 
read the telegram, but as such re- 
ports tended to excite the public 
mind and embarrass the efforts to 
establish peace and concord be- 
tween the two nations, he hoped 
that the American Commissioners 
would bring the matter to the 
knowledge of their Government. 

The President of the American 
Commission replied that the Amer- 
ican Commissioners possessed 
neither information nor instruc- 
tions such as would enable them 
to deal with the subject, which 
properly belonged to the two Gov- 
ernments, but that, prompted by 
motives similar to those avowed by 
the President of the Spanish Com- 
mission, they would communicate 
to their Government the fact that 
the reports in question had been 
brought to their attention 

The discussion of the business 
before the Joint Commission hav- 



Protocolo N" 6. 

Gonferencia del 17 de Octubre de 

i 

Presentes Por parte de los i: 
tados Unidos de America, los Se 
iioresDay, Davis. l'i w,< '.ray, Keid, 
Moore, Fergusson. 

Porpartede Espana. los Sen* 
Montero Pios, Abarzu/a, Garnica, 
Cerero. 

Los Comisarios espanoles in 
formanalos Americanos que los Se- 
nores Villa- Urrutia y Ojeda uo 
pueden asistir a la conferencia por 
hallarse enfermos. 

Se leyo y i'ue aprobada el acta 
anterior. 

El Seiior Tresidente de la Co 
mision Espanola, sin hacer una 
reclamaciou concreta, llama la 
atencion de los Senores Comisarios 
Americanos acercadeun telegrama 
que ha recibido del Gobierno Es- 
paiiol relativoal envio a Manila de 
dos buques de guerra America 
y refuerzos de tropas a la guarni- 
cion de Manila, asi como a los 
malos tratamieutos de que son 
victimas los espanoles prisioneros 
de los tagalos, y sin leer dieho tele- 
grama, ruega a los Senores Coini- 
sionados Americanos lo pongan en 
conocimiento del Gobierno de 
Washington a fin de evitar que 
esos hechos fomenteu la eferves- 
cencia del espiritu publico y enar- 
deciendo las pasiones creen dificul- 
tades para la obra de paz y con- 
cordia entre ambas BTaciones. 

El Seiior Presidente de los Comi- 
sarios Americanos manifiesta en 
contestation que carecian de in- 
formes 6 instrucciones necesarios 
para tratar tal asunto, de la com- 
petencia unica de los dos Gobier- 
nos, pero que inspirandose en 
iguales fines, 6 sea consegnir una 
paz duradera, comuuicara a \\ ash- 
ington los deseos expresados por 
los Seiiores Comisarios espanoles. 



Entrando en la orden del dla, la 
Comision continue) la deliberation 



52 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



in gbeen resumed, the Spanish Com- 
missioners stated that although the 
articles presented by them were 
not couched in the same words as 
the Protocol of August 12, 1898, 
and the propositions in the notes 
preceding its conclusion, the sense 
was in their opinion, the same 
Still, they were ready to withdraw 
their articles, and to substitute for 
them articles more nearly in con- 
formity with the language of the 
Protocol. 

The American Commissioners, in 
response to this statement, pre- 
sented a paper, copy of which is 
hereto annexed, in which, while 
recognizing the fact that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States as- 
sumed all responsibilities for pro- 
tection of life and property that 
legally attach to it during the oc- 
cupation of Cuba, they finally de- 
clined to assume the burden of the 
so-called Cuban debt, either for the 
United States or for Cuba, and 
offered as a substitute for the arti- 
cles previously presented by them 
the precise stipulations of Articles 
I and II of the Protocol, as to Cuba, 
Porto Eico, and other islands in 
the West Indies, and the island to 
be ceded in the Ladrones. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
stated that they reserved the right 
to examine this proposal and to 
present another draft of articles 
which should conform to the Pro- 
tocol. 

The conference was then ad- 
journed to the 19th instant at two 
o'clock, p. m. 

William E. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Wiiitelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



iniciada en la confereneia anterior, 
manifestando el Sehor Presidente 
de los Comisarios espanoles, que si 
bien el articulado que habian pro- 
questo no estaba redactado en las 
mismas palabras empleadas en el 
Protocolo de 12 de Agosto de 1898, 
y en los despachos que mediaron 
para llegar a su conclusion, en su 
opinion, el sentido es el inismo, 
pero que estaban dispuestos a reti- 
rarlas 6 reiormarlas mas en couso- 
nancia con los terminos usados en 
el texto del Protocolo. 

En contestacion los Comisarios 
Americanos presentaron un docu- 
mento de que es copia anexa, en el 
cual, al propio tiempo que deela- 
ran que el Gobierno de los Esta- 
dos Unidos as time las responsabili- 
dades inherentes a la proteccion 
de vidas y haciendas en Cuba, 
mientras dure la ocupacion de 
Cuba, decliuan fmalmente el asu- 
mir la carga de la Deuda cubana, 
tanto para los Estados Unidos 
como para Cuba. Asimismo pro- 
ponen sustituir los articulos pro- 
puestos por ellos con las estipula- 
ciones precisas delos Articulos I y 
II del Protocolo referentes a Cuba, 
Puerto Eico 6 islas de las Antilias 
y la isla de las Ladrones, que ha de 
ser cedida. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles mani- 
festaron que se reservaban el de- 
recho de estudiar la mocion pre- 
sentada, a fin de presentar otro 
proyecto de articulos con arreglo 
al Protocolo, levantandose la se- 
sion despu6s de haber convenido 
el volver a reunirse el dia 19 del 
corrieute a las 2 de la tarde. 
E. Montero Bios 

B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE G ARNICA 

W E de Villa Urrutia 
Eafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 0. 

The American Commissioners having listened with great respect to 
the arguments orally urged by the Spanish Commissioners, in support 
of the articles offered by them, as well as duly considered the written 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

memorandum submitted in support of the same, musl adhere to the 
rejection thereof as stated in the memorandum of the A.merican 
missioners read to the Commission and attached to the protocol of the 
11th instant. The chief additional reason adduced in the oral presen 
tation for the acceptance of sovereignty by the United States in Cuba 
is that without such acceptance the people of Cuba notably of Spanish 
origin will have no protection of person and property. The I i 
States recognizes in the fullest measure that in requiring the relinquish- 
ment of all claim of Spanish sovereignty and the evacuation of the 
Island of Cuba it has assumed all the obligations imposed by I lie canons 
of international law and flowing from its occupation. The United 
Slates, so far as it has obtained possession, has enforced obedience to 
law and the preservation of order by all persons. It has no disposition 
to leave the island a prey to anarchy or misrule. 

As the Spanish Commissioners strenuously urge that the acceptance 
of sovereignty includes the assumption of the so-called Cuban i 
and as it is evident that this question divides the Commission and stays 
its progress, the American Commissioners, having carefully consi 
the arguments of the Spanish Commissioners, must again and finally 
decline to accept this burden either for the United States or for Cuba. 
In the articles proposed by the American Commissioners on the third 
instant there were contained certain stipulations which, the American 
Commissioners believed, while not enlarging the Protocol, would effect- 
ually preserve the evidence of title to property and make (dear the 
nature of public property and rights included in the relinquishment of 
sovereignty and title. It having been urged that these, no less than 
the articles proposed by the Spanish Commissioners, enlarge the terms 
of the Protocol, the American Commissioners are now prepared, for the 
purpose of disposing of the question of Cuba, Porto Rico and Guam, 
simply to embody in the treaty the precise stipulations of the Protocol 
on those subjects, neither adding thereto nor subtracting therefrom. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, offer as a substitute for the^ 
articles heretofore presented by them, the following: 

"Article I.— Spain hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty 
over and title to Cuba. 

"Article II.— Spain hereby cedes to the United States the Island 
of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, and also the Island of Guam in the Ladrones." 

True copy: 

Joins" B. Moore. 



Protocol No. 7. Protocolo No. 7. 

Conference of October 21, 1898. Conferencia del 21 de Octubre de 

J 1898. 

In the protocol of the conference En el acta de la sesion del 1 7 de 

of October 17th, it is stated that an corriente, se fijd el dia 19 para 

adjournment was taken to Wednes- proxima conferencia, pero habienao 

day the 19th. On the 18th of Oc- rogado el Presidente de la 

tober the President of the Span- mision Espanola el dia 18, al J res 

ish Commission made to the Presi- idente de la Comision amencana, 

dent of the American Commission que se aplazase dicha coutei e 

arequest that the next meeting be para el 21, a fin de que los Comi- 

postponed to the 21st. of October, sionados Espauoles pudiesen pre 

in order that the Spanish Commis- sen tar en ella ciertos documentor. 



54 



TREATY OP PEACE. 



sioners might have an opportunity 
to prepare certain papers for sub- 
mission to the Joint Commission. 

The reassembling of the Joint 
Commission was therefore post- 
poned until Friday, the 21st of 
October, at two o'clock, p. m., at 
which hour there were present: 

On the part of the United States : 
Messrs. Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain : Messrs : 
Montero Eios Abarzuza Garnica 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding ses- 
sion was read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they, bad telegraphed 
to their Government the represen- 
tations made to them by the Span- 
ish Commissioners at the last ses- 
sion, as to the reports of the send- 
ing of two American men-of-war 
with reinforcements for the garrison 
at Manila and of the ill treatment 
of Spanish prisoners by the Taga- 
los, but that they had as yet re- 
ceived no reply, probably because 
of the absence of the President 
from Washington. 

The Spanish Commissioners ex- 
pressed their thanks for the action 
of the American Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
stated that they regretted to re- 
ject the proposals presented by 
the American Commissioners at 
the last session, and that they 
therefore presented certain articles 
as a substitute for the articles pre- 
viously submitted by them in rela- 
tion to Cuba and Porto Pico. 

An adjournment was taken to 
Monday, the 24th of October at 
two o'clock, p. m., in order that an 
opportunity might be afforded for 
the translation and examination of 
the new articles. 

William K. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

Wm. P. Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



se convino en que se aplazase hasta 
dicha fecha y en virtud de este 
acuerdo se reunen hoy a las 2 de 
la tarde las dos Comisiones hal- 
landose presentes. 



Por parte de los Estados Unidos 
de America, los Seiiores Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

Por parte deEspana los Senores 
Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero Ojeda 

Se leyo y fue aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manifestaron que habian telegrafia- 
do a su Gobierno lo que los Espafio- 
les les encargaron transmitirle re- 
specto del envio de dos buques de 
guerra americanos con refuerzos 
para la guarniciou de Manila y del 
mal trato que a los prisioneros es- 
paholesdaban los tagalos,pero que 
aim no habian recibido contesta- 
cion, debido probablemente a la 
ausencia de Washington del Presi- 
dente. 

Los Comisionados Espaholes ex- 
presaron con este inotivo su agra- 
decimiento a los Americanos. 

Los Comisionados Espaiioles 
manifestaron quesentian tener que 
rechazar los articulos presentados 
por los Comisionados Americanos 
en la ultima sesion, y que en con- 
secuencia presentaron entonces un 
nuevo proyecto de articulos de tra- 
tado destinado a sustituir a los que 
presentaron anterior mente, rela- 
tivos a Cuba y a Puerto Eico. 

Con el objeto de perraitir la tra- | 
duccion y el examen de estos 
nuevos articulos, se convino en que 
la proxima sesion tendria lugar 
Lunes 24 del corriente a las 2 P 



SWJS 

que I 
ir el 

.M. 



E. Montero Eios 

B. de Abarzuza 

J. de Garnica 

W E de Villa Urrutia 

Eafael Cerero 

Emilio de Ojeda 



treaty of peace. [>[) 

Annex to Protocol No. 7. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los est ados unidos 

articulo 1°. 

Su Majestad Catolica la Eeina Eegente de Espaiia, eii nombre de bu 
augusto hijo Dou Alfonso XIII, Eey do Espaiia, constitution almente 
autorizada por las Cortes del Eeino, renuncia a su soberania y ;i todo 
derecho sobre Cuba. 

Los Estados Unidos de America, aceptando esta renuncia, reciben 
de Espaiia la Isla de Cuba para prestarle ayuda y direction y tenerla 
en su dominio y gobierno hasta que, una, vez realizada su paciticaci6n, 
dejen dicho dominio y gobierno al pueblo cubano. 

Articulo 2°. 

La renuncia y transferencia que Lace Su Majestad Catolica y que 
aceptan los Estados Unidos de America, comprende: 

1. Cuantas prerrogativas, atribuciones y derechos correspondan a Su 
Majestad Catolica, como parte de su soberania sobre la Isla de Cuba y 
sus babitantes. 

2. Cuantas cargas y obligaeiones pecuniarias pendientes al ratificarse 
este Tratado de paz, que previo un minucioso examen de su origen, ob- 
jeto y condiciones de su creation, deban reputarse, segun derecho estric- 
to e innegable equidad, distiutas de las que son propias y pecnliares 
del Tesoro de la Peninsula y baber sido siempre propias ypeculiares de 
Cuba. 

Para hacer el riguroso examen que se prescribe en el parrafo anterior, 
se nombrara por las dos Altas Partes contratantes una Comision de 
personas competentes e imparciales, segiin se determinara en el Articulo 
correspondiente de este tratado. 

Articulo 3°. 

En cumplimiento de lo convenido en los dos artfculos anteriores Su 
Majestad Catolica, en la representation con que celebra este Tratado, 
renuncia y transfiere a los Estados Unidos todos los edincios, muelles, 
cuarteles, fortalezas, establecimientos, vias publicas y deiuas bienes 
inmuebles que, con arreglo a derecho son de dominio publico, y quo 
como de tal dominio publico, corresponden a la Corona de Espafia en la 
Isla de Cuba. 

Quedan por lo tanto exceptuados de esta renuncia y transterencia 
todos los derechos y bienes de cualquiera clase que sean que, hasta la 
ratification del presente tratado, Layan venido pacificamente poseyendo, 
en concepto de dueuos, las Provincias, Municipios, Establecimi 




idquirir y poseer 

quiera que sea su nationalidad. , 

Su Majestad Catolica renuncia tambidn y transfiere a os list 
Unidos, a quien se le entregaran por el Gobierno espanol, todos los u«»« 
mentos y titulos que se refieran exclusivamente a la soberania wans- 
ferida y aceptada y a todos sus derechos, que existan en los Ay 
de la Peninsula, Habiendo de faeilitarle copias cuaiido los J^stauo 
Unidos las reclamaren, de la parte correspondiente a diciia sooerau 



/ 



56 TREATY OF PEACE. 

que contengan los demas documentos y titulos que se refieran adeinas 
a otros asuutos distintos de la Is]a de Cuba y de su soberania y de- 
rechos, que existan en los inencionados Archivos. Una regla analoga 
habra reciprocamente de observarse a favor de Espaiia respecto 4 los 
documentos y titalos agenos en todo 6 en parte a la Isla de Cuba que 
se ballen actualniente en sus Archivos y que interesen al Gobierno 
espanol. 

Todos los Archivos y Eegistros oficiales, asf administrativos coino 
judiciales, que estan a disposicion del Gobierno de Espaiia y de sus 
Autoridades en la Isla de Cuba, y que se refieran a la misnia Isla 6 a 
sus habitantes y a sus derechos y bienes, quedaran sin reserva de nin- 
guno de esta clase, a disposicion de los Estados Unidos para que los 
conserve 6 disponga de ellos con las misinas facultades que hasta ahora 
ban tenido sobre los mismos el Gobierno espanol y sus Autoridades. 
Los particulares, asi espaiioles como cubanos, tendran derecho a sacar, 
con arreglo a las leyes, las copias autorizadas de los contratos, testa- 
nientos y demas documentos que formen parte de los protocolos nota- 
riales 6 que se custodier! en los Archivos administrativos y judiciales, 
bien 6stos se ballen en Espaiia 6 en la Isla de Cuba. 

Articulo 4°. 

En compensaci6n de las pe*rdidas y gastos ocasionados a los Estados 
Unidos por la guerra y a las reclamaciones de sus conciudadanos con 
motivo de los dafios y perjuicios que hubieren sufrido en sus personas 
y bienes durante la ultima insurrecion de Cuba, Su Majestad Catolica, 
en nombre y representacion de Espaiia, y constitucionalmente autori- 
zada por las Cortes del Eeino, cede a los Estados Unidos de America, 
y estos aceptan para si mismos, la Isla de Puerto Eico y las otras Islas 
que actualmente estan bajo la soberanfa espailola en las Indias Occi- 
dentales, asi como la Isla de Guam, en el Archipielago de las Marianas 
6 Ladrones, que fu( ; elegida por los Estados Unidos de America en 
virtud de lo convenido en el Articulo 2° del Protocolo firmado en Wash- 
ington el 12 de Agosto ultimo. 

Articulo 5°. 

Esta cesion de la soberania sobre el territorio y habitantes de Puerto 
Eico y las demas islas mencionadas se entiende que consiste en la cesion 
de los derechos y obligaciones, bienes y documentos relativos 4 la 
soberania de dichas islas, ignales a los que respecto a la renuncia y 
transferencia de la soberania de la Isla de Cuba, se definen en los 
articulos anteriores. 

Esta conforme: 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 7. 

Article I. 

Her Catholic Majesty, the Queen Eegentof Spain, in the name of her 
August Sou Don Alfonzo XIII, King of Spain, thereunto constitution- 
ally authorized by the Cortes of the Kingdom, relinquishes her sover- 
eignty over and title to Cuba. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

The United States of America, accepting said rclin 
the Island of Cuba from Spain to lend it aid and guidanc 
under their control and government until, the pacification tlx 
ized, they leave said control and government to the Cuban pcoj 

Article II. 

The relinquishment and transfer made by Her Catholic, Majesty and 
accepted by the United States of America embrace: 

1. All prerogatives, attributes and rights appertaining to I fer < Jatho- 
lie Majesty as part of her sovereignty over the island of Cuba and its 
inhabitants. 

2. All pecuniary charges and obligations outstanding upon the rati- 
fication of this treaty of peace which, alter a minute examination into 
their origin, purpose, and the conditions of their creation, should be 
held, pursuant to strict law and undeniable to be distinct from 
such as are properly and peculiarly chargeable to the treasury of the 
Peninsula, and to have been always properly and peen i irly Cuban. 

To make the strict examination provided for in tin 
graph, the two High Contracting Parties shall name a ( 
competent and impartial persons in the manner to be determined in the 
proper article of this treaty. 

Article III. 

In obedience to the stipulations of the two preceding articles. Tier 
Catholic Majesty, in the representative character with which she 
eludes this treaty, relinquishes and transfers to the United Stat. 
the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, establishments, public high- 
ways and other immovable property which in conformity with lav 
of the public domain, and which being of the public domain belong to 
the Crown of Spain in the Island of Cuba. 

Therefore there are excepted from this relinquishment and trai 
all rights and property of whatsoever kind which up to the ratification 
of this treaty may havebeen peacefully enjoyed asownei 
inces, municipalities, public or private establishments, 
or civil bodies and any other associations having legal capaci 
acquire and possess property in the Island of Cuba, and private indi- 
viduals, whatever may be their nationality. 

Her Catholic Majesty also relinquishes and transfers to ti: 
States, to which they shall be delivered by the Spanish Governn 
documents and titles exclusively referring to the sovereignty trai 
and accepted, and to all its rights, which may exist m the arch 
the Peninsula. Copies of the part relative to the said soa i •inch 

may appear in other documents, and titles, which refer mi - -t her 

matters distinct from the Island of Cuba or its sovereignty and i 
existing in said archives, must also be furnished when the 
shall require the same. A like rule must be reciprocal ly ol >ser 
respect to Spain in so far as relates to documents and titles un 
in whole or in part with the Island of Cuba that may now be m its 
archives and which are of interest to the Spanish Government. 

All official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, at tne 
disposal of the Government of Spain and of its authorities id l the Island 
of Cuba, and which refer to the said island or its "^^"u^i 
rights and property, shall remain without any reservation ^hatevei ol 
this kind at the disposal of the United States, to preserve the bame or 



58 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



dispose of them with the same authority exercised over them up to the 
present time by the Spanish Government and its authorities. Private 
parties, Spaniards as well as Cubans, shall have the right to make in 
accordance with law authenticated copies of the contracts, wills, and 
other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, all of which 
may be in the executive and judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or 
in the Island of Cuba. 

Article IV. 

As compensation for the losses and expenses occasioned the United 
States by the war and for the claims of its citizens by reason of the 
injuries and damages they may have suffered in their persons and 
property during the last insurrection in Cuba, Her Catholic Majesty, 
in the name and representation of Spain, and thereunto constitutionally 
authorised by the Cortes of the Kingdom, cedes to the United States 
of America, and the latter accept for themselves, the Island of Porto 
Kico and the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 
Indies, as also the Island of Guam in the Mariana or Ladrones Archi- 
pelago, which island was selected by the United States of America in 
virtue of the provisions of Article II of the Protocol signed in Wash- 
ington on August 12 last. 

Article V. 

This cession of the sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of 
Porto Rico and the other islands mentioned is understood to embrace 
the cession of the rights and obligations, property and documents relat- 
ing to the sovereignty of said islands alike in all respects to the relin- 
quishment and transfer of the sovereignty of the Island of Cuba as 
defined in the foregoing articles. 

True copy : Emilio de O jeda. 



Protocol No. 8 
Conference of October 24, 1898 



Present: On the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they had carefully con- 
sidered the articles tendered by the 
Spanish Commissioners at the last 
meeting, by which, while Spain was 
to relinquish sovereignty over 
Cuba, such relinquishment was to 
be accepted by the United States 
and wa s to include such charges and 
obligations, outstanding at the 
ratification of the treaty as should 
be held by a Commission not to be 
properly and peculiarly chargeable 



Protocolo No. 8. 

Conferencia del 24 de Octubre de 

1898. 

Presentes Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de America, los 
Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espaua los Seno- 
res Montero Rios Abarzuza, Gar- 
nica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

FuC leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisionados Americanos 
manifestaron que habian exami- 
nado con todo detenimiento los ar- 
ticulos presentados por los Comis- 
ionados Espanoles en la ultima 
sesion, en los quales Espafia hacia 
el abandono de su Soberania sobre 
Cuba que debia ser aceptada por 
los Estados Unidos comprendien- 
dose en dicho abandono y en su 
aceptacion todas las cargas y obli- 
gaciones existentes al tiempo de la 
ratification del tratado, que una 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



50 



to the treasury of the Peninsula, 
but to be properly and peculiarly 
Cuban, and. that they must reject 
the articlesin question as well as any 
articles that required the United 
States to assume, either for itself 
or for Cuba, the so-called Cuban 
debt. They were willing, however, 
to add to the article in which Spain 
relinquished sovereignity over and 
title to Cuba, a suitable stipulation 
by which the United States would 
assume the obligations as to the 
protection of life and property im- 
posed by its occupation, so long as 
such occupation should continue. 



After much discussion, the Presi- 
dent of the Spanish Commission 
stated that the Spanish Commis- 
sioners did not care for the phra- 
seology in which the relinquish- 
mentof sovereignty was expressed, 
so long as it embraced an obliga- 
tion as to debts, such as was stated 
in the second of the articles 
presented by them. 

The President of the American 
Commission, replying to this state- 
ment, inquired whether the Presi- 
dent of the Spanish Commission 
intended therebj' to say that the 
Spanish Commissioners would re- 
fuse to consider any articles as to 
Cuba and Porto Rico which con- 
tained no provision for the assump- 
tion of indebtedness by the United 
States, or Cuba, or both. 

The Spanish Commissioners hav- 
ing asked for time in which to reply 
to this inquiry, the conference was 
adjourned to YVednesday, October 
26, at four o'clock, p. m. 

William R. Day 

Oushman K. Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Eeid. 

Jokn B. Moore. 



Comision especial hnblera de cod 
siderar como no perteneciente 
afectas al Tesoro de la Peninsula, 
sino como inherences y peculiarea 
del de Cuba, auadiendo Ins Com- 
isionados Ames icanos que 
precisados a reclia/.ar los articuloa 
en cuestion, asi como cualesquiera 
otros en los que se exigiera 6 los 
Estados Unidos que asumiesen 
sea para si, ya para Cuba, Ins car- 
gas de la Deuda cubana ; pero que 
esteban sin embargo dispuesl 
aiiadir al articulo en que Espaiia 
hacia el abandono de su sober; 
y derechos sobre Cuba, una esti 
pulacion por la cual los Estados 
Unidos asumirian sobre si las obi i- 
gaciones relativas a la conserva 
cion de las vidas y propriedades de 
los habitantes de Cuba, que les 
imponia su ocupacion mientras 
esta durase. 

Despues de una prolongada dim- 
ension, manifesto el Presidente de 
los Comisarios Espanoles que la 
Comision Espanola no daba impor- 
taneia a la fraseologia en qu 
expresara el abandono de Sobera- 
nia, siempre que comprendiese el 
tratado una obligation respect) de 
las deudas. tal como fignraba en el 
articulo 2°delproyecto dearticulos 
presentado. 

El Presidente de la Comisim 
Americana contesta a esta declara- 
cibn preguntando si el Presidente 
de la Comision Espanola. entendia 
decir con esto que los Comisarios 
Espanoles se negaban a tomar en 
consideration cualesquiera articu- 
los respecto de Cuba 6 Porto Rico 
quenocontuviesen una disposici6n 
por la que asumiesen sus deudas 
los Estados Unidos 6 Cuba o ami >(.s. 

Los Comisionados espanoles ha- 
biendo pedido un plazo para con- 
testar a esta pregunta, se fijo la 
proxiina conferencia para el Mier- 
coles 26 de Octubre a las 4 P. M. 

E. Montero Rios 

B. de Abarzuza 

J. DE GARXLCA 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



60 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Protocol No. 9. 

Conference of October 26, 1898. 

Present On the part of the 
United States. Messrs Day 
Davis Frye Gray Eeid Moore Fer- 
gusson. 

On the part of Spain Messrs. 
Montero Rios Abarznza Garnica 
Villa-Urmtia Oerero Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The Spanish Commissioners filed 
under the rules a memorandum, 
copy and translation of which are 
hereto annexed, giving their rea- 
sons in support of the articles pre- 
sented by them on the 21st. of Oc- 
tober, and rejected by the Ameri- 
can Commissioners on the 21th. 

Tbe American Commissioners 
stated that they would file under 
tbe rules a written reply, which 
should be annexed to the protocol. 



The Spanish Commissioners then 
made to the inquiry addressed to 
them by the American Commis- 
sioners, at the close of the last ses- 
sion, the following reply: 

"The Spanish Commissioners, 
having become acquainted with 
the questions propounded to them 
at the end of the last conference 
by the President of the American 
Commission, — having read it and 
studied it in order to understand 
with all clearness its meaning and 
its scope; 

"Considering that in the confer- 
ence held by the two Commissions 
on the 14th of this month it was 
resolved that no agreement reached 
upon any article should be con- 
sidered as the final expression of 
the views and opinions of either 
Government on the points and mat- 
ter contained therein, until after an 
agreement should be reached on all 
other articles of the treaty, or in 
other words upon the whole of it: 

"Considering therefore that the 
question propounded by the Presi- 
dent of the American Commission 



Protocolo No. 9. 

Conferencia del 26 de Octubre de 

1808. 

Presentes, Por parte de los Bs- 
tados Unidos de America, los Se- 
noresDay, Davis. Frye, Gray, Keid, 
Moore, Fergus son. 

Por parte de Espaha los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios Espaholes pre- 
sentaron para su insercion en el 
protocolo segun reglamento un 
Memorandum cuya copia y traduc- 
tion son anexos, en el cual exponen 
sus razones en apoyo de los articu- 
los presentados por ellos el 21 del 
corriente y rechazados por los 
Comisarios Americanos el 24. 

Los Comisarios Americanos ofre- 
cieron dar su contestation escrita 
conforme al reglamento copia y 
traduction de la cual formaran 
parte del protocolo general de las 
conferencias. 

Los Comisarios espaholes dieron 
a la pregunta que al fin de la sesion 
anterior les dirigio la Comision 
Americana la contestation sigui- 
ente: 

" Enterados los Comisarios Espa- 
iioles de la pregunta que, al ter- 
minar la ultima conferencia, les 
hizo el Sr Presidente de la 
Comision Americana, y despues de 
haberla leido y estudiado aquellos 
para comprender con toda claridad 
su sentido y alcance : 

"Considerando que en la con- 
ferencia celebrada por ambas 
Comisiones el dia 14 de este raes, 
se convino en que el acuerdo de 
cualquier artfculo no podia con- 
siderarse como expresion definitiva 
de las miras y opiniones de uno u 
otro Gobierno sobre los puntos y 
materia contenida en dicho arti- 
culo, si no se llegaba a convenir 
en todos los del Tratado, 6 sea en 
su totalidad; 

"Considerando por lo tanto que 
la pregunta hecha por el Senor 
Presidente de la Comision Ameri- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



61 



cannot now be given any answer, 
wliieh without violation of the reso- 
lution unanimously adopted by the 
two Commissions at the aforesaid 
conference of the 14th instant, may 
involve the final approval of the 
article or articles to which the 
question refers : 

"Considering furthermore that 
even in case such resolution as the 
above had not been agreed upon 
by the Commissioners, its adoption 
would have been required by the 
very nature and essence of the 
mission entrusted to them, which 
is to frame a treaty of peace, set- 
tling not only the question of the 
Antilles but also that of the Phil- 
ippine Islands and all other ques- 
tions, even of lesser importance, 
which may exist between the two 
High Contracting Parties: 

"Considering that this treaty is 
not to be framed, as no other 
treaty has, or can, be ever framed, 
upon the exclusive basis of strict 
justice, as understood by each 
party, but also upon the basis of 
the advantage to be derived by 
either or by both, thus modifying 
in harmony therewith the demands 
of strict law; and that, therefore, 
the Spanish Commissioners, al- 
though understanding that strict 
law decides the question of the 
Cuban debt in their favor, are in 
duty bound and are willingto mod- 
erate the said strictness in view of 
the advantages which Spain may 
derive from other stipulations of 
the treaty which, without being- 
prejudicial to the United States, 
may be favorable to Spain; 



"Considering therefore that the 
article or articles to which the 
President of the American Com- 
mission refers can not at this time 
be the subject of final approval, 
since they must remain subject to 
the others to be included in the 
same treaty, meeting the approval 
of both High Parties: — 



"The Spanish Commissioners 



cananopuede ten 

iciini que implique una 
eion deiiniiiva del articulo 6 .. 
culos a que dicha pregunta 
ere, a no infriugirse lo convi 
por unanimidad pur ambi 
sionesenla confei obrediclia 

del 14 de este m 

"Considerandoademas,qu 
queasi aquellos no la hubierau 
venido, loexigia lo indole y la 
pria esenciade lamision que le 
sido confiada y que coi 
borar un solo Tratado de 
que queden resueltas no 
cuestion de las Autillas, sii 
bien la de Filipinas y cualquier 
otra, aunque s mte 

que exista entre las dos Altas Par- 
tes: 



"Considerando quo no habiendo 
de elaborarse este Tratado, como 
uunca se ha elaborado ni pi: 
elaborarse ninguno, con el anico 
criterio de la rigurosa justicia que 
cada una de las Partes pueda en- 
tender que le asista, sino tambien 
con el de la conveniencia de cada 
una de ellas y aun de ambas, para 
modificar a su tenor las exigencias 
del criterio meramente juridico, y 
que por consiguiente, sobre la 
cuestion relativa a la deuda dv 
Cuba, los Comisarios Espan< 
queentienden queel rigor del 1 ! 
cho la resuelve a su favor, tienen el 
deber y estan dispuestos a cuinp- 
lirlo, de moderareste rigor, poi 
conveniencias que para Bspaha 
puedan surgir de otras estipula- 
ciones del Tratado, que, sin ser per- 
judiciales a los Kstados Unidos, 
"puedan serfavorables a Espai a: 

"Considerando por lo taut 
el articulo 6 articulos a que si 
fiere la pregunta del Senor 1' 
dente de la Comision Americana, 
no pueden ser por hoy ol 
una aprobacion definitiva, pu 
que no pueden menos de qu 
subordinados a que 1< 
han de ser incluidos en el m - 
Tratado merezcan tambien la apro- 
bacion de Ambas Altes Partes: 

" Los Comisarios Espanoles con- 



62 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



answer the said question by stat- 
ing that, reiterating their convic- 
tion that pursuant to law the colo- 
nial obligations of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico must follow these islands and 
their sovereignty, they do not re- 
fuse 'to consider any articles as to 
Cuba and Puerto Rico which con- 
tain no provision for the assump- 
tion of indebtedness by the United 
States, or Cuba, or both', subordi- 
nating the tinal approval of such 
articles to that of the others which 
are to form the complete treaty, 
and they, therefore, invite the 
American Commissioners to enter 
upon the discussion of the other 
points to be embodied in the Treaty, 
and, at the outset, to take up the 
discussion of the Philippine Archi- 
pelago, and to propose to the 
Spanish Commissioners what they 
understand should be agreed upon 
in said Treaty with respect to this 
subject." 

The American Commissioners, 
after the reading of this paper, 
inquired whether they were to un- 
derstand that the Spanish Com- 
missioners accepted the articles 
previously presented by them as 
to Cuba, Porto Rico, and. Guam. 

The Spanish Commissioners re- 
plied that they accepted them in 
the sense stated in the paper — 
provisionally, subject to the con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace. 



On motion of the American Com- 
missioners, the conference was ad- 
journed to the 27th of October, at 
two o'clock, p. m. 



William R. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
Wi. P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 
John B. Moore. 



testan 4 la sobredicha pregunta 
diciendo que afirniando su convic- 
cion de que con arreglo a Derecho 
las obligaciones coloniales de Cuba 
y PuerteRico deben pasarcon estas 
islas y sus oberania 'no rehusan 
tomar en consideracion cualquier 
otro articulo relativo a Cuba y 
Puerto Rico, que no contenga la 
clausula de asumir las cargas por 
los Estados Unidos 6 por Cuba 6 
por ambos', subordinando la defiui- 
tiva aprobacion de tal articulo a la 
de los dermis que hayan de formar 
la totalidad del Tratado; e" invitan, 
en su cousecuencia, a los Seiiores 
Comisarios Americanos, 4 que se 
proceda 4 la discusion de los demas 
puntos que en el Tratado se han de 
compreuder, y desde luego 4 la del 
relativo al Archipielago filipiuo, 
proponiendo a los Comisarios Es- 
paholes lo que entiendan que debe 
convenirse en aquel sobre este 
asunto." 

Despu6"s de dada lectura de esta 
contestacion, los Comisarios ameri- 
canos preguntaron si debiau enten- 
der por ella que los Comisarios 
espanoles aceptaban los articulos 
presentados por la Comision amer- 
icana relativos 4 Cuba, Puerto 
Rico y Guam. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles con- 
testaron que los aceptaban en el 
sentido expresado en su documen- 
to, y subordinada su aceptacion a 
la aprobacion de los demas articu- 
los que haya de contener el Tratado 
de paz. 

A propuesta de los Comisarios 
Americanos, se aplazo la proxima 
conferencia para el 27 de Octubre 
4 las 2 P. M., a fin de que los Comi- 
sarios Americanos pudieran estu- 
diar con todo detenimiento la con- 
testacion dada por los Comisarios 
Espanoles. 

E. Montero Rios 

B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Ehilio de Ojeda 



treaty of peace. 
Annex to Protocol No. 9. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados un i 

[Memorandum presentado en la sosion do - 21 de Ootubre 1808.] 

Los Coinisarios espanoles se ban enterado con verdadera pena del 
Memorandum presentado por los Senores Coniisarios americanos en la 
eonferencia ultima celebrada en 17 del corriente. En este documeuto 
dichos Senores, fundandose eu afiruiacioiies y apreciaciones con cuya 
exaetitud la Comision espaiiola no puede manifestarse conforme, ;i pesar 
de la recta intention con que, no duda, que l'ueron expuestas, concluyen 
aquellos por manifestar que sustituyen el proyecto de los dos articulos 
sobre Cuba y las demas islas, que habian presentado en la eonferencia 
de 3 del corriente, con otros dos, reducidos a la copia literal de los dos 
primeros articulos del Protocolo de Washington, alegando para esto quo 
entienden que el Tratado de paz, en cuanto se refiere a la soberania do 
las Antillas y de la Isla de Guam en las Marianas, no debe contener 
mas ni menos que la reproduction literal de aquellos dos articulos. 

Mas como estos ya forman parte de un Convenio obligatorio cual lo 
es el Protocolo de Washington, parece intitil haeer de ellos una mera 
reproduction en el tratado que ha de elaborarse en la eonferencia. Los 
contratos, asi en el orden privado como en el international, son per- 
fectos, y producen todos sus efectos para las partes que los hayan otor- 
gado, sin necesidad de ninguna confirmation posterior que en nada puede 
aumentar su efieacia. Parece, por esto, redundante esta reproduccion, 
si a ella se ha de limitar el Tratado de paz sobre las Antillas, como 
quieren los Seiiores Comisarios americanos. 

Si esta consideration es de pura razon y aun de mero buen sentido, 
la propuesta de los Comisarios americanos no se comprende sino en el 
supuesto de que estos entienden que el Tratado, aparte de cualquier 
disposition de caracter secundario que en el pueda inciuirse, no debe 
versar mas <}ue sobre el Arehipielago Filipino. 

Si tal es el pensamiento de la Comision Americana, la Espaiiola no 
puede prestarle su aseutimiento porque entiende que su ejecucion seria 
una infraction del Protocolo. 

Despues de las tres condiciones que el Seiior Secretario de Estado de 
Washington, contestando en 31 de Julio ultimo alMensaje del Gobierno 
de Su Majestad Catolica, de 22 del mismo mes, propuso i i para 

terminar la guerra, dijo: "Si las condiciones ofrecidas aqui son acep- 
tadas en su integridad, los Estados Unidos nombraran Comisarios que 
se encontraran con los igualmente autorizados por E span a, con objeto 
de arreglar los detalles del Tratado de pas y de firmarlo en las condi- 
ciones arriba expresadas." Estos detalles no aparecen circunscritos al 
archipi61ago. 

El propio Seiior Presidente de la Eepublica Americana, en la eonfe- 
rencia que celebro el 10 de Agosto con el Senor Embajador de Fi , 
representante de Espana para el caso, distinguio perfectamente el 
tocolo del tratado de paz, diciendo que aquti debia ser un mero documen to 
preliminar que no tendria por objeto ni por efecto mas que cons 
sin dilation alguna el acuerdo de los dos Gobiernos sobre los pru 
mismos de la paz, y que, por lo tanto, no seria necesano reservar en el, m 
los derechos de las Cortes, ni los del Senado federal, llamados unicamente 
a ratificar el Tratado definitivo. _ . 

El Sehor Presidente, es verdad, hablo del asunto de las t llipmas para 
decir que quedaba reservado a la Conferencia de Pans, pero nunca dijo, 



64 TREATY OF PEACE. 

ni indico siquiera, que este asunto liabria de ser el unico que se trataria 
en esta Conferencia. 

Y finalmente, en el Articulo 5° del Protocolo, redactado de conformidad 
con todos estos precedentes, se dice que los Ooinisarios nombrados por 
ambas Altas Partes habian de proceder en Paris a negociar y concluir 
un Tratado de paz sin limitar ni concretar su objeto y empleando, por 
la inversa, una frase cuyo evidente sentido es que en el Tratado de paz 
que se elaborase por la Oomision habian de resol verse todas las cues- 
tiones, a la sazon pendientes, eutre los dos Estados, que no estuviesen 
resueltas ya en el acuerdo preliminar del Protocolo. 

Cierto es que los Senores Oomisarios Americanos fun dan precisamente 
su ultimo proyecto en la consideracion de que todo lo relativo a las 
Antillas espanolas ya fne" resuelto en el Protocolo. Mas a esta consi- 
deracion es precisamente a la que desde la primera conferencia no ban 
pociido ni pueden prestar su aseutimiento los Comisarios espafioles. 

Los Americanos en su Memorandum de 11 de este mes manifestaron 
que los Comisarios espanoles, ponian en su proyecto condiciones a la 
renuncia de la soberauia en Cuba. Gravisimo error. En aquel pro- 
yecto no se desconoee el caracter puro e incoudicional de tal renuncia, 
lo unico que alii se Lace es eonsignar en lo que esta renuncia consiste. 
Y esto es esencialmente diverso de lo que los Senores Comisarios 
Americanos en ti en den. 

Y que, e recti vamente, los articulo s del proyecto de los espanoles tiene 
por unico objeto fijar el sentido de la renuncia, pero no someterla a 
condiciones, esta demostrado por el objeto mismo dc las discusioues 
orales y escritas que vienen mediaudo eutre los unos y los otros. 

Los Senores Comisarios Americanos entienden que el unico sentido 
que puede darse a la renuncia de soberauia convenida en el Protocolo, 
es el propio del abandono de esta soberania; para deducir de aqui, que 
Espaiia debe abandonar la Isla de Oubacomo cualquier potencia puede 
abandonar un territorio desierto del Africa que antes hubiera poseido. 

Por mas que la Comision espanola distingue el sentido Juridieo de la 
palabra abandono del que es propio de la renuncia, no sostendria esta 
discusion tecnica, impropia de una Conferencia diploinatica, sino fuera 
porque la Comision Americana sostiene su opinion como el principal 
fundamento que da a su aspiracion de que, por tal supuesto abandono, 
quede cortado tpdo vinculo de dereclio y ninguno nuevo surja de aquel 
aeto, entre Espaiia y los Estados (Jnidos, al apoderarse de la Isla, bien 
en su propio nombre y para ellos inistnos, bien en nombre y para el 
pueblo cubauo. 

Pero esta aspiracion, sin ejemplo en los fastos diplomaticos del mundo, 
no pueden admitirla los Comisarios espanoles, dando por reproducido 
cuanto expusieron en el primer capitulo del Memorandum que presen- 
taron en contra del proyecto de articulado de la Comision Americana, y 
auaden las breves consideraciones siguientes, que les sugieren los dos 
Memorandum ultiniamente presentados por la misma. 

Deja la espanola a un lado la cita que, en apoyo de su opinion, la 
Comision Americana liace del Diccionario de Escriche, que es una obra 
muy respetable ciertamente, pero cuyo unico objeto es la exposicion de 
la jurisprudeucia practica del Derecho privado, exposicion muy popular, 
es verdad, en Espaiia, porque sirve de mentor a los jovenes abogados 
en el primer periodo de su vidaprofesioual, pero que es completamente 
agena a la ciencia del Derecho internacional y publico. 

Casos de abandono, en el sentido que se pretende, no registra la his- 
toria moderna de los pueblos mas que los de territories desiertos, 6 a lo 
sumo, poblados por las tribus barbaras del Africa. Abandono de un 



TREATY OF PEACE. C. r ) 

verdadero Estado, ya formado, de existencia secular, con una organiza- 
tion social y politica completa y poblado de habitantes que gozan y 
tienen derecho agozarde todos los beneficios de la civilization moderna, 
no ha habido hasta ah or a, ni creen los Comisarios espanoles <i" r '" 
habra en el mundo. 

Los territories abandonados son legitimamente ocupadoa |>or el 
Estado que quiera establecer en ellos su soberania. Mas esta ocupa- 
cion, meramente de hecho, no. impoue al ocupante otros deberes mas 
que los que en las regiones de Africa cumplen las potencias de Europa 
con las barbaras tribus que los pueblan 6 los recorren. j Oree la 
Comision Americana que los Estados Unidos eu concept*) de ocupantes 
de la Isla de Cuba, puesto que este es el iinico en que segun el supuesto 
que defienden, habran de posesionarsede ella, no han de tener para con 
los habitantes de la graude Antilla mas deberes que los que se cum plea 
con aquellos degradados seres hunianos? 

Tenemos la completa seguridad de que no es tal el pensamiento de los 
Senores Comisarios Americanos, pero a esta consecuencia fatalmente 
conduce a la Comision americana, su empeno en negar toda differentia 
de derecho entre los efectos del abandono y los efectos de la renuncia. 

A esta no obsta la protesta de los Senores Comisarios Americanos en 
su ultimo Memorandum, afirmando que los Estados Unidos dispensaran 
a los habitantes de Cuba y a sus propiedades toda la protection que 
necesiten, como vienen haciendolo en la pequena portion de territorio 
que en la isla ya ocupan por la fuerza de las armas. i Creen los Estados 
Unidos que a Espana con relation 4 la Isla de Cuba y a sus habitantes, 
no deben reconoc; rsele por aquellos m6s derechos al dejar su soberania, 
que los que Estados Unidos 6 cualquiera otra Potencia se apresurarian 
a reconocer a la m6s desgraciada de las tribus africanas de cnyo territorio 
se apoderaran? Pero, aparte de que ellos mismos no dan a esta obliga- 
tion que dicen que tienen, mas fundamento que el hecho de ser posee- 
dores de la Isla, lo cual confirma lo que acabamos de indicar, tambien 
es cierto que dichos Senores Comisarios no se prestan a que esta, ni otra 
obligacion alguna de los Estados Unidos, seconsigneen el tratado qne, 
segun exigen, ha de limitarse A la reproduccion de los dos primeroa 
artfculos del Protocolo. Por lo tanto esaobligacion que en el Memoran- 
dum dicen que contraen no sera exigible por no constar en el Tratado. y 
sin animo de ofensa para los Estados Unidos, la logica no permite que 
se niegue en absoluto, la posibilidad de que pase, en mas 6 en menos, 
con ella, lo que con las obligaciones que expontaneamente contrageron 
los Estados Unidos en las negociaciones que prepararon el Protocolo 
y que, esto no obstante, los Senores Comisarios americanos se niegan a 
que cousten en el Tratado. 

Las Camaras de los Estados Unidos en su resolucion conjunta, y el 
Seiior Presidente de la Union en su ultimatum a Rspana, pudo exigir 
a esta Kacion, aunque intitil es decir que Espana no hubiera accedido 
A tan enorme exigencia. el abandono absoluto de su soberania en Cuba 
en el sentido en que ahora lo exigen sus Comisarios, como pudo tamtm n 
exigirle su cesion franca y libre de toda carga a los Estados Unidos. 
Mas lo cierto es oue no lo exigio, porque se limito a reclainarle la renun- 
>ara que el pueblo cubano/wem libre e mdependtente, 



no consmtio y antes Dien exigio, que esta, icuu^^c. x — -., --— - - » , 
hecha a favor de los Estados Unidos, para aquel pueblo a quien los 
Estados Unidos habian de prestar ayuda y direccion, porqiie no j te 
otro modo era posible que la Isla de Cuba dejara de pasar directa e 
T P 5 



66 TREATY OF PEACE. 

inmediatnmente del poder de Espana al del pueblo cubano, para haber 
de permanecer en poder de los Estados Unidos hasta la pacificacion de 
la isla. Esto nos parece que los Seiiores Coinisarios Americanos no 
pueden menos de reconocerlo coino rigurosamente exacto. 

Y si tales fueron los terminos en que los Estados Unidos encerraron 
su exigencia a que al fin accedio Espana sin que aquellos los hubiesen 
previamente modificado, es claro como la luz del Sol, que el convenio de 
que es formula el articulo 1° del Protocolo, (pues otro no se celebro entre 
las dos Altas Partes) tiene necesariamente que entenderse en el sentido 
de los terminos en que fue propuesto por una de ellas, y aceptado por 
la otra, y que no es licito ahora a cualquiera de ellas alterar estos termi- 
nos con el fin de convertir aquella renuncia, exigida para un objeto 
determinado, y 4 tenor de un procedimiento establecido, en un abandono 
absoluto sin el objeto y procedimiento couvenidos, como el que pretende 
la Comision Americana que se haga. 

No es pues el caso del abandono que la Comision Americana exige, 
sino el de la renuncia convenida que la Espanola sostiene, el que ha de 
consignarse en el tratado. Es un caso analogo a tantos otros por que 
ban pasado las potencias eoloniales cuando perdieron su soberania en 
todas 6 parte de sus colonias. Jamas una potencia colonial abandono, 
en el sentido que ahora se quiere imponer, una colonia para que se 
convirtiese en un nuevo Estado independiente y libre. Cuando esto 
sucedio, la Metropoli cedio 6 renuncio su soberania, si antes la colonia 
misma no la babia conquistado por la fuerza de las armas, pero jamas 
la abandono en el sentido sobredicbo. Si los Seuores Coinisarios ameri- 
canos no estan conformes con esta categorica afirmacion, les rogamos 
que nos citen un caso que la contiadiga. 

Los Coinisarios espanoles ruegan tambien 4 los Seuores Comisarios 
americanos que fijen su atencion, tan ilustrada y serena, en la contra- 
diccion palpitante que resalta entre su teoria y los hechos que los 
Estados Unidos vienen llevando 4 cabo. Segun la Comision Americana 
la unica situation legal posible sobre la Isla de Cuba, entre Espana de 
una parte y los Estados Unidos por si, 6 en nombre del pueblo cubano, 
de la otra, es la siguiente: Espana debe abaudonar la Isla de Cuba. 
Los Estados Unidos despuds del abandono ban de posesiouarse de la 
Isla para el pueblo cubano. 

Y por consiguiente el transito de la Gran Antilla de una a otra situa- 
cion, ba de bacerse sin estableeerse vinculo algnno de derecbo entre 
Espana y su antigua colonia y por ella los Estados Unidos. Pues bien, 
las fuerzas de los Estados Unidos rindieron a Santiago de Cuba, y 
firmaron con las Autoridades militares espanolas una capitulacion. En 
esta no exigicron que las fuerzas de la Metropoli abandonaran 4 Santia- 
go de Cuba, sino que se lo entregaran 4 las Autoridades americanas, 
formandose inventario, que firmaron ambas partes, en el cual consta 
cuauto la una entrego y la otra recibio. La Comision americana que 
est4 en la Habana, por baber sido nombrada en cumplimiento de lo 
prescrito en el Articulo 4° del Protocolo exige 4 la Comision espanola 
que le entregue todo lo que 4 Espana correspondia en uso de su sobe- 
rania, asi en lo civil como en lo military esto, en virtuddeinstrucciones 
expresas de su Gobierno, y por demas est4 el decir que esta entrega 
tambien ba de ser en forma de inventario. 

Ante estos hechos &es posible negar que Espana, al renunciar 4 su 
soberania en Cuba, exigen los Estados Unidos que se la entregue 4 
ellos mismos? 

Pues aun bay mas que esto: la Comision Americana, 4 pesar de la 
teoria que sostiene, ha acomodado sus primeros actos 4 la que sostiene 
la espaliola. En el p4rrafo 2° del articulo 1° que aquella presento en 3 



TREATY OF PEACE. 67 

de octubre, llama cesion (no abandono) a la renuncia do la soberania de 
Espafia eu Cuba. Y esto no se puede explicar por ana Bimpleincorrcc- 
cion de lenguaje, porque en el Articulo L >H fija cuales han de Ber lo 
tos de la cesion dela soberania de Puerto Rico,yemplea para fijai • 
efectos, las mismas, exaetamente las mismas frases, que acababa ile 
emplear en el Articulo l°parafijar los dela renuncia de la soberania en 
Cuba. Prueba acabada de que, segun la Comision Americana, 3 
de sus opiniones sostenidas al calor de la controversia con la espanola, 
al redactar su primer proyecto entendia que los efectos de la ren 
de la soberania eran los mismos, exaetamente los mismos, que los de bu 
cesion. 

Y si quisiera decirse que aunque sean iguales los efectos, la renuncia, 
que la Comision Americana llama abandono, se distingue de la cesion en 
que aquella no se bace con relaeion a nadie que haya de adquirir el 
territorio abandonado, y por el coutrario, la cesion se hace 3 favor de 
quien haya de adquirir el territorio cedido. tampoco los Comisarios 
Americanos marcaron esta diferencia en su proyecto, porque, hablaudo 
en ambos articulos de los Arcbivos y demas papeles que habian de ser 
objecto de la renuncia 6 cesion, dicen por igual eu los dos, empleando 
las mismas frases, que toda copia legalizada de aquellos documentos 
que pudiera ser requerida por uu funcionario del Gobierno espanol, se 
le expedini en todo tiempo, y esto es ininteligible sino en el sentido de 
que ha de baber quien pueda expedir tal copia. Y no sera" posible esl a 
expedition sino por quien tenga en su poder el documento que ha de 
copiar. Y no puede tenerlo en su poder quien no lo haya recibido. 
Por consiguiente los Comisarios Americanos al establecer en el Articulo 
1° las reglas conceruientes a la entrega de los Archivos de la Isla de 
Cuba, partian del supuesto de que esa entrega babia de ser hecha ;i 
alguien. Y eso, y nada mas que eso, es lo que consignaron eu el arti- 
culo 2°, respecto a la entrega de los Arcbivos de la Isla de Puerto Rico. 

La Comision amerieana acude para sostener su inaceptable opinion 
sobre el abandono por Espana de la Isla de Cuba, a la diferencia qne 
cousta en el Protocolo mismo. JJicen que Espana so presto solamente 
a ceder a Puerto Eico a los Estados Unidos, entretanto que respecto 
a la Isla de Cuba se obligd a renunciarla. De esto deducen que los 
efectos de la obligation de Espana, respecto a una Antilla, son mas 
amplios que respecto a la otra. Ya bemos probado con el texto pro- 
pio del proyecto de articulado de dicbos Senores que ni ami esta di- 
ferencia en los efectos con relaeion a Espana entreveian ellos, al redactar 
su proyecto, que existia. La diferencia, no obstante, se comprende bien 
bajo otro aspecto. Los Estados Unidos exigicron a Espana y despu£s le 
declararon la guerra para que Cuba fuera libre e independieute. ^ claro 
esque babiendo vencido ya nopodian exigirleque se lacediese,dejaudo 
4 un lado la libertad e independencia de la Isla, porque esto dana 
motivo al mundo para creer que tal libertad e independencia no habia 
sido la verdadera causa del contiicto. ^o le hicieron la misma exigencia 
respecto a Puerto Rico, y si reclamaron despiu s la soberania de a 
pequeSa Antilla, y de las demas que rodean 4 la Grande (y que haran 
en lo porvenir imposible su independencia, sin la voluntad y gracioso 
consentimiento de los Estados Unidos, que sierapre la tendrftn a su 




sufrido durante la insurreccion colonial. Esta es la natural esplicaci< in 
de que en el Protocolo aparezca la soberania de una isla como renuu- 
ciada y la de las otras como cedida. 



68 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Los Comisarios espafioles entienden por todo lo diclio, que es para ellos 
un deber includible, el continuar sosteniendo que la renuncia de la 
soberania en Cuba, a que se obligo Espana en el articulo del Protocolo, 
debe entenderse no abandono de la soberania en el sentido que dan a la 
frase los Sefiores Comisarios americanos, sino en el de renuncia pro- 
piamente dicha, tal como se ha empleado en el ejemplar escrito en trances, 
que firmo tambien el Gobierno americano, y que por lo tanto, no puede 
inenos de aceptar como texto oficial. Por consiguiente, Espana tiene la 
obligacion de renunciar a la total soberania sobre la Gran Antilla, para 
que a esta obligacion corresponda otra por parte delos Estados Unidos, 
y es la de recibir la Isla en uombre y para el pueblo cubano, por el cual, 
aparte de los altos fines humamtarios que, segun afirman, inspiro su 
conducta, por mas que a ello no pueda asentir Espana, se constituyeron 
libremente y por su propia expontaneidad mandatarios con todas las 
obligaciones que se irapone el " negotiorum gestor", (aunque segun per- 
sisten en afirmar no lo sean "in rem suam") segun denomina el derecho 
a aquel que se encarga de reel a mar y gestionar los iutereses de otro, por 
mas que este no le haya couferido expresa y oticialmente su mandato. 

Creen, por esto, los Comisarios espafioles que el coutraproyecto del 
Articulo primero que presentaron,esta redactado en el extricto sentido 
que tiene el articulo 1° del Protocolo, excepto en un importaute punto 
de que pasan los Comisarios espafioles k ocuparse. 

Los Estados Unidos de America exigieron a Espana, segun se ha 
dieho, la renuncia de la soberauia en Cuba, en los terminos que en este 
Memorandum quedan expresados. 

La Comision Americana en su penultiino Memorandum dice, que si 
Espana hubiese accedido al ser requerida con el ultimatum, a abandon ar 
la Isla de Cuba, sin entregarla ii los Estados Unidos, todo el mundo 
hubiera creido que Espana accedia a cuanto se podia exigirle. Lo 
hubiera quiza creido todo el mundo, menos los Estados Unidos, porque 
no j)arece a la Comision espanola que tenga necesidad de demostrar, 
que liaya nadie, ni en Europa ni en America, que crea que los Estados 
Unidos se lmbierau dado por satisfechos con que Espana se retirase de 
la Isla de Cuba, habiendo ellos de absteuerse de toda intervencion eu 
la Grande Antilla, para que el pueblo que la habita continuase guerre- 
ando eutre si y haciendo de si mismo y de sus destiuos, en virtud de su 
natural derecho, el uso 6 el abusoque, supuesto que era independiente, 
podia hacer sin 6 contra la voluntad de los Estados Unidos. 

De estos terminos es indeclinable e inmediata consecuencia, que los 
Estados Unidos tienen que recibir la Isla de Cuba, no para couservaila 
para siempre, ni siquieraindefiuidamentecomo propia, sino para ejercer 
su soberania, mientras la Isla no este paciflcada y para entregarla al 
pueblo que la habita tan pronto la pacificacion se haya realizado. 

Esto, pues, debe constar en el Articulo primero del Tratado relativo a 
tal renuncia, si ha de acomodarse al contrato convenido entre las dos 
Altas Partes. 

Asi lo comprendieron los Comisarios espafioles. Mas inspirandose en 
sus vivos deseos de transaccion y de paz, se prestaban a que los Estados 
Unidos quedaseu en libertad de transmitir al pueblo cubano la sobe- 
rania de la Isla, cuando ellos, y solo ellos, considerasen que habia llegado 
la oportunidad de hacerlo. 

Propouiendolo asi los Comisarios espafioles, renunciaban en obsequio 
de los Estados Unidos el impoitautisimo derecho que tiene Espafia 
para exigirles, cuando la paciiicaeidn de la Isla se realice, que no reten- 
gan dicha soberania y la entreguen 4 aquel pueblo. 

La Comision americana persiste en afirmar que tal es el proposito de 



TREATY OF PEACE. 69 

los Estados Unidos, pero 110 quiero quo conste en el tratado el notorio 
dereclio de Espana para exigir su cumpliinieuto a su debido tiempo. 

Mas una vez que los Senores Comisarios Americanos seoponen tenni- 
nantemente a la aceptacion del Articulo propuesto por entenderque no 
se acomoda al primero del Protocolo, los espanoles lo sustituyen con 
otro que no solamente se acomodara de un inodo estricto al recto 
sentido de aquel Articulo primero, sino que aparecera redactado cou 
sus propias palabras pero tambien con las frases literalmente copiadas 
de los despachos que precedieron a su redaccion y fijaron su sentido. 

He aqui la nueva redaccion que proponen en sustitucion de la anterior: 

"Su Majestad Catolica la Beina Eegente de Espaiia, en nombre de 
su Augusto bijo Don Alfonso XIII, Key de Espana, constitucionalmente 
autorizada por las Cortes del Reino, renuncia a su soberania y (\ todo 
derecho sobre Cuba. 

"Los Estados Unidos de America, aceptando esta renuncia, reciben 
de Espana la Isla de Cuba para prestarle ayuda y direction y tenerla 
en su dominio y gobierno hasta que, una vez realizada su pacincaci6n, 
dejen dicho dominio y gobieruo al pueblo cubano." 

FUNDAMENTO DE ESTE ARTfCULO. 

El parrafo 1° es la transcription del Articulo 1° del Protocolo, cou las 
variaciones de cancilleria. 

El sentido y las frases del parrafo 2° estan tomadas del ultim; 
dirigido por el Gobierno de Washington a Espana y comunicado en 20 
de abril r'lltimo por aquel Seiior Secretario de Estado al Ministro de 
Espana en a<]uella capital. Figuran asi inismo en el el pensamiento y 
las frases del Gobierno Americano consignados en la contestation del 
Sefior Secretario de. Estado en Washington en 31 de julio ultimo al 
Mensaje del Gobierno espanol proponiendo la termination de la guerra. 
He aqiii dichas frases: " el Gobieruo de los Estados Unidos no ha coin- 
partido las aprensiones de Espana sobre este punto (el de la falta de 
actual aptitud del pueblo cubauo para su independencia) pero piensa 
queen las condiciones de perturbacion y abatimieuto en que esta la 
Isla, esta necesita ayuda y direccion que el Gobierno americano se halla 
dispuesto a otorgarleP 

No bay, pues, en el Articulo nuevamente redactado otro pensamiento 
ni otras frases que las consignadas en el ultimatum de los Estados 
Unidos a Espaiia, en el despacbo citado de su Secretario de Estado y 
en el Protocolo redactado accediendo al ultimatun y de acuerdo con 
la iutencion de los Estados Unidos consignada en el despacbo sobre- 
dicbo. 

Esto no obstante, ruegan los Comisarios Espanoles de un modo 




Unidos de America el cumplimieuto del compromiso que expontanea- 
mente contrageron de dejar la Isla de Cuba libre e independiente, asi 
que este paciflcada, no fuese de suagrado, aquellos estan dispuesto 
renunciar a tal exigencia, dejando a la exclusiva apreciacion d 
Estados Unidos el resolver cuando bayan de cumphr tal compromiso, 
si esta renuncia de la Comision espauola hubiera de servir para la e< 
elusion del Tratado pendiente de paz. 

Los Senores Comisarios Americanos recliazan tambien los aemaa 
articulos del proyecto presentado por los espanoles. 



70 TREATY OP PEACE. 

No admiten que de la soberania fornien parte las cargas y obligaciones 
del Soberano que procedau exclusivamente del servicio publico de la 
Colonia. Y siu eutrar la Comision espanola en la discusion puramente 
teenica de si forman parte de la soberania estas obligaciones, 6 son tan 
solo efecto del ejercicio de la soberania misma, porque el resultado de 
esta discusion sei'ia completamente ineficaz para el punto sobre que no 
convieneu unos y otros Comisiouados, pasan los espanoles a rectificar 
breveuiente los hecbos y los conceptos que se hallan escritos en el 
Memorandum americano de 14 del corriente. Para demostrar aquellos 
que las obligacioues coloniales de Espana en Cuba no deben quedar a 
cargo de esta Isla, exponen que tales obligaciones fueron contraidas 
por la Corona con intervencion de sus funcionarios en la Colonia pero 
siu que esta hubiese intervenido ni prestado su consentimiento para 
contraerlas. En efecto ; el regimen colouial entonces vigente en Espana 
no daba a sus colonias la facultad de tener Camaras electivas que 
ejercieseu con el soberauo el poder supremo. En los ultimos veinte 
aiios ya no sucedia asi. Las Antillas tenian su representaciou en ambas 
Camaras, la cual, por cierto, intervino en todos los actos legislatives 
sobre obligaciones coloniales, sin que nuuca hubiese protestado contra 
su legitimidad y i'uerza obligatoria. Mas, aparte de esto, no se puede 
negar que mientras aquel regimen subsistio conservando todos los 
caracteres de la legalidad & la sazon establecida, los actos que la sober- 
ania colonial ejerciera dentro de las atribuciones que las leyes le con- 
ferian, fueron perfectamente legitimos y produjeron lo que no podian 
menos deproducir: todas sus justas consecuencias. Esta es una maxi- 
ma fundamental en el derecbo publico, sin la cual seria imposible el 
credito de un Estado, porque la validez de todos sus actos estaria siem- 
pre a merced de culquiera causa revolucionaria triuufante. Puede dis- 
cutirse el acierto de los actos del Soberano, pero no cabe discutir su 
legitimidad y carsicter obi igatorio cuando han sido ejecutados envirtud 
de atribuciones y con las solemnidades reconocidas y establecidas por 
la ley. 

Este principio fue reconocido por el Primer Consul, cuando otorgo 
con Baviera su Tratado de 24 de Agosto de 1801. En su Articulo 5° se 
acordo aplicar lo dispuesto eu el Tratado de paz de Luneville referente 
a las deudas hipotecarias de los paises de la orilla izquierda del Rhin. 
En estos territorios habia Dietas que intervenian el poder del Soberano 
y por esto en dicbo Tratado de Luneville se habia exigido que tales 
deudas hubiesen sido por ellas conseutidas. Mas en el Ducado de 
Deux-Ponts y en la parte del Palatinado del Rhin que adquiria la 
Erancia por el Tratado con Baviera, no Labia aquella institucion de 
Gobieruo, y por esto convino el Primer Consul, en el Tratado de 1801 
que las deudas de estos paises pasarian con ellos, con tal que hubiesen 
sido registradas en su origen por sus Autoridades administrativas 
superiores. 

Segiin la tesis contraria a esta doctrina si llegara a desaparecer el 
regimen autocratico de la Eusia actual, el pueblo ruso podria dejar de 
cumplir todas las obligaciones que sus Emperadores, mientras aquel 
regimen subsista, hayan contraido y contraigan para el regimen y 
gobierno de su Imperio. Los mismos Estados Unidos, que, de seguro 
continuaron observando desde su emancipacion muchos de los preceptos 
legislatives acordados antes sin su intervencion, por el poder de su 
Metropoli, tendrian que devolver it la Rusia el Alaska que les vendio 
el Emperador en 1807 sin haber intervenido en la venta los hal)itantes 
de la region vendida; coiuo tendrian que devolver a Espana la Elorida, 
por identica razon, etc. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 7 1 

Si para que sea legitima una deuda ea necesario que al crearln inter. 
venga por si mismo el pueblo que la ha de pagar, cuando las leyea no 
le dan tal intervencion, con mucha mas raz6n habia de ser aecesaria la 
intervencion de un pueblo euaudo su Soberano vendiese el territorio que 
aquel habita. 

La propia actual cesion de la soberania delas Antillas estaria \ iciada 
de nulidad ya que los pueblos cubano y puertoriquefio qo fueron con- 
sultados ni prestaron hasta ahora su expreso y formal asentimiento al 
Protocolo de Washington. He alii las cousecuencias de la teoria que 
bajo el calor de la discusion se halla expuesta en el Memorandum de los 
Sehores Comisarios Americanos. 

Preeisamente el punto que limita mas la libertad de contrataci6u de 
los Soberanos, en la celebracion de los tratados, es el relativo a las deu- 
das de sus Estados. Sobre la integridad de su territorio y ami sobre su 
propio honor pueden libre y validamente contratar porqne contratau 
sobre lo que es suyo. Pero carecen de esta libertad cuando sus actos 
repercuten iumediatamente en los legitimos derechos privados (!<■ 
aquellos particulares que. al amparo de las leyes los habian Legitima- 
mente adquirido, sin que despues hayan tenido intervencion alguna en 
los conflictos que en los tratados se resuelven, ni tengan por lo tanto 
que indebidamente sufrir sus cousecuencias en perjuicio de sus privados 
y legitimos intereses. 

Los acreedores de un Estado, cuando con el contratau tieuen siempre 
muy en cuenta las condiciones de solvencia del Estado a quien prestan 
su fortuna. Por esto, cuando estas condiciones de solvencia decrecen 
por efectodecesionesterritoriales,las Altas Partes entrequienes median 
estas, asi las que hacen la cesion comolas que adquieren lo cedido, pro- 
curan siempre respetar en su integridad aquellos derechos por medio 
del reparto de las obligaciones, eutre el territorio conservado por el Sobe- 
rano cedente y el territorio adquirido por el Soberano cesionario. Esto 
es lo que ha venido haciendose en los Tratados de cesion territorial. 

Mas cuando los acreedores hau adquirido por el propio titulo de su 
contrato un derecho directo sobre ciertos y determinados bienes 6 ciertas 
y determiuadas rentas para reintegrarse con ellos del capital prestado 
y de sus legitimos intereses, el Soberano no puede despu s. sin contar 
previamente con su asentimiento, ceder ni disponer libremente, como 
si fueran de su exclusivo y pleno dominio de aquellos bienes y rentas. 

Si un Soberano se prestara a cometer un atropello semejante de 
derechos que no son suyos, no por eso aquellos a quienes tales derechos 
correspoudan tendran el deber de resign arse y quedaran privados de 
reclamar en nombre de los principios sagrados que amparan la pro- 
piedad privada, el respeto a lo suyo, contra quien quiera que sea en 
cuyo poder se halle aquello que legitimaineute les pertenece. 

Y bueno es, con este motivo, hacer formalmente constar, que aim en 
la hipotesis de que no fuese aceptable el principio que sostiene a 
Comision espanola y que combate la Americana, a saber que la deuda 
colonial no debe quedar a cargo de la Metropoli, esto nunca podria sig- 
nificar que Espaila hubiese de contraer ahora respecto a los tenedores 
de esa deuda mas obligaciones que las que coutrajo al crearla. 1 por 
lo tanto; respecto a aquella parte de la deuda en que no coutrajo mas 
que una obligation subsidiaria de pago, por haberse consignado en su 
emision una hipoteca expresa sobre ciertas y determinadas rentas j 
productos, Espana tendra el derecho de no considerarse nuncaoDUgaaa 
por tal contrato, con arreglo a derecho, a pagar tal deuda. smC ciian.m 
despues de haberse destinado a su pago en primer tCrmino las rentas \ 
productos hipotecados resultaran estos insuacientes, pues hasta entonceb 



72 TREATY OF PEACI 

no sera exigible, segun las reglas elementales del derecho, la obligacitfn 
subsidiaria que contrajo. 

Sin detenerse la Comision espauola hoy sobre las noticias mucbas 
inexactas, que sobre la deuda cubana se leen en el Memorandum ameri- 
cano, se limitara a atirmar que la Isla de Cuba no cubrio, por regla 
general, desde su descubrimiento, sus propios gastos. 

Mientras Espafia conservo las colonias americanas, vino la Isla soste- 
niendose con los auxilios pecuniarios de sus hermanas, y senaladamente 
de los del Virreinato de Mejico. En este siglo, durante inuy pocos anos 
tuvo sobrantes, merced al desarrollo de su natural riqueza obtenida al 
tin con aquellos recursos, y estos sobrantes es cierto que eutraron en el 
Tesoro de la Peninsula. Mas apesar de ellos es lo cierto que en la cueuta 
general del Estado espauol, de 1896 a 97 aparece el Tesoro de la Penin- 
sula con anticipos a Cuba en los afios auteriores de la epoca moderua, 
por valor de 429,002,013.08 pesetas, asi como aparecen tambien adelan- 
tados a Puerto Rico 3,220,488.67 pesetas y a Santo Domingo 1,397,161.69 
pesetas. 

La prosperidad de Cuba fue - de corta duracion, durante la mayor 
parte del tiempo transcurrido desde los tiempos de Colon, ya por la 
escasez de sus habitantes, ya por la servidumbre de la raza negra que 
formaba la mayoria, y ya, en flu, porque los espafioles prefirieran 
colonizar otras partes de America, no pudo la Isla desarollar sus riquezas 
naturales, y, sin embargo, bubo que venir gastando constantemente en 
ella las graudes sumas que exigia el planteamiento de las reformas y la 
creacion de los establecimientos que son condition esencial de la vida 
moderna. 

La Comision espanola no puede menos de protestar contra la afirma- 
cion que en el Memorandum americano se hace, de que la insurrection 
de los diez atios fue producto de causas juntas. Y lamenta que sin una 
necesidad que lo reclamara de un modo indeclinable tal aflrmacion se 
liaya consignado, como la Comision americana, seguramente y con 
razon lamentaria que la espanola consignase aqui sin necesidad que lo 
exigiera, la justicia de las rebeliones de los aborigenes del inmenso 
territorio americano que los Estados Unidos tuvieron que sofocar tantas 
veces con inano ferrea y que asimismo consignase el dereclio a cuyo 
ainparo los Estados del Sur babian querido romper por las armas el 
lazo federal. 

Es intitil, por lo que luego se dira, que la Comision espanola se ocupe 
concretamente de los capitulos de la deuda cubana a que se refiere el 
Memorandum americano. Conqjrenden los errores que hayan podido 
cometerse en este documento, porque es muy natural que los Seuores 
Comisarios americanos no conozcan con toda la precision que se requiere 
para juzgarlos con acierto, los actos de la Administration espanola, ni 
en la Peninsula, ni en sus colonias. 

T esto aparece ademas confirmado por los becbos. 

Sobre la razon que se cree que hay contra parte de la deuda cubana 
en la preteudida justicia de la rebelion de una minoria de aquel pueblo 
reclamando su iudependencia, soloharemos la observacion siguieute: 

Lt* minoria insurrecta, es verdad, se levanto en armas en demanda de 
la iudependencia de la isla. Los Estados Unidos equivocadamente 
creyerou que su causa era justa y se la impusieron con las armas a 
Espana. Mas ahora resulta que Espaila tenia razon, porque los propios 
Estados Unidos reconocen que aquel pueblo no tiene aim las condiciones 
necesarias para gozar desde lnego de su plena libertad y soberania, y por 
esto estan resueltos a no otorgarsela y a retener en ella su dominio, hasta 
que el pueblo cubano pueda gozar de esa libertad prematuramente 
reclamada. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 7.", 

La Comision Espanola esta adeimis en el caso de llamar (a atenci6n 
sobre las obligaciones de Puerto Rico. El memorandum (\ que coin 
se refiere unicamente a las de Cuba; jes que se cree que (\ pesar de 
que la soberaufa de la pequena Autilla noes renunciada, sino cedida 
por Espana a los Estados Unidos, debe tambi.n pasar Iibre de toda 
carga a su poder? jEs que se asienta el principio de que las cesionea 
de territorio, cualquiera que sea la causa que las produzca, aunque 
fuera la conquista, y mucho mas siendo esta causa puramente conven- 
cioual, no llevan ipso facto en si mismas las eargas que afecten al tei ri- 
torio cedido? 

En la discusion oral, los Sres Comisarios Americanos indicaron 
que el gobierno Espaiiol habia decJarado que sobre la pequena Autilla 
no existia deuda alguna. Los Comisarios Espaiioles lian registrado 
cuidadosamente todas las negociaciones escritas que mediaron entre laa 
dos Altas partes, desde el ultimatum del Sr. Presidente de la CTni6n 
de 20 Abril de este ailo, basta la iirma del protocolo en Washington, 
en 12 de Agosto del mismo. En ninguna de ellas hallaron indicaciones 
ni vestigios de tal declaration. Y dicbo sea de paso, cut re otras obli- 
gaciones, pesa desde bace mucbisimos auos sobre la pequena Autilla, 
una parte que aunque exigua, no es menos sagrada, de la carga perpetua 
y verdaderainente de jnsticia, con que Espana mas que en su nomine 
eu el de America, bavenido demonstrando su gratitud al inmortal ( !ol6n 
que la deseubrio y a sus legitimos descendientes, y que la logica lle\ aria 
a los Estados Unidos & repudiar para que continuara pagandola Espafia, 
si bubieran de prevalecer las couclusioues de la Comision, de aquellos. 

Mas es el caso que la discusion sobre la deuda llamada de Cuba do 
parece tener oportuuidad en estos momentos. 

Los Seiiores Comisarios Americanos al ocuparse de los capitulos priuci- 
pales detal deuda, creyeron sin duda que la Comision espauola proponia 
en su proyecto que desde luego fuesen aquellos admitidos como deuda 
colonial, para pasar con la soberaufa a Cuba, 6 a los Estados Qnidos. V 
este es el capital error sobre que descansa su memorandum. Los Comi- 
sarios Espaiioles nopropouen sino que seconsigne en el Tratado an prin- 
cipio basta abora siempre reconcido, a saber, (pie con una colonia pasa la 
deuda que le es peculiar y afecta a su territorio. Contra este principio, 
nada se dice en el Memorandum Americano. Ni espera la Comision 
Espauola que se diga a lo menos por los Estados Onidos, cuyo territorio 
fue por ellos adquirido, no solo con su sangre, sino tambien con el dinero 
de sus cajas. Hoy no faltan publicistas que afirmen que por los trece 
primeros Estados satisficieron a su Metropoli quince millones de libras 
esterlinas. Y son hecbos oticiales quo por la Louisiana, por la Florida, 
por los Estados Indios, por Texas, por California y por el Alaska se 
pagaron 4 Francia, Espana, India, ilusia y Mexico fuertes sumas. Esta 
vez seria la primera en que los Estados Unidos, contra sus propias tia- 
diciones, adquirieran gratuitamente territorios que anexionar pronto 6 
tarde 4 la Union. 

El caso de la adquisicion de Texas, tan identico en su origen, en 
procedimientos y en su termino al actual de la Isla de Cuba, prueba tie 
un modo barto elocuente cuan distinta es la politica que entonces siguio 
el gobierno de Washington con Mexico, de la que abora quiere seguir 
con el Gabinete de Madrid. Entonces sus armas empleadas tamb 
en apoyo de los insurrectos de Texas, se extendieron por la Kepublica 




, *jspanv. 

y de California, como abora exigieron la de Puerto Rico y demas Antil- 
las Espauolas. Pero entonces pagaron a Mexico sin exigirle mdemni- 



74 TREATY OF PEACE. 

zacion de guerra, el valor de los territorios que se anexionahan, y tomaron 
ademas a su cargo la indemnizacion de los Ciudadanos Americanos por 
aquella Repiiblica. perjudicadas. Hoy ban exigido a Espana por uua 
indemnizaeion analoga y por gastos de guerra, la cesion de las islas 
sobredicbas, y quiereu ademas que las cargas de estas islas y de su 
bermana la grande Antilla queden a cargo de la Metropoli, que las 
iutrodujopor su mano cu el muudo civilizado. 

Lo que propouen los Comisarios Espafioles es linicamente el reeono- 
cimiento de este principio, porque su ejecueion entiendeu que debe 
quedar despues a. cargo de una Comisiou de personas rectas e impar- 
ciaies. Si esta, reconocieiido la cuenta que Espana preseute de las 
obligaciones que entiende que deben ser a cargo de Cuba y de Puerto 
Rico, declarau que deben ser a cargo de la Metropoli, Espana se con- 
ibrmara. Pero si declarau que todas 6 algunas deben ser a cargo dela 
Colonia, no bay razon para que los Estados Unidos no presten en tal 
caso tambien su aseutimiento. Si tan seguios estan de su deieclio, no 
pueden rehusar lo que la Comisiou Espanola propoue, ya que uingun 
peligro les ol'rece. Y si no lo estuvieian, su alta justiticacion y el 
respecto que se tienen a si mismos, les iraponen el deber de subordinar 
un interes pecuniario (\ la causa sagrada de la justieia. 

Y para demostrar la Comisiou Espanola a. la americana que el pensa- 
miento sobredicho es el unico que abriga, y que por lo tan to no inteuta 
ahora que se reconozca el pago de eantidad alguna determinada como 
obligacion colonial de cualquiera de las Antillas, no tiene reparo en 
sustituir el articulo 2° que Labia presentado y en suprimir el 4° y 5° 
reemplazando los tres por el siguiente: 

"Articulo 2°. — La renuncia y transfereiicia que hace Su Majestad 
Catolica y que aceptan los Estados Unidos de America, comprende: 

"1. Cuantas prerrogativas, atribuciones y derecbos corres]x>ndan a 
Su Majestad Catolica, como parte desu soberauia sobre la Iola de Cuba 
y sus babitantes. 

"2. Cuantas cargas y obligaciones pecuniarias pendientes al ratifi- 
carse este Tratado de paz, que previo un minucioso examen de su origen, 
objeto y condiciones de su creacion, deban reputarse, segun derecho 
estricto e innegable equidad, distintas tie las que son propias y peculia- 
res del Tesoro de la Peninsula por ser y baber sido siempre propias y 
peculiares de Cuba. 

"Para bacer el riguroso examen que se prescribe eu el parrafo ante- 
rior, se nombrara por las dosAltas I J artes Contratantes una Comisiou 
de personas competentes e imparciales seguu se deteruiiuar4 eu el 
articulo correspondiente de este Tratado." 

Respecto del 2° parrafo del articulo 3° del proyecto espanol, 4 los 
Sres Comisarios Americanos no les parece aceptable la excepcion de 
los bienes patrimoniales del Estado que en el se establecia. Seguu el 
derecho administrativo espanol, el Estado ejerce las facultades del 
doniinio sobre todos los bienes que la ley espanola declara de dominio 
publico. Estos claro es que van comprendidos en la cesion do la sobe 
rania. Mas en Espana el Estado puede tambien adquirir y couscrvar 
como persona juridica bienes inmuebles por los mismos titulos (jue el 
derecho civil establece para los particulares. Estos eran los que se 
excepluaban en la cesion. No obstante lo que se acaba de decir, para 
demostrar una vez mas la Comisiou Espanola su deseo de transaccion y 
de paz, renuncia a esta excepcion ypasa porque sean tambien compren- 
didos dichos bienes patrimoniales del Estado en la cesion y renuncia 
de su soberania en las Antillas. 

Las deuoas excepciones consignadas en aqucl articulo no puede creer 



TREATY OF PEACE. 7- 

laConiision espafiolaque dejen de seraceptadas por la americana. I 
en suproyectohablaba solo de la propiedad individual. Pero no ignoran 
ciertamentelosHonorablesmdividuosdelaComisi6ii Americana, y basta 
seri'a ofender su grande ilustracion el suponerlo, que ademas del indi- 
viduo hay otras personas juridicas en el seno de todas las sociedades 
civiles, que son capaces, por las leyea, de adquirir y couservar la 
propiedad mueble e ininueble. Las sociedades mercantiles ■ • indus- 
trials, las de derecho comtin civil, los establicimientos ptiblicos como 
los de benencencia 6 ensenanza, etc. pueden en Espafia y sus Colonias 
adquirir yconservar la propiedad sobredicha, que esta" al amparo de las 
mismas leyes que rijen y protegen la propiedad individual. Pues ;i la 
propiedad de estas personas juridicas, conocida vulgarmente con el 
noiubre de propiedad corporativa, porque no es nn iudividuo sino ana 
corporation el dueno, se refleren todas las excepciones comprendidas en 
el segundo parrafo del art. 3° del proyecto espauol. 

En el cuarto parrafo del mismo articulo tanibien lian llamado la ateu- 
cion de los Senores Comisarios Americanos respecto a la entrega de los 
Archivos, las frases que tienen por objeto manifestar que los Estados 
Unidos dispoudran de ellos con los mismos derechos y obligaciones cou 
que basta abora ban estado a disposition del Gobernio espauol. La 
explication de estas frases es muyobvia: el Estado mas que duefio 
absoluto de los Archivos publicos, es su depositario y conservador, asi 
es que no puede destruirlos ni enajenarlos, ni privar a los ciudadanos 
del uso que necesiten bacer de los documentos en ellos contenidos para 
la defensa de sus derechos. £ Puede el Estado destruir el Regist ro < ivil 
donde consta el estado civil de cada tiudadano? ^Pnede destruir el 
Registro de la propiedad donde constan los titulos dedominio del patri- 
mouio de cada cualf Ciertamente no; pues eso es lo linico que se dice 
en tales frases. Los Estados Unidos podran disponer de los Archivos 
como podria disponer el Gobierno espanol, pero nada mas que este 
derecbo puede este Gobierno trasmitirles, porque ningan otro mas 
tiene sobre ellos. 

A mayor abundamiento y para que no ofrezca it la Oomision Ameri- 
cana duda alguua el sentido del pensandento de la Espanola, dsta sur- 
tituye el articulo 3° que tenia presentado con el que presenta abora, en 
el que, ademas de suprimir la excepcion delos bienes patriraoniales del 
Estado, aclara los conceptos que parecieron dudosos a la Comision 
americana sobre los Arcbivos y sus papeles. He aqui su texto. 

"Articulo 3°. 

"En cumplimiento de lo convenido en los dos articulos anteriores, 
S. M. Catolica, en la representacion con que celebra este Tratado, 
renuncia y transfiere 4 los Estados Unidos todos los edificios, muelles, 
cuarteles, fortalezas, establecimieutos, vias publicas y denms bienes 
' iumueblesquecon arreglo a Derecbo son de dominio publico, y quecomo 
de tal dominio publico corresponden 4 la Corona de Espafia en la Isla 
de Cuba. 

Quedan por lo tanto exceptuados de esta renuncia y transferencia 
todos los derechos y bienes de cualquiera clase que sean que. basta la 
ratification del presente Tratado, hayan venido pacificamente poseyeDdo, 
en concepto de dueuos, las Provincias, municipios, Establetimientos 
publicos 6 privados, corpoiaciones eclesiasticas 6 civiles y cualesquiera 
otras colectividades que tengan legabnente personalidad juridica para 
adquirir y poseer bienes en la Isla de Cuba, y los particulares, cualquiera 
que sea su nacioualidad. 



76 TREATY OF PEACE. 

"S. M. Catolica rentmcia tambien y transfiere a los Estados TJnidos, 
a quien se le entregaran por el gobierno Espanol, todos los docu- 
mentos y titulos que se refieran exclusivamente a la soberania 
transferida y aceptada, y a todos sns derechos, que existan en los 
Archivos de la Peninsula. Habieudo de facilitate copias cuando los 
Estados Unidos las reclamasen, de la parte correspondiente a dicha 
soberania que contengan los demas docunientosy titulos que se refieran 
ademas a otros asuutos distintos de la Isla de Cuba y de su soberania 
y derechos, que existan en los mencionados Archivos. Una regla 
aualogahabra reciprocamente deobservarse a favor de Espafia respeeto 
a los documentos y titulos agenos en todo 6 en parte Ala Isla de Cuba, 
que se hallen actualmente en sus Archivos y que interesen al Gobierno 
espanol. 

Todos los Archivos y Eegistros Oficiales, asi administrativos como 
judiciales, que estan & disposicion del Gobierno de Espaha y de sus 
Autoridades en la Isla de Cuba, y que se refieran 4 la misma isla 6 a 
sus habitantes y a sus derechos y bieues, quedaran sin reserva de nin- 
guno de esta clase a disposicion de los Estados Uuidos para que los 
conserven 6 dispongan de ellos con las misinas facultades que basta 
ahora ban teuido sobre los mismos el Gobierno espanol y sus Autoridades. 

Los particulares, asi espaiioles como cubauos, tend ran derecho a 
sacar, con arreglo a las leyes, las copias autorizadas de los contratos, 
testamentos y demas documentot que forman parte de los protocolos 
notariales 6 que se custodien ea los Archivos Administrativos y judi- 
ciales, bicn estos se hallen en Espaha 6 en la Isla de Cuba." 

En el articulo vi del proyecto espanol no se consiguaba la causa de 
la cesion que hace Espaha a los Estados Unidos de la Isla de Puerto 
Pico y demas Antillas y de la de Guam en las Marianas. Y sin 
embargo, esta causa esta expresamente cousignada en el ya citado 
despacho del Secretario de Estado en Washington, contestando al 
mensaje del gobierno Espanol. En el despues de manifestarse que el 
Senor Presidente de la Pepublica no reclamaba una iudemnizacion 
pecuniaria por la guerra para dar ]>rueba de una sehalada generosidad, 
se lee el siguiente parrafo: "Sin embargo no puede permanecer insensi- 
ble a las perdidas y 4 los gastos ocasionados por la guerra, ni 4 las 
reclamacioues de nuestros concindadanos con motivo de los daiios y 
perjuicios que ban sufrido eu sus personas y bienes durante la ultima 
insurreccion de Cuba. 

"En cousecuencia esta obligado a pedir la cesion a los Estados 
Unidos y la evacuacion inmediata por Espana de Puerto Rico y de las 
demas islas que se hallan actualmente bajo la soberania de Espana en 
las Indias Occidentales, asi como la cesion en las Ladrones de una Isla 
design ada por los Estados Unidos." 

Estos design aron la Isla de Guam. 

Los Comisarios Espaiioles sustituyen el articulo VI de sn anterior 
proyecto con el que ahora presentan, hacieudo constar la causa de la 
cesion. La Comisibn Americana es bien seguro que en este pun to 
estara conforme con la Espanola para que en el Tratado no aparezcan 
los Estados Unidos adquiriendo gratuitameute aquellas Islas. 

H6 aqui el articulo. 

"Articulo iv. 

"En compensacion de las p6rdidas y gastos ocasionados a los Estados 
Unidos por la guerra, y a las reclamacioues de sus conciudadanos con 
motivo de los dauos y perjuicios que hubiesen sufrido en sus personas 
y bienes durante la ultima insureccion de Cuba Su Majestad Catolica, 
en nombre y representacion de Espaha y constitucionalmente autori- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 77 

zad a por las Cortes del Reino, cede a los Estados Onidos de \- 

y estos aceptan para si mismos, la [sla de Puerto Rico v las otras l I . . 

que actualmente estan bajo la Soberania Espanola en las Indias Oeci 

dentales, asi como la Isla de Guam eu el Archipidlago de las Marianas 

6 Ladrones, que fue elegida por los Estados Unidos de A 

virtud de lo convenido en el articulo 2" del Protocolo firinado en 

Washington el 12 cle Agosto ultimo." 

Respecto al articulo 7° del proyecto, la Comision Espanola entiende 
por cuanto vadicho en este Memorandum, que debe sostei erlo sin otrsi 
variante que la indispensable para ponerlo en relation con los auevos 
articulos que se presentan. 

Quedara pues redactado en la forma siguiente: 

V. 

"Esta cesion de la soberania sobre el territorio y babifantea de 
Puerto Rico y las demas Islas menciouadas se entiende que consiste en 
la cesion de los derechos y obligaciones, bienes y documentos relativos 
a la soberania de dichas Islas, iguales a los que respecto a la renuncia 
y transferencia de la soberania de la Isla de Cuba, se definen en Ins 
Articulos anteriores." 

En resumeu, de todo resulta que la unica cuestion que hasta ahora 
existe y aguarda una resolucion de ambas Oomisiones, esta reducida a 
una cuestion pecuniaria de importancia relativamente secundaria para 
una de las Altas Partes Contratantes, la de la Beuda Colonial. 

Y entienden los Comisarios Espanoles que no es posibleque una cues- 
tion de esta indole pueda dejar de tener una solution satisfactoria, va 
que media entre partes la una el mas grande Estado del Nuevo Mundo, 
inmensamente rico y prospero, con inagotables recursoscon que le dota 
la naturaleza y la prodigiosa actividad de sus habitantes, y el cual 
adquiere ademas por este Tratado territorios de grande importancia, 
realizando asi una aspiracion de su politica en America, y la otra una 
grande y noble nacion del antiguo, cordial ami.ua de aquel en dias para 
ella mas prosperos, pero empobrecida hoy por las desgracias que sobre 
ella ha acumulado el siglo que termina, con un Tesoro cargado de obli- 
gaciones y a la cual este Tratado se reserva la confirmacion solemnede la 
perdida de los ultimos restos del Imperio Americano, cuyo descubri- 
micnto hizo posible la existencia de aquella gran Republica, y que ade- 
mas con el tanto enriquecid al mundo moderno, a costa quizes de su 
propio bienestar y del desarrollo que tenia derecho a esperar de sus 
grandes elementos de riqueza acumulados y no explotados en su seno, 
por dedicar preferente su atencion a Colonias, que como otros seres eu el 
orden de la naturaleza a quienes su madre dedica sus desvelos, ha criado 
y sostenido a costa de su propio bienestar. 

Esta con forme: 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Peotoool No. 9. 

[Memorandum.] 



It is with deep regret that the Spanish Commissioners have thor- 
oughly acquainted themselves with the memorandum presented by the 
American Commissioners at the last session, held ou the 17th instant. 



78 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In this document the said gentlemen, relying upon assertions and views 
to the accuracy of which the Spanish Commission cannot subscribe, 
despite the upright inteution with which it doubts not they were 
expressed, end by saying that they substitute for the draft of the two 
articles relating to Cuba and the other islands, which they presented 
at the session of the 3rd instant, two other articles which are limited to 
literally copying the two first articles of the Protocol of Washington, 
alleging in this behalf that they understand that the treaty of peace, 
so far as it refers to the sovereignty of the West Indies and the Island 
of Guam in the Marianas, should contain neither more nor less than a 
literal reproduction of those two articles. 

But as these already form a part of a binding agreement, which the 
Protocol of Washington is, it seems useless merely to reproduce them 
in the treaty which is to be elaborated in the conference. Contracts, 
private as well as international, are perfect and produce all their effects 
for the parties executing them without the necessity of any subsequent 
confirmation, which can in no wise increase their efficacy. Therefore, 
this reproduction, if the treaty of peace relating to the West Indies is 
to be thus limited, as the American Commissioners desire, seems to be 
redundant. 

If this consideration is pure reason or even mere common sense, the 
proposal of the American Commissioners can only be comprehended on 
the supposition that the latter understand that the treaty, apart from 
any provision of a secondary character that may be included therein, 
should relate only to the Philippine Archipelago. 

If such is the thought of the American Commission, the Spanish 
Commission cannot assent thereto, because it understands that its exe- 
cution would be an infraction of the Protocol. 

After the three conditions which the Secretary of State at Washing- 
ton, replying on July 30 last to the message of the Government of Her 
Catholic Majesty of the Ulind of the said month, proposed to Spain for 
the termination of the war, he said: "If the terms hereby offered are 
accepted in their entirety commissioners will be named by the United 
States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain 
for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing 
and delivering it under the terms above indicated." These details do 
not appear to be circumscribed to the archipelago. 

The very President of the American Republic in the conference he 
held on August 10 with the Ambassador of France, representing Spain 
for the time being, made an absolute distinction between the Protocol 
and the treaty of peace, stating that the former should only be a mere 
preliminary document which should have no object or effect other than 
to record without any delay the agreement of the two Governments 
upon the principles themselves of the peace, and that, therefore, it would 
not be necessary to reserve therein either the rights of the Cortes or 
those of the Federal Senate, who were charged only with the ratification 
oH the final treaty. 

The President, it is true, spoke of the Philippine question to state 
that it was reserved for the Paris conference; but he never said, or 
even intimated, that this subject should be the only one to be treated 
by this conference. 

And, finally, in Article V of the Protocol, framed in harmony with 
all these antecedents, it is said that the Commissioners named by both 
High Parties were to proceed to Paris to negotiate and conclude a 
treaty of peace, without limiting or restricting their object, and, on the 
contrary, employing a phrase the evident meaning of which is that the 






TREATY OF PEACE. 7 [I 

treaty of peace to be elaborated by the Commission should settle all 

questions at the time pending between the two states which were not 
already settled in the preliminary agreement of the Protocol. 

It is true that the American Commissioners base their last draft on 
the ground that everything relating to the Spanish Antilles is already 
settled in the Protocol. But this argument is precisely the one to 
which the Spanish Commissioners from the very first conference nave 
not been able and are now unable to assent. 

The Americans in their memorandum of the 11th of this month stated 
that the Spanish Commissioners placed conditions to the relinquish- 
ment of sovereignty over Cuba in their proposal. A way serious error. 
In that proposal the absolute and unconditional character of such 
relinquishment is not disregarded; all that is done therein is to lay 
down what this relinquishment consists of. And this is essentially 
different from what the American Commissioners understand. 

And that, in fact, the articles of the draft of the Spaniards have for 
sole object the establishing of the meaning of the relinquishment, but 
not to subject it to conditions, is demonstrated by the very object of 
the oral and written discussions which have been taking place bel 
the two sides. 

The American Commissioners understand that the only meaning 
which can be given to the relinquishment of the sovereignty agreed upon 
in the Protocol is that of the abandonment of this sovereignty, to deduce 
therefrom that Spain should abandon the Island of Cuba just as any 
power may abandon a desert territory in Africa which it might for- 
merly have possessed. 

Although the Spanish Commission distinguishes between the legal 
meaning of the word abandonment and that of the word relinquishnH nt, 
it would not engage in this technical discission (improper in a diplo- 
matic conference) were it not for the fact that the American Commis- 
sion urges its opinion as the principal ground for its claim that through 
such supposed abandonment all legal bond is severed and no new one 
grows out of the act, as between Spain and the United States, upon 
the latter taking possession of the island either in their own name and 
for themselves, or in the name of and for the Cuban people. 

But this claim, unexampled in the diplomatic annals of the world, 
cannot be admitted by the Spanish Commissioners, who make a part 
hereof of all that they set forth in the first section of the memorandum 
they presented in reply to the draft of articles of the American Com- 
mission, and they add the following brief observations which are sug- 
gested to them by the two memoranda lately presented by the latter 
Commission: 

The Spanish Commission passes over the citation made in support of 
its opinion by the American Commission from the Diccionario de 
Escriche, -which is certainly a very respectable work, but whose only 
object is the exposition of the practical principles of private municipal 
law, a very popular exposition in Spain, it is true, as it serves as a 
mentor for young lawyers in the early period of their professional life, 
but which 'is absolutely foreign to the science of international and 
public law. 

Cases of abandonment in the sense claimed are not recorded in the 
modern history of peoples save those of desert territories, or at best, 
populated by the barbarous tribes of Africa. An abandonment 
true state already formed, existing for centuries, with a complete social 
and political organization and peopled with inhabitants who enjoy and 
have the right to enjoy all the benefits of modern civilization, has never 



80 TREATY OF PEACE. 

been known np to the present time, and the Spanish Commissioners do 
not believe there is such a case in the world. Abandoned territories 
are legitimately occupied by the state desiring to establish its sov- 
ereignty therein. But this merely de facto occupation does not impose 
upon the occupant duties other than those performed in the regions of 
Africa by the European powers with regard to barbarous tribes peo- 
pling or overrunning them. Does the American Commission believe 
that the United States, as occupants of the Island of Cuba (since this 
is the only condition upon which, according to the view they defend, 
they are to take possession of it,) are to have no duties with respect to 
the inhabitants of the Great Antillian Isle other than those performed 
with regard to those degraded human beings? 

We are fully satisfied that such is not the thought of the American 
Commissioners, but their insistence in denying all difference in law 
between the effects of abandonment and the effects of relinquishment, 
inevitably leads to this conclusion. 

And this, notwithstanding the assertion of the American Commis- 
sioners in their last memorandum to the effect that the United States 
will afford the inhabitants of Cuba and their property all the protection 
they may need, as they have been doing in the small portion of territory 
of the island occupied by force of arms. Do the United States believe 
that they ought not to recognize more rights in Spain upon her relin- 
quishing her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba and its inhabitants 
than they or any other power would hasten to recognize in the most 
unfortunate of the African tribes whose territory they were taking? 
But aside from the fact that they themselves do not attribute to this 
obligation, which they say they have, more than the right to be pos- 
sessors of the island, it is also true that the said Commissioners do not 
lend themselves to this or any other obligation of the United States 
being recorded in the treaty, which, as they demand, must be limited to 
the reproduction of the two first articles of the Protocol. Therefore, 
this obligation, which in the memorandum they say they contract, will 
not be enforceable, as it is not in the treaty; and without any intention 
to offend the United States, logic absolutely precludes the denial of the 
possibility of there happening, more or less, in this connection that 
which happened with respect to the obligations which the United States 
spontaneously contracted in the negotiations leading up to the Protocol 
and which, notwithstanding this, the American Commissioners decline 
to have appear in the treaty. 

The Congress of the United States in its Joint Eesolution and the 
President of the Union in his ultimatum to Spain could have demanded 
of the latter nation (although it is useless to state that Spain would 
not have acceded to so harsh a demand) the absolute abandonment 
of her sovereignty over Cnba in the sense in which it is now demanded 
by the American Commissioners, as he could have also demanded its 
full cession to the United States free of all burdens. But the truth is 
that he did not demand it because he limited himself to claiming the 
relinquishment of the sovereignty in order that the Cuban people 
might become free and independent, or, what is the same thing, the 
relinquishment of the sovereignty in favor of the Cuban people, that 
they might become free and independent, although at the same time he 
demanded that this relinquishment should be at the outset made in 
favor of the United States for that people to whom the United States 
were to give aid and guidance, as it was not otherwise possible for the 
Island of Cuba to pass directly and immediately from the possession 
of Spain to that of the Cuban people, as it was to remain in the con- 



TREATY OF PEACE. g] 

trol of the United States until the pacification of the island. It seems 
to us that the American Commissioners cannot fail to recognize this as 
strictly correct. 

And if such were the terms in which the United States expn 
their demand, to which Spain finally acceded without the former hav- 
ing previously modified them, it is as clear as the light of day that the 
agreement which is formulated in Aiticlelof the Protocol (for no other 
was concluded between the two High Parties) must necessarily In- taken 
in the sense of the terms in which it was proposed by one of the par- 
ties and accepted by the other, and that it is not lawful for either <»i t be 
parties now to alter those terms for the purpose of converting that 
relinquishment, demanded for a determinate purpose and following a 
procedure agreed upon, into an absolute abandonment, without The 
object and procedure stipulated, as the American Commission now 
contends should be done. 

Therefore what is to be set forth in the treaty is notthe abandonment 
which the American Commission demands but rather the relinquishment 
agreed upon which the Spanish Commission upholds. The case is 
analogous to many others which colonial powers have had to meet 
when they lost their sovereignty over all or a part of their colonies. 
Never did a colonial power abandon, in the sense it is now sought to 
urge, a colony, that it might be converted into a new state, free and 
independent. When such a case arose, the mother country ceded or 
relinquished her sovereignty if the colony had not conquered it pre- 
viously by force of arms, but she never abandoned it in the sense 
referred to. If the American Commissioners are not in accord with 
this categorical assertion, we beg them to cite one case that will con- 
tradict it. 

The Spanish Commissioners also beg the American Commissioners to 
direct their calm and enlightened attention to the flagrant contradic- 
tion which stands out between their theory and the acts which the 
United States have been carrying into effect. According to the A meri- 
can Commission the only legal situation possible over the Island of 
Cuba between Spain on the one part and the United States for them- 
selves or in the name of the Cuban people on the other is the following: 
Spain must abandon the Island of Cuba. The United States after the 
abandonment are to take possession of the island for the Cuban people. 
And consequently the transit of the island from one situation to another 
must be made without establishing any legal bond between Spain and 
her former colonies and, for the latter, the United States. Very well; 
the forces of the United States conquered Santiago de Cuba and signed 
a capitulation with the Spanish military authorities. In this they did 
not demand that the forces of the mother country should abandon 
Santiago de Cuba, but that it should be delivered to the American 
authorities, an inventory being made which was signed by both parties, 
in which is recorded how much the one delivered and the other received. 
The American Commission which is in Havana, having been appointed 
pursuant to the provisions of Article IV of the Protocol, demands that 
the Spanish Commission deliver over to it all that belongs to Spain in 
the exercise of her sovereignty as well in the civil branch as in the 
military; and this pursuant to the express instructions of its Govern- 
ment; and it is unnecessary to state that this delivery must also be 
made with an inventory. 

In view of these facts is it possible to deny to Spain, upon relinquish- 
ing her soverignity over Cuba, the right to demand that the I nited 
States have it delivered over to themselves? 
T P 6 



82 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Bnt there is more than this: the American Commission, in spite of 
the theory it is urging, has accommodated its first steps to the theory 
urged by the Spanish Commission. In the second paragraph of Article 
I which the former Commission presented on October 3, it calls the 
relinquishment of the sovereignty of Spain in Cuba a cession, not an 
abandonment. And this cannot be explained as a simple inaccuracy 
in language, because in Article II it establishes what are to be the 
effects of the cession of the sovereignty of Porto Rico, and employs in 
establishing these effects the same, exactly the same, phrases which it had 
just employed in Article I to establish the effects of the relinquishment 
of the sovereignty in Cuba. A complete proof that the American Com- 
mission, notwithstanding the opinion it sustained in the heat of the 
debate with the Spanish Commission on framing its first draft, under- 
stood that the effects of the relinquishment of sovereignty were the 
same, exactly the same, as those of a cession. 

And if it is argued that although the effects are the same, the relin- 
quishment, which the American Commission called abandonment, is 
distinguished from the cession in that the former is not made to any 
one who is to acquire the abandoned territory, whereas, on the con- 
trary, cession is made in favor of someone who is to acquire the ceded 
territory, the American Commissioners also failed to mark this differ- 
ence in their draft, for, speaking in both articles of the archives and 
other papers which were to be the object of the relinquishment or ces- 
sion, they say the same thing in both, employing the same phrases, 
that every certified copy of said document that might be requested by 
an officer of the Spanish Government should be issued to him at all 
times, and this is unintelligible save in the sense that there must be 
some one to issue such copy. And it will be impossible to issue it save 
by the one having in his possession the document to be copied. And 
he who has not received it cannot have it in his possession. Conse- 
quently, when the American Commissioners established in Article I 
the rules relating to the delivery of the archives of the Island of Cuba 
they acted on the supposition that such delivery had to be made to 
some one. And this, and nothing more than this, is what they set down 
in Article II relating to the delivery of the archives of the Island of 
Porto Eico. 

The American Commission, in order to sustain its inadmissible opin- 
ion regarding the abandonment by Spain of the Island of Cuba, relies 
on the difference which appears in the Protocol itself. They say that 
Spain agreed to cede only Porto Rico to the United States while she 
bound herself to relinquish the Island of Cuba. From this they deduce 
that the effects of the obligation of Spain with respect to one are 
broader than with respect to the other. We have already proved by 
the very text of the draft of articles presented by the said gentlemen 
that when they drew it up they did not even perceive this difference 
in the effects with respect to Spain. The difference, nevertheless, is 
well understood under another aspect. The United States made a 
demand on Spain and afterwards declared war on her that Cuba might 
become free and independent. And it is clear that having conquered 
they could not demand that the island be ceded to them, ignoring the 
liberty and independence thereof, as this would give cause to the 
world to believe that such liberty and independence had not been 
the true cause of the conflict. They did not make the same demand 
regarding Porto Rico, and did subsequently claim the sovereignty of 
the latter island and of the others surrounding Cuba (which will ren- 
der impossible its independence without the will and gracious consent 



TREATY OF PEACE. 83 

of the United States, which will always have it al their mercy o 
to their control over the islands surrounding it like n band of iro 
the way of indemnity for the expenses of the war and of the dan 
which they said American citizens had suffered during the col 
insurrection. This is the natural explanation of why in the Protocol 
the sovereignty of one island appears as relinquished and that of the 
others as ceded. 

The Spanish Commissioners understand from all the foregoing that 
it is their nonevadable duty to continue to maintain that the relinquish- 
ment of the sovereignty in Cuba to which Spain bound herself in the 
article of the Protocol must be understood not as an abandon men t of 
sovereignty in the sense given to the phrase by the American Ooi 
sioners,but in that of a relinquishment properly speaking, as expi 
in the copy written in French, which the American Governmenl also 
signed and which for this reason, it cannot do less than accept 
official text. Consequently Spain is bound to relinquish the total 
ereignty over Cuba, so that another obligation may bind the United 
States, which is that of receiving the island in the name of and for (lie 
Cuban people, for whom, aside from the high humanitarian motives 
which, as they assert, inspired their action (although Spain cannot 
assent to this) they freely and of their own motion constituted them- 
selves agents with all the obligations imposed on the "negotiorum 
gestor" (although they persist in affirming that they are not such "in 
rem mam"), as the law designates him who charges himself with man- 
aging and defending the interests of another, although the latter may 
not have conferred upon him express and official power. 

The Spanish Commissioners therefore believe that the counterdraft of 
the first article which they presented is framed in the strict sei se of 
Article I of the Protocol, save in one important point which the Span- 
ish Commissioners proceed to take up. 

The United States of America demanded of Spain, as has been said, 
the relinquishment of the sovereignty over Cuba in the terms set forth 
in this memorandum. 

The American Commission in its last memorandum but one says 
that, if Spain had acceded as required in the ultimatum to the aban- 
donment of the Island of Cuba without delivering it to the United 
States, everybody would have thought that Spain had done all that 
could be required of her. Everybody perhaps would have thought so 
except the United States, because it does not seem to the Spanish 
Commission that it is under the necessity of showing that there is no 
one either in Europe or America who believes that the United States 
would have been satisfied with Spain withdrawing from the Island of 
Cuba, they abstaining from all intervention in the Greater Antille, 80 
that the people inhabiting it should continue fighting among them- 
selves and, in the exercise of their natural right, making of themselves 
and their destinies the use or the abuse which in view of their inde- 
pendence they could make with or without reference to the will of the 
United States. 

It is the undeniable and immediate result of these terms that the 
United States must receive the Island of Cuba, not to retain it for a 
time nor even indefinitely as their own, but to exercise their sovereignty 
until the island is pacified and to turn it over to the people inhabiting 
it as soon as the pacification thereof shall be realized. 

This, then, must, if the agreement which has intervened between the 
two High Contracting Parties is to be complied with, be recorded in the 
first article of the treaty relative to such relinquishment. 



84 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Such was the understanding of the Spanish Commissioners. But, 
animated by their keen desire for composition and peace, they consented 
that the United States should remain at liberty to pass the sovereignty 
of the island over to the Cuban people, when the former, and they alone, 
should consider that the proper time for doing so had come. 

By this proposition the Spanish Commissioners gave up, in deference 
to the United States, the most important right held by Spain, to demand, 
when the pacification of the island shall be effected, that they do not 
retain this said sovereignty, and that they pass it over to that people. 

The American Commission persists in affirming that such is the intent 
of the United States, but does not want the notorious right of Spain to 
demand that it be carried out in due time to be of record in the treaty. 

But since the American Commissioners are decidedly opposed to 
accepting the proposed article because of their construction that it is 
not in accord with the first article of the Protocol, the Spanish Com- 
missioners substitute for it another, which will not only strictly agree 
with the correct meaning of that first article, but will be seen to be 
worded not only in its very terms but also in the sentences literally 
copied from the notes which preceded its drafting and determined its 
import. 

Here is the new phraseology which is proposed in substitution for the 
previous one: 

"Her Catholic Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of 
her August Son Don Alfonzo XIII, King of Spain, thereunto constitu- 
tionally authorized by the Cortes of the Kingdom, relinquishes her sov- 
ereignty over and title to Cuba. 

"The United States of America, accepting said relinquishment, 
receive the Island of Cuba from Spain to lend it aid and guidance and 
hold it under their control and government until, the pacification thereof 
realized, they leave said control and government to the Cuban people." 

BASIS OF THIS ARTICLE. 

Paragraph one is the transcript of Article I of the Protocol with the 
changes of diplomatic form. 

The import and phraseology of paragraph two are taken from the 
ultimatum addressed to Spain by the Government of Washingtor and 
communicated on the 20th of April last by the Secretary of State to 
the Minister of Spain at Washington. There also appear therein the 
views and the sentences of the American Government set forth in the 
reply of the Secretary of State of Washington of the 31st of July last 
to the message of the Spanish Government proposing to terminate the 
war. Here are the said sentences: 

"The Government of the United States has not shared the appre- 
hensions of Spain (that of the lack of present aptitude of the Cuban 
people for independence) but thinks that in the perturbed and pros- 
trate conditions of the island the said island needs aid and guidance, 
which the American Government is prepared, to grant to it." 

There is, therefore, in the new drafting of the article, no other import 
nor other phrases than those set forth in the ultimatum of the United 
. States to Spain in the aforementioned note of their Secretary of State 
and in the Protocol worded in compliance with the ultimatum and in 
accordance with the intent of the United States, as set forth in the 
aforesaid note. 

Notwithstanding that, the Spanish Commissioners especially request 
the American Commissioners to bear in mind that, if the legitimate 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

demands on the part of Spain that the treaty incut ion her righl ; 
in due time of the United States of America the fulfilment of theei 
ment spontaneously undertaken by them, to leave the Island of Cuba 
free and independent whenever peace is restored, be distasteful to them 
the former are ready to forego this demand, leaving it exclusively to 
the determination of the United States to decide at what tunc Huh 
engagement should be fulfilled, if the conclusion of the pending treaty 
of peace can be subserved by such renunciation by the Spanish Com 
mission. 

The American Commissioners also reject the other articles of the draft 
submitted by the Spaniards. 

They do not admit that the charges and obligations of the sovereign 
which proceed exclusively from the public service of the colony arc pari 
of the sovereignty. The Spanish Commission, without entering upon 
a purely technical discussion of the question as to whether such obliga- 
tions form part of the sovereignty or are merely an effect of the exer- 
cise of the sovereignty itself, for the result of such a discussion would 
be absolutely without effect upon the point on which the Commissioners 
on both parts do not agree, will simply proceed briefly to set right the 
facts and the opinions which are set forth in the American memorandum 
of the 14th instant. In order to demonstrate that the colonial obliga- 
tions of Spain in Cuba must not remain a charge upon that island. tin- 
American Commissioners state that these obligations were contracted 
by the Crown through the medium of its officials in the colony, but 
without any intervention or consent towards such obligations on the 
part of the colony. 

It is true, the colonial system then prevailing in Spain did not confer 
upon its colonies the right of having elected Chambers which would 
administer the supreme powers in conjunction with the sovereign. In 
the last twenty years, however, it was not thus. The Antilles had 
representatives in both Chambers who surely intervened in all the legis- 
lative acts bearing upon colonial obligations without ever protesting 
against their lawfulness or binding force. Moreover, besides this, i; 
cannot be denied that so long as this system prevailed, maintaining all 
the characteristics of legality established at the time, the acts which the 
colonial sovereignty performed within the powers with which it was 
invested by law, were perfectly lawful, and carried, as they could not 
fail to do, all their rightful consequences. It is a fundamental maxim 
of public law, without which the credit of a state could not exist. 
because the validity of all its acts would always be at the mercy of any 
triumphant revolutionary movement whatsoever. The wisdom of the 
acts of the sovereign may be discussed, but when they have been exe 
cuted by virtue of his attributes and in the solemn form recognized and 
established by law, their lawfulness and binding character are not a 
matter for discussion. 

This principle was recognized by the First Consul when he concluded 
his first treaty of August 24, 1801, with Bavaria. In its fifth article 
he agreed to apply the provision of the Luneville treaty of peace with 
regard to the mortgage debts of the country on the left bank of I 
Rhine. In those territories there were Diets which participated in the 
power of the sovereign, and for this reason the said treaty of Lunevill 
demanded that such debts should have been agreed to by them. But 
in the Duchy of Deux-Ponts and in that part of the Palatinate of the 
Khine which France acquired by the treaty with Bavaria there was no 
such a governmental institution, and, therefore, the First Consul ag 
in the treaty of 1801 that the debts should follow the countries, pro- 



86 TREATY OF PEACE. 

vided they had been registered at their origin by the supreme admin- 
istrative authority. 

If the position opposed to this doctrine were maintained, the Eussian 
people might be exempted from meeting all the obligations that may 
have been or may be contracted by its Emperors while this system 
should obtain, for the administration and government of their Empire, 
in the event of the abolition of the autocratic system now prevailing in 
Kussia. The United States themselves, who as a matter of fact continued 
to observe after their emancipation many of the provisions of law 
enacted previously without their intervention by the power of the 
mother country, would have to return to Kussia Alaska, which the 
Emperor sold to them in 1807 without the intervention in such sale of 
the inhabitants of the country thus sold; likewise they should return 
to Spain Florida, for the same reason, etc. 

If in order that a debt be lawful it be necessary that the people 
which has to pay the same should intervene when it is incurred, when 
the law does not confer such intervention, how much more necessary 
must the intervention of a people be when ks sovereign sells the terri- 
tory which it inhabits. 

The very act of cession of sovereignty over the Antilles would be 
tainted with nullity, since the Cuban and Porto Eican peoples have 
not been consulted and have not expressed their formal assent to the 
Protocol of Washington. Such are the consequences of a theory 
which in the heat of the discussion has been advanced in the memo- 
randum of the American Commissioners. 

The very point which most limits the freedom of action of sover^ 
eigns in the conclusion of their treaties is that relative to the debts of 
their states. As to the integrity of their territory and even as to their 
own honor they may bind themselves freely and validly because they 
dispose of what is their own. But this liberty ia curtailed when their 
acts immediately reflect on the lawful rights of those private parties 
who lawfully acquired said rights under the protection of the laws 
and have thereafter had no part whatsoever in the conflicts which are 
solved by treaties, and should consequently not suffer unduly from the 
consequences of such treaties to the prejudice of their private and 
legitimate interests. 

When the creditors of a state make a contract -with the same, they 
always take into earnest account the conditions of solvency of the state 
to which they leud their property. Hence, when these conditions of 
solvency are impaired in consequence of territorial cessions, the High 
Contracting Parties between whom these cessions are effected, that 
which makes the cession as well as that which acquires the ceded terri- 
tory, always endeavor wholly to respect such rights by means of a 
partition of the obligation between the territory kept by the ceding 
sovereign and the territory acquired by the sovereign to whom it is 
ceded. This is what has been done in the treaties of territorial cession. 

But when the creditors have been granted by the very certificate of 
their contract a -direct lien on certain defined property or certain defined 
income, in order thus to recover the loaned capital and its legitimate 
interest, the sovereign cannot then, without first reckoning with their 
consent, cede or freely dispose of such property and incomes as if they 
were his full and exclusive property. 

If a sovereign should consent thus to trample upon rights which are 
not his own, those to whom such rights appertain would not be bound 
to submit and remain without appeal, in the name of the sacred prin- 
ciples which protect private property, to the respect of what belongs 



TREAT? OP PEACE. 

to him, whoever lie may be who has in his power that which lawfully 
belongs to him. 

And it were well in this connection formally to record thai even (grant- 
ing that the principle sustained by the Spanish and contested by i 
American Commission, to wit, that the colonial debl should not be 
chargeable to the mother country, is inadmissible, this could in- 
mean that Spain should now assume, with respect to the holders of that 
debt, more obligations than she contracted upon creating it. And, 
therefore, with respect to that part of the debt where she contracted 
only a subsidiary obligation to pay (since at issue it wa sly 

secured by certaiu and determinate revenues and receipts), Spain will 
have the right, under the law, to consider that she is not bound to pay 
such debt save in the event of the revenues and receipts primarily 
hypothecated to the payment thereof proving insufficient, for not until 
then, according to the elementary rules of law, will the subsidiary 
obligation she contracted be enforceable. 

Without expatiating today on the information, very incorrect, which 
is set forth in the American memorandum concerning the Cuban debt, 
the Spanish Commission would confine itself to asserting that as a 
general rule the Island of Cuba has not since its discovery covered its 
own expenses. 

As long as Spain kept the American colonies the island was sus- 
tained by the pecuniary aid of her sisters and specially by that of the 
Vice-Koyalty of Mexico. In this century, for a very few years, she 
had a surplus, thanks to the development of her natural resources, at 
last obtained through this assistance, and it is true that this surplus 
was turned over to the treasury of the Peninsula. But with this excep- 
tion it is patent that the general accounts of the Spanish state from 
1896-1897 show that the treasury of the Peninsula advanced to Cuba, 
in the years preceding that recent period, a sum amounting to 
429,602,013.08 pesetas. There also appears an advance to Porto Rico 
of 3,220,488.07 pesetas, and to Santo Domingo 1,397,161.69 pesetas. 

The prosperity of Cuba was of short duration: for the greater parr 
of the time from the days of Columbus, by reason either of the scarcity 
of its inhabitants or of the slavery of the black race which formed the 
majority, or lastly because Spaniards preferred to colonize other parrs 
of America, the island was unable to develop its natural resources; 
and it was nevertheless constantly necessary to expend m the is and 
the large sums which were required for the establishment ot reform 
and the creation of the institutions which are the essential condition. 

of modern life. . L .. „„«.« „, 

The Spanish Commission cannot but protest against the assertion 
made in the American memorandum that the ten years insurrection 
was the outcome of iust grievances, and it regrets that such an l ass 
tion should have been made without a necessity which would nave 
required it unavoidably, in the same way as the American Coimmss <m 
would surely, and with good reason, regret that the Spanish .Commis- 
sion should say anything here without an imperative necessity ^ol : tws 
justice of the rebellions of the natives of the immense American terri- 
tory which the United States had so often to suppress .with an .mm 
hand, and if it should also say anything of the right by which the ^Soutn 
ern States attempted to break the federal bond by the force , of arms. 

It is useless, for reasons that will hereafter be stated, for the > S?a™* 
Commissioners to take up the concrete discussion ot the ^ ^; 
the Cuban debt to which reference is made in the Amei icani me no£ . 
dum. They understand the errors that may have found their way into 



88 TREATY OF PEACE. 

that document, because it is very natural that the American Commis- 
sioners shoald not have such accurate knowledge as is requisite for 
precise judgment of the acts of the Spanish administration in the 
Peninsula or in its colonies. 

And we find a confirmation of this in the facts. 

In regard to the argument against the recognition of a certain part 
of the Cuban debt, on the ground that the rebellion of a minority of the 
Cuban people to obtain their independence was just, we have only to 
make the following remark: 

The insurgent minority, it is true, rose up in arms to secure the inde- 
pendence of the island. The United States erroneously believed that 
their cause was just, and by force of arms caused it to prevail against 
Spain. But now the facts have shown that Spain was right, as the 
United States themselves have had to recognize that the Cuban people 
are not as yet in such conditions as are necessary to entitle them to 
the enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is upon this ground 
that the United States have decided to withhold from that people the 
said privileges and to hold them under American control, until they 
become able to enjoy that liberty prematurely demanded by them. 

The Spanish Commission feels bound, furthermore, to call the atten- 
tion of the American Commission to the obligations of Porto Rico. 

The American "memorandum" which is now answered refers exclu- 
sively to the obligations of Cuba. Is this omission due to the belief that 
as the sovereignty over Porto Rico was not relinquished but ceded by 
Spain to the United States, it must be conveyed to the latter free from 
burdens of all kinds'? Is the principle maintained that cessions of ter- 
ritory, for whatever causes, whether conquest, or a mere agreement, do 
not carry with them ipso facto all the burdens which encumber the 
ceded territory? 

In the oral discussion the American Commissioners stated that the 
Spanish Government had declared that no debt rested on the smaller 
Antille. The Spanish Commissioners have carefully gone over all the 
written communications that have passed between the two High Par- 
ties, from the ultimatum of the President of the Union of April 20 of 
this year to the signing of the Protocol in Washington on August 12 
of the same. In none of them have they found a suggestion or trace 
of such a declaration. And, be it said in passing, that among other 
obligations, the smaller Antille has been burdened for very many 
years with a part, which though small is no less sacred, of the perpetual 
and truly just charge through which Spain, in the name of America 
rather than her own, has been showing her gratitude to the immortal 
Columbus, who discovered it, and his legitimate descendants, and, should 
the conclusions of the American Commissioners prevail and Spain con- 
tinue paying it, logic would place the United States in the position of 
repudiating it. 

But the fact is that the discussion upon the so-called Cuban debt 
seems to lack opportunity at the present. 

The American Commissioners, when referring to the principal items 
of the said debt, doubtless believed that the Spanish Commission had 
suggested in its draft the said items to be at once admitted as colonial 
debt to be transferred together with the sovereignty either to Cuba or 
to the United States; and this is the capital error upon which the 
American memorandum is based. The Spanish Commissioners only 
wish that the principle, up to this time always admitted, to wit: that a 
debt being exclusively the debt of a colony and affecting its territory, 
goes with the colony itself, be also recognized in this treaty. The 



TREATY OF PEACE. 80 

American memorandum says nothing in contradiction of this principle, 
nor do the Spanish Commissioners expect that anything be now said 
against it. least of all by the United States, whose territory was acquired 
by them not only with their blood but also with the money of their 
treasury. There are publicists who maintain that the thirteen original 
States paid over to their mother country fifteen million pounds sterling 
(£15,000,000); and the facts are official that the United States paid to 
France, Spain, the Indian nations and Russia respectively considerable 
sums of money for Louisiana. Florida, the Indian States, Texas, Cali- 
fornia and Alaska. This instance would be the tirst one in the history 
of the United States, in which they, acting at variance with their own 
traditions, should have gratuitously acquired a territory which sooner 
or later will be annexed to the Union. 

The case of the acquisition of Texas, identical as to its origin, its 
process and its end with that of the Island of Cuba, eloquently shows 
that the policy then pursued with Mexico by the United States is 
different from the one now pursued with Spain. In the ease of Mexico 
the American armies, also in support of insurgents, the Texan insur- 
gents, spread themselves over the territory of the whole Mexican 
Republic, and went as far (a fact which has not taken place in Cuba) 
as to capture the national capital. The United States demanded then 
from Mexico the independence of Texas as they now demand from 
Spain the independence of Cuba, and furthermore they caused Mexico 
to cede to them New Mexico and California, as now they cause Spain 
to cede to them Porto Rico and the other Spanish islands in the West 
Indies. But in the case of Mexico they did not ask from her Govern- 
ment any war indemnity, and consented not only to pay her the value 
of the territories ceded and annexed to the American Umpire, but also 
to assume the payment of the American claims then standing against 
Mexico. 

In the case of Spain, however, they have demanded from her, in the 
way of war indemnity, the cession of the islands above mentioned, and 
ask now, additionally, that the burdens which encumber those islands 
as well as their sister Cuba be thrown on the mother country, who with 
her own hands introduced them into the life of the civilized world. 

The only wish of the Spanish Commissioners is that the principle 
above referred to be admitted and recognized. Its practical application 
may, according to their understanding of the subject, be afterwards 
entrusted to a Commission of righteous and impartial persons. It this 
Commission upon examination of the bill of items to be tiled by Spam, 
showing what obligations ought in her opinion to be paid by either 
Cuba, or Porto Rico, should decide that those obligations must tall on 
the mother country, Spain shall submit to its decision. But it the < om- 
mission decides that the whole or a part of the said debts ought to be 
paid by the colony, there is no reason why the United States in their 
turn should not also submit to the award. If the United States teel so 
sure, as they seem, in their position, they cannot see any danger in 
assenting to the proposition herein made by the Spanish Commission. 
But if they are not so sure, their high sense of justice and the duty n 
respect which they owe to themselves impose upon them the oDligatu 
of causing a matter of mere pecuniary interest to be made subordinate 
to the sacred cause of justice. . . . . 

And in order to show to the American Commission that the 5>pai iiwn 
Commissioners have no other wish than the one stated, and tnat ine 
purpose is not by any means to have a fixed sum adjudged at tnis nme, 
as a colonial debt to be paid by the Spanish Antilles, they have decided 



90 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to withdraw Articles II, TV and V, as drawn up by them in their former 
draft, and offer as a substitute for the three, a single article reading as 
follows: 

"Article II. 

"The relinquishment and transfer made by her Catholic Majesty and 
accepted by the United States of America embrace : 

"1. All the prerogatives, powers and rights belonging to her Catholic 
Majesty as a part of her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba and its 
inhabitants. 

"2. All the charges and pecuniary obligations, outstanding at the 
date of the ratification of this treaty, which upon careful examination 
of their origin, their purposes and the conditions of their creation, 
should be adjudged according to strict law and undeniable equity to be 
different from the charges and obligations which properly and spe- 
cifically belong to the Peninsular treasury, owing to their having been 
at all times properly and specifically belonging to Cuba. 

"To secure the careful examination provided for in the foregoing 
paragraph, a Commission consisting of competent and impartial per- 
sons shall be appointed by the two High Contracting Parties. The 
manner of this appointment shall be determined in this treaty by a 
separate article." 

The American Commissioners do not feel disposed to concur with the 
Spanish Commissioners in the exception made by the latter in the sec- 
ond paragraph of Article III of their draft, regarding what is called 
patrimonial property of the state. The state, under the Spanish laws, 
exercises all rights of ownership over the property declared b}^ law to 
be public property, and it is plain that in this case the cession of the 
sovereignty carries with it the cession of all those rights. But the state 
in Spain can also, in the capacity of a body politic, or corporation, ac- 
quire and hold real property, by the same means and through the same 
processes as private persons can do under civil municipal law. This 
peculiar kind of property was the one referred to in the exception sug- 
gested by the Spanish Commissioners. Notwithstanding this fact, and 
in order to show once more that they feel disposed to compromise dif- 
ferences, and to promote peace, the Spanish Commissioners do hereby 
waive the said exception, and accept that the patrimonial property of 
the state be also included in the cession and transfer of the sovereignty 
of Spain over the Antilles. 

As to the other exceptions which were then suggested, the Spanish 
Commission cannot believe that the American Commission will ever 
refuse to accept them. The American Commission in its draft refers 
only to individual property. But the Honorable Commissioners of the 
United States are not ignorant of the fact, and the mere suggestion of 
it would involve an offense to their great learning, that in audition to 
individual persons there are other persons, capable in all civil societies, 
of lawfully acquiring and holding property both real and personal. 
Commercial and industrial firms, ordinary co-partnerships, public 
establishments, whether charitable institutions, schools, or others, can 
in Spain and her colonies acquire and hold property and enjoy the 
same protection as is given under the laws to the property of individual 
persons. All the exceptions suggested in the second paragraph of 
Article III of the Spanish draft, refer to the property belonging to the 
said corporate entities, which cannot be considered as individual 
persons. 

Certain phrases to be found in the fourth paragraph of the same arti- 



TREATY OP PEACE. 91 

cle, relating to the delivery of public archives, and stating that the 
United States shall exercise over them the same rights and be Bubj< cl 
to the same obligations as Spain, have attracted the attention <d the 
American Commission. The explanation of the reason why these 
phrases were used is easy to be made. Properly speaking, the state is 
not the absolute owner of the public archives, but rather the keeper or 
depository of the same. It is for this reason that it cannot destroy the 
documents which belong to them, or dispose of them by sale or other- 
wise, and also, that no citizen can be deprived of the right to make use 
of those documents in defense of his rights. Can it be in the power of 
the state to destroy the Registries of the Etat-civil and with them all 
the evidence as to the civil condition or status of all its citizens I < 'an 
it be in its power to destroy the property registries, wherein the title 
deeds and the proofs of the ownership of all property arc kept and pre 
served? Certainly not. But this is precisely what is meant by the 
phrases above mentioned. The United States shall have the same 
rights as far as their archives are concerned as Spain used to have; — 
and those rights, the only ones vested in Spain, are also the only ones 
which she can transfer to the United States. 

Nevertheless, and in order to remove from the minds of the Ameri- 
can Commissioners any possible doubt as to the real intention of tin; 
Spanish Commissioners, in framing as they did the aforesaid Article 
III, they have decided to consent to modify that article and word it in 
a different way, omitting to except from the operation of the cession 
the patrimonial property of the state, and explaining the points which 
the American Commissioners deemed to be doubtful. Here is the text 
of the article as amended : 

"Article III. 

"In pursuance of the agreement contained in the two preceding 
articles, Her Catholic Majesty, acting in the same representative 
capacity in which this treaty is entered into, relinquishes and transfers 
to the United States all the buildings, wharves, barracks, fortresses, 
establishments, public highways, and all other real property, which 
appertain under the law to the public domain, and which as such 
belong to the Crown of Spain in the Island of Cuba. 

"The rights and the property of all kinds whatsoever which up to 
the date of the ratification of this treaty have been either peacefully 
exercised, or possessed or held by the provinces, municipalities, public 
or private institutions, civil or ecclesiastical corporations, or any other 
collective entities having legal capacity to acquire and hold property in 
the Island of Cuba, and by private individuals of whatsoever national- 
ity, shall not be included in the relinquishment and transfer above 
made. TT . , 

"Her Catholic Majesty also relinquishes and transfers to the United 
States all the documents and title papers exclusively relating to t Ik- 
bo vereignty transferred and accepted and to all rights thereof, wnicn 
may be found in the archives of the Peninsula. Copies shall also DC 
given to the United States whenever they may ask for them, 01 i 
passages concerning the said sovereignty and rights, which ma\ oceni 
in other documents not relating to the Island of Cuba, but to other saD- 
iects foreign to it, which may exist in the said archives. Ami enc 
same shall be observed reciprocally in favor of Spam regarding docu- 
mentsand papers, having nothing to do, either in whole or in pan, 
with the Island of Cuba, now to be found in the Cuban archive,, « Inch 
may be of interest to the Spanish Government 



92 TREATY OF PEACE. 

"All the official archives and registries, whether belonging to the 
judicial or to the executive departments of the Government, now at the 
disposal of tlie Spanish Government and its authorities in the Island of 
Cuba, and relating to the said island or its inhabitants, and to their 
rights and property, shall be left without restriction of any kind at the 
disposal of the United States, in order that the latter may keep them 
with the same powers which were heretofore vested in the Spanish Gov- 
ernment and authorities. 

"Private individuals, whether Spaniards or Cubans, shall have the 
right to ask for and obtain, in the manner provided by law, authenticated 
copies of all contracts, last wills and testaments, and other documents 
to be found in the notarial archives, which are deemed to form part of 
the judicial or executive archives either in Spain or in Cuba." 

Article VI of the Spanish draft did not set forth the reason of the 
cession made by Spain in favor of the United States of the Island of 
Porto Rico, the other Spanish Antilles, and of the Island of Guam in 
the Marianas. That reason nevertheless was explained in the despatch 
of the Secretary of State of the United States in his answer to themes- 
sage transmitted to him by the Spanish Government. Said despatch 
states that the President of the Republic did not demand the payment 
of any war indemnity, owing to his desire to give testimony of signal 
generosity, and then it says : 

"Nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of 
the United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens 
for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection 
in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States 
and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico 
and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West 
Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected 
by the United States." 

The island designated by them was the Island of Guam. 

The Spanish Commissioners have now decided to change the text of 
the article as formerly framed by them and offer as a substitute another 
article which will leave on record the reason of the cession. It is quite 
certain that the American Commission will agree with the Spanish 
Commission in the advisability of preventing the United States from 
being shown in the treaty as acquiring gratuitously the said islands. 
Here is the new text of the article: 

"Article IV. 

"In compensation for the loss and expenses incurred by the United 
States on account of the war and for the claims of their citizens for 
damages done to their persons or property during the last insurrection 
in Cuba, Her Catholic Majesty, in the name and in representation of 
Spain, and constitutionally authorized to do so by the Cortes of the 
Kingdom, cedes to the United States of America, and the latter accept 
for themselves the Island of Porto Rico and all other islands in the 
West Indies which are now under the sovereignty of Spain, and also 
the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones Archipelago, which 
was chosen by the United States by virtue of Article II of the Protocol 
signed at Washington on August 12 ultimo." 

In regard to Article VII in the draft of the Spanish Commission, the 
lattei understands that it is its duty, for the reasons stated in this 
memorandum, to leave it as it is, with no other change than that which 



TREATY OF PEACE. '.!.'; 

is required indispensably to put it in harmony with the new articles 
now introduced. In consequence thereof, it will read as follows: 

Article V. 

"This cession of sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of 
Porto Rico and the other islands mentioned is understood to consist in 
the transfer of the rights and obligations, property and documents 
relating to the sovereignty over said islands, in the same way as was 
provided in the preceding articles in reference to the relinquishment 
and transfer of the sovereignty over the Island of Cuba." 

It results, in recapitulation, that the only question up to now in 
existence between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is 
a question of money, which as far as one of the High Contracting 
Parties is concerned is relatively of secondary importance. That 
question is the one which relates to the colonial debt. 

The Spanish Commissioners understand that a question of such a 
nature as this cannot fail to be solved satisfactorily between two 
parties, one of which is the greatest nation of the new world, immensely 
rich and prosperous, blessed with inexhaustible resources, whether due 
to nature or to the prodigious activity of its inhabitants, which on the 
other hand acquires by this treaty territories of great importance, and 
thereby fulfils au aspiration of its policy in America, while the other 
party is a great and noble nation of the old world, a cordial friend of 
her late antagonist in days for her more prosperous, but now impover- 
ished through the misfortunes heaped upon her during the century 
which is about to terminate: whose treasury is overburdened by obli- 
gations, and for whom the present treaty will mean the solemn continua- 
tion of the loss of the last remnantsof her Americau empire, although 
through her discovery of the new world she was instrumental in the 
very existence of the Great American Republic, and to the enrichment 
of the modern nations, perhaps at the expense of her own welfare and 
to the detriment of the full development of the great elements of 
wealth accumulated iu her own bosom but neglected through her desire 
preferentially to attend to her colonies, creatures who like all others in 
the order of nature enlist the utmost solicitude on the part of their 
mother, who feeds and supports them at the sacrifice of her own 
welfare. 

True copy: 

Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 10. Protocolo No. 10. 

Conference of October 27. 189S. Confer encia del 27 de Octubre de 

J y 1898. 

Present — On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Es- 

United States: Messrs. Day, tados Unidos de America los 

Davis Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Senores Day, Davis, Frye, dray, 

Fergusson Reid, Moore, Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs. Por parte deEspana losSem 

Montero-Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica 

Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Villa Urrutia Cerero Ojeda 

The protocol of the preceding Fue leida y aprobada el acta ue 

session was read and approved. la sesiou anterior. 



94 



TREATY OP PEACE. 



The American Commissioners 
presented their written reply, copy 
of which is hereto annexed, to the 
memorandum filed by the Spanish 
Commissioners at the last session 
in support of the articles which 
they presented on the 21st instant, 
and which were afterwards rejected 
by the American Commissioners. 

The American Commissioners, 
referring to the acceptance by the 
Spanish Commissioners, in the 
terms expressed in the protocol of 
the last session, of the articles pre- 
sented by the American Commis- 
sioners, said that they were uncer- 
tain whether the acceptance was 
intended to apply to the articles 
first or to those last presented by 
them, and suggested that, if it was 
immaterial to the Spanish Commis- 
sioners, the American Commission- 
ers preferred that the acceptance 
should be taken to refer to the arti- 
cles first presented by them, as 
those articles contained provisions 
as to public archives and records. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that, as his 
acceptance of the articles was con- 
ditional upon the approval of the 
treaty of peace, he had no objec- 
tion to accepting these or any other 
articles, and especially as the first 
article of the American project was 
the same, saving differences in 
diplomatic form, as the first para- 
graph of the first Spanish article; 
but that he did not meau that he 
reuounced the second paragraph 
of that article, and that with re- 
spect to this part and to the other 
articles presented by Spain, he 
reserved, as provided in the pro- 
tocol of the 5th session, all the 
rights therein contained if there 
was no ultimate agreement upon 
the whole. 

The President of the American 
Commission replied that the 
American Commissioners were con- 
tent to take the acceptance of the 
Spanish Commissioners, as ex- 
pressed in their paper and entered 



Los Comisarios americanos hacen 
entrega de su contestation exrita 
que es anexa al acta presente, al 
Memorandum presentado por los 
espanoles en apoyo de los articulos 
presentados por ellos en la sesion 
del 21 del coriente, que fueron re- 
chazados por los Comisarios ameri- 
canos. 

Los Comisarios Americanos refi- 
riCndose a la aceptacion por los 
Comisarios Espanoles, en los ttirmi- 
nos expresados en el acta de la ul- 
tima sesion, de los articulos pre- 
sentados por los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos, manifestaron hallarse incier- 
tos sobre si dicha aceptacion se 
referia a los articulos primeramente 
presentados pos ellos 6 a los ulti- 
mos, y sugirierou que si a los Co- 
misarios espanoles les era indifer- 
ente, los Comisarios Americanos 
preferirian que la aceptacion re- 
cayese sobre los articulos primera- 
mente presentados por ellos, por 
contener estos disposiciones rela- 
tivas a los Archivos publicos y ex- 
pedientes. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
espaiiola contesta que siendo su 
aceptacion de dichos articulos con- 
dicional de la aprobacion del tra- 
tado de paz, no tieue iuconveniente 
en aceptar estos u otros articulos, 
tanto mas cuanto que el articulo 1° 
del proyecto americano, es igual 
Siilvo las difereucias de cancilleria, 
al primer parrafo del articulo espa- 
iiol; pero que esto no significa que 
renuncie a la seguuda parte de di- 
cho articulo 1° presentado por Es- 
pana, y que en cuanto a esta parte 
del articulo y a los demas presenta- 
dos por Espana, se reserva todos 
los derechos que contienen, como 
se con vino en el acta de la 5 il sesion, 
si no hubiese acuerdo ulterior so- 
brela totalidad. 

El Presidente de la Comisi6n 
Americana contesto que las Comi- 
sarios Americanos se avenian a que 
la aceptacion de los Comisarios 
Espanoles, tal cual la expresaba el 
exrito eousignado en el acta de la 






TREATY OF PEACE. 



I>5 



in the protocol of the last confer- 
ence, as applying to the articles 
last submitted, which were ex- 
pressed in the words of the Proto- 
col of August 12, 1898. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission repeated that the form 
or wording of those or of the 
other articles was a matter of in- 
difference to him; and he asked 
whether the American Commis- 
sioners would object to inserting 
in the article in which the cession 
of Porto Rico and the other islands 
in the West Indies and the island 
of Guam was made, or in any of 
the other articles of the treaty, a 
statement that the cession was 
made as indemnity for the expenses 
of the war and the injuries suffered 
during it by American citizens. 

The President of the Ameri- 
can Commission replied that the 
articles should stand as when they 
were accepted, and be considered 
as disposed of for the present, add- 
ing further that the American 
Commissioners did not mean to be 
understood that it should not ap- 
pear in some proper form in the 
treaty that the cession of Porto 
Rico and the other islands above 
referred to was on account of in- 
demnity for the losses and injuries 
of American citizens and the cost 
of the war. This view had been 
expressed in the note addressed to 
the Spanish Government contain- 
ing the demand of the President 
of the United States, and the 
American Commissioners recog- 
nized the force and meaning of 
that demand. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission said that it was not his 
intention now to discuss this point, 
but to state his desire that the ques- 
tion and the answer to it should be 
entered in the protocol. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission then inquired whether 
the American Commissioners were 
ready to answer the written pro- 
posal presented by the Spanish 



ultima conferencia, se reflriese 6 los 
articulos ultimamente present ados, 
expresados en Ins palabrae del 
Protocolo de 12 de A gosto de 1 i 

El Presidente de la Oomision 
Espanola repitequeleesindiferente 

la forma y redaction de unos u 
otros articulos, y pregunta ;i la 
Comision Americana si esta tend r ;i 
inconveniente en que en el articulo 
en que se trata de la eesidn de 
Puerto Rico, otras islas de las 
Antillas y la de Guam, 6 en otro 
cualquiera de los articulos del 
tratado, se exprese que esta cesios 
es en concepto de indemnizaci6n 
por los gastos de la guerra y los 
perjuicios sufridos durante ella por 
los Ciudadanos Americanos. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana contesto que los articu- 
los debian permanecer como esta- 
ban cuando fueron aceptados, de- 
bieudo por ahora eonsiderarso 
como terminados, y anadid que los 
Comisarios americanos no querian 
siguiflcar que seentendiese que no 
habria de figurar en forma adecu- 
ada en el Tratado, que la eesidn de 
Puerto Rico y las demas islas an- 
teriormente raencionadas, era a 
cuenta de iudemnizacion por per- 
didas y agravios de los Ciudadanos 
Americanos y gastos de la guerra. 
Este punto de visto habia sido ex- 
presado en la nota dirigida al Go- 
bierno Espahol en que se consi^na- 
ban las demandas del Presidente 
de los Estados Unidos y los Co- 
misarios de los Estados Unidos re- 
conocian la fuerza y el signifieado 
de esta demanda. 

El Presidente de la Comisi6n 
Espanola dice que no era su inten- 
tion el debatir ahora este punto. 
sino el de hacer constar su deseo 
deque figuren en el protocol-, su 
pregunta y la contestation dada. 

El Presidente de la Comisu n 
Espanola pide entouces a la Uo wl - 
sion Americana que con teste a la 
proposition escrita hecha en la se- 
sion anterior por los Comisarios 



96 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Commissioners at the last session, 
in which they accepted condition- 
ally the two articles of the Ameri- 
can draft. 

The President of the American 
Commission said that he under- 
stood that in the said proposal the 
American Commissioners were in- 
vited to present their propositions 
in regard to the Philippine Islands, 
and said that as this matter was of 
capital importance, and as the 
American Commissioners were not 
yet ready to submit a proposal in 
regard to it, he would propose an 
adjournment in order that they 
might have an opportunity to do 
so, and would suggest that in the 
mean time the Secretaries should 
endeavor to agree on the terms of 
the article relating to public prop- 
erty, archives and records in Cuba, 
Porto Pico and other islands in the 
West Indies, and Guam, for sub- 
mission to the Joint Commission. 
This suggestion was adopted, as 
well as the proposal for an adjourn- 
ment; and it was agreed, on mo- 
tion of the American Commission- 
ers, that the Joint Commission 
should meet again on Monday the 
3 1 st of October, at two o'clock, p. m., 
when the American Commissioners 
should present a proposal on the 
subject of the Philippines; and 
that if by that time the American 
Commissioners were not prepared 
to do so the meeting should be 
postponed to a later day. 

William P. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Peid. 

John B. Moore. 



Espafioles, al aceptar condicional- 
mente losdos articulosdel proyecto 
Americano. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana manifiestaqne entiende 
que en dicha proposition se les 
invita a presentar sus proposi- 
ciones relativas a Filipinas, y dice 
que siendo este punto de impor- 
tancia tan capital, y no hallandose 
la Comision Americana en disposi- 
tion de fonnular aquellas todavia, 
propone un aplazamiento para ha- 
cerlo y sugiere que entre tanto los 
Secretarios Generales de ambas 
Comisiones se pongan de acuerdo 
para redactar un articulo relativo 
a la propiedad publica, a los Ar- 
chivos, expedientes y documentos 
notaiiales en Cuba, Puerto Pico, 
otras islas de las Antillas y Guam, 
que sera sometido 4 la Comision en 
pleno. 

Se aprueba esta suggestion asi 
como el aplazamiento pedido por 
la Comision Americana, y se con- 
viene que los Comisarios se reuni- 
ran el lunes 31 de Octubre a las 2 
P. M. en que la Comision America- 
na presentara sus proposiciones 
sobre Filipinas, sin perjuicio de 
que si para entonces no hubiese 
arm podido elaborar sus proposi- 
ciones, la Comision Americana, se 
acuerde un nuevo aplazamiento. 



E Montero Pios 

B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA. 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
Pafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 10. 

To the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners in 
support of the articles presented by them on the 21st instant, and 
rejected by the American Commissioners on the 24th instant, the latter 
submit under the rules the following reply: 

The memorandum opens with an expression of the deep regret with 
which the Spanish Commissioners have acquainted themselves with the 



TREATY OF PEACE. !»7 

paper in which the American Commissioners, a1 the session oft Ik- 17th 
instant, proposed to substitute for the articles previously presented by 
them, in relation to Cuba, Porto Rico and other islands in the West 
Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Ladrones, the precise stipula- 
tions of the first and. second articles of the Protocol of August 12, L898, 
neither adding thereto nor subtracting therefrom. 

The American Commissioners on their part feel equal regrel that in 
the memorandum now under consideration the Spanish Commissioners 
should have seen lit to reject that proposal on grounds which disclose a 
misconstruction both of the proposal itself and of the stipulations of 
the Protocol on which it was based. 

The American Commissioners in their proposal of the 17th instant 
stated that they were "prepared, for the purpose of disposing of the 
question of Cuba. Porto Rico and Guam, simply to embody in the treaty 
the precise stipulations of the Protocol on those subjects." The Ameri- 
can Commissioners are still prepared to take this step, believing that 
the stipulations in question would suffice for the accomplishment of 
the purposes to which they relate. P>ut they have never asserted that 
the treaty of peace should be limited, in respect of Cuba, Porto Rico, 
and Guam, to the repetition of the precise terms of the Protocol on 
those subjects. Their position is, however, that any clauses that may 
be added must be devoted to the execution of the stipulations of the 
Protocol, and must not impair them or affix conditions to what was 
unconditional. 

Having adverted to the misconstruction of their proposal, the Ameri- 
can Commissioners will point out the misconstruction by the Spanish 
Commissioners of the Protocol. The Spanish Commissioners observe 
that as the stipulations of the Protocol form part of a binding agree- 
ment, which they properly declare the Protocol to be, it is useless merely 
to reproduce them in the treaty that is to be elaborated in the confer- 
ence. The Spanish Commissioners, however, seem to forget that the 
Protocol was an executory agreement, and that it cannot be assumed to 
be useless to ask either party now to do what in thai agreement it prom- 
ised to do. "Spain will', so reads Article I of the Protocol, ••relin- 
quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". This is a promise. 
The American Commissioners, having come hither to claim the lulli - 
ment of that promise, ask the Spanish Commissioners, clothed with 
powers to conclude a treaty of peace, to say in that treaty: "Spam 
hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to noa. 

Upon what theory can this be deemed a "useless" or ''redundant 
stipulation? Is it not, on the contrary, manifest that the treaty < 
peace, no matter what else it may include, must contain a stipn 
to this effect? 




an opportunity to meet them on the common grouna 01 wu<u u ... 
Governments "had unmistakably agreed to. It was and is now appar- 




the conference is at an end. In this crisis the American «om ra issmner8 



conee 
or of 



onference is at an enu. m uu^n^"" - . _,.,„,.; nle 

;ived that both sides might, without any compromise ^o V»™\£ 
opinion, agree that, instead of amplifying the words ot tin 1 roto 



T P- 



98 TREATY OF PEACE. 

col, or substituting: for them argumentative stipulations, they would 
execute the promise in the words in which it was made. They regret 
that the Spanish Commissioners rejected this conciliatory proposition. 

The Spanish Commissioners, in the memorandum now under consider- 
ation, recur to the distinction which they have sought to make between 
the words "abandon" and "relinquish". On this verbal question, 
which was raised by the Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum 
of the 11th of October, the American Commissioners find no occasion 
to add anything to what they have already said; but they feel called 
upon to repel the imputation that they have sought either to leave Cuba 
in a derelict condition or to evade any responsibility to which their 
Government is by its declarations or its course of conduct committed. 

In their proposal of the 17th instant, the American Commissioners 
made the following declaration : 

"The United States recognizes in the fullest measure that in requir- 
ing the relinquishment of all claim of Spanish sovereignty and the 
evacuation of the Island of Cuba it has assumed all the obligations 
imposed by the canons of international law and flowing from its occu- 
pation. The United States, so far as it has obtained possession, has 
enforced obedience to law and the preservation of order by all persons. 
It is not disposed to leave the island a prey to anarchy or misrule." 

By this declaration it is manifest that the American Commissioners 
have not contemplated the reduction of Cuba to the condition of a 
derelict and abandoned territory. They concede, however, the justice 
of the Spanish contention that the obligations which the United States 
has assumed with respect to Cuba should be acknowledged in the 
treaty, and they stand ready to make such acknowledgment. They are 
ready to insert proper stipulations as to the protection of life and 
property in Cuba during its occupation by the United States, and as 
to the aid and guidance which it may be necessary for the United 
States, in the present distracted condition of the island, to give. 

The Spanish memorandum refers to the capitulation of Santiago de 
Cuba, as well as to the evacuation of Cuba under Article IV of the 
Protocol of August 12, 1898, as proof that the island is to be delivered 
to the United States. So far as this argument goes it is perfectly 
sound. By the evacuation of Cuba the island is to pass for the time 
being into the possession of the United States, and the United States 
will, for the time being, occupy it. The Spanish memorandum, how- 
ever, inquires whether, in view of these facts, it is possible to deny 
that Spain, in relinquishing her "sovereignty" over Cuba, has the right 
to demand that it shall be received by the United States. 

This argument begs the question. The American Commissioners 
have never denied that the Island of Cuba will, upon its evacuation by 
the Spanish forces, come into the possession of the authorities of the 
United States; but this possession is by no means to be confounded 
with the sovereignty of the island, which the United States has long 
since declared to Spain an intention not to assume. The United States 
will take possession of the island for the purpose of pacifying it, but 
not as titular sovereign; and it is not to be charged with proposing to 
reduce it to the condition of a "desert territory in Africa", merely 
because it declines to assume the character of such sovereign. 

As to the statement of the Spanish memorandum that Spain's 
relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba was described by the Amer- 
ican Commissioners, in the second paragraph of the first article pre- 
sented by them on October 3, as a cession, they have only to say that 
they have searched the paragraph and the whole article for the word 



TREATY OF PEACE. fl!» 

in question, and that they are forced to the eonclnsion thai an error in 
translation has misled the Spanish Commissioners. 

The Spanish Commissioners, adverting to the citation by the Amer 
ican Commissioners of the dictionary of Escriche, seek to minimize the 
importance of that citation by saying that the dictionary serve. 
mentor for young- lawyers in the early period of their professional life 
The American Commissioners, however, can do no less than infer from 
this statement that the work in question is recognized in Spain as being 
of the highest authority. 

The American Commissioners areata loss to conjecture what more 
they can say to render their position clear as to the purpose ami mean 
ing of the relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over 
Cuba, as stipulated in Article I of the Protocol. The various forms 
which the argument of the Spanish Commissioners on this subject 
assumes are nothing but variations of their misconstruction of the 
American Commissioners' position. For example: The Spanish memo 
randum argues that the stipulations in the Protocol in regard to the 
relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the cession of Porto Rico 
are, in spite of a total difference in language, to be considered as tin- 
same in effect, because the American Commissioners, in the articles 
presented by them on the 3rd instant, seemed to contemplate that the 
archives in Cuba, as well as those in Porto Rico, shall be in the pos- 
session of someone to whom application for copies may be made. The 
Spanish memorandum declares that this would be impossible unless 
someone has the documents in his possession. This is quite true; hut 
the observation would be meaningless if it were not for the fact that 
the Spanish Commissioners insist upon saying that the American Com- 
missioners, because they decline to accept for their Government the 
sovereignty of Cuba, have contended that the island must be aban- 
doned by Spain in the sense of being left derelict. 

It is perfectly manifest that the contracting parties in deliberately 
employing different stipulations with respect to Cuba and Porto Rico 
neither expressed nor intended to express the same idea. This differ- 
ence is so clearly and fully explained in the memorandum of the Ameri- 
can Commissioners of the 14th of October that it seems to be idle to 
enlarge upon it. 

The American Commissioners have never based their position as to 
Spain's relinquishment of all claim of sovereignty over Cuba upon the 
English text of the Protocol as distinguished from the French text, as 
the Spanish memorandum suggests. On the contrary, in their memo- 
randum of the 14th of October, the American Commissioners distinctly 
declared that the words used with reference to Cuba in the French 
text were precisely the same in meaning as those used in the English 
text. 

In their memorandum of the 14th of October, the American Commis- 
sioners applied to their position as to Spain's relinquishment of all 
claim of sovereignty over Cuba a simple test. If Spain, they said, had, 
in reply to the demands of the United States, declared that she relin- 
quished her sovereignty over Cuba, but did not relinquish it to the 
United States, no one could have imagined that the demand of the 
United States would not have been satisfied. The Spanish memorandum 
intimates that everybody would have thought so except the I nited 
States, and declares that there is no one either in Europe or in America 
who believes that the United States would have been content with 
Spain's withdrawing from theisland and would have abstained from all 
intervention therein, leaving the inhabitants to continue to fight among 



100 TREATY OF PEACE. 

themselves. It is obvious, however, that Spain's relinquishment of 
sovereignty over Cuba and the subsequent intervention of the United 
States for the purpose of establishing order there are different matters. 
Whatever the United States might in certain contingencies have done 
with respect to Cuba, Spain would have satisfied the demands of that 
Government by withdrawing from the island. The question of subse- 
quent intervention in its affairs would then have lain between the 
United States and the people of the island themselves. The United 
States certainly could not have complained if Spain, while relinquish- 
ing her sovereignty, had refused to aid in or be a party to this inter- 
vention. 

In the Spanish memorandum an effort is made to answer that part 
of the argument submitted by the American Commissioners on the 14th 
instant in which it is maintained that the so-called Cuban debt is not 
in any sense a debt of Cuba, but that it is in reality a part of the 
national debt of Spain. The American Commissioners were able to 
show that the debt was contracted by Spain for national purposes, 
which in some cases were alien and in others actually adverse to the 
interests of Cuba; that in reality the greater part of it was contracted 
lor the purpose of supporting a Spanish Sbrmy in Cuba; and that, while 
the interest on it has been collected by a Spanish bank from the reve- 
nues of Cuba, the bonds bear upon their face, even where those reve- 
nues are pledged for their payment, the guarantee of the Spanish nation. 
As a national debt of Spain, the American Commissioners have never 
questioned its validity. 

The American Commissioners, therefore, are not required to main- 
tain, in order that they may be consistent, the position that the power 
of a nation to contract debts or the obligation of a nation to pay its 
debts depends upon the more or less popular form of its government. 
They would not question the validity of the national debt of Russia, 
because, as the Spanish memorandum states, an autocratic system pre- 
vails in that country. Much less do the American Commissioners main- 
tain that a nation cannot cede or relinquish sovereignty over a part of 
its territory without the consent of the inhabitants thereof, or that it 
impairs the national obligation of its debt by such cession or relin- 
quishment. 

Into these questions they do not think it necessary to enter. 

As to the rights, expectations, or calculations of creditors, to which 
the Spanish memorandum adverts, the American Commissioners have 
only to say that as regards the so-called Cuban debt, as explained in 
their memorandum of the 14th instant, the creditors, from the begin- 
ning, took the chances of the investment. The very pledge of the 
national credit, while it demonstrates on the one hand the national 
character of the debt, on the other hand proclaims the notorious risk 
that attended the debt in its origin, and has attended it ever since. 

The Spanish memorandum observes that in the last twenty years the 
Antilles have been represented in the Spanish Cortes and declares 
that their representatives have participated in all legislative acts bear- 
ing upon colonial obligations without ever protesting against their law- 
fulness or binding force. The information in the possession of the 
American Commissioners leads to a different conclusion. 

The American Commissioners have in their hands the Diario de las 
Sesiones de Cortes, for Thursday, the 29th of July, 188G, when the 
Cuban budget for 1880-1887 was introduced and discussed. By this 
record it appears that on the day named Senor Fernandez de Castro, a 
Senator from Cuba, referring to the budgets of 1880, 1882, 1883, 1881, 



TREATY OF PEACE. In I 

and 1S86, declared that he had objected to all of them, and thai no 
Cuban debt ought to be created, since the obligations embraced in il 

were national and not local. Be entered into a brief examination ol 
the items which constituted the debt, and created something ol 
sation by pointing out that quinine had been consumed in Cuba, 
during the war of 1808-1878, at the rate ol' $5,000 a week. 

Another Cuban Senator, Senor Morelos, supported the views <>\ 
Senor Fernandez de Castro. 

Senator Carbonell, representing the University »»l' Havana, in a 
speech of great power, continued the argument, saying: "Have tin- 
people involved in this matter ever been consulted ? The country has 
not been heard, and now for the first time has become acquainted with 
the fact that it has to pay such debts." 

The Cuban and Porto Rican Senators, Sefiores Portuondo, Ortiz, Labia, 
Montoro, Fernandez de Castro, Figueras, and Vizcarrondo, went fur 
ther, and introduced a bill to provide for the payment by Spain of the 
so-called Cuban debt in proportion to the productive capacity of the 
various provinces. 

The protests of the colonial Senators were not heeded, but their jus 
tice was recognized by no less a Spanish statesman than Senor Sagasta, 
the present Premier of Spain, then in the opposition, who said : 

"Our treasury is not now sufficiently provided with funds to aid 
Cuba in the way and to the extent that we would like to do: but I saj 
the Peninsula must give all that it can, and we must do without hesi- 
tation all that we can." 

Was not this a clear acknowledgment of the national character of the 
debt? 

Perhaps not so clear as that made in the decree of autonomy for 
Cuba and Porto Rico, signed by the Queen Kegent of Spain on the 
25th of November, 1897, and countersigned by Senor Sagasl 
President of the Council of Ministers. In Article II of the "Transient 
Articles" of the decree, we find the following declaration: 

"Article II. The manner of meeting the expenditures occasioned by 
the debt which now burdens the Cuban and Spanish treasury, and that 
which shall have been contracted until the termination ol the war. 
shall form the subject of a law wherein shall be determined the part 
payable by each of the treasuries and the special means of payiug tin' 
interest thereon, and of the amortization thereof, and, if necessary, of 
paving the principal. . ,. 

"Until the Cortes of the Kingdom shall decide this point, there shall 
be no change in the conditions on which the aforesaid debts have been 
contracted, or in the payment of the interest and amortization, or m 
the guarantee of said debts, or in the manner in which the payments 
are now made. n . • 

"When the apportionment shall have been made by the < one 
shall be for each one of the treasuries to make payment ot the pa 
assigned to it. . , „., 

" Engagements contracted with creditors under the pledge of the - 

specteu. 




nues oi Laioa was wnuny witum nuc w «^~- ~. — -- o „ ri tl 
could be modified or withdrawn by it at will without aflectmg t 
Obligation of the debt. , , . tl ,,;.] 

As to what is stated in the Spanish memorandum touching th< aid 



102 TREATY OF PEACE, 

given to Cuba in the List century or the early part of the present cen- 
tury by the Vice Royalty of Mexico, the American Commissioners might 
offer certain pertinent historical observations; but they deem it neces- 
sary now to say only that Mexico is not making any claim before this 
Joint Commission, either directly or indirectly. As to the statement 
that Cuba has produced during a very few years in the present century 
a surplus which was turned over to the treasury of the Peninsula, the 
American Commissioners will cite the justly celebrated Diccionario 
Geour&fico-Estadistuo-Historico de la I.sJa de Cuba., by Sen or Don Jacobo 
de la Pezuela, by which (see article on Senor Don Claudio Martinez de 
Pinillos) it appears that after 1825 not only were all the expenses of 
the island paid out of its revenues, but surpluses were sent, annually 
and regularly, to the mother country. These surpluses from 1850 to 1860 
amounted to $34,416,83(5. And it is to be observed that in addition to 
the regular annual surpluses turned over after 1825, extraordinary 
subsidies were from time to time granted to the Home Government. It 
was for services rendered in matters such as these that Sehor Pinillos 
received the title of Count of Villanueva. 

As to the recent "advances" to Cuba, referred to in the Spanish 
memorandum, it is to be regretted that details were not given. But, 
by the very term "advances", it is evident that the Spanish memoran- 
dum does not refer to gifts, but to expenditures for the reimbursement 
of which Cuba was expected ultimately to provide; and the American 
Commissioners do not doubt that these expenditures were made for the 
carrying on of the war, or the payment of war expenses, in Cuba. 

When the American Commissioners, in their memorandum of the 14th 
instant, referred to the Cuban insurrection of 1868 as the product ot 
just grievances, it was not their intention to offend the sensibilities of 
the Spanish Commissioners, but to state a fact which they supposed 
to be generally admitted. They might, if they saw fit to do so, cite the 
authority of many eminent Spanish statesmen in support of their 
remark. They will content themselves with mentioning only one. On 
February 11, 1869, Marshal Serrano, President of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment at Madrid, in his speech at the opening of the Constituent 
Cortes, referred to the revolution in Spain and the insurrection in Cuba 
in the following terms: "The Revolution is not responsible for this ris- 
ing, which is due to the errors of past Governments; and we hope that 
it will be speedily put down and that tranquillity, based upon liberal 
reforms, will then be durable." (Annual Register, 1869, page 255.) 

The American Commissioners have read without offense the reference 
in the Spanish memorandum to the Indian rebellions which it has been 
necessary for the United States to suppress, for they are unable to see 
any par allel between the uprisings of those barbarous and often savage 
tribes, which have disappeared before the march of civilization because 
they were unable to submit to it, and the insurrections against Spanish 
rule in Cuba, insurrections in which many of the noblest men of Spanish 
blood in the island have participated. 

ISTor are the American Commissioners offended by the reference of 
the Spanish memorandum to the attempt of the Southern States to 
secede. The Spanish Commissioners evidently misconceive the nature 
and the object of that movement. The war of secession was fought and 
concluded upon a question of constitutional principle, asserted by one 
party to the conflict and denied by the other. It was a conflict in no 
respect to be likened to the uprisings against Spanish rule in Cuba. 

The American Commissioners are unaware of the ground on which 



TREATY OF PEACE. In;; 

it is asserted in the Spanish memorandum thai the United : 

been compelled to admit that the Cuban people are as \.t i • the 

enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is true thai an intimation 
of such unfitness was made in the note of the Spanish Governmenl on 
the 22nd of July last. The Government of the United States, in its 
reply of the 30th of July, declared that it did not share the apprehen 
sions of Spain in this regard, but that it recognized that in the pre ion I 
distracted and prostrate condition of the island, bronghl aboul In the 
wars that had waged there, aid and guidance would be m 

The reference in the Spanish memorandum to the obligations of Porto 
Eico is not understood by the American Commissioners, who bad been led 
to believe that there was no Porto Ei< an debt. OnJune30, L8 6, Senor 
Castellano, Colonial Minister of Spain, in submitting to the < lortes the 
budget of Porto Eico for 1896-97, the last one. as it is understood, 
framed, said: 

"The duty to report to the National representation the financial con- 
dition of Porto Eico is exceedingly gratifying. It shows the evergrow- 
ing prosperity of the Lesser Antille, which, through the multiplicity of 
its production and the activity of its industry, has succeeded in securing 
markets for its surpluses in the whole world. 

"It being without any public debt (sin deuda publico,), all its q< 
sities being covered, its treasury being full to repletion, its public serv- 
ices being fulfilled with regularity, with economy in the expenses, and 
with a constant development of the revenues of the state, the spectacle 
afforded by Porto Eico is worthy of attention." 

The Gaceta de Madrid of July 1, 1896, which published this budget, 
published also a Law, approved June 29, 1896, providing for the dispo- 
sition to be made of the surplus of $1,750,909 in the treasury of Porto 
Eico at the expiration of the fiscal year 1895-96. 

No Porto Eican Loan was ever contracted or floated before 1896. 

No Porto Eican bonds are quoted in the markets of Europe or 
America. 

It is possible that the Governor General of Porto Eico may have 
borrowed money from a bank or from private persons in order to meet 
in advance expenses authorized by the budget, and that he may have 
given promissory notes for the amount borrowed, but these notes, pa tl 
on maturity, do not constitute a Porto Eican debt, in the sense claimed 
by the Spanish Commission. 

Nor is it to be supposed, in view of the flourishing condition of the 
colonial finances, as explained by the Spanish Minister of the Colonies. 
that any note of the kind referred to remains unpaid. 

The American Commissioners are not acquainted with the works ol 
the publicists who maintain that the thirteen original United States 
paid to Great Britain 15,000,000 pounds sterling, presumably for the 
extinguishment of colonial debts. The American Commissioners, how- 
ever, feel no interest in the matter, since the statement is ear 
erroneous. The preliminary and definitive treaties of peace befr 
the United States and Great Britain of 1782 and 1783 were published 
soon after their conclusion, and have since been republished 
forms. They are the only treaties made between the two couutr 
to American independence, and they contain no stipulation oi tin 
referred to 

Nor do the American Commissioners perceive the relevancy of t he 
citation in the Spanish memorandum of the sums paid by the i 
States to France, Spain, Eussia, and various Indian nations lor tern- 



104 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tory acquired from them. In none of those cases does .t appear that 
the United States assumed any debts. The money paid by the United 
States was paid for the territory. 

As to the case of Texas, the American Commissioners have only to 
observe that Texas was an independent state which yielded up its 
independence to the United States and became a part of the American 
Kepublio. In view of this extinction of the national sovereignty, the 
United States discharged the Texan debt. Indeed, the whole reference 
made in the Spanish memorandum to the case of Texas is quite inac- 
curate. The United States did not demand of Mexico the independ- 
ence ot Texas. That independence was established by the inhabitants 
of Texas themselves, and had long been acknowledged, both by the 
United States and by other powers, before the voluntary annexation 
of Texas to the United States. 

The payments of money made by the United States to Mexico for terri- 
tory obtained by the former from the latter at the close of the Mexican 
war are referred to in the Spanish memorandum, but these payments 
established no principle. They were made by the United States as a 
part of the general settlement with Mexico, and it will hardly be argued 
that if the treaty of peace had contained no stipulation in the subject, 
anything would have been due from the United States. 

The Spanish memorandum, however, refers to these transactions as 
if they constituted precedents for the proposal put forward by the 
Spanish Commissioners for the arbitration by the United States and 
Spain of the question whether the whole or any part of the alleged 
Cuban and Porto Eican debts should be assumed or guaranteed by the 
United States. The American Commissioners are compelled to take a 
different view of the subject. They have no doubt that if during the 
negotiations with Mexico a proposal had been put forward by either 
party for the arbitration of the question whether Mexico should cede 
the territories demanded by the United States, or whether if they were 
ceded the United States should pay for them, and if so how much, such 
proposal would have been rejected by the other party as entirely inap- 
plicable 10 the transaction. 

So it is in the present case. The Commissioners of the United States 
and of Spain have met for the purpose of concluding a treaty which is 
to terminate a war. The matters involved in this transaction are mat- 
ters for mutual adjustment and definitive settlement. They are matters 
to be determined by the parties themselves, and not by any third party. 
Arbitration comes before war, to avert its evils; not after war to escape 
its results. 

As was shown by the American Commissioners in their memorandum 
of the 14th of October, the burdens imposed by Spain upon Cuba in 
the form of the so-called Cuban debt have been the fruitful source of 
Cuban insurrections. In the opinion of the American Commissioners 
the time has come for the lifting of this burden, and not for the sub- 
mission to a third party of the question whether it shall be lifted at all. 

Having answered so much of the Spanish memorandum as relates to 
the vital articles of the Spanish proposals and expounds the Spanish 
views regarding them, the American Commissioners do not think it 
necessary to discuss the remaining articles, which may be, for the pur- 
pose of this discussion, regarded as merely subsidiary, and as to which 
they make all necessary reservations. 

Near the close of their memorandum, the Spanish Commissioners say : 

"It appears by this recapitulation that the only question now pend- 
ing between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a 



TREATY OF PEACE. 111.", 

question of money, which, so far as one of the High Contracting l\u 
is concerned, is relatively of secondary importance. That question is 
the one which relates to the colonial debt." 

In this conclusion the American Commissioners concur. 
The American Commissioners have maintained thai the proposal by 
the Spanish Commissioners that the United States shall assume the 
so-called Cuban debt is in reality a proposal to affix a condition to the 
unconditional promise made by Spain in the Protocol of /Yugusl 1 ', 
1898, to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba"; 
and they have further maintained that the abstention of Spain from 
proposing such a condition at that time precludes her from proposing 
it now. The American Commissioners have declared, and now repeat, 
that if such a proposal had been made during the negotiations that 
resulted in the conclusion of the Protocol it would have terminated 
them, unless it had been withdrawn. 

In confirmation of the position that the Spanish Commission is now 
precluded from proposing the assumption by the United States of the 
so-called Cuban debt, the American Commissioners, besides invoking 
the unconditional stipulation of the Protocol, are aide to point to the 
fact that the Spanish Government, in the correspondence that resulted 
in the conclusion of that instrument, took the precaution, in replyin.tr 
to the demand of the United States for the relinquishment by Spain of 
all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of 
the island, to refer to the duty which in her opinion rested upon the 
United States under the circumstances to provide for the protection of 
lite and property in the island until it should have reached the stage of 
self-government. In his note of August T. 1898, the Duke of Almo- 
dovar, replying to the demand of the United States, said: 

"The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba l»einu' 
imperative, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this 
territory shall not have fully reached the condition required to take 
rank among other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure 
order and protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the 
Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country." 

If to this reservation, which the American Commissioners have 
declared their readiness to recognize in the treaty, the Spanish Govern- 
ment had desired to add another on the subject of the Cuban debt, the 
opportunity then existed and should have been seized. Indeed, the 
insertion of a few words in the reservation actually made would have 
rendered it applicable to the so-called Cuban debt as well as to the pro- 
tection of life and property. 

A labored argu mentis made in the memorandum submitted by the 
Spanish Commissioners to prove that the Government of the 1 nited 
States in declining to take upon itself the so called Cuban debt is act- 
ing in violation of all principles of international law and assumes an 
attitude hitherto unknown in the history of civilized nations. Cases 
supposed to be apposite are cited, showing the assumption of national 
debts where one sovereignty is absorbed by another, or a division of 
national indebtedness where a nation is deprived ot an integral part ot 
its domain, either bv cession, or the attainment ot independence I 
colony theretofore charged with raising a part of the national reven 
Elsewhere we have pointed out the differences manifestly existing 
between the cases cited and the one in hand. The 1 nited States ma> 
well rest its case upon this point upon the plain terms ot the i rot, 
which, as the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Oommisi 
well says, contains the agreement between the parties— • lor no otnei 



106 TREATY OF PEACE. 

was formulated between the two parties", and which is executed when 
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. If 
the question were still open the United States might well challenge the 
fullest inquiry into the equity of this demand. 

It is urged in the Spanish Commissioners' memorandum that the United 
States, erroneously believing in the justice of the cause of Cuban inde- 
pendence, made it its own, and took up arms in its behalf. "The U nited 
States", so declares the Spanish memorandum, "made a demand on 
Spain, and afterwards declared war on her, that Cuba might become 
free and independent." The causes of the demand of the United States 
for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba are amply shown in 
the history of the events which preceded it. For many years the Uui ted 
States patiently endured a condition of affairs in Cuba which gravely 
affected the iuterests of the nation. As early as 1875 President Grant 
called attention to all its dread horrors and the consequent injuries to 
the interests of the United States and other nations, and also to the 
fact that the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, 
seemed to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked 
for the termination of the strife. During that administration, notwith- 
standing that it was clearly intimated to Spain that the United States 
could no longer endure the situation — which had become intolerable — , 
no unfriendly action was taken, and for ten years it suffered all the 
inconvenience and deprivation, destruction of trade and injury to its 
citizens incident to the struggle, which was ended by the Peace of 
Zanjon, only to break out again and to be waged with every feature of 
horror and desolation and profitless strife which had characterized the 
former struggle. 

President Cleveland, in his Annual Message of 1896, was constrained to 
say to the Congress of the United States : " When the inability of Spain 
to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it 
is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all pur- 
poses of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its 
re establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing 
more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction 
of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented 
in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded 
by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and 
discharge". Throughout President Cleveland's administration this 
situation was patiently endured, at great loss and expense to the 
United States, which then and at all times was diligent in maintaining 
the highest obligations of neutrality, through the vigilance of its navy 
and its executive and judicial departments. 

The present Chief Executive of the United States, in his first Annual 
Message, in 1897, again called attention to the disastrous effects upon 
our interests of the warfare still being waged in Cuba. The patient 
waiting of the people of the United States for the termination of these 
conditions culminated in the Message of April 2, 1898, of the President 
to Congress, in which he said: "The long trial has proved that the 
object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire 
of insurrection may flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it 
has not been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present 
methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which 
can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the 
name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered 
American iuterests which give us the right and the duty to speak and 
to act, the war in Cuba must stop." Acting upon this Message the 
Congress of the United States, in the Eesolutiou approved by the Presi- 



TREATY OF PEACE. In, 

dent April 20, 1898, which has been so often referred to in the memo- 
rauduui submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, based its <l. 
that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and •■. . : 
in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its forces from Cuba m d Unban 
waters, upon conditions in Cuba (so near the United States) which were 
declared to be such that they could no longer be endured. 

It is not necessary to recite the record of the events which followed 
that demand, well known to the members of this Commission, and 
which are now a part of the history of the world. It is true that t In- 
enforced relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty will result in the 
dom and independence of the Island of Cuba and not. in thi 
dizement of the United States. This resume of events which led to 
the United States taking up arms is not made to wound the suscepti- 
bilities of the Spanish nation, or its distinguished representatives upon 
this Commission, but, in view of the truth of history and the statements 
made in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, 
less could not be said by the representatives of the United States. Not 
having taken up arms for its own advancement, having refrained from 
acquiring sovereignty over Cuba, the United States now seeks to 
attain a peace consistent with its ends and purposes in waging war. 
In asking, as a victorious nation, for some measure of reparation, it has 
not emulated the examples of other nations and demanded reparation 
in money for the many millions spent and the sufferings, privations 
and losses endured by its people. Its relations to Cuba have been 
those of a people suffering without reward or the hope thereof. 

The American Commissioners therefore feel that they are billy justi- 
fied both in law and in morals in refusing to take upon themselves in 
addition to the burdens already incurred the obligation of discharging 
the so-called colonial debts of Spain — debts, as heretofore shown, cli idly 
incurred in opposing the object for the attainment of which the resolu- 
tion of intervention was adopted by the Congress and sanctioned by the 
President of the United States. If it could be admitted, as is argued 
in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, that the 
United States in this relation stands as the agent of the Cuban people, 
the duty to resist the assumption of these heavy obligations would be 
equally imperative. The decrees of the Spanish Government itself show- 
that these debts were incurred in the fruitless endeavors of that Gov- 
ernment to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people for greater 
liberty and freer government. 



True copy: 



John 15. MOOEE. 



Protocol So. 11. Protocolo Xo. 11. 

Conference of October 31, 1898. Gonferencia del 31 Octubre de 1 

Present On the part of the Presentes. Por parte de los ] 

United States. Messrs Day tados Unidos de America. 

Davis Frye Gray Reid Moore Senores Day. Davis, brye. 

Fergusson Peid. Moore. Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain Messrs. Por parte deEspana. los, 

Montero-Rios Abarzuza, Garnioa, Moutero Rios. Abarzuza. Uai 

Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Villa-Urrutia. C erero . >jeaa. 

The protocol of the preceding Fue leida y aprobada el acta tt< 

session was read and approved. la sesion anterior. 



108 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The American Commissioners 
stated that, in accordance with the 
understanding expressed in the 
protocol wliich had just been read, 
they were prepared to present their 
proposal on the subject of the Phil- 
ippines. The proposal was read in 
English and translated into Span- 
ish, and delivered to the Spanish 
Commissioners. It was as follows : 

"The American Commissioners, 
having been invited by the Spanish 
Commissioners at the last confer- 
ence to present a proposition in 
regard to the Philippine Islands, 
beg to submit the following article 
on that subject: 

"'Spain hereby cedes to the 
United States the archipelago 
known as the Philippine Islands, 
and lying within the following line: 
A line running along the parallel 
of latitude 21° 30' North from the 
118th to the 127th degree meridian 
of longitude East of Greenwich, 
thence along the 127th degree me- 
ridian of longitude East of Green- 
wich to the parallel of 4° 45' North 
latitude, thence along the parallel 
of 4° 45' North latitude to its inter- 
section with the meridian of longi- 
tude 119° 35' East of Greenwich, 
thence along the meridian of longi- 
tude 119° 35' East of Greenwich 
to the parallel of latitude 7° 40' 
North, thence along the parallel of 
latitude of 7° 40' North to its in- 
tersection with the 116th degree 
meridian of longitude East of 
Greenwich, thence by a direct line 
to the intersection of the 10th de- 
gree parallel of North latitude with 
the 118th degree meridian of longi- 
tude East of Greenwich, and thence 
along the 118th degree meridian of 
longitude East of Greenwich to the 
parallel of latitude 21° 30' North.' 



"A proper reference to the ces- 
sion thus proposed may be inserted 
in the article of the treaty relat- 
ing to public property, archives 
and records in territory which 
Spain cedes or over which she 
relinquishes her sovereignty. 



El Prcsidente de la Cor.iision 
Americana, maniriesta que, con- 
forme al acuerdo que cousigna el 
acta que acaba de leerse, los Com- 
isarios Americanos estan dispues- 
tosa presentar su proposition rela- 
tiva a Filipinas. La- proposicion 
es leida en ingles, dispues en espa- 
fiol, y entregada a los Comisarios 
Espaiioles. Su contenido es el si- 
guiente: 

"Los Comisarios Americanos, ha- 
biendo >ido invitados por los Com- 
isarios Espaiioles en la ultima con- 
ferencia a presentar una proposi- 
cion respecto de las Islas Filipinas, 
se periniteu someter sobre esta 
cuestion el articulo siguiente. 

"Espahapor este articulo cede 
a los Estados Unidos el archipiel- 
ago conocido por Islas Filipinas, 
situado dentro de las lineas sig- 
uientes: una linea que cone a lo 
largo del paralelo 21° 30' de latitud 
Norte desile el grado 118 hasta el 
grado 127 del meridian© de longi- 
tud Este de Greenwich; y de aqui 
a lo largo del grado 127 meridiano 
de longitud Este de Greenwich 
hasta el paralelo 4° 45' de latitud 
Norte; y de aqui a lo largo del 
paralelo 4° 45' latitud Norte ha-^a 
su intersecciou con el meridiano e 
longitud 119° 35' Este de Green- 
wich; de aqui a lo largo del me- 
ridiano de longitud 119° 35' Fste 
de Greenwich, al paralelo de lati- 
tud 7° 40' Norte: de aqui a lo 
largo del paralelo de latitud 7° 40' 
Norte, hasta su intersecciou con el 
grado 110 del meridiano de longi- 
tud Este de Greenwich; de aqui 
por una linea directa a la intersec- 
ciou del decimo grado paralelo de 
latitud Norte con el 118 grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, y de aqui a lo largo <1<1 
grado LIS meridiano de longiti d 
Este de Greenwich al paralelo lie 
latitud 21° 30' Norte. 

"Una irencion oportuna de la 
cesion asi propuesta, puede ser in- 
sertada en el articulo del Tratado 
relativo a la propiedad publica, 
Archivos y actas notariales en los 
territorios que Espana cede 6 a 
cuya soberania reuuncia. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



09 



"The American Commissioners 
beg further to state that they are 
prepared to insert in the treaty a 
stipulation for the assumption by 
the United States of any existing 
indebtedness of Spain incurred 
for public works and improvements 
of a pacific character in the 
Philippines." 

The Spanish Commissioners 
asked for an adjournment in order 
that they might examine the pro- 
posal, and either accept it or pre- 
sent a counterproposal, and sug- 
gested that the Commission should 
meet again on Friday, the 4th of 
November, at two o'clock, p. m., 
without prejudice to asking for a 
postponement, if it should be nec- 
essary. 

This suggestion was accepted, 
and the conference was accordingly 
adjourned. 

William R. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
Wm. P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Re id. 
John B. Moore. 



" Los Comisarios Americano 
permiten ademas mnnifestar ipie 
estan dispuestos (\ insertar en el 
Tratado una estipulacion por la 
(pie asumiriin los Estados I 'nidon 
cualquiera deuda kV- Espafia eon- 
traida para obraa piiblicas <> 
mejoras do caracter pacitico en 
Filipinas." 

Los Comisarios Espailoles piden 
un aplazamiento para estudiar 
dicha proposicion y sugieren que 
ambas Comisiones Be reunan de 
nuevo el viernes pr6ximo a las ~l l\ 
M., sin perjuiciode pedii un nuevo 
plazo si fuese uecesario. 



Aceptada esta 
levanto la sesion. 



indicacitin, se 



E. MONTERO lvl'os 
B. DE Abarzuza 

J. DE GAKNICA 

\V K de Villa Oreutla 
Rafael Cereuo 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 12. 



Protocolo No L2. 



Conference of November 4, 1898. Confer ■encia del i de Xoviemh 
J 1898. 



Present— On the part of the 
United States: Messrs. Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs. 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that, having 
carefully examined the proposal of 
the American Commissioners in re- 
lation to the Philippines, he pre- 
sented a counter-proposal on that 
subject, which counter-proposal he 
delivered to the Secretary of the 
Spanish Commission, who handed 
it to the Secretary of the American 
Commission. 



Presentes Por parte de los Bs- 
tados Unidos de America. l<>s 
Sehores Day. Davis. Live. Cray. 
Reid. Moore Fergusson 

Por parte de Espafia los Senorea 
Montero Rios. Abarzuza. Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia. Cerero. Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

ElPresidente de la Comision Es- 
panola manifiesta que despaes de 
haber examinado atentament< 
proposicion delos Comisarios Ame- 
ricanos, relativa a Filipinas, pre- 
senta una contraproposicii u sobre 

el mismo asunto, qu ' :l1 

SecretariodelaComision Espa 
quien a su vez la pone en manos 
del Secretario dela ComisiOn Ame- 
ricana. 



110 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The American Commissioners de- 
siring to Lave the counter-proposal 
translated to them immediately, it 
was read in English by their Inter- 
preter; and it is annexed to the 
protocol. 

The President of the American 
Commission then stated that as 
they understood from the reading 
of the paper that their proposal 
was rejected, they had under the 
rules a right to file a memorandum 
in writing in support thereof, and 
that, under the circumstances, and 
in order that the paper presented 
by the Spanish Commissioners 
might be carefully translated and 
considered, the American Commis- 
sioners desired an adjournment till 
Tuesday, the 8th of November, at 
two o'clock, p. m. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
agreed to the adjournment, but 
stated that, as their paper, besides 
rejecting the American proposal, 
also put forward a counter-pro- 
posal, they understood that they 
would have the right to submit a 
memorandum in writing in support 
of such counter- proposal, if the 
American Commissioners should 
reject it. 

The Commissioners concurring 
in opinion upon these matters, the 
conference was adjourned to the 
day previously fixed.. 

William E. Day 

Ctjshman K. Davis 

Wm. P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Reid. 

John B. Moore. 



Los Comisarios Americanos de 
seando que fuese inmediatamente 
traducida dicha contraproposicion, 
fue leida en ingl6s por su inter- 
prete y anadida en calidad de an- 
exo al presente Protocolo. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana manifiesta que entiende 
que de la lectura del anterior doc- 
umento se desprende ser rechazada 
la proposicion del a Comision Amer- 
icana, y que segun el reglamento 
tiene esta el derecho de presentar 
un Memorandum escrito en apoyo 
de aquella; que en vista de ello y 
a fin de que pudiera ser traducido 
cuidadosamente y exauiinado el 
documento presentado, los Comisa- 
rios Americanos deseaban aplazar 
la conferencia hasta el martes 8 de 
Noviembre a las 2. P. m. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles asien- 
teu al aplazamiento, pero anadem 
que el documento por ellos presen- 
tado ademas de rechazar la propo- 
sicion Americana contiene una con 
tra-proposicion y que por tanto en- 
tienden que asimismo tendrian el 
derecho de presentar un Memoran- 
dum por escrito en apoyo de su 
contraproposicion si esta fuese re- 
chazada por los comisarios Ameri- 
canos. 

Siendo esto acordado por los 
Comisarios, se aplaza la conferen- 
cia hasta el dia y hora auterior- 
mente citados. 

E. Montero Rios 
B. de Abarzuza 

J. DE GARNICA 

W R de Villa TJrrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 12. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS. 



PROPOSICION. 



La Comision Espanola ha leido con viva sorpresa la proposicion que 

la Americana ha presentado en lasesion del 31 del ultimo mes deOctubre. 

El unico articulo que en ella se contiene, esta redueido a que Espafia 



TREATY OF PEACli. 1 I 1 

ceda a los Estados Unidos el arehipielago conocido poi Mas I'iIi; 
situado en el perimetro alii geograficamente determinado. 

Contiene ademas diclia proposition, aunque no para que fornien | 
del articulo, dos parrafos de los cualeselsegundoesde unaimportantia 
tal, que exige que laComision espafiola haya de ocuparse eu este escrito 
especialmente de su contenido. 

Los Comisarios espaiioles acaban de decir que les ha causado viva 
sorpresa esta proposicion, y es de su deber exponer las razones que tal 
sentimiento explican. 

Desde la primera conferencia hasta la ultima, los Sefiores < 'omisario \ 
Americanos sostuvieron constantemente, y alegaron como principal 
fundamento de los proyectos sobre Cuba y Puerto Rico, que en i 
couferencias, ambas Comisioues tenian que atenerse ;i las bases estable- 
cidas en los preliminares de paz, que habian sido convenidos y firm ados 
el 12 de Agosto ultimo. Lo mismo decian y continuan diciendo los 
Comisarios Espaiioles. La unica diferencia entre los unos y los otros 
consistio en que los Americanos sostenian que aquel documento habia 
de ser entendido extrictameute en su sentido literal, sin querer tomar 
en consideration para fijar este sentido ningun otro dato, antecedente 
ni documento. Y como en el Protocolo no se habia escrito la frase 
"Deuda de Cuba 6 de Puerto Rico", entendian que por esta ra/.on 
Espafia debia transmitir 6 ceder su soberania sobre aquellas islas,que- 
dandoseconsus obligaciones. lios Comisarios Espaiioles, por la inversa, 
entendian que el sentido literal del Protocolo debia fijarse teniendo 
presentes no solo las reglas generales del Derecho international sobre 
interpretation de los tratados, sino tambien las negociaciones en que 
ambas partes lo habian preparado y en que de antemano lo habian 
oficialmente interpretado. 

Pues bien, la proposicion pretendiendo la cesiou por Espana de las 
Islas Filipinas a los Estados Unidos, no solamente no cabe dentro de 
los articulos del Protocolo, sino que esta en notoria contradiction con 
el, y es, en opinion de la Comision espafiola, su flagrante infraction. 

Contiene aquel convenio seis articulos y de ellos solamente el tercero 
se refiere al Arehipielago Filipino. Dice asi literalmente traducido 
del texto oficial frauces: 

"Los Estados Unidos ocuparan y tendran la tiudad, la babia y el 
puerto de Manila, esperando la conclusion de un tratado de paz que 
debera determinar la inspection (controle), la disposition y el gobierno 
de las Filipinas." Esto es lo iinico que bay en el Protocolo 
arehipielago. 




articulo 

stiene (por extrano que 



podria decir otra cosa sino que en aquella disposition se acord< 
ocupacion meramente temporal 6 provisional de Manila y su puerto y 
bahla por los Estados Unidos hasta que se hiciese el tratado de paz ea 
quese habiade determinar 6 couvenir sobre la inspection, la disposicion 



que 

y el gobierno de Filipinas. 



;„Que tiene esto que. ver con un cambio 6 cesion de soberania • 
La primera parte del articulo es completamente clara. No oti 
mor duda de que alii lo unico que se con vino sobre Manila, si 



los 

a 



inenor duda de que alii lo unico que se con vino soore iuuuu», B 
y puerto, fue su ocupacion, no definitiva, sino provisional, po 
Estados Unidos, ocupacion que no babia de durar mas <nw lasts 
celebration del Tratado de paz. No necesita el sentido literal 
comprobacion alguna. Mas si la necesitara, pueden los Senores 
sarios Americanos registrar el numero 19 del Libro amarillo, que acaoa 



112 TREATY OF PEACE. 

de publicar el Gobiemo de la Republica Francesa. Dicho niimero con- 
tiene la Circular que a los ties dias de firmado el Protocolo, dirigio el 
Senor Ministro de negocios extra it geros de Francia a sus Embajadores 
en Europa, dandoles cueuta de la mision a que el Gobierno de la 
Republica se habia prestado que desempenara su Eiubajador en Wash- 
ington para ofrecer la paz al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos en nom- 
bre del de Su Majestad Catolica. Y en esta Circular dice el Senor 
Ministro que su Embajador en aquella capital habia firmado en nombre 
de Espana, y a su ruego, un Protocolo que conteuia las exigencias de 
los Estados Unidos para la paz. Enumera el Senor Ministro tales 
exigencias y respecto a Filipiuas consigna, como la unica que contenia 
a quel documento, la ocupacion PRO VI SIGNAL de Manila por las fuerzas 
americanas. 

Los Senores Comisarios Americanos no desconoccran la incontesta- 
ble fuerza moral del testimonio del Senor Ministro de la Republica 
Francesa, amiga por ignal de los dos Estados beligerantes, y cuyo Senor 
Ministro no podia saber el contenido del Protocolo, sino por el autori- 
zadisimo conducto de su Eiubajador, que lo habia discutido, convenido 
y firmado en nombre de Espana con el Gobiemo Americano. 

El caracter meramente provisional de tal ocupacion subsistio aun 
despues de firmado el Protocolo, cuando, contra lo convenido en su 
articulo 6°, el General Merritt se apodero de la plaza por la fuerza. 
En el ultimo parrafo del niimero 5 de las reglas convenidas para la 
capitulation y que fueron firmadas en 14 de Agosto en nombre del 
Ejercito Americano por el Brigadier General de voluntarios Mr. E. V. 
Green, por el Capitan de la Marina Americana Mr. Lamberton, por el 
Tenientc Coronel e Inspector General Mr. Whittier y por el Teniente 
Coronel y Juez Abogado Mr. Crowder, se lee lo signiente: "La devo- 
lution de las annas depositadas por las fuerzas Espaholas, tendra lugar 
cuando se evacue la plaza por las misinas 6 por el Ejercito Americano." 

Entendian, pues, los que esto firmaban que las fuerzas Americanas no 
ocupabau definitivameute la plaza porque suponian que jjodia llegar el 
caso de que hubieran de evacuarla. Y si suponian esto, claro es que 
entendian que era meramente provisional la ocupacion. 

Es verdad : las fraces "inspeccion, disposicion y gobierno delas Fili- 
pinas" no tiene un sentido claro. El Gobierno Espanol y su Represen- 
tante en Washington ya lo hicieron notar reclamado su explication al 
Gobierno Americano (que no la did), antes de firmarse el Protocolo. 
Pero cualquiera que sea la que ahora inteute dar, no puede llegarse, en 
ningiin caso, a pretender que tales frases encierren el pensamiento de 
la cesion de la soberauia de Espana en el archipitiago. Esta cesion 
alii convenida, 6 sea la adquisicion a perpetuidad del archipitdago por 
los Estados Unidos, estaria en contradiction con la occupation exclu- 
sivamente temporal de Manila, tambien alii acordada, ya que esta 
expresainente consign ada en el mismo parrafo. 

Ko podrian nunca tampoco admitirse con arreglo 4 las maximas de 
interpretation de los Tratados porque tal supuesta cesion seria un bene- 
ficio a favor de quienes se negaron a aclarar sin alegar para ello razon 
algnna valedera, cuando oportunamente se les pidio, elconcepto que ya 
entouces aparetia ambiguo 6 indeterminado de tales frases; y porque 
aun sin tal razon, habria lugar a aplicar 4 los Senores Comisarios Ameri- 
canos, con el fundamento que ellos no tuvieron para aplicarla a los espa- 
noles (segiin estos entienden), la razon que consignaron en su ultimo 
Memorandum, y segun la cual, "la abstention de Espana de proponer 
en el Protocolo la condition del transpaso do la Deuda, la incapacitaba 
para proponerht ahora." Los Estados Unidos se abstavieron de pro- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 11;; 

poner a Espana en el Protocolo, frauca v abiertamente, con,., franca • 
abiertamente debe consignarse todo en los Tratados que siemp 
otorgan paraser entendidos y cumplidos de buena r- . la cesion < 
Soberania en el arcbipielago. No lo hicieron, v por eso estan incan ici 
tados de proponerla abora. 

Cuan to precede realm en te sobra porque existe la prueba irrefutable 
para los Senores Comisarios Americanos de que al firmarse el Prol 
de Washington el diguisimo Seuor Presidente de la [Jni n , 
abngaba el pensamiento de que Espana hubiese de ceder el Arcbi- 
pielago Filipino a los Estados Unidos, sino que abrigaba el pensamiento 
eontrario, 6 sea el de que Espana habra de consen ar alii bu Soberania 

En la conferencia que el Embajador de Francia Senor Cambon tuvo 
en 4 de agosto ultimo con Mr. Mac-Kinley ;i presencia de su Secretario 
de Estado, haciendole observaciones sobrela cesion de la fsla de Puerto 
Eico en compensacion de los gastos de la guerra, el Senor Presidente 
le contesto mostrandose inflexible en este punto, y le repitio que la 
cuestiou de Filipinas era la unica que no estaba ya definitiranunte 
resuelta en su pensamiento. Con tal motive el Senor Cambon le pidio 
explicaciones sobre el seutido de las sobredicbas frases de la clausula 
3 a relativa al Arcbipielago Filipino, porque aparecia redactada en 
terminos que podian prestarse a los temores de Espana respecto 
soberania en aquellas islas. El Senor Presidente le contesto las sigui- 
entes textuales palabras: "No quiero dejar subsistir ningiin equivoco 
sobre este particular. Los negociadores de los dos paises seran los que 
resuelvan cuales sean las ventajas permanent es" (fijese la atencion <-n 
la frase: no "derecbos") "que pediremos en el arcbipielago, y en lin los 
que decidan la intervencion, (controle), disposicion y gobieruo de Fili- 
pinas" y agreg6 "El Gobieruo de Madrid puede tener la seguridad tie 
que, hasta aJwra, no haynada resudto. a priori en mi pensamiento contra 
Espana, asi como considero que no bay nadadecidido contra los Estados 
Unidos." ^ Cabe en lo posible que nadie dude de que el \2 de Ago 
Senor Presidente de los Estados Unidos al firmar su Secretario de 
Estado el Protocolo, no tenia el pensamiento de exigir a Espai 
cesion de su Soberania en el archipielago para los Estados Onidi 

Pero bay mas: no solo no tenia ese proposito, sino que sus fi 
demuestran que tenia el de que Espana babia de conservar aquella 
Soberania. Segun el los Comisionadosen Paris babian de acordar las 
ventajas permanentes que los Estados Unidos pedirian en el arcbipielago. 
Pues si Espana no bubiera de conservar su soberania. tque ventajas 
para el porvenir era posible que pidieran los Comisionadosde los Estados 
Unidos a Espana y que esta babia depoderconcederles? Si los Estados 
Unidos se babian de quedar eon la soberania, j,como se explica qi • 
Comisionados en Paris hubieran de pedir a Espana ventajas en nn 
arcbipielago que el mismo tiempo babian de reclamar y rccibir i 
suyo ? 

Mas aun bay otra prueba, tan irrefutable como la anterior de que el 
Gobieruo de Washington no solamente entouces estaba ageno a" 
pensamiento y proposito sobre la soberania del Arcbipielago Filipino. 
sino que consintio que estahubiera decoutinuar en Espano, excluyent 
en su propio pensamiento toda mudanza sobre este punto al redact; 
primero y al firmar despues la clausula 3 a del Protocolo. 

Contestando al Gobieruo de Espana, porsu despacho de 7 de Ag 
al Honorable Senor Secretario de Estado en Washington, que le habia 
hecho saber en el suyo del 31 de Julio las condiciones, talcs como 
aparecen redactadas e incluidas en el Protocolo, bajo las cuales el 
T P 8 



114 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Gobierno Americano estaba dispuesto a poner termino a la guerra, le 
decia el Ministro espafiol sobre la base 3 a lo que sigue: 

"La base rel'erente a las Islas Filipinas parece a nuestra inteligencia 
demasiado indeterminada. En primer termino el titulo invocado por 
los Estados Unidos para la ocupacion de la bahia, puerto y ciudad do 
Manila, esperando la conclusion de un Tratado de paz, no puede ser el 
de conquista, porque la ciudad de Manila se defiende aim: a pesar del 
bloqueo por mar y el asedio por tierra, aquel por la flota Americana, y 
este por las fuerzas que acaudilla un indigena alentado y pertrecbado 
por el Almirante, la bandera espafiola no ba sido arriada. En segundo 
lugar el Archipielago Filipino se balla intacto en poder y bajo la 
soberania de Espana. Entieude pues el Gobierno Espanol que la ocupa- 
cion temporal de Manila babra de constituir una garautia. Dicese que 
en el Tratado de paz se determinara la intervencion, la disposicion y el 
gobierno de Filipinas, y como la intention del Gobieruo federal queda 
per demas velada en esta clausula inter esa a este Gobierno consignar 
que aceptando la base tercera no renuncia d priori a la Soberania total del 
Archipielago Filipino, dejando d los negociadores el cuidado de estipular 
acerca de las reformas aconsejables por la, sitnacion de aquellas posesiones 
y el nivel de cultura de sus naturales. El Gobierno de Su Majestad acepta 
la base 3 a acompaiiada por la declaration supradicha. n 

Bien claro aparece que el Gobierno Espafiol no acepto la linica base 
que en el Protocolo bay sobre Filipinas, sino en cuanto en ella se qui- 
siera decir que Manila no babia de ser mas que temporalmente ocupada, 
como garantia, y que la intervencion, la disposicion y el gobierno de 
que en la base se bablaba, tendrian por linico objeto el regimen y gobi- 
erno interior de aquellas islas, pero no su soberania total que Espafia 
expresamente se reservaba y babia de conservar. 

Contra esta interpretation dada de antemauo por el Gobierno de Su 
Majestad Catolica a la base tercera del Protocolo, y en cuyo unico 
sentido la aceptaba, nada dijo, nada indico el Gobierno de Wasbington 
antes de firmarlo. Por la in versa el Seiior Secretario de Estado al 
remitir al Seiior Embajador de Francia la minuta del Protocolo que 
babia de firmarse le decia en una carta, que la nota del Gobierno Espa- 
fiol (que era la en que se ballabanlas frases anteriormente transcritas,) 
contenia en su espiritu la aceptacion por Espana de las condiciones 
propuestas ])or los Estados Unidos. Por consiguiente la condicion 
tercera babia sido redactada por el Gobierno Americano en el mismo 
sentido en que la entendia el Gobierno Espanol, porque no podia decir, 
en otro caso, el Senor Secretario de Estado, con vista de la Nota en que 
constaba el unico sentido aceptable para el Gobierno Espafiol, que este 
la aceptaba. 

Asi pues; los Estados Unidos podran reclamar boy tal soberania, 
mas para esta reclamacion no pueden fundarse en el Protocolo. 

Y" <;,, que otro titulo que no sea este pueden alegar contra la voluntad 
de Espana? 

En el protocolo se fijaron las bases que los Estados Unidos exigian a 
Espana para la paz, 6 lo que es lo mismo todas las condiciones que los 
Estados Unidos imponian a Espana para que pudiera aquella restable- 
cerse entre los dos paises. A la vez se acordo alii, la iumediata suspen- 
sion de las bostilidades, suspension que por parte de Espafia fue 
religiosamente observada basta el presente; Por lo tanto los Estados 
Unidos no pueden ni tienen derecbo para exigir boy a Espafia mas 
condiciones onerosas, que las contenidas en el Protocolo, por causas 
anteriores a su fecba, una vez que entonces no impi'sieron uuis que las 
quo alii estan escritas, daudose con su aceptacion por satisfecbosj ni 



TREATY OP PEACE. 1 ] ;, 

por causas posteriores ya que desde entonces Espana no ejecnto aoio 
alguno de agresion ni did motive ;i auevas exigencias m reclamations 
de los Estados Unidos. 

Si por motivos que no estan en la esfera de la competencia de la 
Comision Espauola, el Gobierno Americano desea ahora adquirir la Bobe- 
rania del archipielago filipino, no es ciertamente el medio adecoado 
para el logro de su proposito una reclamation hecha al amparo de loa 
preliminares de paz couvenidos en el Protocolo iirwado en \\ a 
ton en 12 de Agosto por ainbas Altas Partes. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles indicaron al principio de este escrito que 
el 2° parrafo que despues del proyectado articulo contenia hi proposi- 
tion Americana era de tal importancia que les imponia la necesidad de 
ocuparse especialmente de su coutenido. * 

Dicbos Sres Comisarios manifestan en el que estan dispuestoa a* 
insertaren el tratadouna estipulaciou por la que asumiran los Estados 
Unidos cualquiera deuda de Espana contraida para obras piibli< 
mejoras de caracter pacifico en Filipinas. 

El Archipielago esta efectivamente gravado con una deuda de 200 
millones de pesetas, garautizada con la hipoteca de los productos y 
rendimientos de la Aduanade Manila; ypesan ademas sobre la Corona 
obligaciones, cargas dejusticia yotras pensionesde inenor importancia, 
del servicio exclusivo de aquella Colonia. 

Tor lo que hace a la deuda hipoteearia, ya ban consignado los Comi 
sarios Espanoles cou ocasion de la deuda de la misma chise que pesa 
hipotecariamente sobre la renta de las Aduauas y sobre todos los 
impuestos, directos 6 indirectos de la Isla de Cuba, que no pueden 
siquieraadmitir diseusinn acercadel valor yeflcacia de tales hipotecas. 

Constituidas legalmente por un Soberauo legitiino y legitimamente 
adquiridas por los particulares de diversas nacionalidades que se inte- 
resaron en equellas operaciones de credito, Espana no es duena d<> los 
derecbos de estas terceras personas que estan al amparo de las leyes 
que protegeu la propiedad privada, para que en un Tratado eon los 
Estados Unidos ni con otra Potencia alguna, pueda consentir en uada 
que signiflque 6 implique una lesion de derecbos que no son suyos. Se 
lovedan los deberes mas elementales de la probidad publica y privada. 

Espana no reclama el reconocimiento de esas deudas bipotecarias para 
su propio beneticio, puesto que su tesoro no se ha obligado a pagar tales 
deudas siuo subsidiariamente, esto es, solamente en el caso en que no 
fueran suficientes las reutas e impuestos hipotecados. Si hace tal recla- 
mation es solamente eu cumplimiento de un deber moral que pesa 
sobre todo deudor bonrado y ademas en beneficio de los tenedores de 
su deuda propia, los cuales no podrian menos devernn peligro para bus 
intereses en el becbo de que Espana, sin estar a ello obligada, recargase 
las oblio-aciones de su tesoro con otras cuantiosas a que bubiera de 
atender juntainente que a las suyas propias y corriendo el peligro de 
que sus recursos no bastasen para atender a todas. La deuda y obli- 
gaciones delas Colonias que a ella directamente interesan son las que no 
gozau del privilegio de una bipoteca, porque respecto a ellas estn prmci- 
palmente obligada al pago, y entiende que no es justo que caando I 
ha contraido por y para sus colonias, baya de continual- despues 
perdeiias, gravada con tales cargas, que son, despues de todo, 
pequena parte del inmenso capital que en aquellas se invirtio y que na 
cubierto con sus propios recursos. 

Quede dicbo, porlo tanto, y esperan los Comisarios Espanoles que no 
habran de tener necesidad de repetirlo, que Espana no puede m deue, 



116 TREATY OF PEACE. 

porque el respeto 41) ageno se lo veda, convenir en este tratado, ni en 
ninguno, sobre nada que implique la lesion 6 la supresion 6 siquiera 
desconocimiento de derechos privados y agenos contra la voluntad de 
bus legitimos y particulares dueiios. 

Mas aim por lo que toca a la dueda colonial no privilegiada, su dig- 
nidad y el respeto que se debe a si misma, le vedan igualmente admitir 
las bases que resaltan en el parrafo de la proposition de que se esta 
ocupando y que consiste en el examen de la inversion que Espafia liaya 
podido dar a los productos obtenidos por la creation de dicbas duedas. 
Esto equivaldria 4 soineter al criterio de una potencia extrafia los actos 
de su gobierno interior. Acertados 6 no, (acertados entiende que ban 
sido todos,) fueron perfectauiente legitimos y estan al amparo de su 
Soberania. 

Y aiin en la inadraisible hipotesis de que tal acierto no bubiera babido 
en ellos, no saben los Comisarios Espafioles que baya nadie que pueda 
bacer depender la legitimidad de una deuda legalmeute coutraida, de 
la inversion buena 6 mala, que, despues de constituida, baya dado el 
deudor 4 sus productos. 

No ban de poner termino los Comisarios Espaiioles 4 este escrito sin 
llamar la atencion de los bonorables Comisarios Americanos sobre un 
punto que nx> puede menos de ser resuelto en el tratado, en coinpli- 
miento de lo conveuido en la base 6 a del protocolo : dice esta asi: " Una 
vez terminado y firm ado este protocolo, deberan suspenderse las hosti- 
lidades en los dos paises, y 4 este efecto se deberan dar ordenes por 
cada uno de los dos Gobiernos 4 los Jeles de sus fuerzas de mar y tierra, 
tan pronto como sea posible." 

Ya antes de la firma del Protocolo, el Sr Presidente de la Union, 
despues de enterar al Sr Embajador de Fraucia el dia 30 de Julio 
ultimo, de las coudicioues que los Estados Uuidos imponian 4 Espafia 
para restablecer con ella la paz, le manifesto que consentia en conceder 
la suspension de hostilidades en seguida que el Seiior Ministro de Estado 
Espanol hiciera saber al Embajador de Francia, su representante en Wash- 
ington, que aceptaba las negociaciones sobre las bases indicadas por el 
Gobierno federal; y que autorizaba a diclio Embajador para fir mar en su 
nombre el acta preliminar que ponia termino a las hostilidades. 

El Gobierno espafiol manifesto su conformidad con tales bases, y 
autorizo al Embajador de Francia para aceptarlas y firmarlas en su 
nombre, por su despacbo de 7 de Agosto, que fue iminediatainente 
comunicado al Gobierno de Washington. Apesar de esto, las hostili- 
dades no sesuspendieron entouces. Mas al fin se acordo su suspension 
pocos dias despues, 6 sea el dia 12, por el mencionado art 6° del 
protocolo. 

Esto no obstante el dia 13, el General Merritt, Jefe de las fuerzas 
Americanas en Manila, y el Admirante de la flota en aquella bahfa, exi- 
gieron la reudicion de la plaza, y por no prestarse 4 ella sus autoridades, 
rompieron el fuego dicbas fuerzas contra el polvorin de San Antonio 
Abad, y contra las trincheras que defendian laciudad del lado de tierra, 
causando innecesariamente un nuinero considerable de bajas 4 las 
fuerzas espafiolas, que hubieran entregado pacificamente la ciudad 4 los 
Americanos, en cumplimiento de la base 3 a del Protocolo, para que la 
conservasen en garantia hasta la celebracion del tratado de paz. 

El General Merritt entro por la fucrza en Manila, hizo prisionera de 
guerra su guarnicion compuesta de 8 4 9,000 hombres, se apodero de los 
fondos publicos y de la recaudacion de los impuestos, incluso los de 
Aduanas, nombro iuterdente general y Administrador de la hacienda 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1 \ 7 

publica y recolector de dichos impuestosdlosoflcialesdesuetfrcito que 
tuvoporconveniente,destituyendopore8toa loa fnncionariosespafiol!" 
relevo al Commandante Espanol de la guardia civil eucargadu del ordei! 
publico; constituyo tribunales militares; abrio el puerto de Manila y 
todos los deraas deFilipinas que se hallaban en posesi6n desua fuerzaa 
de mar y tierra, al comercio de su naeion y al do los unit nil. s. previo el 
pago de los derechos que rigiesen al tiempo de su introduction y que 
sus funcionarios percibieron. Todo esto consta en el acta preliininarde 
capitulation del 13 de Agosto, en la capitulacidn misma del I l, en el 
bando del General Merritt de igual fecha, en sus ordenes de 22 v 23 del 
propio mes, y en las demas dictadas por las Autoridades y fuuciouarioa 
Americanos en Manila. 

El Gobierno espanol reclamo al de Washington, contra todo lo alii 
ocurrido, por conducto de la Embajada francesa, en 29 de Agosto, :i v 
11 de Septierabre ultimo, insistiendo despuos hasta el presente, en laa 
mismas reclamaciones, y seiialadamente en la iumediata libertad de 
la guarnicion prisionera en Manila yen la devolution de sus arinas, 
questo que por una parte no podia enviar refuerzos dc^lr la Peninsula 
al Archipielago, cuyo envio tampoco veian con huenos ojos los Rstados 
Unidos, y por la otra, necesitaba aquellas fuerzas para liberal a mil- 
lares de espafioles prisioneros de los insurrectos tagalos, y vidimus de 
sus malos tratamieutos, y para combatir ydominar aquella iuaurrecciou 
de sus propiossubditos. Las reclamaciones del Gobierno Espaiiol fueron 
hasta abora inutiles. Estos hechos continuan cada dia toraando peor 
aspecto. LI 21 de Septierabre el Capitan W. P. Moffot, nombrado por 
el Prevoste Gobernador Americano, encargado de las prisiones de la 
plaza de Bilibid, con facultadde disponar la entrada y libertad de toda 
clase de presos, se la dio a dos llamados Silvestre Lacoy y Marcos 
Alarcon, que estaban procesados por el delito de robo en cuadrilla, ;i 
otros dos que lo estaban por desercion, a 6 que lo estaban por drx-.i- 
cato, 4 otro que lo estaba por asalto y robo y a otros tres que lo estaban 
por homicidio. Como se ve, todos estos presos Estaban en la carcel 
por delitos comunes. Este hecho inaudito rue comunicado al Gobierno 
de S. M. G. por la Gomandancia General del Apostadero de Manila. 

Ahora bien, se hace preciso examinar todos estos hechos desde el 
punto de vista de su legalidad y con relacion a lo que en la clausula 6 a 
del protocolo se habia conveuido, y constituia una formal obligacion 
para ambos Gobiernos. 

j Desde cuando debio comenzar 4 producir sus efectos la suapen8i6n 
le las hostilidades acordada en dicha clausula 6 a ! La contestation no 
es dudosa. El texto es claro yexplicito: las hostilidades liabian de 
suspenderse desde la conclusion y firma del protocolo. 

Esto ocurrio en la tarde del 12 de Agosto. Por lo tan to, <\v>ih> dicha 
tarde los actos de guerra que cualquiera de los beligerantes ejecutara, 
habian de teuersecomono hechos para el efectode restablecer el u statu 
quo ante" el momeuto de la rirma del protocolo. 

Es ocioso y hasta seria ofensivo para la alta ilustracion dela Co- 
mision Americana exponer aqui la doctrina, no solo admitida desde los 
tiempos de Grotius sin contradiccion en el Derecho y en las practioaa 
iuternacionales, y a que prestan su asentimiento y su apoyo todo 
ilustres tratadistas Anglo-Americanos que dela materia se ban ocupado, 
sino que aderads estd elevada en los Estados Unidos a la categona de 
Derecho establecido, en el arto 140 de sus instrucciones para loa 
Ejercitos en Garapaha, que dice asi: "El arraisticio liga a los beliger- 



118 TREATY OF PEACE. 

antes a parfcir del dia convenido entre ellos para su ejecucion, pero los 
oficiales de los dos ejeicitos no son responsables de esta ejecucion, mas 
que desde el dia en que el armisticio les hasidooficialinente notiticado." 

El dia de la ejecucion fljado en el Articulo G° del Protocolo fiie el en 
que se coucluyese y firinase : asi textualinente se dice alii: "A la con- 
clusion y firina de este Protocolo las hostilidades entre los dos paises 
deberan ser suspendidas." 

El General Merritt y el Almirante de la escuadra no seran personal- 
mente responsables de la sangre que innecesariamente derraraaron el 
dia 13, si entonces no teuiau noticia oflcial del Protocolo que se habia 
tirmado el dia anterior en Washington, pero esto no obsta para que, 
como dice uno de los mas ilustres tratadistas del derecho Internacional, 
el honor inilitar exije abstenerse escrupulosamente de aprovecharse de 
toda ventaja que podria sacarse de la ignorancia de las tropas que no 
hubieran sido todavia informadas del armisticio. En casos como este 
la Potencia beligerante cuyas luerzas, por ignorancia, ejecutaron un 
acto de guerra, no puede aprovecharse de sus ventajas y debe reponer 
las cosas al " statuo" quo ante" indemnizando al beligerante perjudicado 
de los danos y perjuicios que por aquel acto de guerra se le hubieran in- 
ferido, y restituyendo, como dice el ilustre publicista anglo americano 
Dudley Field, todas las presas hechas en contravencion del armisticio. 

Esto es tan elemental y vulgar en los Estados Unidos, que en sus 
colegios sirve de texto la obra titulada "Elementos de Derecho inter- 
nacional y Leyes de Guerra" escrita por el Mayor General Halleck y 
en cuya edicion de Filadeltia — pagina 283 se lee lo siguiente: 

"La tregua liga a las partes contratantes desde el momento de su con- 
clusion a inenos que no se estipule especialmente otra cosa, pero no liga 
a los individuos de una nacion hasta el puntode hacerles personalrnente 
responsables de su ruptura mientras no tengan noticia actual y posi- 
tiva de ella. 

"Por cousiguiente, si los individuos sin conocimiento de la suspen- 
sion de hostilidades, matan un enemigo 6 destruyen su propiedad, no 
cometen por tales actos un crimen ni est4n obligados a indemnizaciou 
pecuniaria, pero si se hacen prisioneros 6 presas, el soberano estd en la 
obligation de poner a aquellos inmediatamente en libertad y de restitnir 
las presas." 

El Gobierno americano no ha puesto, hasta ahora, en libertad a la 
guarnicion prisionera de Manila, ni ha reducido su ocupaciou belica de 
la plaza a los limites de un simple derecho de guarnicion en ella, que es, 
segun el articulo 3° del Protocolo, lo uuico a que tenia derecho como 
garantia hasta el Tratado de Paz. 

Los Comisionados espaiioles, por lo tanto, en cumplimiento de lo 
expresamente convenido en el Protocolo, entienden que en el Tratado de 
Paz debe consignarse: 

1°. La entrega iumediata de la plaza al Gobierno Espanol. 

2°. La libertad iumediata de la guarnicion de la misma. 

3°. La devolucion al Gobierno Espanol de todos los fondos y propie- 
dades publicas de que se apodero el Ejercito Americano despucs de 
entrar en la plaza y de los impuestos de todas clases que ha venido 
percibiendo y que perciba hasta su devolucion; y, 

4°. El compromiso por parte de los Estados Unidos de indemnizar a 
Espana de los gravisimos perjuicios que le ha ocasionado con la reten- 
cion de aquellas tropas prisioneras, porque a esto lue debido queimpu- 
nemeute se propagase la insurrecion tagala en la Isla de Luzon y su 
invasion en las Islas Visayas, y porque tambi6n a esto mismo ha sido 
debida la contiuuacion de los malos tratamientos de los millares de 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1 l'> 

prisioneros espauoles civiles y militares, 6 que impunementecontiniian 
sometiendoles las fuerzas insurrectas tagalas. 

Eu virtud de cuanto precede la Comisi6n Espaiiola fciene el honor <le 
liacer a la Oomision Americana la siguiente proposicion : 

Primero. Que no puede acepter la proposicion que ha presentado 
pidiendo la cesion de la soberania del Archipielago Filipino (\ los Bsta 
dos Uuidos por eutender que es contraria a los preliniinares de pa 
veuidos eu el Protocolo de Washington; y 

Segtjndo. Que en su consecuencia la invita a que, de acuerdo con lo 
convenido en los mencionados articulos 3° y 6° del Protocolo, se sirva 
presentar una proposicion sobre la intervencion, disposicion y gobierno 
del Archipielago Filipino, y sobre el corapromiso que, segun lo que se 
acaba de decir, deben contraer los Estados Uuidos por efecto del hecho 
de guerra ejecutado por sus tropas despues de flrmado el Protocolo, 
apoderandose a viva fuerza de la ciudad de Manila y ejecutando los 
actos que estan fuera de los unicos derechos que los Estados dnidoa 
podian ejercer en aquella ciudad y su bahia y puerto, con arreglo a lo 
convenido en la menciouada base 3 a del Protocolo. 

Esta confornie 

Emilio de Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol ]So. 12. 
proposition. 

The Spanish Commission has read with great surprise the proposition 
presented by the American Commission at the meeting held on the 3lst 
of October, ultimo. 

The only article which said proposition contains is reduced to pro- 
viding for' the cession by Spain to the United States of the archipelago 
known as the Philippine islands, situated within the perimeter geo 
graphically determined in its text. 

But in addition thereto the proposition contains two paragraphs, not 
intended to form apart of the article, the second of which is of such 
importance as to demand from the Spanish Commission to deal with it 
specially in this paper. 

The Spanish Commissioners have stated that the American proposi 
tion excited in them great surprise, and it is their duty to sel forth tin- 
reasons which explain that feeling. 

From the first to the last conference, the American Commissioners 
have been alleging constantly— and that allegation was the principal 
ground upon which their drafts relating to Cuba and Porto Rico were 
based— that in their conferences the two Commissions have to abide by 
the bases established in the preliminaries of peace agreed upon am 
signed on the 12th of August ultimo. The same was said ami cm: 
tinues to be said by the Spanish Commissioners. One difference, how- 
ever, has existed in this respect between the two Commissions, am 
this has been that the American Commissioners understand that me 
Protocol should be construed according to its letter, strictly, ami with- 
out taking into consideration any data, antecedent or document. 
this reason, as the words " Debt of Cuba, or of Porto Rico were not 
written on the Protocol, they have deemed that Spam should transmit 
or cede her sovereignty over the islands, but should retain tlie lattei a 



120 TREATY OF PEACE. 

obligations. The Spanish Commissioners understand, on the contrary, 
that for determining the literal meaning of the Protocol it is necessary 
not only to bear in mind the general rules of international law as to 
the interpretation of treaties, but also the negotiations carried on 
between the two parties which culminated in this agreement, and in 
which the interpretation of the latter had been given beforehand and 
officially. 

Therefore the proposition relating to the cession by Spain to the 
United States of the Philippine Islands, besides not being included in 
or covered by the articles of the Protocol, appears to be in open con- 
tradiction of its terms. In. the opinion of the Spanish. Commission it 
is a flagrant violation of the agreement. 

The Protocol contains six articles, and only one, the third, refers to 
the Philippine Archipelago. Literally translated (into Spanish) from 
the otticial French text, it reads as follows: — 

"The United States shall occupy and hold the city, the bay and the 
harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which 
shall determine the inspection (controle), the disposition, and the gov- 
ernment of the Philippine Islands." 

This is all that the Protocol says about the archipelago. 

Even accepting as a proper standard for the interpretation of this 
article the narrow one of the literal meaning, as claimed (no matter how 
strange it may appear) by the American Commission, the Spanish Com- 
mission would have only to reply that the text of the Protocol refers to 
nothing else than the temporary or provisional occupation by the United 
States of Manila, its harbor, and its bay, until the treaty of peace, 
determining or agreeing upon the inspection, disposition and govern- 
ment of the Philippine Islands, should be concluded. 

What has this to do with any change or cession of sovereignty? 

The first part of the article is perfectly clear. Not even the slight- 
est doubt can exist as to the fact that the only agreement as to Manila, 
its bay and its harbor, referred to the occupation thereof, not final but 
provisional, by the United States; said occupation to last only until 
the conclusion of the treaty of peace. No proof is necessary to cor- 
roborate this literal construction of the text. But should it be required, 
the American Commission would find it in document number 19 in the 
Yellow Book just published by the Government of the French Repub- 
lic. Said document contains the circular addressed by the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassadors in Europe, 
three days after the signing of the Protocol, acquainting them with 
the mission which the Government of the Republic had allowed to be 
entrusted to the French Ambassador at Washington, to offer peace to 
the Government of the United States in behalf of the Government of 
Her Catholic Majesty. This circular states that the French Ambassa- 
dor at Washington had signed, in the name of Spain and at her 
request, a Protocol setting forth the demands of the United States, 
and after enumerating those demands, and in referring to the Philip- 
pine Islands, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs says that the only 
one contained in that document was the provisional occupation of Manila 
by the American forces. 

The American Commission will not disregard the unquestionable 
moral weight of the testimony of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the French Republic, equally friendly to the two belligerent states, who 
could know nothing about the Protocol except through the most authori- 
tative channel of the French Ambassador who had discussed it with 



TREATY OF PEACE. i J | 

the American Government, and agreed to it and signed if, in tin- na 

of Spain. 

The mere provisional character of that occupation remained even 
after the Protocol was signed, when General Merritt, contrary t«> what, 
had been agreed upon in Article VI of the same, forcibly took pi 
sion of Manila. In the last paragraph of number 5 in the ml' 
capitulation agreed upon and signed on August L5, on tin- pari <»t the 
United States by Brigadier General of Volunteers E. V. Greene, by 
Captain Lamberton of the United States Navy, by Lieutenant Colonel 
and Inspector-General Whittier, and by Lieutenant Colonel Judge 
Advocate Crowder, the following was said: — 

"The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish Um^'s shall 
take place when they evacuate the city or when the American army 
evacuates." 

Therefore it was understood by those who signed this agreement that 
the American forces did not permanently occupy the place, ;i- they 
anticipated the case that they would have to evacuate it. And if they 
anticipated this, it is clear that they understood their occupation of 
the place to be merely provisional. 

True it is that the words "inspection, disposition and government of 
the Philippine Islands" have not a clear meaning. The Spanish < rov- 
ernment and its representative at Washington had noticed this fact 
and asked for the proper explanation thereof (which was not given by 
the American Government, before the Protocol was signed. Hut what- 
ever construction may now be placed upon these words, the fact is that 
in no case can their meaning be so stretched as to involve in any way 
the idea of cession of the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago. 
Such a cession or acquisition in perpetuum of the archipelago by the 
United States, had it been agreed upon in the Protocol, would have 
been in contradiction with the mere temporary occupation of Manila, 
which at the same time was agreed upon in the same clause of that 
instrument. 

Nor could the said construction ever be admitted as valid, under the 
rules of interpretation of treaties, because the said admission would 
result in benefiting a party who refused to explain, when asked at the 
proper time to do so, the meaning of the words which even then were 
considered ambiguous and indeterminate. Even if tins were not the 
case, the rule which the Spanish Commission understand to hav. 
applied to them without reason, set forth by the American Commis- 
sioners in their last "memorandum", namely, that "the abstention of 
Spain from proposing in the Protocol the condition of the transfer ot 
the debt precluded her from proposing it now", would be applicable to 
the case. The United States abstained from proposing to Spam in the 
Protocol, frankly and openly, as frankly and openly as all things must 
be set forth in all treaties, which must never be, concluded unless 
understood and complied with in good faith, the cession of her sover- 
eignty over the archipelago. They did not do it, and they Decau 
thereby precluded from proposing it now. . , , . i 

All thft * " ~' L *"* *~ " D+ »«>aii 

necessity, 

m issioTiftrs 

worthy President of the I 

have to cede the Philippine Archipelago to the United fc .totes, oui 

entertained, on the coutrary, an opposite idea, namely, tnai opai 

would retain her sovereignty over it. 




122 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In the conference held on August 4 last, between Mr. Cambon, 
Ambassador from France, and President McKinley, in the presence of 
th« United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cambon made some remarks 
as to the cession of Porto Pico in compensation for the expenses of the 
war, and the President, showing himself inflexible upon that point, 
repeated his assertion that the Philippine question was the only one 
not finally nettled in his mind. It was then that Mr. Cambon asked tor 
an explanation about the meaning of the above cited phrases in Article 
III of the Protocol, relating to the Philippine Archipelago, as the lan- 
guage of said article might lend itself to inspire fear in Spain in regard 
to her sovereignty over these islands. President Mclvinley answered him, 
verbatim, as follows: 

" I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point. 
The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve npon 
the permanent advantages (notice that he said "advantages" and not 
"rights") which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the 
intervention (controle), disposition and government of the Philippine 
Islands." 

He further said: "The Madrid Government can rest assured that up 
to now nothing is decided a priori, in my own mind, against Spain, nor do 
1 consider anything decided by it against the United States." 

Is it therefore doubtful that on the 12th of August, when the Secre- 
tary of State of the United States signed the Protocol, the President of 
the United States had no idea of demanding from Spain the cession to 
the United States of her sovereignty over the archipelago 1 

But there is something more. The President of the United States, 
far from entertaining that purpose, clearly showed by his language that 
he desired that Spain should preserve her sovereignty. He said that 
the Commissioners at Paris would have to come to an agreement as to 
the -permanent advantages to be demanded by the United States in the 
Philippine Archipelago. If Spain was to be deprived other sovereignty, 
what future advantages could possibly be asked from Spain by the 
United States Commissioners, or granted them by Spain? How would 
it be possible for the American Commissioners at Paris to ask Spain 
for advantages in an archipelago which they at the same time had to 
demand and receive as their own property? 

There is still another proof, as irrefutable as the above, that the 
Washington Government, far from having at that time any idea or 
intention to acquire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, con- 
sented that said sovereignty continue to be vested in Spain, by remov- 
ing from its own mind all idea of change in this respect, either when 
framing or signing Article III of the Protocol. 

When the Spanish Government, by its despatch of the 7th of August, 
answered the note of the Honorable Secretary of State of the United 
States of the 31st of July, wherein he informed Spain of the conditions, 
such as set forth in the Protocol, upon which the American Govern- 
ment was disposed to put an end to the war, the Spanish Secretary of 
State used in regard to basis 3 the following language: 

" The basis relating to the Philippine Islands seems, according to our 
understanding, to be too indeterminate. In the first place, the title 
invoked by the United States for the occupation of the bay, harbor and 
city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be 
conquest, as the city of Manila is still defending itself. In spite of the 
blockade by sea and the siege by laud, the former by the American fleet, 
the latter by forces commanded by a native encouraged and assisted by 
the American Admiral, the Spanish flag has not been lowered. In the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1 ' 

Second place, the Philippine Archipelago is wholly in the power sind 
under the sovereignty of Spain. The Spanish Government understands, 
therefore, that the temporary occupation of Manila must constitutes! 
guarantee. The treaty of peace, it is said, shall determine the inter- 
vention, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands, and :m 
the intention of the Federal Government is too much veiled in tin 
clause, it is important for this Government to state that while accepting the 
3d basis, it does not relinquish a priori the entire sovereignty over the 
Philippine Archipelago, and leaves to the negotiators the care to stipulate 
in regard to such reforms as it may be advisable to introduce there, — in 
view of the situation of those possessions and the degree of cultivation of 
their inhabitants. The Government of Her Majesty accepts the 3d claust 
as supplemented by the aforesaid declaration." 

It appears very plainly that the Spanish Government did not accept 
the only item of the Protocol which relates to the Philippine Islands, 
except in so far as it meant that the occupation of Manila should be 
only temporary and in the nature of a guarantee, and that the inter- 
vention, disposition and government spoken of in the item should r< fer 
to the interior regime and administration of the government of the said 
islands, and not to the entire sovereignty, which Spain expressly 
reserved and was entitled to retain. 

Against this construction placed beforehand by the Government of 
Her Catholic Majesty upon the 3d basis of the Protocol,— a construc- 
tion upon which exclusively it was accepted,— the Washington Govern- 
ment said or suggested nothing, before signing the instrument. On the 
contrary, the Secretary of State of the United States, when sending to 
the French Ambassador the draft of the Protocol which was to be 
signed, said to him in a letter that the noteof the Spanish Government 
(the one in which the above quoted phrases appear) contained in its 
spirit the acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the I nited 
States. Therefore, the third condition had been framed by the A men- 
can Government in the same sense in which it had been understood by 
the Spanish Government. Otherwise it would have been impossible 
for the Secretary of State of the United States to say. upon examina- 
tion of the note in which the Spanish Government explained the only 
meaning of the article which would be acceptable to it, that the Span 
ish Government did accept it. 

The result is that while the United States may now come and claim 
the said sovereignty, the claim can never be founded upon the Protocol. 
And what other title, different from that agreement, can they allege, 
against the will of Spain, to be vested in them? 

The bases upon which the United States agreed to make peace with 
Spaiu. or, in other words, the conditions which the United States 
imposed upon Spain for the reestablishment of peace between the two 
countries, were set forth in the Protocol. An immediate suspension ot 
hostilities was also agreed upon in that instrument; and ^Spain t up to 
the present time has scrupulously kept the agreement, Therefore tin 
United States can have no right to demand now from Spain any oner- 
ous conditions not contained iu the Protocol, either because o events 
prior to its date,-since when the Protocol was signed the I nited .tares 
did not make moredemands than are written therein, and w< ie sat. mi 
with their acceptance by Spain,-or because of subsequent evMtejMna 
Spain, after the instrument was signed, did not ^^SSo 
or give the United States any occasion to make furthei complaint 

demands. , ,. . • ,i .-*-;,.,, n f the 

If for reasons which are beyond the sphere ot jurisdiction ot t 



124 TREATY OF PEACE 

Spanish Commission, the American Government wishes now to acquire 
sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, the proper way to accom- 
plish that purpose is certainly not a claim based upon the preliminaries 
of peace agreed upon between the two High Contracting Parties and 
set forth in the Protocol signed at Washington on the 12th of August. 

The Spanish Commissioners stated at the beginning of this paper 
that the second paragraph which the American proposition contained 
after the proposed article was of such importance that it imposed on 
them the necessity of dwelling especially upon its import. 

The Commissioners assert therein that they are disposed to insert in 
the treaty a stipulation whereby the United States will assume any 
debt of Spain contracted for public works or improvements of a pacific 
character in the Philippines. 

The archipelago is in fact burdened with a debt of 200 millions of 
pesetas, secured by mortgage on the proceeds and revenues of the 
Manila custom house; and there further rest upon the Crown obliga- 
tions, just charges and other pensions of lesser importance, exclusively 
connected with the service of that colony. 

With respect to the mortgage debt, the Spanish Commissioners have 
already stated with relation to the debt of a like nature which by way 
of mortgage burdens the revenues of the custom houses and all the 
taxes, direct and indirect, of the Island of Cuba, that they cannot 
even admit any discussion relative to the validity and efficacy of such 
mortgages. 

Legally created by a legitimate sovereign, and legally acquired by 
the individuals of various nationalities who interested themselves in 
those provincial operations, Spain is not the proprietor of the rights of 
these third parties, who are under the aegis of the laws protecting pri- 
vate property, so as to consent in a treaty with the United States or 
any other power in any way to anything which means or implies an 
impairment of rights which are not hers. The most elemental duties 
of public and private probity forbid this. 

Spain does not demand the recognition of these secured debts for her 
own benefit, since her treasury has not bound itself to pay the same, 
save subsidiarily, that is, only in the event that the revenues and taxes 
mortgaged are insufficient to meet them. If she makes the demand it 
is only in obedience to a moral duty resting upon every honest debtor, 
and, further, in behalf of the holders of her own debt, who could not 
but see a danger to their interests in the fact that Spain, without being 
bound thereto, should overburden her treasury with other heavy obliga- 
tions for which it would be liable jointly with her own, and running the 
risk of her resources being insufficient to meet them all. The debt and 
obligations of the colonies which directly interest her are those not 
enjoying the privilege of security, because with respect to these she is 
primarily bound, and she understands that it is not just that when she 
lias contracted them for her colonies she should continue, after losing 
them, burdened with such charges, which are, after all, a small part of 
the immense capital invested in those colonies which was furnished 
from her own resources. 

Let it be understood therefore, and the Spanish Commissioners hope 
there will be no necessity to repeat it, that Spain cannot and ought not, 
since respect for the rights of others forbids it, to agree in this treaty 
or in any to anything implying the impairment or suppression or even 
disregard of the private rights of others against the will of their legiti- 
mate and special proprietors. 

Still more with respect to the unprivileged (unsecured) colonial debt, 



TREATY OF PEACE. L25 

their dignity and the respect due to their own selves likewise forbid 
them accepting the bases which stand out in the paragraph of the prop- 
osition under consideration, which consists of the looking into the 
investment Spain may have made of the proceeds resulting from the 
creating of such debts. This would be equivalent to submitting to the 
judgment of a foreign power the acts other internal government. Judi 
cious or riot (and the Commissioners understand they have all been 
judicious) they were perfectly legitimate acts and thej are protected by 
her sovereignty. 

And even in the inadmissible hypothesis that such judiciousne i 
were wanting in them, the Spanish Commissioners do not know thai 
there is anyone who can cause the legitimacy of a legally contracted 
debt to depend upon the investment, good or bad, which alter its crea- 
tion, the debtor may have made of its proceeds. 

The Spanish Commissioners cannot close this paper without calling 
the attention of the honorable American Commisioners to a point which 
cannot but be resolved in the treaty, in obedience to the stipulations of 
the Gth basis of the Protocol, which is as follows: "Upon the conclu- 
sion and signing of this Protocol, hostilities between the two countries 
shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as 
possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and 
naval forces." 

Even before the signing of the Protocol the President of the Union, 
after apprising the Ambassador of France on the 30th of July last of 
the conditions the United States imposed on Spain for restoring peace 
therewith, said to him that he consented to granting the suspension of 
hostilities as soon as the "Spanish Minister of State should makeknoicn 
to the Ambassador of France, his representative in Washington, that he 
accepted the negotiations upon the bases suggested by the Federal Govern- 
ment; and authorized the said Ambassador to sign in his name the prelim- 
inary minute which put an end to the hostilities.'' 7 

The Spanish Government made known its agreement to such bases, 
and authorized the Ambassador of France to accept and sign them in 
its name through its despatch of August 7, which was immediately a >m- 
municated to the Government at Washington. Notwithstanding this, 
the hostilities were not then suspended. But finally the suspension 
thereof was agreed to a few days later, that is on the 12th, in the said 
Gth article of the Protocol. 

In spite of this, on the 13th, General Merritt, commander of the A men- 
can forcesiu Manila,and the Admiral of the fleet in that bay,demanded 
the surrender of the place, and as its authorities did not agree thereto, 
the said forces opened fire on the San Antonio Abad powder-magazine 
and on the trenches which defended the city on the laud side, unneces- 
sarily causing a considerable number of losses to the Spanish tones, 
who would have peacefully delivered the city over to the Americans in 
obedience to the third basis of the Protocol that they might hold it as 
a guaranty pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. 

General Merritt entered Manila by force, he made prisoners ot war o 
its garrison made up of eight or nine thousand men, he took possessioi 
of the public funds and the collection of taxes, including custon 
receipts, he named as Intendaut General and Administrator ot tut 
Public Treasury, and Tax Collector, the officers of his army he saw n , 
thereby displacing the Spanish officials. He relieved the Spanish L 
mander of the civil guard charged with the maintenance of puDUO 
order: he constituted military courts; he opened the port ot Manila 
and all tin other ports of the Philippines in the possession ot his lauu 



126 TREATY OF PEACE. 

and naval forces to the commerce of his nation and of neutral nations, 
conditioned on the payment of the dues in force at the time of his 
arrival, which were collected by his officials. All of this is recorded in 
the preliminary minute of the capitulation of August 13, in the capitu- 
lation of the 14th itself, in the proclamation of General Merritt of like 
date, in his orders of the 22nd and 23rd of the same month and in the 
others dictated by the American authorities and officials in Manila. 

The Spanish Government remonstrated to thatof Washington through 
the French Embassy against everything that occurred there on August 
29 and the 3rd and 11th of September last, repeating such remon- 
strances since and down to the present time, signally insisting upou the 
immediate release of the garrison held prisoners in Manila and upon 
the return of their arms, since, on the one hand, it could not send rein- 
forcements from the Peninsula to the archipelago, nor would the United 
States look favorably upou such an action, and, on the other hand, it 
needed those forces to liberate the thousands of Spanish prisoners of 
the Tagalo insurgents, victims of their ill-treatment, and to combat and 
dominate that insurrection of its own subjects. The remonstrances of 
the Spanish Government have been up to the present fruitless. These 
acts are daily assuming a worse phase. On September 21 Captain 
W. P. Moffatt, appointed by the American Provost- Marshal in charge 
of the Bilibid prisons with authority to regulate the entrance and 
release of all kinds of prisoners, released two named Silvestre Lacoy 
and Marcos Alarcon, charged with the offense of highway robbery; 
two others charged with desertion; six charged with contempt of 
authority; another charged with assault and robbery, and three others 
charged with homicide. As is seen, all these prisoners were in jail for 
common crimes. This unheard of act was communicated to the (iov- 
ernment of Her Catholic Majesty by the Commandant General's Office 
of the station of Manila. 

Very well; it becomes necessary to examine all these acts from the 
standpoint of their legality and with relation to what was agreed on in 
Article VI of the Protocol, which constituted a formal obligation for 
both Governments. 

When was the suspension of hostilities agreed on in said Article VI 
to go into effect? The answer is not doubtful. The text is clear and 
explicit: the hostilities were to be suspended upou the conclusion and 
signing of the Protocol. This occurred on the afternoon of August 12. 
Therefore from that afternoon the warlike acts which either of the bel- 
ligerents should commit were to be held as not doue in order to restore 
the statu quo ante at the moment of signing the Protocol. 

It is idle, and may even be an insult to the great learning of the 
American Commission, to expound here the doctrine, not only admitted 
without contradiction since the time of Grotius in international law 
and usage, and to which all the learned Anglo-American treatise-writers 
have given their asseut and support, but which is furthermore raised 
in the United States to the category of established law in article 110 
of the Instructions to Armies in the Field, which reads as follows: 
"The armistice binds the belligerents from the day agreed upon between 
them for its going into effect; but the officers of the two armies are not 
responsible for this except from the day upou which they are officially 
notified of the armistice". 

The day when it was to go into effect determined in Article VI of 
the Protocol was that on which it should be concluded and signed. 
There it says verbatim: "Upon the conclusion and signing of this 
Protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended," 



TREATY OF PEACE. |_'7 

General Men-it t and the Admiral of the squadron maj nol be |>< 
ally responsible lor the blood they unnecessarily shed on the l.'kh if 
they had no official notice tlien of the Protocol which bad been signed 
on the previous day in Washington; but this docs nol conflict, 
of the most learned writers on international law says, with military 
honor, demanding that they scrupulously abstain from profiting by any 
advantage that may be gained through the ignoranceof troops who may 
not yet have been informed of the armistice. In cases like this tl - 
ligerent power whose forces through ignorance commit a warliki 
cannot profit by its advantages, and should restore things to the 
quo ante, indemnifying the belligerent injured for the damages and 
injuries he may have suffered through said warlike act, and restoring, 
as is said by the learned Anglo-American publicisl Dudley Field, all 
prizes taken in violation of the armistice. 

This is so elementary and common in the United States that in their 
colleges the work entitled "Elements of International Law and Laws 
of war", written by Major General Halleck, serves as a text book, ami 
in the Philadelphia edition thereof, page 283, appears the following: 

"The truce binds the contracting parties from ///>• moment of its con- 
elusion unless otherwise specially stipulated; but it does not bind the 
individuals of a nation to the extent of making them personally respon- 
sible for its rupture until they have actual and positive notice thereof. 

"Consequently, if individuals without knowledge of the suspension 
of hostilities, kill an enemy or destroy his property, they do not by 
such acts commit a crime, nor are they bound to pecuniary indemnity. 
but if prisoners or prizes are taken the sovereign is bound to immediately 
release the former and restore the prizes." 

The American Government has not released, up to this time, the 
imprisoned garrison of Manila, nor has it reduced its military ocenpa 
tion to the limits of a simple right to garrison it, which is, according to 
Article III of the Protocol, the only thing it had a right to do as a 
guaranty until the signing of the treaty of peace. 

The Spanish Commissioners, therefore, in obedience to what was 
expressly agreed to in the Protocol, understand that the trea 
peace ought to embody: 

1st The immediate delivery of the place to the Spanish Government. 

2nd The immediate release of the garrison of the same. 

3rd The return to the Spanish Government of all the funds and pub- 
lic property taken by the American army since its occupation of the 
place, and of the taxes of every kind collected or to be collected up to 
the time of returning the same. 

4th The obligation on the part of the United States to indemnify 
Spain for the serious damage occasioned her by the detention as pris- 
oners of the said troops, to which detention is due the spreading 
impunity of the Tagalo insurrection in the island of Luzon and its inva- 
sion of the Visayas islands, and because, moreover, to this same can- 
has been due the ill-treatment of thousands of Spanish prisoners, 
and military; treatment to which the Tagalo insurgents have 
tinued to subject them with impunity. 

In virtue of what has been said the Spanish Commission has 
honor to make to the American Commission the following prop< 

First.— Tli at it cannot accept the propositions it has 
ing for the cession of the sovereignty of the Philippine Archipel 
the United States, as it understands that this is contrary 
inaries of peace agreed upon in the Protocol of Washingto 

Second.— In consequence of this it invites the American Commis 



128 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



to present, in accordance with the stipulations of Articles III and VI 
of the Protocol, a proposition concerning the control, disposition and 
government of the Philippine Archipelago and concerning the obliga- 
tion which, as has just been said, it is the duty of the United States to 
contract because of the acts of war committed by its troops after the 
signing of the Protocol in forcibly seizing the city of Manila and per- 
forming acts beyond the scope of the only rights the United States 
could exercise in that city, its bay and harbor, pursuant to the stipula- 
tions of the said Article II of the Protocol. 
True copy : 

Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 13. 

Conference o/N'oiiember9, 1898. 

On the 8th instant, the day to 
which the conference was ad- 
journed, the American Commission- 
ers requested a postponement of the 
meeting from two to four o'clock, iu 
order that an opportunity might 
be given for the completion of the 
copying of their answer to the 
counter-proposition presented by 
the Spanish Commissioners at the 
last session. The Spanish Com- 
missioners being unable to be pres- 
ent at the latter hour, the session 
was, on their suggestion, post- 
poned till the 9th of November, at 
two o'clock, p. in., at which hour 
there were 

Present On the part of the 
United States: Messrs. Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs. 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding ses- 
sion wj*s read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
presented an Answer to the Coun- 
ter Proposition submitted by the 
Spanish Commissioners on the 4th 
instant in relation to the Philip- 
pines. A copy of the Answer is 
hereto aunexed. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
stated that they would examine 
the answer, but that its length and 
the necessity of having it carefully 
translated made it impossible for 



Protocolo No. 13. 

Gonferencia del 9 de Novlemure de 

1898. 

El 8 del corriente, dia senalado 
para la reunion de las Comisiones, 
solicitaron los Comisarios araerica- 
nos que en vez de celebrarse a las 
dos tuviese lugar a las cuatro de 
aquella tarde, a flu de completar la 
copia de su respuesta a la contra- 
proposicion presentada por los 
Comisarios Espafioles en la ultima 
sesion. No pudiendo concurir a 
dicha hora los Comisarios Espa- 
noles, se aplazo a propuesta suya 
hasta hoy 9 de Noviembre a las 2. 
P. M. en cuya hora se hallan. 



Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America, los 
Sefiores Day. Davis. Frye. Gray. 
Reid. Moore. Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espaha. los Sefiores 
Montero Rios. Abarzuza. Garnica. 
Villa-Urrutia. Cerero. Ojeda. 

Fu6 leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios americanos pre- 
sentan una contestation a la cou- 
traproposicion presentada en la 
sesion del 4 del corriente por los 
Comisarios Espanoles relativa a las 
Islas Filipinas y se uue dicho doc- 
umento a esta acta. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles mani- 
festaron que examinarian dicha 
contestation y que en vista de su 
extension y de la necesidad de tra- 
ducirla cou esmoro, que hacia iin- 






TREATY OK PEACE. 






them at the moment definitely to 
state what time would be needed 
for a reply; and they proposed 
either to advise the American Com- 
missioners later in the day when 
the Commission might meet again, 
or at once to designate a day with- 
out prejudice to asking for a post- 
ponement, should it be necessary 
and should the nature of the docu- 
ment require it. 

The American Commissioners 
preferring the latter course, the 
conference was adjourned till Sat- 
urday the 12th of November at two 
o'clock, p. m., with the understand- 
ing that the Spanish Commission- 
ers might if necessary ask for a 
postponement. 

William R. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
Wm P Fryb 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 
John B. Moore. 



posible el saticr a pun to fijo el 
tiempo que se oecesitaria pai n con 
testarla, proponian,yaseadar aviso 
a la Comision Americana aquella 
noche misma, del dia en que podia 
reunirse la Comision, ya sea fijar 
en aquel momento an dia Bin per- 
juicio de pedir un aplazamiento si 
fuese necesario y resultase de la 
naturaleza del documento. 

Los Comisarios Americanos lia- 
biendo dado la preferencia ;i la se- 
gunda de estas proposiciones, e 
aplazo la conferencia hasta el - ■> 
badol2delcorriente ;i Lasdos P.M. 
en la inteligencia de que los ( lomi- 
sarios Uspanoles tendnan La facul 
tad de pedir un aplazamiento si lo 
considerasen necesario. 

E. MONTERO RfOS 

b de abarzuza 
j. de garnica 
WKde Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilo de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 13. 

ANSWER OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS TO THE PROPOSITION OF 
THE SPANISH COMMISSIONERS OF NOVEMBER 3, 1898. 

The American Commissioners, replying to the Spanish proposition 
of the 4th instant, will proceed at once to the examination of the 
grounds on which the Spanish Commissioners endeavor to justify their 
expression of surprise at the American proposals of the 31st of October 
on the subject of the Philippines. ««„«,«.< 

The Spanish argument sets out with the erroneous assumption that 
the United States bases its demands in respect of the Philippines upon 
the terms of the Protocol in the same sense as it bases its demands in 
regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the terms of the same instrument ; 
and, proceeding upon this assumption, it finds in the P^|, ">» V, ,- 'a 
United States on the two subjects an inconsistency, rhe United 
States, it declares, adhered, in respect of Cuba and Porto ^Rico, to the 
"letter" of the Protocol, while in the case of the Ph •! 1>P'"£, t J... 
presented a demand "not included in or covered by the articles ol 

^UTrrican Commissioners are not disturbed by this ,1, arge .of 
inconsistency, since they deem it obviously groundless {;>'.,! 
their demand's in regard to Cuba and Porto Rmou, out lie p 
terms of the Protocol, because it was in those very terms that™ 
United States had made its demands and ^™* ^^^^^ 
by promising to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty o\u and title 

T P 9 



130 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Cuba", and to "cede" to the United States Porto Eico and certain 
other islands. The United States, in insisting upon the words of the 
Protocol on these subjects, merely asked ,that the precise concessions 
of Spain be made good. 

In the case of the Philippines, the United States, except as to the 
bay, city, and harbor of Manila, confined itself to demanding that the 
subject should be left in the widest and fullest sense for future nego- 
tiations. While it did not, with the exception referred to, demand 
specific concessions, it reserved and secured the right to demand them. 
Its position, therefore, is, not that its present demands in respect of 
the Philippines were specifically set out in the Protocol, but that they 
are justified by and included in the right which it therein expressly 
reserved and secured to make demands in the future. 

Putting aside, however, the erroneous assumption of which notice 
has just been taken, it appears that the Spanish Commissioners differ 
with the American Commissioners as to the scope and meaning of the 
third article of the Protocol signed by the representatives of the two 
Governments at Washington on the 12th of August, 1898. This article 
is as follows: 

" Article 3. — The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay 
and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, 
which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the 
Philippines." 

The Spanish Commissioners contend that in the negotiation and 
settlement of a treaty under this article nothing can be demanded by 
the United States which impairs the sovereignty of Spain over the 
islands, and that a fair construction of the terms of the article can 
require only such changes in the government of the islands, reforms in 
administration and kindred changes, as do not affect ultimate Spanish 
sovereignty. 

It is the contention on the part of the United States that this article 
leaves to the determination of the treaty of peace the entire subject of 
the future government and sovereignty of the Philippines necessarily 
embraced in the terms used in the Protocol. 

The Spanish Commissioners support their contention upon two 
grounds: First, that the meaning of the words is not such as to include 
the sovereignty of Spain in the Philippines. Second, that the history 
of the negotiations, and the reservations made by Spain in the course 
thereof, preclude the United States from making its claim. 

It is a principle of law no less applicable to international differences 
than to private controversies that where the result of negotiations has 
been embodied in a written compact, the terms of such agreement shall 
settle the rights of the parties. The reasous upon which this doctrine 
rests are too well known to need recapitulation here. While the United 
States might well rest its case upon a construction of the terms used, 
it has no disposition to avoid the fullest examination and the most 
searching scrutiny of the negotiations which preceded the making of 
the Protocol, as they but serve to make clear the purpose of the parties 
to leave to the treaty now in process of negotiation the fullest oppor- 
tunity to dispose of the government and sovereignty of the Philippine 
Islands in such a manner as might be recorded in the treaty. 

The two Governments being at war, negotiations with a view of 
obtaining a treaty of peace were opened by the Government of Spain 
through the Minister of State addressing to the President of the United 
States, in the name of the Government of Her Majesty the Queen 
Regent, a note dated the 22nd of July, 1898, which it is not necessary 



TREATY OP PEACE. 1 ?> | 

to set out in full here. It is sufficient to say that therein the President 
of tlieUuited States is asked to name the terms upon which peace may 
be had between the two countries. This note was presented to tin- 
President of the United States on the 26th day of July, 181)8, by Mr. 
Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, author- 
ized to make the application, and represent the Spanish Government 
in the subsequent negotiations which led up to the execution of the 
Protocol. At that meeting the President received the note of Jul 
from the Spanish Government and advised Mr. Cambon that after con- 
sultation with his Cabinet he would prepare an answer which could he 
transmitted to the Spanish Government. On July 30, following, the 
terms of peace having been carefully considered and agreed upon by 
the President and his Cabinet, the President received Mr. Cambon at 
the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which meeting wen- 
present Mr. Thiebaut, Secretary of the French Embassy in Wash in 
and the then Secretary of State of the United Stales. The answer ol 
the President to the communication of the Spanish ( rovernment, dated 
July 30, 1898, was then read to Mr. Cambon. This note was in tin- 
exact form in which it was afterwards signed and delivered to Mr. 
Cambon to be sent to the Spanish Government, with a single exception. 
After some discussion of the terms of the note as to Cuba, and Porto 
Eico and other West ludiau islands, Mr. Cambon said he did not know 
what the Spanish Government would desire as to the Philippines, and 
no matter what the note might say as to the Commission, the Spanish 
Government would regard the purpose of the United States as being 
fixed to acquire not only Cuba and Porto Pico, but the Philippic 
well. The President said that as to the Philippines the note expressed 
the purposes of this Government, and their final disposition would 
depend upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and 
ratified by the interested Governments. 

After further discussion, in which the President reiterated that the 
treaty must determine the fate of the Philippines, and the note of the 
President on that subject reading then as now with the single exception 
that the word " possession " was then in Article III, so that it read 
trol, possession and government of the Philippines", where it now reads 
"control, disposition and government of the Philippines" Mr. Cambon 
said that the word "possession" translated into Spanish in such 
as to be regarded as of a severe and threatening nature, and sugg 
a change in that word. He suggested the word ••condition - . The 
President declined to change the word except for a word of similar 
import or meaning. The word "disposition"' being suggested, 
considerable talk the President consented that that word, not changing 
the meaning, being indeed a broader one and including possession, 
might be substituted. Thereupon the note at the close of the interview 
of July 30, in exactly the form it was originally east with the s 
change of the word "disposition" for "possession", was delivered I 
Mr. Cambon to be communicated to the Spanish Government. 

On Wednesday, August 3, in the afternoon, Mr. Cambon having 
mated a desire 'for a further interview with the President, ano 
meeting between the same persons was held at the Executive B 
Mr. Cambon said the Spanish Government had received the ans 
the President, and that it was regarded by Spain as very severe. 
asking a modification as to Porto Pico, to which the President promptly 
answered that he could not consent, Mr. Cambon said there was a (lis- 
position to believe in Spain that the United States intended I 
Philippine group j that the Spanish Government appreciated that 



132 TREATY OF PEACE. 

reforms were necessary in the government; that American privileges 
should be granted; but that Spanish sovereignty should not be inter- 
fered with was a matter which Spain would insist upon. The Presi- 
dent answered that the question of Cuba, Porto Pico and other West 
India islands, and the Ladrones, admitted of no negotiation; that the 
disposition of the Philippine Islands, as he had already said to Mr. 
Cainbon, must depend upon the treaty which might be negotiated, and 
that he could not make any change in the terms theretofore submitted. 
Mr. Cainbon called attention to the wording of the note as to the pos- 
session of the city, bay and harbor of Manila to be retained during the 
pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be done with them after- 
wards. The President said that must depend upon the terms of the 
treaty. 

This is the same interview alluded to in the memorandum of the 
Spanish Commissioners as having occurred on the 4th of August. It 
in fact occurred on the afternoon of August 3, the difference in date 
arising from the fact, no doubt, that it was reported on the 4th of Au- 
gust. This can make but little difference, as there was but one interview 
at that time. 

In reporting the conversations, and comparing the memoranda made 
by Mr. Cambon with those made by the representative of the American 
Government then present, it must be borne in mind that Mr. Cambon 
did not speak or understand English, but communicated with the Pres- 
ident through the medium of an interpreter, his Secretary, and that 
neither of the American representatives understood or spoke the French 
language. Making this allowance, it is perfectly apparent that the 
American President, even in the version reported and transcribed in 
the memorandum of the Spanish Commission, at all times maintained 
that the treaty of peace should determine the control, disposition and 
government of the Philippines. The President did say that the Philip- 
pine question was the only one left open for negotiation and settle- 
ment in the treaty. It is undoubtedly true that it was not then fully 
settled in his own mind as to what disposition should be made of 
the Philippines. Had it been, there would have been nothing to 
leave to negotiation and settlement in the treaty. It was the purpose 
of the President in everything written and spoken to leave to the 
negotiators of the treaty the most ample freedom with reference to 
the Philippines, and to settle, if their negotiations should result in an 
agreement, the control, disposition and government of those islands in 
the treaty of peace. When Mr. Cambon spoke of Spain's purpose to 
retain sovereignty over those islands, the President did say he wanted 
it clearly understood that no ambiguity should remain upon that point, 
bat that the whole matter should be decided as set forth in the treaty 
of peace, which should determine the control, disposition and govern- 
ment of the Philippine Islands. He certainly did not use the word 
"intervention" nor limit the subject of negotiation to "advantages" in 
the Philippines; nor cau it be claimed that any report was made to the 
Spanish Government of the precise English words used by the Presi- 
dent. In the same paragraph quoted in the memorandum of the 
Spanish Commission in whieh it is said he used the words above 
quoted, it is added that the President also said the negotiators should 
decide upon the "intervention" (controle), disposition and government 
of the Philippine Islands. Even this version of the conversation is 
ample proof that the President showed no uncertainty as to the scope 
and meaning of the terms used. He did say in substance, in reply to 
the inquiry of Mr. Cambon as to whether the United States had pre- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

judged the matter of the Philippine [slands and the rights to be 
acquired therein by the United States, thai the ease bad not been pre 
judged either as to the United States or as to Spain. The whole 
matter would be left to the Commission for negotiation, and to be 
settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime the United States 
would insist upon holding Manila as laid down in the note, and its dis- 
position thereafter would depend upon the terms of the treaty. This 
is reported in the quotation in the Spanish note as the utterance of the 
President that "the Madrid Government can rest assured that up to 
now nothing is decided a priori in my own mind against Spain, nor d<> 
I consider anything decided by it against the United States." This 
may not be an unfair interpretation, though not the exact words 
by the President. It shows clearly that he did not regard the United 
States as limited to "advantages in the Philippines", but the whole 
matter, being undecided in the President's mind, was left open m accord- 
ance with the terms of the note. The case was not decided in advance 
in any of its aspects either for or against either government. 

Great stress is laid in the Spanish memorandum upon the allegation 
that the President had not then determined to take the Philippine 
group, and indeed did not intend to do so. It is utterly immateiial to 
inquire as to what either Government would then have insisted upon. 
There was a mutual agreement that the question should not then be 
decided. Opportunity for full investigation was reserved, the linal 
conclusion to be arrived at as the result of the negotiations now in 
progress, in the treaty of peace to be here concluded. 

Further conversation as to the number of Commissioners, the | 
of meeting, et cetera, terminated the interview. 

On the afternoon of August 9, Mr. Cambon, having received the note 
of August 7 sent by the Duke of Almodovar, called by appointment at 
the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which interview were pres- 
ent the same parties as at the last meeting. The part of that note 
which relates to the Philippines, in the exact terms in which it was 
then presented in English text by the French Ambassador to the Presi- 
dent of the United States, is as follows: 

'"The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, 
to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on winch the 
United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor 
and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, can- 
not be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on 
sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a 
native supported and provided for by the American Admiral, Manils 
still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. 
On the other hand, the whole Archipelago of the Philippines is m the 
power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the ( b.vernn 





therefore the 

the third conditioi 

Spain over the 

such reforms as 

ture of their natives may render desirable. 

'"The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, \wt 
the above mentioned declarations.' c T ,. 1Tn< i, <;,,%- 

"Such are the statements and observations which the Spanisn 



134 TREATY OF PEACE. 

ernment has the honor to submit in reply to your Excellency's com- 
munication. They accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of 
the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties. 

'•The agreement between the two governments implies the irremeable 
suspension of hostilities and the designation of Commissioners for the 
purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, 
under the terms above indicated." 

It is translated in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners in 
language differing somewhat from the terms of the note as presented 
to the President. In the translation in the memorandum it is said that 
the treaty shall determine "the intervention, disposition and govern- 
ment of the Philippine Islands". In the note as presented to the Presi- 
dent it reads "it is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the 
control, disposition and government of the Philippines". The word 
"entire" precedes "sovereignty" in the translation embodied in the 
Spanish note. 

It is true that, taking these words of the Duke of Almodovar either 
as they were conveyed to the President of the United States, or as they 
are now quoted in the Spanish proposition, it may be argued that they 
do no more than reserve to Spain the right to maintain that she did not 
in advance of the negotiations for peace renounce her sovereignty over 
the archipelago. She did this, by her own declaration, for the reason 
that the intentions of the United States were "veiled"; clearly per- 
ceiving that by the terms of the demand the United States would have 
the right, if it saw fit to exercise it, to ask that she yield her sover- 
eignty over the group, and that her sovereignty was thus put in 
jeopardy, she took the precaution to say that she did not intend, in 
assuming the chance of such a demand, to concede it in advance. 

The American Commissioners do not deny that this may be a fair 
construction of this particular paragraph of the Duke's note. The 
representatives of the United States were not willing, however, to leave 
anything to construction. When therefore the Duke's answer was read 
to the President it was immediately objected to by him and the Sec- 
retary of State, in that it was vague and indefinite, purporting to 
accept the terms laid down in the note of the United States, while 
requiring some modification. In referring to the Philippines, while in 
one paragraph it stated the acceptance of the terms, in another it 
seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty, with such reforms, etc., 
as that Government might see fit to grant. The unsatisfactory char- 
acter of this answer is more clearly shown when in the subsequent part 
of the same note, not quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Com- 
missioners, it was said without qualification that they (the Spanish 
Government) accept tlie proffered terms, subject to the approval of the 
Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties. In 
the part of the note referred to above it is said "the Spanish Govern- 
ment must declare that, while accepting the said condition, they do 
not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, 
leaving it to the negotiators, etc." These contradictory statements 
were called to the attention of Mr. Cambon, and made the note, as was 
said to him, unsatisfactory to the United States. 

It is to be observed, as has already in effect been pointed out, that 
even the terms of this note are inconsistent with the claim now put for- 
ward that Spanish sovereignty shall not be interfered with, for the 
length to which the statement goes in the note is that the Spanish Gov- 
ernment does not a priori relinquish entire sovereignty over the Philip- 
pine Archipelago, thus leaving it clearly to be inferred that the Spanish 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

Government recognized that the negotiat ions resulting in ;i treaty might 
require a relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty consequenl upon such 
negotiations. 

Mr. Cambon, having heard the objections raised by the American 
representatives to the note, asserted that allowance musl be made for 
different translations which the note had undergone in course of trans 
mission, and to the desire of the Spanish Government to express regret 
at the loss of its colonies; and he was very confident that it was the 
intention to accept the terms of the United States, Ii was then sug- 
gested by the American Eepresentatives that if this be true, and the 
note was to be regarded as a full acceptance, the best way to settle the 
matter was to put the terms in the shape of a definite Protocol, which 
the President would authorize the Secretary of Slate to sign for the 
United States, Mr. Cambon to submit to the Spanish Government the 
exact terms of the Protocol, to which an answer Yes or .Vo could be bad ; 
and if the Spanish Government accepted the Protocol, that would end 
the controversy. Mr. Cambon concurred in this view, and said if the 
Protocol was drawn up in proper form he would submit it to the Span- 
ish Government, and if authorized would execute it on its part. 

On that evening, August 9, the Protocol was prepared in the State 
Department at Washington, and taken to the Executive Mansion, where 
it was submitted to the President and members of the Cabinet there 
present. On the morning of August 10, Mr. Cambon called at the State 
Department at Washington, a draft of the Protocol was submitted to 
and approved by him, and put into French by Mr. Thi^baut, Secretary 
of the French Embassy at Washington, and experts in the State 
Department. It was carefully compared with the English text, and 
then telegraphed by Mr. Cambon to the Spanish Government. On the 
same day, August 10, the note of the Secretary of State enclosing the 
Protocol was sent to Mr. Cambon in Washington. Tins note, it is said, 
contains the admission of the Secretary of State of the United States 
that the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 7 "contained in its 
spirit the acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the United 
States." The best answer to this obvious misconstruction of the terms 
of the note of the Secretary of State is in the text of the note itself, 
which is as follows : 

Department of State, 

Washington, August 10, 1S9S. 

Excellency, Although it is your understanding that the note of the D 
Almodovar, which you "left with the President on yesterday afternoon, is intended 
to convey an acceptance by the Spanish Government of the terms set forth in my 
note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the President would appoint Commis- 
sioners to negotiate and conclude with Commissioners on the part of Spain a ireat\ 
of peace, I understand that we concur iu the opinion that the Duke s note, doubtless 
owin»- to the various transformations which it has undergone in the coarse of its 
circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, iu the lorm in which it 
has reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit. 

Under these circumstances, it is thought that the most direct and certain way ot 
avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol to be signed by us as the 
representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on wni 
the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken. 

I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol m which you will find th 
I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of tne 6} 
together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commie 
arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other 
■ islands uuder Spanish sovereignty iu the West Indies, as well as for the appomtui 
of Commissioners to treat of peace. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. 

(Signed:) William E. Day. 

His Excellency M. Jules Cambon, etc. 



136 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In this note, so far from saying that the Secretary of State of the 
United States understands that the note of the Spanish Government 
of August 7 accepts the American terms, it is distinctly said "although 
it is your (Mr. Cambon's) understanding that the note of the Duke of 
Almodovar is intended to convey the acceptance by the Spanish Gov- 
ernment of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo, * * * 
I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubt- 
less owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in 
the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is 
not, in the form in which it reached the hands of the President, entirely 
explicit." 

Here it is distinctly stated that the Secretary of State and Mr. Cam- 
bon concur that the note is not entirely explicit. Was it then to be 
expected after all this careful negotiation that a note which the Ameri- 
can representatives contended did not accept the terms of the United 
States, and which both negotiators agreed was not explicit, was to be 
received as a satisfactory answer to the American demand? Not so. 

" Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and 
certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol, 
to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United 
States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to 
be undertaken." 

This is a most emphatic and definite declaration that the note of 
August 7 was not satisfactory, and that it was the purpose of the 
United States to leave nothing open to misunderstanding, but to 
embody, in a contract so plain that dispute would be forever foreclosed, 
the exact terms upon which negotiations for peace would be under- 
taken. The note goes on to say "I therefore enclose herewith a draft 
of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have embodied the 
precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, together 
with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners, 
etc." What does this note mean? Does it admit the construction that 
the proposal was intended to embody the acceptance of August 7, 
reserving Spanish sovereignty"? It is definitely settled, as a perusal 
of the document will show, that the Protocol embodied, not the uncer- 
tain and equivocal terms of the note of August 7, but the precise terms 
stated in the note of the American Government of July 30. This note 
to Mr. Cambon enclosed the Protocol just as it was written and just as 
it was signed by the parties. It would seem, if ever an attempt was 
fairly made to have a clear understanding, if ever all precautions were 
taken which could leave no room for misunderstanding, such was the 
course pursued in the present case. 

It is thus seen how utterly groundless is the declaration in the Span- 
ish "proposition" that, in order to determine the meaning of the Pro- 
tocol, it is necessary to "bear in mind * * * the negotiations carried 
on between the two parties which culminated in this agreement, and in 
which the interpretation of the latter had been given beforehand and 
officially"! In the correspondence thus invoked by the Spanish Com- 
missioners as an interpretation of the Protocol, the two Governments 
did not contemplate the execution of such an instrument; and if the 
response of the Spanish Government to the American demands had 
taken the form of a simple acceptance, no Protocol would have been 
made. The first suggestion of such an instrument was that made in 
the interview in which the Spanish response was declared to be unsat- 
isfactory. It was because the Spanish response was unacceptable that 
the United States demanded a Protocol. And it is upon this rejected 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1,'',7 

response that the Spanish argument for the limitation of i be clear scope 
and meaning of the Protocol is built. 

If further proof of the soundness oft lie position of the United 8 
were needed, it would be found in a most convincing form in the tele 
gram sent by Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Seethe French "Yellow Book" referred to in the Spanish memorandum, 
telegram number 9, Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Fo] 
Affairs. 

No. 9.—M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, to V. 
Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Washington, Augu I 
The Federal Government has decided to state precisely (preciser), in a Protocol, 

the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its ji atcreri upon. 

I send yon herewith this document, which 1 Bhall thank you to transui I to the 

Spauish Government. 

(Signed:) J. Cambon. 

In this telegram, which was immediately communicated to the Spauish 
Government, and which led to the telegram to Mr. Cambon authoriz- 
ing him to sign the Protocol, followed by lull power from the Queen 
Regent to Mr. Cambon to that effect, Mr. Cambon distinctly says, ool 
that the American Government has accepted the note of Augusl 
in any wise agreed to such reservations as are contained therein, but 
that "the Federal Government has decided to .shite precisely (precis 
a Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judg- 
ment, be entered upon. I send yon, tin's document, etc. n 

It thus clearly appears that the bases of peace negotiations were to 
be determined by the instrument which was enclosed, and which it was 
understood put in definite terms the ultimate agreement of the pa 

It was because the answer made in the note of August 7 was rejected 
by the United States, and for this reason alone, that hostilities were 
not upon the receipt of that note declared to be suspended: and it has 
remained for the Spauish Commissioners in their ••proposition" t>» 
advance for the first time in behalf of their Government the su 
tion that such a declaration should then have been made. It was not 
so made because that note was not received as an acceptance of the 
American demands. Hostilities were declared to be suspended only 
upon the signature of the Protocol. 

The correspondence quoted in the French "Yellow Book," no less 
than the subsequent communications from Mr. Cambon to the Ameri- 
can Government, shows distinctly that with the exact terms of this 
Protocol before it, the Spanish Government, on the 11th instant, and 
subsequently by full power of the Queen Regent, authorized Mr. Cam- 
bon to execute the Protocol in behalf of Spain. Observe the language 
of the note of Mr. Cambon to the American Secretary of State oi 
Augitet 12, 1898: 

Embassy of the French Republic en the United Si \ 

Washington, Augusl 

Mr. Secretary of State: Ihave the honor to inform you that I ha ed, 

through the intermediation of the department of foreign affairs at Paris, a tele 
dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of Almodovar del Rio a i 
that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish Governu 
upon me full powers in order that I may sign, without other formality i 
delay, the Protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by conn 
between you and me. The instrument destined to make regular tl 
are thus given to me by telegraph will be subsequently addressed to m 

"His Excellency the Minister of State adds that in accepting th 
by reason of the suspension of hostilities which will be the immedia vaeuce 



138 TREATY OF PEACE. 

of that acceptance, the Spanish Government has pleasure in hoping that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States will take the necessary measures with a view to 
restrain (empicher) all aggression on the part of the Cuban separatist forces. 

The Government of the Republic having, on the other hand, authorized me to 
accept the powers which are conferred upon me by the Spanish Government, I shall 
hold myself at your disposition to sign the Protocol at the hour you may be pleased 
to designate. 

Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with you toward the restoration of 
peace between the two nations, both friends of France, I beg you to accept, Mr. 
Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very high consideration. 

(Signed:) Jules Cambon. 

In the light of these facts, it appears there is absolutely no founda- 
tion for the claim that the American Government accepted the Spanish 
reservations so far as they are contained in tlie note of the Duke of 
Almodovar of August 7. Had that note been only a distinct and 
unqualified acceptance of the terms as contained in the American note 
of August 30, it would have been unnecessary to require that all uncer- 
tainty and doubt should be removed by reducing into -few and simple 
terms, which it was believed could never be misunderstood, the final 
agreement of the parties. So far from remaining unanswered, the note 
of August 7 was declared unsatisfactory when presented to the Presi- 
dent. Thus ended the attempt to come to an agreement by correspond- 
ence; and it was decided that a Protocol should embody the ultimate 
terms. 

The Spanish Government telegraphed the amplest authority to Mr. 
Cambon to execute it. We are then remitted to the terms of the 
Protocol itself. 

The American Government is at a loss to know how stronger terms 
could have been used to evidence the purpose of the President to keep 
open the most full and absolute right to deal with and determine the 
dominion over the Philippine Islands. This was the purpose of insert- 
ing the third article of the Protocol, which embodied the terms of the 
third demand of the United States, as set forth in the note of July 30 
of the American Government to the Duke of Almodovar, wherein it is 
said: "Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to 
occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposi- 
tion and government of the Philippines." 

What are these similar grounds'? They are to be found in the next 
preceding paragraph of the note of July 30, in which the President says 
that, though not then making any demand for pecuniary indemnity, 
nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the 
United States incident to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for 
injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in 
Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States, 
and the immediate evacuation by Spain, of the Island of Porto Pico, 
etc. On similar grounds, to wit, among others the right of the United 
States to have indemnity for its losses, the United States will hold the 
city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of 
peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government 
of the Philippines. 

How could the United States receive indemnity in whole or in part 
from the control, disposition and government of tlie Philippines, if 
Spanish sovereignty was not to be touched? It is difficult to conceive 
what terms could have been used which would more clearly have 
evidenced the purpose of the parties to afford the fullest latitude in 
dealing with the Philippine question. The treaty was to determine not 






TREATY OF PEACE. 139 

alone the control, disposition and government, but at the same time 

had full power to determine all that is implied in control, disposition 
and government. Certainly the word "control" was not used here in 
the sense of "register" or "inspection", but in its broader Bense of 
"authority or command; authority over; power over; the regulation 
or rule of." 

What word could be broader than "disposition," which has practically 
the same meaning in both the French and English languages? "The 
disposal of ; distribution of; alienation of; definite settlement of; ulti- 
mate destination.'''' We have in these two words, then, authority over, 
dominion of, final and ultimate destination of the subject matter. What 
is "government" but the right of administration, or exercising sover- 
eignty, the direction, the political management of a state? Either of 
these terms implies power of interfering with sovereignty. Taken 
together, they give the fullest scope in dealing with all power, govern- 
mental, territorial and administrative. 

it is not argued in the Spanish "proposition" that these words should 
have a narrow meaning so far as disposition and government are con 
cerued, but transcribed into the French language it is sought to give a 
narrower meaning to the word "control." It must be construed in the 
connection in which it is found in the Protocol, in its broader sense of 
power or dominion. Noscitur a sociis is a legal maxim which applies to 
the discussion or determination of the meaning of phrases. "Control" 
associated with disposition and government of territory might have a 
very different significance when used in another relation in its less 
familiar meaning of "inspection or register." The word "disposition" 
used in another association might have an entirely different meaning, 
and a meaning which, in connection with government and control, would 
deprive it of all sense. 

The American Government, then, feels itself amply supported in its 
right to demand the cession of the Philippines with or without conces- 
sions, relying upon either the exact terms of the Protocol or those terms 
interpreted in the light of the negotiations, oral and written, which led 
to its execution. 

The Commissioners of the United States notiee with regret that an 
attempt has been made in the memorandum of the -Spanish Commis- 
sioners to invoke the high authority of the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in the interpretation of the Protocol, so as to exclude therefrom 
all mention of the right of the treaty to deal with the control, disposi- 
tion and government of the Philippines. In the French "Yellow Book 
cited by the Spauish Commissioners, it is apparent that as early as the 
10th of August the French Government was in possession of the exact 
terms of the Protocol, transmitted in the note of that date of its Ambas- 
sador, Mr. Cainbon. Would anybody believe that in summing up this 
note the Minister would intentionally omit one ot the most essential 
parts of the Protocol? ., 

The note number 19 referred to is no part of the negotiations: ts 
purpose was merely to advise the Ambassadors of the French RepubU 
at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, etc., of the result of the 
action of the representative of France in bringing about a suspension 
of hostilities, and the preliminary agreement as to peace, between two 
nations toward which the French Government was actuated ta fee 
of humanity and mutual friendship. In this note it is said tnat 
points upon which both parties have reached an agreement were set 
forth in a Protocol. In stating the contents ot that m.uuincnt, 



140 TREATY OF PEACE. 

doubtless through inadvertence, it is not stated that the treaty shall 
determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. 
The attention of tbe Minister being called to this matter by the 
American Ambassador in Paris, he very promptly corrected any mis- 
apprehension which might exist as to his despatch. This appears in 
the following letter from the American Ambassador, which has just 
been received by the American Commissioners: 

Ambassadk des Etats-Unis, 18, Avenue Kleber, 

Paris, November 5, 1S9S. 

Dear Sir: I beg to inform you that I saw the French Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in regard to that portion of the reply of the Spanish Peace Commissioners in which 
they refer to a letter sent by him to the French Ambassadors dated August 15, 1898, 
which appears in the French " Yellow Book", and attempt to construe the language 
used therein as an interpretation of the French Minister of the meaning of the Pro- 
tocol, and speak of tne unquestionable moral weight of the testimony therein given 
by him regarding that instrument. He assured me emphatically and unreservedly 
that the letter referred to was intended to be simply a brief resume of the general 
features of the preliminary peace negotiations carried on between the two belliger- 
ents, and that he did not attempt to quote the precise language of the Protocol. He 
disclaimed any intention of given any views of his own regarding it, having no 
authority for so doing, and declared that the brief mention contained in his letter 
could in no wise be construed as an interpretation by him of the terms or meaning 
of that instrument. He promised that he would at ouce send to the French Ambas- 
sadors the full text of the Protocol in order that they might be informed of its con- 
ditions in extenso and that there might be no ground for misapprehension as to its 
terms. 

The Minister repeated what he had said several times before, and which I know 
to be true, that he and his Government had all along observed a strict and impartial 
neutrality between the two powers which were negotiating, being equally friendly 
to both, and that he intended to continue the observance of such neutrality. 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed) : Horace Porter. 

Hon. William R. Day, 

President of the American Peace Commission, Paris. 

It is stated that the occupation of Manila was to be only temporary. 
This is undoubtedly true. The Protocol, so far as it relates to the Philip- 
pines, is itself provisional. It expressly provides for the doing of certain 
things pending the conclusion of a treaty which is in this particular to 
supersede it. Had it provided for the permanent occupation of Manila 
by the United States, it would have withdrawn the Philippines to that 
extent from the sphere of future negotiation. 

While the terms of surrender cited in the Spanish memorandum, 
negotiated after the execution of the Protocol and having nothing to 
do with the negotiations for peace, show the character of this occupa- 
tion, it is to be noticed that the very paragraph cited from the terms 
of that document shows that it was equally contemplated that condi- 
tions might arise which would require the evacuation by the Spanish 
forces of the city. In it it is said "the return of the arms surrendered 
by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or 
when the American army evacuates it." The commanders of the 
American and Spanish forces did not undertake to determine the right 
of either party permanently to hold Manila, but contemplated conditions 
which might require its evacuation by the forces of either country. 

But it is as idle to cite the stipulations of the capitulation for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of the Protocol as it would be to 
cite the stipulations of the Protocol for the purpose of determining the 
meaning of the capitulation. It is notorious that, owing to the inter- 
ruption of telegraphic communication, Manila was captured and the 
capitulation arranged and concluded by the commander of the American 
forces in the Philippines without communication with his Government, 



TREATY OF PEA< K. Ml 

which was at the moment as uninformed of what was taking place al 
Manila as was its commander of what was taking place al Washington. 

It is superfluous, therefore, to argue, even if it were material i<> d 
that the stipulations of the capitulation cannot Ik- invoked in explana- 
tion or limitation of the stipulations of the Protocol. For tin- same 
reason it is perhaps unnecessary to comment upon tin- statement thai 
" General Merritt, contrary to what .had been agreed upon in Article V I 
of the same (Protocol), forcibly took possession of Manila". The Ameri 
can Commissioners are loth to assume thai the Spanish -• proposition " 
employs these words for the purpose of intimating that General Merritt 
could at the time of the capture of Manila have had knowledge of tin- 
Protocol. It is a fact doubtless well known to the Spanish Govern- 
ment that on the lo'th of August last, four days after the signature of 
the Protocol, and four days before the receipt at Washington of the 
news of the capture and capitulation of Manila, the Department of 
State addressed to the French Ambassador a note soliciting the con- 
sent of the Spanish Government to the restoration of cable communi- 
cation between Manila and Hong Kong, in order that continuous 
telegraphic connection with the Philippines might be reestablished. 

It is observed that the Spanish Commissioners in their "proposition" 
say that the words of the Protocol in relation to the Philippines "have 
not a clear meaning", but that no matter what construction may be 
placed upon them, "in no case can their meaning be so stretched as to 
involve in any way the idea of cession of the sovereignty of Spain <»\ er 
the archipelago", since "such a cession or acquisition in perpetuum of 
the archipelago by the United States, had it been agreed upon in the 
Protocol, would have been in contradiction with the mere temporary 
occupation of Manila, which at the same time was agreed upon in the 
same clause of that instrument". This statement, as well as the para- 
graph that immediately follows it, merely reiterates the erroneous 
assumption, to which we have already adverted, that the ultimate 
demands of the United States in respect of the Philippines were 
embodied in the Protocol, while, as a matter of fact, the instrument 
shows upon its face that it was agreed that the formulation of those 
demands should be postponed till the negotiations for a treaty of peace 
should be undertaken. 

How, then, stands the demand of the Government of the United 
States for the cession of the Philippine Islands with the concessions 
which it is willing to make, as set forth in its proposition of the 31st 
ultimo"? This demand might be limited to the single -round of indem- 
nity, but this limitation the American Commissioners do not herein 
concede. The United States does not now put forward any claim for 
pecuniary indemnity to cover the enormous cost of the war. It does 
not take the sovereignty of Cuba; as has been shown in former memo- 
randa submitted by the American Commissioners, it assumes only bur- 
dens there. It does demand, and Spain has agreed to cede, the Island 
of Porto Pvico and the small Island of Guam in the Ladroni 
is Spain asked to give up in the Philippines? A country constantly 1 
rebellion against its sovereignty, so that if the United States wen 
withdraw therefrom to-day, Spain would immediately have to 
to arras to overcome a rebellious and discontented people. 

This situation could not be more vividly portrayed than to use the 
words of the Spanish memorandum in which, after speaking o 
neglect of her own welfare to the detriment of her full .level, 
this condition is attributed to "her desire to preferentially attena to 
her colouies, creatures who, like all others in the order ot nature, enusi 



142 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the utmost solicitude on the part of their mother, who feeds and sup- 
ports them at the sacrifice of her welfare". 

The American Commissioners note, with some surprise, that the 
Spanish Commissioners, so soon after having provisionally accepted 
the American articles as to Cuba and Porto Itico, now return to the 
question of the so-called Cuban debt. They regret to find a position 
which, under certain reserves, had been distinctly waived, immediately 
resumed, and now expressed in language rarely employed in diplomacy, 
unless to convey a deliberate ultimatum. The Spanish Commissioners 
assume that this debt, for the most part incurred by Spain (not Cuba) 
in the effort first to subjugate the Cuban insurgents, and subsequently 
to overcome the United States, has the binding effect of a mortgage 
upon the very land wrested from Spain through the defeat of this effort. 
They then say that tbey cannot even admit any discussion as to the 
validity and efficacy of such mortgages. In language equally unusual, 
they continue: u Let it be understood, therefore, and the Spanish Com- 
missioners hope there will be no necessity to repeat it, that Spain cannot 
and ought not to agree in this treaty," etc. Now, since Spain, as lately 
as in the next to the last paper filed here by her Commissioners did, 
under reserve, agree in this treaty to waive objections to our articles 
containing no reference to the so-called Cuban debt, the American Com- 
missioners feel themselves justified in inquiring distinctly whether this 
sudden change of position is final? Do the Spanish Commissioners 
wish it to be understood now, without any necessity for repetition, that 
they will accept no treaty which does not provide for an assumption of 
this so-called Cuban debt, or for some part of it, by the United States, 
for itself or for Cuba? 

The American Commissioners observe also the declaration that the 
dignity and self-respect of Spain forbid an inquiry into the use Spain 
may have made of the proceeds of these loans. Now — to consider only 
a single aspect of the issue thus raised — it is not denied that the pro- 
ceeds of a part of these loans were employed directly in making war 
upon the United States. Is it to be understood that the United States, 
after succeeding in the war, is forbidden to take notice even of this 
fact? That would be to require the successful nation to pay the war 
expenses of the defeated nation. Is it an acceptance, Without inquiry, 
of this part of the so-called Cuban debt, that the Spanish Commis- 
sioners declare is demanded by the dignity and self-respect of Spain — 
which they wish therefore to have now understood, and which they 
hope there will be no necessity to repeat? 

The American Commissioners do not here examine the statements 
that these debts were legally created, that they may have been legally 
acquired by individuals of various nationalities, or that Spain is not 
the proprietor of these rights of third parties. They do question the 
statement that Spain does not demand the recognition of these so- 
called "secured debts" for her own benefit. They are bonds of the 
Spanish nation, guaranteed by the faith of the Spanish nation, with 
another guarantee (which might more properly have been called a 
"subsidiary" one), pledging Spanish sovereignty and control over cer- 
tain Spanish colonial revenues. Spain has failed to maintain her 
sovereignty and control over these revenues, and is bound to the third 
parties with whom she dealt for that failure to make good her title to 
the security she pledged. The third parties knew what it was pledged 
for — the continuous effort to put down a people struggling for freedom 
from the Spanish rule. They took the obvious chances of their 
investment on so precarious a security, but they must have relied 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1 I.", 




. could 

be attached ineradicably to the soil tlioy lived on, is to put it In the 
power of any unjust ruler to condemn a colony to perpetual sub 
tion and misgovernment bysimply loading it with so called '• morl •_ 
for loans effected without their consent by their oppressors, till it can 
neither bear them itself nor find anyone else to assume them. Thai 
would be a conclusion alike repugnant to common sense and menn 
to liberty and civilization. 

After reviewing in their "proposition" the provisions of the Protocol, 
the Spanish Commissioners proceed to inquire whether there is any 
other "title", not founded on that agreement, npon which the demand 
for the cession of the group can be supported. Under this head they 
discuss the capture of Manila by the American forces, and. alter con- 
cluding that the capitulation was invalid, they declare that the treaty 
of peace should provide for the immediate delivery of the place to the 
Spanish Government, the immediate release of the Spanish garrison, 
and the performance of various acts which imply that the military 
occupation and government of the city by the United States has'been 

illegal. 

These startling pretentions require at the hands of the American Com- 
missioners a comprehensive examination. 

On the -2nd of July, 1808, the Government of Spain, impelled by and 
admitting the adverse results of the war, made representations to the 
President of the United States by written communication of its Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, transmitted through the Ambassador of France 
at Washington, to the expressed end that "the calamities already so 
great" and "evils still greater" to the two countries might "be termi- 
nated otherwise than bv force of arms'". The response of I be President, 
through Mr. Day, Secretary of State, to this communication was made 
July 30, 1808, and was in part as follows: 

The President therefore responding to your Excellency's request will 
terms of peace which will he accepted by him at the present time, subject 
approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter. . 

Your Excellency in discussing the subject of Cuba intimates that Spam has i 
to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The Government o 
United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spam in this regard, but it 
nizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and 
guidance will be necessary, aud these it is prepared to give. 

The United States will require: . . .. . 

First, The relinquishment by Spain of all claim ol sovereignty over oi title to 
Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island. „:«„„+„«- 

Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now 
put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he canimt he 
Fnsensible to the losses and expenses of the United States m^ent to the war or o 
the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and proper^ J™^ 6 ™? 
insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United 
and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico and other 
now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies and also the cess,, 
island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. , -,, , M 

Third. On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to occupy _aod LwU 
the citv, bav, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion > of a .treaty o 
which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the_ M] P m 

If the terms hereby offered are accepted m their entirety , Conra u» 

named bv the United States to meet similarly authorized Commissioner 
of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the tre* } of peace ami »> uin 
and delivering it under the terms above indicated. 



144 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The negotiations thus entered into were followed by the Protocol of 
agreement between the United States and Spain signed at Washington 
August 12, 1898, by which it was provided : 

Article I. 

Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 

Article II. 

Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones 
to be selected by the United States. 

Article III. 

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pend- 
ing the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposi- 
tion and government of the Philippines. 

Article IV of that instrument obligated Spain to the immediate 
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Kico and the other islands under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies, and provided for the appointment by 
each government, within ten days of the above date, of Commissioners 
who should meet at Havana in Cuba and at San Juan in Porto Rico 
within thirty days after such date for the purpose of arranging and 
carrying out the details of such evacuation. 

By Article V of the Protocol, the Contracting Parties agreed to 
appoint each not more than live Commissioners to treat of peace, who 
should meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the 
negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace. Article VI of the Pro- 
tocol is as follows: 

Upon the conclusion and signing of this Protocol, hostilities between the two coun- 
tries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible 
by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. 

Before the notice provided for in Article VI could possibly be given, 
and on the 13th day of August, 1898, the next day after its signa- 
ture, the American land and naval forces at Manila attacked that city 
and, upon the 14th of August, 1898, compelled its surrender under the 
terms of a military capitulation, which comprehended not only the sur- 
render and occupation of the city, but also the surrender of its garri- 
son, being from 9,000 to 11,000 troops in number, and comprising 
substantially the entire Spanish military force in the Philippine Islands. 
The United States thereupon, having previously for a long time been 
in possession of the bay and harbor of Manila, took military possession 
of that city, and has ever since been in military occupation thereof, 
administering its government concerns in the manner usual in such 
cases. In so doing, the United States took possession of the public 
property of Spain situate in Manila, including certain moneys due to 
that Government which had been collected as revenues; proceeded to 
administer, collect and expend the taxes and customs of that port, and 
also to take charge of and administer the police government of the city; 
and generally continued to exercise over the city, harbor and bay the 
rights and powers of a belligerent in rightful military occupancy. 

It is now contended by Spain, who also, as a part of that contention, 
rejects the articles tendered by the United States for the cession to 
that Government of the Philippine Archipelago, that such occupation 
and acts were in violation of the Protocol, and that, for that reason, 
she is entitled: 

1. To the immediate delivery of the place (Manila) to the Spanish 
Government^ 



TREATY OF PEACE. I I ;, 

2. The immediate release of the garrison of the same; 

3. The return to the Spanish Governmenl of all the funds and public 

property taken by the American army since its occupation of the place, 
and all the taxes of every kind collected or to be collected up to the 
time of returning the same; 

4. The recognition of the obligation on the part of flip United states 
to indemnify Spain for alleged serious damage occasioned by the deten 
tion as prisoners of her troops, to which detention it is alleged is due 
the spread with impunity of the Tagalo insurrection in Luzon and it s 
invasion of the Vizayan islands, and, moreover, because to the same 
has been due the alleged ill-treatment of thousands of Spanish prison- 
ers, military and civil. 

In the dilatory assertion of these extraordinary claims the Spanish 
Commissioners have at times repudiated and at other times have 
appealed to and claimed rights under the stipulations of a convention 
entered into between Spain and the United States, by and under which 
the rights, duties, liabilities and status of the contracting parties were 
explicitly settled. That convention is the Protocol of August L2, 1 - 18. 

It is contended by the American Commissioners that an establish- 
ment of the status quo provided for by that Protocol, and comprehended 
within its intent and meaning upon a fair construction of its terms, is 
the only demand that Spain can, upon her own theory, make in the 
premises, even if it is hypothetically conceded, for the mere purposes 
of this branch of the discussion, that the legal propositions which she 
advances are at all applicable to the alleged breach of the armistice. 
For the United States insists and has always insisted (except hypo- 
thetically as stated above and merely for purposes of this argument) 
that the military operations by which Manila was captured were justi- 
fiable and lawful. The status quo is the right of the United Stato 
occupy and hold thet'ity, harbor and bay of Manila pending the con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposi- 
tion and government of the Philippines. That condition exists. The 
United States does so hold such territory. It has been so conceded 
and insisted by Spain in correspondence which will be particularly 
considered in another portion of this paper. That occupancy is refer- 
able to, and is justified by, the Protocol, and cannot be defeated by 
the alleged illegality of hostilities. To so invalidate it, it will be nec- 
essary for Spain to denounce and repudiate the Protocol in all its 
parts, including, of course, the authority under which this Commission 
is proceeding and the stipulation for an armistice, and thus produce a 
renewal of active war, as we shall elsewhere more fully demonstrate. 

It is maintained by the American Commissioners that all and singular 
the acts done after the surrender of Manila and complained of by Spain 
were and are rightful acts under the Protocol itself: that they would 
have been rightful if no naval or military operations whatever had been 
conducted against that city after the signature thereof, and that their 
rightfulness is not impaired by such hostile operations. 

The Protocol presents two features : One, general in its character, per- 
taining to negotiations for peace; the other, subordinate and special i 
its provisions, pertaining to the capitulation of the city ot Manila and 
its bav and harbor, but which is also an inseparable part and parcel oi 
the stipulations and processes by which a treaty ot peace is to oe 

The second of these features presents a case of the military capitu- 
lation of a certain defined territory, to be occup.ed and held JbytM 
United States "pending the conclusion of a treaty ol peace which snail 

T P 10 



146 TREATY OF PEACE. 

determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines". 
This stipulation is sometimes ignored and sometimes relied upon by 
the Spanish Commissioners to meet the various exigencies of their 
argument. 

The Spanish Commissioners are entirely correct in treating this par- 
ticular stipulation of the Protocol (as they do in one branch of their 
argument) as a military convention providing for a capitulation, and in 
citing (as they do) the laws of war applicable to military occupancy of 
a conquered or surrendered portion of the territory of one of the bel- 
ligerents. If, therefore, as the American Commissioners contend, the 
acts complained of, and for which Spain now demands reparation, were 
rightful acts under the Protocol, and could rightfully have been done 
by that Government if no hostilities whatever had been conducted 
against Manila after its signature, the entire contention of Spain for 
reparation on account of those acts fails. The Protocol, as respects the 
occupation by the United States of the city of Manila and its bay and 
harbor, was, as we have observed, a military convention for the capitu- 
lation of certain territory therein specifically defined. When executed 
by the United States taking possession it presented a case of military 
occupation of that certain defined territory, and vested in that Govern- 
ment all the rights which the laws of war give to a military occupancy. 
This capitulation was general in its character and terms. It compre- 
hended the defined territory and all that it contained, including the 
forts, the munitions of war, the barracks. It included every thing 
and every person left in the city by Spain. It included the garrison 
for that reason. Under the special circumstances of the case the sur- 
render of the garrison was necessarily contemplated by the Protocol. 
The city was closely besieged on the land side by the insurgents. It 
was in extremity for provisions and the insurgents controlled the 
water supply. The Spanish forces had been uuable to raise the siege, 
and therefore could not escape from the city on the land side. The 
city was blockaded by the American fleet; the fleet of Spain had been 
destroyed and there was no escape for her troops by water. The con- 
ditions were such that even if an escape could have been effected by 
land or sea, the forces of Spain would have had no base whatever for 
any military operations. So clearly was this the situation that the 
Spanish Commander-in-Chief fled from the city shortly before it was 
attacked, took refuge on a neutral man-of-war, and was conveyed by it 
to Hong Kong. Had it been intended that the garrison should be per- 
mitted to depart from the capitulated city, the usual provision would 
have been made that it should march out with its arms and with the 
honors of war. Containing no such provision, the exaction that the 
Spanish troops should surrender to the occupying power was as justi- 
fiable aud legal under the Protocol as was the taking possession by 
that power of the forts, barracks and munitions of war. Consequently, 
no rightful claim whatever against the United States can be made 
that afterwards it refused to permit the capitulated army to resume 
its arms and proceed beyond the limits of the capitulated territory 
as an organized military force for the purpose of suppressing the 
Tagalo insurrection, or for any military purpose whatsoever. That 
this has always been the position of the United States upon this ques- 
tion plainly appears from the diplomatic correspondence between the 
two Governments, and particularly in the letter of the Secretary of 
State to Mr. Cambon dated September 16, 1898. The argument which 
would sustain the right of Spain to the release of her army would, 
with equal cogency, support a claim on her part to have delivered up to 



TREA.TT OF PEACE. 1 1 7 

her for the same purpose a ship of war that might have been included 
in the capitulation, and all the munitions of war which came into the 
possession of the United States under and by virtue of its stipulated 
right of occupancy. In all cases where, pending war, :i certain defined 
part of the territory of one of the belligerents is bj the terms <>i ;i 
military convention, agreed to be put in the military occupation and 
possession of the other belligerent, the sovereignty of the occupying 
party (the United States in the present instance) displaces or suspends 
the sovereignty of the other belligerent and becomes for the purposes 
of the military occupation a substitute for it. 

It is not necessary to multiply citations of the many authoril ies which 
sustain this proposition. General tlalleck's work on International Law 
has been invoked by the Spanish Commissioners and the citations in 
this paper will be limited to that work, observing that they are made 
from the chapter which treats of the rights of military occupation (lin- 
ing war as contradistinguished from the rights of a complete conquest 
''Capitulations are agreements entered into by a commanding officer 
for the surrender of his army, or by the governor of a town, or a for- 
tress, or particular district of country, to surrender it into the bands of 
the enemy." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 319.) 

"It follows, then, that the rights of military occupation extend over 
the enemy's territory only so far as the inhabitants are vanquished or 
reduced to submission to the rule of the conqueror. Thus, it a fort, 
town, city, harbor, island, province, or particular section of country 
belonging to one belligerent, is forced to submit to the arms of the 
other, such place or territory instantly becomes a conquest, and is sub- 
ject to the laws which the conqueror may impose on it: although he 
has not yet acquired the plenum dominium et utile, he has the temporary 
right of possession and government." (Halleck, Vol. 11, p. 434.) 

To consider more specifically the claims advanced l.\ the Spanish 
Commissioners: 

The first is, that Spain "is entitled to the immediate delivery of the 
place (Manila) to the Spanish Government." 

To do this would contravene the provisions ol the Protocol by which 
it is agreed that "the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay 
and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, 
which treaty the two Commissions have been negotiating ever since 
October 1, 1898. They are negotiating under the Protocol, lhat 
instrument is an entirety- Neither party, having entered into it ami 
continued the negotiations for which it provide to a date more tli 
two months after the acts were done of which Spam now complains. 
can now allege such acts as grounds for the rejection ot the obligations 
of that instrument. , , , , , , , , . , 

If auy right of repudiation ever existed, it should have been assert* d 
in due time as against the entire instrument and all of its Provisions. 
This has never been attempted. On the contrary, the contracting 
parties have proceeded to negotiate, agree, and perlorm undei tin 
requirements of that instrument, Pmtnnnl 

By so doing, Spain has waived the alleged breaches ot the 1 rotocol 
which she now advances. (r . 1ITi<n .. n f 

The second demand is for the immediate release ol tl < g soi 
Manila. We show in another place that this ^^^^' . 
facts and circumstances, necessarily included in the capitulation pr< 

Vi Tt^irI^drforthe return to the ^^j"-* 
all funds and public property taken by the American armj since 



148 TREATY OF PEACE. 

occupation of the place (Manila) and all taxes of every kind, collected 
or to be collected. 

We have maintained in another portion of this paper that the occu- 
pation of Manila is justly referable to the Protocol; tbat that instru- 
ment is a military capitulation : that the effect of the occupancy by the 
United States was to suspend the sovereignty of Spain in the territory 
so occupied, and to substitute for the purposes of military occupation 
the sovereignty of the United States. It follows upon principle and 
authority from these considerations that the United States had the 
right to take the public property, and to collect the taxes demanded, 
and has the right to retain the same. 

"Political laws, as a general rule, are suspended during the military 
occupation of a conquered territory. Tbe political connection between 
the people of such territory and the state to which they belong is not 
entirely severed, but is interrupted or suspended so long as the occu- 
pation continues. Their lands and immovable property are, therefore, 
not subject to the taxes, rents, etc.. usually paid to the former sover- 
eign. These, as we have said elsewhere, belong of right to the con- 
queror, and he may demand and receive their payment to himself. 
They are a part of the spoils of war, and the people of the captured 
province or town can no more pay them to the former government than 
they can contribute funds or military munitions to assist that govern- 
ment to prosecute the war. To do so would be a breach of the implied 
conditions under which the people of a conquered territory are allowed 
to enjoy their private property, and to pursue their ordinary occupa- 
tions, and would render the offender liable to punishment. They are 
subject to the laws of the conqueror, and not to the orders of the dis- 
placed government. Of lands and immovable property belonging to 
the conquered state, the conqueror has, by the rights of war, acquired 
the use so long as he holds them. The fruits, rents and profits are 
therefore his. and he may lawfully claim and receive them. Any con- 
tracts or agreements, however, which he may make with individuals 
farming out such property, will continue only so long as he retains con- 
trol of them, and will cease on their restoration to, or recovery by, 
their former owner."" (Halleck, Yol. II, p. 437.) 

"During the war of 1812 the city and harbor of Castine, a port of 
the United States, was taken and occupied by the British forces: their 
commander proceeded to levy and collect customs duties. The ques- 
tion of his right to do so and the suspension of the sovereignty of the 
United States was afterwards adjudicated by the Supreme Court. 

"'By the conquest and military occupation of Castine," says the 
Supreme Court, 'the enemy acquired that firm possessiou which 
enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that 
place. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, 
of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no 
longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabit- 
ants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the sur- 
render, the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the 
British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as 
it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case, no 
other laws could be obligatory upon them: for where there is uo pro- 
tection or allegiance or sovereignty there can be no claim to obedience. 
Castine was, therefore, during this period, so far as respected our 
revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it 
by the inhabitants were subject to such duties only as the British Gov- 



TREATY OP PEACE. 149 



ernment chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported 
into the United States." 7 (Halleck, Vol. U, p. 1 16 ! 17.) 

"The moneys derived from these sources may be used for the sapport 
of the government of the conquered territory, or for the expenses of 
the war." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 447.) 

"Those who are permitted to hold commercial intercourse with Buch 
territory, whether they be subjects of the conqueror, or of foreigu States, 
must conform to the regulations, and pay the duties established by tin- 
conquering power; and, in case of conquest by the United Slates, the 
President, in the absence of legislative enactments, exercises this 
power." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 446.) 

"We will next consider the effect of a military occupation of a State 
upon debts owing to its government. Hoes such conquest of the state 
carry with it the incorporeal rights of the State, such as debts, etc. I 
In other words, do these rights so attach themselves to the territory 
that the military possession of the latter carries with it the right to 
possess the former 1 ? There are two distinct cases here to be considered : 
First, where the imperium of the conqueror is established over the 
whole State (victoria universalis); and, second, where it is established 
over only apart, as the capital, a province, or a colony (victoria partic- 
ularis). As has already been stated, all rights of military occupation 
arise from actual possession, and not from constructive conquests; they 
are de facto, and not de jure rights. Hence, by conquest of a part of a 
country, the government of thatcountry, or the State, is not in the pos- 
session of the conqueror, and he, therefore, cannot claim the incorporeal 
rights which attach to the whole country as a State. But, by the mili- 
tary possession of apart, he will acquire the same claim to the incor- 
poreal rights which attach to that part, as he would, by the military 
■ occupation of the whole, acquire to those which attach to the who!.-. 
We must also distinguish with respect to the situations of the debts, 
or rather thelocality of the debtors from whom they are owing, whether 
in the conquered country, in that of the conqueror, or in that of a 
neutral. If situated in the conquered territory, or in that of the con- 
queror, there is no doubt but that the conqueror may, by the rights of 
military occupation, enforce the collection of debts actually due tot e 
displaced government, for the de facto government has, in This respect, 
all the powers of that which preceded it." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 461.; 

In other particulars Spain has not only waived any right to insist 
that the hostilities at Manila were in violation of the Protocol, but has 
acted upon the assumption that they were not such acts of violation. 

On August 15, 1S ( .)S, the French Ambassador, acting for Spam, in a 
letter of "that date, addressed to the Secretary of State, inquired as 
follows: "May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished 
between Spain and Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines."' 

"Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish 
bottoms to Cuba, Porto Pico, Philippines?" 

To these inquiries the Department of State answered by letter dated 
August 17, 1898, that: .f.ini, 

"1. This Government will interpose no obstacle to the reestablish 
ment of the postal service by Spanish steamers between Spam on t 
one side and Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines on the other. 

"2. The United States will not object to the importation of supplies 
in Spanish bottoms to Cuba and the Philippines but it has been 
decided to reserve the importation of supplies Horn the United state 
to Porto Rico to American vessels." 



150 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Though it is probable that both of these communications were written 
before notice of the capture of Manila had been received, yet it is 
believed that Spain has, down to the present time, availed herself of the 
privileges thus solicited and granted. 

On August 29, 1808, the French Ambassador, acting for Spain, by- 
letter of that date, addressed to the Secretary of State, suggested that 
"the Spanish troops, whom the capitulation of the city of Manila has 
reduced to inaction, might be placed at once at the disposal of Spain, 
who would use them for the defense of the islands against the insur- 
gents. 

" The Minister of State at Madrid thinks that, if the United States 
Government sees any objection to this arrangement, it will, at least, 
fcave no reason to oppose the despatch of troops directly from the 
Peninsula to the Philippines." 

To this letter the Department of State made answer under date of 
September 5, 18U8, and observed, among things: 

"in your informal note of the 29th ultimo it is stated that the Span- 
ish Government suggests that, for the purpose of checking insurgent 
hostilities, the Spanish troops now held as prisoners of war by the 
American forces may be placed at the disposal of Spain, to be used 
against the insurgents; or, if this be objected to, that the Spanish 
Government may be allowed to send troops from the Peninsula to the 
Philippines. It can scarcely be expected that this Government would 
even consider the question of adopting the first alternative, in view of 
the fact that for some time before the surrender of Manila the Spanish 
forces in that city were besieged by the insurgents by land while the 
port was blockaded by the forces of the United States by sea." 

It seems impossible to conceive that the correspondence from which 
the above quotations have been made could have taken place except 
upon the basis of the opinion then entertained both by the United 
States and Spam, that the possession by the former power of the City 
of Manila, and the surrender to it of the Spanish forces were either 
lawful ab initio, or had become lawful by acquiescence and waiver by 
Spain, and that nothing had been done or required by the United States 
that was not warranted by the terms of the Protocol respecting the 
occupation by that Government of the city, harbor and bay of Manila. 

And, on the 11 th day of September, 1898, the Ambassador of France, 
acting for Spain, in a letter of that date to the Secretary of State, dis- 
tinctly stated that "the Spanish Government is of opinion that the 
occupation by the American forces of the city, bay and harbor of Manila 
must be considered in virtue of the Protocol of August 12, and not in 
virtue of what was agreed to in the capitulation of the 14th of the same 
month, which is absolutely null by reason of its having been concluded 
after the belligerents had signed an agreement declaring the hostilities 
to be suspended." 

Considering together these requests and concessions, and particu- 
larly the explicit admission above quoted, it seems a feat of forensic 
and dialectic hardihood to assert now that the military occupation by 
the United States of the City of Manila is void under the Protocol, and 
that, for that reason, the city ought to be delivered up to Spain, its gar- 
rison liberated, its forts, barracks, and munitions returned, the moneys 
collected paid back to Spain, and the United States to be mulcted in 
damages for the military operations of the insurgents. 

And, considering from altogether another point of view the claim 
that, since Manila was actually captured a few hours after the Protocol 
was signed on the other side of the globe instead of a few hours before, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



L51 



it should be returned, the thought might occur to a just and irapai tial 
mind to remember why it was not captured earlier. The world i 
that the attack was only delayed to protect the city and its Spanish 
inhabitants from the dreaded vengeance of the insurgents. It would 
be extraordinary if this act of humanity should now be claimed by the 
beneficiary as the sole reason for depriving the benefactor of his 
victory. 

It might further occur to a just and impartial mind that the < r en era! 
and the Admiral commanding, to whom that humane delay was due, 
were entitled to a more generous recognition of perfectly well known 
facts than is implied in the statements of the Spanish Commissioners 
that "in spite of this (the signature of the Protocol) General Merritt 
and the Admiral of the fleet demanded the surrender of the place, 
etc. * * * opened fire, * * * unnecessarily causing a considerable Dum- 
ber of losses to the Spanish forces;" and again that "General Merritt 
and the Admiral of the squadron may not be personally responsible for 
the blood they unnecessarily shed on the 13th, if they had no official 
notice then of the Protocol which had been signed on the previous day 
in Washington". The American Commissioners have too high an esti- 
mate of the chivalric honor of the Spanish people to accept that as the 
final record Spain would wish to make of this incident. 

The American Commissioners for the various reasons hereinbefore 
stated are constrained to reject the several demands embodied in the 
"proposition" to which the present paper is an answer. 

True copy : 

John P>. Moore. 



Protocol No. 14. 

Conference of November 16, 1898. 

The conference having been 
postponed at the request of the 
Spanish Commissioners, in order 
that they might have an oppor- 
tunity to prepare a reply to the 
paper presented by the American 
Commissioners at the last session, 
it was decided to meet on the 16th 
of November, at two o'clock, p. 
m., at which hour there were 



Present: On the part of the 
United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, 
Prye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergus- 
son. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero llios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The Spanish Commissioners pre- 
sented their answer, copy and 



Protocolo No. 14. 

Conferencia del 16 de Novicmbre de 
1898. 

Los Comisarios espanolesen vir- 
tud de lo acordado en la sesion 
anterior respecto del aplazamiento 
de la proxima conferencia para una 
fecha posterior a la iijada, solicit a- 
ron une prorroga para presentar 
su contestation al Memoranda in 
que en la ultima sesion present anm 
los Comisarios Americanos y ha- 
biendose fijado de coniiin acuerdo 
el dia 16 a las 2 P. M. para la re- 
union de ambas Comisiones, se 
hallan en dicho dia y hora 

Presentes Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de Amenca los 
Senores Day, Davis. Frye, Gray, 
Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte deEspana. los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta do 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios EspaSoles pre- 
sentan la contestacion al Meinoran- 



152 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



translation of which are annexed 
to this protocol, to the American 
Memorandum relating to the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and in so doing the 
President of the Spanish Commis- 
sion stated that the document, 
besides being an answer to the 
American Memorandum, was also 
a Memorandum in support of the 
last proposition presented by the 
Spanish Commissioners; and he 
called attention to the concluding- 
part, wherein a motion or proposi- 
tion was made with reference to 
the contingency that the American 
Commissioners should think that 
they must insist upon tbeir former 
proposal on the Philippines. 

The American Commissioners 
asked that the final part of the 
Memorandum, to which the Presi- 
dent of the Spanish Commission 
referred, be read, and it was orally 
translated into English by their 
Interpreter. 

The American Commissioners 
moved that, in order that the whole 
paper might be carefully translated 
and attentively examined, the con- 
ference be adjourned till Saturday, 
November 19, at two o'clock, p. m., 
without prejudice to asking for a 
postponement if necessary. 

The Spanish Commissioners ex- 
pressed their assent to this motion, 
and it was therefore decided that 
the next conference should be held 
on Saturday, the 19th instant, at 
two o'clock, p. m. 

William B. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray^ 

Whitelaw Beid. 

John B. Moore. 



dum Americano, que es anexa al 
acta presente, relativo a las Islas 
Filipinas, y al hacerlo, el Presi- 
dents de la Comision Espahola, 
manifiesta que dicho documento a 
la vez que contesta al Americano, 
es asimismo un Memorandum en 
apoyo de la ultima proposition 
presentada por los Comisarios 
Espanoles, y llama la atencion 
sobre su xiltima parte en que se 
hace una motion 6 proposicion 
para el caso en que los Comisarios 
Americanos crean deber insistir 
en su anterior proposicion sobre 
Filipinas. 



Los Comisarios Americanospiden 
que sea leida la ultima parte del 
Memorandum a que se retiere el 
Presidentede laComision Espano- 
la, y esta es vertida verbalmente al 
ingles por su interprete. 

Los Comisarios Americanosmani- 
fiestan que considerando que es 
necesario traducir con esmero y en- 
terarse atentamente de dicho docu- 
mento, proponen el aplazamiento 
de la sesion hasta el Sabado a las 
2 de la tarde, sin perjuicio de pedir 
una proriogasi lo estimaseu neees- 
sario. 

Los Comisarios espaholes mani- 
fiestan su asentiiniento, y queda 
por tanto fijada la proxima confer- 
encia para el sabado 19 a las 2 P. M. 



E. Montero Bios 
B. de Abarzuza 

J. DE GARNICA 

W B de Vtlla-Urrutia 
Eafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 14. 
comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS. 



[Presontado en la aesion del dia 16 de Noviembre 1898. (14* conferencia.)] 

El ultimo escrito presentado por laComision Americana tiene un doble 
objeto. Por una parte es el Memorandum quepresento en apoyo de su 
proposicion de 31 de Octubre ultimo, pidiendo la cesion de las Islas 



TREATY OF PEACE. L53 

Filipinas a los Estados Unidos. T por la otra es la exposici6n de las 
razones quetieue la Comision Americana para qo admitir la proposici6n 
espailolade 4 de estemes, en que la invitabaaquepresentase ana i 
objeto fuera el cumplimiento de lo convenido en los Articulos 3 y U del 
Protocolo de Washington. 

Por lo que hace al primer objeto sobre que versa el Memorandum 
Americano, la Comision Espanola se dedicara priineramente en este a 
replicar & su coutenido. Y por lo que hace a la segunda parte, aquella 
insistira en la forma de Memorandum reglamentario en la exposicion de 
las razones que abonan su proposicion rechazada. 

REPLICA AL MEMORANDUM AMERICANO. 

Eazones de mdtodo y el deseo de reducir las proporciones de 
escrito, inclinan a los Comisarios Espanoles a ocuparse priineramente 
del punto relativo a las deudas hipotecarias de las colouias de I. 
que, anque de capital importancia, no hubieran vuelto a controvertir en 
esta parte de la discusion del tratado, si no apareciera nuevamente 
promovido por la Comision Americana on el ultimo parrafo de su propo- 
sicion, pidiendo la cesion del Archipelago Filipino. 

Keconocela Comision Espanola la dificultad que siente para contestar 
a esta parte del Memorandum Americano, debida esta dificultad a Los 
graves errores de hecho de que aquella esta sembrada, y tambien a las 
extranas doctrinas juridicas que alii campean. 

Ante todo necesita la Comision Espanola hacer constar que en su 
documento no entieude haber empleado lenguage, ni siquiera fiases 
impropias de una discusion diplomatica. Celosa de las consideraciones 
a quetiene derecho, empieza por guardar religiosamente las que cor- 
responden a los demas, y, en sus documentos evita con el mayor cuidado 
toda i'rase que pueda ser personalmente desagradable a quien vaya 
dirigida, y con inucha mas razon, las que pudieran reputarse ofensivas 
a quienes estan, y tienen derecho a estar, al amparo de las personas 
con quienes los Comisarios Espanoles tengan que discutir. 

Los Comisarios Americanos dicen que notaron con sorpresa que os 
Espanoles, despues de haber aceptado provisionalmente los articulos 
que aquellos habian propuesto sobre Cuba y Puerto Rico, vuelven ahora 
a suscitar la cuestion de la deuda cubana, planteando de nuevo an tema 
que bajo ciertas reservas fabia sido terminantemente abandonada. \ no 
satisfechos con tan rotundas afirmaciones afiadieron que la Comision 
Espanola en su contestacion escrita presentada en la sesion tie Lb a 
Octubre, habia retirado sus observaciones anteriores a los articulos ae 
la Comision Americana. . .. _ 

Por lo que hace a esta supuesta retirada, mvitamos a nuestros d 
colegas de America a que, buscando con todo detemmiento 1; 
de nuestra contestacion escrita, en que aquella conste, se sn van cit 
pues entre tanto y siempre nosotros nemos de afirmar de un m 
rotundo, que en nuestro documento no existen tales bases, result 
de el por lo contrario que nada teniamos que retirar, puesto qm 
teniamos nuestras afirmaciones, aunque subordmando su sostenin 
en lo futuro a las conveniencias de Espana. En efecto, can- p 
de lo que acabamos de decir y como suticiente contestacion & as tra 
de la Comision Americana, basta transcribe aqui las en u< , 
aquella supuesta aceptaddn provisional yaquel *~> a n JesS 
tema sobre la mencionada deuda "Los Comisarios Es pa ,^ " ! t 

a la sobredicha pregunta (que es la que por escrito es . I . hec 
Comision Americana en la reunion del dia 24 Oe^)7^^^ 
ando sus conviccion de que con arreglo a derecho, las oblij. 



154 TREATY OF PEACE. 

coloniales de Cuba y Puerto Rico deben pasar con estas islas y su sober- 
ania, no rehusan tomar en consideration cualquier otro articulo relativo 
d Cuba y Puerto Rico que no contenga la clausula de asumir las cargas 
por los Estados Unidos 6 por Cuba 6 por ambos ,, (estas eran las propias 
palabras de la pregunta a que contestaban), "subordinando la dennitiva 
aprobacion de tal articulo a la de los demas que liayan de formar la 
totalidad del Tratado, etc." Y eutre las razoues que por escrito con- 
signaron para dar esta contestation, esta la que alii se expresa con las 
siguientes frases " Considerando que no habiendo de elaborarse este 
Tratado, como nunca se ha elaborado ni puede elaborarse ninguno, con 
el unico criterio de la rigurosa justicia que cada una de las partes pueda 
entender que le asista, sino tambien con el de la conveniencia de cada 
una de ellas y aim de ambas para ruodincar a su tepor las exigencias 
del criterio meramente juridico, y que por consiguiente sobre la cuestion 
relativa a la deuda de Cuba los Comisarios Espaiioles que entienden 
que el rigor del derecho la resuelve a su favor, tienen el deber y estan 
disquestos a cumplirlo, de moderar este rigor por las conveniencias que 
para Espana puedan surgir de otras estipulaciones del Tratado, que sin 
ser perjudiciales a los Estados Unidos, puedan ser favorables a Espafia". 

Parece bien claro que el supuesto abaudono de (pie ahora se babla 
en el Memorandum Americano y la supuesta aceptacion de los articulos 
relativos a Cuba y Puerto Pico, estaba limitada al caso en que la Co- 
mision espaiiola entendiera que en los demas que se fueran discutiendo 
y aprobando, hubiese para Espana ventajas que, a su juicio, la compen- 
saran de un sacrificio mayor 6 menor de su derecho sobre las deudas, 
puesto que, si tales ventajas no se ot'recian, no tendria la Comisiou Es- 
paiiola razon para hacer ninguno; y por lo tanto, claro es que podria 
insistir en el reconocimiento de su derecho. 

Pues bien, - & qu6 ventajas desde entonces se ban ofrecido a Espaiia, 
hasta este momento, en el curso de las couferencias? 

Desde aquella fecha los trabajos del Tratado no adelantaron mas que 
un paso, y este ha consistido en pedir a Espana, sin alegar razon alguna 
en pro de tal petition cuando se hizo, que ceda a los Estados Unidos el 
Archipielago de Filipinas. i Entiende la Comision Americana que esta 
cesion es una ventaja para Espana"? Sus Comisionados no se sorpren- 
derian al oir una contestacion en sentido afirmativo, que ya hacen pre- 
ver ciertas frases consiguadas en el Memorandum a que contestan. No 
necesitan decir que no participan de esa opinion. 

Hubiera, pues, estado la Comision Espaiiola en su derecho, volviendo 
a insistir no de un modo incidental, sino directo y principal, en sus 
reclamaciones sobre la transmision de las deudas y obligaciones colo- 
niales. No lo ban hecho, ni se proponen hacerlo ahora, mas esto no ba 
obstado ni obsta a que no deje pasar en silencio supuestos y afirma- 
ciones, siquiera para que no llegue un dia en que se diga que habian 
sido por ella consentidas porque no las habia controvertido, negandolas 
expresainente su asentimiento. 

Aflrma la Comision Americana que Espana coutrajo (no dice que haya 
invertido la deuda anteriormente contraida) la mayor parte de la deuda 
hipotecaria de cuba u en su esfuerzo primero para subyugar a los insur- 
rectos cubanos, y lucgo para oponerse a los Estados Unidos, y discurri- 
endo sobre el mismo tema, aiiade, que "no se ha negado que parte del 
importe de estos emprestitos se invirtio directameute en hacer la guerra 
a los Estados Unidos." Para hacer tales afirmaciones es indispensable 
suponer que se ignoran las fecbas de la creacion de tales deudas. La 
una me emitida por Real Decreto de 10 de Mayo de 188G, es decir, ocho 
alios lespues de establecida la paz en Cuba, y nueve antes de que, por 



TREATY OF PEACE. l. r 



»0 



las sugestiones y medios que ya son del dominio publico, hul 
vuelto a perturbarse. Lasegunda emision se hizo por Heal Decretode 
27 de Setienibre de 1890, es decir, doce afios despuds que reinaba ana 
paz completa en Cuba y se hallaba esta isla en el apogeo de mi proBpe- 
ridad, y cinco alios antes (pie hubiese comenzado mi desolation por hi 
uueva rebelion que alii, mas 6 menos espontaneamente surgi6. Y en 
los dos Decretos se dice ademns cuales eian las causas que provocaban 
estas emisiones, y los gastos en cuya satisfaction se Labia tie m 
su iinporte, figuiando entre los prineipales el pago de los deficit de los 
presupuestos anteriores y posterities de la isla, los cuales bien Babido 
es que eran debidos a la grau rebaja que en sus inipuestos habia becbo 
la Metropoli. 

I Querra decirse que esta, por mi don sobrenatnral de adivinaci6n, 
sabia en 1886 y 1890 que en 1895 babia de reproducirse la insurreccidn 
de Cuba, y en 1898 los Estados Unidos le habian de dispensar su pro 
teccion armada 1 ? Pues, solamente en tal hipotesis podria admitirse 
la exactitud de ias frases que se leen en el Memorandum Americano. V 
por lo que hace a los gastos que a Espana ocasionti la gnerra de los 
Estados Unidos, sin duda su Comision ignora que en 20 de Abril de 
este alio, en que comenzaron las bostilidades, el Tesoro Espauol 
estaba realizando las operaciones que, en forma de obligaciones oou la 
garantia especial de lasAduanas de la Peninsula, babia acordado bacer 
en 1890 y 1897 por mil millones de pesetas, yotra por doscieutos veinte y 
tres millones de pesetas, acordada en 2 de Abril de 1898 con la garantia 
espeeial de las rentas del tobaco y timbre del Estado y la del impuesto 
de consumos de Espana, y que, en fin, para la atencion especial de la 
guerra con los Estados Unidos, se babia acordado ademas emitir por 
Real Decreto de 31 de Mayo de este afio, deuda perpetua interior al 1 
per cent por valor de mil millones de pesetas de las cuales fueron 
inmediatamente negociadas 800,785,000. Pespues de estos datos, es de 
suponer que la Comision Americana no habra de insistir en la afirina- 
cion tan sin fundamento aventurada en su Memorandum, por compren- 
der que los gastos de la guerra con los Kstados Unidos nada tienen que 
ver con la deuda hipotecaria colonial de Cuba. 

Una vez mas la Comision Americana expone en su ultimo Memoran- 
dum la extrana teoria de que las colonias Espanolas no tienen obliga- 
tion de pagar la deuda contraida por la Metropoli para Bofocar la 
rebelion de pocos 6 mucbos de sus habitantes. Pero esta vez llegau 
hasta el punto de poner tan singular teoria al amparo del sentido comun, 
afirmando que la contraria es una amenaza para la libertad y la 
civilization. 

Ab! si loscolonos y los ciudadanos de la Grau Republica hubiesen 
alegado para justificar una rebeldia, 6 en lo futuro alegasen en caso 
igual de que kquel poderoso Estado no esta ciertamente exento, una 
teoria semejante, - b la bubieraadraitido via admitira el Gobierno Ameri- 
cano? Lo que no el sentido comtin, sino el sentido moral reprueba, es 
que se intente poner toda rebelion contra los poderes legitimos al 
amparo de la libertad y de la civilization. - b Era 6 no Espana soberana 
legitima de Cuba cuando surgiola primera insurreccidn y durante toda 
la segunda? s Se baatrevidonadieanegar nia poner en duda siquiera, 
la soberania de Espaiia sobre aquella isla en el tiempo a (pie uos 
mos refiriendo? i No fueron los mismos Estados Unidos y su Gobierno 
los que un dia v otro dia le reclamaron que la sofocase, sin excloir el 
medio de las arinas, restableciendo lo mas pronto posible la paz en so 
colonial Pues accediendo Espana a estas iustancias ; quien, mdusoio* 
Estados Unidos, puede negar la legitimidad de los gastos que fiizo al 
satisfacerlas 1 



156 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Teoria semejante que, por los respetos que la Comision espafiola viene 
guardando y tiene eldeber de guardar, no califica couio seguramente la 
calificarian todos los poderes constituidos de la tierra, no puede soste- 
nerse a la faz de los liombres, sino partiendo del supuesto de que el poder 
metropolitano era ilegitimo y su soberania una arbitrariedad del des- 
potisino. ^Y coucreta y cenidamente se califica asi a la Corona de 
Espafia por su domination en Cuba hasta la celebration del Protocolo 
de Washington? - & Puede, sobre todo, calincarla asi el Estado que, sin 
cesar, ha solicit ado la action de esa soberania para domiuar a los que 
contra ella se habian levantado en la isla con las annas en la mano? 

Pasaremos a otro asunto, ya que este es niuy delicado para tratarlo 
con calraa y serenidad en una discusion diplointitica en que se intenta 
controvertirlo. 

En el Memorandum a que estamos contestando, se asienta la singular 
afirmation de que la hipoteca eonstituida en las dos sobredichas erai- 
siones, puede Ilamarse mas propiamente una garantia subsidiaria y que 
quien esta principalmente obligada al pago es la nation espafiola. Sin 
duda la Oomision Americana, al hacer tal atirmacion, no tenia a la vista 
el articulo 2° del Real Decreto de 10 de Marzo de 1886, acordando la 
emision de 1,240.000 billetes hipotecarios de la Isla de Cuba, ni el par- 
rafo tambien segundo del articulo igualmente segundo del Real Decreto 
de 27 de Setiembre de 1890, acordando la emision de 1,750,000 billetes 
hipotecarios tambien de la misma isla. Los dos dicen literalmente lo 
mismo, y bastara por'lo tanto que transcribamos uno de ellos. Dice 
asi: "Los nuevos billetes tendran la garantia especial de las rentas de 
Aduanas, sello y timbre de la Isla de Cuba, la de las contribuciones 
directas e indirectas que alii existau 6 puedan establecerse en lo suce- 
sivo, y la general de la Naciou Espafiola. Estaran exeutos de todo 
impuesto ordinario y extraordinario, etc." 

Tampoco ha debido ver la Comision Americana ninguno de los titulos 
emitidos de estas deudas, que se hallan por tod as partes esparcidos 
incluso en Cuba y en las manos de tereeros y particulares dueflos; si los 
hubiera visto, habria leido en ellos lo siguiente: " Garantia especial de 
las rentas de Aduanas, sello y timbre de la Isla de Cuba, la de las con- 
tribuciones directas e indirectas que alii existau 6 puedan establecerse 
en lo sucesivo y la general de la Nation Espafiola." " El Banco hispano- 
colonial percibira por medio de sus delegados en la Isla de Cube 6 
recibira en Barcelona por conducto del Banco Espanol de la Habana, el 
producto de las Aduanas de la misma, reteuiendose anticipada y dia- 
riameute lo necesario, segun la tabla al dorso, para aplicarlo en cada 
trimestre al pago de intereses y amortization." 

Si despues de esto la Comision Americana continua entendiendo que 
esta deuda no se emitio como hipotecariay que la hipoteca no consistio 
en las rentas de las Aduanas de Cuba y sus demas impuestos; y que 
estas rentas no fueron las que se sefialaron principalmente y en primer 
lugar, y por lo tanto antes que el Tesoro de la Peninsula para el pago 
de los intereses y amortization de esta deuda, nada mas tenemos que 
decir. No sabemos demostrar la evidencia. 

Por lo que hace a los tenedores de estos titulos y a la severidad que 
entendemos es injustificada, con que aquellos son tratados en el Memo- 
randum Americano, no es Espafia la que tiene el deber de defenderlos. 
Cuando a su noticia llegue el juicio que sobre ellos se emite, es de supo- 
ner que por si mismos se defenderan, porque despues de todo, no nece- 
sitan hacer grandes esfuerzos para demostrar la justicia de su causa. 

Por lo que a Espafia toca, y con esto su Comision procede 4 contestar 
categoricamente a las preguntas que se forinulan en el Memorandum 



TREATY OF PEACE. 157 

Americano, le basta defender la legitimidad de bur actoa y el perfecto 

derecbo cou que creo aquella deuda y estableci6 su hipoteca ; y por < 

siguiente, el estricto que tieue para no pagar los interesea y ai tiza 

cion delamisma, sino cuaudo se le pruebe la insuficiencia de laa r< 
hipotecadas cou que aquellos deben ser primeramente Bal iafechos. 

Si los que tales rentas tengau en su poder, quiereu " no cumplir la 
obligacion sobre ellas constituida, es cosa que quedara* bajo su reapon- 
sabilidad j>uesto que Espana no'tiene medios de hacerles cumplii 
obligacion, ni por otra parte tiene ella para cou los acreedores m&a 
deberes que los que honradamente ha venido hasta ahora cumpliendo. 
Pero Espana, vuelve a decirlo su Comision (y es lo duico que textual 
mente ba dicho en su documento anterior aunque en otro sentido apa- 
rezcaen el Memorandum Americano) no puede prestarse enesteTratado 
con los Estados Unidos, ni en otro alguno con cualquier Potencia a" 
hacer ni declarar en su propio nombre, nada que manifieste 6 sii 
implique que ella misma pone en duda y mucho menos desconoce, ni ami 
voluntariamente nierraa por lo que a ella toca, Ins derechos hipoteearios 
de los tenedores de aquellas deudas. No tiene medioa eficacea para que 
los que hay an de ser tenedores de las hipotecas, respeten talcs derechos. 
Por esto no los em plea si los tuviese, ya que no por estricta justicia ;i 
lo menos por un deber moral, los emplearia, ajustandose asi a los seu- 
timientos de la probidad publica y privada. 

Creen, pues, los Comisarios Espauoles haber contestado bien categ u i- 
camente a las preguntas que sobre este particular se les dirigen en el 
Memorandum Americano, ydespu^sde esto pasan a ocuparsedel princi- 
pal punto tratado en aquel Memorandum y que se refiere a la soberania 
del Archipitlago filipino. 

Segun el Memorandum Americano se funda la cesion del Arcliipi 
que se pide a Espana, no en que tal cesion se haya convenido en el 
articnlo 3" del Protocolo, como se convino en el 2° la de la Isla de Puerto 
Rico, sino en que, segun aquella Comisiou, entre los asuntos relativos a 
las Islas Filipinas que en el articulo sobredicho se dejaron a la libre 
resolucion de la Conferencia de Paris, csta el que tiene por objecto la 
cesion por Espafia de la soberania en aquellas islas a los Estados I nidoa 
de America. 

La Comisiou espanola sostiene que lejosde haberse encomendado tan 
grave asunto a la Conferencia de Paris, asunto que sin duda seria ma.s 
importante que todos los que esta llamada a discutir, el articulo 
Protocol*) descausa sobre el supuesto de que la soberania del Archi- 
pielago habia de continuar siendo de Espana. 

La Comision Americana busca el fundamento de su t< sis en la mter- 
pretacion de las frases de la citada clausula 3°, y ademAs en las nego- 
ciaciones que la prepararon y terminarou con su aceptaci6n. 

Examiuaremos con fria serenidad los razonamientos de csta I 
Dice la Comision Americana que es un priucipio de derecbo que "cuando 
el resultado de negociaciones se ha comprendido en un escrito cerrado, 
los terminos de este acuerdo deben definir los derechos de las partes. 

La 
Trata 
del 

en tal caso, debe entenderse que las diferencias que 
ciaciones hubiera habido, entre los Estados contratantes, qm 
resueltas por el acuerdo claro, precise, y de fijo sentido en que coiivini 
eron. Mas ^es este el caso sobre que discnten al presente amoaa 

Codiisiones? . , . ,, n BTiaS( .i 

Antes de contestar A esta pregunta, entiende la Comision Espanola, 




158 TREATY OF PEACE. 

que es bueno transcribir, una vez mas, el texto del Articulo 3° del Pro- 
tocoled literal y fielinente traducido del original fiances. Dice asi : " Los 
Estados Unidos ocuparan la Oiudad, puerto y babia de Manila en espera 
de la conclusion de un Tratado de paz que debera determinar la inter- 
vencion (controle) la disposition y el Gobierno de las Filipinas". 

No sabe la Comision Espanola si la Americana ignora que, al recibirse 
por el Gobierno de Madrid el despacbo del Sefior Secretario de Estado 
de Wasbington, en fecba 3° de Julio, comunieandole las tres condiciones 
con cuya aceptacion por Espana, estaban los Estados Unidos dispuesto* 
a bacer la paz, y la tercera de las cuales era la que, sin la menor altera- 
tion se transcribio despues en el Protocolo, for in an do su clausula 3 a , 
dirigio un despacbo telegrafico al Seiior Embajador de Francia en Wasb- 
ington Mr. Cambon el l°de Agosto en el que, sobre este punto le decia 
literalmentelosiguiente: "El tercer punto en que sedetermiua la forma 
de disponer de las Islas Filipinas, parece falto de precision a este Gobi- 
erno. Ha suplido (este Gobierno se entiende) las deficiencias que en el 
se advierten, su])oniendo que no bay cnestion respecto de la soberania 
permanente de Espana en aquel Arcbipielago y que la ocupacion tem- 
poral de Manila, su puerto y su babia, por el Gobierno federal, sola- 
niente ba de durar el espacio uecesario para un acuerdo entre ambos 
paises, sobre reformas adininistrativas." Tenemos a disposicion de la 
Comision Americana este despacbo por si quisiera leerlo y estudiarlo 
por si in is ma. 

Mr. Cambon, recibido que bubo este documento, tuvo con el Sefior 
Presidente de la Republica Americana una conferencia, el dia 3, y que, 
respecto al particular de que la Comision Espanola se ocupa en este 
moinento, aparece referida en el despacbo de dicbo Sefior Embajador 
de 4 de Agosto, en los terminos siguientes: "Aprovecbe esta declara- 
tion para rogar al Presidente que tuviera la bondad de precisar sus 
inteuciones en lo que posible se rehere a Filipinas. En este punto, 
le dije, esta la contestation del Gobierno Federal redactada en terminos 
que pueden prestarse a todas las pretensiones de parte de los Estados 
Unidos, y por consiguiente, a todos los temores de Espafia, respecto de 
su soberania" El Presidente le contesto como luego se dira. Mas el 
Gobierno Espafiol, a pesar de las palabras de aquel Alto Magistrado 
insistio, en su despacbo de 7 de Agosto, en las dudas que le ofrecia el 
sentido de la clausula 3 a . Inutil insistencia. El Gobierno Americano, 
ni entonces, ni antes, ni despues, se presto a manifestar concretamente 
su pensamiento envuelto en las frases de controle, disposicion y go- 
bierno de Filipinas, de que se babia de ocupar la Conferencia de Paris. 
Abora es cuando por primera vez entra en esta explication. En el 
Memorandum 4 que esta contestaudo la Comision Espanola, es donde 
la consigna la Americana. Dice: "Ciertamente la palabra control (en 
ingles) no fue aqui aplicada en el sentido de register (investigacion 6 
inspeccion) sino en su sentido mas ampliodeautoridad 6 mando * * * 
$ que palabra podia ser mas amplia que disposicion, que practicamente 
tiene la misma significacion en francos y en ingles? * * * tenemos 
por tanto en estas dos palabras "la autoridad sobre", "dominiode", 
final y definitiva explicacion de la materia en cuestiou." ^ Que es 
gobierno sino el derecho de administracion 6 de ejercer soberania, la 
direccion, el manejo politico de un Estado? Cualquiera de estos 
terminos im plica la facultad 6 poder de intervenir con soberania. 
Juntos tienen el mas amplio alcance, para tratar de todos los poderes, 
gubernamental, territorial 6 administrativo." 

La explicacion, si no parece oportuna por lo tardia, tampoco parece 
satisfactoria. Desde luego se ocurre que si con el proposito de que tal 



TREATY OF PEACE. \r ) <\ 

cosa significasen aqnellas palabras, seempefidel Gobierno Americano en 
sostenerlas, aunque sin explicarlas, a pesar de las diversas veces en que 
asiselepidio j porque raz6n no tuvo entonces la franqueza que ostenta 
ahora su Coinision? £ porque en vezde decirque la confereneia de Paris 
liabia de determinar la intervenci6n, la disposition y gobierno de las 
Islas Filipinas, no dijo que dicha conferencia habia de resolver obre su 
soberania, acordando 6 no, su cesion a los Estados CTnidos, como ahora 
la reclaman sus Cornisionados fundandose en que en aqnellas (Vases 
esta tambien contenida esta cesion? ^No hubiera sido esto aias bi eve, 
mas explicito y de mayor franqueza? 

Pero^es adraisible la interpretation que ahora fuera de saz6n pre- 
tenden dar aquellos a las sobredichas frases? Dicen que la palabra 
control (contrdle en frances) no puede tomarse en el sentido de register 
(investigation 6 inspection )sino en el deautoridad 6 mando. V i porque* I 
Porque este es el sentido mas am pi io que tal palabra tiene en inglds. 
Mas prescinden de lijar su ateucion en que el Protocolo fue redactado 
tambien en frances, cuyo ejemplar firmo como oficial el Senor Seeretario 
deEstadode Washington. Y que dicha palabra, en frances,no 
semejante cosa sino investigation 6 inspection, que tarobidn significa en 
ingles y icomo ]>ueden dejar de reconocer los Comisarios Americanos 
quecuandounTratadoseharedactadooficialmenteen doso mas idiomas 
a sus palabras no se puede dar otro sentido que el que sea comun a todos 
ellos? 

Sostienen asimismo que la palabra disposieidn significa enajenci6n. 
No lo negamos por mas que cuando se emplea en este sentido, es para 
aplicarla a las relaciones juridicas de la vida civil y privada, pues en 
fiances la significacion mas comun y frecuente de tal palabra es la de 
" distribucion segiin un orden cierto y determinado." 

Afirman (pie la palabra gobierno significa el derecho de administrai 
6 de ejercer soberania, y aunque tal sentido puede admitirse, tampoco 
puede rechazarse el de la "manera de gobernar" 6 la "forma que tal 
gobierno ha de tener." iVias sea uno u otro el sentido en que aqnellas 
tres palabras fueron empleadas en la clausula 3 a , si do hubiera en las 
negociaciones datos suficientes para fijar eittre tan diversos sentidos 
aquel en que se emplearon, es imposible que se desconozca como se 
acaba de demonstrar, que por lo menos no tienen en si mismas y por si 
solas tales palabras un sentido claro preciso y que no pueda ofrecer 
motivoa ambigiiedades y dudas. Asi lo demostraron ya entonces los 
hechos. 

El Gobierno Espaiiol y su representante en Washington, precisaraente 
porque no tenian esa claridad, reclamaron aunque intitilmente explica- 
ciones, y ^quien se empeno con verdadera tenacidad en sostener tan 
oscuras frases? jS t o se negara que ha sido el Gobierno de Washington. 
Pues sirvause leer los Senores Cornisionados lo que sobre la interpreta- 
tion de frases semejantes, dice el inmortalYattel,una de las mas -ramies 
autoridades en cuanto se refiere a las relaciones internacionales de los 
pueblos, en su Derecho de Gentes, tomo 3°, pagina L97. "La duda debe 
resolverse contra aquel que ha dado la ley en el Tratado, porque es el, 
en alguna manera quien la ha dictado, y falta suya es si no se ha 
expresado mas claramente; y entendiendo 6 restrigiendo la signitica- 
cion de los terminos en el sentido que le es menos favorable, do Be e 
haceningun agravio 6 no se le bace mas que aquel a que ha qucndo 
exponerse. Mas con una interpretacion contraria se correna el nesgo 
de convertir terminos vagos 6 ambiguos en lazos para el mas debil con- 
tratante que ha sido obligado a recibir lo que el mas fuerte ha dictado. 



1G0 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Acaba de indicar la Comision Espanola que en las negociaciones hay 
datos suficientes para fijar el verdadero sentido de aquellas tres bien 
niemorables palabras Lo mismo por su parte aflrma la Comision 
Americana. Veamos cnal de los dos contradictories sentidos entienden 
ambas Comisiones que es el que debe preferirse. 

En el Memorandum Americano se asienta como base de todo el razo- 
namiento, segun ya se lia dicho, que en la clausula 3 a del Protocolo, se 
dejo a la libre resolucion de la Conferencia de Paris que habia de elabo- 
rar el Tratado de Paz el punto relativo a la soberauia del Archipielago 
Filipino. Pues bien, - & ba tenido la Comision Americana en cuenta 
cuando haeia tan graves afirmaciones, que el Seuor Secretario de Estado 
de Washington, en su despacho de 30 de Julio, en que comunico al 
Gobierno Espanol las tres coudiciones, que el de los Estados Unidos le 
imponia para la paz y en que la tercera, como queda dicho, estada 
redactada con las mismas palabras con que se lee en el Protocolo, 
establecia tambien el nombramiento de los Comisarios que habian de 
redactar el Tratado de paz y fijaba y cncunscribia sus facultades para 
este objeto? En dicho despacho se lee el parrafo siguiente: "si las 
coudiciones ofrecidus aqui son aceptadas en su integridad, los Estados 
Unidos nombraran Comisarios que se encontraran con los igualmeute 
autorizados por Espana con el objeto de arreglar los detalles del Tratado 
de Paz y de firmarlo en las coudiciones arriba indicadas." - u Entieude 
la Comision Americana que es un detalle en este Tratado de Paz la 
inesperada cesion que reclaman a Espana de un inmenso territorio que 
tieue mas de 300,000 kilometros cuadrados de superticie y que cuenta 
cou mas de 9,000,000 de habitantes? ^Entiende que es un detalle la 
adquisicion de un Archipielago que para nadie es un secreto que esta 
11 am ado a ser proximamente un factor importante para la paz del 
mundo? 

Pero acndamos a los precedentes, como hace la Comision Americana, 
en busca de ese sentido tan ambiguo. 

Ketiere aquella el principio de las negociaciones. Estamos conformes 
con su relato hasta que llega a la nan acion de la primera Conferencia de 
Mr Cambon con el Sefior Presidente de los Estados Unidos: se refiere 
en el ^Memorandum que, en tal conferencia el Presidente dijo respecto 
a Eilipinas que la nota, (la citada del oO de Julio) expresaba los propo- 
sitos de su Gobierno y la disposicion final de aquellas dependeria del 
Tratado que debia negociarse por los Comisionados. que despu^s de 
una posterior discusion en que el Presidente reitero que el Tratado habia 
de determinar el porvenir de las Islas Filipinas, se leyo el Articulo 3° en 
que se decia que los Comisionados resolverian sobre el controle, la 
posesion y el gobierno de aquellas Islas; que Mr Cambon propuso la 
substitucinn de la palabra posesion por la de condition, por entender que 
aquella podia ser tomada por el Gobierno Espanol como severa y ame- 
nazadova; el Presidente se nego al carnbio propuesto mas al tin acepto 
en lugar de la ]>alabra posesion la de disposicidn, que (retieren los Comi- 
sionados Americanos, no sabemos si como opinion del Presidente 6 
suya propia) no cambiaba el significado, y que siendo muy amplio, podia 
incluir el de la posesion. 

Veamos ahora como refiere Mr Cambon lo que paso en esta entre- 
vista. Decia en su despacho de 31 de Julio al Gobierno Espafiol: 

"<Las peticiones formuladas en el Articulo 3° (dijo al Presidente) son a 
proposito para conqirometer en Madrid el £xito de esta negociacion 
preliminar, sobre todo si se mantiene entre las palabras controle y gobi- 
erno de Eilipinas la palabra posesion, que parece poner desde ahora en 
duda la soberania de Espaiia sobre esta Coloniaj observara V. me dijo 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1C1 

entonces el Presidente de la Republica que mis peticiones, en lo tj 
refierealos dos priineros Articulos, no admiteu discusion; dejo 4 las 
negociaciones el cuidado de resolver la cuestion de Filipinas. Si las 
fuerzas americanas '(fijese toda la atencion en estaa liases - permanecen 
hasta hoy en sus posicioues, es para obedecer a an deber que me iinpo- 
nen respecto a los residentes y extrangeros loa progresos * • • 
(aqui unas palabras que no pudieron traducirse pero que bien se com- 
prende que debian referirse a la insurrection tagala). Viendo 'al 
Seiior Presidente de la Republica resuelto a do modificar los t^rminoa 
del articulo 3° bice un llamamiento tan apremiaute a su generosidad, 
que * * * rnando reeniplazar la palabra posesidn por la de disposi- 
tion que no prejuzga el resultado de las negociaciones y que no tieue 
el niismo sentido global.'" 

Entre una y otra relacion notaran seguramente los Coin isarios Ameri- 
canos bastantes diferencias. En la suya nada se lee respecto & la iiuica 
razon que manifesto el Presidente que tenia, para no retirar deade 
luego del Archipielago las fuerzas Americanas, lo cual acusa que enton- 
ces estaba muy lejos de pensar en que hubiera de pedirse la soberania 
de aquel para los Estados Unidos. Seguu la relacion Americana, la 
palabra disposition fue aceptada porque contenia el sentido de la pala- 
bra posesion; mas segun el despacho de Mr Cambon aquella palabra 
en hi gar de la de posesion cambiaba el sentido global de la clausula. 
Y tengau 6 no razon la Comision Americana 6 Mr Cambon, siem pre 
resulta que este acepto el cambio, porque entendio que asi quedaba 
descartada toda cuestion sobre la conservacion de la Soberania de 
Espana sobre Filipinas. 

El viernes, 3 de Agosto, volvio a celebrar el Sefior Presidente otra 
conferencia con Mr Cambon. Se dice en el Memorandum que, en el la, 
manifest*) este que Espana insistia sobre el asunto de que su soberan a 
no fuera intervenida; que el Presidente le contesto que la disposition 
de las Islas Filipinas, debia depender del tratado que habia de negoci- 
arse, y que no podia bacer ningun cambio en los termiuos anteriormente 
propuestos. 

Veamos abora como refiere esta conversacion Mr Cambon, en su 
despacho del 4 de Agosto al Ministro de Estado Espanol. " Mr. Mac 
Kinley, se mostro inflexible (sobre la cesiou de Puerto Rico) y me repitio" 
que la cuestion de Filipinas era la iinica que no estaba ya dehnitiva- 
mente resuelta en su pensamiento." Despues de referir su insistencia 
en las frases que ya quedan transcritas en este Memorandum .Mr 
Cambon continua: "Mr. Mc Kinley me contesto, no quiero dejar sub- 
sistir ningun equivoco sobre este particular; los negociadores de los 
dos paises seran los que resuelvan cuales seran (notese) las veutajas 
permanentes que pediremos en el Archipielago y, en tin, los que decidan 
la intervenci<3n (controle), disposicion y gobierno de las Islas Filipinas. 
T agrego, el Gobierno de Madrid puede tener la seguridad de que basta 
abora, no bay nada resuelto a priori en mi pensamiento contra Espana, 
asi como considero que no hay nada decidido contra los Estados 
Unidos." {Textual.) 

Comparese tambien una relacion con la otra. La del Memorandum 
americano se limita A referir que el Sefior Presidente habia dicho, que 
la disposition de las Islas Filipinas debia depender del Tratado y que 
ningun cambio podia bacer en los terminos. Pero oin ire la segunda y 
mas importaute parte de la conversacion que retiere Mr Cambon, a 
pesar deque contiene datosque no pueden dejar lugar ;i la menorduda, 
sobre la cuestidu pendiente. Se observa en primer lugar que asi en 

T P 11 



162 TREATY OF PEACE. 

esta contestaeion, como en la anterior, de la misma manera que en las 
notas del Gobierno Americano, se omite con el mayor cuidado la palabra 
soberania, al hablar de las Filipinas, entre tanto que, con un cuidado 
igual, se euiplea esta palabra por el Gobierno Espanol y por su repre- 
sentante en Washington, para decir sin cesar que aquella no quedaba 
sometida 4 discusion. Unase esta observacion 4 las ya heehas sobre 
la persistente y clara auuque iinplicita resistencia a explicar las tres 
palabras sobredichas. 

Mas a pesar de todo esto el Sehor Presidente dijo, y la Comision Ameri- 
cana en su Memorandum no lo niega, categoricameute, que la Confe- 
rencia de Paris seria la que babia de resolver cuales babian de ser las 
ventajas permaneutes que los Estados Unidos babian de pedir en el 
Arcbipielago, ademas de cual habia de ser el controle, la disposition y 
el gobierno de las I'slas. 

Se dice en el Memorandum que el Presidente no se limito a hablar de 
las ventajas permaneutes. Es verdad que la Comision Espanola no ha 
dicho, ni dice que se haya limitado a eso porque afiadio lo que se acaba 
de decir. &Pero que tiene esto que ver para desconocer el sentido que 
de las palabras del Presidente resultan? Si era su pensamiento, ya 
perfectamente form a do a la sazon, el pedir en la Conferencia no una sola 
ventaja sino ventajas permanentes en el Arcbipielago para los Estados 
Unidos es evidente que no pensaba pedir la soberania; $ puede esta 
calificarse de mera ventaja permanente de los Estados Unidos en 
aquellas Islas? Y aunque tan singular hipotesis quisiera sostenerse 
• b como habia de explicarse en este caso el nuuiero plural empleado por el 
Sehor Presidente de los Estados Unidos? A esta observacion ya hecha 
en el escrito anterior de la Comision Espanola no se contesta en el Mem- 
orandum Americano, y se comprende, porque no tiene contestaeion possi- 
ble que pueda ser harmonizada con el proposito que alii se pretende 
sostener. 

No hemos de oenparnos de las indicaciones que en el Memorandum se 
leen sobre el diverso idioma que entendian y hablaban los iuterlocutores 
en las dos Confeiencias sobredichas: no puede ciertameute tal circun- 
stancia dar verosimilitud al supuesto de que el Sehor Presidente no 
haya expresado, no ya una idea incidental, sino las importantes y capi- 
tales que Mr. Cambon afirma que le ha oido. 

Si este no lo hubiera entendido, a pesar de que tenia a su lado, segun 
se refiere en aquel Memorandum, a su Secretario que entiende y habia 
el ingles, no se puede suponer que le hubiera atribuido, de modo tan 
positivo, sin faltar deliberadamente 4 la verdad, lo que consigua en su 
despacho. 

Pasemos ahora a la nota del Gobierno Espanol del 7 de Agosto. La 
Comision Americana esta con forme con la espanola en reconocer que en 
esta Nota el Gobierno de Madrid al manifestar que aceptaba la clausula 
3 a salvo a priori su soberania sobre el Arcbipielago Filipino : por esto 
no consideramos necesario transcribir una vez mas textualmeute sns 
palabras: la unica diferencia entre ambas Comisiones consiste en que 
entretanto que la Espanola afirma y se rati flea en estaafirmacion, que en 
la Nota de su Gobierno se empleaba el adjetivo enter a 6 total, al hablar 
de la soberania que alii se reservaba para E span a, la Americana dice 
que en la traduccion al ingles de esta nota, que entrego al Gobierno de 
Washington Mr. Cambon, no existe tal adjetivo. Nosotros tenenios la 
copia, no la traduccion como se la llama en el Memorandum Americano, 
de la Nota original del Gobierno Espanol, la que ponemos 4 la disposi- 
cion de la Comision Americana. En ella, el adjetivo est4 escrito, si al 
hacerse en Washington su traduccion, al ingles, se omitio, cosa es que 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

sabrala Comision Americana, por haber visto lal traducci6n, pero que 

no puede nienos de ignorar la espauola, que nuuca tuvo de ella < »ei- 

miento. La diferencia no tiene importancia alguna, porque, aun pre- 
scindieudo de tal adjetivo, queda siempre como verdad ,v asi la reconoce 
la Comision Americana que el Gobierno Espafiol seresei vaba alii " , 
su soberauia sobre Filipinas y que solamente con esta rescn a aceptaba 
la base 3°. Y si despues el Gobierno Espafiol no cam bio de opinion y 
en efecto esto no se afirina ni seria posible que so afirmase en el Memo- 
randum Americano, siempre resultara" que el Protocolo y bu clausula 3 - 
no obligan, en buen derecho, al Gobierno Espafiol, sino con la exp 
reserva que bizo al aceptarla, y de que do desistio despues. 

Mas en el Memorandum Americano comprendiCndose sin duda, la 
incontrastable fuerza de la consecuencia quo resultaba de baberse 
firmado el Protocolo sin que el Gobierno de Washington, una vez 
enterado de aquella reserva, nada hubiera dicho en contra mi 
manifiesta que, asi el Presidente de la Union como su Secretario <lo 
Estado, al oir la lectura de aquella Nota, dijeron que era vaga <■ inde- 
finida, suponiendo que aceptaba los terminos de la de 1"- Estados 
Unidos, mientras requeria alguna modification, y que respecto a Fili- 
pinas, si en un parrafo se expresaba la aceptaci6n de la clausula en 
otro parecia reservarse el dereclio absoluto de soberania. 

La reflexion es habil, mas por desgracia suya, no parece tan exacta 
como b6bil. Es verdad que dicbos Senores, leida que les tuc la Nota, 
revelaron su desagrado. Lo que no parece exacto, a juzgar por Io que 
dijo entonces Mr. Cainbon, esque la causa detal desagrado fuese lo que, 
no vaga e indefinidamente, si no clara y terminantemente, en la No 
decia sobre la'reserva que Espana hacia de su soberania sobre el Archi- 
pielago. El mismo Memorandum Americano transcribe el parrafo corre- 
spondiente de la Nota leida y en el esta, no vaga e indeterminada, sino 
expresa, clara, y terminante esta reserva. 

La causa revelada en aquel acto, por el Senor Presidcnte, de so i 
grado, fue otra muy diversa, que refiere Mr. Oambon en el parrafo 
siguiente de su despacho de 10 de Agosto. llelo aqui: "Senor Duque: 
Tambien ba sido esta vez en la Casa Blanca, en presencia del Mr 
Mc Kinley y por expreso deseo suyo, donde be comunicado al S 
tario de Estado el telegrama (la nota sobredicha) de 7 de Agosto, en 
que V. E. declara que el Gobierno de Espana acepta las condiciones 
impuestas por los Estados Unidos. Esta lectura contrario visiblemente 
al Presidente de la Kepublica y al Secretario de Estado. DespuCs de 
un silencio prolongado me dijo el Mr. Mc Kinley: To ha 
a Espana la cesion y por consiguiente la evacuacidn inmediata (esta 
evacuation inmediata no bemos podido averiguar cuando habia sido 




aproi 

a entrar en estas consider a atones de orden interior. II ice observai 
al conformarse el Gobierno de S. M. con sus deberes constitucioi 
no bacia mas que imitar al Presidente, al cual leestan impuestas obliga- 
ciones analogas, y que en su contestation de 30 de JuHo, habia reservado 
expresamente la ratification del Senado Federal" (asi era la veraaU y 
consta en dicbo despacbo de 30 de Julio). 
No alego el Selior Presidente ni su Secretario de Estado otro motivo 




alguna m4s que lareserva del Gobierno Espafiol de la aprobaci6n de las 
Cortes. 



164 TREATY OF PEA.CE. 

Asi es que el Sefior Presidente concluyo por contestar al Sefior Cam- 
bon, quelepreguntaba sobrelas prendas de sinceridad que podriadarle 
Espafia, lo siguieute: "Habrfa un medio de poner termiuo a todo equi- 
voco: podriamos nosotros preparar un proyecto que reproduzca las 
condiciones propuestas a Espafia en los mismos terminos en que ya los 
he fornmlado, (hasta aqui esto era en efecto todo lo convenido) y que 
fijen los plazos en que se nombrardn por una parte los Plenipotenciarios 
encargados de negociar en Paris el Tratado de paz, y por otra parte Comi- 
siones especiales encargadas de determinar los detalles de la evacuacion de 
Cuba y de Puerto Rioo. v (Esto si que se babia pasado de consignarlo 
en la Nota del 30 de Julio, y esto por si solo bubiera sido causa bastante 
para explicar el cambio de fornializacion de las condiciones para la paz). 

Vease pues si bay una distancia inmensa entre lo que en el Memo- 
rand nm Americano se afirma, y lo que Mr. Oambon manifesto al 
Gobierno Espafiol en su Nota del 10 de Agosto, 6 sea immediatamente 
despues de baber asistido a tan importante conferencia y cuando por 
consiguiente tenia tan reciente en su memoria lo ocurrido en ella. 
Haciendo justicia a la perfecta veracidad de los Comisarios Americanos 
su relacion de aquella conferencia a los tres meses de celebrada, no 
puede ser preferida por los Comisarios espafioles 4 la del Honorable 
Mr. Cambon que bizo la suya inmediatamente depues de ocurrido el 
suceso que en ella tan detallamente narraba. 

En el Memorandum Americano se niega que el Sefior Secretario de 
Estado de Washington baya manifestado en su Nota de 10 de Agosto a 
Mr. Oambon, como la Coniision Espafiola babia afirmado, que la del 
Gobierno de Madrid, (la de 7 de Agosto) conteuia en su espiritu la 
aceptacion por Espafia de las condiciones propuestas por los Estados 
Unidos; y al efecto se inserta alii literalmente dicha Nota. 

Eectifica la Comision Espafiola su afirmacion anterior acomodandola 
a lo que en aquella se expresa. Pero cumple a su veracidad decir que 
al hacerla se refirio a la Nota de Mr. Cambon, de 11 de Agosto, que 
empieza con el siguieute parrafo: " Senor Duque: Al transmitirme el 
proyecto de Protocolo cuyo texto he telegratiado a V. E. el Secretario 
de Estado me ha dirigido una carta que puede resumirse como sigue: 
Aunque la nota entregada ayer en la Casa Blanca contiene en su 
espiritu la aceptacion por Espafia de las condiciones propuestas por los 
Estados Unidos, en su forma, no particulariza bastante esplicita- 
mente, lo que sin duda so debe a que ha tenido que ser traducida y 
cifrada varias veces." Estas palabras que bien pueden explicarse sin 
mengoa de la indiscutible veracidad del Honorable Mr. Cambon, indu- 
jeron y no podian menos de inducir a error a los Comisarios Espafioles. 
Cumplen noblemente el deber de declararlo asi. 

Mas despues de todo, la diferencia no es de importancia. El Sefior 
Secretario de Estado, y esto si que consta en su propia carta, no puso 
otro defecto a la Nota Espafiola del 7 de Agosto, que el no ser enteramente 
explicita, sin duda a causa de las diversas transforraaciones que babia 
sufrido. Pero es el caso, que ese defecto no es posible que lo hubiese 
atribuido el Sefior Secretario de Estado al parrafo de dicha nota per- 
fectameute traducida al ingles (salvo el adjetivo total) que en el Mem- 
orandum Americano se copia, y se dice que babia sido leido al Sefior 
Presidente de la Union y a su Secretario de Estado y en cuyo parrafo, 
clara, esplicita y terminautemente, el Gobierno Espafiol reserva a priori 
su soberania en Filipinas. Seria poco explicito todo lo demas que la nota 
contenia si se quiere decirlo asi, pero aquella reserva no lo fue segura- 
mente. Por lo tanto, la carta a que nos veninios refiriendo no contradice 
la afirmacion que sostenemos, de que la mencionada reserva, de que el 



TREATY OF PEACE. 165 

Gobierno de Washington oportunamente so habfa enterado y constaba 
tan clara en la traduction inglesa quo tenia en su poder, no file" poi 61 
contradicha, ni sirvio de inotivo paraemplear la nueva forma <lc Proto- 
colo como medio de solemnizar el convenio sobre las bases de la paz. 
Ese motivo bien resalta en los documentos ya examinados que contienen 
aquellas negociaciones. 

Despues de cuanto precede nos parece que, hayan sido cualesquiera 
las intimas intenciones del Gobierno de Washington, su conducta y sua 
palabras escritas y babladas no son bastantes para destruir la anima- 
tion que hacemos de que Espana acepto la tercera clausula del Pro- 
tocolo en el sentido comunicado a aquel Gobierno, y no contradicho por 
61, de que a priori quedaba a salvo su soberauia en Filipinas, puesto 
que su controle, su disposicion y gobierno, que habia de acordar la 
Conferencia de Paris, se referian unicamente a su regimen interior. 
Y esto por si soloseria bastante para sostener sin contradiction fundada 
que aquella Conferencia no puede ocuparse ui tiene atribuciones para 
ocuparse de la cesion que piden los Estados CTnidos, aunque por an 
supuesto que consideramos imposible, llegara a destruirse la prueba 
que, tomada de las mismas palabras del Seuor Presidente de la Union, 
hemos procurado bacer y creemos que hemos hecho, de que segun su 
propio pensamiento entonces aquella soberauia quedaba fuera de dis- 
cission ulterior. 

j Que ha de decir la Comision Espanola sobre las palabras (pie lee en 
el Memorandum Americano y que parecen buscar un fundamento a la 
actual petition de aquellos, en la indemnizacion de guerra, como si do 
estuviera fuera de discusiou y no hubiera sido reconocido por la misma 
Comision Americana que esta indemnizacion de los gastos de la guerra, 
y no solo de ella sino tambien la de los ciudadanos americanos, en su 
mayoria, si no todos origiuarios de Cuba aunque, al parecer, naturali- 
zados despues en los Estados Unidos, que habian sufrido perjuicios 
en la ultima insurrection, se habia convenido en cubrirla con la cesi6n 
de Puerto Rico, de las demas Autillas y de la lsla de Guam en las 
Marianas? 

O^ es que esa indemnizacion ha de ser una cuenta abierta en (pie 
quepa pedir todo lo demas que a Espana queda, incluso la propia Penin- 
sula? 

Por cierto que el haberla limitado a la lsla de Guam en el Oriente, 
es uu indicio mas que acredita que los Estados Unidos no pensabau a 
la sazon en las Islas Filipinas. Si pensarau - b se concibe que reclama- 
ran entonces, desde luego, una pequena e insignificante lsla y dejaran 
de reclamar el inmenso Imperio Filipino que estaba a ella tan proxiinol 

Reconozcase pues, que carece de fundamento la reclamacion 6 peti- 
tion del Archipielago Fipino que k se bace para los Estados Unidos en 
la forma y con las condiciones que se leen en la proposition Ameritana. 
Mientras esta cesion se pretenda en tal forma y con tales condiciones, 
la Comision Espanola no puede menos de recbazarla. 

MEMORANDUM EN APOYO DE LA ULTIMA PROPOSICl6N ESPANOLA. 

En esta proposition pidieron los Comisarios de Espana, segun se 
recordara, que los Americanos preseutasenotraaoomodandola a lo con- 
venido en los articulos 3 U y 6° del Protocolo, esto es, propomendo la 
forma de intervention disposicion y gobierno que habia de estaMe 
cerse por Espana en Filipinas, la devolution de la plaza, puerto y baiua 
de Manila, la libertad de su guaruicion, actualmente pnsiouera, la devo- 
lution de los foudos publicos, rentes e impuestos que hubiesen percibiao 



1G6 TREATY OF PEACE. 

hasta que se hiciera la entrega de la plaza, y el compromiso, 6 sea el 
reconocimiento por parte de los Estados Unidos, de la obligation de 
indemnizar a Espafia por la retention de las tropas que guarnecian la 
ciudad, cuando se rindio, el 14 de Agosto ultimo. 

La Coniision americana ha rechazado esta proposition porque enti- 
ende que uo exijen que la presente los citados Articulos 3 y 6 del 
Protocolo. 

Kespecto a la primera parte que se refiere a la intervention, disposi- 
tion y gobierno del Archipielago el tratar de demostrar aqui que no se ha 
cumplido el articulo 3° con la proposition americana en que, en lugar de 
ocuparse del regimen interior de aquellas Islas, se pidio su cesion 4 los 
Estados Unidos, seria repetir lo que en la parte anterior de este docu- 
mento deja espuesto la Comision Espanola. De sus razonamientos 
entiende que resulta, con la claridad del medio dia, que una cosa es la 
cesion de aquellas Islas, que es de todo punto agena a lo contenido en la 
convention de Washington y otra es el regimen interior de las mismas 
que, segun su referida clausula 3 a puede y debe ser materia del Tratado 
de Paz. 

Ealtarian, pues, los Comisarios Espafioles a sus propias convicciones, 
si no persistieran en demandar a la Comision Americana, la presenta- 
tion de una proposition sobre tal regimen, a no quedar infringida, no 
solo en su propio sentido, sino liasta en su propio texto, la clasula 3 a de 
aquel couvenio. 

En el primer parrafo de la proposition especial y relativa 4 la torn a de 
Manila, se pide la devolution inmediata 4 Espaiia de la ciudad y de su 
babia y pueito. Kectificando aqui una de las equivocationes de becho 
que abundan en el Memorandum Americano tenemos que hacer constar 
que, en la proposition Espafiola, no se pidio esta entrega inmediata ni 
de nada de lo que los siguieutes p4rrafos de la proposition tambien 
coutienen, para que se llevase a cabo desde ahora. La entrega inme- 
diata babia de suceder, como no podia menos de ser asi, 4 la celebration 
del Tratado de Paz. La prueba es bien concluyeute para que los Comi- 
sarios Espafioles debierau suponer que nunca tendrian que bacer esta 
rectification. Dice asi el primer p4rrafo de la proposition sobredicha: 
"Los Comisarios Espanoles por lo tanto, en cumplimiento de lo expresa- 
mente convenido en el Protocolo entienden que en el Tratado de Paz 
debe consignarse, 1° la entrega etc ... . * * *".... Si esta se babia 
de convenir en el Tratado de Paz ^como pudo suponerse que la Comi- 
sion Espanola pedia que se hiciese antes de conveuirse? 

Vamos 4 despejar el trabajo de este Memorandum baciendo dos recti- 
ficaciones de caracter personal antes de entrar 4discutir el punto de la 
rendition y capitulation de Manila y sus consecuencias. 

En el Memorandum Espanol al que el ultimo Americano sirve de con- 
testation, no hay frase que ofendani lastime la honorabilidad del Gen- 
eral Merritt y del Almirante Dewey. En el Memorandum Americano 
quiere darse 4 entender que, con mayor 6 menor habilidad, se insinua 
en el Espanol la idea de que los Jefes Militares de la Union, rindieron por 
la fuerza de las armas la plaza de Manila el 13 de Agosto, cuando ya 
sabian que se babia acordado la suspension de hostilidades. Es un 
error. La Comision Espaiiola no empleo, ni acostumbra 4 emplear, 
habilidades de ningun genero para disfrazar su pensamiento. Si hubiera 
creido que aquellos Generales habian faltado al armisticio despues de 
tener noticia de su celebration, lo hubiera claramente dicho. Al hacerlo 
asi, no hubieran faltado 4 los respetos que aquellos Jefes merecen,como 
4 nadie se le ocurrio creer en 1871 que se faltaba 4 los respetos debidos 
al General aleman de Manteuffel iinput4udole la falta que habia come- 



TREATY OF PEACE. L67 

tido cuando despues de celebrado un armisticfo parcial entre las tropaa 
francesas y alernanas, se aprovecho del error en que, Bobre la exb i 
de este Armisticio, habia incurrido el General Clinchaut, para envolver 
y obligar arefugiarseen SuizaalCuerpodc Bjercito de su mando. Nos- 
otros nada hemos dieho, ni tenemos que decir, contra la conducta pei 
sonal de aquellosdos Jefes, al contrario, podemos afirmarun hechoque 
redundaera pro delosbellos sentiinientos del Almirante. El L°de Mayo, 
quiz& bajo la embriagadora influencia de la victoria, envi6 desde el 
"OTympia" al Gobernador General de Manila, una coinunicaci6n que 
dice asi: " Deuo rendirse inmediatamente todos los buques, torpederos, 
y de guerra que existan con bandera espanola, Manila serd destruida." 
Esta comunicacion presumiinos que no tiguarara en el capitulo de la 
bistoria en que se registran los servicios prestados a la causa de la 
humanidad de que tanto se alardea en estos tiempos. Pero dos com- 
placeinos en reconocerque el autor de aquella orden draconiana, pur la 
espontaneidad de sus buenos sentiinientos, se abstuvo, aunque nubiera 
podido intentarlo, de llevarla a cabo. 

Esto no obsta para que el buen juicio que merecen personalmente 
aquellos bonorables Jefes, no pueda extenderse hasta el punto de tener 
que agradecerles que hubieseu deliberadamente dilatado la rendicion 
de la plaza hasta el 13 de Agosto, por su proposito de •• proteger (\ la 
Ciudad y a sus habitantes espafioles contra la terrible venganza de los 
insurrectos". No parece comprensible este proposito : los insurrectos 
no sitiaban aiin la plaza por el lado de tierra, en los primeros dias de 
Mayo, que solamente estaba bloqueada desde la bahia por la flota 
Americana. Empezaron despues y no can el mismo nuinero de fuerzas 
desde el principio, pues estas fueron poco a poco aumentandose hasta 
forraar las masas de insurrectos que se hallaban al frente de las trin- 
cheras de defensa por el lado de tierra el dia de la reudicion. De 
suerte que, si por la indicada razou los Jefe Americanos no se hah an 
apoderado hasta aquel tierapo de la plaza, mucho menos debieron 
hacerlo despues. Mas, aparte de esto, los hechos demuestran que tal 
peligro no existia, porque siempre hubieran podido evitarlo las fuerzas 
Americanas que, al rendirse Manila, habrian de desembarcar en ella y 
guarnecerla, como lo evitaron desde el 14 de Agosto & pesar de que, 
segun se ha dicbo, era mayor el numero de los insurrectos sublevados 
que dominaban en las afueras. 

Vease, pues, como sin incurrir en pecado de ingratitud, puede dear 
de recono cerse aquel supuesto servicio a los sobredichos Jefes sin que 
esto en nada obste al buen concepto a que les hace acreedores su com- 
portamiento personal. 

En cambio el Memorandum Americano al referir la inesperada rendi- 
cion y la salidade Manila del General que mandaba lastropasenpauolas, 
emplea una palabra de todo punto incompatible con el honor de an nnl- 
itar. Oualquiera que haya sido la conducta de aquel -1 efe, esta al amparo 
de las Leyes y Tribunales de su Patria,que examinaran sus actos par 
aprobarloso desaprobarlos segun fuese menester per., do esta ;i men 
de nadie mas y sobre todo de juicios de caracter oficial que quieran 
emitirse en el extrangero y por extrangeros. 

Dejamos asentado en la segunda parte de este Memorandum qi 
la tantas veces citada clausula 3* del Protocols se habia convenido la 
ocupacion por las fuerzas de los Estados Unidos de la ( mdad, puer 
bahia de Manila hasta la celebracion del Tratado de Paz meramei 
concepto de garantia. , ' „__ - in ol 

En tal sentidoqueda alii demostrado que acepto esta oc upa<i6n ^el 
Gobierno de Madrid sin expresa contradiccion por parte del LroUitmo 
de Washington. 



168 TREATY OF PEACE. 

En el Memorandum Americano parece que quiere deslizarse la idea 
de que tal ocupacion debia tener, asimismo, el caracter de indeniza- 
tion por los gastos de guerra, fundandose en que en la Nota de 30 de 
Julio en que el Senor Secretario de Estado comunico al Gobierno Espa- 
nol las tres condiciones bajo las cuales podia restablecerse la paz, des- 
pues de decir en la segunda que para aquella indeinnizacion Espafia 
liabia de ceder Puerto Eico, las otras Antillas y la Isla de Guam, se 
comenzaba la clausula 3 a con las frases : " Por la misma razon los Esta- 
dos Unidos tieneu titulos para ocupar la plaza de Manila ect." La 
observation no carece a primera vista de alguna fuerza, pero saben 
perfectamente los Comisionados Americanos que esta es aparente y que 
lo ocurrido prueba cumplidamente lo contrario. Despues de manifestar 
6 insistir el Gobierno espanol en su Nota del 7 de Ag6sto y su repre- 
sentante en las couferencias que celebro con el Sehor Presidente de la 
Eepiiblica en que la ocupacion de Manila no habia de tener otro carac- 
ter que el de una mera garantia, aparecen suprimidas en el Protocolo 
las frases sobredichas. De suerte que dejo de hacerse en el lelacion 
alguna entre la ocupacion futura de aquella plaza y el pago de la indem- 
nizacion de guerra, y aclem^s dejo de decirse que los Estados Unidos 
tenian ya el dereclio de oeuparla. Sin duda por esto la idea se insinua, 
pero no se desenvuelve, ni categoricamente se afirma, en el Memoran- 
dum Americano. 

Los Comisionados espanoles reconocen que tuvieron una agradable 
sorpresa al observar que, en este documeuto, ya no se alegaba, como 
habia alegado el Gobierno Americano al contestara la Nota del Espanol 
de 7 de Setiembre ultimo, la razon perentoria de que la suspension de 
hostilidades, segun la clausula 6 a del Protocolo no debia comenzar 4 
regir inmediatamente de concluido y firmado este documento sino des- 
pues de su notification a los Jefes de las fuerzas beligerantes, a pesar 
de que, punto de tanta importancia Labia sido expuesto, razonado y 
demostrado con todo detenimiento, en el documento espanol 4 que aquel 
sirve de contestation. Esta couducta abona su buen criterio y su ilus- 
tracion en la materia porque equivale a un implicito reconocimiento de 
la solidez de aquella afirmacion que, despues de todo, es elemental en la 
materia y que por nadie, como doctrina corriente, ha sido contradicha. 

En cambio aspiran, insistiendo en analogas indicaciones que se leen 
en la citada respuesta del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos a la nota 
del de Madrid de 7 de Setiembre ultimo, a desvirtuar, por tardia, la 
reclamation Espahola sobre la capitulation de Manila. No ban podido 
comprender los Comisionados Espanoles la fuerza del razonamiento 
sobre este punto. El Gobierno de Madrid formulo con toda solemnidad 
este reclamacion en la mencionada nota, es decir, 23 dias despues de la 
capitulacion de la plaza; ^que ley, ni que pnictica abonan que se 
tenga por prescrito el derecho 4 una reclamacion de esta especie cuando 
no se hace antes de transcurrir el dia vigesimo tercero 4 contar desde 
el hecho que la motiva? 

Se dice ademas, entrando en el terreno de las intenciones del Gobierno 
Espanol, que este suponia que aquel hecho de guerro habia sido perfecta- 
mente correcto cuando pocos dias despues pedia al Gobierno Americano 
permiso para transportar viveres a Filipinas y restablecer el servicio 
ordinario de sus vapores correos. Cuando esto acaecio, atin ignoraba 
el Gobierno Espanol lo ocurrido el dia 14 de aquel mes en Manila. Asi 
tambien deja entender la Coinision Americana, que es verdad. M?is 
aunque lo supiera, - h que permiso es ese que se supone pedido por el 
Gobierno Espanol 1 ? Lo sucedido es lo que no podia menos de ocurrir 
entre Gobiernos que, aunque enemigos, guard an siempre los deberes 
que la lealtad impone a todos. 



TREATY OF PEACE. L69 

El statu quo que resultaba de la suspension de hostilidades prohib a 
a cad a uno de los beligerantes, mejorar su situation en perjuii 
otro, mientras aquel estado subsist id a : el Gobierno Espanol, como 
cualquiera otro que no quiere faltar a los indicados deberes, tenia el de 
comunicar al Gobierno Americano, obraudo con el de acuerdo, el resta- 
blecimiento de los servicios que existian antes de la gnerra; asi obro •■! 
mismo Gobierno de Washington cuando en Hi de Agosto solicits del 
Gobierno de Madrid el consentimiento para restablecer el Bervicio tele- 
grafico entre Manila y Hong Kong. 

Reconozcase, pues, que la reclamation del Gobierno Espanol Fue' 
hecba en tiempo oportuno y aunque entonces no la bubiera becho, su 
Comision estaba autorizada para hacerla ahora, pues to que lo esta" para 
pedir todo aquello que conduzca al cumplimiento fiel y exacto del < ion- 
venio de Washington. 

Queda, pues, sentado por no haber sido contradicho en el Memoran- 
dura Araericano a que en este se contesta, que la suspension de hostili- 
dades convenida en la clausula 6 a del Protocolo, commenzo 6 regir y & 
producir sus legates efectos, inmediatamente despues que aqu< 1 se 
firmo en la tarde del 12 de Agosto de este aho. Y tengase present e 
que "si hayun precepto de las leyesde la gnerra masclaroy perentorio 
que otro alguno es el de que los pactos entre los enemigos, como son las 
treguas, ban de cumplirse fielraente y que su inobservancia debe califi- 
carse no solo como una contradiction del verdadero interns y del deber 
de las partes inmediatas sino de los de toda la humanidad." Estas 
frases no las reehazaran los Comisionados Americanos porqueson de su 
illustre compatriota el eminente Wharton en su Digesto del Derecho 
International de los Estados Unidos formado con textos de los Presi- 
dentes y Seeretarios de Estado, con las decisiones de los Tribunales 
Federates y cou los dietamenes de los Attoney Generates. 

& - h Se ha observado con esta escrupulosidad lo convenido en la clausula 
6 del Protocolo? El dia 13 de Agosto era canoneada la plazade Manila 
y el 14 se rendia. Los Jefes de las fuerzas Americanas, no tienen los 
Comisionados Espanoles razon alguna paraafirmar que supieran que las 
hostilidades estaban suspendidas; pero es lo cierto que aquella action 
de guerra se ejecuto despues de esta suspension. 

Y con este* motivo tiene la Comision Espanola que completar la 
pequena historia que se hace en el Memorandum americano sobre el 
restableciraieuto del cable de Manila, Se dice alii que en 16 de Agosto 
fue elGabinete de Washington quien, por medio de una Nota al Ernba- 
jador de Francia, solicito el consentimiento del Gobierno Espanol para 
restablecer la comunicacion telegrafica entre aquella plaza y Hon.: Kong. 
Y esto es verdad, pero tambien lo es lo que se pasa a referir. El Almi- 
rante Araericano habia cortado en Manila dicho cable al pnncipio de la 
campana. Despues de varios inutiles intentos de la Direcci6n general 
Espanola de Correos y Telegrafos cerca de la Compania concesionaria 
para el restableciraieuto desu servicio, insistio aquella Direccioo en tfde 
Julio ultimo cercade la indicada Compania sobre tal restablecimiento con- 
formandosepor parte de Espanacon la absoluta neutralidad del sen icio. 
La Compania puso esta proposition en noticia del Embajador de 
Estados Unidos en Londres para obtener tambien su consentimiento. 
Mas este, en 16 del mismo mes, le contesto que su Gobierno prelena 
que continuase cortado. De esto resulta que si no babia comumca- 
clones directas con Manila por la via de Hong Kong el l-de ^goMO, 
en que se firrao el Protocolo, era debido al Gobierno de Wa shington 
que hacia un raes que se habia opuesto a su res tablecimiento. ****[ " 
mas, si fuera precisa (que no lo es) para .pie la ignorancia de la suspen 



170 TREATY OF PEACE. 

sion de hostilidades en que estaben los Generates Americanos al ata<5ar 
la plaza el 13 de Agosto, no solo no pueda servir de motivo j>ara que los 
Estados Unidos se aprovechen del acto de guerra entonces ejecutado 
contra lo que su Gobierno liabfa convenido el dia anterior, sfno para 
que tengan que respouder de los indebidos perjuicios que aquel acto 
causo a la otra parte beligerante. 

Todos los razonamientos extendidos en el Memorandum Americano 
sobre el caracter legal que alii se pretende dar a la rendition y capitu- 
lation de Manila y a los actos que desde entonces ejecutaron en la plaza 
y aim fuera de ella, los Jefes de las fuerzas Militares de la Union, 
pueden concentrarse en las siguintes aflrmaciones : 

Primera. — El caracter legal de la mencionada capitulation es el mismo 
que corresponderia a la entrega pacifica de la plaza en virtud de lo con- 
veuido en la clausula 3 a del Protocolo y por esto los derechos que la 
parte beligerante tiene en la plaza que ocupa como garantia son los 
mismos que tendria si la ocupara por haberla rendido en action de 
guerra, y 

Segunda. — La ocupacion de Manila, su bahia y puerto convenida en 
la clausula 3 a del Protocolo fue una ocupacion militar. 

La Oomision Espanola no hubiera creido nunca que tuviera que recti- 
ficar errores tan graves si no los leyera estatnpados en el Memorandum 
Americauo. 

Es elemental en la materia que la ocupacion de una plaza 6 de un 
territorio convenida entre las partes beligerantes para que sirva de 
garantia a lo estipulado en un Tratado 6 al cumplimiento de una obli- 
gation que pese sobre aquella a quien corresponda la soberania de la 
plaza 6 territorio ocupado, no tiene, ni puede tener, otro titulo mas que 
el del Convenio mismo en que se balla estipulado. Pero el de la ocu- 
pacion a viva i'uerza de una plaza 6 territorio que se rinde por un acto 
de guerra, tiene un nombre especial y es el de capitulacion. 

Y el denominar asi lo convenido en el Protocolo para poner por tal 
medio a su amparo la capitulacion ilegal de Manila despues de haberse 
firmado aquel documento, es un error en que hasta ahora nadie ha, 
oficial ni eientiticamente, incurrido y que no consiente el siguificado, no 
ya tecnico sino vulgar de la palabr a capitulacion. La ocupacion paci- 
fica de garantia no da inas derecho 4 la parte ocupante que el de esta- 
blecer la guaniicion 6 conservar las fuerzas militares que considere 
necesarias en la plaza 6 territorio, para tenerlos en su poder entretanto 
que no se cumple la obligation principal a que la ocupacion sirve de 
garantia. El aprovisionamiento de las tropas de ocupacion, es natural 
que sea a cargo del Soberano del territorio ocupado. Mas aunque este 
Aprovisionamiento es una condition natural no es esencial del convenio. 
Por esto, en los casus mas notables (pie se han presentado de ocupa- 
ciones de esta especie, tuvobuen cuidado la parte ocupante de estipular, 
de un modo expreso, la obligation de este aprovisionamiento. Bien 
conocidos son los casos de ocupacion, en concepto de garantia, que hubo 
en 1815 y 1871 de varios depart amentos dela Francia, a la termination 
el primero de las guerras del Imperio, y el segundo de la franco- 
pruaiana. En ellos se estipulo, expresamente, que el sostenimiento de 
las tropas de ocupacion babia de correr & cargo del Gobierno France's. 
Esto no se hizo en la clausula 3 a del Protocolo de Washington. 

Todos los demas derechosde la soberania, seiialadamente la percepcion 
de las rentas e impuestos publicos, contiuiian en la paciiica posesion 
del Soberano del territorio ocupado. La parte ocupante tiene que 
respetar religiosamente tales derechos. La legitimidad de sus actos no 



TREATY OF PEACE. 17 I 

se extiende mas alia de lo que sea necesario para el oumplimiento del 
fin de la ocupacion. 

De estos elementales principios, que para el caso presente m> ni i 
tan mayor desenvolvimiento, resulta que los Estados (Jnido8,en virtud 
de lo couveuido en la clausula 3 a del Portocolo, u<> teniau mda dereeho 
que el de conservar en su poder, liasta la Celebration del Tratado de 
Paz, la Oiudad, puerto y bahia de Manila, conm garantia de loeonvenido 
en dicho Protocolo y por lo tanto, nada mas que el dereeho de 
guarnecer diclia plaza, bahia y puerto con las fuerzas u< ■•■■ de ru 

Ejercito y Marina, pero respetandoelejerciciode la Soberauia de Espana 
en ellas en todo lo demas (pie sea compatible con este dereeho de 
guarnicion (que asi propiamente es denominada la ocupacion < 1 *^ 
garantia). 

Pero lade una plaza 6 territorio ]>or un acto <lc guerra, da mas amplios 
derechos al beligerante que de la una 6 del otro se ha apoderado por la 
fuerza. No adquiere, es verdad, por la conquista, el dereeho de sobera- 
uia en el pais conquistado, pero si adquiere la posesi6n y ejercicio 
provisional de esta soberauia. Mientras la ocupacion subsiste, las 
atribuciones del Soberano en el orden politico, en el Bnanciero y ami 
en el Administrativo, pueden ser ejercidas por cl ocupante, aunque 
siempre con la moderation que requiere el respeto debido a" los derechos 
de los habitantes pacificos, porque hoy la guerra no se hace entre los 
pueblos, sino entre las fuerzas armadas de los Estados beligerantes. 

Basta con lo dicho para que resalte la diferencia capital que a uadie 
permite confundir la ocupacion pacifica de garantia con la ocupaci id 
belica de la conquista. ^Enque' concepto persistenlos Estados Unidos 
desde el 14 de Agosto en ocupar la Ciudad, puerto y bahia de Manila .' 
En concepto de ocupacion belica; por haberse apoderado de la plaza a 
viva fuerza despues de firmado el Protocolo. ; En que concepto ticneit 
exelusivamente dereeho los Estados Unidos para ocupar aquella plaza 
y su bahia y puerto? En el de ocupacion pacifica de garantia, y oada 
mas que en este, por lo couveuido en la clausula 3 a de aquel Uonveuio. 
t Coino, pues, cabe afirmar que es indiferente para el caso el caracter de 
tal ocupacion? Es inutil insistir mas sobre un punto de los mas ele- 
mentales que hay en la materia del Dereeho International de la guerra. 

El segundo error que se ostenta en el Memorandum Americano, con- 
siste en suponer que fue" una ocupacion militar la convenida en el Pro- 
tocolo. Para aquellos que entiendan esta denomination en el sentido 
de ocupacion con fuerzas militares, sin duda alguna serii la i 
denomination la que aplicaran a estos dos tan diversos casos de 
ocupacion. Mas por quienes, empleaudo el tecnicismo consagrado por 
lacieucia y por los Tratados, reserven la denominacion de ocupacion 
militar a la ocupacion btiica 6 sea a la (pie se hace por la fuerza, no 
podra caliticarse de ocupacion militar, la convenida en el Protocolo. 

Es, pues, inutil querer poner al ainparo de una denominacion com 
actos esencialmente diversos y cuyas consecuentias legitimas jamas se 
han confundido. La ocupacion de la plaza, bahia y puerto de Mam 
4 quetienen dereeho los Estados Unidos por lo couveuido en VV asm 
ton, no es una ocupacion militar 6 belica que le haya contern o 
mamente los derechos y facultades que esta lleva en si misma. 

Los Jefes de las fuerzas Americanas en Filipinas, es indudable i 
participaron del error que en el Memorandum se comete. becompn 
que una vezapoderadosde la plaza y mientras no tuvieronnopciadeia 

suspension de hostilidades, hubiesen comenzado a ejercer todas I, 
ultades y derechos de un ocupante militar o belico. Mas en eKMemo- 
randum Americano se recouoce que el 16 de Agosto lue.on aquellos 



172 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Jefes etterados de la suspension convenida de hostilidades. Esto no 
obstante, continuaron ejerciendo aquellas facultades que no tenian y 
que debian saber que no tenian. En aquella fecha aim funcionaban los 
organismos de la administration Espanola. Desde el 16 de Agosto fne' 
cuando las fuerzas Americanas comenzaron a apoderarse " manu mili- 
tari " de tales organismos y de los fondos, rentas e impuestos publicos 
asi como continuaron reteniendo prisioneras las tropas espaiiolas que se 
liabian rendido el dia 14. 

Consideraruos inutil insistir m«1s en la refutation de errores de tal 
gravedad e importancia, cuya imica explication solamente puede hal- 
larse en la triste y dura necesidad de tener que emplearlos coinounicos 
niedios de defensa de un punto cuarteado por todos lados. 

Y como no liemos podido dar en el Memorandum Americano con 
razones de mayor solidez que las indicadas entre las que se alegaron 
contra la proposition espanola, se considera esta Cornision en el deber 
de sostenerla y de no poder couformarse por lo tanto, con la conclusion 
que pone termino al sobredicho Memorandum Con lo dicbo podria la 
Comision Espanola dar por terminado este trabajo, si no fuera por el 
vivo deseo que la anima de buscar, por su parte, medios que removi- 
endo los obstaculos que hoy existen para llevar a cabo la obra de paz 
encomendada a estas Conferencias, puedan facilitar a ambas Comisiones 
el desempefio de una mision, que no puede menos de estar en perfecta 
armonia con los sentimientos de humanidad y patriotismo que por igual 
ciertamente las anima. 

Aceptese la interpretation que la Comision Americana da a las clau- 
sulas 3 a y 6 a del Protocolo 6 aceptese la que sostiene la Espanola, es, por 
desgracia, evidente que surge una situation que tan solo la buena fe" de 
ambas partes puede resolver. Ya porque la Conferencia de Paris no 
tenga atribuciones para ocuparse de la cuestion sobre la soberania del 
Archipielago Filipino, aunque solo por el modo y forma con que es pro- 
puesta por la Comision Americana, ya porque, aunque tales atribuciones 
tenga tiene tambien la natural y legitima libertad de ejercerlas en el 
sentido que la conciencia inspire a sus iudividuos, es lo cierto que, 
por hallarse dividida por igual la opinion de estos, sobre el asunto, se 
hace imposible la solution del mismo. La Comision Americana segu- 
ramente no sostendrd que en el caso de conflicto 6 empate de su voto 
con el de la Espaiiola deba prevalecer el suyo para que tenga el caracter 
de acuerdo de la conferencia en pleno. 

Y como los Estados Unidos no llevan sus pretensiones mas alia que a 
que se les reconozca el derecho, que, segiin ellos, tienen por el Protocolo 
para pedir la soberania del Archipielago, pero no llegan hasta el extremo 
de decir que les asiste tambien el derecho de exigir a la Conferencia que 
acceda a su peticion, imponiendosela como si fuera un mandato, aparece 
manifiesta la imposibilidad de que pueda ser atendida la peticion del 
Gobierno Americano, yen su consecuencia la de que este pueda adquirir 
la soberania del Archipielago por el unico titulo legitimo que aiirma y 
reconoce que puede trasmitirsela. 

jCuales son las consecuencias de una situacion tan apremiante 6 
inflexible? $,La ruptura delas negociaciones? ^La consiguiente reaper- 
tura de la guerra ? 

I Habra quien no se detenga ante consecuencias tan terribles ? ^ Habra 
quien entienda que no es preferible antes que someterse a ellas acudir 
a cualquier otro medio que la buena fe" no puede menos de inspirar 4 las 
partes coutratantes? 

Y &cual es este medio 1 ? 

Pudieran muy bien ambas Comisiones acordar que la cuestion rela- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

tiva a la soberania de las Islas Pilipinas quedase separada de 
ciaciones yrestrvada a las que directamente se entablaran entre ai 
Gabinetes, pudiendo entretanto continuar deliberandi aquellaa Bobre 
todo lo demas que ha de coutenerse en el Tratado de paz. 

Este medio, k primera vista tan sencillo, encierra qo obstante pp 
peligros y seiialadamente los mismos que pubieran existir abora 
negociaciones se rompieran, con la sola ventaja de dilata por po o 
tieinpo su advenimiento. Si las dos Alias Partes do llegasen ■> an 
acuerdo, la situation seria igual a la en que hoy so halla la conferencia 
de Paris. 

Para la Comision Espanola hayotro medio mas sencillo y mas seguro, 
y consiste en que ambas Oomisiones acuerden propouer a* bus < robiernoa 
que un Arbitro 6 un Tribunal arbitral constituido en la forma <mi que 
aquellos convengan, fije el recto sentido en que deben ser entendidos 
los Articulos 3° y 6° del Protocolo de Washington. 

La diferenciade opinion entre ambas Gomisiones, descansa principal- 
meute en el diverso sentido que cada una da a aquellos Articulos. 

Asi resulta de sus respectivos Memorandums. 

Pues bien, si en los coutlictos de las naciones hay 6 puede haber algo 
que en vez de ser resuelto por la fuerza de las armas, deban los hombres 
de buena volnntad tratar de resolverlo por la fuerza de la justicia, 6 
siquiera por los dictados de la equidad es precisamente aquello que 
consiste en la diversa interpretation que haya surgido al tratar de ap- 
licarse un Articulo decualquier Tratado en que anteriormente hubieran 
convenido. 

Podran los Soberanos, por un sentimiento de natural fiereza resi- 
stirseasometeraljuiciodeun tereero todo aquello queafecta a su honor, 
6 siquiera a su amor propio. Podran noquerer encomendar & an juicio 
semejante la existencia 6 aim la integridad de sus Estados. Pero no 
se concibe que a lafaz del muudo moderno y cristiano prefieran cubrir 
latierrade cadaveres 6 inundarla de sangre humana, a someter su pro- 
pia opinion en asuntos tan expuestos a la falibilidad de la inteligencia 
de los hombres, como no puede menos de serlo el sentido que quiera 
darse a un mero Articulo de cualquier convencion que sobre materia 
libre y agena a las sagradas causas sobredichas haya podido ser cele- 

Los Estados Unidos, son entre todos los pueblos del mundo civil i 
los que, para gloria suya, ban tornado la iniciativa y han manifestado 
mas decidido em p en o en que se acuda a este medio tan humano, tan 
racional y tan cristiano, antes que al cruento de la guerra, para resolver 
los conflictos entre las Naciones. 

Yaen 1835 el Senado de Massachusetts aprobaba una proposicion, 
presentada por la Asociacion Americana de la Paz, preconizando la 
creacion de un Tribunal Internacional para resolver amistosa y deflni- 
tivamente las dificultades entre los pueblos. 

En 1851 el Comite deNegocios Extrangeros de Washington, por unani- 
midad declaraba que era de desear que los Estados Unidos insertas 
en sus Tratados una clausula para que diferencias que no pui 
resolverse por la via diplomacia fueran sometidas, antes de eomenzar 
las hostilidades, a la resolucion de Arbitros. 

En 1853 « ' ' 
En 1873, 

signar esta humanitaria aspi~~ 
fijar su propria linea de conducta en tan laudable sentido, amDi 
Camaras acordaban por resolucion conjunta rogar al Presidente, qi 
emplease de tiempo en tiempo su influencia para comprometer a waoa 




174 TREATY OF PEACE. 

los Gobiernos que con los Estados Unidos sostuvieran relaciones diplo- 
niaticas, a soineter las cuestiones que entre los unos y los otros pudie- 
ran surgir eu el porvenir a la resolution de Arbitros. 

El caso que se presenta en las conferencias de Paris, espera la Co- 
mision Espafiola que no ha de dar motivo a que los Estados Unidos, apar- 
tandose de tan gloriosos precedentes, quieran resolverlo por el ultimo 
medio que entre seres racionales y libres es tristemente inevitable, 
siquiera nunca sea licito, en defecto de otros mas hunianos, para con- 
servar inalterable la paz entre los hombres. 

Esta conforme 

Emilio de Ojeda 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 14. 

The last paper presented by the American Commission serves a double 
purpose. On the one hand it is a memorandum in support of its propo- 
sition of the 31st of October ultimo, asking for the cession of the Phil- 
ippine Islands to the United States. On the other hand it is a statement 
of the reasons why the American Commission refuses to accept the 
Spanish proposition of the 4th instant, by which it was invited to sub- 
mit a draft having for its object the fulfilment of the agreements made 
and entered into in Articles III and VI of the Washington Protocol. 

As regards the first point of the American memorandum, to which 
the Spanish Commission will first give its attention, a reply to its con- 
tents will be presently given. As regards the other point, the Spanish 
Commission will insist on setting forth in the form of a memorandum, 
as provided by the rules, the grounds upon which its rejected proposition 
is based. 

REPLY TO THE AMERICAN MEMORANDUM. 

For the sake of systematic exposition, and moved by the desire to 
reduce as much as possible the dimensions of the present paper, the 
Spanish Commissioners feel themselves inclined to deal in the first 
place with the mortgage debts of the Spanish colonies, — which in spite 
of its capital importance they would have refrained from discussing 
again at the present stage of the negotiation of the treaty, if, as it 
appears, the American Commission had not raised it anew in the last 
paragraph of its proposition asking for the cession of the Philippine 
Archipelago. 

The Spanish Commission acknowledges the difficulty under which it 
finds itself to answer this part of the American memorandum, — said 
difficulty arising out of the grave errors of fact with which said memo- 
randum is strewed, and of the strange doctrines of law which are 
maintained in it. 

The Spanish Commission needs before all to put on record that in its 
opinion, no language, or even a phrase, improper to a diplomatic dis- 
cussion, has been used by it. Jealous of the considerations to which it 
is entitled, it begins by paying religiously those which are due to 
others, and in its documents it avoids with the greatest care the use of 
any phrase which might be personally unpleasant to whom it might be 
addressed, and much more, and with still stronger reasons, any word 
which might be deemed offensive to those who are and have the right 



TREATY OF PEACE. ] 75 

to be under the protection of the poisons with whom the Spanish Com 
missioners may have to discuss. 

The American Commissioners say that they noticed with surprise that 
the Spanish Commissioners, after having accepted provisionally tin- 
articles which the former had proposed in regard to Cuba and Porto 
Rico, come now and raise again the question of the Cuban debt, reviving 
a point which under certain reservations had been expressly abandoned. 
And not contenting themselves with such rotund affirmations, they 
further said that the Spanish Commission in its written answer pre 
seuted at the meeting of the 20th of October, had withdrawn its for- 
mer observations to the articles of the American Commission. 

So far as the said supposed withdrawal is concerned, we invite our 
worthy American colleagues to search with care all the phrases of our 
written answer, and show to us where it can be found. In the mean- 
time, now as always, we are bound to state most positively that our 
document does not contain any such phrases, and that it shows, on the 
contrary, that we had nothing to withdraw, since we con tinned to main- 
tain our views, subject, however, to what might prove in the future to 
be best for Spain. And, indeed, as a proof of what we havejusl stated, 
and as sufficient answer to the phrases of the American Commission, 
we shall content ourselves with transcribing here the phrases, wherein 
the supposed provisional acceptance and the express withdrawal of the 
subject of the Cuban debt, are said to be found. "The Spanish < !om- 
missioners answer the said question (the question which the American 
Commission had propounded to them in writing at the meeting of the 
24th of October) by stating that, reiterating their conviction that pur- 
suant to law the colonial obligations of Cuba and Porto Pico must 
follow these islands and their sovereignty, they do not refuse to considi r 
any articles as to Cuba and Porto Rico which contain no provision for the 
assumption of indebtedness by the United States or Cuba or both" f these 
were exactly the same words of the question which we answered) 
"subordinating the final approval of such articles to that of the others 
which are to form the complete treaty," etc. And one of the reasons, 
set forth in writing, which induced us to the aforesaid answer, was as 
follows : 

"Considering that this treaty is not to be framed, as no other treaty 
has or ever can be framed, upon the exclusive basis of strict justice, as 
understood by each party, but also upon the basis of the advantage to 
be derived by either or by both, thus modifying in harmony therewith 
the demands of strict law; and that therefore the Spanish Commis- 
sioners although understanding that strict law decides the question of 
the Cuban debt in their favor are in duty bound and are willing to mod- 
erate the said strictness in view of the advantages which Spain may 
derive from other stipulations of the treaty, which without being preju- 
dicial to the United States may be favorable to Spam." 

It seems to be very plain that the supposed abandonment, now spoken 
of in the American memorandum, and the supposed acceptance oi 
articles relating to Cuba and Porto Eico, were limited to the contingency 
that the Spanish Commission should understand, from the discus 
and approval of all the other articles, that advantages enough 
derived by Spain sufficient to compensate a greater or lesser e 
of her rights regarding said debts, since if such advantages were not 
derived the Spanish Commission had no necessity to sacrifice anytli 
for which reason, it is clear that it could insist upon the recognition ot 
its right. 



176 TREATY OF PEACE. 

This being the case, what have been the advantages offered to Spain, 
up to this moment, in the course of the conferences'? 

Since the date of that answer the negotiations for the treaty have 
advanced only one step, and this has consisted in asking Spain, with- 
out alleging any reason in support of this request when made, the 
cession to the United States of the Philippine Archipelago. Does the 
American Commission understand that this cession is an advantage 
for Spain? The Spanish Commissioners would not be surprised by 
hearing this question answered affirmatively, as certain phrases of the 
memorandum seem calculated to anticipate. But they do not need to 
say that they do not share that opinion. 

The Spanish Commission would have been, therefore, justified in 
insisting, not indirectly, but directly and principally, upon its claims as 
to the transmission of the colonial obligations and debts, it has not 
done this nor does it intend to do so at present; but this has not pre- 
vented nor does it prevent it now from not allowing to pass, without 
contradiction, supposed statements and affirmations, if only that a day 
may not come when it can be charged with having consented to them, 
because of failure to contradict them, and expressly refusing its assent 
thereto. 

The American Commission affirms that Spain contracted (it does not 
say that it used the debt previously contracted) the greatest part of the 
Cuban debt u in an effort, first to conquer the Cuban insurgents, and then 
to oppose the United States", and then discoursing upon the same theme, 
it says, "that it has not been denied that a part of these loans was 
directly used to wage war against the United States.'* To make such 
statements it is indispensable to suppose that the dates of the creation 
of those debts are not known. One debt was contracted under the 
authority of the Decree of May 10, 1886, that is to say, eight years after 
the re-establishment of the peace in Cuba, and nine years before the 
fresh disturbances of the same in that island through suggestions and 
by means which now are known to the world. The second issue was 
authorized by Royal Decree of September 27, 1800, that is to say, twelve 
years after Cuba had found herself in a condition of perfect peace, and 
at the pinnacle of her prosperity, and five years before the work of her 
desolation began, through the new rebellion which more or less spon- 
taneously broke out there. And the two Decrees explain also what 
were the reasons why the said issues were authorized, and what were 
the expenses to be met by them, the payment of deficiencies in previous 
and subsequent appropriation bills in the island being prominent among 
them. It is well known that these deficiencies were due to the great 
reduction of taxes made in Cuba by the mother country. 

Will it ever be said that Spain, through some supernatural gift of 
divination, foresaw in 1880 and 1800, that in 1895 an insurrection was 
again to break out in Cuba, and that in 1898 the United States were to 
lend it their armed protection ? Under no other hypothesis the correct- 
ness of the phrases of the American memorandum relating to this point 
could ever be admitted. 

And so far as the expenses incurred by Spain owing to the war with 
the United States are concerned, without doubt the American Commis- 
sion is unaware of the fact that on the 20th of April of the present year, 
when the hostilities began, the Spanish Government was still engaged 
in operations of credit, in the shape of bonds, with the direct guarantee 
of the custom houses of the Peninsula, to the amount of 1,000 millions 
of pesetas, as decided in 1800 and 1807, — and in other operations to the 
amount of 223 millions of pesetas, as authorized on the 2nd of April, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 177 

1898, with the special guarantee of the stamp and tobacco revenues in 
the Peninsula, as well as the revenue called de consumo in Spain,— and 
that, in order to meet the expenses of the war with the United Stales, 
a Royal Decree had t>een issued on the 31st of May in the present year, 
authorizing the creation of a 4 per cent, perpetual domestic debt, to the 
amountof 1,000 millions of pesetas, out of which 806,785,000 were imme- 
diately negotiated. Upon acquaintance with these facts, it is to be sup- 
posed that the American Commission will not be willing to insist upon 
the statement so groundlessly made in its memorandum, as it will then 
understand that the expenses of the war with the United States have 
nothing to do with the Cuban colonial mortgage debt. 

The American Commission advocates once more in its memorandum 
the strange theory that the Spauish colonies are not bound to pay the 
debt contracted by the mother country to put down the rebellions 
whether of few, or of many, of their inhabitants. But this time, it 
reaches the extreme of puttiug such a singular doctrine under the shelter 
of common sense, by affirming that a doctrine to the contrary would be 
a threat to liberty and civilization. 

Ah! if the colonists, and the citizens of the Great Republic would 
have alleged, in justification of a rebellion, — or should allege in the 
future, in an identical case, an emergency from which that powerful 
nation is certainly not exempted, — a theory of that kind, — would the 
American Government have ever accepted it? Will it ever accept it 
in the future? — What is condemned not by common, but by moral sense, 
is the attempt to put all rebellion against legitimate authority under 
the shelter of liberty and civilization. Was Spain, or was she not, the 
legitimate sovereign of Cuba when the first insurrection broke out, and 
during the whole term of the second? Has anyone ever dared to deny, 
or to doubt even, the sovereignty of Spain over that island at the time 
to which we are now referring? Were not the United States them- 
selves, and their Government, those who day after day urged Spain to 
put down the rebellion, without excluding the use of arms, and reestab- 
lish as promptly as possible the peace in her colony? And if Spain 
complied with such demands, who, the United States included, can deny 
the legitimate character of the expenses which, by virtue of that com- 
pliance, she necessarily incurred? 

A doctrine of this nature, which the Spanish Commission, through 
considerations of respect, observed thus far by it, and which it has the 
duty to observe, does not deservedly characterize as it certainly would 
be by all the constituted Powers of the earth, cannot be advocated in 
the face of men, except from the standpoint that the authority of Spain 
was illegitimate, and that her sovereignty was only an arbitrary act of 
despotism. And is the crown of Spain characterized in this manner, 
concretely and specifically, for her domination in Cuba prior to the 
Signing of the Washington Protocol? Can this be done above all by 
the very same nation which urged Spain to exercise her sovereign 
authority to conquer those who had risen in arms against her in the 
island? 

Let us pass to another subject, as the present is too delicate to De 
treated with calm and serenity in a diplomatic discussion wherein any 
attempt is made to controvert it. 

In the memorandum which we are now answering, the singular attir- 

mation is made that the mortgage created by the two issues above 

named can be called more properly a subsidiary guarantee, and that 

the party principally bound to pay is the Spanish nation. Undoubtedly 

T P 12 



178 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the American Commission in making this affirmation had not before its 
eyes Article II of the Koyal Decree of iMay 10, 1886, authorizing the 
issue of 1,240,000 hypothecary bonds of the Island of Cuba, or the 2nd 
paragraph of Article II of the Koyal Decree of September 27, 18 ( J0, 
authorizing the issue of 1,750,000 hypothecary bonds of the same island. 
Both texts read literally the same thing, and it will be sufficient for us 
to transcribe one of them. Their language is as follows: — "The new 
bonds shall have the direct (especial) guarantee of the customs reve- 
nue, stamp revenue of the Island of Cuba, direct and indirect taxes 
now levied or to be levied there in the future, and the subsidiary 
(general) guarantee of the Spanish nation. They shall be exempt from 
all ordinary and extraordinary taxes, etc." 

Nor can the American Commission have seen any of the bonds issued 
under these authorizations, which are scattered everywhere in the 
world, Cuba included, and are owned by third parties and private indi- 
viduals; had it seen them it might have read the following: "Direct 
(especial) guarantee of the customs revenue, stamp revenue of the 
Island of Cuba, direct or indirect taxes therein levied or to be levied 
hereafter, and the subsidiary (general) guarantee of the Spanish nation." 
"The Spanish Colonial Bank shall receive, in the Island of Cuba, 
through its agents there, or in Barcelona, through the Spanish Bank 
of Havana, the receipts of the custom houses of Cuba, and such 
amount thereof as may be necessary, according to the statements fur- 
nished on the back of the bonds, to meet the quarterly payment of 
interest and principal, shall be retained daily and in advance." 

If after this, the American Commission continues to understand that 
this debt was not contracted as a debt secured by mortgage, and that 
this mortgage was not placed upon the customs revenues and other 
taxes of Cuba, — and further that these revenues were not pledged 
principally and primarily, and therefore prior to the Peninsular Treas- 
ury, to the payment of interest and principal, we shall have nothing to 
say. We are unable to prove what is self evident. 

Turning now to the bondholders and to the severity, in our opinion 
unjustified, with which they are treated in the American memorandum, 
we shall say that the duty to defend them does not belong to Spain. 
When they know what is the opinion entertained about them, it is to 
be supposed that they will defend themselves, for after all they will 
not need any great effort to demonstrate the justice of their cause. 

So far as Spain is concerned, and here the Spanish Commission pro- 
ceeds to answer categorically the questions propounded in the Ameri- 
can memorandum, it is sufficient for her to defend the legitimacy of her 
action and her perfect right to create that debt and the mortgage with 
which it was secured, — and therelore the strict right vested in her not 
to pay either interest or principal, except upon proof of the insufficiency 
of the mortgaged revenues, out of which they should be primarily paid. 
If those who hold those revenues are not willing to comply with the 
obligations to the fulfilment oi which said revenues were pledged, the 
responsibility therefor will belong to them, and not to Spain, who has 
neither the means to compel them to comply with that duty, nor is bound 
to do for the bondholders anything else than what she has honestly 
done up to now. But Spain, the Spanish Commission says again, (and 
this is the only thing that she has textually said, although the Ameri- 
can memorandum seems to understand it differently,) cannot lend itself 
in this treaty with the United States, nor in any other treaty with any 
other Power, to do or to declare in her name anything which may mean, 
or imply, that she herself has doubts, and much less ignores or voiuu- 



TREATY OK PEACE. 170 

tarily abridges, so far as she is concerned, the mortgage rights of the 
bondholders. She has no efficient means to cause those who may 
become holders of the mortgaged revenues to respect those rights 
Therefore she does not employ them; did she have them, she would 
employ them, if not through strict justice, at least through a moral 
duty, thus following the dictates of probity both public and private. 

The Spanish Commissioners believe therefore to have answered 
gorically enough the questions propounded to them in this respeel in 
the American memorandum, and this being done they proceed to occupy 
themselves with the principal point which is dealt with m thai memo- 
randum which refers to the sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago. 

According to the American memorandum the cession of the archi 
pelago which is asked from Spain docs not rest upon any agreement to 
that effect made in Article III of the Protocol, as was the case in re 
to the Island of Porto Rico in Article II of the same; bur on the tact 
that, according to the American Commission, the matter of the ce 
by Spain to the United States of America of her sovereignty over I 
islands was included in the number of those relating to the Philippine 
Islands which were left to the free decision of the conference of Paris. 

The Spanish Commission maintains that such a v.rave sub 
undoubtedly the most important of all which it is called upon to dis- 
cuss, far from having been entrusted to the Paris Conference, is shown 
by Article III of the Protocol to have been left beyond its scope, as 
said Article rests upon the basis that the sovereignty over that archi 
pelago should continue to be vested in Spain. 

The American Commission tries to find an argument in support of 
its views in the construction that it places upon the language of Article 
III, and also upon the negotiations which preceded the Protocol and 
culminated in its acceptance. 

We shall examine with cold impartiality the reasonings upon which 
this thesis is founded. 

The American Commission says that it is a principle of law that 
"when the result of some negotiations has been embodied in <i w ritten 
compact, the terms of such agreement shall settle the rights of the 
parties." 

The Spanish Commission accepts this rule of interpretation of the 
treaties, if it has, as an indispensable condition, the fact that the terms 
of the agreement are clear, precise and of settled and indubi 
meaning, because it must be understood in that case, that all the differ- 
ences which presented themselves during the negotiations between the 
contracting states were set at rest by the clear, precise and explicit 
agreement entered into by them. 

But, is this the case with the subject now discussed by the two I 
missions? 

Before answering this question, the Spanish Commission deems it to 
be advisable to transcribe once more the text of Article III of the Pro 
tocol, literally and faithfully translated from its French original. It 
reads as follows: "The United States shall occupy the city, harbor an. 
bay of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which 
determine the intervention {controle), disposition and government ot 
the Philippine Islands." 

The Spanish Commission does not know whether the American Com 
mission is, or is not, conversant with the fact that when the Govern- 
ment of Madrid received from the Washington Secretary of 
despatch of July 30, setting forth the conditions, upon the acceptance 
of which the United States were disposed to conclude the peace,— the 



180 TREATY OF PEACE. 

third of which was subsequently transcribed without any change in the 
Protocol, and forms Article III thereof, — it sent a telegram to Mr. 
Cambon, Ambassador of France in Washington, dated August 1, in 
which, referring to this point, it literally said the following: "The 
third point in which the form of disposition of the Philippine Islands 
is determined seems to this Government to lack precision. It (the 
Spanish Government) has supplied the deficiency to be noticed in it, 
on the supposition that there is no question in regard to the permanent 
sovereignty of Spain over that archipelago, and that the temporary 
occupation of Manila, its harbor and its bay by the Federal Govern- 
ment shall last only the time which may be necessary for the two 
countries to reach an agreement as to administrative reforms." We 
have this despatch at the disposal of the American Commission, should 
it wish to read it and study it. 

Upon the receipt of this document Mr. Cambon had a conference 
(August 3) with the President of the American Republic, and the por- 
tion thereof which refers to the point now dealt with by the Spanish 
Commission, was couched by the French Ambassador in his despatch 
of the 4th of August in the following language: "I availed myself of 
this declaration to request the President to have the kindness to state 
as precisely as possible his intentions in regard to the Philippine 
Islands. On this point, I told him, the answer of the Federal Govern- 
ment is couched in terms that may lend themselves to all claims on the 
part of the United States, and consequently to all apprehensions of 
Spain in regard to her sovereignty." The President replied to him, as 
will be hereafter explained. But the Spanish Government, notwith- 
standing the language of the President, reiterated in its despatch of 
August 7 the doubts entertained by it about the meaniug of Article 
III. Useless reiteration. Neither then, nor before, nor afterwards, 
has the American Government ever consented to give a concrete form 
to the idea involved in the phrase "control, disposition and govern- 
ment" of the Philippine Islands, to be determined by the Paris Com- 
mission. Now, for the first time, it has come to give an explanation. 
In the memorandum to which the Spanish Commission is now giving 
an answer, the American Commission has set it forth. It says: "Cer- 
tainly the word control was not used here in the sense of 'register' or 
'inspection ', but in its broader sense of 'authority or command'. What 
word could be broader than 'disposition', which has practically the 
same meaning in both the French and the English languages? We 
have in these two words, then, authority over, dominion of, final and 
ultimate destination of the subject matter. What is government but 
the right of administration, or exercising sovereignty, the direction, 
the political management of a state? Either of these terms implies 
power of interfering with sovereignty. Taken together, they give the 
fullest scope in dealing with all power, governmental, territorial and 
administrative." 

The explanation, besides being as it appears inopportune by reason 
of its tardiness, seems also to be unsatisfactory. It occurs, at once, 
that if the American Government used those words in the sense afore- 
said, which it never explained in spite of the repeated requests made 
to it for that purpose, what was the reason why it did not show at that 
time the frankness now displayed by its Commission? Why instead of 
stating that the Paris conference should determine the control, dispo- 
sition and government of the Philippine Islands did it not say that said 
conference should decide about the sovereignty over said islands, by 
agreeing or disagreeing as to their cession to the United States, as now 



TREATY OF PEACE. 181 

demanded by the American Commissioners, on the ground that such a 
cession is also embraced in those phrases'? Would not this have been 
briefer, more explicit and more frank? 

But, is it possible to accept the construction placed now, out of sea- 
son, by the American Commissioners upon the said phrases'? They say 
that the word "control" (controle in French) cannot be taken in the 
sense of register (investigation or inspection), but in the sense of 
authority or command. And why? Because this is the broadest mean- 
ing of the word in the English language. But the American Commis- 
sioners have failed to notice that the Protocol was also written in 
French, that the Secretary of State at Washington affixed his signature 
to the official copy so written of the instrument, and that the word 
"controle" in French does not mean what is claimed, but only, as also 
in English, investigation or inspection. But how can the American 
Commissioners fail to recognize that when a treaty has been officially 
drawn in two or more languages, its words cannot be given a sense dif- 
ferent from the one which is common to them in those languages? 

They also state that the word disposition means alienation. We do 
not deny it, although when the term is used in that sense it is always 
in connection with legal business in private civil life, because in French 
the most usual meaning of the word is "distribution according to a cer- 
tain and determined order." 

They affirm that the word government means the right of administer- 
ing or exercising sovereignty; and although it is true that such a sense 
can be admitted, it is also true that the meaning of "manner of gov- 
erning", or of "form which may be given to the government" cannot be 
rejected. 

But whatever the sense may be in which the said three words were 
used in the third article of the Protocol, even if sufficient information 
could not be found in the record of the negotiation to fix the true sense 
in which they were used, it is impossible not to see, as has been proved, 
that the said words do not possess in themselves a clear, precise mean- 
ing, incapable of lending itself to doubts or ambiguities. So it was 
already demonstrated by actual facts. 

The Spanish Government and its representative in Washington, on 
the very ground that the said words lacked clearness, asked, although 
uselessly, for explanations. And who insisted with real stubbornness 
upon retaining such obscure phrases? It cannot be denied that ii, was 
the Government of Washington. Let the American Commissioners be 
pleased to read what the immortal Vattel, one of the greatest authori- 
ties on all things referring to international relations, says in his Law of 
Nations, Vol. Ill, page 197. "The doubt must be resolved against the 
one who has given the law in the treaty, because he is in some manner 
the one who dictated it, and it is his fault if he has not expressed him- 
self with more clearness. By extending or restricting the meaning of 
the words in the sense which is less favorable, no injury is done to him, 
other than that which he was willing to incur. But by making the 
interpretation otherwise the risk would be run to convert vague or 
ambiguous terms into bonds to tie up the feebler of the contracting 
parties, who was compelled to receive what the stronger dictated." 

The Spanish Commission has just stated that the record of the nego- 
tiations contains sufficient data to fix the true sense of those three very 
memorable words. 

The American Commission, on its part, affirms the same thing. Let 
ns see, then, to which of the two contradictory constructions, adhered 
to by either Commission, must be given preference. 



182 TREATY OF PEACE. 

It is stated in the American memorandum as the basis upon which, 
as has already been said, the whole reckoning thereof is founded, that 
in Article III of the Protocol the point relating to the sovereignty over 
the Philippine Arcbipelago was left to the free decision of the Paris 
conference to which the framing of the treaty of peace was entrusted. 
But has the American Commission taken mto consideration, when mak- 
ing such a grave affirmation, that the Washington Secretary of State, 
in his despatch of July 30 last, in which he communicated to the Span- 
ish Government the three conditions imposed upon the latter by the 
United States, before consenting to reestablish peace, and in which 
Article III was, as before said, couched in the same language which 
was afterwards used in the Protocol, provided also for the appointment 
of Commissioners to frame the treaty of peace, and fixed and circum- 
scribed their powers in that respect? In that despatch the following 
paragraph occurs: "If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their 
entirety, Commissioners will be named by the United States to meet 
similarly authorized Commissioners on the part of Spain for the pur- 
pose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and 
delivering it under the terms above indicated." Does the American 
Commission understand that the unexpected demand of the cession by 
Spain of an immense territory, the area of which exceeds 300,000 
square kilometres, and whose population is over 9,000,000 of inhabitants, 
is a detail in this treaty of peace? Do they understand that the acqui- 
sition of an archipelago, whose importance as a factor in the near 
future for the peace of the world is no secret for anyone, can be called 
a detail? 

But let us go to the record, as the American Commission does, and 
search for light as to the meaning of those ambiguous words. 

The American Commission narrates how the negotiations began. 
We agree with its narrative up to the point relating to the first con- 
ference between Mr. Cambon and the President of the United States. 
The memorandum says that in that conference the President said in 
regard to the Philippines that the note (the cited note of July 30) 
expressed the purposes of his Government, and that the final disposi- 
tion to be made of those islands should depend upon the treaty to be 
negotiated by Commissioners. That after a subsequent discussion in 
which the President reiterated that the treaty should determine the 
future of the Philippine Islands, Article III was read in which it was 
stated that the Commissioners should decide about the controle, the 
possession and the government of those islands; that Mr. Cambon pro- 
posed the change of the word possession into the word condition, 
because he thought the former could be construed by Spain as threat- 
ening and severe; that the President refused to consent to the proposed 
change, but at last was induced to admit the word disposition in place 
of the word possession, which, according to the American Commissioners 
(we do not know whether on their own personal opinion or on opinion 
expressed by the President) did not change the meaning, and which, 
for having so much amplitude, might also embrace possession. 

Let us see now how Mr. Cambon relates what happened in that con- 
ference. In his despatch of the 31st of July he said to the Spanish 
Government what follows: 

"The demands formulated in Article III (I said to the President) are 
apt to endanger in Madrid the success of this preliminary negotiation, 
especially if the word possession is retained in conjunction with controle 
and government of the Philippine Islands, as it seems to put in doubt 
from this moment the sovereignty of Spain over that colony. You will 



TREAT r OF PEACE. 183 

notice, the President of the Eepublic then told me, that my demands 
as set forth in Articles I and II, admit of no discussion; I leave it to 
the negotiators to decide the question of the Philippine Islands. If 
the American forces (let full attention be paid to these phrases) retain 
up to now their respective positions, it is in obedience to a duty imposed 
upon me, in favor of residents and foreigners, by the progress * * * 
(Here are some words which could not be translated, but which are 
easily understood to mean the Tagalo insurrection.) Seeing that the 
President of the Eepublic was firm in not changing the terms of 
Article III, I made such an urgent appeal to his generosity as to 
secure his order to use the word disposition instead of possession, as the 
former does not prejudge the result of the negotiation, and has not the 
comprehensive meaning which belongs to the other word." 

The American Commissioners will notice, no doubt, that between 
the two relations there are many differences. In their own narration 
nothing is said in regard to the only reason alleged by the President 
not to cause at once the American forces to be withdrawn from the 
archipelago, a reason which reveals that the President at that moment 
was very far from thinking that the sovereignty over that territory 
should be asked to be transferred to the United States. According to 
the American narration the word disposition was accepted because it 
contained the meaning of the word possession. But according to Mr. 
Cambon's despatch the word disposition accepted in place of possession 
changed the comprehensive meaning of the article. And be the Amer- 
ican Commission or Mr. Cambon right or wrong, the result is that the 
latter accepted the change because he understood that all question 
about the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Islands was thereby 
eliminated. 

On Friday the 3rd of August the President held another conference 
wiih Mr. Cambon. The memorandum reads that the latter stated at 
that time that Spain insisted upon the point that her sovereignty 
should not be interfered with; that the President replied that the dis- 
position of the Philippine Islands should depend upon the treaty to be 
negotiated; and that he could not make any change in the terms pre- 
viously proposed. 

Let us see now how Mr. Cambon narrates, in his despatch of August 
4 to the Spanish Minister of State, what passed at this interview. 

"Mr. McKinley showed himself unyielding (regarding the cession of 
Porto Pico) and he repeated that the cpiestion of the Philippine* was 
the only one which was not as yet finally settled in his mind.' After 
narrating his insistence with respect to the phrases which are already 
embodied in this memorandum, Mr. Cambon continues: "Mr. McKinley 
answered me: '1 do not want any misunderstanding to remain on this 
subject; the negotiators of the two countries shall be the ones to be 
called upon to decide what are to be [note this] the permanent advan- 
tages we shall ask for in the archipelago, and, finally, those to decide 
the intervention (controle), disposition and government of the Philip- 
pine Islands. And', he added, 'the Government of Madrid can rest 
assured that up to the present nothing against Spain has been settled 
a priori in my own mind, as I myself consider that nothing is decided 
against the United States', " (Verbatim.) 

Compare one narration with the other. That of the American memo- 
randum confined itself to the statement that the President had said 
that the disposition of the Philippine Islands should depend upon the 
treaty, and that he could not make any change in the words. But it 
omits the second and most important part of Mr. Cambon's conversa 



184 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tion as narrated by him, although it contains information capable of 
removing all doubt in regard to this question. It is to be noticed, in 
the first place, that while the word sovereignty used in connection with 
the Philippine Islands is carefully avoided, both in this answer and in 
the former one and in the notes of the American Government, the same 
pains are taken by the Spanish Government and by its representative 
in Washington to use the very same words and unceasingly repeat that 
the Spanish sovereignty was not under discussion. Let this remark 
be united to the others already made in regard to the persistent and 
clear although implied refusal to explain the meaning of the words 
above mentioned. 

But in spite of all this, the President said, and the American Com- 
mission does not categorically deny it in its memorandum, that the 
Paris conference should be the only one called upon to decide as to the 
permanent advantages to be asked by the United States in the Philip- 
pine Archipelago, and as to the control, disposition and government of 
the islands. 

The memorandum says that the President did not confine himself to 
speaking of permanent advantages. It is true that the Spanish Com- 
mission has not said, nor does it say now, that he confined himself to 
that point, for he added what has just been referred to. But what has 
this to do with ignoring the meaning of the words of the President? 
If his mind, already fully made up at that time, was to ask of the con- 
ference not merely one but several permanent advantages to be enjoyed 
by the United States in the archipelago, it is self-evident that he did 
not think of asking for the sovereignty. Could the latter ever be con- 
sidered as a permanent advantage of the United States in those islands? 
And even though so singular a hypothesis were upheld, how could the 
plural number used by the President of the United States be properly 
explained? To this observation already made in the preceding paper 
of the Spanish Commission no answer has been given in the American 
memorandum, and the reason is that none can be given which can 
harmonize with the purposes it is there attempted to uphold. 

We cannot occupy ourselves with the indications made in the memo- 
randum about the different languages spoken by both interlocutors in 
the aforesaid conferences. Such a circumstance cannot impart any 
probability to the supposition that the President did not express, not 
an incidental idea, but the important and capital statements which 
Mr. Cambon asserts he heard. If Mr. Cambon did not understand what 
the President said, although, as stated in the Memorandum, he had at 
his side his own Secretary who understands and speaks the English 
language, nevertheless he cannot be supposed to have attributed to 
him, without deliberately violating truth, such positive language as 
that recorded in his despatch. 

Let us pass now to the note of the Spanish Government of August 7. 
The American Commission concurs with the Spanish that in said note 
the Government of Madrid, upon stating that it accepted Article III, 
reserved a priori its sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago; there- 
fore we deem it unnecessary again to transcribe its contents verbatim. 
The only difference existing between the two Commissions lies in that 
while the Spanish Commission asserts, and reiterates this assertion, 
that in the note of its Government, on referring to the sovereignty 
therein reserved for Spain, the adjective "entire" or "whole" was 
employed, the American Commission says that there is no such adjec- 
tive in the English translation of the note which Mr. Cambon delivered 
to the Government of Washington. We have the copy, not the trans- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 185 

lation, as it is called in the American memorandum, of the original note 
of the Spanish Government, which we place at the disposal of the 
American Commission. Therein appears the adjective. If when the 
translation thereof into English was made in Washington it was omit- 
ted, it is a matter with which the American Commission is acquainted, 
as it has seen such translation ; but the Spanish Commission, who never 
had knowledge of it, cannot but be ignorant of it. The difference isof 
no importance whatever, since, leaving the said adjective out of the 
question, the truth is, and the American Commission acknowledges it, 
that the Spanish Government reserved therein a priori its sovereignty 
over the Philippines, and that it only accepted Article III with this 
reservation. And if the Spanish Government did not change its mind 
afterwards — and this in fact is not asserted, nor would such an asser- 
tion be possible, in the American memorandum — the result must always 
be that the Protocol and its 3rd Article do not in good law bind the 
Spanish Government save with the express reservation it made on 
accepting it, and which it did not subsequently withdraw. 

But in the American memorandum, doubtless recognizing the incon- 
trovertible force of the consequence which grew out of the Protocol 
having been signed without the Government of Washington, once 
apprised of such reservation, making any objection thereto, it is stated 
that the President of the Union as well as his Secretary of State, on 
hearing the said note read, remarked that it was vague and indefinite, 
purporting to accept the terms of tbat of the United States, while it 
required some modification, and, as regards the Philippines, while in 
one paragraph it stated the acceptance of the article, in another it 
seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty. The argument is skill- 
ful, but unfortunately its accuracy is not as apparent as its skillfulness. 
It is true that the said gentlemen showed their dissatisfaction upon the 
note being read to them. What is apparently inaccurate, judging from 
what Mr. Cambon then said, is that the cause of the dissatisfaction was 
what was said, not vaguely and indefinitely, but clearly and explicitly, in 
the note as to the reservation which Spain made of her sovereignty 
over the archipelago. The very American memorandum transcribed 
the paragraph in interest of the note, and therein this reservation 
appears, not vague and uncertain, but express, clear and explicit. 
The cause for his dissatisfaction at the time given by the President 
was a very different one, which Mr. Cambon refers to in the following 
paragraph from his despatch of August 10. Here it is: 

"Duke: Again has it been at the White House, in the presence of 
Mr. McKinley, and at his express request, that I have communicated 
to the Secretary of State the telegram (the note aforesaid) of August 7, 
in which Your Excellency declares that the Government of Spain 
accepts the conditions imposed by the United States. This reading 
visibly displeased the President of the Republic and the Secretary of 
State. After a long silence Mr. McKinley said to me: ' I" had asked of 
Sjmin the cession, and consequently the immediate evacuation [we have 
been unable to ascertain when this immediate evacuation was requested] 
of the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. Instead of the categorical accept- 
ance I expected, the Spanish Government addresses me a note in which it 
invoices the necessity of obtaining the approval of the Cortes. I cannot 
lend myself to going into these considerations of an internal nature. 7 I 
observed that the Government of Her Majesty in complying with its 
constitutional duties did no more than follow the President upon whom 
like obligations are imposed, and that in his reply of July 30 he had 
expressly reserved the ratification by the Federal Senate." (This is 
the fact, and so it appears from said despatch of July 30.) 



186 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Neither the President nor his Secretary of State advanced any reason 
for their displeasure other than the foregoing, and, according to Mr. 
Cainbon, these gentlemen said nothing during the conversation respect- 
ing the said reservation made by Spain of her sovereignty over the 
archipelago, nor regarding anything else whatever save the reservation 
of the Spanish Government as to the approval of the Cortes. 

Thus the President ended by answering Mr. Cambon, who questioned 
him as to the pledges of sincerity Spain might give, as follows: "There 
might be a means of putting an end to all misunderstanding; we might 
draw up a projet which shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain 
in the same terms in which I have already framed them, [up to this time 
this was in effect all that had been agreed upon] and which shall estab- 
lish the terms within which there shall be named on the one hand the Pleni- 
potentiaries charged with negotiating the treaty of peace in Paris, and on 
the other the special Commissioners entrusted with the determining of the 
details for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico." (The incorporation 
of this was overlooked in the note of July 30, and this alone would 
have been sufficient to explain the change in the framing of the condi- 
tions of peace.) 

See, then, if there is not an immense difference between what is stated 
in the American memorandum and what Mr. Cambon said to the Span- 
ish Government in his note of August 10, or, immediately after having 
been present at so important a conference, aud when, consequently, 
what occurred thereat was fresh in his mind. Doing justice to the abso- 
lute truthfulness of the American Commissioners, their account of that 
conference, three months after it was held, cannot be preferred by the 
Spanish Commissioners to that of Hon. Mr. Cambon, who gave his 
immediately after the happening of the event, which he so minutely 
recounted in his despatch. 

It is denied in the American memorandum that the Secretary of State 
of Washington stated in his note of August 10 to Mr. Cambon, as the 
Spanish Commission had asserted, that the note of the Government of 
Madrid (that of August 7) contained in its spirit an acceptance by Spain 
of the conditions imposed by the United States, and in this connection 
the said note is inserted literally. 

The Spanish Commission corrects its former assertion, accommoda- 
ting it to the above. But it is due to it to say that ou making the asser- 
tion it referred to the note of Mr. Cambon of August 11, which begins 
with the paragraph following: 

Duke: Upon transmitting to me the draft of the Protocol, the text of which I 
have wired Your Excellency, the Secretary of State addressed ine a note which may 
be epitomized as follows: Although the note delivered yesterday at the White 
House conveys in its spirit an acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by 
the United States, in its form it does not so specify with sufficient explicitness, 
owing doubtless to its having to be translated and put in cipher several times. 

These words, which may well be explained without detracting from 
the unquestioned veracity of the Hon. Mr. Cambon, led, as they could 
not but do, the Spanish Commissioners into error. They nobly comply 
with the duty of so admitting. 

But after all the difference is unimportant. The Secretary of State 
(and this certainly does appear from his own letter) raised no objection 
to the Spanish note of August 7, other than that it was not entirely 
explicit, undoubtedly due to the various transformations which it had 
undergone. But the fact is that the Secretary of State could not pos- 
sibly have directed his objection to the paragraph of said note, perfectly 
well translated into English (save the adjective "entire"), which is 



TREATY OF PEACE. 187 

copied in the American memorandum, and which it is said was read to 
the President of the American Union and his Secretary of State, 
wherein the Spanish Government clearly, explicitly and conclusively 
reserves a priori its sovereignty over the Philippines. All the remain- 
ing contents of the note may be little explicit, if it is wished so. to 
assert, but that reservation was not, surely. Therefore the note to 
which we refer does not contradict the statement we are supporting, 
that the said reservation, of which the Government of Washington was 
opportunely apprised and which appears so clearly in the English 
translation in its possession, was not by it contradicted, nor did it 
serve as a reason for employing the new form of Protocol as a means of 
solemnizing the agreement upon the bases of peace. This reason 
clearly stands out in the documents already examined which said nego- 
tiations embody. 

In view of the foregoing, it seems to us that whatever may have been 
the real intentions of the Government of Washington, its acts and its 
written and spoken words do not suffice to overcome the assertion we 
make that Spain accepted the 3rd article of the Protocol in the sense 
communicated to that Government, and not contradicted by it, that its 
sovereignty over the Philippines was preserved* (reserved) a priori, 
since their control, disposition and government, which were to be deter- 
mined by the Paris conference, referred only to their internal regime. 
And this, of itself, would be sufficient to maintain without fear of suc- 
cessful contradiction that this conference cannot consider, nor has it the 
power to consider, the cession asked by the United States, even though 
in the hypothesis to our mind impossible that the proof, drawn from the 
very words of the President of the Union, which we have attempted to 
furnish and we think we have furnished that in his own mind at that 
time the said sovereignty was beyond all subsequent discussion, should 
be destroyed. 

What is the Spanish Commission to say with respect to the words it 
reads in the American memorandum which seem to seek in a war 
indemnity a ground for their present request; as though this were not 
excluded from discussion, and it had not been acknowledged by the 
very American Commission that it had been agreed to cover this 
indemnity for the expenses of the war, and not only these but also the 
claims of American citizens, the majority of which, if not all, natives 
of Cuba, although apparently later naturalized in the United States, 
who had suffered injuries in the last insurrection, by the cession of 
Porto Pico, the other West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the 
Mariana? 

Or, is this indemnity to be an open account in which it shall be 
proper to ask all that remains to Spain, including the Peninsula itself? 

Certainly the limiting of the indemnity to the Island of Guam in the 
East is another indication which proves that the United States did not 
think at the time of the Philippine Islands. If they did, is it conceiv- 
able that they would then claim, at the outset, a small and insignificant 
island and fail to claim the immense Philippine Empire which was so 
near to it? 

Be it acknowledged, then, that the demand or request for the Philip- 
pine Archipelago which is made for the United States in the form and 

*The Spanish text here is "a priori qnedaba a" salvo la soberania",— in English 
"the sovereignty was a priori or from the beginning lefjfc in safety, or preserved, or 
conserved." "in the foregoing page the Spanish text instead of "quedaba & salvo 
reads reserva. [Note of "translator.] 



188 TREATY OF PEACE. 

under the conditions set forth in the American proposition, lacks 
foundations. While this cession is claimed in such form and under 
such conditions, the Spanish Commission cannot but decline it. 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP THE LAST SPANISH PROPOSAL. 

It will be remembered that, in that proposal, the Spanish Commis- 
sioners asked that the American Commissioners should present another 
adjusting the same to the stipulations of Articles III and VI of the 
Protocol, that is, expounding the form of intervention, disposition and 
government which should be established by Spain in the Philippines, 
the return of the city, bay and harbor of Manila, the release of its garri- 
son, now held as prisoners, the refunding of the public moneys, revenues 
and imposts which might have been collected up to the time when the 
city might be delivered, and the undertaking or say the acknowledg- 
ment on the part of the United States of the obligation to indemnify 
Spain for the detention of the troops that garrisoned the city when it 
surrendered on the 14th of August last. 

The American Commission has rejected that proposal because in its 
judgment the aforesaid Articles III and VI of the Protocol do not 
demand that it be presented. 

With respect to the first part which refers to the intervention, dispo- 
sition and government of the archipelago, all attempt to demonstrate 
here that Article III is not in accordance with the American proposal 
which, instead of addressing itself to the internal regime of these 
islands, asks their cession to the United States, would be a mere repe- 
tition of the statements set forth by the Spanish Commission in the 
preceding part of this paper. 

It is believed that its arguments show with the clearness of noon-day 
that the cession of those islands which is in every respect foreign to 
the provisions in the Washington agreement is one thing, and that the 
internal regime of the said islands, which under the aforesaid Article 
III may and must be a matter for the treaty of peace, is another. 

The Spanish Commissioners would then be remiss in their own con- 
victions if they did not persist in requesting the American Commission 
to present a proposal concerning said regime in which the 3rd Article 
of the said agrement will remain unbroken, not only in its meaning 
but also in its intent. 

In the first paragraph of the proposal with especial reference to the 
capture of Manila the immediate return to Spain of the city, its bay 
and harbor is demanded. 

By way of rectifying here one of the misapprehensions of fact that 
abound in the American memorandum, we have to put it ou record that 
the Spanish proposal did not demand that immediate return, nor the 
immediate execution of anything set forth in the following paragraphs 
of the proposition, which contain nothing to be instantly done. The 
immediate delivery was, as it could not otherwise be, to be effected upon 
the conclusion of the treaty of peace. So conclusive is the proof that 
the Spanish Commissioners were bound to suppose that they should 
never be called upon to make this rectification. The first paragraph of 
the aforesaid proposal reads as follows: "The Spanish Commissioners 
therefore in accordance with the express stipulations of the Protocol 
understand that the treaty of peace must provide for, first the delivery, 
etc." If this was to be agreed upon in the treaty of peace, how can it 
be supposed that the Spanish Commission should ask that the delivery 
be effected before it was agreed on ? 



TREATY OF PEACE. 189 

We shall now clear this memorandum of difficulties by making two 
rectifications of a personal character before taking up the discussion 
of the point bearing on the surrender and capitulation of Manila and 
their consequences. There is not in the Spanish memorandum to which 
the last American memorandum is a reply, a single sentence that 
assails or wounds the respectability of General Merritt and Admiral 
Dewey. The American memorandum would intimate that the idea is 
suggested with more or less ability in the Spanish memorandum that 
the military commanders of the Union conquered the city of Manila 
by the force of arms on the 13th of August when they already knew 
that the suspension of hostilities had been agreed on. This is an error. 
The Spanish Commission did not use, is not in the habit of using, cun- 
ning of any kind to conceal its sentiments. If it had believed that 
these generals had broken the armistice after receiving notice of its 
conclusion, it would have said so openly. By so doing it would not 
have been lacking in the regard which these commanders deserve, in 
the same way as it occurred to no one in 1871 that it was a lacking of 
the regard due to the German General de Manteuffel to charge him 
with the offence which he committed when, after a partial armistice 
between the French aud German forces had been signed, he availed 
himself of the mistake made by General Clinchant upon the extension 
of the said armistice, and surrendered the army corps under his com- 
mand and compelled it to take refuge in Switzerland. We have said 
nothing, we have nothing to say against the personal behavior of these 
two commanders. On the contrary we can state a fact that redounds 
to the credit of the fine sentiments of the Admiral. On the 1st of 
May, he sent to the Governor General of Manila from the Olympia, 
perhaps under the intoxicating influence of victory, a communication 
which read as follows: "If all the vessels, torpedo-boats and warships 
under the Spanish flag do not surrender immediately, Manila will be 
destroyed.'' 

We presume that this communication will have no place in the chap- 
ter of history in which are recorded the services rendered to the cause 
of humanity of which there is so much ostentation in these days. But 
we take pleasure in acknowledging that the author of this draconian 
order, refrained, in the spontaneousnessof his kind feelings, from carry- 
ing it out, although he might have had the power to attempt it. 

This cannot prevent us from not carrying the favorable opinion to 
which the honorable commanders are personally entitled to the poiut 
of considering ourselves obliged to them for their deliberately postpon- 
ing the surrender of the city until the 13th of August for the purpose 
of "protecting the city and the Spanish residents against the awful 
vengeance of the insurgents". This purpose does not seem compre- 
hensible; in the early days of May the insurgents were not yet besieg- 
ing from the land side the city, which was only blockaded from the bay 
by the American fleet. They began afterwards and not with the same 
numbers of forces from the outset, since these were increased little by 
little, until they made up the masses of insurgents who were in front 
of the trenches of defence on the day of the surrender. So that if the 
American commanders had not taken possession of the city until then 
for the reason above mentioned, they should much less have done so 
thereafter. But besides this, it is demonstrated by the fact that such 
a danger did not exist, for it could at all times have been avoided by 
the American forces which upon the surrender of Manila should have 
landed in and garrisoned the city, in the same way as it was avoided 
after the 14th of August, in spite of the fact that as above stated the 



190 TREATY OF PEACE. 

insurgents in irms who prevailed outside of the city were in larger 
numbers. 

It may thus be seen how it is no sin of ingratitude to fail in recog- 
nizing that supposed service at the hands of the aforesaid commanders, 
without this being in any way a hindrance to the favorable opinion to 
which their personal behavior entitled them. 

On the other hand, the American memorandum in its reference to the 
unexpected surrender and the exit from Manila of the general in com- 
mand of the Spanish troops on the evening before the surrender, uses 
a word altogether irreconcilable with the honor of a soldier. Whatever 
may have been the conduct of that commander, he is under the protec- 
tion of the law and tribunals of his country, which will look into his 
actions for the purpose of approval or disapproval as the case may 
require; but he is not at the mercy of anyone else and, above all, of 
opinions of an official character that would be delivered abroad and by 
foreigners. 

We have laid down in the second part of this memorandum that in 
the so often cited 3rd article of the Protocol the occupation by the 
forces of the United States of the city, harbor and bay of Manila until 
the conclusion of the treaty of peace had been agreed upon merely by 
way of a guaranty. It is therein demonstrated that the Government of 
Madrid accepted this occupation in that sense, without express con- 
tradiction on the part of the Government of Washington. 

It seems that in the American memorandum it is endeavored to 
inject the idea that such occupation should likewise have the character 
of an indemnity for the expenses of the war, based on the fact that in 
the note of July 30, in which the Secretary of State communicated to 
the Spanish Government the three conditions upon which peace could 
be restored, after saying in the second that by way of such indemnity 
Spain must cede Porto Pico, the other West Indies and the Island of 
Guam, the 3rd article began with the words: " On similar grounds the 
United States is entitled to occupy the city of Manila, etc." At first 
sight the argument is not wanting in force; but the American Commis- 
sioners know perfectly well that this is only apparent, and that what 
did occur proves absolutely the contrary. Although the Spanish Gov- 
ernment in its note of August 7 and its representative in the confer- 
ences with the President of the Republic, stated and insisted that the 
occupation of Manila was to have no character other than that of a 
mere guaranty, the said words are suppressed in the Protocol. So that 
the latter failed to express any connection between the future occupa- 
tion of said place and the payment of the war indemnity, and moreover 
it failed to state that the United States were already entitled to occupy 
it. Doubtless, for this reason, the idea is only hinted at, but not devel- 
oped, nor categorically asserted in the American memorandum. 

The Spanish Commissioners acknowledge having been agreeably 
surprised on noticing that in this document the American Commis- 
sioners do not allege, as had been alleged by the American Govern- 
ment on replying to the note of the Spanish Government of September 
7 last, the peremptory reason that the suspension of hostilities, accord- 
ing to the 6th Article of the Protocol, ought not to go into effect imme- 
diately upon the concluding and signing of this instrument, but after 
notice thereof to the commanders of the hostile forces, an allegation 
which -vas made notwithstanding the fact that a point of such impor- 
tance had been expounded, reasoned and demonstrated with all care in 
the Spanish document to which that reply was given. This action of 
the American Commissioners proves their sound judgment and learn- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 191 

ing in the premises, because it is equivalent to an implied recognition 
of the validity of the Spanish view on the subject, which, after all, is 
elementary and which as a current doctrine has never been attacked 
by anyone. 

Nevertheless they endeavor, upon arguments analogous to those set 
forth in the said reply of the Government of the United States to the 
note of the Government of Madrid, of September 7 last, to invalidate 
the Spanish claim as to the capitulation of Manila, for being tardily 
made. The Spanish Commissioners are unable to see the force of this 
argument. The Government of Madrid formulated this claim with 
every solemnity in the said note, or in other words, twenty-three days 
after the capitulation of Manila. What laws or practice justify hold- 
ing a claim of this kind as forfeited, when not presented before the 
twenty-third day subsequent to the act giving rise to it? 

Entering into the field of the intentions of the Spanish Government, 
it is stated further that the latter supposed that the above act of war 
had been perfectly correct, when a few days later it requested of the 
American Government permission to transport provisions to the Philip- 
pines and reestablish its regular mail service. When this occurred, the 
Spanish Government was still ignorant of the events which had taken 
place on the 14th of that month in Manila. The American Commission 
also leaves it to be understood that this is so. But even if the Spanish 
Government had been cognizant of those events, what permission is that 
which it is supposed the Spanish Government requested? What hap- 
pened was only what could not fail to occur between Governments 
which, although enemies, observe at all times the duties which upright- 
ness imposes upon all. 

The status quo growing out of the suspension of hostilities prohibited 
each of the belligerents from improving his situation to the prejudice 
of the other while such status lasted. The Spanish Government, like 
any other which does not wish to fail in its said duties, was bound to 
communicate to the American Government, acting in concert with it, 
the reestablishment of the service which existed prior to the war. The 
Government of Washington acted in the same way when on August 16 
it i-equested the consent of the Government of Madrid to reestablish 
the telegraphic service between Manila and Hong Kong. 

Let it be acknowledged then that the claim of the Spanish Govern- 
ment was lodged in time, and that even if it had not been then pre- 
sented, its Commission was authorized to make it now, since it is 
empowered to ask for everything that shall lead to a faithful and strict 
carrying out of the convention of Washington. 

It is therefore settled, since it has not been contradicted in the Amer- 
ican memorandum to which this is a reply, that the suspension of hos- 
tilities agreed upon in the Oth Article of the Protocol went into legal 
effect immediately after the latter was signed on the afternoon of August 
12 of this year. And let it be borne in mind that "if there is one rule 
of the law of war more clear and peremptory than another, it is that 
compacts between enemies, such as truces and capitulations, shall be 
faithfully adhered to, and their non-observance is denounced as being 
manifestly at variance with the true interest and duty, not only of the 
immediate parties, but of all mankind ". The American Commissioners 
will not repudiate these words as they are those of their learned coun- 
tryman, the eminent Wharton, in his Digest of international Law, 
made up of passages taken from Presidents, Secretaries of State, deci- 
sions of Federal Courts, and opinions of Attorneys General. 

Have the provisions of the 6th Article of the Protocol been observed 



192 TREATY OF PEACE. 

with this scrupulousness? On the 13th day of August the city of 
Manila was bombarded and on the 14th it surrendered. 

The Spanish Commissioners have no reason whatever for asserting 
that the Commanders of the American forces knew that the hostilities 
were suspended. But it is a fact that the said hostile act was executed 
after this suspension. 

And in this connection the Spanish Commissioners have to complete 
the short history recounted in the American memorandum, regarding 
the reestablishing of the Manila cable. It is stated therein that it 
was the Government of Washington which, on August 16, through a 
note to the Ambassador of France, requested the consent of the Span- 
ish Government to the reestablishment of telegraphic communication 
between that place and Hong Kong. This is true, but so also is what 
is about to be related. The American Admiral had cut the said cable 
at the beginning of the campaign. After several fruitless efforts of the 
Spanish Director General of Posts and Telegraphs with the concession- 
ary company looking to the reestablishment of its service, on July 9 last 
the said Director insisted on the reestablishment, agreeing on the part 
of Spain to the absolute neutrality of theservice. Thecompany brought 
this proposal to the notice of the Ambassador of the United States in 
London, in order also to obtain his consent. But the latter on the 16th 
of the same month replied that his Government preferred that it remain 
cut. It results from this that if there was no direct communication 
with Manila, via Hong Kong, on August 12, when the Protocol was 
signed, it was due to the Government of Washington, which one month 
before had opposed its reestablishment. This is another reason, were 
it necessary (which it is not) to prove that the ignorance of the Ameri- 
can commanders, when attacking the place on August 13, of the sus- 
pension of hostilities, not only cannot serve as a reason for the United 
States to profit by the act of war then executed in violation of what 
their Government had agreed to the previous day, but furnishes a 
ground upon which to base a claim for the unjustified damage the said 
act inflicted upon the other belligerent party. 

All the arguments set forth in the American memorandum as to the 
legal character it is there endeavored to give to the surrender and 
capitulation of Manila and to the acts since then executed in the city 
and even outside of it, by the commanders of the military forces of the 
Union, may be reduced to the following affirmations: 

First. The legal character of the said capitulation is the same as 
that which would correspond to the peaceful surrender of the place, 
pursuant to the stipulations of Article III of the Protocol; and there- 
fore the rights which the belligerent party has in the place he occupies 
as a guaranty are the same as he would have if he occupied it through 
an act of conquest in an act of war; and 

Second. The occupation of Manila, its harbor and bay, stipulated in 
Article III of the Protocol, was a military occupation. 

The Spanish Commission would never have believed that it would 
have to correct such grave errors, had it not seen them written in the 
American memorandum. 

It is elementary on the subject that the occupation of a place or of 
a territory, agreed upon by belligerent parties that it may serve as a 
guaranty for the stipulations of a treaty, or the performance of an obli- 
gation renting on the party possessing the sovereignty over the place 
or territory occupied, has not and cannot have any title other thau that 
in the convention in which it is stipulated. But the title to occupation 
by main force of a place or territory which surrenders through an act 



TREATY OF PEACE. 193 

of war, has a special name, which is capitulation. And to so denomi- 
nate what was agreed on in the Protocol in order thereby to bring under 
its terms the illegal capitulation of Manila alter the signing of that 
instrument, is an error into which no one up to this time has officially 
or scientifically fallen, and which neither the technical nor ordinary 
meaning of the word capitulation would admit. The peaceful occupa- 
tion as a guarauty conveys no more right to the occupying party than 
of establishing the garrisons or maintaining the military forces he may 
deem necessary, in the place or territory, to retain it in his possession, 
until the performance of the principal obligation of which the occupa- 
tion is the guaranty. It is natural that the provisioning of the army 
of occupation should be at the expense of the sovereign of the territory 
occupied. But although this provisioning is a natural condition, it is 
not essential to the convention. Therefore in the most prominent cases 
which have arisen of occupation of this kind the occupying party took 
good care expressly to stipulate the obligation to provision. Well 
known are the cases of occupation by way of guaranty of several depart- 
ments of France which occurred in 1815 and in 1871, the former at the 
end of the wars of the Empire and the latter at the conclusion of the 
Franco-Prussian war. There it was expressly stipulated that the main- 
tenance of the army of occupation should be at the expense of the 
French Government. This was not done in Article III of the Protocol 
of Washington. 

All the other rights of sovereignty, signally the collection of reve- 
nues and public taxes, continue in the peaceful possession of the sov- 
ereign of the territory occupied. The party occupaut must religiously 
respect such rights. The legitimacy of his acts does not extend 
beyond what may be necessary to meet the ends of the occupation. 

From those elementary principles, which for the present case do not 
need to be enlarged upon, it results that the United States, pursuant 
to the stipulations of Article 111 of the Protocol, has no further right 
than to retain in its possession until the conclusion of the treaty of 
peace the city, harbor and bay of Manila as a guaranty of the engage- 
ments of said Protocol, and, therefore, no more than the right to gar- 
rison the said city, bay" and harbor with the necessary forces of its 
army and navy, but respecting the exercise of the sovereignty of Spain 
over the same in everything else compatible with this right to garrison, 
which is the proper designation of a guaranty occupation. 

But the occupation of a city or territory through an act of war gives 
fuller rights to the belligerent who has taken forcible possession of one 
or the other. He does not acquire it is true, through conquest, the right 
of sovereignty over the conquered territory, but he does acquire the 
possession and temporary exercise of this sovereignty. While the occu- 
pation lasts the prerogatives of the sovereign, political, financial, and 
even executive, may be exercised by the occupant, but always with the 
moderation required by the respect due the rights of the pacific inhabit- 
ants, since nowadays war is not waged between the peoples but between 
the armed forces of the belligerent states. 

What goes before suffices to bring out the capital difference which 
precludes anyone from confounding the peaceful guaranty occupation 
with the belligerent occupation or conquest. On what ground does the 
United States persist after the 14th of August in occupying the city, 
harbor and bay of Manila? On the ground of belligerent occupation, 
having taken the city by force after the Protocol was signed. On what 
ground has the United States the exclusive right to occupy that city, 
T P 13 



194 TREATY OF PEACE. 

bay and harbor 1 ? On the ground of a peaceful guaranty occupation, 
and nothing more than this, pursuant to the stipulations of Article III 
of the said compact. How, then, can it be asserted that the character 
of such occupation is immaterial in this case? 

It is needless to lay further stress upon one of the most elementary 
points in the matter of the international law of war. 

The second error that is displayed in the American memorandum 
consists in supposing that the occupation agreed to in the Protocol was 
a military one. Those who understand this expression in the sense of 
occupation with military forces there can have no doubt whatever in 
applying the same denomination to these two kinds of occupation, 
although they are so different. But for those who, using the technical 
term sanctioned by science and by the treaties, call military occupation 
only that which is belligerent, or effected by force, the occupation 
agreed to in the Protocol cannot be termed a military one. 

It is therefore useless to endeavor to bring under a common denomi- 
nation acts which are essentially different and whoso lawful conse- 
quences have never been confounded. The occupation of the city, bay 
and harbor of Manila granted to the United States by the Washington 
agreement, is not a military or belligerent occupation, from which can 
lawfully be derived the rights and faculties which are inherent therein. 

It cannot be doubted that the commanders of the American forces in 
the Philippines fell into the same error as the memorandum. One can 
understand that once in possession of the place and while they had no 
notice of the suspension of hostilities they should have commenced to 
exercise all the rights and privileges of a military or belligerent occu- 
pant. But the American memorandum admits that on the ICth of 
August these commanders were advised of the stipulated suspension of 
hostilities. Notwithstanding this, they continued to exercise these 
rights and privileges, which they did not possess, and which they 
ought to have known they did not possess. On that date the machin- 
ery of Spanish administration was still in operation. It was on the 
ICth of August that the American forces began to take possession 
manu militari of that machinery, of the public moneys, revenues and 
imposts, and also to hold as prisoners the Spanish troops that had 
surrendered on the 14th. 

We believe it unnecessary to insist any longer upon the refutation 
of errors of such gravity and importance, for which a single explana- 
tion can be found only in the sad and dire necessity of using them 
as the only means of defence on a point which is battered from all 
quarters. 

And as we have been unable to come across any argument in the 
American memorandum more substantial than those referred to, among 
those that were advanced against the Spanish proposal, this Commis- 
sion considers it its duty to support it and set forth that it cannot con- 
cur in the conclusion with which the memorandum closes. 

The Spanish Commission might here put an end to this paper, were 
it not for the earnest desire with which it is animated of seeking on its 
part some means of removing the obstacles which are now standing in 
the way of the work of peace entrusted to these conferences, and of 
facilitating to both Commissions the fulfilment of a charge which can- 
not but be in perfect harmony with the sentiments of humanity and 
patriotism which surely inspire them both in the same degree. 

Whether the interpretation of Articles III and VI of the Protocol as 
given by the American Commission, or as insisted upon by the Spanish 
Commission, is accex>ted, the fact remains unfortunately that a situation 



TREATY OF PEACE. 195 

is created which can be settled only by the good faith of both parties. 
Be it because the conference of Paris has no powers to consider the 
question concerning the sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, in 
the manner and form proposed by the American Commission ; be it 
because, even though it had such powers, it also would have to enjoy 
the natural and legitimate freedom of exercising them in the sense dic- 
tated, by their conscience to the members thereof, — the real fact is that 
as the opinion of the Joint Commission is equally divided, on the sub- 
ject, the solution of the difficulty becomes impossible. 

The American Commission will surely not contend that in the event 
of conflict, or tieiug of its vote with that of the Spanish Commission, 
theirs should prevail and be given the character of a decision of the 
Joint Commission. 

And inasmuch as the United States do not claim anything more than 
a recognition of the right which, according to them, they have under 
the Protocol to ask the sovereignty over the archipelago, but do not go 
to the extreme of saying that they also have the right to demand of the 
conference that their petition be acceded to, and force the same upon 
it as if it were an order, the impossibility of the petition of the Amer- 
ican Government being complied with, and consequently of the sov- 
ereignty over the archipelago being secured by it through the only 
lawful title which it professes and acknowledges as the only mode of 
transfer, becomes manifest. 

What are the consequences of so harassing and unyielding a situa- 
tion? The rupture of negotiations? The consequent renewal of 
hostilities? 

Is there anyone who will not halt in the presence of such terrible 
consequences? Is there anyone who will entertain the idea that it is 
not better before submitting to them to resort to some other means that 
good faith cannot fail to suggest to the Contracting Parties? 

And what is that means? 

Both Commissions might very well agree to leave the question relat- 
ing to the sovereignty over the Philippine Islands out of their own 
negotiations and reserve it for direct negotiations to be opened between 
the two Governments, and continue in the meanwhile their discussion 
of all the other points to be embodied in the treaty of peace. This 
method, which at first sight appears so simple, is nevertheless fraught 
with serious dangers, and signally those which might exist now were 
the negotiations broken off, with the only advantage of putting the 
dangers off for a short while. Should the two High Parties fail to 
agree, the situation would be the same as that which now confronts the 
Paris conference. 

In the opinion of the Spanish Commission, there is another means 
more simple still and surer, which consists in an agreement by the two 
Commissions to propose to their Governments that an arbitrator or an 
arbitration tribunal, constituted in the manner by them agreed upon, 
shall determine the true sense in which Articles III and VI of the 
Protocol of Washington should be taken. 

The difference of opinion between the two Commissions lies princi- 
pally in the different sense each gives to those articles. 

This appears from their respective memoranda. 

Now, it seems that if ever in international conflicts there is, or may 
be, anything which men of good will should endeavor to settle by the 
force of justice, or even by the dictates of equity, instead of force of 
arms, it is that which consists in a difference of interpretation of an 
article of any treaty previously agreed upon, arising out of the attempt 
to put it into execution. 



196 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Sovereigns may, through a feeling of natural pride, refuse to submit 
to the judgment of a third that which affects their honor or even their 
amour-propre. They may not wish to entrust to such a judgment the 
existence or even the integrity of their states. But it is inconceivable 
that in the face of the modern and Christian world they should prefer 
covering the earth with corpses and deluging it with human blood, to 
submitting to it their own opinion, in matters so exposed to the falli- 
bility of the mind of men, such as cannot fail to be the proper sense to 
be given to an article of a convention, concluded upon matters which 
are alien and foreign to the above sacred subjects. 

The United States are among the peoples of the civilized world those 
which, to their glory, have taken the initiative and have shown the 
most decided interest in resorting to this means so humane, so rational, 
and so Christian, rather than to the bloody one of war, to settle con- 
troversies between nations. 

As far back as 1835 the Senate of Massachusetts approved a measure 
presented by the American Peace Association urging the creation of 
an international court to settle amicably and finally all difficulties 
between countries. 

In 1851 the Committee on Foreign Relations of Washington {sic) 
unanimously declared that it was desirable for the United States to 
insert in its treaties a clause whereby differences which could not be 
settled diplomatically should be submitted before the outbreak of hos- 
tilities to the judgment of arbitrators. 

In 1853 the Senate approved the report of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. In 1873 the Senate again, and in 1874 the two Houses, reaf- 
firmed this humanitarian aspiration. And, finally, in 1888, not satisfied 
with having marked out their own line of couduet in so laudable a 
direction, both Houses agreed by Joint Resolution to request the Pres- 
ident to use his influence from time to time to bind all governments 
maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States to submit all 
questions that might arise between them in the future to the judgment 
of arbitrators. 

The Spanish Commissioners hope that the case which presents itself 
before the Paris Conference will not lead the United States to depart 
from such glorious precedents, and seek to settle the matter by the last 
means which although never lawful among rational and free beings is 
sadly inevitable, in preference to other means more humane, conducive 
to preserve unalterable peace among men. 

True copy : 

Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 15. Protocolo No. 15. 

Conference of November 21, 1898. Confer encia del 21 de Noviembre 

de 1898. 

The session having been post- Habiendose aplazado la sesion a 

poned, at the request of the peticion de los Comisarios Anieri- 

Americau Commissioners, till Mon- cauos hasta el Lunes 21 del corri- 

day the 21st of November, on that ente a las 2 p. m. se hallaron en 

day there were dichos dia y hora. 

Present: On the part of the Presences Por parte de los 

United States : Messrs. Day, Davis, Estados Unidos de America, los 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



197 



Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergus- 
son. 

On the part of Spain : Messrs. 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, G-aruica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission presented a reply to 
the Memorandum presented by the 
Spanish Commissioners at the last 
session on the subject of the Philip- 
pines. In so doing, he called atten- 
tion to the concluding part of the 
reply, and suggested that it be read. 
But, before it was read, he stated 
that he desired to say that the 
American Commissioners had care- 
fully examined the very able argu- 
ment of the Spanish Commission- 
ers, but had felt obliged to adhere 
to their construction of the powers 
of the Joint Commission under the 
Protocol. The Joint Commission 
had been in session for several 
weeks, and it was the opinion of 
the American Commissioners that 
a conclusion should be reached. 
They had consulted their Govern- 
ment and had decided to make con- 
cessions, which were embodied in 
the concluding part of their reply, 
which was intended to bring the 
discussion immediately to a close. 



The concluding part of the reply 
of the American Commissioners 
was then read by their Interpreter 
to the Spanish Commissioners. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission, after the close of the 
reading, stated that if the memo- 
randum of the American Commis- 
sioners contained nothing more 
than what had just been read, he 
could give an immediate answer; 
but, as it was necessary to trans- 
late and to become acquainted with 
the preceding part, some time 
would be needed iu which to pre- 
pare a reply. He then proposed 
that the Commissioners meet on 
Wednesday the 23rd instant, un- 
less something should arise to re- 
quire a postponement. 



Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana, los Seiiores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana presento una contesta- 
tion al Memoradum presentado por 
los Comisarios Espanoles en la ulti- 
ma sesion relativo a las Filipinas. 

Al hacerlo asi 11a mo la aten- 
cion sobre la parte final de su con- 
testacion y manifesto su deseo de 
que se diera lectura de ella. Pero 
autes de que fuera leida, dijo que 
deseaba hacer constar que los 
Comisarios Americanos habian con- 
siderado atentamente los argu- 
mentos habilisimos de los Comisa- 
rios Espanoles; pero que]se veian 
obligados a adherirse a su inter- 
pretacion de las facultades de la 
Comision en pleno segiiu los ter- 
minos del protocolo. Dicha Comi- 
sion habia prolongado sus labores 
durante varias semanas, y en vista 
de esto los Comisarios Americanos 
opinaban que debia llegarse a un 
resultado final. Habian consul- 
tado a su Gobicrno y decidido hacer 
las concesiones que estaban con- 
signadas al final de su contestacion, 
y cuyo objeto era el de terminal" de 
una vez la discusion. 

La ultima parte de dicha contes- 
tacion fue vertida verbalmente al 
Castellauo por el Interprete de la 
Comision Americana. 

El Presidente de la Comisi6n 
Espaiiolamanifiestaque si el Memo- 
randum de los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos no contuviese otra cosa que 
lo que acababa de leerse podria dar 
una contestacion inmediata; pero 
que como habia que traducir y en- 
terarse de lo que precedia a su parte 
ultima, se necesitariaalgun tiempo 
para dar una respuesta. Propuso 
en seguida que las Comisiones se 
reuniesen el Miercoles 23, a menos 
que surja algun incidente que exija 
un aplazamiento. 



198 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The American Commissioners Asienten los Comisarios Ameri- 

concurring, it was agreed to ad- canos y se acuerda que se levante 

journ the conference to the 23rd of la sesion liasta el Miercoles 23 de 

November, without prejudice to the Noviembre a las 2 p. m, sin perju- 

right of the Spanish Commissioners icio del derecbo de aplazarla que 

to ask for a postponement. assiste a los Comisarios Bspanoles. 

William R. Day E. Montero Rios 

Cushman K. Davis B. de Abarzuza 

Wm P Frye J. DE G ARNICA 

Geo. Gray W R de Villa Urrutia 

Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero 

John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 15. 

reply of the american commissioners to the memorandum 
presented by the spanish commissioners on november 16, 

1898. 

The American Commissioners have examined the memoraduin of the 
Spanish Commissioners with that deliberate care and attention which 
they have been accustomed to bestow upon all the representations 
which those Commissioners have been pleased to submit touching the 
questions before the conference. 

They note, in the first place, that the Spanish Commissioners dis- 
claim any intention by their paper of the 3rd of November to withdraw 
their previous acceptance of the American articles on the subject of 
Cuba, Porto Rico and the other Spanish islands in the West Indies, 
and the Island of Guam in the Ladrones. 

This disclaimer, in spite of the form in which it is expressed, the 
American Commissioners would be content simply to accept without 
comment, were it not for the fact that it is accompanied with certain 
observations on the so-called Cuban debt that impose upon them the 
necessity of recurring to what they have previously said on that subject. 

In citing the Royal Decrees of 1886 and 1890, and the contents of the 
bonds issued thereunder, as something with which the American Com- 
missioners were previously unacquainted, the Spanish Commissioners 
seem to have overlooked or forgotten the paper which the American 
Commissioners presented on the 14th of October. In that paper the 
American Commissioners expressly mentioned and described the finan- 
cial measures of 1880' and 1890 and the stipulations of the bonds thereby 
authorized. But they did more than this. Being concerned with the 
substance rather than with the form of the matter, they reviewed with 
some minuteness the history of the debt and the circumstances of its 
creation. They showed that it was in reality contracted by the Spanish 
Government for national purposes; that its foundations were laid more 
than twenty years before the Royal Decree of 1886, and at a time when 
the revenues of the island were actually producing a surplus, in national 
enterprises in Mexico and San Domingo, foreign to the interests of Cuba; 
and that it was soon afterwards swollen to enormous dimensions as the 
result of the imposition upon Cuba, as a kind of penalty, of the 
national expenses incurred in the efforts to suppress by force of arms 
the ten years' war for the independence of the island. At this point 



TREATY OF PEACE. 199 

the American Commissioners in their paper of the 14th of October 
referred to the financial operation of 1886, but they properly referred 
to it in its true character of a national act for the consolidation or 
funding of debts previously incurred by the Spanish Government, and 
expressly quoted the national guaranty that appears on the face of the 
bonds. At the risk of a repetition which should be unnecessary, the 
American Commissioners will quote from their paper of the 14th of 
October the following paragraph : 

"Subsequently the Spanish Government undertook to consolidate 
these debts [i. e., the debts incurred in Mexico, San Domingo, and the 
ten years' war] and to this end created in 1886 the so-called BUletes 
Mpotecarios de la Isla de Cuba, to the amount of 020,000,000 pesetas, or 
$124,000,000. The Spanish Government undertook to pay these bonds 
and the interest thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national 
character of the debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the 
bonds, "the Spanish Nation" (la Nation Espanola) guaranteed their 
payment. The annual charge for interest and sinking fund on account 
of this debt amounted to the sum of 30,191,000 pesetas, or $7,838,200, 
which was disbursed through a Spanish financial institution, called the 
Banco Hispano- Colonial, which is said to have collected daily from the 
custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum 
of $33,339 ". 

The American Commissioners then referred in the same paper to the 
authorization by the Spanish Government in 1890 of a new issue of 
bonds, apparently with a view to refund the prior debt as well as to 
cover any new debts contracted between 1880 and 1890, and stated 
that, after the renewal of the struggle for independence in February, 
1895, this issue was diverted from its original purpose to that of rais- 
ing funds for the suppression of the insurrection. 

The American Commissioners are at a loss to perceive how, in recit- 
ing these transactions, in which past and not future obligations were 
dealt with, they could have been understood to intimate that Spaiu, 
through what is described in the Spanish memorandum as a "super- 
natural gift of divination," foresaw the insurrection of 1895 and the 
ultimate intervention of the United States. The American Commis- 
sioners will not indulge in the ready retort which this fanciful effort at 
sarcasm invites. Whether the consequences of imposing upon Cuba 
burdens not to be borne, were or were not foreseen by Spain, is a ques- 
tion upon which it would be idle now to speculate. 

As to the special "Cuban War Emergency Loan," composed of "five 
per cent peseta bonds," which were referred to as part of what was con- 
sidered in Spain as properly constituting the Cuban debt, the American 
Commissioners expressly declared that it did not appear that in these 
bonds the revenues of Cuba were mentioned. 

The American Commissioners, in reviewing in their paper of the 14th 
of October the history of the so-called Cuban debt, necessarily invited 
the fullest examination of their statements. They have yet to learn 
that those statements contained any error. 

They freely admit, however, that they had never seen it asserted, till 
they read the assertion in the Spanish memorandum, that the deficien- 
cies in the Cuban appropriation bills or budgets which the debts are 
said to represent were "due to the great reductions of taxes made in 
Cuba by the mother country." If, as they are now assured, this is a 
fact " well known," they are compelled to admit that they were, and 
that they still remain, ignorant of it. Indeed, the American Commis- 
sioners were not aware that Cuban appropriation bills or budgets 



200 TREATY OF PEACE, 

existed prior to 1880, in May of which year the first measure of the 
kind was submitted to the Spanish Cortes. During the discussion of 
that budget, a distinguished Senator, not a Cuban, who had been Min- 
ister of State in the Spanish Cabinet, SeuorDon ServandoRuiz Gomez, 
presented to the Senate an official statement of the Colonial Depart- 
ment, showing that the alleged debts of Cuba amounted to $126,834,- 
419.25 in gold and $45,300,070 in paper, or, in round numbers, $140,000,000 
in gold. 

It is true that after 1880, and especially after 1886, deficiencies 
appeared in the budgets, but a correct conception of their cause may 
be derived from the budget of 1886-1887, when the prior debts were 
consolidated. The amount of the burdens imposed upon Cuba by that 
budget, eight years, as the Spanish memorandum observes, "after the 
reestablish nient of peace," was $25,959,734.79, which was distributed 
as follows: 

General obligations $10, 853, 836. 79 

Department of Justice 863,022.22 

Department of War 6,730,977.17 

Department of the Treasury 903,326.29 

Department of the Navy .„ 1,434,211.40 

Department of the Interior 3,935,658.92 

Department of Fomeuto 1, 238, 702. 00 

$25, 959, 734. 79 

Gf the sum total of this burden, it is seen that the three items of 
General Gbligations, War, and Navy, constitute nearly three-fourths. 
And what were the " General Obligations " ? The principal item — 
nine-tenths of the whole — was that of $9,617,423.02, for interest, sink- 
ing fund, and incidental expenses, on the so-called Cuban debt. The 
rest went chiefly for pensions to Spanish officials. 

The budget for 1890-1897 amounted to $28,583,132.23. 

These figures, which speak for themselves, seem to render peculiarly 
infelicitous the novel suggestion that the deficiencies in the Cuban 
budgets have been due to the reduction of taxes. 

As to that part of the Spanish memorandum in which the so-called 
Cuban bonds are treated as "mortgage bonds," and the rights of the 
holders as "mortgage rights," it is necessary to say only that the legal 
difference between the pledge of revenues yet to be derived from taxa- 
tion and a mortgage of property cannot be confused by calling the 
two things by the same name. In this, as in another instance, the 
American Commissioners are able to refer to previous statements 
which, although the Spanish memorandum betrays no recollection of 
them, for obvious reasons remain unchallenged. The American Com- 
missioners have shown, in their argument of the 27th of October, that 
the Spanish Government itself has not considered its pledge of the 
revenues of Cuba as in any proper legal sense a mortgage, but as a 
matter entirely within its control. In proof of this fact the American 
Commissioners quoted in that argument certain provisions of the decree 
of autonomy for Cuba and Porto Kico, signed by the Queen Kegent of 
Spain on the 25th of November 1897, and countersigned by Senor 
Sagasta, as President of the Council of Ministers. By that decree it 
was declared that the manner of meeting the expenditures occasioned 
by the debt which burdened "the Cuban and Spanish treasury" should 
"form the subject of a law" wherein should be "determined the part 
payable by each of the treasuries, and the special means of paying the 
interest thereon, and of the amortization thereof, and, if necessary, ot 
paying the principal:" that, when the "apportionment" should have 



TREATY OF PEACE. 201 

been "made by the Cortes," each of the treasuries should "make pay- 
ment of the part assigned to it," and, finally, that "engagements con- 
tracted with creditors under the pledge of the good faith of the Spanish 
nation shall in all cases be scrupulously respected." 

In these declarations the American Commissioners find, as they 
stated in the argument above referred to, "a clear assertion not only 
of the power of the Government of Spain to deal with the so-called 
Cuban debt as a national debt, but also a clear admission that the 
pledge of the revenues of Cuba was wholly within the control of that 
Government, and could be modified or withdrawn by it at will without 
affecting the obligation of the debt," and, so long as the stipulated pay- 
ments upon the debt were made, without violating the engagements ot 
Spain with her creditors. 

No more in the opinion of the Spanish Government, therefore, than 
in point of law, can it be maintained that that Government's promise 
to devote to the payment of a certain part of the national debt reve- 
nues yet to be raised by taxation in Cuba, constituted in any legal 
sense a mortgage. The so-called pledge of those revenues constituted, 
in fact and in law, a pledge of the good faith and ability of Spain to 
pay to a certain class of her creditors a certain part of her future reve- 
nues. They obtained no other security, beyond the guarantee of the 
"Spanish Nation," which was in reality the only thing that gave sub- 
stance or value to the pledge, or to which they could resort for its 
performance. 

One more remark, and the American Commissioners have done with 
the renewed discussion into which they regret to have been obliged to 
enter on the subject of the so-called Cuban debt. The Spanish Com- 
missioners are correct in saying that the Government of the United 
States repeatedly urged Spain to reestablish peace in Cuba, and did 
not exclude the use of arms for that purpose; but the impression con- 
veyed by this partial statement of facts is altogether erroneous, as is 
also the implied representation that Spain's course in the matter may 
be considered as a compliance with the demands of the United States. 
Tlie Government of the United States did indeed repeatedly demand 
that order be reestablished in Cuba; but through long years of patient 
waiting it also tried and exhausted all the efforts of diplomacy to induce 
Spain to end the war by granting to the island either independence or 
a substantial measure of self-government. As early as the spring of 
1869, not long after the deepening gloom of the ten years' war began 
to settle upon the island, the United States offered its mediation and 
its credit for the reestablish ment of peace between Spain and her 
colony. Spain then as afterwards preferred war to the relinquishment 
of her rule, and the United States did not assume to discuss the legiti- 
macy of the expenses incurred in the pursuit of that policy. But the 
question of Spain's right to incur those expenses, and that of her right 
or her power to fasten them as a perpetual burden upon the revenues 
of Cuba, after those revenues have passed beyond her control, are 
questions between which the American Commissioners feel neither diffi- 
culty nor hesitation in declaring and maintaining a fundamental differ- 
ence both in law and in morals. 

The American Commissioners, before passing to the principal subject 
before the conference, will briefly notice that part of the Spanish mem- 
orandum which treats of the occupation of Manila by the American 
forces. 

With the elaborate references to the apparent implication in a pre- 
vious paper that General Merritt and Admiral Dewey might have 



202 TREATY OF PEACE. 

knowingly violated the armistice in their capture of Manila a few hours 
after its signature, and with the new remarks about Admiral Dewey's 
draconian order, the spontaneousness of his kind feelings, and other 
and similar phrases, we do not occupy ourselves; nor with the objec- 
tions to our use of the word "fled "in describing the escape of the 
Spanish General before the surrender. We are entirely content on 
these points with the record. For the same reason we pass without 
comment the remark concerning the claim for indemnity "on similar 
grounds" in the Philippines that "on first sight this argument is not 
wanting in force; but the American Commissioners know perfectly well 
that this is only apparent, and that what did occur proves absolutely 
the contrary." We interpret this apparent charge of intentional deceit 
in the light of the valued assurance given in another part of the same 
paper by the Spanish Commissioners when they, themselves, admit 
that "no language or even a phrase improper to a diplomatic discussion 
has been used by them "and "they avoid with the greatest care the 
use of any phrase which might be personally unpleasant." 

With regard to what is stated in the Spauish memorandum as to the 
occupation of territory as a guaranty in time of peace, and the limita- 
tions that are usually affixed to such occupation, the American Com- 
missioners have only to advert to the fact that, as has often been 
observed by the Spauish Government in its communications, the state 
of war between the United States and Spain is not yet ended. In its 
original demands, just as in the Protocol of August 12, the United 
States declared that it would "occupy and hold the city, bay and har- 
bor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace." These 
words imported a military occupation, with all its usual incidents, 
political and administrative, during the continuance of the state of war. 

The distinction between the occupation of territory as a guaranty 
in time of peace, and the military occupation of the enemy's territory 
in time of war, is well illustrated in the case of Prance and Germany in 
1871, which the Spanish memorandum, unfortunately for its purpose, 
cites in support of its contention as to the nature of the American 
occupation of Manila under the Protocol. By a convention concluded 
on January 28, 1871, Prance and Germany agreed to a general armis- 
tice, which took effect immediately in Paris and three days later in the 
departments. Under this convention the belligerent armies were to 
preserve their respective positions, which were separated by a definite 
line of demarcation, and, simply in recognition of the nature of the 
occupation, each of the armies reserved the right "to maintain its 
authority in the territory that it occupies, and to employ such means as 
may be considered necessary for the purpose by its commanders." By 
a subsequent convention of February 15, 1871, the fortified town of 
Belfort, which was besieged by the Germans, but had not been taken 
when the armistice was made, was brought within the German lines of 
occupation. On February 26, 1871, the belligerent powers concluded a 
preliminary treaty of peace. By this treaty, which, unlike the conven- 
tion for an armistice, required the formal ratification of the two govern- 
ments, the sovereignty of France over Alsace-Lorraine was renounced, 
and provision made for the payment to Germany besides of a war 
indemnity. By an additional convention signed on the same day it 
was agreed that the German troops should "refrain for the future from 
raising contributions in money in the occupied territories," but, on the 
other hand, it was declared that the German authorities should "con- 
tinue to collect the state taxes" therein. And it was provided by the 
preliminary treaty that not until the conclusion aud ratification of the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 203 

definitive treaty of peace should "the administration of the depart- 
ments" remaining "in German occupation" be "restored to the French 
authorities ". 

"The United States will occupy and hold," so reads the Protocol, 
"the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty 
of peace". These brief words obviously and necessarily imported the 
military occupation, in time of war, though not of active hostilities, of 
a designated territory, with the usual incidents of such occupation, 
and not an occupation as a guarantee in time of peace. From the 
incidents of one kind of occupation nothing is to be inferred as to the 
incidents of the other, for the simple reason that the two things are 
different in their nature. The occupation by a belligerent army of a 
hostile territory is conceded to involve the exercise of a paramount 
power of control which would be utterly inconsistent with the rights of 
the titular sovereign over his territory and its inhabitants in time of 
peace. 

The American Commissioners have examined with special care that 
part of the Spanish memorandum which deals with the " control, dis- 
position and government of the Philippines", and to the consideration 
of that subject they will now address themselves. 

The American Commissioners are obliged at the outset to call atten- 
tion to the fact that the present argument of the Spanish Commissioners 
contains the same defects as the previous one, in being directed against 
a position which the American Commissioners not only have never 
assumed, but which they expressly repudiate. The American Com- 
missioners now repeat that their proposal for the cession of the Philip- 
pines is neither based nor alleged to be based upon a specific concession 
of Spanish sovereignty in the Protocol, but upon the right secured to 
the United States by that instrument to make in the negotiations for 
peace such demands on the subject as it should then deem appropriate 
under the circumstances. The only obligation therefore now resting 
upon the American Commissioners is to show not that their proposals 
in regard to the Philippines are founded on the Protocol, in the same 
sense as their demands in the case of Cuba, Porto Pico, and Guam, 
but that those proposals are embraced within the right thereby 
expressly secured to the United States to make demands in the future. 

In the light of this plain and simple proposition, which is sustained 
not only by the Protocol itself, but by every document referred to or 
quoted in the present discussion, how idle and unavailing is the char- 
acterization of the present demands of the United states as "tardy", 
as well as the insinuation that that Government in postponing, with 
the express concurrence of Spain, the formulation of its demands, was 
guilty of a want of "frankness"! 

The American Commissioners are gratified to find in the passages 
quoted in the Spanish memorandum from Mr. Cambon's reports of his 
conferences with the President, the amplest confirmation of their posi- 
tion. Those reports, as quoted by the Spanish Commissioners, show 
that the Spanish Government, far from asking, in any proper sense of 
the word, "explanations" of the phrase "control, disposition and gov- 
ernment", fully understood its meaning, and sought but failed to obtain 
a limitation of it. Indeed, there is not to be found from first to last a 
suggestion that if the words "control, disposition and government" 
were allowed to stand they did not embrace the amplest right to deal 
with Spanish sovereignty in the islands. 

In this relation it is the duty of the American Commissioners to notice 
the fact that the Spanish memorandum, in comparing the reports of 



204 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Cambon with those quoted by the American Commissioners, inti- 
mates that the former are entitled to preference because they were con- 
temporaneous. But the record quoted by the American Commissioners 
was also contemporaneous, and was made by the Secretary of State 
under the supervision of the President himself. With this observation, 
the American Commissioners will pursue their argument. 

In his report of the conversation of the 30th of July, Mr. Cambon is 
quoted as stating that "the President of the Pepublic was firm in not 
changing the terms of Article III", bat that, as the result of an appeal 
to his generosity, he consented to substitute the word "disposition" 
for "possession." 

The American Commissioners have already stated that the President 
refused to change the word "possession" except for a word of equally 
extensive meaning, and that the reason for which Mr. Cambon was 
understood to desire the change was that the word "possession" would, 
when translated into Spanish, seem to be of a severe and threatening 
nature. The meaning of Mr. Cambon, as defined in his report to the 
Spanish Government, was that the word "disposition" did not "pre- 
judge" the result of the negotiations, and that it had not so "compre- 
hensive" a meaning as the word "possession." 

The American Commissioners are unable to concur in Mr. Cambon's 
estimate of the relative comprehensiveness of these two English words; 
but they are obliged to point out, as a matter more material to the 
present discussion, that he does not, as the Spanish Commissioners 
affirm, allege that he "accepted the change because he understood that 
all question about the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Islands 
was thereby eliminated". On the contrary, his only claim is that the 
word "disposition" did not "prejudge" the "result" of the "negotia- 
tion". His understanding therefore appears to have been precisely the 
opposite of that ascribed to him in the Spanish memorandum. 

That this is the case is confirmed beyond all peradventure by the 
unsuccessful efforts subsequently made by Mr. Cambon, under instruc- 
tions of the Government at Madrid, to obtain a limitation of the Ameri- 
can demand, as it then and has ever since stood, that the treaty of 
peace should determine " the control, disposition and government of 
the Philippines". 

The telegram of the Spanish Government to Mr. Cambon, in relation 
to this demand, has now for the first time been disclosed to representa- 
tives of the Government of the United States. What other instruc- 
tions Mr. Cambon may then have had in his possession, it is not material 
to conjecture. But, according to his own report, as quoted in the 
Spanish memorandum, he requested the President, in the interview of 
the 3rd of August, " to have the kindness to state as precisely as pos- 
sible his intentions in regard to the Philippine Islands. On this 
point," continues Mr. Cambon, " I told him ' the answer of the Federal 
Government is couched in terms that may lend themselves to all claims 
on the part of the United States, and consequently to all apprehensions 
of Spain in regard to her sovereignty.' " 

Here is a clear declaration of Mr. Cambon that the phrase "control, 
disposition and government", admitted of "all claims" on the part of 
the United States", and that it created apprehensions on the part 
of Spain in regard to her "sovereignty"; and he asked, not for an 
"explanation" of the phrase, but for a statement by the President, as 
"precisely as possible", of his "intentions". In other words, Mr. 
Cambon, acting under the instructions of the Spanish Government, 
endeavored to obtain at that time a statement of the demands which 



TREATY OF PEACE. 205 

the United States would make in regard to the sovereignty of Spain, 
and thereby at least an implied limitation of the rights in that regard. 
The reply of the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, shows that he 
was firm in his determination both to retain the precise words of the 
demand and the full liberty of action which they secured. On this sub- 
ject the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, declared that he did 
not want "any misunderstanding to remain"; nothing was decided as 
against either Government; the negotiators of the treaty of peace must 
determine the matter. 

This is from first to last the sum and substance of Mr. Cambon's 
reports, as quoted in the Spanish memorandum. The recurrence in 
that memorandum to Mr. Cambon's apparently casual use of the words 
"permanent advantages", as an evidence that sovereignty was not in 
question, when he himself declares that the words "control, disposition 
and government" lent themselves to "all claims" and therefore raised 
apprehension as to Spain's "sovereignty", discloses the infirmity of the 
contention in which the argument is employed. Indeed, the words 
"permanent advantages" are not in the context of Mr. Cambon invested 
with the importance which the Spanish memorandum now ascribes to 
them. As the American Commissioners pointed out on a previous 
occasion, it is not pretended that Mr. Cambon attempted to report the 
original words of the President, who spoke in English; and, immedi- 
ately after attributing to the President words which he translates by 
the terms "permanent advantages", Mr. Cambon narrates the Presi- 
dent's undoubted declaration that the "control, disposition and gov- 
ernment" of the Philippines must be determined in the treaty of peace, 
in advance of which the case was not to be considered as decided 
against either Government. 

In his report of the interview of the 9th of August, Mr. Cambon, as 
quoted in the Spanish memorandum, states that, when the note of the 
Spanish Government of the 7th of that month, in reply to the Amer- 
ican demands, was read, the President and the Secretary of State were 
visibly displeased, and that, after a long silence, the President objected 
to that part of the reply which related to the evacuation of Cuba and 
Porto Pico. The Spanish memorandum declares that neither the Presi- 
dent nor the Secretary of State advanced any other reason than this 
for their displeasure, and that, "according to Mr. Cambon, these gentle- 
men said nothing during theconversation respecting the said reservation 
made by Spain of her sovereignty over the archipelago". As no direct 
assertion to this effect by Mr. Cambon is quoted, the American Com- 
missioners are obliged to assume that he made none, and that the state- 
ment in the Spanish memorandum is a mere inference from an omission 
to report what was said on the subject of the Philippines. This omission 
may be accounted for by the fact that Mr. Cambon, although he had 
previously declared that the American demand admitted of " all claims " 
on the part of the United States, expressed and maintained the opin- 
ion that the Spanish reply fully accepted it, and therefore left nothing 
in that regard to be conceded, while in respect of the demand for the 
evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico, which was to be immediate, the 
reservation by Spain of the approval of the Cortes, which was not then 
in session, presented an obstacle to an agreement. This objection he 
deemed it necessary to report, since it required, in his own opinion, a 
modification of Spain's reply to the American demands. But whatever 
may have been the cause of the omission, it is a fact that no small part 
of the "visible displeasure" of the President and the Secretary of 
State arose from the apparent design, upon which comment was duly 



206 TREATY OF PEACE. 

made, in some way to limit the scope of the demand in regard to the 
Philippines — a design then as ever afterwards frustrated. In the 
opinion of the American Commissioners the note in question was far 
from "explicit'- ; nor can it be maintained that the President, while 
hearing that note with "visible displeasure" and adhering with "real 
stubbornness " to the phrase "control, disposition and government", 
because it "prejudged" nothing, at the same time accepted the words 
of limitation. 

But what does Mr. Cambon say as to the introduction of the subject 
of the Protocol, which had not previously been suggested ? After further 
conversation the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, said: "There 
might be a means of putting an end to all misunderstanding; we might 
draw up a projet, which shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain 
in the same terms in which I have already framed them, and which shall 
establish the terms within which there shall be named on the one hand 
the Plenipotentiaries charged with negotiating the treaty of peace in 
Paris, and on the other band the special Commissioners entrusted with 
the determination of the details of the evacuation of Cuba and Porto 
Eico." 

The American Commissioners are unable to perceive the "immense 
difference" between this version of the President's words and that 
given in their own paper. The President suggests a means for putting 
an end, not to any particular misunderstanding, but to "all misunder- 
standing." And how does he propose to do this? By drawing up a 
Protocol, which "shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain," 
not with qualifications, reservations or explanations, but "in the same 
terms in which I have already framed tbem." There was not, nor could 
there be, any misapprehension as to the meaning aud effect of these 
words, nor was any betrayed in the telegram, heretofore quoted by the 
American Commissioners, in which Mr. Cambon advised the Spanish 
Government that the Government of the United States had "decided 
to state precisely (preciscr), in a Protocol, the bases upon which peace 
negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon." 

With this telegram Mr. Cambon communicated the text of the Pro- 
tocol; and if his telegraphic summary of the note of the Secretary of 
State of the 10th of August was, as the Spanish Commissioners admit, 
inaccurate, it is equally true that his previous telegram conveyed with 
no uncertainty the purpose of the United States in requiring the adop- 
tion of a Protocol. 

If the fact were less clear than it is, that the refusal of the President 
to accept the Spanish reply of the 7th of August as in any respect a 
satisfactory answer to the demands of the United States, gave rise to 
the Protocol, the American Commissioners would deem it proper to 
examine in detail the references to that note in the Spanish memoran- 
dum. But they will, under the circumstances, merely advert to the 
statement that Spain in the paragraph relating to the Philippines 
explicitly "reserved" her sovereignty over the archipelago, the impli- 
cation being that she expressly withdrew it from the sphere of negotia- 
tion. The language of the note is, however, that " the Spanish Gov- 
ernment must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they 
do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago." 
This language, instead of withdrawing the sovereignty from discussion, 
implies that it may, as the result of the negotiations, be necessary to 
renounce it. The American contention, however, does not require fur- 
ther analysis of the note of August 7 than has been given in this and 
the preceding memoranda of the American Commissioners. It was 



TREATY OF PEACE. 207 

rejected by the President, and the final agreement of the parties 
reduced to the clear and unequivocal terms of the Protocol. 

The Spanish Commissioners endeavor to argue that there could have 
been no intention to include in the powers of this Joint Commission the 
question of the sovereignty of the Philippines, because the Secretary 
of State of the United States, in his note of the 30th of July last, after 
stating the demands of his Government, added: "If the terms hereby 
offered are accepted in their entirety, Commissioners will be named by 
the United States to meet similarly authorized Commissioners on the 
part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of 
peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated." 
Is the " unexpressed demand " of the United States, inquire the Spanish 
Commissioners, for the cession of an immense territory, understood by 
the American Commissioners to be a detail of the treaty of peace? 

The American Commissioners have no difficulty in replying that they 
do so understand it, but not in the sense which the question implies. 
It is evident that the Spanish memorandum seeks to construe the lan- 
guage of the Secretary of State as if he had used in connection with 
the word " details " the word "unimportant," and actually proposed to 
refer to the Commissioners the settlement of only " unimportant details." 
It should seem unnecessary to say, however, that in speaking of 
"details" he merely referred to the particulars of the treaty as consid- 
ered separately and in relation to the whole. It can hardly be sup- 
posed that if the two Governments had intended that the negotiations 
of the treaty of peace should be occupied with details of little impor- 
tance, they would each have sent five commissioners to a neutral capital 
for the purpose of arranging them. 

But it is argued by the Spanish Commissioners that the words "con- 
trol, disposition and government", even taken by themselves, do not 
comprehend the subject of sovereignty, but merely that of governmental 
"reforms". To the American Commissioners such an interpretation is 
incomprehensible. If nothing but "reforms" had been intended, it 
could never have occurred to either party to employ for that purpose 
three words none of which expressed its meaning, while each of them 
contained a broader one. On the other hand, the use of the word 
"sovereignty" in conjunction with the words actually employed was 
unnecessary, while, if used alone, it would have defeated the very 
object of postponing the whole subject of the Philippines for future 
determination. "Control, disposition and government" included every- 
thing. "Sovereignty" would have excluded everything but itself, and 
have left to future determination merely the question of its own exist- 
ence, supreme and unconditional. In the event of the United States 
desiring to take only a part of the archipelago, such a limitation of the 
scope of the negotiations would have been injurious to both parties. 

The Spanish Commissioners, however, have sought to restrict the 
meaning of the words "control, disposition and government," by an 
appeal to the French text, into which the original English was trans- 
lated; and as the French word " ■controW' ', by which "control" was 
translated, bears a significance less extensive than the latter, they seem 
to contend that all the other words, both in the English and in the 
French text, should be reduced to harmony with it. 

To the American Commissioners, this argument appears to involve 
the elimination of the entire English text and of the greater part of the 
French. It first strikes out, as at least superfluous, the English words 
"disposition and government," and the French words "disposition et 
gouvememenV s and then limits the meaning of the English "control" 



208 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to that of the French "controle". It thus virtually reduces the stipu 
lation to the single French word last mentioned. By no principle of 
construction can this process be defended. 

The American Commissioners are therefore, for the reasons which 
they have stated, compelled to maintain that by the plain and compre- 
hensive terms of the Protocol, as construed in their normal sense and 
in the light of all the circumstances of its adoption, the future of the 
Philippines was left, in the fullest measure, to the determination of this 
Joint Commission. 

This conclusion renders it necessary to answer the proposals of the 
Spanish Commissioners for the resignation by this Commission of its 
peacemaking functions under the Protocol of the 12th of August, and 
the transfer to other persons of the duty of determining the question 
now particularly before it. 

The Spanish Commissioners propose that the Joint Commission, shall, 
instead of disposing of the question of the Philippines, adopt one of 
the following courses: 

I. Kemit that question to the two Governments, for adjustment, if 
possible, by direct negotiation; or 

II. Advise those governments to submit it to an arbitration, in which 
the true sense of Articles III and VI shall be determined. 

To the first of these proposals it is sufficient to reply that bofh Gov- 
ernments have by the solemn engagement of the Protocol committed 
to their direct representatives here assembled the duty of concluding a 
definitive treaty of peace which shall determine the destiny of the 
archipelago. That these representatives shall, alter weeks of patient 
investigation and interchange of views in oral discussion and written 
argument, surrender their task unaccomplished to other representatives 
of the same Governments, is a suggestion which cannot be seriously 
enteitained. Indeed, the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners 
frankly admits that in the event of a new disagreement the situation 
would be the same as that which now confronts the Paris conference. 

It is equally futile now to invite arbitration as to the meaning of 
terms plainly expressed in the Protocol. " To avoid misunderstand- 
ing," as the United States declared in its note of the 10th of August, 
the precise agreement of the two Governments was put into a concise 
and simple form. Shall it be said that this Joint Commission is incap- 
able of interpreting the very compact under which it has assembled? 
The principle of international arbitration can have no application to 
such a case. To avoid war no government, it is believed, will do or 
suffer more than the one which the American Commissioners have the 
honor to represent in this conference. Unfortunately no way for arbi- 
tration was opened before the actual conflict began. Arbitration, as 
we have had occasion heretofore to observe, precedes war, to avoid its 
horrors; it does not come after the trial by battle to enable either party 
to escape its consequences. 

The American Commissioners, feeling that this body must accept the 
responsibility of reaching conclusions, must decline to ask the assist- 
ance of an arbitrator. It is true that the very constitution of a joint 
commission like the present presupposes a possible irreconcilable differ- 
ence of opinion of representatives of one nation opposed to others of 
equal number and authority. In such an event, nothing remains but 
for one of the contesting parties to yield its opinions in order that a 
peaceful solution may be reached. In the present case the American 
Commissioners have determined to make concessions to the extent 
embodied in the proposals which will conclude this memorandum. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 209 

The United States is accused by tbe Spanish Commissioners of harsh 
and severe measures in dealing with a discomfited enemy. In the 
light of events which led to and characterized the war, no less than of 
historical precedents which might be cited, this charge is found to be 
entirely groundless. 

For half a century the attempts of the Cubans to overthrow the 
sovereignty of Spain over the island, within a hundred miles of the 
shores of the United States, have produced serious disturbances in 
that country, grave and constant interference with its commerce, and 
frequent danger of the rupture of friendly relations with Spain. How 
could the conditions existing in the island be otherwise than of. vital 
concern to us? The Cubans were our neighbors, with whom our rela- 
tions were neeessarily intimate and extensive; and they had been 
engaged in a struggle for independence with stronger reasons than 
existed in our own case when we rebelled against the mother country. 
The revolution of 1805, like the prior attempts at independence, entailed 
upon us heavy burdens. It made it necessary to patrol our coasts, to 
tax both civil and military resources in order to detect and prevent 
expeditions from our shores in the interests of the insurgents, and to 
repress the natural sympathy of our citizens, while we remained passive 
witnesses of misery, bloodshed and starvation in a land of plenty almost 
within sight of our borders. At length came the destruction of tbe 
battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana, with the loss of 206 of her 
crew. While we may not attribute this catastrophe to the direct act of 
a Spauish official, it betrayed, in the opinion of the United States, such 
neglect or inability on the part of Spain to secure the safety of the ship 
of a friendly nation in the principal harbor of the island as to induce 
Congress to recite it as an outgrowth of conditions which required our 
intervention. 

War ensued; and in less than four months nearly all the ports of 
Cuba were blockaded, Santiago was taken, the Spanish lleets in the 
West Indies and the Philippines destroyed, Porto Rico was about to 
surrender, Manila was on the point of capitulating, and all the colonies 
of Spain lay practically at the mercy of the United States. This 
recital is made, not in an unbecoming spirit of triumph, but because 
it exhibits the conditions that existed, and the advantages that the 
United States enjoyed, when, preferring peace to war, it agreed to the 
Protocol. 

The Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum have in diplomatic 
words expressed their surprise at our want of magnanimity to a defeated 
country. How does the case appear in the light of what has been 
stated? We might have demanded from Spain indemnity in money 
for the cost of the war, which, even if no unforeseen contingencies occur, 
will have amounted to $240,000,000, at the close of the present calen- 
dar year, to say nothing of further expenses which will be required 
under the laws of the United States existing at the outbreak of the 
war. We might have required compensation for our injuries and losses, 
national as well as individual, prior to the outbreak of the war. Yet 
we have asked for no inoney. From the relinquishment of Spanish 
sovereignty in Cuba we derive no compensation. Porto Pico, Guam and 
the Philippines will bring burdens as well as benefits, and, regarded 
simply as indemnity, will be grossly inadequate to compensate the 
United States for the mere pecuniary cost of the war; and yet, in spite 
of all this, lor the sake of peace, we propose to make to Spain liberal 
concessions. Can we be justly charged Yvith abuse of our opportunities, 
T P 14 



210 TREATY OF PEACE. 

or with taking undue advantage of the misfortunes of an adversary? 
The American Commissioners can perceive no ground for such a charge. 
On the contrary, they think tbat the Spanish Commissioners should 
accept our terms at once, and restore peace between the two countries. 

Even if the United States were disposed to permit Spanish sover- 
eignty to remain over the Philippines, and to leave to Spain the resto- 
ration of peace and order in the islands, could it now in honor do so? 
The Spanish Commissioners have, themselves, in an earlier stage of 
these negotiations, spoken of the Filipinos as our allies. This is not a 
relation which the Government of the United States intended to estab- 
lish ; but it must at least be admitted that the insurgent chiefs returned 
and resumed their activity with the consent of our military and naval 
commanders, who permitted them to arm with Aveapons which we had 
captured from the Spaniards, and assured them of fair treatment and 
justice. Should we be justified in now surrendering these people to the 
Government of Spain, even under a promise of amnesty, which we 
know they would not accept? 

If, on the other hand, the United States should be content to retain 
Luzon alone, could anything but trouble be expected from the division 
of the group? Would not contrasts in government, in modes of admin- 
istration, and in the burdens of taxation, in different islands lying so 
closely together, but largely inhabited by kindred peoples, produce 
discontent among the inhabitants? If the natives of the islands that 
remained under Spanish rule should, as doubtless would be the case, 
continue in insurrection, would not the natives of the American islands 
endeavor to help them, by fitting out hostile expeditions and furnishing 
arms and supplies? Would not complaints then be made by one Gov- 
ernment against the other, leading to crimination and recrimination 
and probably in the end to another international war? 

The situation that has arisen in the Philippines was neither foreseen 
nor desired by the United States, but, since it exists, that Government 
does not shirk the responsibilities growing out of it; and the American 
Commissioners now make to the Spanish Commissioners, in the light of 
those responsibilities, a final proposition. 

The proposal presented by the American Commissioners in behalf of 
their Government for the cession of the Philippines to the United States 
having been rejected by the Spanish Commissioners, and the counter- 
proposal of the latter for the withdrawal of the American forces from 
the islands and the payment of an indemnity by the United States to 
Spain having been rejected by the American Commissioners, the Ameri- 
can Commissioners, deeming it essential that the present negotiations, 
which have already been greatly protracted, should be brought to an 
early and definite conclusion, beg now to present a new proposition 
embodying the concessions which, for the sake of immediate peace, 
their Government is under the circumstances willing to tender. 

The Government of the United States is unable to modify the pro- 
posal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago of the 
Philippines, but the American Commissioners are authorized to offer 
to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed to, the sum of twenty 
million dollars ($20,000,000) to be paid in accordance with the terms to 
be fixed in the treaty of peace. 

And it being the policy of the United States to maintain in the 
Philippines an open door to the world's commerce, the American Com- 
missioners are prepared to insert in the treaty now in contemplation a 
stipulation to the effect that, for a term of years, Spanish ships and 



TREATY OF PEACE. 211 

merchandise shall be admitted into the ports of the Philippine Islands 
on the same terms as American ships and merchandise. 

The American Commissioners are also authorized and prepared to 
insert in the treaty, in connection with the cessions of territory by 
Spain to the United States, a provision for the mutual relinquishment 
of all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of 
the United States against Spain and of Spain against the United 
States that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrec- 
tion in Cuba and prior to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. 

The American Commissioners may be permitted to express the hope 
that they may receive from the Spanish Commissioners, on or before 
Monday the 28th of the present month, a definite and final acceptance 
of the proposals herein made as to the Philippine Islands, and also ol 
the demands as to Cuba, Porto Pico and other Spanish islands in the 
West Indies, and Guam, in the form in which those demands have been 
provisionally agreed to. In this event it will be possible for the Joint 
Commission to continue its sessions and to proceed to the consideration 
and adjustment of other matters, including those which, as subsidiary 
and incidental to the principal provisions, should form a part of the 
treaty of peace. 

In particular the American Commissioners desire to treat of religious 
freedom in the Caroline islands, as agreed to in 1S80; of the release of 
prisoners now held by Spain for political offenses in connection with 
the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines; the acquisition of the 
island variously known as Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong Island in the Caro- 
lines, for a naval and telegraph station, and of cable-landing rights at 
other places in Spanish jurisdiction ; and the revival of certain treaties 
heretofore in force between the United States and Spain. 

True copy: 

John B. Moore. 



Protocol No. 16. Protocolo No. 16. 

Conference of November 28, 1S98. Gonferencia del 28 de Noviembre de 

1898. 

The conference which was to Aplazada la Conferencia que de- 
have been held on the 23rd instant bio celebrarse el dia 23 del corri- 
having been adjourned in conse- ente a consecuencia de la corre- 
quence of the correspondence ex- spondancia cambiada entre los 
changed between the Presidents Presidentes de ambas Comisiones, 
of the two Commissions, which is que va anexa al Acta presente, en 
appended to the present protocol, forma de dos cartas del Presidents 
in the shape of two letters of the de la Comision Espafiola y de las 
President of the Spanish Commis- dos contestaciones a aquellas del 
sion and the answers thereto of the Presideute de la Comision Ameri- 
President of the American Com- cana, se reunieron ambas Comis- 
mission, the Joint Commission met iones hoy a las 2 de la tarde, hal- 
to day at two o'clock, p. m., when landose 
there were 

Present: — On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los 

United States: Messrs: Day, Estados Uuidos de America, los 

Davis, Frye, Gray, Peid, Moore, Sen ores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 

Fergusson. Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 



212 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



On the part of Spain: Messrs. 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
conference was read and approved. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission, in accordance with 
the agreement previously reached, 
presented to the American Commis- 
sioners a document containing the 
final answer of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment to the proposition as to 
the Philippine Islands which the 
American Commissioners pre- 
sented as final at the last session. 

The language of the answer is as 
follows : 

"The Spanish Commissioners 
hastened to lay before their Gov- 
ernment the proposition which, as 
final, was presented to them at the 
last session by the American Com- 
missioners, and they are now spe- 
cially authorized to give within 
the time designated and under the 
conditions expressed the reply 
which was requested of them by 
the American memorandum. 

" Examined solely in the light 
of the legal principles which have 
guided the action of the Spanish 
Commissioners during the course 
of these negotiations, the latter 
consider the American proposition 
in every way inadmissible for the 
reason repeatedly set forth in pre- 
vious documents forming a part of 
the Protocol. 

"Neither can they consider the 
said propositions as a satisfactory 
form of agreement and compromise 
between two opposing principles, 
since the terms which by way of 
concession are offered to Spain do 
not bear a proper proportion with 
the sovereignty which it is endeav- 
ored to compel us to relinquish in 
the Philippine Archipelago. Had 
they borne such proportion, Spain 
would have at once, for the sake 
of peace, made the sacrifice of ac- 
cepting them. The American 
Commission knows that the Span- 
ish Commission endeavored, al- 



Por parte deEspana. los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola de conformidad con lo 
acordado anteriormente presenta 
a los Comisarios Americanos un 
documento que contiene la contes- 
tacion definitiva del Gobierno 
Espauol a la proposicion sobre Fili- 
pinas, que con caracter de final 
preseutaron en la ultima sesion los 
Comisarios Americanos. 

Los t^rminos de dicha contesta- 
cion son los siguientes : 

" Los Comisarios Espanoles se 
apresuraron a poner en conocimi- 
ento de su Gobierno la proposicion, 
que con caracter de definitiva les 
fue presentada en la sesion ultima 
por los Senores Comisarios Ameri- 
canos, y se hallau hoy explicita- 
mente autorizados a dar la respues- 
ta que dentro del plazo sehalado y 
con las condiciones expresadas en 
el Memorandum Americano se les 
pedia. 

" Examinada rinicamente a la lay 
de los principios juridicos que ha 
veuido inspirando la conducta de 
los Comisarios Espanoles durante 
el curso de estas negociaciones, 
encuentran estos de todo punto 
inadmisible la proposicion Ameri- 
cana, porlas razonesrepetidamente 
expuestas en anteriores docu- 
mentos que forman parte de Pro- 
tocolo. 

"Tampoco pueden considerar 
dicha proposicion como satisfacto- 
ria formula de avenencia y trans- 
action entre opuetos principios, 
pues las condiciones que a titulo 
de concesion se ofrecen a Espafia, 
no guardan ninguna proporcion 
con la soberania a que se nos 
quiere obligar a renuuciar en el 
Archipielago filipino. Si la hu- 
bieran guardado, hubiese hecho 
Espaha, desdeluego, elsacrificio de 
aceptarlas en aras del deseo de la 
paz. Consta a la Comision Ameri- 
cana que la Espanola intento, aun- 
que sin 6xito, entrar en esta via, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



213 



though fruitlessly, to follow this 
course, going so far as to propose 
arbitration for the settlement of 
the principal questions. 

"Spain then having on her part 
exhausted all diplomatic recourses 
in the defence of what she consid- 
ers her rights and even for an equit- 
able compromise, the Spanish Com- 
missioners are now asked to accept 
the American proposition in its en- 
tirety and without further discus- 
sion, or to reject it, in which latter 
case, as the American Commission 
understands, the peace negotia- 
tions will end and the Protocol of 
Washington will, consequently, be 
broken. The Government of Her 
Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of 
patriotism and humanity, will not 
assume the responsibility of again 
bringing upon Spain all the horrors 
of war. In order to avoid them it 
resigns itself to the painful strait 
of submitting to the law of the vic- 
tor, however harsh it may be, and 
as Spain lacks material means to 
defend the rights she believes are 
hers, having recorded them, she 
accepts the only terms the United 
States offers her for the concluding 
of the treaty of peace." 

This answer was delivered to 
the American Commissioners and 
translated by their Interpreter 
into English. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission expressed the opinion 
that, the proposition of the Ameri- 
can Commission having been ac- 
cepted, it was in order for the 
Secretaries of the two Commissions 
to confer and agree upon the form 
in which the articles relating to 
Cuba. Porto Rico, and the Philip- 
pine Islands should be drawn up, 
which articles they should after- 
wards submit to the Joint Commis- 
sion for approval or modification. 

The American Commissioners 
assented to this proposal, and sug- 
gested that the correspondence 
exchanged between the last and the 
present session be appended either 
to this protocol or to the next. 



llegando hasta proponer el arbi- 
trage para la resolution de las 
cuestiones priucipales. 

"Agotados pues, por parte de 
Espaha todos los recursos diplo- 
maticos para la defensa del que 
cousidera su derecho, y aim para 
unaequitativa transaction, seexige 
hoy a los Comisarios Espanoles que 
acepten en conjunto y sin mas dis- 
cusiones la proposition Americana 
6 que la rechacen, en cuyo caso 
quedarian terminadas, segun eu- 
tiende la Comision Americana, las 
negociaciones para la paz y roto 
por cousiguiente el Protocolo de 
Washington. El Gobierno de S. M. 
movido por altas razones de pa- 
triotismo y de humanidad, no ha de 
incurrir en la responsabilidad de 
desatar de nuevo sobre Espafia 
todos los horrores de la guerra. 
Paraevitarlosseresignaaldoloroso 
trancede someterse ;i la ley del ven- 
cedor, por dura (pie esta sea, y como 
carece Espafia demedios materiales 
para defender el derecho que cree 
le asiste, una vez ya consignado, 
acepta las unicas condiciones que 
los Estados Unidos leofrecen para 
la conclusion del Tratado de paz." 

Es entregada dicha contestation 
a los Comisarios Americanos y ver- 
tida al ingles por su interprete. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espauola manifiesta que aceptada 
la proposition de la Comision 
Americana procederia en su sentir 
que los Secretarios de ambas 
Comisioues se pusieian deacnerdo 
para la redaction de los articulos 
referentes (i Cuba, Puerto Rico y 
Filipinas, que sometenau luego a 
la Comision en pleno para que esta 
los aprobase 6 modificase. 



Asiente 4 ello la Comision Ameri- 
cana y su Presidente propone que 
la correspondencia cambiada entre 

los dos Presidentes en el intervalo 
entre la ultima y la preseute sesion, 
scan anexas a esta acta 6 a la 
proxima. 



214 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The President of the Spanish 
Commission concurring - in this sug- 
gestion, it was agreed that the two 
letters which he had addressed to 
the President of the American Com- 
mission and the answers thereto 
given by the latter be appended 
to the present protocol. 

The President of the American 
Commission expressed the hope 
that a mutually satisfactory agree- 
ment might be reached as to all 
matters other than those disposed 
of by the acceptance of the Ameri- 
can proposition, and, in order to 
hasten the conelusionof thetreaty, 
he proposed that the American 
Commission should draw up arti- 
cles and present them at the next 
conference to be orally discussed, 
thus avoiding the presentation of 
memoranda which would delay the 
negotiations. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission answered that the 
form in which the American Com- 
missioners should desire to pro- 
ceed was left entirely to their 
choice and that he had nothing to 
suggest in this respect; and he 
also expressed the opinion that the 
presentation of memoranda would 
be unnecessary, except in some 
special case which might occur. 
Ho proposed that ihe meeting 
should be adjourned until the Sec- 
retaries should have drawn up the 
draft of articles previously men- 
tioned by him. 

The President of the American 
Commission concurred in this pro- 
posal, and, being desirous also to 
present the articles referring to the 
subsidiary points of the treaty at 
the next session, he moved that 
that session should be held on 
Wednesday the 30th instant, at 
two o'clock, p. m. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission concurred in this pro- 
posal, and requested the American 
Commission to hasten as much as 
practicable their proceedings, so 
as to terminate at the earliest pos- 
sible moment the labors of the 
Commission. 



El Presidente del a Comisidn Es- 
pafiola es de la misma opinion y 
se acuerda que las dos cartas que 
ha dirigido al Presidente de la 
Comision Americana y las dos con- 
testaciones de este, seau anexas al 
acta presente. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana manifiesta su esperauza 
de que pueda llegarse ahora a un 
acuerdo satisfactorio respecto de 
los dermis puntos subsidiaries de 
su proposicion, aparte de los que 
han sido ya aceptados, y dice que 
con objeto de apresurar la conclu- 
sion del tratado, se propone redac- 
tar los dermis articulos y presen- 
tarlos en la proxiina conferencia 
para ser discutidos oralmente, evi- 
Tiindose asi la presentacion de Me- 
moranda que retrasaria las nego- 
ciaciones. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola contesta que la forma en 
que deseen proceder los Comisa- 
rios Americanos queda completa- 
mente 4 su election, y que nada 
tiene por tanto que sugerir al re- 
specto, siendo asimismo de opinion 
que huelga la presentacion de 
Memoranda al respecto, salvo algiiu 
caso especial que pudiera ocurrir 
y propone que se levante la sesion 
y se aplace la nueva reuuion hasta 
que los Secretarios puedan redac- 
tar el proyecto de articulado. 



El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana hace asimismo esta re- 
serva, y deseaudo presentar el ar- 
ticulado referente a los puntos 
subsidiarios del tratado en la 
proxiina sesion, propone que esta 
tenga lugar el Miercoles 30 del 
presente a las 2. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espauola conviene en que asi sea i 
y ruega a los Comisarios Ameri- * 
canos que apresuren en lo posible 
sus procedimientos a fin de que 
terminen cuanto antes las tareas 
de la Comisidn. 



TREATY OF FEACE. 215 

The session was accordingly En consecuencia queda aplazada 

adjourned till Wednesday the 30tb la proxiina sesion para el Miercoles 

instant, at two o'clock, p. m. 30 del corriente a las 2 P. M. 

William E. Day E. Montero Rios 

Cushman K. Davis B. de Abarzuza 

Wm P Frye J. de Garnica 

Geo. Gray W R de Villa Urrutia 

Whitelaw Eeid. Eafael Oerero 

John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda 



Annex 1 to Protocol Ko. 16. 
comision para la negociaci6n de la paz con los estados 

UNIDOS. 

Sr. D. William R. Day. 

Muy Senor mio, A fin de que pueda esta Comision y en su caso el 
Gobierno de S. M. C. deliberar con pleno y exacto conocimiento de su 
sentido sobre la proposicion con que termina el Memorandum presentado 
en la sesion de ayer por la Comision que dignamente presidis, y que 
acaba de traducirse al espartol, me es necesario rogaros que, con la 
urgencia que os sea posible, os sirvais, si os parece conveniente, aclarar 
el concepto de los puntos siguientes de dicba proposicion, cuya inteli- 
genoia es para mi obscura y vaga: 

Primero. La proposicion que haceis jdescansa sobre la base de que 
las colonias espafiolas ban de pasar libres de toda carga, quedando por 
consiguiente todas, absolutamente todas, las obligaciones y deudas 
coloniales pendientes, de cualquier clase que ellas sean y cualquiera 
que baya sido su origen y objeto, a cargo exclusivamente de Espaiia? 

Segundo. El ofrecimiento que los Estados Unidos hacen a Espaiia de 
establecer igualdad de condiciones durante cierto numero de anos en 
los puertos del Arcbipielago entre los buques y mercancias de ambas 
naciones, ofricimiento que se bace preceder de la afirmacion de que la 
politica de los Estados Unidos es mantener en las Filipinas la puerta 
abierta el comerico del mundo, ;„debe entenderse en el sentido de que 
los buques y mercancias de las dermis naciones ban de gozar 6 poder 
gozar de la misma situacion que por cierto tiempo se conceda 4 los de 
Espaiia, mientras los Estados Unidos no cambien dicba politica? 

Tercero. Habiendo consiguado el Sr. Secretario de Estado, en la 
nota de 30 de Julio ultimo, que la cesion por Espaiia de la Isla de 
Puerto Pico y de otras islas actualmente bajo su soberauia en las 
Indias Occidentals, asi corao de una en las Ladrones, era en compen- 
sacion de las pt^rdidas y gastos becbos por los Estados Unidos, durante 
la guerra, y de los daiios que sus ciudadauos babian sufrido durante la 
ultima insurreccion de Cuba, jcufilcs son las reclamaciones a que se 
reflere la porposicion, al exigirse en ella que en el tratado se ba de 
insertar una disposicion sobre ell abandono mutuo de todas las reclama- 
ciones individuales y nacionales surgidas desde el principio de la ultima 
insurreccion en Cuba basta la conclusion del tratado de paz? 

Cuarto. Al decirse que en el tratado se ba de couvenir sobre la liber- 
tad de los detenidos por Espaiia por delitos politicos relacionados con 
las insurrecciones de Cuba y Filipinas, $se quiere dar a entender que 4 
la vez no se ba de convenir sobre la libertad de los prisoneros espa- 



216 TREATY OF PEACE. 

noles qne estan eu poder de las faerzas americanas y de sus auxiliares 
los insurrectos de Cuba y Filipinas? 

Quinto. Tambien se ha de convenir eu el tratado sobre la adquisicion 
por los Estados Uuidos del derecho de ainarre de cables en otros sitios 
bajo la jurisdiction de Espana. ^En que region estan diehos sitios? 
Esta i'rase, jj,comprende solamente los territorios de Espaua en el Ori- 
ente 6 tambien en la Peninsula? 

Sexto. Se dice asimismo que se renovaran ciertos tratados que hasta 
abora estuvieron en vigor entre los Estados Unidos y Espana, ^Cuales 
son estos tratados? 

Y finalmente, Septimo. Dicen los ComisaVios americanos que si los 
espaiioles aceptan final y concretamente su proposicion y las anteriores 
sobre Cuba, Puerto Eico y deinas islas, sera posible a la Coinision en 
pleno continuar sus sesiones y proceder al estudio y arreglo de otros 
puntos, ^significan estas frases que si la Comision espanola no acepta 
final y concretamente dichas proposiciones, sin modificacion sustancial, 
la Comision en pleno no continuara sus sesiones? 

Os ruego y encarezco la resolucion de estas dudas, si lo teneis a bien, 
sobre la inteligencia de vuestra proposicion, lo mas pronto que os sea 
posible, para que la Comision espanola pueda dar en sesion de la Comi- 
sion en pleno la contestacion que considere procedente. 

Aceptad, Sehor, os lo ruego, el testimonio de mi distinguida conside- 
ration. 

E. Montero Eios 

Paris, 22 de Noviembre de 1898. 



[TranalatioD.] 

Annex 1 to Protocol No. 1G. 

COMMISSION FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF PEACE WITH THE UNITED 

STATES. 

Mr. William R. Day 

My dear Sir, In order that this Commission and, if necessary, the 
Government of H. C. M., may study with a full and exact knowledge 
the proposition which Closes the memorandum presented at yesterday's 
session by the Commission you worthily head, the translation into 
Spanish of which has just been completed, it becomes necessary to beg 
you that with all possible haste you will be pleased to make clear the 
meaning of the following points of said proposition, which to me is 
obscure and vague: 

First. Is the proposition you make based on the Spanish colonies 
being transferred free of all burdens, all, absolutely all outstanding 
obligations and debts, of whatsoever kind and whatever may have 
been their origin and purpose, remaining thereby chargeable exclusively 
to Spain? 

Second. Is the offer made by the United States to Spain to establish 
for a certain number of years similar conditions in the ports of the 
archipelago for vessels and merchandise of both nations, an offer which 
is preceded by the assertion that the policy of the United States is to 
maintain an open door to the world's commerce, to be taken in the sense 
that the vessels and goods of other nations are to enjoy or can enjoy 



TREATY OF PEACE. 217 

the same privilege (situation) which for a certain time is granted those 
of Spain, while the United States do not change such policy? 

Third. The Secretary of State having stated in his note of July 30 
last that the cession by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico and the other 
islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as one 
of the Ladrones, was to be as compensation for the losses and expenses 
of the United States during the war, and of the damages suffered by 
their citizens during the last insurrection in Cuba, what claims does the 
proposition refer to on requiring that there shall be inserted in the 
treaty a provision for the mutual relinquishment of all claims, indi- 
vidual and national, that have arisen from the beginning of the last 
insurrection in Cuba to the conclusion of the treaty of peace? 

Fourth. Upon stating that the treaty must contain au agreement as 
to the release of those held by Spain for political onenses connected 
with the insurrections of Cuba and the Philippines, is it desired that it 
be taken as meaning that at the same time there is to be no agreement 
as to the release of the Spanish prisoners held in the possession of the 
American forces and their auxiliaries, the insurgents of Cuba and the 
Philippines? 

Fifth. In the treaty there is also to be an agreement as to the acquire- 
ment by the United States of cable landing privileges in other places 
under the jurisdiction of Spain. Where are such places? Does this 
sentence only include territories of Spain in the Orient, or in the 
Peninsula also? 

Sixth. It is also said that certain treaties which were in force between 
the United States and Spain up to this time will be revived. What 
are these treaties? 

And, finally, seventh. The American Commissioners say that if the 
Spanish Commissioners accept their proposition finally and definitely 
and the previous proposals as to Cuba, Porto Kico and other islands, it 
will be possible for the Joint Commission to continue its sessions and 
proceed to the examination and arrangement of other points. L)o these 
words mean that if the Spanish Commission does not finally and defi- 
nitely accept said propositions without substantial modifications, the 
Joint Commission will not continue its sessions? 

I beg and earnestly request you to settle these doubts, should you be 
so disposed, as to the meaning of your proposition as soon as may be 
possible, in order that the Spanish Commission may, in a session of the 
Joint Commission, furnish the reply it may deem proper. 

Accept, Sir, I pray you, the expression of my distinguished consid- 
eration. 

Signed: E. Montero Eios. 

Paris, November 22, 1898. 



Annex 2 to Protocol Xo. 16. 

United States and Spanish Peace Commission, 

United States Commissioners. 

Paris. November 22, 1898. 
Seiior Don E. Montero Eios. 

My dear Sir. Having received and read your letter of today, 
touching the final proposition presented by the American Commission- 
ers at yesterday's conference, I hasten to answer your enquiries seri- 
atim, first stating your question, and then giving my reply. 



218 TREATY OF PEACE. 

"First. Is the proposition you make based on the Spanish colonies 
being transferred free of all burdens, all, absolutely all outstanding 
obligations and debts, of whatsoever kind and whatever may have 
been their origin and purpose, remaining thereby chargeable exclusively 
to Spain?" 

In reply to this question, it is proper to call attention to the fact 
that the American Commissioners,^ their paper of yesterday, expressed 
the hope that they might receive within a certain time "a definite and 
final acceptance" of their proposal as to the Philippines, and also "of 
the demands as to Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish Islands in the 
West Indies, and Guam, iuthe form in which those demands have been 
provisionally agreed to." 

The form in which they have thus been agreed to is found in the pro- 
posal presented by the American Commissioners on the LTth of Octo- 
ber and annexed to the protocol of the Gth conference, and is as follows : 

"Article 1. Spain hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over 
and title to Cuba. 

"Article 2. Spain hereby cedes to the United States the Island of 
Porto Pico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, and also the Island of Guam in the Ladrones." 

These articles contain no provision for the assumption of debt by the 
United States. 

In this relation, I desire to recall the statements in which the Ameri- 
can Commissioners have in our conferences repeatedly declared that 
they would not accept any articles that required the United States to 
assume the so-called colonial debts of Spain. 

To these statements I have nothing to add. 

But, in respect of the Philippines, the American Commissioners, while 
including the cession of the archipelago in the article in which Spain 
"cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Pico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also the Island 
of Guam in the Ladrones," or in an article expressed in similar words, 
will agree that their Government shall pay to Spain the sum of twenty 
million dollars ($20,000,000). 

"Second. Is the offer made by the United States to Spain to estab- 
lish for a certain number of years similar conditions in the ports of the 
archipelago for vessels and merchandise of both nations, an offer which 
is preceded by the assertion that the policy of the United States is to 
maintain an open door to the world's commerce, to be taken in the 
sense that the vessels and goods of other nations are to enjoy or can 
enjoy the same privilege {situation) which for a certain time is granted 
those of Spain, while the United States do not change such policy?" 

The declaration that the policy of the United States in the Philip- 
pines will be that of an open door to the world's commerce necessarily 
implies that the offer to place Spanish vessels and merchandise on the 
same footing as American is not intended to be exclusive. But, the 
offer to give Spain that privilege for a term of years, is intended to 
secure it to her for a certain period by special treaty stipulation, what- 
ever might be at any time the general policy of the United States. 

"Third. The Secretary of State having stated in his note of July 30 
last that the cession by Spain of the Island of Porto Pico and the 
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well 
as one of the Ladrones, was to be as compensation for the losses and 
expenses of the United States during the war, and of the damages 
suffered by their citizens during the last insurrection in Cuba, what 
claims does the proposition refer to on requiring that there shall be 



TREATY OP PEACE. 219 

inserted in the treaty a provision for the mutual relinquishment of all 
claims, individual and national, that have arisen from the beginning of 
the last insurrection in Cuba to the conclusion of the treaty of peace?" 

While the idea doubtless was conveyed in the note of the Secretary 
of State of the United States of the 30th of July last that the cession 
of " Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain 
in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, 
to be selected by the United States," was required on grounds of indem- 
nity, and that "on similar grounds the United States is entitled to 
occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the 
conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, dis- 
position and government of the Philippines," no definition has as yet 
been given of the extent or precise effect of the cessions in that regard. 
The American Commissioners therefore propose, in connection with the 
cessions of territory, "the mutual relinquishment of all claims for 
indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of the United States 
against Spain and of Spain against the United States, that may have 
arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to 
he conclusion of a treaty of peace." 

And I may add that this offer is made by the American Commissioners 
in full view of the fact that the citizens of the United States, having 
claims that come within the foregoing relinquishment, will, on the 
strength thereof, apply to their own Government for indemnity. 

As to the fourth, fifth and sixth questions contained in your letter, 
permit me to point out that they do not relate to matters concerning 
which the American Commissioners stated that the acceptance of our 
proposals within the time mentioned would be a condition of continuing 
the conferences. The American Commissioners contined that condition 
to their proposals touching Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands 
in the West Indies, Guam, and the Philippines. In respect of the other 
matters referred to, they expressed their readiness to "treat", in case 
the Spanish Commissioners should remove the obstacle to so doing, by 
a definite aud final acceptance of the proposals abovementioned, the 
refusal of which would render the continuance of the conferences 
impracticable. 

In what I have just said, you will find an answer to your seventh 
question. 

It does not appear to be necessary to specify at this moment the par- 
ticulars of the subjects referred to in your fourth, fifth and sixth ques- 
tions, since, if our proposals in regard to Cuba, Porto Pico and other 
Spanish islands in the West Indies, Guam, and the Philippines, are 
not accepted, the negotiations will end. I deem it proper, however, 
even at the risk of seeming to anticipate, to say, so far as concerns 
the subject of your fourth question, that the American Commissioners 
would expect to treat for the release of prisoners on the basis of abso- 
lute equality. All Spanish prisoners in the possession of the American 
forces would necessarily be released as the result of a treaty of peace ; 
and the American Commissioners would be willing to stipulate that 
their Government would undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish 
prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. 

With an expression of regret that the process of translating your 
letter has somewhat delayed my reply, I beg you to accept, my dear 
sir, the expression of my distinguished consideration. 

Signed: William R. Day. 



220 treaty of peace. 

Annex 3 to Protocol No. 16. 

comisi6n para la negociaci6n de la paz con los estados unidos. 

Hon. M. William R. Day, 

Presidente de la Comision americana para la pas con Espaiia. 

Muy Senor mio de mi disting-uida consideraci6n. A fin de 
adelantar cuanto sea posible los trabajos que por arnbos Gobiernos a 
una y otra Ooniision ban sido encomeudados, y que ya requieren una 
proxiina termination, ruego a Vd., en nombre de esta Oomision que se 
sirva proponer a la de su digna presidencia si esta dispuesta a acceptar 
por via de transaction sobre la soberania del Arcbipielago Filipino 
cualquiera de las tres proposiciones siguientes: 

A. — " Renuncia de Espafia a su soberania en Cuba y cesion de Puerto 
Rico y demas Antillas, Isla de Guam en las Ladrones y Arcbipielago 
Filipino, incluso Mindanao y Jolo, a los Estados Unidos, habiendo de 
satisfaeer estos a Espafia la eautidad de cien millones de dollars 
($100,000,001)) en compensation de su soberania en el arcbipielago y de 
las obras de utilidad publica ejecutadas durante su domination entodas 
las islas de Orieute y Occidente cuya soberania renuncia y cede." 

B. — "Cesion a los Estados Unidos de la IslaCusayeen las Carolinas, 
del derecbo de amarre de un cable en cualquiera de ellas 6 de las 
Marianas, mientras sean del dominio de Espaua, y del Arcbipielago 
Filipino propiamente dicbo, 6 sea empezando por el Norte, de las Islas 
Batanes, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas y todas las demas que sigueu al 
Sur bastael mar de Jolo, reservandose Espafia al Sur de este mar las 
Islas de Mindanao y Jolo, que nunca ban formado parte del Arcbi- 
pielago Filipino propiamente dicbo. 

" Los Estados Unidos en compensation de las islas sobredicbas, del 
derecbo de amarre del cable y de las obras publicas ejecutadas por 
Espafia en aquellas islas durante su domination, abonaran a Espafia 
la cantidad de cincuenta millones de dollars ($50,000,000)." 

O. — " Espafia renuncia a su soberania en Cuba y cede gratuitamente 
a los Estados Unidos el Arcbipielago Filipino propiamente dicbo, ade- 
mas de Puerto Rico y demas Antillas y la Isla de Guam que cede en 
compensacion delos gastos de guerra e indemnizaciones deciudadanos 
americanos por dafios sufridos desde el principio de la ultima insurrec- 
tion cubana: 

"Los Estados Unidos y Espafia someteran & un tribunal arbitral 
cuales son las deudas y obligaciones de caracter colonial, que deban 
pasar con las islas cuya soberania Espafia renuncia y cede." 

Ruego a Vd. que esa Comision se sirva deliberar sobre cada una de 
estas proposiciones por si considera acceptable cualquiera de ellas, 
comunicandomelo si lo tieue 4 bien antes del lunes proximo 28 del cor- 
riente 6 teniendo formado ya su juicio para dicbo dia (que es el tijado 
en la utima proposicion de esa Comision), en que podran reunirse ambas 
en pleno a la bora acostumbrada de las dos de la tarde. y en cuya sesion 
esta Comision espanola dar4 su definitiva contestacion, de que, segvin 
la de la americana, babra de depender la continuacion 6 terminacion de 
estas conferencias. 

Queda de Vd. con la mayor consideracion atento servidor q. 1. b. 1. m. 

E. Montero Rios 

Paris, 23 de Noviembre de 1898. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 221 

[Translation.] 

Annex 3 to Protocol No. 16. 
commission for tiie negotiation of peace with the united 

STATES. 

Hon. William R. Day, 

President of the American Commission for Peace with Spain. 
My dear and esteemed Sir, In order to push to the utmost the 
work which has been entrusted by the two Governments to one and 
the other Commission and which now requires a prompt termination, 
I beg yon, in the name of this Commission, to be pleased to propose to 
that worthily headed by you whether it is willing to accept, by way of 
compromise in re the sovereignty of the Philippine Archipelago, any 
of the three propositions following: 

A. " Relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and 
cession of Porto Rico and other Antilles, Island of Guam in the 
Ladrones and the Philippine Archipelago, including Mindanao and 
Sulu, to the United States, the latter paying to Spain the sum of one 
hundred million ($100,000,000) dollars as compensation for her sover- 
eignty in the Archipelago and the works of public utility she has exe- 
cuted during her rule in all the islands of the East and West the 
sovereignty over which she relinquishes and cedes." 

B. " Cession to the United States of the Island of Cusaye in the 
Carolines, of the right to land a cable on any of these or of the Marianas, 
while they remain under Spanish rule, and (cesion) of the Philippine 
Archipelago proper, that is, beginning on the North, the Islands of 
Bataues, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas. and all the others following to the 
south as far as the Sulu Sea, Spain reserving to the south of this sea the 
Islands of Mindanao and Sulu which have never formed a part of the 
Philippine Archipelago proper. 

"The United States, as compensation for said islands, for the right 
to land cables and for the public works executed by Spain in said islands 
during her rule, will pay to Spain the sum of fifty million ($50,000,000) 
dollars." 

C. " Spain relinquishes her sovereignty over Cuba and gratuitously 
cedes to the United States the Philippine Archipelago proper, besides 
Porto Rico, the other West Indies and the Island of Guam, which she 
cedes as compensation for the expenses of the war and as indemnity to 
American citizens for injuries suffered since the beginning of the last 
Cuban insurrection. 

" The United States and Spain will submit to an arbitral tribunal 
what are the debts and obligations of a colonial character which should 
pass with the islands the sovereignty over which Spain relinquishes and 
cedes." 

I beg you that said Commission be pleased to deliberate over each of 
these propositions so that, should it consider anyone of them acceptable, 
it may be communicated to me, should you be so disposed, before Mon- 
day next, the 28th instant, or your mind being already made up. on that 
day (which is the one set in the last proposition of the said Commission) 
when the two Commissions may meet jointly at the usual hour of two, 
p. m., at which session this, the Spanish Commission, will give its final 
reply, upon which, according to the answer of the American, must 
depend the continuation or termination of these conferences. 

I remain, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant. 

Signed: E. Montero Rio§. 

Paris, November 23, 1898. 



222 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Annex 4 to Protocol No. 16. 

United States and Spanish Peace Commission. 

United States Commissioners. 

Paris. November 26, 1898. 

My dear Sir, Your letter dated the 23rd instant, in which you 
propose, by way of compromise, the adoption of one of three alternative 
propositions, in place of the proposition submitted by the American 
Commissioners at our last conference, was not received by me till the 
evening of the 24th. 

I at once had it carefully translated, and, in compliance with your 
request, laid it before my associates. 

We maturely considered it, and, although our last proposition, which 
was submitted under instructions, was expressly declared to be final, 
we decided, in view of the importance of the subject, to communicate 
your proposals to our Government. 

Its answer has just been received; and, as we anticipated, it instructs 
us to adhere to the final proposition which we have already submitted. 

It is proper to say that my associates and myself, during the long 
course of the negotiations, have, in accordance with the wishes of our 
Government, given the most deliberate attention to everything in the 
way of argument or of suggestion that has been brought to our notice, 
in the hope that some basis of mutual agreement might be found. But, 
unfortunately, our discussions seemed to divide us, rather than to bring 
us together, and no progress was made towards a common accord. 

Under these circumstances the American Commissioners, acting 
upon explicit instructions, offered at once, for the sake of peace, all 
the concessions which their Government was able to make concerning 
the particular matters embraced in the proposition the acceptance of 
which was made a condition of further negotiations. 

As I stated in my letter of the 23rd instant, if that proposition should 
be accepted, the matters referred to in the concluding paragraph of 
the paper submitted by the American Commissioners at the last ses- 
sion, would become the subject of negotiations, and, in regard to them, 
I should hope for a mutually satisfactory arrangement. 

The American Commissioners expect to be present at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs on Monday next for the purpose of receiving the 
answer to their final proposition. 

I remain, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant, 

Signed: William It. Day. 

Senor Don E. Montero Kios, etc., etc., etc. 



Protocol No. 17. Protocolo No. 17. 

„ , „ ,, 7 ._._ Conferencia del 30 de Noviembre de 

Conference of November 30, 1808. J 18 gg 

Present: On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Esta- 

United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, dos Unidos de America, los Seno- 

Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergus- res Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, 

son. Moore, Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: Por parte de Espafia los Seiio- 
Montero Kios, Abarzuza, Garnica, res Montero Rfos, Abarzuza, Gar- 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. mca,Villa-Urrutia ; Cerero, Ojeda. 






TREATY OF PEACE. 



223 



The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission presented a draft of 
articles with reference to the con- 
clusion of a definitive treaty, in the 
first part of which draft were in- 
cluded the articles agreed upon by 
the two Secretaries for submission 
to the Joint Commission, in rela- 
tion to, the matters comprised in 
the proposition accepted by the 
Spanish Commissioners at the last 
session. 

The Joint Commission then pro- 
ceeded to the consideration of the 
draft, article by article, and, after 
discussing some of the articles, de- 
cided to adjourn the session, and 
to continue the discussion at the 
next conference, which was fixed 
for Thursday, the 1st of December, 
at three o'clock, p. m. 

William R. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana presentaun proyecto de 
articulos para la conclusion de un 
tratado de paz definitivo, en cuya 
parte primera estan inclufdos los 
que fueron acordados entre los Sec- 
retaries de ambas Comisiones para 
ser sometidos a la Comision en 
plenp, relativos a las materias com- 
prendidas en la proposition acep- 
tada por los Comisarios Espaholes 
en la ultima sesion. 

La Comision en pleno procedio 
entouces al examen de los articulos 
uno por uno y despues de discutir 
algunos de ellos, decidio levantar 
la sesion y contiuuar la discusion 
en la proxima Conferencia, que se 
fijo para el Jueves 1° de Diciembre 
a las 2 P. M. 

E. MONTERO EfoS 
B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

W. E. de Villa-Urrutia 
Bafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 18. 



Protocolo No 18. 



Conference of December 2, 1898. Conferencia del 2 Diciembre de 1898. 



The session which Avas to have 
been held yesterday having been 
postponed by mutual agreement, 
owing to a lack of time to exam- 
ine the modifications and addi- 
tions proposed by the Spanish 
Commissioners to the draft of a 
treaty presented by the American 
Commissioners at the session of 
November 30, the two Commis- 
sions met today at two p. m., 
there being 

Present On the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 



Aplazada de comun acuerdo la 
conferencia que debio celebrarse 
ayer por falta de tiempo para ex- 
a miliar las modificaciones y adi- 
ciones propuestas por los Comisa- 
rios Espauoles al proyecto de Trat- 
ado presentado por los Comisarios 
Americanos en la sesion del 30 de 
Noviembre, reunieronse hoy 4 las 
2 p. m. ambas Comisiones hallan- 
dose 

Presentes Por parte de los 
Estados Uuidos de America: los 
Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espaha : los Senores 
Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 



224 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission observed that at the 
last session he had presented a 
draft of articles for a final treaty, 
and asked the Spanish Commis- 
sioners if they had examined it, 
and were ready to give their reply. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission auswered that he had 
consulted his Government, and 
that he could not reply until he had 
received its instructions; but that, 
in any case, the Spanish Commis- 
sion was not inclined to treat of 
subsidiary points as the American 
Commission desired, without hav- 
ing first disposed of all the points 
essential to the treaty of peace. 

The President of the American 
Commission asked the President of 
the Spanish Commission whether 
he could state when he would re- 
ceive the instructions; and the 
latter replied that he would proba- 
bly receive them to-day or to mor- 
row. 

The American Commissioners 
proposed that the Commission pro- 
ceed to the reading and discussion 
of the articles presented by them 
that were not taken up at the last 
session. The President of the 
Spanish Commission observed that 
as those articles were divided into 
two parts, one comprising the first 
eight articles examined and ap- 
proved at the last session with the 
exception of four points, three of 
which the Americans were to ex- 
amine and the fourth of which was 
to be submitted by the Spaniards 
to their Government, and as the 
other part also was dependent 
upon instructions from that Gov- 
ernment, he deemed it useless to 
examine and discuss the latter 
part. And, on the other hand, he 
stated that the Secretary General 
of the Spanish Commission had 
delivered to the Secretary General 
of the American Commission a 
draft of other articles which must 
necessarily form part of the treaty 



Fue" leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana recuerda que en la ulti- 
ma sesion presento un proyecto de 
articulos para uu tratado definitivo 
y pregunta a los.Comisarios Espa- 
noles si lo han examiuado y estau 
dispuestos a dar una contestation 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espahola mauifiesta que ha con- 
sul tado a su Gobierno y no puede 
contestar hasta haber recibido sus 
iustrucciones ; pero de todos modos 
no esta dispuesta la Comision 
Espanola a tratar de los puntos ac- 
cessories que desea la Americana 
sin que antes se haya coucluido 
con todo lo relativo a lo que con- 
stituye esencialmente el Tratado de 
paz. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana pregunta aide la Espa- 
hola si puede decirle cuaudo reci- 
bira dichas instrucciones, y el 
Presidente de la Comision Espanola 
con testa que probablemente las 
recibira de hoy a manana. 

Proponen los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos que se proceda a la lectura 
y discusion de los articulos por 
ellos propuestos que no fueron ex- 
aminados en la sesion anterior y 
el Presidente de la Comision Es- 
pahola haceobservarque dividien- 
dose dichos articulos en dos par- 
tes: una compuesta de los ocho 
primeros articulos ya examinada y 
aprobada en la ultima sesion salvo 
cuat.ro puntos tres de los cuales 
quedaron los Americanos en estu- 
diar y el 4° quedaron los Espafioles 
en consultar a su Gobierno, y la 
otra pendiente tambien de instruc- 
ciones de su Gobierno, cree inutil 
examinar y discutir esta ultima. 
En cambio hace presente que el 
Secretario General de la Comision 
Espanola ha entregado al de la 
Americana el proyecto de los demas 
articulos que debtn formar parte 
necesariamente del Tratado de paz 
y sobre los cuales hasta el presente 
momento la Comision Americana 
nada ha contestado y adeinas que 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



225 



of peace and with respect to which 
the American Commissioners had 
not as yet given an answer; and 
further that the American Com- 
mission was to have consulted its 
Government and to give an answer 
to-day on the three points above 
mentioned as forming a part ol 
some of the eight articles already 
approved, which answer was nec- 
essary in order that the agreement 
previously reached upon these ar- 
ticles might be enlarged ; aud that, 
therefore, with a view to preserve 
in the discussion the natural order, 
he considered it requisite that the 
articles that were indispensable to 
such treaty should be completed 
by the answer of the American 
Commissioners before passing on 
to the discussion of points of minor 
interest which did not affect the 
concluding of peace, though this 
did not imply that the Spanish 
Commissioners did not entertain 
the desire to take them up at the 
proper time. 

The American Commissioners 
insisted that these subsidiary 
points be taken up, or all discus- 
sion be postponed until the Span- 
ish Commissioners shall have 
received instructions to treat upon 
all the points which have been 
submitted to them. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission held to his opinion, 
insisting that even after the in- 
structions of his Government with 
respect to the subsidiary points 
were received, the Spanish Com- 
mission would not discuss them 
until after the termination of the 
discussion of the articles which it 
had presented, and which related 
to the treaty of peace proper. The 
American Commission having in- 
quired as to what were the three 
points to which the President of 
the Spanish Commission had above 
referred, which the American Com- 
missioners were to examine, he re- 
plied that they were as follows: 
The extending to Cuba and Porto 
Eico of the commercial treatment 
granted to Spain in the Philip- 
T p 15 



la Comision Americana quedo en 
consultar a su Gobierno y en dar 
hoy contestacion sobre dichos tres 
indicados puntos relativos a al- 
gunos de los ocho articulos apro- 
bados que faltaban para ampliar 
sobre dichos puntos el acuerdo ya 
tornado sobre aquellos y que por 
tanto, con objeto de guardar en la 
discusion el orden natural, con- 
sul era necesario que se completen 
estos articulos indispensables de 
dicho Tratado con la contestacion de 
los Comisarios Americanos, antes 
de pasar a discutir puntos demenor 
interes que no afecton a, la conclu- 
sion de la paz, lo cual no quiere 
decir que los Comisarios Espafloles 
no tengan el deseo de tratar opor- 
tuuamente de ellos. 



Insisten los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos en que deben ser examiua- 
dos estos puntos subsidiaries 6 
renunciarse a toda discusion hasta 
que los Comisarios Espanoles ha- 
yau recibido instrucciones para 
tratar sobre todos los puntos que 
les hayan sido sometidos. 

Mantiene el Presidente de la 
Comision Espahola su opinion in- 
sistiendos en que aim despues de 
recibidas las instrucciones de su 
Gobierno sobre tales puntos acces- 
orios la Comision Espahola no en- 
trara a discutirlos si no despues 
que se haya terminado la discusion 
de los articulos que tiene present- 
ado y que son relativos al Tratado 
de paz propriameuto dicho, y hab- 
iendole pregnntado la Comision 
Americana cualeseran los tres pun- 
tos 4 que se referia el Presidente 
de la Comision Espahola y que de- 
bian ser examinados por la Com- 
ision Americana, contesta que son 
tres, a saber: ampliacion a Cuba y 
Puerto Eico del trato comercial 
concedido a Espana en Eilipinas; 
repatriation por cuenta de ambas 



226 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



pines; the repatriation at the ex- 
pense of both nations of the pris- 
oners taken, and the return to 
Spain of the war material in Cuba 
and Porto Rico with respect to 
which the evacuation commissions 
had not come to a decision, since 
such material in the Philippines, 
he understood, belonged to Spain. 
He added that the Spanish Com- 
mission had promised to consult its 
Government regarding the main- 
tenance of public order in the Phil- 
ippines, and that if the American 
Commissioners were ready to enter 
upon the discussion to which they 
were invited, he would, without 
having received instructions, un- 
dertake to give a categorical an- 
swer upon this point, which answer 
he was confident his Government 
would ratify. 

The discussion continued, the 
American Commission insisting on 
its proposal to discuss the whole of 
its draft, or to postpone all discus- 
sion until the Spanish Commission 
should have instructions upon all 
points. The Spanish Commission, 
holding to its opinion that it was 
duly authorized to treat upon 
everything essential to the treaty 
of peace, and therefore ready to 
sign its articles at once, but deter- 
mined not first to treat of those 
points which are not essential to 
the treaty, asked that its readiness 
to discuss in the natural order what- 
ever related directly to the treaty of 
peace, be spread upon the minutes. 

The arguments on both sides 
having been repeated, the Presi- 
dent of the American Commission 
stated that he as well as his col- 
leagues hoped that the relations 
of the two countries might not be 
limited to the strict terms of a 
treaty of peace, but rather that 
an agreement might be reached 
for mutual concessions which 
would be beneficial to both Gov- 
ernments and promote the cordial- 
ity in their relations. The Presi- 
dent of the Spanish Commission 
stated that this was also the desire 



naciones de los prisioneros hechos, 
y devolucion a Espaiia del material 
de guerra en Cuba y Puerto Rico 
de que ya no hubieran dispuesto 
las Comisiones de evacuacion, por- 
que en cuanto al existente en Fili- 
pinas entiende el Presidente que 
pertenecia a Espaiia. Aiiade que 
por su parte la Comision Espanola 
se comprometio a consultar acerca 
del mantenimiento del orden pub- 
lico en Filipinasy que silosComisa- 
rios Americanos estan dispuestos 
a aceptar la discusion a que les in- 
vita, el se compromete sin haber 
recibido instrucciones a dar sobre 
este punto una respuesta catego- 
rica que su Gobierno confia en que 
ratificara. 



Continue la discusion man tenien- 
do la Comision Americana su pro- 
posito dediscutirel conjuntode su 
proyecto 6 de aplazar toda dis- 
cusion hasta que la Espanola tenga 
instrucciones sobre todos sus extre- 
mos, y sosteniendo la Espanola su 
criterio de que estan debidainente 
autorizados atratarde cuanto cons- 
tituye el Tratado de paz esencial- 
mente dicho, y dispuestos por tan to 
a firmar sus clausulas al punto; 
pero resueltos a no tratar antes 
aquellos puntos que no son esen- 
ciales adichotratado,desean conste 
en e] acta su disposition a seguir 
discutiendo por suorden natural 
cuanto a dicho Tratado de paz di- 
rectum eute se refiere. 

Repitense los argumentos por 
una y otra parte y habiendo mani- 
festado el Presidente de la Comi- 
sion Americana que tauto el como 
sus colegas esperaban que no se 
limitarian las relaciones de ambos 
paises a las condiciones estrictas 
de un Tratado de paz, sino que 
podria llegarse a un acuerdo sobre 
mutuas concesiones beneficiosas 
para ambos Gobiernos y que fo- 
mentarian la cordialidad en sus 
relaciones, el Presidente de la Co- 
mision Espanola manifest6 que 
tales eran tambi^n los deseos de 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



227 



of the Spanish Commissioners, 
but that to his mind it would be 
easier to reach an understanding 
upon the less important points if 
the decisions arrived at on the 
necessary articles of the treaty of 
peace were satisfactory. 

The American Commissioners 
proposed to adjourn the session in 
order that the instructions awaited 
by the Spanish Commissioners 
might arrive, and to examine the 
articles presented by the latter. 

The Spanish Commissioners 
agreed to this, and the session was 
adjourned till Saturday, the 3rd 
instant, at two p. m. 

William R. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Reid. 

John B. Moore. 



los Comisarios Bspaholes pero que 
en su sentir cuanto mas satisfac- 
torias fuesen las soluciones dadas 
a los articulos indispensables del 
Tratado de paz mas se facilitaria 
la inteligencia a que podriallegarse 
respecto de los demas puntos 
menos importantes. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
pusieron aplazar la sesion a fin de 
dar lugar a que llegasen las ins- 
trucciones que aguardaban los 
Comisarios Espaholes y a estudiar 
los articulos por estos presentados. 

Acordado asi por la Comision 
Espahola se aplazo la sesion para 
el sabado 3 del corriente a las 2, 
p. m. 

E. Montero Rios 

B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

W R de Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 19 



Protocolo No. 19. 



Conference of December 5, 1898. Confer encia del 5 Diclembre de 1898. 



At the request of the American 
Commissioners the session which 
was to have been held on Satur- 
day the 3rd instant was postponed 
until today at three p. m., when 
there were 

Present On the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain : Messrs : 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the Americaii 
Commission asked the President 
of the Spanish Commission whether 
he had received instructions from 
his Government touching the 
points on which the American 
Commissioners desired to treat. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that he had in 



A petition de los Comisarios 
Americanos la sesion que debio 
celebrarse el Sabado 3 del corriente 
fiie" aplazada para hoy a las 3, hal- 
landose en dichos dia y hora 

Presentes Por parte de los 
Estados Unidos de America: los 
Seiiores Day Davis Frye Gray 
Reid Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espaha : los Senores 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Pregunta el Presidente de la 
Comision Americana al Presidente 
de la Comision Espahola si ha reci- 
bido instruccioues de su Gobierno 
relativas a los puntos que la Comi- 
sion americana deseaba tratar, y el 
PresidentedelaComision Espahola 
contesta que en efecto las ha reci- 
bido pero que reitera su proposito 



228 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



fact received them ; but he reiter- 
ated his purpose not to take up 
those points until the matters in- 
herent in and essential to the treaty 
of peace proper should be discussed 
and finally approved. 

It was agreed that the Commis- 
sions should communicate to each 
other the answers of their respec- 
tive Governments to the questions 
previously submitted to them. 
The President of the American 
Commission stated, in the first 
place, that his Government was 
not willing to grant and embody 
in the treaty of peace the exten- 
sion to Porto Eico and Cuba of 
the commercial treatment offered 
to Spain in the Philippines for ten 
years; but that, recognizing the 
advisability of concluding a com- 
mercial agreement between the 
countries, the subject might be 
treated of in a general commercial 
convention. 

With respect to the return and 
transportation at the expense of 
each nation of the prisoners taken 
by it, it was agreed, as an addi- 
tion to Article VIII, that Spain 
and the United States should 
transport them at their expense 
to the nearest port of their respec- 
tive countries, but that the trans- 
portation of prisoners of war taken 
in the Philippines should not in- 
clude native soldiers but only 
Peninsular Spaniards in the army. 
The Secretaries-General of the two 
Commissions were charged with 
the framing of this addition to 
Article VIII. 

With regard to the return of the 
war material in Cuba and Porto 
Eico not disposed of by the evac- 
uation commissions, the American 
Commissioners declared that they 
were not authorized to treat. 

With respect to the war material 
in the Philippines, the American 
Commissioners stated that it should 
be governed by the same condi- 
tions as were agreed to by the 
evacuation commissions in the 
West Indies. 



de no tratar dichos puntos hasta 
que se hayan discutido y aprobado 
definitivamente los asuntos que son 
iuherentes y esenciales al Tratado 
de paz propiamente dicho. 

Se convino en comenzar por 
comunicarse ambas Comisiones las 
contestations respectivas de sus 
Gobiernos a los puntos que les 
fueron sometidos anteriormente y 
mauifiesta el Presidente de la 
Comision Americana en primer 
lugar, que su Gobierno no esta 
dispuesto a conceder y consignar 
en este Tratado de paz la extension 
a Puerto Eico y a Cuba del trato 
comercial ofrecido a Espana du- 
rante diez anosen Filipinas; pero 
que reconociendo la coveniencia 
de que se pacte un acuerdo comer- 
cial entre ambos paises, podria tra- 
tarse este asunto en un tratado de 
comercio. 

Eespecto de la devoluci6n y tras- 
porte por cuenta de una y otra 
Nation de los prisioneros hechos 
por cada una de ellas, se acuerda 
como adicion al Articulo VIII, 
que Espana y los Estados Unidos 
los trasportaran a su costa al 
puerto mas cercano de sus paises 
respectivos, pero que el trasporte 
de los prisioneros de guerra hechos 
en Filipinas, no se extendera a los 
soldados indigenas sino a los indi- 
viduos peninsulares de aquel ej£r- 
cito. Los Secretarios Generates de 
ambas Comisiones quedan encarga- 
dos de la redaction de esta adicion 
al Articulo VIII. 

En lo relativo a la devolution del 
material de guerra en Cuba y Puer- 
to Eico de que no hayan dispuesto 
las Comisiones de evacuation, la 
Comision Americana se declarain- 
competente para tratar. 

Eespecto del material de guerra 
existente en Filipinas, los Comisa- 
rios Americanos manifestaron que 
debia ajustarse a lasmismas condi- 
ciones acordadas por las Comisio- 
nes de evacuation en las Antillas. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



229 



The President of the Spanish 
Commission and his colleagues 
maintained that the cession of the 
archipelago did not carry and could 
not carry with it anything except 
what was of a fixed nature; they 
explained the character of the 
siege artillery and heavy ordnance 
which the Americans claimed for 
themselves, and after some dis- 
cussion to the end of determining 
precisely what each Commission 
understood as portable and fixed 
material, it was agreed that stands 
of colors, uncaptured war vessels, 
small arms, guns of all calibres, 
with their carriages and accesso- 
ries, powder, ammunition, live 
stock, and materials and supplies 
of all kinds belonging to the land 
and naval forces shall remain the 
property of Spain : that pieces of 
heavy ordnance, exclusive of field 
artillery, in the fortifications, shall 
remain in their emplacements for 
the term of six months to be reck- 
oned from the ratification of the 
treaty; and that the United States 
might, in the mean time, purchase 
such material from Spain, if a sat- 
isfactory agreement between the 
two Governments on the subject 
should be reached. 

It was agreed that the Secreta- 
ries-General of the two Commis- 
sions should be entrusted with the 
framing of such an article. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission, having agreed at the 
last session to consult his Govern- 
ment regarding the proposal of the 
American Commissioners that the 
United States should maintain 
public order over the whole Philip- 
pine Archipelago, pending the ex- 
chan ge of rati fication s of th e treaty 
of peace, stated that the answer 
of his Government was that the 
authorities of each of the two 
nations should be charged with the 
maintenance of order in the places 
where they might be established, 
those authorities agreeing among 
themselves to this end whenever 
they might deem it necessary. 



El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola y sus colegas manifesta- 
ron qne la cesion de dicho Archi- 
pielago no Uevaba ni podia llevar 
consigo sino lo que es de caracter 
inmueble, explicaron las condi- 
ciones de la artillerfa de plaza y 
de sitio que reclamaban para si 
los Americanos, y despues de al- 
guna discusion al efecto de deter- 
minar con precision lo que una y 
otra Comision entendian por mate- 
rial portatil y material fijo, se eon- 
viene en que seran propiedad de 
Espaiia banderas y estandartes, 
buques de guerra no apresados, 
armas portatiles, cauones de todos 
calibres con sus montajes y acce- 
sorios, polvoras, municiones, ga- 
nado, material y efectos de toda 
clase pertenecientes a los ejercitos 
de mar y tierra; qne las piezas de 
grueso calibre, que no sean artil- 
leria de campana, colocadas en las 
fortificaciones y en las costas, que- 
daran en sus emplazamientos por 
el plazo de seis meses a partir del 
canje de ratincaciones del tratado; 
y que los Estados Uuidos podran, 
durante este tiempo, comprar a 
Espana dicho material si ambos 
Gobiernos llegan a un acnerdo 
satisfactorio sobre el particular. 

Se acuerda que los Secretarios 
Generales de ambas Comisiones 
queden encargados de redactar 
dicho articulo. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola habieudo quedado en la 
sesion anterior en consultar & su 
Gobierno, respecto la proposicion 
de los Comisarios Americanos por 
la cual los Estados Unidos man- 
tendrian el orden en todo el Archi- 
pielago filipino, mientras se ratifi- 
caba el Tratado de paz, manifiesta 
que la contestation de su Gobierno 
es que las Autoridades de cada una 
de ambas naciones cuiden de con- 
servar el orden en las regiones en 
que se hallen establecidas y po- 
niendose con este objeto de acuer- 
do unas y otras cuando lo estimen 
necesario. 



230 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



In view of this reply the Ameri- 
can Commissioners did not insist 
that their proposal should be incor- 
porated in the treaty. 

The readingin English and Span- 
ish of the articles of the treaty 
from the first to the eighth inclu- 
sive was then proceeded with, and 
they were approved by both Com- 
missions, which declared them to 
be final save as to mere modifica- 
tions of form, upon which the Sec- 
retaries General might endeavor to 
agree. 

The President of the American 
Commission, desiring that the dis- 
cussion of the matters presented 
by that Commission should next be 
taken up,the President of the Span- 
ish Commission maintained the 
opinion which he had expressed at 
the last session, and at the begin- 
ning of this, to the effect that the ex- 
amination of those matters should 
not be entered upon until the Com- 
missions had discussed what was 
essential to the treaty of peace, and 
that therefore the articles pro- 
posed by the Spanish Commission 
as additional to the first eight, 
should be taken up. 

It was agreed that in view of the 
lateness of the hour the sessiou 
should be adjourned until tomor- 
row, Tuesday, the 6th instant, at 
two, p. m. 

William B. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
Wm P Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Beid. 
John B. Moore. 



En vista de esta contestaci6n, 
los Comisarios Americanos no in- 
sistieron en que formase su propo- 
sicion parte del Tratado. 

Se procede en seguida a la lec- 
tura en espanol y en ingles de los 
articalos del tratado desde el pri- 
mero al ocho inclusive y son apro- 
bados por ambas Comisiones que 
los declaran definitivos salvas cu- 
alquiera modifica cion de meraforma 
sobre las cuales tratarian de po- 
nerse de acuerdo los Secretarios 
Generales. 

Deseando entonces el Presidente 
de la Comision Americana que se 
pasase a la discusion de los puntos 
presentados por su Comision, y 
manteniendo el Presidente de la 
Comision Espailola el criterio que 
habia sostenido en la sesion ante- 
rior y al prin cipio de esta, de que 
no podia pasarse al examen de 
dichos puntos sin haber antes di- 
scutido cuanto era esencial al tra- 
tado de paz y tomando por tanto 
en consideracion los articulos adi- 
cionales a los ocho primeros, pro- 
puestos por la Comision Espaiiola, 
acordose que en vista de lo avan- 
zado de la hora se aplazasela sesion 
hasta inaiiana inartes 6 del corri- 
ente a las dos, p. m. 



EUGENIO MONTERO BfOS 
B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

"W li de Villa Urrutia 
Rafael Cerero 
Emilio De Ojeda 



Annex to Protocol No. 19. 
the eight articles as discussed in the conference. 



PREAMBLE, 



The United States of America 
and Her Majesty the Queen lie- 
gent of Spain, in the name of her 
August Son Don Alfonso XIII, 



PREAMBULO. 



S. M. la Beina Begente de Es- 
paiia, en nombre de Su Augusto 
Hijo Don Alfonso XIII, y los Es- 
tados Unidos de America, dese- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



231 



desiring to end the state of war 
now existing between the two 
countries, have for that purpose 
appointed as Plenipotentiaries: 

The President of the United 
States, William R. Day, lately 
Secretary of State; Cushman K. 
Davis, a Senator of the United 
States; William P. Frye, a Senator 
of the United States ; George Gray, 
a Senator of the United States; 
and Whitelaw Reid, lately Minis- 
ter Plenipotentiary of the United 
States to France; 

And Her Majesty the Queen 
Regent of Spain, (here insert 
names and titles). 

Who, having assembled in Paris, 
and having exchanged their full 
powers, which were found to be 
in due and proper form, have, after 
discussion of the matters before 
them, agreed upon the following 
articles : 

Article I. 

Spain hereby relinquishes all 
claim of sovereignty over and title 
to Cuba. 

And as the island is, upon its 
evacuation by Spain, to be occu- 
pied by the United States, the 
United States will, so long as such 
occupation shall last, assume and 
discharge the obligations that 
may under international law at- 
tach to its character as occupant, 
for the protection of life and prop- 
erty. 

Article II. 

Spain hereby cedes to the United 
States the Island of Porto Rico 
and other islands now under Span- 
ish sovereignty in the West Indies, 
aud the Island of Guam in the 
Ladrones or Marianas. 



Article III. 

Spain hereby cedes to the United 
States the archipelago known as 



ando poner termino al estado de 
guerra hoy existente entre ambas 
Naciones, ban nombrado con este 
objeto por sus Plenipotenciarios, a 
saber : 

S. M. la Reina Regente de Es- 
paiia a (aqui se insertan los nom- 
bres) y el Presidente de los Estados 
Unidos de America 4 (aqui se in- 
sertan los nombres). 



Los cuales reunidos en Paris, 
despues de haberse comunicado sus 
pleuipotencias respectivas, habien- 
dolas hallado en buena y debida 
forma, previa la discusion de las 
materias pendientes, han conve- 
nido en los articulos siguientes: 



Articulo 1°. 

Espaha por el presente renuncia 
todo derecho de Soberania y pro- 
piedad sobre la Isla de Cuba. 

En atencion a que dicha Isla esta 
a punto de ser evacuada por Espaua 
y ocupada por los Estados Unidos, 
los Estados Unidos inientras dure 
su ocupacion, tomaran sobre si y 
cumpliran las obligaciones que el 
derecho internacional iinpone a un 
caracter de ocupautes, para la pro- 
teccion de vidas y haciendas. 

Articulo 2°. 

Espana par el presente Tratado 
cede a los Estados Unidos la Isla 
de Puerto Rico y las deinas que 
estan ahora bajo su soberania en 
las Indias Occideutales, y la Isla 
de Guam en el Archipielago de las 
Marianas 6 Ladrones. 

Articulo 3°. 

Cede tambien Espaiia a los Esta- 
dos Unidos el Archipielago cono- 



232 



TREATY OP PEACE. 



the Philippine Islands, and com- 
prehending the islands lying within 
the following line: 

A line running from west to east 
along or near the twentieth par- 
allel of north latitude, and through 
themiddle of the navigablechannel 
of Baehi, from the one hundred and 
eighteenth (118th) to the one hun- 
dred and twenty- seventh (127th) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich, thence along the 
one hundred and twenty-seventh 
(127th) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich to the par- 
allel of four degrees and forty five 
minutes (4° 45') north latitude, 
thence along the parallel of four 
degrees and forty-five minutes 
(4° 45') north latitude to its inter- 
section with the meridian of longi- 
tude one hundred and nineteen 
degrees and thirty-five minutes 
(1 1 9° 35') east of Greenwich, thence 
alongthemeridian of longitude one 
hundred and nineteen degrees and 
thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east 
of Greenwich to the parallel of lati- 
tude seven degrees and forty min- 
utes (7° 40') north, thence along 
the parallel of latitude of seven 
degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') 
north to its intersection with the 
one hundred and sixteenth (110th) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich, thence by a direct 
line to the intersection of the tenth 
(10th) degree parallel of north lat- 
itude with the one hundred and 
eighteenth (118th) degree meridian 
of longitude east of Greenwich, and 
thence along the one hundred and 
eighteenth ( 118th) degree meridian 
of longitude east of Greenwich to 
the point of beginning. 

The United States will pay to 
Spain the sum of twenty million 
dollars ($20,000,000) within three 
mouths after the exchange of the 
ratifications of the present treaty. 

Article IV. 

The United States will, upon the 
signature of the present treaty, 
send back to Spain, at its own cost, 



cido por Is! as Filipinas, situado 
dentro de las lineas siguientes: 

Una linea que corre de Oeste k 
Este, cerca del 20° paralelo de lati- 
tud Norte, a traves de la mitad del 
canal navegable de Bachi, desde 
el 118° al 127° grados de longitud 
Este de Greenwich; de aqui k lo 
largo del ciento veintisiete (127) 
grado meridiano de longitud Este 
de Greenwich al paralelo cuatro 
grados cuareuta y cinco miuutos 
(4° 45') de latitud Norte; de aqui 
sguendo el paralelo de cuatro gra- 
dos cuarenta y cinco minutos de 
latitud Norte (4° 45') hasta su in- 
terseccion con el meridiano de 
longitud ciento diez y nueve grados 
y treinta y cinco minutos (119° 
35') Este de Greenwich; de aqui 
siguiendo el meridiano de longitud 
ciento diez y nueve grados y trienta 
y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de 
Greenwich al paralelo de latitude 
siete grado cuarenta minutos (7° 
40') Norte, de aqui siguiendo el 
paralelo de latitud siete grados 
cuarenta minutos (7° 40') Norte k 
su intersection con el ciento diez y 
seis (116°) grado meridiano de 
longitud Este de Greenwich, de 
aqui por una linea recta k la inter- 
section del decimo grado paralelo 
de latitud Norte, con el ciento diez 
y ocho (118°) grado meridiauo de 
longitud Este de Greenwich, y de 
aqui siguiendo el ciento diez y ocho 
grado (118°) meridiano de longitud 
Este de Greenwich al puntoen que 
comienza esta demarcation. 



Los Estados Unidos pagaran a 
Espana la suina deveinte millones 
de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de 
tres meses despues del canje de 
ratificationes del presente tratado. 

Articulo 4°. 

Los Estados Unidos al ser fir- 
mado el presente tratado trasporta- 
raii a Espafia k su costa los soldados 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



235 



the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- 
oners of war on the capture of Ma- 
nila by the American forces. The 
arms of the soldiers in question 
shall be restored to them. 

Spain will, upon the exchange of 
the ratifications of the present 
treaty proceed to evacuate the 
Philippines, as well as the Island 
of Guam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners 
appointed to arrange for the evac- 
uation of Porto Rico and other 
islands in the West Indies, under 
the Protocol of August 12 1898, 
which is to continue in force till its 
provisions are completely executed. 
The time within which the evacua- 
tion of the Philippines and of the 
Island of Guam shall be completed 
shall be fixed by the two Govern- 
ments. 

Article V. 

In conformity with the provisions 
of Articles I, II and III of this 
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, 
and cedes in Porto Rico and other 
Islands in the West Indies, in the 
Island of Guam, and in the Philip- 
pine Archipelago, all the buildings, 
wharves, barracks, forts, struc- 
tures, public highways and other 
immovable property which in con- 
formity with law belong to the pub- 
lic domain, and as such belong to 
the Crown of Spain. 

And it is hereby declared that 
the relinquishment or cession, as 
the case may be, to which the pre- 
ceding paragraph refers, cannot in 
any respect impair the property or 
rights which by law belong to the 
peaceful possession of property of 
all kinds, of provinces, municipal- 
ities, public or private establish- 
ments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, 
or any other associations having 
legal capacity to acquire and pos- 
sess property in the aforesaid ter- 
ritories renounced or ceded, or of 
private individuals, of whatsoever 
nationality such individuals may 
be. 



espafioles que hicieron prisioneros 

de guerra las fuerzas American as 
al ser capturada Manila. Las 
armas de estos soldados les serdn 
devueltas. 

Espana al ratincarseel pjresente 
tratado, procedera a evacuar las 
Islas Filipinas,asicomo lade Guam, 
en coudiciones semejantes 4 las 
acordadas por las comisiones nom- 
bradasparaconcertarlaevacuacion 
de Puerto Rico y otras Islas en las 
Indias Occidentales, segun el Pro- 
tocolo de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que 
continuara en vigor hasta que sean 
conipletauiente cumplidas sus dis- 
posiciones. El termino dentro del 
cual sera completadalaevacuacion 
de las Islas Eilipinas y de la de 
Guam, sera fijada por ambos Go- 
biernos. 



Articulo 5°. 

En cumplimiento de lo con venido 
en los articulos 1°, 2° y 3° de este 
tratado, Espana renuncia en Cuba 
y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras 
Islas de las Indias Occidentales y 
en la Isla de Guam, en las Islas 
Filipinas, todos los edificios, muel- 
les, cuarteles, fortalezas, estableci- 
mientos, vias publicas y demas 
bienes inmuebles, que con arreglo 
a derecho son del dominio publico 
y como tal corresponden 4 la 
Corona de Espana. 

Queda por lo tanto declarado que 
esta renuncia 6 cesion, segun el 
caso, a que se refiere el parrafo an- 
terior, en nada puede mermar la 
propiedad 6 los derechos que cor- 
respondan con arreglo a las leyes 
al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes 
de todas clases de las provincias, 
municipios, establecimientos pub- 
licos 6 privados, corporaciones civi- 
les oeclesiasticas, 6 de cunlesquiera 
otras colectividades que tienen per- 
sona lidad juridica para adquirir y 
poseer bienes en los mencionados 
territorios renunciados 6 cedidos, 
y los de los individuos particulars 
cualquieraque sea su nacioualidad. 



234 



TREATY OP PEACE. 



The aforesaid relinquishment or 
cession, as the case may be, in- 
cludes all documents exclusively 
referring to the sovereignty relin- 
quished or ceded that may exist 
in the archives of the Peninsula. 
Where any document in such 
archives only in part relates to 
such sovereignty, a copy of such 
part will be furnished whenever it 
shall be requested. Like rules 
shall be reciprocally observed in 
favor of Spain in respect of docu- 
ments in the archives of the islands 
above referred to. 

In the aforesaid relinquishment 
or cession, as the case may be, are 
also included such rights as the 
Crown of Spain and its authorities 
possess in respect of the official ar- 
chives and records, executive as 
well as judicial, in the islands above 
referred to, which relate to said 
islands or the rights and property 
of their inhabitants. Such archives 
and records shall be carefully pre- 
served, and private persons shall 
without distinction have the right 
to require, in accordance with law, 
authenticated copies of the con- 
tracts, wills and other instruments 
forming part of notarial protocols 
or files, or which may be contained 
in the executive or judicial archives, 
be the latter in Spain or in the isl- 
ands aforesaid. 



Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun 
el caso, incluye todos los docu- 
mentos que se refieran exclusiva- 
mente a dicha Soberania renun- 
ciada 6 cedida que existan en los 
Archivos de la Peninsula. Cuando 
estos documentos existentes en 
dichos Archivos, solo en parte cor- 
respondan a dicha Soberania, se 
facilitaran copias de dicha parte, 
siempre que sean solicitadas. 
Eeglas analogas habran reeiproca- 
mente de observarse en favor de 
Espaiia respecto de los documentos 
existentes en los Archivos de las 
Islas antes mencionadas. 

En las antescitadas renuncia 6 
cesion, segun elcaso,sehallan com- 
prendidos aquellos derechos de la 
Corona de Espaiia y de sus Autori- 
dades sobre los Archivos y Eegis- 
tros Oiiciales, asi administrativos 
como judiciales de dichas Islas que 
se refieran a ellas 6 a los derechos 
y propiedades de sus habitantes. 
Dichos archivos, registros, etc., 
deberan ser cuidadosamente con- 
servados y los particulares sin 
excepcion, tendran derecho a sacar 
con arreglo a las Leyes, las copias 
autorizadas de los contratos, testa- 
mentos y demas documentos quo 
formen parte de los protocolos 
notariales 6 que se custodien en 
los archivos administrativos 6 
judiciales, bien estos se hallen en 
Espaiia, 6 bien en las Islas de que 
se hace meucion anteriormente. 



Article VI. 



Articulo 6°. 



The United States and Spain, in 
consideration of the provisions of 
this treaty, hereby mutually relin- 
quish all claims for indemnity, na- 
tional and individual, of every 
kind, (including all claims for in- 
demnity for the cost of the war,) 
of either Government, or of its cit- 
izens or subjects, against the other 
Government, that may have arisen 
since the beginning of the late in- 
surrection in Cuba and prior to the 
ratification of the present treaty. 



Espaiia y los Estados Unidos de 
America en atencion a lo estable- 
cido por este tratado, renuncian 
mutuamente por el presente a toda 
reclamacion de indemnizacion na- 
tional 6 privada de cualquier 
genero (incluyendo toda reclama- 
tion por indemuizaciones por el 
coste de la guerra), de uu Gobi- 
enio contra el otro, 6 de sus siib- 
ditos 6 ciudadanos contra el otro 
Gobierno, que puedan haber sur- 
gido desde el comienzo de la ulti- 
ma insurrection en Cuba y anter- 
ior a la ratificaci6n del presente 
tratado. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



235 



Article VII. 

The United States will, for the 
term of ten years from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications 
of the present treaty, admit Span- 
ish ships and merchandise to the 
ports of the Philippine Islands on 
the same terms as ships and mer- 
chandise of the United States. 



Article VIII. 

Spain will, upon the signature of 
the present treaty, release all per- 
sons held by her as prisoners, mili- 
tary or political, in connection with 
the insurrections in Cuba and the 
Philippines, and the war with the 
United States. 

Eeciprocally, the United States 
will release all persons make pris- 
oners of war by the American 
forces, and will undertake to ob- 
tain the release of all Spanish pris- 
oners in the hands of the insur- 
gents in Cuba and the Philippines. 



Articulo 7°. 

Los Estados Unidos durante el 
termino de diez anos a contar desde 
el canje de la ratificacion del pre- 
sente tratado, admitiran en los 
puertos de las Islas Filipinas los 
buques y las mercancias espanoles, 
bajo las mismas coudiciones que 
los buques y las mercancias de los 
Estados Unidos. 

Articulo 8°. 

E span a al ser firm ado el pre- 
sente tratado, pondra en libertad 
a todos los detenidos en calidad de 
prisioneros de guerra 6 por delitos 
politicos, a consecuencia de las in- 
surrecciones en Cuba, y en Filipi- 
nas, y de la guerra con los Estados 
Unidos. Reciprocamentelos Esta- 
dos Unidos pondran en libertad a 
todos los prisioneros de guerra he- 
chos por las fuerzas American as y 
gestionaran la libertad de todos los 
prisioneros espanoles en poder de 
los insurrectos de Cuba y de Fili- 
pinas. 



Protocol ISTo. 20. 
Conference of December 6, 1898. 



Present — On the part of the 
United States Messrs. Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, 
Fegusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The President of the American 
Commission, referring to the dis- 
cussion that had taken place at the 
two preceding sessions on the sub- 
ject of procedure, stated that he 
recognized the force of the position 
of the President of the Spanish 
Commission that the articles re- 
lating to the necessary part of the 
treaty should first be taken up; 



Protocolo No. 20. 

Confer encia del 6 de Diciembre de 

1898. 

Presentes. Por parte de los Es- 
tados Unidos de America: los 
Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, 
Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana: los Seiio- 
res Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Gar- 
nica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

El acta de la sesion anterior fue 
leida y aprobada. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana, refirieudose a la discu- 
sion habida en las dos anteriores 
sesiones respecto al orden de tra- 
bajos, declaro reconocer la razon 
que tenia el Presidente de la Comi- 
sion Espanola para discutir en pri- 
mer termino los articulos relativos 
a la parte necesaria del tratado; 
pero que. en opinion de los Conii- 



236 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



but that, in the opinion of the 
American Commissioners, nothing 
was more strictly pertinent to a 
treaty of peace than a clause for 
the revival of treaties, which the 
war had suspended or terminated, 
such, for example, as the extradi- 
tion treaty between the two coun- 
tries; and he therefore proposed 
that the Joint Commission should 
take up, first, the article proposed 
by the American Commissioners 
for the revival of former treaties, 
then the articles proposed by the 
Spanish Commissioners, and then 
the rest of the articles proposed 
by the American Commissioners. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that he felt 
compelled to insist upon the con- 
tention of that Commission on the 
subject of procedure, and that he 
begged to differ as to the order in 
which the article for the revival of 
treaties should be discussed ; while 
such an article might be relevant 
to a treaty of peace, yet it was 
usually the last article of all, and 
should therefore be the last con- 
sidered. 

The President of the American 
Commission observed that, while 
the American Commissioners felt 
that their view was reasonable and 
proper, they desired to proceed 
with the business of the Joint Com- 
mission; and he inquired whether, 
if the articles proposed by the 
Spanish Commission were taken 
up and considered, all the articles 
proposed by the American Com- 
mission would then in like manner 
be taken up and considered. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission answered in the affirm- 
ative, adding that he had not pro- 
posed to take up the articles of the 
Spanish Commission because they 
were its articles, but because they 
were specially appropriate to a 
treaty of peace. 

The President of the American 
Commission then took up the sub- 
ject of nationality, in regard to 



sarios Americanos, nada habia mas 
estrictamente pertinente a un tra- 
tado de paz que la renovation de 
los tratados suspendidos 6 terini- 
nados por la guerra, tales como, 
por ejemplo, el tratado de extradi- 
tion entre los dos paises; por lo 
cual proponia que la Comision en 
pleno se ocupara en primer termino 
del articulo propuesto por los Comi- 
sarios Americanos para renovar los 
anteriores tratados, siguiendo con 
los articulos propuestos por los 
Comisarios Espaholes y acabando 
con los deinas articulos propuestos 
por los Comisarios Americanos. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola replico que debia insistir 
"en el punto de vista adoptado por 
esta Comision respecto al procedi- 
mieuto, sintiendo no estar de 
acuerdo respecto al orden en que 
se habia de discutir el articulo 
relativo a la renovacion de los tra- 
tados, pues si bien es verdad que 
este articulo suele insertarse en 
los tratados de paz, ordinaria- 
mente es el ultimo de todos, y debe 
por lo tanto ser el ultimo de los 
que se estudiau. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana replico que, aunque los 
Comisarios Americanos entendiau 
que sn punto de vista era razon- 
able y adecuado, deseaben sin 
embargo adelantar los trabajos de 
la Comision mixta, ypregun to que 
si los articulos propuestos por la 
Comisi6n Espanola eran discutidos 
y examinados, serian a. su vez 
todos los articulos propuestos por 
la Comision Americana de igual 
manera discutidos y examinados 

El Presidente de la Comision Es- 
panola contesto afirmativamente, 
ahadiendo que no habia propuesto 
discutir los articulos dela Comision 
Espanola porque fuesen los suyos 
propios, sino porque eran especial- 
mente propios de un Tratado de 
paz. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana empez6 ocup^nrtose de 
nacionalidad, respecto a la cual la 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



237 



which the American Commission 
originally presented the following 
article : 

"Article VI. Spanish subjects 
residing in the territory over which 
Spain by the present treaty relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
may remain in such territory, or 
may remove therefrom, retaining, 
in either event, all their rights of 
property; and, in case they remain, 
they may preserve their allegiance 
to the Crown of Spain, by making, 
before a court of record, within a 
year from the date of the signature 
of this treaty, a declaration of their 
decision to reserve such allegiance, 
in default of which declaration they 
shall be held to have renounced it 
and to have adopted the national- 
ity of the territory in which they 
may reside. Except as provided 
in this treaty, the civil rights and 
political status of the inhabitants 
of the territories hereby ceded to 
the United States shall be deter- 
mined by the Congress." 



To this article the Spanish Com- 
missioners proposed on the 30th of 
November the amendments con- 
tained in the two following articles: 

"nationality. 

"Article — . Spanish subjects 
now or hereafter residing or domi- 
ciled in the territory the sover- 
eignty over which Spain relin- 
quishes or cedes by the present 
treaty may live in or withdraw 
from said territory, acquiring and 
retaining in either case every kind 
of property, or, alienatingand freely 
disposing thereof or of its value or 
proceeds; practice, with the free- 
dom they now enjoy, industry, com- 
merce, and other mechanical or lib- 
eral professions, and enjoy their 
personal status, without being sub- 
ject to any exception prejudicial to 
the rights secured to them by this 
treaty. If they remain in the ter- 
ritory they shall be allowed to pre- 
serve their nationality by making 
before the proper officer a declara- 



Comision Americana presento en 
un principio el articulo que sigue : 

"Articulo VI. Los subditos 
espanoles que residan en el terri- 
torio cuya Soberania Espana ha 
renunciado 6 cedido por el presente 
tratado, podran permanecer en 
dicho territorio, 6 podran salir de 
41, conservando en ambos casos 
todos sus derechos de propiedad, 
y en el caso de que permauecieran 
en 61, podran conservar su nacion- 
alidad espanola haciendo ante una 
Oficina de registro, dentro del aiio 
de la fecha de la hrma de este 
tratado, una declaration de su 
proposito de conservar dicha na- 
cionalidad; a falta de esta decla- 
racion, se considerara que han 
renunciado su nacionalidad y 
aceptado la del territorio en que 
residen. A exception de lo dis- 
puesto por este tratado, los dere- 
chos civiles y la capacidad poli- 
tica de los habitantes de los 
territorios aqui cedidos a los 
Estados Unidos, seran definidos 
por el Congreso." 

En 30 de Noviembre, los Comi- 
sarios Espanoles propusieron que 
este Articulo se enmendara por 
medio de los dos articulos sigui- 
entes : 

"nacionalidad. 

"Articulo — . Los subditos es- 
panoles residentes odomiciliados al 
presente 6 en lo futuro en el terri- 
torio cuya soberania Espana re- 
nuncia 6 cede por el presente tra- 
tado, podran vivir en dicho terri- 
torio 6 retirarse de 61, adquiriendo 
y conservando en uno u otro caso, 
toda clase de propiedad 6 realizan- 
dola y disponiendo libremente de 
ella 6 de su valor 6 producto. ejer- 
cer con la libertad que actualmente 
tienen, la industria, el comercio y 
demas profesiones mecanicas 6 
liberales y gozar de su estatuto 
personal; sin que puedan ser some- 
tidos a ningun regimen de excep- 
cion en perjuicio de los derechos 
que en este tratado se les recono- 
cen. Si permanecen en el territo- 
rio, podran conservar su nacionali- 



238 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



tion of such intention, within the 
term of one year, to be reckoned 
from the date of the exchange of 
ratifications of this treaty or the 
taking up of their residence therein. 



" Failure to comply with this re- 
quirement shall be considered as a 
renunciation of their nationality, 
and the adoption of that of the ter- 
ritory in which they may reside. 
Save in the cases covered by this 
treaty, the civil rights and political 
condition of the Spaniards living 
in ceded territories shall be gov- 
erned by the laws applicable to all 
other foreigners in the territory of 
their residence. 

" Article — . All the other in- 
habitants of the territories ceded 
shall have the right to choose the 
Spanish nationality within the 
period of one year to be reckoned 
from the date of the exchange of 
the ratifications of this treaty, the 
choice to be made in the manner 
provided for in the preceding arti- 
cle. Notice thereof shall be given 
immediately to the Spanish Gov- 
ernment, or to its consular officers, 
and without which requisite the 
nationality thus chosen shall not 
be at any time recognized." 

The American Commissioners 
proposed, at this meeting, as a sub- 
stitute for the foregoing articles, 
the following article: 

"Article VI. Spanish sub- 
jects, natives of the Peninsula, re- 
siding in the territory over which 
Spain by the present treaty relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
may remain in such territory or may 
remove therefrom, retaining in 
either event all their rights of prop- 
erty, including the right to sell or 
dispose of such property or of its 
proceeds; and they shall also have 
the right to carry on their indus- 
try, commerce and professions, 
being subject in respect thereof to 
such laws as are applicable to 



dad haciendo ante una oficina 
publica de registro una declaration 
de su propdsito de conservar dicha 
nacionalidad, dentro del termino 
de un aho, que se contara desde la 
fecha del canje de ratificaciones de 
este tratado, 6 desde que aquellos 
fijen alii su residencia. 

"Si faltasen 4 este requisite, se 
les considerara como si la hubiesen 
renunciado y adoptado la nacion- 
alidad del territorio en que residan. 
Excepto en cuanto previene este 
tratado, los derechos civiles y con- 
dition politica de los espanoles 
habitantes en los territorios cedi- 
dos, se regiran por las ley es comunes 
a todos los demas extrangeros en 
el territorio de su residencia." 

"Articulo — . Los demas habi- 
tantes de los territorios cedidos 
podran optar por la nacionalidad 
espariola en el termino de un afio, 
a contar desde el cambio de ratifi- 
caciones de este tratado, habiendo 
de hacer esta option en la forma 
prescrita en el articulo anterior y 
ponerla inmediatamente adeinas 
en conocimiento del Gobierno Es- 
panol 6 de sus agentes consulares, 
sin cuyo requisite no les sera re- 
conocida en ningiin tiempo la na- 
cionalidad de su option." 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
ponen en esta sesion, que los ante- 
riores articulos sean sustituidos 
por el siguiente: 

"Articulo VI. Los subditos 
espanoles naturales de la Penin- 
sula, que residan en el territorio 
cuya soberania Espaiia renuncia 6 
cede por el presente tratado, po- 
dran permanecer en dicho territo- 
rio 6 marcharse de el, conservando 
en uno u otro caso todos sus dere- 
chos de propiedad, con inclusion 
del derecho de vender 6 disponer 
de tal propiedad 6 de sus productos ; 
y adem&s teudran el derecho de 
ajercer su industria, commercio 6 
profesion, sujetandose a este re- 
specto a las leyes que sean appli- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



239 



other foreigners. In case they re- 
main in the territory they may pre- 
serve their allegiance to the Crown 
of Spain by making, before a court 
of record, within a year from the 
date of the exchange of ratifica- 
tions of this treaty a declaration of 
their decision to preserve such alle- 
giance; in default of which decla- 
ration they shall be held to have 
renounced it and to have adopted 
the nationality of the territory in 
which they may reside. 

"The civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of 
the territories hereby ceded to the 
United States shall be determined 
by the Congress." 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission objected to this article, 
as it was read, on various grounds ; 
and, after some discussion, the 
President of the American Com- 
mission stated that with respect to 
the article in question, as well as 
the other articles which the Ameri- 
can Commissioners might adopt, 
they would require, as a necessary 
condition of their adoption, the in- 
sertion in each article that was to 
run for a length of time of a clause 
limiting the obligation of the 
United States thereunder, in re- 
spect of Cuba, to the time of its 
occupation of the island, or else 
the insertion in the treaty of a geu- 
eral clause to this effect, as follows : 

"Itis understood that any obliga- 
tion assumed by the United States 
with respect to Cuba is limited to 
the time of its occupancy thereof." 

No conclusion having been 
reached on the articles in question ; 
it was agreed that the rest of the 
articles should be read and then 
handed to the Spanish Commis- 
sioners in order that they might 
consider them and give their answer 
to the counter - proposals of the 
United States at the next confer- 
ence, and that all the articles 
should be inserted in the protocol 
of today's conference. 



cables a los demas extrangeros. 
En el caso de que perinanezcan en 
en el territorio, podran conservar 
su nacionalidad Espahola haciendo 
ante una oficiua de registro, dentro 
de un aho despues del cambio de 
ratificaciones de esta tratado, una 
declaracion de su proposito de con- 
servar dicha nacionalidad; a falta 
de esta declaracion, se considerara 
que han renunciado dicha naciona- 
lidad y adoptado la del territorio 
en el cual pueden residir. 

"Los derechos civiles y la con- 
dicion politica de los naturales que 
habitan los territories aqui cedidos 
a los Estados Unidos se determi- 
naran por el Congreso." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanolapreseutovariasobjeciones 
al texto de este articulo, y despues 
de alguna discusion, el Presidente 
de la Comision Americana declaro 
que con respecto al articulo en 
cuestiou, como a los demas que 
los Comisarios Americanos puedan 
aceptar, pediran que, como con- 
dicion necesaria de su adopcion, 
se iuserte en todos los articulos 
que deban estar en vigor durante 
cierto tiempo, una clausula limi- 
tando la obligacion que de ellos se 
derive para los Estados Unidos, 
con respecto a Cuba, al tiempo de 
su ocupacion de la Isla, 6 en otro 
caso que se inscriba en el tratado 
una clausula general que diga: 

" Se entiende que cualquier obli- 
gacion asumida por los Estados 
Unidos con respecto a Cuba, se 
limita al tiempo que ocupen a 
esta," 

No habiendose adoptado acuerdo 
alguno sobre este articulo, se con- 
vino en que se leyeran los demas y 
se entregaran a los Comisarios 
Espanoles, para que pudieran ex- 
aminarlos y contestar a las contra- 
proposiciones de los Estados Uni- 
dos en la sesion proxima, decidien- 
dose ademas que, todos los articuios 
se insertaran en el protocolo de la 
conferencia de hoy. 



240 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Pursuant to this agreement, the 
following articles offered by the 
Spanish Commission were read : 



"grants and contracts for' public 
works and services. 

"Article — . 

"All grants and contracts for 
public works and services in the 
islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, the 
Philippines and other ceded terri- 
tory shall be maintained in force 
until their expiration, in accord- 
ance with the terms thereof, the 
new Government assuming all the 
rights and obligations thereby at- 
taching up to the present time to 
the Spanish Government. 

"public contracts. 

"Article — . 

" Contracts formally entered into 
by the Spanish Government or its 
authorities for the public service 
of the islands of Cuba, and Porto 
Rico, the Philippines and others 
ceded by this treaty, and which 
contracts are still unperformed, 
shall continue in force until their 
expiration pursuant to the terms 
thereof. Such contracts as also 
cover the service peculiar to Spain 
or any of her other colonies, the 
new Government of the above 
mentioned islands shall not be 
called upon to carry out, save only 
in so far as the terms of said con- 
tracts relate to the particular serv- 
ice or treasury of such islands. 
The new Government will there- 
fore, as regards the said contracts, 
be holden to all the rights and 
obligations therein attachiug to 
the Spanish Government. 



"List of Pending Contracts for 
Public Works and Services. 

"Mail and Transportation con- 
tract with the Compania Transat- 
lantica. 



En cumplimiento de este acuerdo, 
fueron leidos los signientes articu- 
los que habian sido propuestos por 
la Comision Espahola: 

"CONCESIONES DE OBRAS Y SERVICIOS 
PUBLICOS. 

"Articulo — . 

Continuaran observandose igu- 
almente todas las concesiones de 
obras y servicios publieos en las 
islas de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Fili- 
pinas y demas territories cedidos, 
hasta su cancelation, con arreglo 
a las clausulas con que hubiesen 
sido otorgadas, subrogandose el 
nuevo Gobierno en los derechos y 
en las obligacioues que por dichos 
contratos correspondieron hasta 
ahora al Gobierno Espanol." 

"CONCESIONES DE OBRAS Y SERVICIOS 
PUBLICOS 

"Articulo— 

Los contratos regularmente cel- 
ebrados por el Gobierno Espanol 6 
por sus Autoridades para el servi- 
cio publico de las Islas de Cuba, 
Filipinas, Puerto Rico y demas que 
se ceden por este tratado, y cuyos 
contratos esten pendientes de cum- 
plimiento, continuaran observan- 
dose hasta su termination, con ar- 
reglo a sus clausulas. 

"En aquellos en que tambien 
estnviese interesado el servicio pe- 
culiar de Espaha 6 de cualquiera 
de sus demas colonias, el nuevo 
Gobierno de las islas sobredichas, 
no concurrira a su cumplimiento, 
siuo en la parte que, con arreglo al 
contrato mismo, corresponda a su 
servicio y Tesoro especial. 

" Quedara por lo tanto el nuevo 
Gobierno subrogado en lugar del 
Espanol, en todos los derechos y ob- 
ligacioues que de los mencionados 
contratos pudieran resultar en favor 
6 en contra de aquel. 

"Lista de contratos pendientes 
por obras y servicios publicos. 

"Contrato para correos y tras- 
portes con la Coinpauia Trasatlan- 
tica," 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



241 



' Contract with English Com- 
pany (' Cuba Submarine') for the ca- 
ble on the south of Cuba. 

" Cable contract, Manila to Hong 
Kong, with another English Com- 
pany ('The Eastern'). 

"Railroad concesssion from Ma- 
nila to Dagupan. 

"All other concessions for rail- 
roads now in operation or under 
construction in Cuba or Porto Rico. 

"The above are all the contracts 
at present recalled, although it can- 
not be stated that there are not 
others relative to public works and 
services. None of recent date. 

"December 1, 1898." 

The President of the American 
Commission stated that the Ameri- 
can Commissioners were con- 
strained to reject these articles. 
The United States did not propose 
to repudiate any contract found 
upon investigation to be binding 
under International Law; but no 
such clauses as now proposed had 
been inserted in treaties heretofore 
made by the United States with 
Spain, France, Mexico and Russia, 
for the acquisition of territory; and 
it might be assumed that the United 
States would deal justly and equita- 
bly in respect of contracts that were 
binding under the principles of In- 
ternational Law. 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commission, was 
then read : 



" Contrata de la Compania Ingle- 
sa (Cuba Submarine) para el cable 
en el Sur de Cuba. 

"Coutrato del cable de Manila a 
Hong Kong con otra Compania 
Inglesa (The Eastern). 

"Concesion del ferrocaril de Ma- 
nila a Dagupan. 

" Todas las deinas concesiones de 
ferro- car riles en explotacion 6 en 
construction en Cuba y Puerto 
Rico. 

"Estos son los contratos que 
ahora se recuerdan, aunque no 
puede decirse si hay otros relativos 
aobras y servicios publicos, ningu- 
no de ellos de fecha reciente. 

" 1° de Diciembre de 1898." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana declaro que los Comisa- 
rios Americanos se veian obligados 
a rechazar estos Articulos. Los 
Estados Unidos no se proponen re- 
pudiar ningun contrato que, al ser 
examinado, se encuentreque obliga 
segun la ley internacional; pero 
clausulas parecidas a la que ahora 
se propone no se han insertado en 
tratados anteriorraente celebrados 
porlos Estados Uuidoscon Espana, 
Francia, Mexico y Rusia por ad- 
quisicion de territorios; y podia 
admitirse que los Estados Unidos 
obraran con justicia y equidad en 
los contratos que los obliguen con 
areglo a los principios del derecho 
internacional. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por la Coinision Espanola: 



"religion. 



"Article — . 



The Roman Catholic Apostolic 
Religion, its institutions and minis- 
ters, shall continue to enjoy in all 
the territories which are the sub- 
ject of this treaty the lioerty and 
the rights in the undisturbed pos- 
session of which they are at 
present. 

"The members of this Church, 
whatever their nationality, shall 
T p 16 



"religi6n. 

"Articulo — . 

La Religion Catolica Apostolica 
Romaua y sus instituciones y min- 
istros continuaran gozando en 
todos los territorios que son objeto 
de este tratado, de la libertad y 
prerogativas en cuya posesion 
pacifica se hallan. 

" Los fleles de esta Inglesia, cual- 
quiera que sea su nacionalidad, 



242 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



continue to enjoy the same liberty 
they now enjoy with respect to the 
profession of their religion and the 
exercise of their form of worship." 
The President of the American 
Commission stated that the United 
States could make no distinction 
as to religion, and proposed the 
following article: 

"RELIGION. 



continuaran asimismo gozando de 
la libertad que hoy tienan para la 
profesion de su religion y el ejerci- 
cio de su culto." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana declara que los Estados 
Unidos no puedeu hacer distincion 
entre las religiones, y propone el 
articulo siguiente: 

"RELIGION. 



ARTICLE — . 

"The inhabitants of the terri- 
tory over which Spain relinquishes 
or cedes her sovereignty shall be 
secured in the free exercise of their 
religion." 

The following article, proposed 
by the Sx)anish Commission, was 
read : 

"The 'Maine.' 

"Draft of additional articles to the 
Treaty of Peace with the United 
States. 

"'MAINE.' 

"Article — . 

"At the request of the Spanish 
Government, the two High Con- 
tracting Parties agree to appoint 
an International Commission to 
be entrusted with investigating the 
causes of and responsibility for 
the 'Maine' catastrophe which 
occurred in the harbor of Havana 
on February 15, 1898. This Inter- 
national Commission shall be com- 
posed of seven experts to be ap- 
pointed as follows: 

"Three by the Spanish Govern- 
ment — one to be a Spanish subject, 
another a British subject, and a 
third a French subject. 



"Three by the United States 
Government — one to be a citizen of 
the United States, another a Brit- 
ish subject, and a third a French 
subject. 



ARTICULO 



"Los habitantes del territorio, 
cuya Soberania Espaila renuncia 6 
cede, tendran asegurado el libre 
ejercicio de su religion." 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo pro- 
puesto por la Comision Espanola : 



"El Maine. 

"Proyecto de articulos adicionales al 
Tratado de paz con los Estados 
Unidos. 

"MAINE 

" Articulo — . 

A petici6n del Gobierno Espa- 
nol, las dos Altas Partes Coutra- 
tantes convienen en nombrar una 
Oomision internacional encargada 
de depurar las causas y responsa- 
bilidadesde la catastrofe del Maine, 
ocurrida en el puerto de la Habana 
el 15 de Febrero de 1898. Esta 
Comision internacional, se compon- 
dra de siete tecnicos nombrados de 
la manera siguiente: 

" Tres por el Gobierno Espanol, 
cuyos nombramientoshan derecaer 
precisamente uno en un stibdito 
espanol, otro en un stibdito brita- 
nico y el tercero en un siibdito 
frances. 

"Tres por el Gobierno Norte 
Americano cuyos noinbramientos 
habr&n de recaer, uno en un ciu- 
dadano de los Estados Unidos,otro 
en un stibdito britfinico y el tercero 
en un siibdito frances. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



243 



"The Commission to be presided 
over, with a deciding vote, by a 
German expert, chosen by mutual 
agreement by the Spanish and 
American Governments. 

" Should no agreement be 
reached hereon, the Spanish Gov- 
ernment shall designate one per- 
son and the United States Gov- 
ernment another, both persons to 
be experts and of German nation- 
ality, the choice for President to 
be decided by lot and the drawing 
to take place at the Department of 
State at Washington. 

"The expenses of this Commis- 
sion are to be borne in equal moie- 
ties by the two Governments, the 
Commission to meet in Havana at 
the earliest possible moment after 
the consent of the Governments of 
Germany, France and Great Brit- 
ain is secured. 

"In the event of the Spanish 
Government being found responsi- 
ble, it shall pay to the United 
States its share of the expenses of 
the Commission. Further, a Span- 
ish warship must go to New York 
and salute the flag of the United 
States. 

" If, on the contrary, the Commis- 
sion shall decide that Spain is not 
responsible, attributing the catas- 
trophe to an accident inside the 
vessel or other fortuitous cause, the 
Government of the United States 
shall pay to Spain its share of the 
expenses of the Commission. 

"Moreover, the President of the 
* United States shall report the ar- 
bitral award to the Congress of the 
United States, setting forth in the 
official message the righteous 
course of the Spanish nation." 

This article was rejected by the 
American Commissioners, who 
stated that they considered the 
case as closed. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that he was 
unable to consider it as closed, 
since the President of the United 
States had referred to it in his 



" Presidira la Comision con voto 
decisivo un teciiico Aleman,elegido 
de comun acuerdo por los Gobier- 
nos Espanol y Americano. Caso de 
no llegarse a un acuerdo, el Go- 
bierno Espanol designara un indi- 
viduo y el Norte Americano otro, 
debiendo ser tecnicos y de nacion- 
alidad Alemana, y en el Ministero 
de Negocios Extrangeros de 
Washington sedicidira por suerte 
el que haya de ser Presidente. 



"Los dos Gobiernos sufragaran 
por mitad los gastos de esta Co- 
mision que debera reunirse en la 
Habana a la brevedad posible, pre- 
vio el asentimientode los Gobiernos 
de Alemania, Francia y Gran Bre- 
tana. 

"Caso de aparecer responsable 
el Gobierno Espanol, tendra que 
abonar la parte de gastos corre- 
spoudientes por esta Comision a 
los Estados Uuidos. Ademas, un 
barco de guerra espanol tendra que 
ir a Nueva York a saludar el pa- 
belh'ui de los Estados Unidos. 

"Si, por el contrario, decidiera 
la Comision la irresponsabilidad de 
Espana, atribuyendo la catastrofe 
a un accidente en el interior del 
buque, 6 caso fortuito, el Gobierno 
de los Estados Unidos tendra quo 
abonar la parte de gastos corre- 
spondieute por esta Comision a 
Espana. 

"Ademas, el Presidente de los 
Estados Unidos debera dar cuenta 
de la sentencia arbitral a las Ca- 
maras Norte- Americanas, haciendo 
constar en el Mensage Oficial la 
lealtad de proceder de la Nacion 
Espaiiola." 

Este articulo fu6 rechazado por 
los Comisarios Americanos, quienes 
declararon que consideraban ter- 
miuado el asunto. 

El Presidente de la Comisi6n 
Espaiiola declaro que no podia con- 
siderarlo como terminado, desde 
que el Presidente de los Estados 
Unidos se habia referido a el en su 



244 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



message to Congress on Monday 
last. 

The President of the American 
Commission stated that the Amer- 
ican Commissioners had not re- 
ceived a copy of the message and 
therefore had not read it. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that he had in 
his possession an extract from it, 
which he could produce. 

The President of the American 
Commission answered that the 
American Commissioners did not 
care to continue the discussion of 
the subject on the present occasion. 

The following article proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners was 
read : 



Mensage al Congreso el Lunes 
ultimo. 

El presidente de la Comision 
Americana declaio que los Comi- 
sarios Americanos no habian reci- 
bido copia del Mensage, y por lo 
tanto no lo habian leido. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola contesto que tenia en su 
poder un extracto del mismo, que 
podia presentar. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana replico que los Comisa- 
rios Americanos no estaban dis- 
puestos a continuar la discusion de 
este asunto en la ocasion presente. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espa- 
noles : 



PENSION TO THE DUKE OF VERAGUA. 



" Article 



"CARGA BE JUSTICTA DEL DUQUE DE 
VERAGUA. 

"Articulo — . 



"The United States will con- 
tinue paying to the descendants of 
the Great Discoverer of America, 
Christopher Columbus, the portion 
still payable of the pension they 
have been collecting since the time 
of their illustrious predecessor, as 
a proof of the gratitude of modern 
civilization which Spain has been 
paying. 

"This pension, since the Royal 
Order of November 11, 1829, has 
been reduced to the two sums fol- 
lowing: 

$3,400 (hard dollars) annually, 
chargeable to the treasury of Porto 
Rico and $4,000 (like dollars) to 
the treasury of Manila. 

"The United States and the 
said descendants by mutual agree- 
ment may fix the principal repre- 
sented by these pensions and liq- 
uidate the latter by delivering 
over the principal thus agreed on, 
if deemed mutually advisable." 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they rejected this 
article. 

Tne following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners, 
was read: 



Los Estados Unidos continu- 
aran satisfacieudo 6, los descen- 
dientes del Gran descubridor de 
America, Cristobal Colon, la parte 
de pension todavia subsistente que 
han venido cobrando, desde los 
tiempos de su ilustre progenitor, 
come una prueba de gratitud de 
la civilizacion moderna, que venia 
satisfaciendo Espana. 

"Esta pension viene reducida 
desde Real Orden de 11 de Novi- 
embre de 1829, a las dos cantidades 
siguientes : 

"$3,400 (pesos fueites annates, 
consignada sobre el Tesoro de 
Puerto Rico y 4,000 (idem) sobre 
el Tesoro de Manila. 

"Los Estados Unidos y diclios 
descendientes de comun acuerdo 
podran capitalizar estas pensioner 
y extinguirlas por la entrega del 
capital que fijen, si asi respectiva- 
lnente lotuvieran por conveniente." 

Los Comisarios Americanos de- 
elaran que rechazan este articulo. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espa- 
noles : 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



245 



"deposits and bonds. 

"Article — . 

"Moneys received by Govern- 
ment offices and establishments 
in the aforesaid territories from 
Spanish citizens in the way of de- 
posits, consignments, loans and 
security of all kinds shall be re- 
turned to the lawful owners, 
whenever proper, either because 
of the expiration of the time for 
which they were made, or because 
of the fulfilment of the principal 
obligations by them guaranteed. 
This restitution shall be made by 
the Head of the Office where the 
sums of money were deposited, 
consigned, loaned, or given as se- 
curity; and iu default thereof by 
whoever is responsible for such 
sums under the law." 

The American Commissioners 
stated that they rejected this arti- 
cle. 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners, 
was then read : 

"CONSULS. 

"Article — . 

"Spain shall have the power to 
establish Consular officers in the 
ports and places of the territories, 
the sovereignty over which has 
been either relinquished or ceded 
by the present treaty." 

This article the American Com- 
missioners accepted. 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners,was 
then read : 

"jurisdiction of courts. 



"dep6sitos y fianzas. 
"Articulo — . 

Seran devueltos los depositos, 
consignaciones, pr^stamos y fian- 
zas detodas clases coustituidas por 
ciudadanos espanoles en los estab- 
lecimientos y oficinas del Estado, 
existentes en los territorios so- 
bredichos, a sus legitimos duellos 
cuando fuere proeedente su devo- 
lucion por haber vencido los plazos 
por que se hubiesen hecho 6 por 
haberse ya cumplido las obligacio- 
nes principales a que sirvieron de 
garantia. Esta devolucion se hara 
por el Jefe de la Oficiua en que se 
hubieren entregado las cantidades 
depositadas, consignadas, presta- 
das 6 dadas en fianza, 6 en su de- 
fecto por quien de dicha devolu- 
cion deba responder con arreglo a 
las leyes." 

Los Comisarios Americanos de- 
claran que rechazan este articulo. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espailo- 
les: 

"agentes consulares. 

"Articulo — . 

Espaha podra establecer Agen- 
tes consulares en los puertos y 
plazas de los territorios cuyaren- 
uncia y cesion es objeto de este 
tratado." 

Los Comisarios Americanos acep- 
tan este articulo. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espaiio- 
les: 

"JURISDICCION CIVIL Y CRIMINAL. 



"Article — . 

The Spaniards residing in the 
said territories shall be subject in 
matters civil as well as criminal to 
the jurisdiction of the Courts of 
the country wherein they reside, 
pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- 



" Articulo — . 

Los espanoles residentes en los 
mencionados territorios estaran 
sometidos en lo civil y en lo crim- 
inal a los Tribunales del pais en 
que residan con arreglo a las leyes 
comunes que regulen sucompeten- 



246 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



erning the same; and they shall 
have the right to appear before 
said Courts, and to pursue the 
same course as citizens of the 
country to which the Courts be- 
long." 

This article the American Com- 
missioners accepted. 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners, 
was read : 



cia, pudiendo comparecer ante los 
mismos en la misma forma y em- 
pleando los mismos procedimientos 
que deban observar los ciudada- 
nos del pais a que pertenezca el 
Tribunal." 

Los Comisarios Americanos acep- 
tan este articulo. 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Comisarios Espauo- 
les: 



"JURISDICTION OF COURTS. 

" Article — . 

Civil and criminal actions and 
suits against the Government that 
may be pending at the time of the 
exchange of the ratifications of 
this treaty, to which the citizens 
of the countries the sovereignty 
over which has been relinquished 
or ceded are a party and who pur- 
suant to such treaty cease to be 
Spaniards shall be tried and deter- 
mined subject to the following 
rules : 

" First. Judgments rendered 
either in civil or criminal matters, 
before the date aforesaid, and with 
respect to which there is no re- 
course, under the Spanish law, 
shall be deemed to be final, and 
shall be executed in due form by 
competent authority in the terri- 
tory within which such judgments 
should be carried out. 

"Second. Personal actions and 
cases against the Government 
which may be pending before the 
Courts of the Peninsula or the 
islands adjacent thereto, wherein 
a citizen of the said territories who 
by this treaty ceases to be a Span- 
iard is the plaintiff, shall, if the de- 
fendant is a Spaniard, continue to 
be tried in due form before the said 
Courts to the rendition of the final 
judgment. Personal actions where- 
in the defendant is an inhabitant 
of the said territories which by 
this treaty cease to be Spanish, 
shall be tried by the competent 
Court of the domicile of the de- 



"COMPETENCIA DE TRIBUNALES. 

"Articulo — . 

Los pleitos civiles y adminis- 
trates y las causas criminales 
peudientes al hacerse el canje de 
ratificaciones de este tratado, en 
que sean parte los ciudadanos resi- 
dentes en los territorios renunciado 
y cedidos que con arreglo 4 aquel 
dejen de ser espaiioles concluiran 
de sustanciarse a tenor de las re- 
glas siguientes: 



"Primera: Las sentencias dic- 
tadas antes de la fecha mencionada 
asi en lo civil como en lo criminal, 
y contra las cuales no haya recur sos 
que iuterponer con arreglo a la ley 
espauola, tendran el caracter de 
ejecutorias y deberan ser cumpli- 
das por los tramites legales por la 
autoridad competente en el terri- 
torio en que proceda su cuinpli- 
miento. 

"Segunda. Los pleitos civiles 
por accion personal, ylos adminis- 
trativos peudientes ante los Tri- 
bunals de la Peninsula e Islas 
adyacentes, en que fuese demau- 
dante un ciudadano de dichos ter- 
ritorios, que por este tratado deje 
de ser espanol, continuaran sus- 
tanchindose por los Tribunales 
ante quienes penden, hasta que 
recaiga sentencia ejecutoria, si 
fuese espanol el demandado. Los 
tambien por accion personal en 
que sea demandado un habitante 
de los sobredichos territorios que 
por este tratado pierda la naciona^ 
lidad espaiiola, pasaran al conoci 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



247 



fendant. Actions in rem or mixed 
actions, when the immovable prop- 
erty in litigation is situate in the 
Peninsula or adjacent islands, shall 
be pursued to final judgment and 
until the same is executed before 
the Courts having cognizance 
thereof. 



"Third. Criminal actions pend- 
ing on said date before the Su- 
preme Court of Spain against citi- 
zens of the territory relinquished 
and ceded, which ceases to be Span- 
ish by this treaty, shall continue 
under its jurisdiction until final 
judgment; but this having been 
once rendered, the cases shall pass 
for execution to the jurisdiction of 
the competent Court at the place 
where the same should be carried 
out," 

The American Commissioners 
proposed, in place of the foregoing 
article, the following : 

"jurisdiction of courts. 



miento del Juez 6 Tribunal del 
domicilio del demandado que fuese 
competente. Aquellos en que se 
ejercite una action real 6 mixta si 
el inmueble que fuese su objeto 
radicase en la Peninsula e Islas 
adyacentes, continuaran hasta que 
en ellos recaiga ejecutoria y esta 
sea cumplida ante los Tribui tales 
que de ella estuvieran conociendo. 

"Tercera. Las causas criminales 
pendientes en la sobredicha fecha 
ante el Tribunal Supremo de Es- 
paha, contra los ciudadanos de los 
territories reuunciado y cedidos, 
que dejen de ser espaiioles por este 
tratado, continuaran sometidas a 
su jurisdiccion hasta que recaiga 
senteucia; pero una vez que esta 
fuese dictada,pasaranpara su cum- 
plimieuto a la jurisdiccion del Juez 
que sea competeute en el lugar en 
que aquella deba ser cumplida." 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
ponen que el anterior articulo se 
substituya por el siguiente : 

"jURISDICCl6x DE LOS TRIBUNALES. 



"Article 



"Articulo — . 



Judicial proceedings pending at 
at the time of the exchange of rati- 
fications ( >f this treaty in the territo- 
ries over which Spain relinquishes 
or cedes her sovereignty shall be 
determined according to the fol- 
lowing rules: 

"1. Judgments rendered either 
in civil suits between private indi- 
viduals, or in criminal matters, be- 
fore the date mentioned, and with 
respect to which there is no re- 
course or right of review under the 
Spanish law, shall be deemed to 
be final, and shall be executed in 
dne form by competent authority 
in the territory within which such 
judgments should be carried out. 

"2. Civil suits between private 
individuals which may on the date 
mentioned be undetermined shall 
be prosecuted to judgment before 
the Court in which they may then 
be pending, or in the Court that 
may be substituted therefor. 



Los procedimientos judiciales 
pendientes al eaujearse las ratifi- 
caciones de este tratado, en los 
territories sobre los cuales EspaDa 
renuncia 6 cede su soberania, se 
determinaran con arreglo a las 
reglas siguientes : 

"1. Las sentencias dictadas en 
causas civiles eutre particulares, 6 
en una materia criminal, antes de 
la fecha mencionada, y contra las 
cuales no haya apelacion 6 derecho 
de revision, con arreglo a las leyes 
espanolas, se consideraran como 
firmes, y seran ejecutadas en de- 
bida forma por la Autoridad com- 
petente en el territorio dentro del 
cual dichas sentencias deban cum- 
plirse. 

"2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- 
ticulares q ue en le fecha mencionada 
no hayan sido juzgados, continu- 
aran su tramitacion ante el Tribunal 
en que se halle el proceso, 6 ante 
aquel que lo sustituya. 



248 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



"3. Criminal actions pending on 
the date mentioned before the Su- 
preme Court of Spain against citi- 
zens of the territory which by this 
treaty ceases to be Spanish shall 
continue under its jurisdiction until 
final judgment; but, such judgment 
having been rendered, the execu- 
tion thereof shall be committed to 
the competent authority of the 
place in which the case arose." 

The following article, proposed 
by the Spanish Commissioners, 
was read: 

"COYPRIGHTS AND PATENTS. 

"Article — . 

The rights of property secured 
by copyrights and patents acquired 
by Spaniards in the islands of 
Cuba, and Porto-Rico, the Philip- 
pines, and all other territories 
ceded, at the time of the exchange 
of the ratifications of this treaty, 
shall continue to be respected. 
Spanish scientific, literary and ar- 
tistic works, not subversive of pub- 
licorder in the said territories, shall 
continue to be admitted free of duty 
in the said territories, for twenty- 
five (25) years, to be reckoned from 
the date of the exchange of the 
ratifications of this treaty, and the 
proprietary rights of their authors 
shall be protected for a like period." 

The American Commissioners 
proposed, as a substitute, the fol- 
lowing article: 



"copyright and PATENTS. 
"Article — . 

The rights of property secured 
by copyrights and patents acquired 
by Spaniards in the island of 
Cuba, and in Porto Pico, the Phil- 
ippines, and other ceded territo- 
ries, at the time of the exchange 
of the ratifications of this treaty, 
shall continue to be respected. 
Spanish scientific, literary and ar- 



"3. Las acciones en materia cri- 
minal pendieutes en la fecha men- 
cionada ante el Tribunal Supremo 
de Espana contra ciudadanos del 
territorio que segiin este tratado 
deja de ser espahol, continuaran 
bajo su jurisdiccion hasta que re" 
caiga la sentencia definitiva; pero 
una vez dictada esa sentencia, su 
ejecucion sera encomendada a la 
Autoridad competente del lugar 
en que la accion se suscito." 

Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- 
puesto por los Coinisarios Espa- 
noles: 

"PROPIEDAD LITERARIA E INDUSTKIAJ . 

"Articulo — 

Continuaran respetandose los 
derechos de propiedad literaria, 
artistica 6 industrial adquiriridos 
por Espanoles en las Islas de Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Filipinas y dermis 
territories cedidos, al hacerse el 
canje de ratificaciones de este 
tratado. Las obras espanolas 
cientificas, literarias y artisticas, 
que no sean peligrosas para el 
orden publico en dichos territorios, 
continuaran entrando en los mis- 
mos con franquicia de todo derecho 
de Aduana durante veinte y cinco 
(25) ahos, a contar desde el canje 
de ratificaciones de este tratado, y 
durante el mismo termino sera 
protegida la propiedad de sus 
autores." 

Los Comisarios Americanos pro- 
pusieron que se sustituyese este 
articulo por el siguiente: 

"PROPRIHDAD LITERARIA E INDUSTRIAL. 

"Articulo — . 

Los derechos de propiedad lite- 
raria e industrial reconocidos a los 
Espanoles por medio de registros 
y paten tes en las Islas de Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Filipinas y otros terri- 
torios cedidos, al canjearse las rati- 
ficaciones de este tratado, contin- 
uaran siendorespetados. Lasobras 
espanolas cientificas, literarias y 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



249 



tistic works, not subversive of pub- 
lic order in the territories in ques- 
tion shall continue to be admitted 
free of duty into such territories, 
for the period of ten years, to be 
reckoned from the date of the ex- 
change of the ratifications of this 
treaty." 

The reading of the articles pro- 
posed by the Spanish Commis- 
sioners having been completed, 
the President of the American 
Commission stated that it was his 
understanding that the articles 
proposed by the American Com- 
missioners would be accepted or 
rejected by the Spanish Commis- 
sioners at the next meeting. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that the Span- 
ish Commissioners would pursue 
the same course with respect to 
the American articles as the Amer- 
ican Commissioners had pursued 
with reference to the Spanish arti- 
cles. 

On motion of the American Com- 
missioners the conference was ad- 
journed till to-morrow, Wednesday, 
the 7th of December, without prej- 
udice to the right of the Spanish 
Commissioners to request a post- 
ponement. 

William R. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

Wm P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Eeid. 

John B. Moore. 



artisticas, que no sean subversivas 
contra el oiden publico en los terri- 
tories referidos, continuar^u siendo 
admitidaslibres de derechos en los 
mismos, durante diez anos 4 con tar 
desde el canje de las ratilicaciones 
de este tratado." 

Habiendose terminado la lectura 
de los articulos propuestos por los 
Comisarios Espanoles, el Presi- 
dente de la Comision Americana 
declaro que entendia que los arti- 
culos propuestos por los Comisarios 
Americanos serian aceptados 6 
rechazados por los Comisarios 
Espanoles en la sesion proxima. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola coutesto que los Comi- 
sarios Espanoles seguiran respecto 
a los articulos Americanos el mismo 
procedimiento qne los Comisarios 
Americanos habian seguido con 
referenda a los articulos espanoles. 



A propuesta de los Comisarios 

Americanos, se levanto la sesion, 
acordando reunirse inanana, Mier- 
coles 7 de Diciembre, sin perjuicio 
del derecho de los Comisarios Es- 
l)afioles para pedir un aplazami- 
ento. 

EUGENIO MONTERO RlOS 
B. DE ABARZUZA 
J. DE GARNICA 

W R de Villa Urrutia 

Rafael Cerero 
Emilio de Ojeda 



Protocol No. 21 



Protocolo No. 21. 



Conference of December 8, 1898. Conferencia del 8 de diciembre de 

1898. 



The session which was to have 
been held on yesterday having 
been postponed at the request of 
the Spanish Commissioners, the 
Joint Commission met today at 
two o'clock, p. in., there being 



Aplazada, a propuesta de los 
Comisarios Espanoles, la sesion que 
debio haber tenido lugar el dia de 
ayer, se reum'eron el dfa de hoy a 
las dos de la tarde, hallandose 



250 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Present on the part of the United 
States : Messrs : Day, Davis, Frye, 
Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Bios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa-Urrutia, Cerero. 

Mr. Ojeda was unable to be pres- 
ent, owing to illness, and Mr. Villa- 
Urrutia performed his duties as 
Secretary. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The Spanish Commissioners pro- 
posed that the American Commis- 
sioners modify tbe clause presented 
by them and mentioned in the pro- 
tocol of the last session relating to 
the limiting of the obligations of 
the United States in Cuba to the 
time of its occupation thereof. 

The American Commissioners 
took this proposition under con- 
sideration and submitted to the 
Conference a new wording of the 
clause which was approved and 
which is as follows : 

"It is understood that any obli- 
gations assumed in this treaty by 
the United States with respect to 
Cuba are limited to the time of 
their occupancy thereof; but they 
will, upon the termination of such 
occupancy, advise any Govern- 
ment established in the island to 
assume the same obligations." 

The Spanish Commissioners ob- 
served that although the American 
Commissioners had rejected at the 
last session the article presented 
by the Spanish Commissioners re- 
lating to the "Maine," they consid- 
ered it their duty to insist upon 
this question beiug submitted to 
arbitration. 

The American Commissioners 
answered, referring to the observa- 
tions made by them on this subject 
at the last session. 

The Spanish Commissioners re- 
plied that siuce this new proposal 
for arbitration was also rejected, 
they would ask the American Com- 
missioners to be pleased to propose 
some method of clearing up the 
matter of the "Maine," and the re- 



Presentes por parte de los Esta- 
dos Unidos de America, los Seiio- 
res Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, 
Moore Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana los Seuo- 
res Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Gar- 
nica, Villa-Urrutia Cerero 

Por hallarse enfermo no pudo 
asistir el Sr Ojeda, e hizo sus veces 
como Secretario el Sr Villa-Urru- 
tia. 

Fu6 leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles pro- 
ponenquelosdelos Estados Unidos 
modifiquen la clausula por ellos 
presentada y que se menciona en 
el acta de la sesion vdtima, relativa 
a la limitacion de las obligaciones 
de los Estados Unidos en Cuba al 
tiempo que dure su ocupacion. 

Los Comisarios Americanos to- 
man en consideracion esta proposi- 
cion y someten a la conferencia una 
redaction de dicha clausula que es 
aceptado y dice asi : 

"Queda entendido que qal- 
quier obligation aceptada en este 
Tratado por los Estados Unidos con 
respecto a Cuba esta limitada al 
tiempo que dure su ocupacion en 
esta Isla, pero al terminar dicha 
ocupacion, aconsejaran al Gobierno 
que se establezca en la Isla, que 
acepte las mismas obligaciones." 

Los Comisarios Espanoles mani- 
festan que aunque la Comision 
Americana habia rechazado en la 
sesion ultima el articulo presentado 
por la Comision Espahola sobre el 
"Maiue", consideraban sin embar- 
go su deber insistir en que esta 
cuestion se sometiese a un arbi- 
trage. 

Los Comisarios Americanos con- 
testaron que se referian a las mani- 
festation es que hicieron en la 
sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios Espanoles re- 
plican que puesto que esta nueva 
proposition de arbitrage era tam- 
bien rechazada, se sirvieran los 
Senores Comisarios Americanos 
proponer cualquier medio de ex- 
clarecer este asunto del "Maine" 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



251 



sponsibility growing out of it, so 
that the unjust prejudice against 
Spain shown in the United States 
by reason of an incomplete inves- 
tigation might disappear, and the 
resentment of Spain, because the 
uprightness of her authorities or 
subjects, and the capacity of her 
administration to guarantee the 
safety in her ports of vessels of 
a nation with which she was at 
peace, had been placed in doubt, 
might also be blotted out. 



The American Commissioners 
replied that they had no method 
to propose. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission, pursuant to the rules, 
presented a memorandum, which 
is hereto annexed, in support of 
the propositions rejected by the 
American Commissioners at the 
last session. 

The American Interpreter pro- 
ceeded to translate the Memoran- 
dum and to read it in English. 

The President of the American 
Commission reserved the right to 
reply in writing to the memoran- 
dum at the next session. 

After explanations interchanged 
by the Presidents of the two Com- 
missions, such articles presented by 
the Spanish Commissioners as were 
accepted or modified by the Amer- 
ican Commissioners were ap- 
proved. 

The reading of the articles pre- 
sented by the American Commis- 
sion was then entered upon. 

The articles were read, one by 
one, in the order in which they 
stood. 

The first was as follows: 



y las responsabilidades consi- 
guientes, demanera que pudiesen 
desaparecer las injustas preven- 
ciones que se habian manifestado 
en los Estados Unidos contra Es- 
pafia por causa de una information 
incompleta, y se borrase tambien 
el resen timiento de Espana por 
haberse puesto en duda la lealtad 
de sus Autoridades 6 de sus na- 
cionales y la capacidad de su ad- 
ministration para garantizar por 
su parte la seguridad en sus puer- 
tos a los barcos de una Nation con 
quien estaba en paz. 

Los Comisarios Americanos con- 
testaron que no tenian ningun me- 
dio que proponer. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola, con arreglo al reglanien- 
to, preseuto un Memorandum, que 
va anejxo al Acta, en apoyo de las 
proposiciones rechazadas por la 
Comision Americana en la sesion 
ultima. 

El Interprete Americano proce- 
dio a la lectura en ingles de dicho 
Memorandum. 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana se reserva el derecho de 
contestar por escrito a dicho Mem- 
orandum en la sesion proxima. 

Despuos de las explicaciones que 
mediaron entre los Presidentes de 
Ambas Comisiones quedo entendi- 
do que se aprobaban los articulos 
presentados por la Comision Espa- 
nola, tales como habian sido acep- 
tados 6 modificados por la Comi- 
sion Americana. 

Procediose entonces a la lectura 
de los articulos presentados por la 
Comision Americana. 

Los articulos fueron leidos uno 
por uno, en el orden en que fueron 
presentados. 

El 1° fue el siguiente : 



"Article 

"Spain hereby cedes to the 
United States the island variously 
known as Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong- 
Island, in the Carolines; and also 
concedes to the United States the 
right to land telegraph cables in 



"Articulo. 

"Espana cede por el presente a 
los Estados Unidos la Isla diversa- 
mente llamada Kusaie, Ualan 6 
Strong Island en las Carolinas; y 
ademas concede a los Estados Uni- 
dos el derecho de amarrar cables 



252 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



the Canary Islands, or on any ter- 
ritory owned by Spain on the coast 
of Africa, or in the Peninsula. 

"In consideration of what is set 
forth in this article, the United 
States will pay to Spain the sum 
of one million dollars, ($1,000,000) 
within three months from the 
exchange of the ratifications of the 
present treaty." 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission declared that even in 
the event of an agreement being 
reached upon this article, it would 
have to figure elsewhere than in 
the treaty, as it was foreign there- 
to; but that he was compelled to 
reject it, because the Spanish Gov- 
ernment at this time neither enter- 
tained the idea of disposing of one 
of the Caroline Islands, nor could 
it do so for want of Constitutional 
authority, previous authorization 
of the Cortes being necessary in 
the premises. Neither could what 
related to cable landings be accept- 
ed, because if stipulated in a treaty 
it might imply an easement on 
the national territory which the 
Spanish Government was not em- 
powered to create, and because any 
American Company might request 
through the executive channel as 
other alien companies have done, 
such a concession, which was for- 
eign to an international treaty. 

The following article was then 
read : 



telegr^ficos en las Islas Canarias 6 
en cualquier territorio espanol de 
la costa de Africa 6 en la Penin- 
sula. 

"En consideracion de losestable- 
cido en este articulo, los Estados 
Unidos pagaran a Espana la suma 
de un millon de dollars ($1,000,000) 
dentro de los tres meses del canje 
de ratificaciones del presente 
trataclo." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola declaro que aim en caso 
de que hubiera habido acuerdo 
sobre este articulo tendria que 
figurar aparte del tratado, por ser 
ageno al mismo; pero que se veia 
obligado k rechazarlo, por que si 
entraba en el .'iniino del Gobierno 
Espanol, en estemomento, el anage- 
nar una de las Islas Carolinas, ni 
podia tampoco hacerlo por carecer 
de facultades constitucionales, ne- 
cesitando para ello estar previa- 
mente autorisado por las Cortes. 
Tampoco podia aceptarse lo rela- 
tivo al amarre de cables, por que 
estipulado en un tratado podria 
significar una servidumbre sobre 
territorio nacional, que el Gobierno 
Espanol no estaba autorizado & 
constituir, y porque cualquiera 
Compania Americana podria solici- 
tar por la via administrativa y 
como lo hanhechootras Companias 
Extraugeras, una concesion agena 
a un tratado internacional, 

Se ley 6 luego el articulo siguiente : 



"Article 



"Articulo 



"In conformity with the under- 
standing established by an ex- 
change of notes in the year 1886, 
Spain agrees that American mis- 
sions and missionaries shall be 
allowed to resume and hereafter 
freely to carry on their work in 
the Caroline Islands that remain 
under Spanish sovereignty. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission observed that it was 
not known that any claim was 
pending in the premises, and that 
as the Constitution of the State 



"Deconformidad con el acuerdo 
establecido por un canje de notas, 
en el aiio 1886, Espana conviene en 
que las misiones Americanas y los 
Misioneros podran reanudar y defe- 
pu£s llevar libremente a efecto sus 
trabajos en las Islas Carolinas que 
quedan bajo la Soberania de Es- 
pana." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola manifiesta que no consta 
este rjeudieute ninguna reclama- 
tion sobre el particular, y que 
como la constitution del Estado 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



253 



laid down the rights of private 
individuals in religious matters, 
there was nothing in this regard 
to insert in the treaty. 

The following article was then 
read : 

"Article 

"The United States and Spain 
will reciprocally accord to the ships 
of each other, in their respective 
ports, most favored nation treat- 
ment, in respect of all port charges, 
including entrance and clearance 
dues, light dues and tonnage 
duties. 

"It is further agreed that the 
two Governments will enter into 
negotiations with a view to the 
conclusion of a commercial con- 
vention." 

In place of the first paragraph, 
the American Commissioners now 
propose the following : 

" Spain will in her ports accord 
to vessels of the United States the 
same treatment in respect of all 
port charges, including entrance 
and clearance dues, light du s, 
and tonnage duties, as is accorded 
to Spanish vessels in the ports of 
the United States." 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission objected to the second 
paragraph of the article as unneces- 
sary; and suggested that the first 
paragraph be amended so that it 
should be reciprocal in its provi- 
sions and be limited as to its 
duration. 

After discussion, the following 
article was drawn up : 

"The Government of each coun- 
try will, for the term of ten years, 
accord to the merchant vessels of 
the other country the same treat- 
ment in respect of all port charges, 
including entrance dues, light dues 
and tonnage duties, as it accords 
to its own merchant vessels not 
engaged in the coastwise trade. 
This article may at any time be 
terminated on six months' notice 
given by either Government to the 
other." 



marca los derechos de los particu- 
lars en materias religiosas, nada 
hay que insertar a este respecto en 
el tratado. 

Se ley6 luego el articulo 
siguiente : 

Articulo. 

"Los Estados Unidos y Espana 
concederan reciprocamente a los 
buques de cada uno de ellos, en sus 
respectivos puertos, el trato de la 
nacion mas favorecida respecto a 
todos los derechos de puerto, inclu- 
yendo los de entrada y salida, faros 
y tonelage. 

"Se conviene ademas en que los 
dos Gobiernos empecarau las nego- 
ciaciones para concluir un convenio 
comercial." 

En lugar del primer parrafo pro- 
pouen ahora los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos el siguiente : 

" Espana concedera en sus puer- 
tos, a los buques de los Estados 
Unidos, el mismo trato con respecto 
a todos los derechos de puerto, in- 
cluyendo derechos de entrada y 
salida, de faro y tonelage, que se 
concede a los buques espanoles en 
los puertos de los Estados Unidos." 

El Presidente de la Comision 
Espanola manifesto que el segundo 
parrafo del articulo era innecesario, 
y pidio que semodificase el primer 
parrafo de manera que fuese recip- 
roca la estipulacion y limitado el 
tiempo de su duracion. 

Despues de discutido se aprobo 
el articulo en la forma siguiente: 

"El Gobierno de cada pais con- 
cedera por el termiuo de diez afios, 
a los buques mercantes del otro el 
mismo trato en cuauto a todos los 
derechos de puerto, incluyendo los 
de eutrado y salida, de faro y tone- 
lage, que concede a sus propios 
buques mercantes no empleados en 
el comercio de cabotage. Este arti- 
culo puede ser denunciado en cual- 
quier tiempo daudo noticia previa 
de ello cualquiera de los dos Gobi- 
ernos al otro con seis meses de an- 
tieipacion." 



254 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



The following article was then 
read: 

"Article 

"The following treaty stipula- 
tions heretofore entered into by 
the United States and Spain shall 
be held to continue in force: 

"Treaty of October 27, 1795, so 
far as it is confirmed by Article 
XII of the Treaty of February 
22, 1819; 

"Treaty of February 22, 1819, so 
far as its provisions have not been 
executed or become obsolete; 

"Convention of February 17 
1834, for the settlement of claims 

"Agreement of February 11-12 
1871, for the settlement of claims 
Article VII; 

"Convention of January 5, 1877 
and the supplementary convention 
of August 7, 1882, for the extradi 
tion of criminals; 

"Protocol of January 7, 1877, 
concerning Judicial procedure; 

"Convention of June 19, 1882, 
concerning trade-marks; and the 
agreement between the two coun- 
tries in relation to international 
copyright. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission stated that the Span- 
ish Commissioners were unable to 
accept this article. Some of the 
treaties to which it referred were 
obsolete or related to conditions 
which no longer existed, and it 
would involve a more extended 
examination than the Joint Com- 
mission was in a position to give. 
But this did not imply that the two 
Governments might not take up 
the subject themselves. 

The American Commissioners 
inquired whether the objection of 
the President of the Spanish Com- 
mission applied to the extradition 
treaties. 



Seleyo luego el articulo siguiente i 



Articulo. 

" Los siguientes tratados, antes 
celebrados entre los Estados Uni- 
dos y Espana, continuaran en 
vigor : 

"Tratado de 27 Octubre de 1795, 
en su parte contirmada por el arti- 
culo XII del Tratado de 22 de Fe- 
brero de 1819. 

" Tratado de 22 de Febrero de 
1819, en sus disposicioues que no 
han sido ejecutadas 6 que no hau 
caido en desuso. 

"Convenio de 17 de Febrero de 
1834 para el arreglo de reclama- 
ciones. 

"Acuerdo de 11-12 de Febrero de 
1871, para el arreglo de reclama- 
ciones (Articulo Yll) 

"Convenio de 5 de Enero de 
1877, y convenio supletorio de 7 de 
Agosto de 1882, para la extradi- 
tion de criminales. 

"Protocolo de 7 de Enero de 
1877, sobre procedimientos judi- 
ciales. 

"Convenio de 19 de Junio de 
1882, respectos a las marcas de 
fabrica: y el acuerdo entre los dos 
paises, con relation a la propiedad 
literaria internacional." 

Manifesto el Presidente de la 
Comision Espafiola que no podia 
aceptar dicho articulo, por que al- 
gunosdelos Tratados a que el mis mo 
se refer i a estaban ya en desuso 6 
se referian a condiciones que ya no 
existian, por lo cual er4 preciso 
hacer un estudio de cada uno de 
ellos mas detenido que el que podia 
hacer esta Comision. Pero que esto 
no significaba que ambos Gobier- 
nos no pudierau entenderse direc- 
tamente sobre este asunto. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pre- 
guntaron si las observaciones del 
Presidente de la Comision Espano- 
la se aplicaban a los tratados de 
extradiciun. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



255 



The President of the Spanish 
Commission replied that it did, as 
those treaties needed revision. 

The American Commissioners 
urged the revival of the extradi- 
tion treaties, the convention con- 
cerning trade-marks, and the 
agreement in relation to interna- 
tional copyright; and proposed 
that, in view of the immediate im- 
portance of the subjects to which 
they related, they should, if the 
Spanish Commissioners were not 
prepared to revive them fully, be 
revided temporarily as a modus 
vivendi, for a period of a year or 
even for six months, so as to enable 
the two Governments to consider 
the question of their renewal. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission adhered to the views 
which he had expressed, and the 
article was rejected. 

The following article was then 
read: 

"Article 

"The present treaty shall be rati- 
fied by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate thereof, and 
by Her Majesty the Queen Regent 
of Spain; and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Washington 
within six months from the date 
hereof, or earlier if possible. 

"In faith whereof, we, the re- 
spective Plenipotentiaries, have 
signed this treaty, and have here- 
unto affixed our seals. 

"Done in duplicate at Paris, the 

day of in the year of Our 

Lord, one thousand eight hundred 
and ninety eight." 

This article was accepted. 

The conference was then ad- 
journed, with the understanding 
that the Joint Commission should 
reassemble for the purpose of sign- 
ing the treaty, whenever it should 
be ready for signature; and that, 



El Presidente de la Coinision Es- 
pariola respondio que si, por que 
estos tratados necesitaban ser co- 
rregidos. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pi- 
dieron larenovacion de los tratados 
de extradicion, marcasde fabrica y 
propiedad literaria y propusieron 
que en vista de la importancia in- 
mediata de los asuntos a que se 
refer i an fuesen renovado tempo- 
ralmente como un modus vivendi, 
por un plazo de un auo 6 de seis 
meses, si los Comisarios Espaholes 
veian inconveniente en su renova- 
tion absoluta, a fin de permitir a 
ambos Gobiernos el estudiar la 
cuestion de su renovation. 

El Presidente de la Comisi6n 
Espahola mantuvo su anterior opi- 
nion, y el articulo fue rechazado. 

Se leyo luego el articulo sigui- 
ente: 



"Articulo 

" El presente Tratado sera rati- 
ficado per Su Majestad la Reina 
Regente de Espana y por el Presi- 
dente de los Estados Unidos, de 
acuerdo y con la aprobacion del 
Senado; y las ratificaciones se can- 
gearau en Washington dentro del 
plazo de seis meses desde esta fecha, 
6 antes si posible fnese. 

" En fe de lo ciial, los respectivos 
Plenipotenciarios firman y sellan 
este Tratado. 

Hecho por duplicado en Paris 
a diez de Diciembre del ano mil 
ochocientos noventa y ocho. 

Se aprobo este articulo. 

Se levanto la sesion en la inteli- 
geneia de que la Comision en pleno 
se reuniria con objeto de firmar el 
tratado, cuando estuviese en dis- 
position de ser firraado, y que entre 
tanto ambas Comisiones podrian 
coinuuicarss cualquier Memoran- 



256 TREATY OF PEACE. 

in the mean time, each Commission dum que con arreglo al reglamento 

might communicate to the other deseasen presentar. 
any memoranda which it should Eugenic* Montero Bios 

desire to file urider the rules. B. de Abarzuza 

William B. Day J. de G arnica 

Ctjshman K. Davis W. B. de Villa-Urrutia 

Wm P Prye Bafael Cerero 

Geo. Gray Emilio de Ojeda 

Whitelaw Beid. 
John B. Moore. 



Annex to Protocol No. 21. 

Memorandum. 

La Comision Espanola propuso a la Americana el proyecto de varios 
Articnlos, para el tratado de paz, que esta rechaza. 

Se niega a reconocer a los habitantes de los paises cedidos y renun- 
ciados por Espana, el derecho de optar por la ciudadania que hasta 
ahora gozaron. Y sin embargo, este derecho de opcion, que es uno de 
los mas sagrados de la personalidad humana, ha sido constantemente 
respectado desde que se emancipo el hombre de la servidumbre de la 
tierra, nindiendose 4 este sagrado derecho tribute en los Tratados que 
sobre cesion territorial se celabraron en el mundo moderno. 

Se niegan a estipular el respecto quemereceu los contratos celebrados 
por un Soberano legitimo para obras y servicios publicos, contratos que 
afectan sustancialmente a la propiedad privada de particulares y que 
fueron respetados en el Tratado de Gampo Forinio de 1797, en el de 
Paris de 1814, en el de Zurich de 1859, en el de Paris de 1860, en los de 
Viena de 1864 y 1866, y que respeto tambien Alemania al terminar su 
guerra con la Francia por el tratado de Frankfort de 1871. 

La Comision Americana alega como unica razou para no estipular este 
respecto el que los Estados Unidos, en sus tratados, nuuca lo han re- 
conocido. Como si los Estados Unidos fueran la unica Potencia posee- 
doradel criterio de justicia que debe inspirar las convenciones y los actos 
de las Naciones. 

Se niegan 4 que s*ean devueltos a sus legitiraos y particulares duenos, 
por quienes, scan funcionarios espanoles 6 americanos, esten obligados 
segun justicia a esta devolucion, las cantidades quehubiesen entregado 
en las Cajas publicas en los territories que dejan de pertenecer 4 Espana 
en concepto de cousignaciones depositos 6 fianzas de contratos u obli- 
gaciones, despues que estos hayan sido cumplidos y la fianza, por lo 
tan to, deba ser cancelada, Y sin embargo 4 esta devolucion se rindio 
homenage por Belgica, los Paises Bajos, Austria, Francia, Cerdefia 
Diuamarca, Prnsia, Italia y Alemania en los Tratados que entre si 
celebraron en 1839, 1859, 1864, 1866 y 1871. 

Se niegan 4 reconocer el car4cter permanente de lasobligacionesque 
por este Tratado contraen los Estados Unidos respecto 4 cosas y per- 
sonas en Cuba, limitando su duracion al tiempo de la ocupacion militar 
de la Grande Antilla por las tropas americanas, sin tener presente que 
las obligaciones correlativas que Espana contrae exige la Comision 
Americana que seau permauentes y que por cousiguiente queda de esa 
manera violada la justicia al violarse el principio de reciprocidad que 



TREATY OF PEACE. 257 

informa siempre los elerechos y las obligaciones de las partes contra- 
tantes. 

La Comision Americana se presta en la sesion de hoy (D b,e 87) a 
aconsejar los EE. UU. la observancia de este Tratado al Gobierno 
independiente de Cuba quando llegue a const ituirse. La C. E. vista 
esta manifestation, a tempera cuanto acaba de decir sobre este punto 
hasta que qnede en harmonia con las inanifestationes en esta sesion 
de la Comision Americana. 

Nada tiene que decir la Comision Espanola sobre la negativa de la 
Americana 4 tomar a cargo de los Estados Unidos la pension de 
gratitud que Espana viene pagando a. los descend ientes del inmortal 
descubridor de America. Espana se reserva este asunto para resolverlo 
como entienda mas con forme a la justicia sin olvidar la causa de la 
civilisacion modern a de la misma America. 

Espana hapodido sacriticar y sacrifica sus intereses todos coloniales en 
el altar de la paz y paraevitar larenovacion deuna guerra quees evidente 
que no puede sostenercon una nation incomparablemente maspoderosa 
y de mayoresrecursos. Ha sostenido sus derecbos e a estas Couferencias 
con toda la energia que correspondia a la rectitud de su conciencia. 
Cuando a su Comision le fue impuesta como ultimatum la proposition 
conquecoucluye el Memorandum Americano presentado en la sesion de 
21 de Noviembre ultimo, sinabaudonar su derecho y solo por via de trans- 
action, inspirandose en su amor a la paz, hizo proposiciones en que sus 
intereses eran sacriflcados ; los Estados Unidos las rechazaron todas. 

Sobre las dos importantes cuestiones de derecho dependientes de la 
interpretation que se diera al Protocolo de Washington, propuso a la 
Comision Americana el arbitrage. Fue tambien rechazado. 

Al ultimatum que acaba de citarse de 21 de Koviembre sucede el 
que en la ultima sesion va envuelto en los Articulos que propone la 
Comision Americana. La Espaiiola que cumpliendo las instrucciones 
de su Gobierno se soraetio al 1°, se sometera tambien a este. 

Se couforma, pues, con que los Estados Unidos incluyan en el Tratado 
los Articulos a que este Memorandum se reflere. 

Pero la Comision Americana rechaza tambien otro que es para 
Espana, si cabe, de mayor iinportancia que los demas Articulos que la 
Espanola habia propuesto; porque a diferencia de 6stos, aquel afecta 
a su propia dignidad. La catastrofe del "Maine," di ocasion en los 
Estados Unidos a que una parte muy caracterizada y sefialada de su 
prensa, cubriese de ultrages el honor inmaculable del pueblo espanol. 

Parecia que el tiempo iba haciendo su obra de templanza de las 
pasiones y de olvido de los agravios, cuando la Comision Americana, en 
su citado Memorandum de 21 de iSToviembre ultimo, renovo tan lamen- 
table incidente acusando de descuido e incapacidad a Espana para 
garantir en sus puertos la seguridad de los buques de una Nation amiga. 
El derecho mas sagrado que a Espana no podia dejar de reconocersele 
por que se le reconoce al mas desgraciado de los seres humanos en la 
tierra, era el de defenderse de una imputation, que en tan tristes con- 
diciones la dejaba ante las demas Naciones. Por esto presento su 
Comision el 1° de este mes los Articulos proponiendo el nombramiento 
de una tecnica intern acioual, nombrada con todas las garantias imagi- 
nables para asegurar su imparcialidad, «4 fin de que procediese a inves- 
tigar las causas de la catastrofe y si en ella cabia, siquiera fuera por 
negligencia, alguna responsabilidad 4 Espana. 

Cuando esta proposition estaba sometida 4 la Comision Americana, el 
SenorPresidentede los Estados Unidosen su Mensagede5delmismomes 
dirigklo & las Camaras Americanas volvio a ocuparse de un asunto que 
T p — 17 



258 TREATY OF PEACE. 

no podia menos de remover las pasiones de los dos pueblos entre 
quieues sus Coinisioua dos estaban elaborando el restablecimiento de la 
paz. Califico la catastrofe de sospechosa, afirino que su causa habia sido 
externa y auadio que solainente por falta de una prueba positiva la 
Comision Americana, que habia inform ado sobre ella, babia dejado de 
consiijnar a quien correspondia la responsabilidad de dicha action. 

I Como era posible imaginar que al siguiente dia de pronunciadas estas 
frases en Washington la Comision Americana en Paris habia de negar 
a Espana aquel sagrado derecho de defeusa cuyo respeto redamaba? 

No puede, pues, la Comision Espauola resignarse a tal negativa y con- 
signa solemnemente su protesta contra ella, haciendo constar que en lo 
futuro no sera licito jamas a los que se oponen a que se depuren las 
causas de aquella horrible catastrofe, imputar abierta 6 embozadamente 
responsabilidades de ningun genero por ella a la noble Nation Espaiiola 
y a sus Autoridades. 



[Translation.] 

Annex to Protocol No. 21. 

Memorandum. 

The Spanish Commission proposed to the American Commission the 
draft of several articles for the treaty of peace, which the latter has 
rejected. 

The American Commission refuses to acknowledge the right of the 
inhabitants of the countries ceded or relinquished by Spain to choose 
the citizenship with which up to the present they have been clothed. 
And nevertheless this right of choosing, which is one of the most 
sacred rights of human beings, has been constantly respected since the 
day in which man was emancipated from serfdom. This sacred right 
has been respected in treaties of territorial cession concluded in mod- 
ern times. 

It refuses also to stipulate anything in relation to the respect due 
the contracts entered into by a legitimate sovereign for public works 
and services, — contracts which materially affect the rights of property 
of private individuals, which were respected in the treaties of Campo 
Formio of 1707, of Paris of 1814, of Zurich of 1859, of Paris of 1860, of 
Vienna of 1804 and 1800, and which Germany respected also when 
ending the war with Prance by the treaty of Frankfort of 1871. The 
American Commission alleged as its only reason for this refusal that 
the United States in its treaties has never recognized these contracts 
as though the United States were the only power controlling the 
standard of justice which must govern the conventions and the acts of 
nations. 

It refuses to provide for the restitution to their lawful aud private 
owners by whoever, be he a Spanish or an American official, is bound 
rightfully to do it, of the sums of money they may have paid into the 
public treasuries of the territory which ceases to belong to Spain, in 
the way of consignments, deposits, or security for contracts or obliga- 
tions, after they have been executed or performed, and which security 
should be returned. And nevertheless horn :\ ge was paid to such return 
by Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, France, Sardinia, Denmark, Prussia, 
Italy and Germany in the treaties concluded between them in 1839, 
1859, 1864, 1866 and 1871. 



TEEATY OF PEACE. 259 

The American Commission refuses to recognize the permanent char- 
acter of the obligations contracted by the United States iu this treaty 
with respect to persons and things in Cuba, limiting the duration thereof 
to the time of the military occupation of the Greater Antille by the 
American troops, without bearing in mind that the American Commis- 
sion demands that the corresponding obligations contracted by Spain 
shall be permanent, and that justice is thus violated in attacking the 
principle of reciprocity which always governs the rights and obligations 
of contracting parties. 

In today's session (December 8), the American Commission consents 
to the United States advising the independent government of Cuba 
whenever it shall be constituted, to observe this treaty. In view of 
this statement, the Spanish Commission moderates what it has just 
said upon this point in so far as it is necessary to make it harmonize 
with the statements of the American Commission made in this session. 

The Spanish Commission has nothing to say to the refusal of the 
American Commission to assume for the United States the pension of 
gratitude which Spain has been paying to the descendants of the 
immortal discoverer of America. Spain reserves this matter to settle 
it as she understands shall best befit justice, without forgetting the 
cause of modern civilization and America itself. 

Spain has been able to sacrifice, and does sacrifice, all her colonial 
interests upon the altar of peace, and in order to prevent the renewal 
of a war which it is evident she cannot sustain with a nation incompar- 
ably more powerful and with greater resources. 

She has upheld her rights in these conferences with all the energy 
the rectitude of her conscience demanded. When there was imposed 
upon her Commission as an ultimatum the proposition which closes the 
American memorandum presented at the session of November 21 last, 
without waving its rights, and solely by way of compromise, inspired 
by its love for peace, it made propositions wherein her interests were 
sacrificed. The United States rejected them all. 

Upon the two important questions of law, depending upon the inter- 
pretation to be given the Protocol of Washington, it proposed arbitra- 
tion to the American Commission. This proposition was also rejected. 

The ultimatum of November 21, which has just been cited, is suc- 
ceeded by that which at the last session is involved in the articles the 
American Commission proposes. The Spanish Commission which, com- 
plying with the instructions of its Government, submitted to the first, 
will also bow to this. 

It assents, then, to the United States including in the treaty the 
articles to which this memorandum refers. 

But the American Commission also rejects another article which is 
to Spain, if possible, of greater importance than the other articles the 
Spanish Commission had proposed ; because, differing from these, the 
former affects her own dignity. The Maine disaster gave occasion for 
a very respectable and prominent part of the press in the United States 
to cover with insults the unstainable honor of the Spanish people. It 
seems that time was doing its work of tempering passions and casting 
into oblivion the wrongs, when the American Commission, in its said 
memorandum of November 21, again brought up so lamentable an inci- 
dent, accusing Spain of negligence and incapacity to guarantee security 
to vessels of a friendly nation in her ports. The most sacred right, 
which could not fail to be recognized as attaching to Spain, as it is 
vouchsafed to the most wretched of human beings, was that of defend- 
ing herself from an imputation which left her in so sorry a plight before 



260 



TEEATY OF PEACE. 



the other nations. For this reason her Commission, on the first of this 
month, presented the articles proposing the appointment of an Inter- 
national Expert Commission, to be named with all imaginable guaran- 
tees to assure its impartiality, in order that it might proceed to inves- 
tigate the cause of the disaster, and whether auy responsibility were 
attachable to Spain, even were it through negligence. 

When this proposition was under submission to the American Com- 
mission, the President of the United States, in his message to the 
American Congress of the 5th of the said month, again took up a sub- 
ject which could not but rekindle the passions of the two peoples whose 
Commissioners were working over the restoration of peace. He char- 
acterized the disaster as suspicious; he affirmed that its cause was 
external; and added that only for want of positive proof the American 
Board of Inquiry which had reported thereon had failed to fix the 
responsibility for the act on any one. 

How could it be imagined that on the day following that upon which 
these words were pronounced in Washington, the American Commis- 
sioners in Paris could refuse to Spain that sacred right of defense, the 
respecting of which she demanded 1 ? 

The Spanish Commission, therefore, cannot yield to such a refusal, 
and solemnly records its protest against it, setting forth that in the 
future it shall never be lawful for those who oppose the investigating 
of the cause of that horrible disaster, to impute, openly or covertly, 
responsibility of any kind therefor to the noble Spanish nation, or its 
authorities. 

True copy : 

Emilio de Ojeda. 



Protocol No. 22. 



Protocolo No. 22. 



Conference of December 10, 1898. 



Conferencia del 10 de Diciembre de 

1898. 



Present: on the part of the 
United States: Messrs: Day, 
Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, 
Fergusson. 

On the part of Spain: Messrs: 
Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, 
Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

The protocol of the preceding 
session was read and approved. 

The American Commissioners 
presented a written reply to the 
memorandum of the Spanish Com- 
missioners read at the last session. 
The reply is hereto annexed (An- 
nex No. 1.). 

The Treaty of Peace (Annex No. 
2.) was read and approved and was 
signed by Plenipotentiaries of the 
two High Contracting Parties. 

The President of the Spanish 
Commission expressed his thanks 



Presentes: Por parte delosEsta- 
dos Unidos de America: los Sefio- 
res : Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, 
Moore, Fergusson. 

Por parte de Espana : los Seiio- 
res : Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Gar- 
nica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. 

Fue leida y aprobada el acta de 
la sesion anterior. 

Los Comisarios Americanos pre- 
sentaron su contestacion escrita al 
Memorandum de los Comisarios 
Espanoles leido en la sesion ultima, 
que va anexo al protocolo (anexo 
No. 1). 

Se leyo y aprobo el Tratado de 
Paz (Anexo No. 2) y se procedio a 
sufirniaporlosPlenipotenciariosde 
las dos Altas Partes Contratantes. 

El Senor Presidente de la Co- 
llision Espanola manifiesta su agra- 



TREATY OP PEACE. 



261 



to the American Commissioners 
for the kind phrases with which 
their last memorandum concluded. 
He had much pleasure in acknowl- 
edging also the courtesy and con- 
sideration which had been shown 
by them in their personal inter- 
course during the continuance of 
the negotiations, which, however 
painful to the Spanish Commis- 
sioners, would leave with them the 
personal remembrance of the at- 
tentions which had been bestowed 
upon them by the worthy members 
of the American Commission. 

The President of the American 
Commission replied that the words 
to which the President of the Span- 
nish Commission referred were but 
the spontaneous expression of the 
true feelings of the American Com- 
missioners toward the Spanish 
Commissioners, for whom they en- 
tertained sentiments of the highest 
esteem and regard. 

The protocol of this session was 
read and approved, and the Joint 
Commission ended its labors. 

William R. Day 

Cushman K. Davis 

W m P Frye 

Geo. Gray 

Whitelaw Reid 

John B. Moore. 



decimiento a los Comisarios Ameri- 
canos por las atentas frases con 
que terminaron su ultimo Memo- 
randum y se complace en reconocer 
asimismo la cortesia y la prudencia 
que en sus relaciones persouales 
han demostrado durante el cur so 
de una negociacion que aunque 
dolorosa para los Comisarios Espa- 
lioles dejava en ellos el recuerdo 
personal de las ateuciones que han 
merecido a los dignos miembros de 
la Coinision Americana. 



El Presidente de la Comision 
Americana contesto que las pala- 
bras a que aludio el Presidente 
de la Comision Espanola eran la 
expontanea expresion de los ver- 
daderos sentimientos de los Comi- 
sarios Americanos hacia los Comi- 
sarios Espauoles, por quienes te- 
nian la mayor estimacion y aprecio. 

Se ley 6 y aprobo el Protocol o de 
esta sesion, acabando sus trabajos 
la Coinision en pleno. 

EUGENIO MONTERO RlOS 

B. De Abarzuza 

J. De Garnica 

W R De Villa Urrutia 

Rafael Cerero 

Emilio De Ojeda 



Annex 1 to Protocol No. 22. 

memorandum op the american commissioners in reply to that 
of thh spanish commissioners subiyutted at the meeting of 
december 8, 1898. 

In the memorandum submitted at the last meeting by the Spanish 
Commissioners, the statement is broadly made, "The American Com- 
mission refuses to acknowledge the right of the inhabitants of the 
countries ceded or relinquished by Spain to choose the citizenship with 
which up to the present time they have been clothed." 

The American Commissioners do not so understand the article upon 
the subject of citizenship submitted by them as a substitute for the 
article proposed by the Spanish Commissioners. An analysis of this 
article will show that Spanish subjects, natives of Spain, are allowed 
a year's time in which, by the simple process of stating in a court of 
record their intention so to do, they may preserve their allegiance to 
Spain. 

Such persons have the fullest right to dispose of their property and 



262 TREATY OF PEACE. 

remove from the territory, or remaining to continue to be Spanish 
subjects or elect the nationality of the new territory. 

As to natives, their status and civil rights are left to Congress, which 
will enact laws to govern the ceded territory. This is no more than 
the assertion of the right of the governing power to control these 
important relations to the new government. The Congress of a coun- 
try which never has enacted laws to oppress or abridge the rights of 
residents within its domain, and whose laws permit the largest liberty 
consistent with the preservation of order and the protection of prop- 
erty may safely be trusted not to depart from its well settled practice 
in dealing with the inhabitants of these islands. 

It is true that the Spanish Commissioners proposed an article upon 
the subject of nationality supplementing the one offered by them as to 
nationality of Spanish subjects, which provides that all inhabitants of 
the ceded territory other than Spanish subjects shall have the right to 
choose the Spanish nationality within one year after the exchange of 
ratifications of the treaty. This would permit all the uncivilized tribes 
which have not come under the jurisdiction of Spain, as well as foreign 
residents of the islands, to elect to create for themselves a nationality 
other than the one in control of the territory, while enjoying the benefits 
and protection of the laws of the local sovereignty. This would create 
an anamolous condition of affairs leading to complications and discord 
important to avoid. 

The American Commission felt constrained to reject the articles 
tendered by the Spanish Commissioners in respect to contracts entered 
into for public works and services. It took this step because the nature, 
extent and binding obligation of these contracts are unknown to the 
American Commissioners, aud they again disclaim any purpose of their 
Government to disregard the obligations of international law in respect 
to such contracts as investigation may show to be valid and binding 
upon the United States as successor in sovereignty in the ceded territory. 

The American Commissioners also rejected the article proposed by 
the Spanish Commissioners upon the subject of " Deposits and Bonds." 
In the form tendered, the American Commissioners understand this 
article to obligate the United States to return moneys " received by 
Government Offices and Establishments from Spanish citizens" for 
the purposes specified, although the same never came into the posses- 
sion of the authorities of the United States in said territories. Nothing 
can be further from the intention of that Government than to keep from 
the lawful owners such sums as come under its control which should 
be restored after the fulfilment of contracts or obligations intended to 
be secured thereby. Certainly the United States has no intention to 
indulge in such confiscation of property which becomes subject to its 
control, and may safely rely in such matters upon the confidence war- 
ranted by its consistent record. 

Respecting the observation in the memorandum of the Spanish Com- 
mission upon the last message of the President of the United States, 
wherein he refers to the disaster to the battleship Maine, the American 
Commissioners feel obliged to decline to enter upon any discussion of 
the same, in obedience to well established precedents and practice in 
the history of their country. 

The American Commissioners cannot close this final memorandum 
without expressing their sense of the thoroughness, learning, and 
devoted ability, no less than the uniform courtesy with which the 
Spanish Commissioners have conducted the negotiations about to 
terminate. 

True copy: John B. Moore. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



263 



Annex 2 to Protocol No. 22. 



The United States of Amer- 
ica and Her Majesty the 
Queen Begent of Spain, in 
the Name of Her August Son 
Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to 
end the state of war now existing 
between the two countries, have 
for that purpose appointed as 
Plenipotentiaries: 

The President of the 
United States, 

William E. Day, Cushman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, and Whitelaw 
Eeid, citizens of the United 
States ; 

And Her Majesty the Queen 
Begent of Spain, 

Don Eugenio Montero Bios, 
President of the Senate, Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzuza, 
Senator of the Kingdom and ex- 
Minister of che Crown, Don Jose 
de Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes 
and Associate Justice of the Su- 
preme Court; Don Wenceslao 
Bamirez de Villa- Urrutia, 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and 
Don Rafael Cerero, General 
of Division; 

Who, having assembled in Paris, 
and having exchanged their full 
powers, which were found to be in 
due and proper form, have, after 
discussion of the matters before 
them, agreed upon the following 
articles : 

Article I. 

Spain relinquishes all claim of 
sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 

And as the island is, upon its 
evacuation by Spain, to be occu- 



Los Estados Unidos de Ame- 
rica Y S. M. la Beina Begente 
de Espana, en Xombre de su 
Augusto Huo Don Alfonso 
XIII, deseando poner termino al 
estado de guerra hoy existente 
entre ambas Xaciones, han nom- 
brado con este objeto por sus Ple- 
nipotenciaros a saber : 

El Presidents de los Esta- 
dos Unidos de America A : 

William B. Day, Cushman K. 
Davis, William P. Frye, 
George Gray, y Whitelaw 
Eeid, ciudadauos de los Estados 
Unidos; 

Y su Majestad la Beina Be- 
gente de Espana, A 

Don Eugejnio Montero Bios, 
Presidente del Senado. Don 
Buenaventura de Abarzuza 
Senador del Beino, Ministro que 
ha sido de la Corona, Don Jose 
de Garnica, Diputado a Cortes, 
Magistrado del Tribunal supremo. 
Don Wenceslao Bamirez de 
VillA-Urrutia, Enviado Extra- 
ordinario y Ministro plenipoten 
ciairo en Braselas, y Don Bafael 
Cerero, General de division; 

Los cuales reunidos en Paris, 
despues de haberse comunicado 
sus plenos poderes que fueron ha- 
llados en buena y debida forma, y 
previa la discussion de las materias 
pendientes, ha couvenido en los 
siguientes articulos : 

Articulo I. 

Espana renuncia todo derecho 
de soberania y propiedad sobre 
Cuba. 

En atencion a que dicha isla, 
cuaudo sua evacuada por Espana, 



264 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



pied by the United States, the 
United States will, so long as such 
occupation shall last, assume and 
discharge the obligations that may 
under international law resultfrom 
the fact of its occupation, for the 
protection of life and property. 

Article II. 

Spain cedes to the United States 
the island of Porto Pico and other 
islands now under Spanish sov- 
ereignty in the West Indies, and 
the island of Guam in the Marianas 
or Ladrones. 

Article III. 

Spain cedes to the United States 
^ne archipelago known as the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and comprehending 
the islands lying within the follow- 
ing line: 

A line running from west to east 
along or near the twentieth paral- 
lel of north latitude, and through 
the middle of the navigable chan- 
nel of Bachi, from the one hundred 
and eighteenth (118th) to the one 
hundred and twenty -seventh 
(127th) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich, thence 
along the one hundred and twenty- 
seventh (127th) degree meridian of 
longitude east of Greenwich to 
the parallel of four degrees and 
forty-five minutes (4° 45') north 
latitude, thence along the parallel 
of four degrees and forty-five 
minutes (4° 45') north latitude to 
its intersection with the meridian 
of longitude one hundred and nine- 
teen degrees and thirty-five min- 
utes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, 
thence along the meridian of longi- 
tude one hundred and nineteen 
degrees and thirty-five minutes 
(119° 35') east of Greenwich to the 
parallel of latitude seven degrees 
and forty minutes (7° 40') north, 
thence along the parallel of lati- 
tude seven degrees and forty min- 
utes ( 7° 40' ) north to its intersection 
with the one hundred and six- 
teenth (116th) degree meridian of 



va a ser ocupada por los Estados 
Unidos, los Estados Unidos mien- 
tras dure su ocupacion, tomaran 
sobre si y cumpliran las obliga- 
ciones que {tor el hecho de ocuparla, 
lesimpone el Derecho Internacion- 
al, para la proteccion de vidas y 
haciendas. 

Artictjlo II. 

Espaiia cede a los Estados Uni- 
dos la Isla de Puerto Rico y las 
demas que estan ahora bajo su so- 
beraniaenlas Indias Oceidentales, 
y la Isla de Guam en el Archipie- 
lago de las Marianas 6 Ladrones. 

Artictjlo III. 

Espaiia cede a los Estados Uni- 
dos el archiepielago conocido por 
Islas Filipinas, que compreude las 
islas situadas dentro de las lineas 
siguientes : 

Una linea que corre de Oeste a 
Este, cerca del 20° paralelo de la- 
titud Norte, a traves de la mitad 
del canal navegable de Bachi, 
desde el 118° al 127° grados de 
longitud Este de Greenwich; de 
aqui a lo largo del ciento veintisiete 
(127) grado meridiano de longitud 
Este de Greenwich al paralelo cua- 
tro grados cuarenta y cinco minu- 
tos (4° 45') de latitud Norte; de 
aqui siguiendo el paralelo de cua- 
tro gra dos cuarenta y cinco min utos 
de latitud Norte (4° 45') hasta su 
interseccion con el meridiano de 
longitud ciento diez y nueve grados 
y treinta y cinco minutos (119° 35') 
Este de Greenwich; *de aqui si- 
guiendo el meridiano de longitud 
ciento diez y nueve grados y treinta 
y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de 
Greenwich, al paralelo de latitud 
siete grados cuarenta minutos (7° 
40') Norte; de aqui siguiendo 
el paralelo de latitud siete 
grados cuaranta minutos (7° 40') 
Norte, a su interseccion con el 
ciento diez y seis (110°) grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, de aqui por una linea recta, a 
la interseccion del decimo grado 
paralelo de latitud Norte, con el 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



265 



longitude east of Greenwich, thence 

by a direct line to the intersection 
of the tenth (10th) degree parallel 
of north latitude with the one hun- 
dred and eighteenth (118th) degree 
meridian of longitude east of Green- 
wich, and thence along the one 
hundred and eighteenth (118th) 
degree meridian of longitude east 
of Greenwich to the point of 
beginning. 

The United States will pay to 
Spain the sum of twenty million 
dollars ($20,000,000) within three 
months after the exchange of the 
ratifications of the present treaty. 

Article IV. 

The United States will, for the 
term of ten years from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications 
of the present treaty, admit Span- 
ish ships and merchandise to the 
ports of the Philippine Islands on 
the same terms as ships and mer- 
chandise of the United States. 

Article V. 

The United States will, upon the 
signature of the present treaty, 
send back to Spain, at its own cost, 
the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- 
oners of war on the capture of 
Manila by the American forces. 
The arms of the soldiers in question 
shall be restored to them. 

Spain will, upon the exchange of 
the ratifications of the present 
treaty, proceed to evacuate the 
Philippines, as well as the island 
of Guam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners 
appointed, to arrange for the evacu- 
ation of Porto Rico and other is- 
lands in the West Indies, under 
the Protocol of August 12, 1898, 
which is to continue in force till its 
provisions are completely executed. 

The time within which the evacu- 
ation of the Philippine Islands 
and Guam shall be completed shall 
be fixed by the two Governments. 



ciento diez y ocho (118°) grado me- 
ridiano de longitud Este de Green- 
wich, y de aqui siguiendo el ciento 
diez y ocho grado (118°) merid'ano 
de longitud Este de Greenwich, al 
punto en que comienza esta de- 
marcation. 



Los Estados Unidos pagaran a 
Espana la simia de veinte milliones 
de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de 
tres meses despues del canje de 
ratificaciones del presente tratado. 

Articulo IV. 

Los Estados Unidos durante el 
t^rmiuo de diez anos a contar desde 
el canje de la ratification del pre- 
sente tratado admitiran en los puer- 
tos de las Islas Filipinas los buques 
y las rnercaiicias espauoles, bajo las 
misnias condiciones que los buques 
y las mercancias de los Estados 
Unidos. 

Articulo V. 

Los Estados Unidos, al ser fir- 
mado el presente tratado, traspor- 
tar.tn a. Espana, 4 su costa, los 
soldados espaflolcs que hicieron 
prisioneros de guerra las fuerzas 
Americanas al ser capturada Ma- 
nila. Las armas de estos soldados 
les seran devueltas. 

Espana, al canjearse las ratifica- 
ciones del presente tratado, proce- 
dera a evacuar las Islas Filipinas, 
asi como la de Guam, en condi- 
ciones semejantes a las acordadas 
por las Comisioues nombradas para 
concertar la evacuation de Puerto 
Rico y otras Islas en las Antillas 
Occidentales, segun el Protocolo 
de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que con- 
tinuara en vigor hasta que sean 
completamente cumplidas sus 
disposiciones. 

El termiuo dentro del cual sera 
completada la evacuation de las 
Islas Filipinas y la de Guam, sera, 
fij ado por ambos Gobiernos. Seran 



266 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Stands of colors, uncaptured war 
vessels, small arms, guns of all 
calibres, with their carriages and 
accessories, powder, ammunition, 
livestock, and materials and sup- 
plies of all kinds, belonging to the 
land and naval forces of Spain in 
the Philippines and Guam, remain 
the property of Spain. Pieces of 
heavy ordnance, exclusive of field 
artillery, in the fortifications and 
coast defences, shall remain in 
their emplacements for the term 
of six months, to be reckoned from 
the exchange of ratifications of 
the treaty ; and the United States 
may, in the mean time, purchase 
such material from Spain, if a sat- 
isfactory agreement between the 
two Governments on the subject 
shall be reached. 

Article VI. 

Spain will, upon the signature 
of the present treaty, release all 
prisoners of war, and all persons 
detained or imprisoned for politi- 
cal offences, in connection with the 
insurrections in Cuba and the 
Philippines and the war with the 
United States. 

Reciprocally the United States 
will release all persons made pris- 
oners of war by the American 
forces, and will undertake to ob- 
tain the release of all Spanish 
prisoners in the hands of the in- 
surgents in Cuba and the Philip- 
pines. 

The Government of the United 
States will at its own cost return 
to Spain and the Government of 
Spain will at its own cost return 
to the United States, Cuba, Porto- 
Rico, and the Philippines, accord- 
ing to the situation of their re- 
spective homes, prisoners released 
or caused to be released by them, 
respectively, under this article. 

Article VII. 

The United States and Spain 
mutually relinquish all claims for 
indemnity, national and individ- 
ual, of every kind, of either Gov- 



propiedad de Espaiia banderas y 
estandartes, buques de gnerra no 
apresados, armas portatiles, caiio- 
nes de todos calibres con sus mon- 
tajes y accesorios, polvoras, muni- 
ciones, ganado, material y efectos 
de toda clase pertenecientes a los 
ejercitos de mar y tierra de Espaiia 
en las Filipas y Guam. Las piezas 
de grueso calibre, que no sean ar- 
tilleria de campaha, colocadas en 
las fortificaciones y en las costas, 
quedaran en sus emplazamentos 
por el plazo de seis meses a partir del 
canje de ratificaciones del presente 
tratado, y los Estados Unidos 
podran, durante ese tiempo, com- 
prar a Espaiia dicho material, si 
ambos Gobiernos llegan a un 
acuerdo satisfactorio sobre el par- 
ticular. 

Articulo VI. 

Espaiia, al ser firmado el presente 
tratado, pondra en libertad a todos 
los prisioneros de guerra y a todos 
los detenidos 6 presos por delitos 
politicos a consecuencia de las in- 
surrecciouesen Cuba y en Filipinas 
y de la guerra con los Estados 
Unidos. 

Reciprocamente, los Estados Uni- 
dos pondran en libertad a todos los 
prisioneros de guerra hechos por 
las fuerzas Americanas, y gestiona- 
ran la libertad de todos los prisi- 
oneros espaiioles en poder de los 
iusurrectos de Cuba y Filipinas. 

El Gobierno de los Estados Uni- 
dos trasportara, por su cuenta a 
Espafia, y el Gobierno de Espafia 
trasportara por su cuenta a los 
Estados Unidos, Cuba, Puerto Rico 
y Filipinas, con arreglo a la situa- 
cion de sus respectivos hogares, los 
prisioneros que pongano quehagan 
poner en libertad respect ivamente, 
en virtud de este Articulo. 

Articulo VII. 

Espaiia y los Estados Unidos de 
America renuucian mutuamente, 
por el presente tratado, a toda re- 
clamation de indemnizacion na- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



267 



ernment, or of its citizens or sub- 
jects, against the other Govern- 
ment, that may have arisen since 
the beginning of the late insurrec- 
tion in Cuba and prior to the ex- 
change of ratifications of the pres- 
ent treaty, including all claims for 
indemnity for the cost of the war. 



The United States will adjudi- 
cate and settle the claims of its 
citizens against Spain relinquished 
in this article. 

Article VIII. 

In conformity with the provisions 
of Articles I, II, and III of this 
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, 
and cedes in Porto Rico and other 
islands in the West Indies, in the 
island of Guam, and in the Philip- 
pine Archipelago, all the buildings, 
wharves, barracks, forts, struc- 
tures, public highways and other 
immovable property which, in con- 
formity with law, belong to the 
public domain, and as such belong 
to the Crown of Spain. 

And it is hereby declared that 
the relinquishment or cession, as 
the case may be, to which the pre- 
ceding paragraph refers, cannot in 
any respect impair the property or 
rights which by law belong to the 
peaceful possession of property of 
all kinds, of provinces, municipal- 
ities, public or private establish- 
ments, ecclesiastical or civic bod- 
ies, or any other associations hav- 
ing legal capacity to acquire and 
possess property in the aforesaid 
territories renouuced or ceded, or 
of private individuals, of whatso- 
ever nationality such individuals 
may be. 

The aforesaid relinquishment or 
cession, as the case may be, includes 
all documents exclusively referring 
to the sovereignty relinquished or 
ceded that may exist in the ar- 
chives of the Peninsula. Where 
any document in such archives only 
in part relates to said sovereignty, 
a copy of such part will be furnished 



cional 6 privada de cualquier 
genero de un Gobieruo contra el 
otro, 6 de sus siibditos 6 ciudada- 
nos contra el otro Gobieruo, que 
pueda haber surgido desde el co- 
mien zo de la ultima insurrection en 
Cuba y sea anterior al canje de 
ratificaciones del presente tratado, 
asi como a toda indemnizacion en 
concepto de gastos ocasionados por 
la guerra. 

Los Bstados Unidos juzgaran y 
resolventn las reclamaciones de sus 
ciudadanos contra Espana, a que 
reuuucia en este Articulo. 

Articulo VIII. 

En cumplimiento de lo convenido 
en los Articulos I, II y III de este 
tratado, Espana renuucia en Cuba 
y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras 
Islas delas Indias Occidentals, en 
la Isla de Guam y en el Archipie- 
lago de las Filipinas, todos los edi- 
ficios, muelles, cuarteles, fortalezas, 
establecimientos, vias piiblicas y 
dermis bienes inmuebles que con 
arreglo a derecho son del dominio 
publico y como tal corresponden a 
la Corona de Espana. 

Queda por lo tan to declarado que 
esta renuncia 6 cesi6n, segun el 
caso, a que se refiere el parrafo an- 
terior, en nada puede mermar la 
propiedad, 6 los derechos que co- 
rrespondan, con arreglo a las leyes, 
al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes 
de todas clases de las provincias, 
municipios, establecimientos piibli- 
cos 6 privados, corporaciones civiles 
6 eclcsiasticas, 6 de cualesquieia 
otras colectividades que tienen per- 
sonalidad juridica para adquirir y 
poseer bienes en los mencionados 
territorios renunciado 6 cedidos, y 
los de los individuos particnlares, 
cualquiera que sea su nacionalidad. 

Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun el 
caso, iucluye todos los documentos 
que se refieran exclusivamente a 
dicha Soberania renunciada 6 ce- 
dida, que existan en los Archivos 
de la Peninsula. 

Cuando estos documentos exis- 
tentes en dichos Archivos, solo en 
parte correspondan a dicha Sobe- 



268 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



whenever it shall be requested. 
Like rules shall be reciprocally- 
observed in favor of Spain in re- 
spect of documents in the archives 
of the islands above referred to. 



In the aforesaid relinquishment 
or cession, as the case may be, are 
also included such rights as the 
crown of Spain and its authorities 
possess in respect of the official 
archives and records, executive as 
well as judicial, in the islands above 
referred to, which relate to said 
islands or the rights and property 
of their inhabitants. Such archives 
and records shall be carefully pre- 
served, and private persons shall 
without distinction have the right 
to require, in accordance with law, 
authenticated copies of the con- 
tracts, wills and other instruments 
forming part of notarial protocols 
or files, or which may be contained 
in the executive or judicial ar- 
chives, be the latter in Spain or in 
the islands aforesaid. 



Article IX. 

Spanish subjects, natives of the 
Peninsula, residing in the territory 
over which Spain by the present 
treaty relinquishes or cedes her 
sovereignty, may remain in such 
territory or may remove therefrom, 
retaining in either event all their 
rights of property, including the 
right to sell or dispose of such prop- 
erty or of its proceeds; and they 
shall also have the right to carry on 
their industry, commerce and pro- 
fessions, being subject in respect 
thereof to such laws as are appli- 
cable toother foreigners. In case 
they remain in the territory they 
may preserve their allegiance to the 
Crown of Spain by making, before 
a court of record, within a year from 
the date of the exchange of ratifi- 
cations of this treaty, a declaration 
of their decision to preserve such 
allegiance ; in default of which dec- 



rania, se facilitaran copias de dicha 
parte, siempre que sean solicitadas. 
Reglas analogos habran reciproca- 
mente de observarse en favor de 
Espana, respecto de los documen- 
tos existentes en los Archivos de 
las Islas antes mencionades. 

En las antecitadas renuncia 6 
cesion, segun el caso, se hallan 
comprendidos aquellos derechos de 
la Corona de Espana y de sus Au- 
toridades sobre los Archivos y 
Registros oficiales, asi administra- 
tivos como judiciales de dichas 
islas, que se refieran a ellas y a los 
derechos y propiedades de sus ha 
bitantes. Dichos Archivos y Re- 
gistros deberan ser cuidadosa- 
mente conservados, y los particu- 
lars sin exception, tendran derecho 
a sacar, con arreglo a las Leyes, 
las copias autorizadas de los con- 
tratos, testamentos y deinas docu- 
mentos que formeu parte de los 
protocolos notariales 6 que se cus- 
todien en los Archivos administra- 
tivos 6 judiciales, bien estos se 
hallen en Espana, 6 bien en las 
Islas de que se hace mention 
anteriormente. 

Articulo IX. 

Los subditos espaiioles, naturales 
de la Peninsula, residentes en el te- 
rritorio cuya soberania Espana 
renuncia 6 cede por el presente tra- 
tado, podran permanecer en dicho 
territorio 6 march arse de el, conser- 
vando en uno u otro caso todos sus 
derechos de propiedad, con inclu- 
sion del derecho de vender 6 dis- 
poner de tal propiedad 6 de sus 
productos; y ademas tendran el 
derecho de ejercer su industria, 
comercio 6 profesion, sujetandose 
a este respecto a las leyes que sean 
aplicables a los deinas extrangeros. 
En el caso de que permanezcan en 
el territorio, podran conservar su 
nacionalidad espanola haciendo 
ante una Oficina de registro, den- 
tro de un aiio despues del cam bio 
de ratificaciones de este tratado, 
una declaration de su proposito 
de conservar dicha nacionalidad; 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



269 



laration they shall be held to have 
renounced, it and to have adopted 
the nationality of the territory in 
which they may reside. 

The civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of 
tbe territories hereby ceded to the 
United States shall be determined 
by the Congress. 

Article X. 

The inhabitants of the territories 
over which Spain relinquishes or 
cedes her sovereignty shall be se- 
cured in the free exercise of their 
religion. 

Article XI. 

The Spaniards residing in the 
territories over which Spain by 
this treaty cedes or relinquishes 
her sovereignty shall be subject in 
matters civil as well as criminal to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the country wherein they reside, 
pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- 
erning the same; and they shall 
have the right to appear before 
such courts, and to pursue the 
same course as citizens of the 
country to which the courts belong. 

Article XII. 

Judicial proceedings pending at 
the time of the exchange of ratifi- 
cations of this treaty in the terri- 
tories over which Spain relin- 
quishes or cedes her sovereignty 
shall be determined according to 
the following rules: 

1. Judgments rendered either in 
civil suits between private individ- 
uals, or in criminal matters, before 
the date mentioned, and with re- 
spect to which there is no recourse 
or right of review under the Span- 
ish law, shall be deemed to be final, 
and shall be executed in due form 
by competent authority in the ter- 
ritory within which such judgments 
should be carried out. 

2. Civil suits between private in- 
dividuals which may on the date 



a falta de esta declaracion, se con- 
siderara que hau renunciado dicha 
nacionalidad y adoptado la del te- 
rritorio en el cual puedeu residir. 

Los derechos civiles y la condi- 
tion politica de los habitantes 
naturales de los territorios aqui 
cedidos a los Estados Unidos se 
determiuaran por el Congreso. 

Articulo X. 

Los habitantes de los territorios 
cuya soberania Espafia renuncia 6 
cede, teudrau asegurado el libre 
ejercicio de su religion. 



Articulo XI. 

Los espaholes residentes en los 
territorios cuya soberania cede 6 
renuncia Espaiia por este tratado, 
estaran sometidos en lo civil y en 
lo criminal a les tribunales del pais 
en que residan con arreglo a las 
leyes communes que regulen su 
competeucia, pudieudo comparecer 
ante aquellos, en la misma forma 
y ampleando los mismos procedi- 
mientos que deban observar los 
ciudadanos del pais a que perte- 
nezca el tribunal. 

Articulo XII. 

Los procedimientos judiciales 
pendientes al canjearse las ratifi- 
caciones de este tratado, en los 
territorios sobre los cuales Espana 
renuncia 6 cede su Soberania, se 
determinaran con arreglo a las 
reglas siguientes: 

1. Las sentencias dictadas en 
causas civiles entre particulares 6 
en materia criminal antes de la 
fecha meucionada, y contra las cua- 
les no haya apelacion 6 casacion 
con arreglo a las leyes espanola,s, 
seconsideraran como firmes, y seran 
ejecutadas en debida forma por la 
Autoridad competente en el terri- 
torio dentro del cual dichas senten- 
cias deban cumplirse. 

2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- 
ticulares que en la fecha inencio 



270 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



mentioned be undetermined shall 
be prosecuted to judgment before 
the court in which they may then 
be pending or in the court that 
may be substituted therefor. 

3. Criminal actions pending on 
the date mentioned before the Su- 
preme Court of Spain against citi- 
zens of the territory which by this 
treaty ceases to be Spanish shall 
continue under its jurisdiction un- 
til final judgment; but, such judg- 
ment having been rendered, the 
execution thereof shall be commit- 
ted to the competent authority of 
the place in which the case arose. 



Article XIII. 

The rights of property secured 
by copyrights and patents acquired 
by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, 
and in Porto Rico, the Philippines 
and other ceded territories, at the 
time of the exchange of the ratifi- 
cations of this treaty, shall con- 
tinue to be respected. Spanish sci- 
entific, literary and artistic works, 
not subversive of public order in 
the territories in question, shall 
continue to be admitted free of 
duty into such territories, for the 
period of ten years, to be reckoned 
from the date of the exchange of 
the ratifications of this treaty. 

Article XIV. 

Spain shall have the power to 
establish consular officers in the 
ports and places of the territories, 
the sovereignty over which has 
been either relinquished or ceded 
by the present treaty 

Article XV. 

The Government of each country 
will, for the term of ten years, ac- 
cord to the merchant vessels of the 
other country the same treatment 
in respect of all port charges, in- 
cluding entrance and clearance 
dues, light dues, and tonnage 



nada no hayan sido juzgados, con- 
tinuaran su tramitacion ante el 
Tribunal en que se halle el proceso, 
6 ante aquel que lo sustituya. 

3. Las acciones en materia crimi- 
nal pendientes en la fecha mencio- 
nada ante el Tribunal Supremo de 
Espafia contra ciudadanosdelterri- 
torio que segun este tratado deja de 
ser espafiol, continuaran bajo su ju- 
risdiccion hasta que recaiga la sen- 
tencia definitiva; pero una vez dic- 
tada esa sentencia, su ejecucion 
sera encomendada a la Autoridad 
competeute del lugar en que la 
accion se suscito. 

ArtIculo XIII. 

Continuaran respetandose losde- 
rechos de propiedad literaria, ar- 
tistica e industrial, adquiridos por 
esparioles en las Islas de Cuba y en 
las de Puerto Pico, Filipinas y de- 
mas territorios cedidos, al hacerse 
el cauje de las ratificaciones de este 
tratado. Lasobras espafiol as cien- 
tificas, literarias y artisticas, que no 
seau peligrosas para el orden pu- 
blico en dichos territorios, continu- 
aran entrando en los mismos, con 
frauquicia de todo derechodeadua- 
na por un plazo de diez ahos a con- 
tar desde el canje de ratificaciones 
de este tratado. 

Articulo XIV. 

Espana podra establecer Agen- 
tes Consulares en los puertos y 
plazas de los territorios cuya re- 
nuncia y cesion es objeto de este 
tratado. 



Articulo XV. 

El Gobierno de cada pais conce- 
dera, por el termino de diez aiios, 
a los buques mercantes del otro el 
mismo trato en cuanto a todos los 
derechos de puerto, incluyendolos 
de en trad a y salida, de faro y 
tonelaje, que concede a sus propios 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



271 



duties, as it accords to its own 
merchant vessels, not engaged in 
the coastwise trade. 

This article may at any time be 
terminated on six months notice 
given by either Government to the 
other. 



Article XVI. 

It is understood that any obli- 
gations assumed in this treaty by 
the United States with respect to 
Cuba are limited to the time of its 
occupancy thereof; but it will 
upon the termination of such occu- 
pancy, advise any Government 
established in the island to assume 
the same obligations. 

Article XVII 

The present treaty shall be rati- 
fied by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate thereof, and 
by Her Majesty the Queen Regent 
of Spain; and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Washington 
within six months from the date 
hereof, or earlier if possible. 

In faith whereof, we, the respec- 
tive Plenipotentiaries, have signed 
this treaty and have hereunto 
affixed our seals. 

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 
tenth day of December, in the year 
of Our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and ninety eight. 



SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 
SEAL 



William R. Day 
Cushman K. Davis 
William P. Frye 
Geo. Gray 
Whitelaw Reid. 



buques mercantesno empleados en 
el comercio de cabotaje. 

Este articulo puede ser denun- 
eiado en cualquier tiempo dando 
noticia previa de ello cualquiei a de 
los dos Gobiernos al otro con seis 
meses de anticipacion. 

Articulo XVI. 

Queda entendido que cualquiera 
obligation aceptada enestetratado 
por los Estados Unidos con respecto 
a Cuba, esta limitada al tiempo que 
dure su ocupacion en esta isla, 
pero al terminar dicha ocupacion, 
aconsejaran al Gobierno que se es- 
tablezca en la isla que acepte las 
misnias obligacioues. 

Articulo XVII. 

El presente tratado sera ratifi- 
cado por el Presidente de los Esta- 
dos Unidos, de acuerdo y con la apro- 
bacion del Senado, y por Su Majes- 
tad la Keina Regente de Espafia; y 
las ratificaciones se canjearan en 
Washington dentro del plazo de 
seis meses desde esta fecha, 6 antes 
si posible fuese. 

En fe de lo cual, los respectivos 
Plenipotenciarios firman y sellan 
este tratado. 

Hecho por duplicado in Paris a 
diez de Diciembre del alio mil ocho- 
cientos noventa y ocho. 

seal] Eugenio Montero Rios 
seal] B. de Abarzuza 
seal] J. DE G ARNICA 
seal] W R de Villa Urrutia 
seal] Rafael Cerero 



PEACE PROTOCOL OF AUGUST 12, 1898, AND CORRESPONDENCE 



MESSAGE 



GOVERNMENT OF H. M. THE QUEEN REGENT OF SPAIN, 
SUBMITTED BY H. EXO. MR. J. CAM BON, AMBASSADOR 
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, TO WILLIAM McKINLEY, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



Madrid, July 22, 1898. 
Mr. President: 

Since three months the American people and the Spanish nation are 
at war because Spain did not consent to grant independence to Cuba 
and to withdraw her troops therefrom. 

Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife, and only endeavored 
to defend her possessions with no other hope than to oppose, in the 
measure of her strength, the undertaking of the United States, and to 
protect her honor. 

Neither the trials which adversity has made us endure nor the 
realization that but faint hope is left us could deter us from struggling 
till the exhaustion of our very last resources. This stout purpose, how- 
ever, does not blind us, and we are fully aware of the responsibilities 
which would weigh upon both nations in the eyes of the civilized 
world were this war to be continued. 

This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who wage it the 
hardships inseparable from all armed conflict, but also dooms to use- 
less suffering and unjust sacrifices the inhabitants of a territory to 
which Spain is bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no 
nation either of the old or of the new world. 

To end calamities already so great and to avert evils still greater, our 
countries might mutually endeavor to find upon which conditions the 
present struggle could be terminated otherwise than by force of arms. 

Spain believes this understanding possible, and hopes that this view 
is also harbored by the Government of the United States. All true 
friends of both nations share no doubt the same hope. 

Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she 
carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object: the 
vindication of her prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of 
insurrection it was her desire to spare the great island from the dangers 
of premature independence; in the present war she has been actuated 
by sentiments inspired rather by ties of blood than by her interests and 
by the rights belonging to her as mother country. 
272 



TREATY OF PEACE. 278 

Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors 
of war if the United States are, on their part, likewise disposed. 

The President of the United States and the American people may 
now learn from this message the true thought, desire, and intention of 
the Spanish nation. 

And so do we wish to learn from the President of the United States 
upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba and 
might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason 
should both Governments agree upon the means of pacifying the 
island. 

In the name of the Government of H. M. the Queen Regent I have 
the honor to address this message to your excellency, with the expres- 
sion of my highest consideration. 

Due d'Almodovar del Rio, 

Ministre d'Etat. 



Department of State, 

Washington, July 30, 1898. 
Excellency: 

The President received on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 26th instant, 
from the hand of his excellency the ambassador of France, representing 
for this purpose the Government of Spain, the message signed by your 
excellency as minister of state in behalf of the Government of Her 
Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, and dated the 22d instant, as to 
the possibility of terminating the war now existing between the United 
States and Spain. 

The President received with satisfaction the suggestion that the two 
countries might mutually endeavor to ascertain the conditions on which 
the pending struggle may be brought to an end, as well as the expres- 
sion of Spain's belief that an understanding on the subject is possible. 

During the protracted negotiations that preceded the outbreak of 
hostilities the President earnestly labored to avert a conflict, in the 
hope that Spain, in consideration of her own interests, as well as those 
of the Spanish Antilles and the United States, would find a way of 
removing the conditions which had, for half a century, constantly dis- 
turbed the peace of the Western Hemisphere and on numerous occa- 
sions brought the two nations to the verge of war. 

The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustra- 
tion of his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of 
the United States the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the 
relinquishment by Spain of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which 
she was unable to enforce would relieve a situation that had become 
unendurable. 

For years the Government of the United States, out of regard for 
the susceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the 
expenditure of its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. 
But a point was at length reached at which, as Spain had often been 
forewarned, this attitude could no longer be maintained. The specta- 
cle at our very doors of a fertile territory wasted by fire and sword, 
and given over to desolation and famine, was one to which our people 
could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands of human- 
ity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects of which they 
had become so deeply involved. 

To this end the President, with the authority of Congress, presented 
to Spain a demand for the withdrawal of her land and naval forces 
T p 18 



274 TREATY OF PEACE. 

from Cuba, in order that the people of the island might be enabled to 
form a government of their own. To this demand Spain replied by 
severing diplomatic relations with the United States, and by declaring 
that she considered the action of this Government as creating a state 
of war between the two countries. 

The President could not but feel sincere regret that the local ques- 
tion as to the peace and good government of Cuba should thus have 
been transformed and enlarged into a general conflict of arms between 
two great peoples. Nevertheless, having accepted the issue with all 
the hazards which it involved, he has, in the exercise of his duty, and 
of the rights which the state of war confers, prosecuted hostilities by 
land and sea, in order to secure at the earliest possible moment an 
honorable peace. In so doing he has been compelled to avail himself 
unsparingly of the lives and fortunes which his countrymen have 
placed at his command; and untold burdens and sacrifices, far tran- 
scending any material estimation, have been imposed upon them. 

That as the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the 
United States the strife has, as your excellency observes, proved 
unequal, inclines the President to offer a brave adversary generous 
terms of peace. 

The President therefore responding to your excellency's request, will 
state the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present 
time, subject to the approval of the Senate of the United States 
hereafter. 

Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that 
Spain has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature inde- 
pendence. The Government of the United States has not shared the 
apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that 
in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and guid- 
ance will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give. 

The United States will require : 

First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over 
or title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island. 

Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will 
not now put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Neverthe- 
less he can not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United 
States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries 
to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He 
must, therefore, require the cession to the United States and the imme- 
diate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Eico and other islands 
now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the 
cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United 
States. 

Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy 
and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclu- 
sion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, 
and government of the Philippines. 

If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety commis- 
sioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly author- 
ized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the 
details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the 
terms above indicated. 

I avail myself of this occasion to oifer to your excellency the assur- 
ances of my highest consideration. 

William E. Day. 

His Excellency the Duke of Almodovar del Eio, 

Minister of State, etc. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 275 



MESSAGE OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE DUKE OF ALMO- 
DOVAR DEL RIO, MINISTER OF STATE OF SPAIN, 
SUBMITTED BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. J. CAMBON, 
AMBASSADOR OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, TO HON- 
ORABLE WILLIAM R. DAY, SECRETARY OF STATE OF 
THE UNITED STATES. 

[Translation.] 

Madrid, August 7th, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State: 

The French ambassador at Washington, whose good offices have 
enabled the Spanish Government to address a message to the Presi- 
dent of the United States, has forwarded by cable your excellency's 
reply to this document. 

In examining the arguments used as a preamble to the specification 
of the terms upon which peace may be restored between Spain and the 
United States, it behooves the Spanish Government to deduct from 
the order of events that the severance of diplomatic relations with the 
United States had no other purpose than to decline the acceptance of 
an ultimatum which Spain could only consider as an attempt against 
her rightful sovereignty over Cuba. 

Spain did not declare war; she met it because it was the only means 
of defending her rights in the Greater Antilles. Thus did the Queen 
and the United States see fit to transform and enlarge the purely local 
question of Cuba. 

From this fact your excellency draws the conclusion that the ques- 
tion at stake is no longer only the one which relates to the territory of 
Cuba, but also that the losses of American lives and fortunes incident 
to the war should in some manner be compensated. 

As to the first condition, relating to the future of Cuba, the two Gov- 
ernments reach similar conclusions in regard to the natural inability of 
its people to establish an independent government; be it by reason of 
inadequate development, as we believe, or on account of the present 
distracted and prostrate condition of the island, as your excellency 
states, the fact remains that Cuba needs guidance. The American 
people are willing to assume the responsibility of giving this guidance 
by substituting themselves to the Spanish nation, whose right to keep 
the island is indisputable; to this intimation we have nothing to oppose. 
The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being impera- 
tive, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory 
shall not have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among 
other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and 
protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban 
natives still loyal to the mother country. 

In the name of the nation the Spanish Government hereby relin- 
quishes all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to 
the irremeable evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the 
Cortes — a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the other 
proffered terms— just as these terms will have to be ultimately approved 
by the Senate of the United States. 

The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to 
the sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of 
Porto Rico and of the other islands now under the sovereignty of 
Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the 
Ladrones, to be selected by the Federal Government. 



276 TREATY OF PEACE. 

This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, 
and expels us at once from the prosperous Island of Porto Eico and 
from the Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized 
through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have 
been possible to compensate by some other cession for the injuries 
sustained by the United States. However, the inflexibility of the 
demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the Island of Porto Pico 
and the other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West 
Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the 
Ladrones, to be selected by the American Government. 

The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to 
be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United 
States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and 
the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, can not 
be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by 
the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on laud by a native 
supported and provided for by the American admiral, Manila still 
holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On 
the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power 
and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the Government of 
Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should consti- 
tute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine 
the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines; but as the 
intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, 
therefore the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting 
the third condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of 
Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to 
such reforms which the condition of these possessions and the level of 
culture of their natives may render desirable. 

The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with the 
above-mentioned declarations. 

Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish Gov- 
ernment has the honor to submit in reply to your excellency's com- 
munication. They accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval 
of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties. 

The agreement between the two Governments implies the irremeable 
suspension of hostilities and the designation of commissioners for the 
purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, 
under the terms above indicated. 

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assur- 
ances of my highest consideration. 

Almodovar del Pio. 



Department of State, 

Washington, August 10, 1898. 
Excellency: Although it is your understanding that the note of 
the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday 
afternoon, is intended, to convey an acceptance by the Spanish Govern- 
ment of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis 
on which the President would appoint commissioners to negotiate and 
conclude with commissioners on the part of Spain a treaty of peace, I 
understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubt- 
less owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the 



* TREATY OF PEACE. 27 7 

course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, 
in the form in which it has reached the bands of the President, entirely 
explicit. 

Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and 
certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a protocol, 
to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United 
States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to 
be undertaken. 

I therefore inclose herewith a draft of such a protocol, in which you 
will find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in 
my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for 
the appointment of commissioners to arrange the details of the imme- 
diate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment of com- 
missioners to treat of peace. 

Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera- 
tion. 

William E. Day. 

His Excellency M. Jules Oambon, etc. 



PROTOCOL. 

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His 
Excellency Jules Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotenti- 
ary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing 
for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United 
States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the 
following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments 
have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in 
view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to 
say: 

Article 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or 
title to Cuba. 

Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto 
Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 
Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United 
States. 

Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, 
and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace 
which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the 
Philippines. 

Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and 
other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies ; and to 
this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of 
this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so 
appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, 
meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the 
details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish 
islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing 
of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within 
thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in 
Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying oat the details 
of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands under 
Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies. 



278 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Article 5. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more 
than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so 
appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and pro- 
ceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty 
shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional 
forms of the two countries. 

Article 6. Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostili- 
ties between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that 
effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the 
commanders of its military and naval forces. 



Department of State, 

Washington, August 10, 1898. 
Excellency: 

I have the honor to say, as I assured you orally this morning, that 
upon the suspension of hostilities between the United States and 
Spain, as the result of the signing and sealing of the protocol upon 
the terms of which we have agreed, it is the purpose of this Govern- 
ment to take prompt and efficient means to aid the introduction of food 
supplies into the ports of Cuba. 

Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera 
tion. 

William E. Day. 

His Excellency Mr. Jules Gambon, etc. 



William R. Day, 

Secretary of State : 
You are hereby authorized to sign, on the part of the United States, 
the protocol of this date embodying the terms on which the United 
States and Spain have agreed to treat of peace. 

William McKinley. 
Executive Mansion, 

Washington, August 12, 1898. 



[Translation.] 



Embassy of the French Eepublic 

in the United States, 

Washington, August 12, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to inform you that I 
have just received, through the intermediation of the department of 
foreign affairs at Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which 
the Duke of Almodovar del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her 
Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish Government confers upon me 
full powers in order that I may sign, without other formality and with- 
out delay, the protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by com- 
mon accord between you and me. The instrument destined to make 
regular the powers which are thus given to me by telegraph will be 
subsequently addressed to me by the post. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 279 

His excellency the minister of state adds that in accepting this pro- 
tocol, and by reason of the suspension of hostilities which will be the 
immediate consequence of that acceptance, the Spanish Government 
has pleasure in hoping that the Government of the United States will 
take the necessary measures with a view to restrain (empecher) all 
aggression on the part of the Cuban separatist forces. 

The Government of the Republic having, on the other hand, author- 
ized me to accept the powers which are conferred upon me by the 
Spanish Government, I shall hold myself at your disposition to sign 
the protocol at the hour you may be pleased to designate. 

Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with you toward the 
restoration of peace between two nations, both friends of France, I beg 
you to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very 
high consideration. 

Jules Cambon. 

Hon. William E. Day, 

Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Washington. 



ETo.94.] Department op State, 

Washington, August 15, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to make formal acknowledgment of 
the note you addressed to me, under date of the 12th instant, informing 
me of your receipt, through the medium of the department of foreign 
affairs at Paris, of a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the 
Duke of Almodovar del Rio, minister of state of Spain, by order of 
Her Majesty the Queen Eegent, conferred upon you full powers to sign, 
without other formality and without delay, the protocol already drawn 
up by you and me, leaving the documentary confirmation of your said 
full powers to follow by mail; and adding that, the Government of the 
Republic having authorized you to accept the powers so conferred upon 
you by the Spanish Government, you were ready to sign the protocol 
at such time as I might designate. 

The signing of the protocol on the afternoon of the 12th instant by 
you and me, in the presence of the President, followed by the imme- 
diate action of the President in issuing his proclamation suspending 
hostilities, in accordance with the appropriate stipulation of that pro- 
tocol, testified in a most gratifying manner the full recognition by this 
Government of the powers conferred upon you, and, I am glad to believe, 
marked the first and most effective step toward the happy restoration 
of peace between the United States and Spain. It is especially grati- 
fying to the President and to this Government that you, as the honored 
representative of the French Republic, allied to our American Common- 
wealth by the unbroken ties of more than a century of close friendship 
and to the Kingdom of Spain by propinquity and intimate association, 
should have been thus instrumental in contributing to this auspicious 
result. 

Referring to the observation contained in your note relative to the 
internal order of Cuba during the suspension of hostilities, I may remark 
that the forces of the United States, in proportion as they occupy Cuban 
territory in the course of the evacuation thereof by Spain and its deliv- 
ery to the arms of the United States under the terms of the protocol, 
will, it is believed, be adequate to preserve peace and order, and no 
doubt is entertained of their ability to restrain any possible injury to 



280 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the inhabitants of the island in the country which shall by degrees come 
under their control. 

Be pleased, Mr. Ambassador, to accept the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

William R. Day. 



[Translation.] 



The French ambassador, referring to his communication of the 12th 
instant, has the honor to inform the Secretary of State of the United 
States, that he has just received, through the department of foreign 
affairs at Paris, the full powers which had been conferred upon him, in 
the name of the King of Spain, by Her Majesty the Queen Regent, to 
enable him to sign the preliminary protocol of the negotiations for the 
reestablishment of peace between Spain and the United States. 

Mr. J. Cambon requests the Hon. William R. Day to please to find 
inclosed the said document, and avails himself of the occasion to renew 
the assurances of his highest consideration. 

Washington, August 30, 1898. 

Hon. Wm. R. Day, 

Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Washington. 



DON ALFONSO XIII 

POR LA GRACIA DE DIGS Y LA CONSTITUCl6N REY DB ESP ANA Y EN 
SU NOMBRE Y DURANTE SU MENOR EDAD 

DONA MARIA CRISTINA 

REINA REGENTE DEL REINO. 

Por cuanto ha llegado el caso de negociar y firmar en Washington un 
Protocolo en que se pacten los preliminares de paz entre EspaSa y los 
Estados Unidos de America y siendo preciso que para ello autorice 
Yo una persona en quien concurran las circunstancias necesarias: Por 
tanto He venido en elegir, obtenido al efecto el asentimiento de Su 
Excelencia el Presidente de la Republica Francesa, a Vos Don Julio 
Cambon, Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de la Republica 
Francesa en los Estados Unidos de America, como por la presente Os 
elijo y nombro para que revestido del caraeter de Mi Plenipotenciario 
procedais a negociar y firmar, con el Plenipotenciario que al efecto 
designe Su Excelencia el Presidente de los Estados Unidos de America, 
el precitado Protocolo. Y todo lo que convengais, negocieis y firmeis, 
en cumplimiento de este encargo, lo doy desde ahora por grato y rato, 
lo observare y cumplire y lo hare observar y cumplir como si por Mi 
misma lo hubiera efectuado, para lo cual Os doy todo Mi pleno poder en 
la mas amplia forma que en derecho se require. Y en fe de ello He 
hecho expedir la presente firmada de Mi mano, debidamente sellada y 
refrendada el infrascrito Mi Miuistro de Estado. Dado en el Palacio de 
Madrid a once de Agosto de mil ochientos noventa y ocho. 

[seal] Maria Cristina. 

El Ministro de Estado 

Juan Manuel Sanchez y Gutierrez de Castro. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 281 

[Translation.] 

DON ALFONSO XIII 

BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, 
AND IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY, 

DONA MARIA CRISTINA, 

QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM. 

Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington 
a protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the 
United States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me 
to empower for that purpose a person possessing the requisite qualifica- 
tions : Therefore, I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of 
His Excellency the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio 
Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the French 
Republic in the United States of America, as I do, by these presents, 
select and appoint you to proceed, invested with the character of my 
plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary whom 
His Excellency the President of the United States of America may 
designate for that purpose the aforesaid protocol. And I declare, from 
the present moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate, and sign 
in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, and I will 
observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and executed 
as if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full 
powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I 
have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed 
and countersigned by the undersigned, my minister of state. Given in 
the palace at Madrid, August 11, 1898. 

[l. s.] Maria Cristina. 

Juan Manuel Sanchez y Gutierrez de Castro, 

Minister of State. 



PEOTOCOL OF AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 



Signed at Washington, August 12, 1898. 



PROTOCOL. 

William R. Day, Secretary of 
State of the United States, and 
His Excellency Jules Cambon, 
Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic 
of France at Washington, respec- 
tively possessing for this purpose 
full authority from the Govern- 
ment of the United States and the 
Government of Spain, have con- 
cluded and signed the following 
articles, embodying the terms on 
which the two Governments have 
agreed in respect to the matters 
hereinafter set forth, having in 
view the establishment of peace 
between the two countries, that is 
to say : 

Article I. 

Spain will relinquish all claim 
of sovereignty over and title to 
Cuba. 

Article II. 

Spain will cede to the United 
States the island of Porto Rico 
and other islands now under Span- 
ish sovereignty in the West Indies, 
and also an island in the Ladrones 
to be selected by the United States. 



PROTOCOLE. 

William R. Day, Secretaire 
d'Etat des Etats-Unis, et Son 
Excellence M. Jules Oambon, 
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et 
Pl6"nipotentiaire de la Republique 
Francaise a Washington, ay ant 
respectivement regu a cet effet 
pleine autorisation du Gouverne- 
ment des Etats-Unis et du Gou- 
vernement d'Espagne, out conclu 
et signe les articles suivants qui 
precisent les ternies sur lesquels 
les deux Gouvernements se sont 
mis d'accord en ce qui concerne les 
questions ci-apres designees et 
ayant pour objet 1'6'tablissenient de 
la paix entre les deux pays, savoir : 



Article I. 

L'Espagne renoncera a toute 
pretention a sa souverainete" et a 
tout droit sur Cuba. 

Article II. 

L'Espagne cedera aux Etats- 
Unis File de Porto-Rico et les 
autres iles actuellement sous la 
souverainete" Espagnole dans les 
Indes Occidentales, ainsi qu'une 
ile dans les Ladrones qui sera 
choisie par les Etats unis. 



282 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



283 



Article III. 

The United States will occupy 
and hold the city, bay and harbor 
of Manila, pending the conclusion 
of a treaty of peace which shall 
determine the control, disposition 
and government of the Philippines. 



Article IV. 

Spain will immediately evacuate 
Cuba, Porto Eico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in 
the West Indies; and to this end 
each Government will, within ten 
days after the signing of this pro- 
tocol, appoint Commissioners, and 
the Commissioners so appointed 
shall, within thirty days after the 
signing of this protocol, meet at 
Havana for the purpose of arrang- 
ing and carrying out the details of 
the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba 
and the adjacent Spanish islands; 
and each Government will, within 
ten days after the signing of this 
protocol, also appoint other Com- 
missioners, who shall, within thirty 
days after the signing of this pro- 
tocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto 
Eico, for the purpose of arranging 
and carrying out the details of the 
aforesaid evacuation of Porto-Eico 
and other islands now under Span- 
ish sovereignty in the West Indies. 



Article III. 

Les Etats-Unis occuperont et 
tiendront laville, la baie et le port 
de Manille en attendant la conclu- 
sion d'un traite de paix qui devra 
determiner le controle, la disposi- 
tion et le Gouvernement des Phil- 
ippines. 

Article IV. 

L'Espagne eVacuera imme'diate- 
ment Cuba, Porto Eico et les autres 
iles actuellement sous la souve- 
rainete Espagnole dans les Indes 
Occidentales ; a cet effet chacun 
des deux Gouvernements nom- 
mera, dans les dix jours qui sui- 
vront la signature de ce protocole, 
des commissaires, et les commis- 
saires ainsi nommes devront, dans 
les trente jours qui suivront la 
signature de ce protocole, se ren- 
contrer a la Havane afin d'arranger 
et d'executer les details de l'eva- 
cuation sus mentioned de Cuba et 
des iles Espagnoles adjacentes; et 
chacun des deux Gouvernements 
nommera egalement, dans les dix 
jours qui suivront la signature de 
ce protocole, d'autres commissaires 
qui devront, dans les trente jours 
de la signature de ce protocole, se 
rencontrer a San Juan de Porto- 
Eico afin d'arranger et d'executer 
les details de l'evacuation sus- 
mentionnC'e de Porto-Eico et des 
autres iles actuellement sous la 
souveramete" Espagnole dans les 
Indes Occidentales. 



Article V. 

The United States and Spain 
will each appoint not more than 
five commissioners to treat of 
peace, and the commissioners so 
appointed shall meet at Paris not 
later than October 1, 1898, and pro- 
ceed to the negotiation and con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace, which 
treaty shall be subject to ratifica- 
tion according to the respective 
constitutional forms of the two 
countries. 



Article V. 

Les Etats-Unis et 1'Espagne 
nommeront, pour traiter de la 
paix, cinq commissaires au plus 
pour chaque pays; les commis- 
saires ainsi nominees devront se 
rencontrer a Paris, le l er Octobre 
1898, au plus tard, et proceder a 
la negotiation et a la conclusion 
d'un traite de paix; ce traite sera 
sujet a ratification, selon les formes 
constitutionnelles de chacun des 
deux pays. 



284 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Article VI. 

Upon the conclusion and signing 
of this protocol, hostilities between 
the two countries shall be sus- 
pended, and notice to that effect 
shall be given as soon as possible 
by each Government to the com- 
manders of its military and naval 
forces. 

Done at Washington in dupli- 
cate, in English and in French, by 
the Undersigned, who have here- 
unto set their hands and seals, the 
12th day of August 1898. 
[seal.] William R. Day 
[seal.] Jules Cambon 



Article VI. 

A la conclusion et a la signature 
de ce protocole, les hostilites entre 
les deux pays devront etre sus- 
pendues, et des ordres a cet effet 
devront etre donnes aussitot que 
possible par chacun des deux 
Gouvernements aux commandants 
de ses forces de terre et de mer. 

Fait a Washington, en double 
exemplaire, anglais et francais, par 
les Soussignes qui y ont appose" 
leur signature et leur sceau, le 12 
Aout 1898. 

seal.] William R. Day 
seal.1 Jules Cambon 



CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND 
THE EMBASSY OF FRANCE, AT WASHINGTON, AS REPRESENT- 
ING THE INTERESTS OF SPAIN. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Sherman. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, April 22, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that 
before leaving Washington, and in fulfillment of the instructions of his 
Government, Mr. Polo de Bernabe confided to me and at the same time 
to the minister of Austria-Hungary the protection of Spanish subjects 
and interests in the United States. 

With a view to simplifying in practice the accomplishment of the 
mission which our respective Governments have accepted, the minister 
of Austria-Hungary and I have made in common accord the following 
arrangements : 

First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain 
stored in the legation of Austria-Hungary. 

Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of 
Spanish interests will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria- 
Hungary in New York and Chicago and to the consulates of France in 
New Orleans, San Francisco, and Philadelphia. 

Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a 
representative he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in 
those places where the two countries are only represented by consular 
agents such protection will be exercised by the French agent. 

Fourth. Questions the adjustment of which may necessitate repre- 
sentations to the Department of State will be dealt with either by the 
minister of Austria- Hungary or by me, accordingly as the Austrian or 
the French consul shall have had the initiative therein. 

Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself alone with the steps 
to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States. 

I to-day send instructions in this sense to the French consuls, and I 
will be grateful to you to be pleased to invite the competent authorities 
to extend to them, the case arising, all the needful facilities. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Sherman to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 12.] Department of State, April 25, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 22d instant, whereby you inform me that Mr. Polo de 
Bernabe, before leaving Washington, and in fulfillment of the instruc- 
tions of his Government, intrusted to you, and at the same time to 
the Austro-Hungarian minister, the protection of Spanish subjects and 
interests in the United States.' To the end of simplifying in practice 
the accomplishment of this commission, which your respective Govern- 
ments have accepted, you and the Austro-Hungarian minister have 

285 



286 TREATY OF PEACE. 

agreed upon certain convenient arrangements, which you are pleased 
to communicate to me, as follows: 

"First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain stored in 
the legation of Austria-Hungary. 

Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests 
will be con tided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and 
Chicago, and to the consulates of France in New Orleans, San Francisco, and 
Philadelphia. 

Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a representa- 
tive, he will assume the protection of Spanish interests ; in those places where the 
two countries are only represented by consular agents, such protection will be exer- 
cised by the French agent. 

Fourth. Questions the adjustment of which may necessitate representations to the 
Department of State will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-Hungary 
or by me [the French Ambassador], accordingly as the Austrian or the French consul 
shall have had the initiative therein. 

Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself [the French Ambassador] alone with 
the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States. " 

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United 
States admits your friendly action in assuming charge of the pro- 
tection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States, aud 
that the scheme which you and the Austro-Hungarian minister have 
devised for the practical division of the charge you have simultane- 
ously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experience shall 
show its convenience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in con- 
formity with the international usage which obtains in circumstances 
like the present, that the arrangement contemplates only the friendly 
offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as well as of the con- 
sular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion there- 
for arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and their interests actually 
within the jurisdiction of the United States, and embraces no repre- 
sentative office by either of you on behalf of the Government of Spain, 
between which and the Government of the United States a condition 
of war unhappily exists. 

I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of the notes 
thus addressed to me by yourself and the Austro Hungarian minister, 
to the end that they may give all due heed to such representations as 
the agents of either country may feel called upon to make in behalf of 
Spanish subjects and interests in fulfilment of the friendly office of pro- 
tection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no con- 
fusion may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among 
the respective consulates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the 
French consular officers who have been designated to act in the manner 
stated in your note. 

Be pleased to accept, etc. John Sherman. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 
Washington, April 26, 1898. (Received April 26, 8 p. m.) 
Mr. Secretary of State : In your acknowledgment, dated April 
25, of a note which I had the honor to address to you on the 22d of 
the same month, in regard to the steps which I had taken, in concert 
with the minister of Austria-Hungary, for the purpose of insuring the 
protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 287 

which our Governments have simultaneously assumed, you were good 
enough to express to me the desire to receive the list of French consuls 
and consular agents designated to exercise such protection, under the 
conditions indicated in my above-mentioned note. 

In order to comply with your request, I hasten to transmit to you, 
as an inclosure, the list of these agents, and I avail myself of this occasion 
to thank you for the instructions intended to facilitate their mission 
which you propose to issue to the competent authorities. 
Pray accept, etc., 

Jules Cambon. 



[Inclosure in the 'French ambassador's note of April 2C, 1898. J 

List of French consular posts charged with the protection of Spanish interests. 

Consulates. — New Orleans, San Francisco. 
Vice-consulates. — Philadelphia, Galveston. 



Savannah, Los Angeles, Portland, Oreg., San Jose 



Mr. Thiebaut to Mr. A dee. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of France in the United States, 

Washington, April 27, 1898. 
Dear Mr. Adee : Referring to our conversation of day before yester- 
day, I have tbe honor to transmit to you herewith for your information 
copy of a telegram which tbe Ambassador has received from tbe agent of 
the steamer Buena Ventura, recently captured by the Federal squadron 
in the Gulf of Mexico: 

Liverpool, April 24, 1898. 
Not being able to communicate with onr Buena Ventura, notwithstanding all efforts 
made, we beg you to be pleased to indicate to us in what way we can do so. Families 
anxious. 

Larranaga. 

The Ambassador would be especially obliged to you if you could ena- 
ble him to answer this telegram. News of the crew of this vessel might 
doubtless be obtained either from the Department of the Navy or the 
Treasury. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Thiebaut. 



Mr. A flee to Mr. Thiebaut. 

Department of State, April 28, 1898. 
My Dear Mr. Thiebaut : In further acknowledgment of your per- 
sonal note of yesterday, requesting permission, on behalf of the fam- 
ilies and friends of the officers and crew of the steamer Buena Ventura, 
recently captured by the Federal squadron, to communicate with the 



288 TREATY OF PEACE. 

said officers and crew, I beg to inform you that I am now in receipt of a 
reply to my letter to the Attorney-General on the subject. Mr. Griggs 
states that the persons seized on the various vessels recently captured 
as prizes of war are now being harbored and protected at Key West 
Barracks, and that they are therefore at present in the custody and 
control of the War Department, but that he has directed the United 
States attorney for the southern district of Florida to cooperate with 
the officers of the War Department in permitting all proper communi- 
cations from the respective families or friends to reach the officers and 
crew of the vessel in question. 

In order to save any possible delay, I have, however, written the 
Secretary of War, requesting that the privilege you ask for the families 
and friends of the crew be granted, although I have little doubt that 
the instructions of the Attorney-General above referred to will have 
accomplished already the desired result. 

I will again communicate with you on receiving any further informa- 
tion in the matter. 

I am, etc., Alvey A. Adee. 



Mr. Thiebaut to Mr. Adee. 

Washington, April 28, 1898. 

My Dear Mr. Adee : I hasten to acknowledge receipt of your per- 
sonal note of to-day in which you inform me that the persons seized on 
the Spanish vessels recently captured by the Federal fleet are now in 
the custody and control of the War Department, at Key West Bar- 
racks, but that upon instructions of the Attorney-General, the United 
States attorney for the southern district of Florida will cooperate with 
military authorities in permitting all proper communications from fami- 
lies or friends to reach the officers and crew of the steamer Buena 
Ventura. 

I have at once transmitted this information to the agent of the vessel 
in question at Liverpool. 

I am directed by the ambassador to convey to you his thanks for 
your so courteous action iu the matter, and I beg you to believe me, 
my dear Mr. Adee, 

Most sincerely, yours, Thiebaut. 



Memorandum from French Embassy. 

Could the Department of State inform the French ambassador 
whether the Spanish schooner Sofia is among the number of vessels 
captured by the Federal fleet? 

Washington, April 29, 1898. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 15.] Department of State, April 29, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 26th instant, transmitting a list of the French officers who 
have been intrusted with the protection of Spanish subjects and inter- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 289 

ests in the United States, and to inclose herewith for your information 
and use six printed conies of the correspondence which has passed 
between your Embassy, the Austro- Hungarian legation, and this 
Department on the subject. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary. 



[Inclosure. 



CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF SPANISH SUBJECTS AND INTER- 
ESTS IN THE UNITED STATKS BY THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS OF 
FRANCE AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

The French ambassador to the Secretary of State. 
[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic in the United States, 

Washington, April 22, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that before leaving 
Washington, and in fulfillment of the instructions of his Government, Mr. Polo y 
Bernabe confided to me and at the same time to the minister of Austria-Hungary 
the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States. 

With a view to simplify in practice the accomplishment of the mission which our 
respective Governments have accepted, the minister of Austria- Hungary and I have 
made in common accord the following arrangements: 

First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain stored in 
the legation of Austria-Hungary. 

Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests 
will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and Chi- 
cago and the consulates of France in New Orleans, San Francisco, and Philadelphia. 

Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a representa- 
tive, he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places where the 
two countries are only represented by consular agents, such protection will be exer- 
cised by the French agent. 

Fourth. Questions the adjustment of which may necessitate representations to the 
Department of State will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-Hungary 
or by me, accordingly as the Austrian or French consul shall have had the initiative 
therein. 

Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself alone with the steps to be taken 
with respect to the Government of the United States. 

I to-day send instructions in this sense to the French consuls, and I will be grate- 
ful to you to be pleased to invite the competent authorities to extend to them, the 
case arising, all the needful facilities. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



The Austro-Hungarian minister to the Secretary of State. 
[Translation.] 

No. 1143.] Imperial Royal Austro-Hungarian Legation, 

Washington, April 22, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor, Mr. Secretary of State, to inform 
you that Mr. Polo y Bernab6, in carrying out the directions of his Government with 
respect to his departure from Washington, has simultaueously intrusted to the 
French ambassador and myself tho protection of Spanish subjects and interests in 
the United States. 

In order to simplify in practice the carrying out of this commission, which our 
Governments have accepted, the French ambassador and I have agreed in common 
upon the following rules: 

1. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will be left on deposit in 
the Austro-Hungarian legation. 

TP 19 



290 TREATY OF PEACE. 

2. The custody of the archives and the protection of Spanish interests in New 
York and Chicago will he intrusted to the local Austro-Hungarian consuls general, 
and in New Orleans, Philadelphia, and San Francisco to the French consulates. 

3. In those places where only one of the two countries has a representative, the 
latter will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places where hoth 
are represented only hy consular agents, such protection will be exercised through 
the French agents. 

4. Questions the settlement of which may call for representations to the Depart- 
ment of State will be acted upon either by the French ambassador or by me, accord- 
ingly as the initiative thereof shall have been taken through a French or an 
Aii6tro-Hungarian consul. 

5. In all other cases the French ambassador will take exclusive charge of the pro- 
ceedings with the Government of the Union. 

I to-day send the appropriate instructions to the Austro-Hungarian consulates, 
and I will be very grateful to you, Mr. Secretary of State, if you will be pleased to 
invite the competent authorities to extend to them, the case arising, the necessary 
assistance. 

Accept, etc., Hengelmuller. 



The Secretary of State to the French ambassador. 

No. 12.] Department of State, 

Washington, April 25, 1S98. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 
22d instant, whereby you inform me that Mr. Polo de Bernab6, before leaving Wash- 
ington and in fulfillment of the instructions of his Government, intrusted to you, 
and at the same time to the Austro-Hungarian minister, the protection of Spanish 
subjects and interests in the United States. To the end of simplifying in practice 
the accomplishment of this commission, which your respective governments have 
accepted, you and the Austro-Hungarian minister have agreed upon certain conven- 
ient arrangements, which you are pleased to communicate to me, as follows: 

"First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain stored in 
the legation of Austria-Hungary. 

"Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests 
will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and Chi- 
cago, and to the consulates of France in New Orleans, San Francisco, and Phila- 
delphia. 

"Third. In those localities where only one <5f the two countries has a representa- 
tive, he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places where the 
two countries are only represented by consular agents, such protection will be exer- 
cised by the French agent. 

"Fourth. Questions, the adjustment of which may necessitate representations to 
the Department of State, will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-Hun- 
gary or by me [the French ambassador], accordingly as the Austrian or the French 
consul shall have had the initiative therein. 

"Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself [the French ambassador] alone 
with the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States." 

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States admits your 
friendly action in assuming charge of the protection of Spanish subjects and inter- 
ests in the United States, and that the scheme which you and the Austro-Hungarian 
minister have devised for the practical division of the charge you have simulta- 
neously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experience shall show its con- 
venience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in conformity with the international 
usage which obtains iu circumstances like the present, that the arrangement con- 
templates only the friendly offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as well 
as of the consular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion there- 
for arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and their interests actually within fche 
jurisdiction of the United States, and embraces no representative office by either of 
you on behalf of the Government of Spain, between which and the Government of 
the United States a condition of war unhappily exists. 

I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of the notes thus addressed 
to me by yourself and the Austro-Hungarian minister, to the end that they may give 
all due heed to sueh representations as the agents of either country may feel called 
upon to make in behalf of Spanish subjects and interests in fulfillment of the friendly 
office of protection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no confu- 
sion may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among the respective 
consulates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the French consular officers 
who have been designated to act in the manner stated in your note. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

John Sherman. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 291 

The Secretary of State to the Austro-Hungarian Minister. 

No. 218.] Department of State, 

Washington, April 25, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 22d instant, 
whereby you inform me that Mr. Polo de Pernab 4 , before leaving Washington and 
in fulfillment of the instructions of his Government, intrusted to you. and at the same 
time to the French ambassador, the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in 
the United States. To the end of simplifying in practice the accomplishment of this 
commission, which your respective Governments have accepted, you and the French 
ambassador have agreed upon certain convenient arrangements which you are pleased 
to communicate to me, as follows: 

"First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will be left on deposit 
in the Austro-Hungarian legation. 

"Second. The custody of the archives and the protection of Spanish interests in 
New York and Chicago will be intrusted to the local Austro-Hungarian consuls- 
general, and in New Orleans, Philadelphia, and San Francisco to the French 
consulates. 

"Third. In those places where only one of the two countries has a representative, 
the latter will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places whore 
both are represented only by consular agents, such protection will be exercised 
through the French agents. 

"Fourth. Questions, the settlement of which may call for representations to the 
Department of State, Avill be acted upon either by the French ambassador or by me 
[the Austro-Hungarian minister], accordingly as the initiative thereof shall have 
been taken through a French or an Austro-Hungarian consul. 

"Fifth. In all other cases the French ambassador will take exclusive charge of 
the proceedings with the Government of the Union." 

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States admits 
your friendly action in assuming charge of the protection of Spanish subjects and 
interests in the United States, and that the scheme which you and the French 
ambassador have devised for the practical division of the charge you have simul- 
taneously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experience shall show its 
convenience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in conformity with the inter- 
national usage which obtains in circumstances like the present, that the arrangement 
contemplates only the friendly offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as 
well as of the consular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion 
therefor arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and their interests actually within 
the jurisdiction of the United States, and embraces no representative office by 
either of you on behalf of the Government of Spain, between which and the Gov- 
ernment of the United States a condition of war unhappily exists. 

I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of notes thus addressed 
to me by yourself and the French ambassador, to the end that they may give all due 
heed to such representations as the agents of either country may feel called upon to 
make in behalf of Spanish subjects and interests, in fulfillment of the friendly office 
of protection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no confusion 
may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among the respective consu- 
lates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the Austro-Hungarian consular 
officers who have been designated to act in the manner stated in your note. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

John Sherman. 



The French Ambassador to the Secretary of Slate. 
[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic in the United States, 

Washington, April 26, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: In your acknowledgment, dated April 25, of a note 
which I had the honor to address to you on the 22d of the same month, in regard to 
thesteps which I had taken, in concert with the minister of Austria-Hungary, for 
the purpose of insuring the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United 
States, which our Governments have simultaneously assumed, you were good enough 
to express to me the desire to receive the list of French consuls and consular agents 
designated to exercise such protection, under the conditions indicated in my above- 
mentioned note. 

In order to comply with your request, I hasten to transmit to you, as an inclosure, 
the list of these agents, and I avail myself of this occasion to thank you for the 



292 TREATY OF PE>CE. 

instructions intended to facilitate their mission which you propose to issue to the 
competent authorities. 

Pray accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



[Inclosure.] 
List of French consular posts charged ivith the protection of Spanish interests. 

Consulates. — New Orleans, San Francisco. 

Vice-consulates. — Philadelphia, Galveston. 

Consular agencies. — Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, Louisville, St. Louis, St. Paul, 
Brownsville, Dallas, El Paso, San Antonio, Baltimore, Boston; Charleston, S. C; 
Norfolk ; Portland, Me. ; Apalachicola, Baton Rouge, Birmingham, Mobile, Pensacola, 
Savannah, Los Angeles; Portland, Oreg. ; San Jose. 



The Austro- Hungarian minister to the Secretary of State. 
[ Translation.] 

No. 1185.] Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Legation, 

Washington, April 26, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note No. 218, of April 25 instant, and in compliance with the desire expressed 
therein to advise you, Mr. Secretary of State, that, in addition to the Austro-Hunga- 
rian consulates-general in New York and Chicago, the imperial and royal consulates 
at Pittsburg, Pa., aud Richmond, Va., at which places the French Government 
maintains no consular representation, have been intrusted with the protection of 
Spanish subjects. 

The list cf names of the Austro-Hungarian officers thus called to the exercise of 
this friendly protection is: 

New York, Consul-Gen6ral Franz Stockinger; 

Chicago, Consul Max von Proskowetz; 

Pittsburg, Consul Thomas von Dessewify; 

Richmond, Consul Christof. Borchers. 

Accept, etc., Hengelmuller. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 16.] Department of State, May 3, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to communicate to you for your 
information copies of notes just exchanged with the Mexican minister 
at this capital in relation to extending*, at the request of the Spanish 
minister in Mexico, friendly protection in case of need to Spanish inter- 
ests at Laredo, Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., through the Mexican consuls 
in those cities. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



[Inclosure. — Translation.] 
Mr. Romero to Mr. Moore. 

Mexican Legation, 

Washington, May 2, 1S98. 
Mr. Acting Secretary: I have the honor to inform you that the Government of 
Mexico has advised me by telegraph that at the request of the Spanish minister in 
Mexico, and for the reason that there is no other than a Mexican consul in Laredo, 
Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., those consuls have been authorized to protect Spanish 
interests. 






TREATY OF PEACE. 203 

The Mexican Government accordingly gives me instructions to communicate this 
fact to you, and in so doing I have the honor to state to you that I have spoken in 
regard to the matter with the ambassador of France in Washington, who I under- 
stand has charge of the protection of Spanish interests in the United States, and if 
the case arises I shall proceed in accord with him. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

M. Romero. 



[Inclosure 2.] 
Mr. Moore to Mr. Romero. 

No. 333.] Washington, May 3, 189S. 

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of tbe 2d instant 
relative to the authorization given by the Mexican Government to the Mexican 
consuls at Laredo, Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., to protect Spanish interests in their 
respective localities, this step having been taken at the instance of the Spanish 
minister in Mexico, inasmuch as there are in those places no consuls of any other 
nation. 

You state that you have spoken in regard to this matter with the French ambas- 
sador, who, you understand, is charged with the protection of Spanish interests in 
the United States and will proceed in accord with him should a case arise. As you 
will perceive by the inclosed copy of recent correspondence with the representatives 
of France and Austria-Hungary in this capital, you are right as to Mr. Cambon's 
announcement that in all cases other than those originating through a French or 
Austro-Hungarian consulate he will charge himself alone with any matters of 
Spanish protection involving representations to the Government of the United 
States. 

1 presume you will have arranged with Mr. Cambon so that any question affecting 
Spanish interests in the United States which may arise at Laredo or Nogales may, if 
the case require, take the regular course so agreed upon. 

The State and Treasury authorities at those two points will be advised of the per- 
mission which your Government has given to the Mexican consuls there. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 



(Inclosure: Printed correspondence as above.) 



J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Moore. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, May 4, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State : In reply to your communication of tbe 
3d of this month, I have the honor to inform you that the Mexican 
minister has made known to me that his Government has, at the request 
of the cabinet of Madrid, consented to commit to the Mexican consuls 
the protection of Spanish subjects and interests at Nogales (Arizoua) 
and at Laredo (Texas), where neither France nor Austria are repre- 
sented. 

For the purpose of preserving the arrangement which the minister of 
Austria- Hungary and I have adopted for the protection of the Spanish 
interests in the United States, and with which our communications 
dated 22d of April last acquainted your honorable predecessor, it has 
been agreed between Mr. Romero and myself that such correspondence 
relative to Spanish affairs as he might receive from the Mexican con- 
suls at Nogales and Laredo would be turned over by him to me, and I 
would give them such action as might be expedient. 
Accept, Mr. Secretary, etc., 

Jules Gambon. 



294 TREATY OF PEACE. 

[Personal.] 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, May 4, 1898. 
My Dear Mr. Thiebaut : Referring to previous correspondence rela- 
tive to measures for permitting all proper communications from families 
or friends to reach the officers and crew of the steamer Buena Ventura, 
I beg to inform you that the Department luis received a letter from the 
Secretary of War stating that the proper military officers will be directed 
to cooperate with the United States attorney for the southern district 
of Florida iu permitting all proper communications from families and 
friends to reach the officers and crew of the vessel in question, subject 
to such restrictions as it may be deemed proper to impose. 
I am, etc., 

J. B. Moore. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 19.] Department of State, May 7, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to the memorandum left at this Department 
on the 29th ultimo by the secretary of the French embassy on your 
behalf, inquiring whether the Spanish schooner Sofia was among the 
number of the vessels captured by the Federal fleet, I have the honor 
to inform you that I am advised by the Secretary of the Navy that the 
Sofia was captured by the United States torpedo boat Borter off the 
northern coast of Cuba on the morning of April 24. 
Accept, etc., 

William R. Day. 



[Personal.] 

Mr. Adee to Mr. Thiebaut. 

Department of State, May 7, 1898. 
My Dear Mr. Thiebaut: With further reference to your personal 
note to me of the 27th ultimo, I beg to inform you that if the owners 
of the captured steamer Buena Ventura desire to correspond with her 
officers and crew the Secretary of the Navy suggests that if communi- 
cations, open for inspection, be sent to the commandant of the United 
States naval station at Key West there would probably be no objec- 
tion to their delivery, provided the contents of the communications do 
not render such action inadvisable. 

Very truly, yours, Alvfjy A. Adee. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 22.] Department of State, May 10, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to previous correspondence relative to the 
protection of Spanish subjects and interests by the Mexican consuls at 
Laredo, Tex., and Nogales, Ariz., I have the honor to acknowledge the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 295 

receipt of your note of the 4th instant, stating that the Mexican minister 
at this capital lias agreed with you to let the French embassy act upon 
such correspondence of the said Mexican consuls as may bear on the 
subject. 

Accept, etc., William R. Day. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, May 17, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: The wife of Commander Guevedo, cap- 
tain of the Spanish packet boat Panama, captured by the Federal fleet 
and now actually detained at Key West, solicits my Government to 
obtain for her authority to correspond with her husband, about whom 
she is without news. 

Likewise, the minister of colonies informs me of the desire, which has 
been expressed to him by interested families, to have news of the health 
and situation of the crew of this boat. I should be greatly obliged to 
you to be able to authorize the commander to address to his family and 
to receive from it, through the medium of this embassy, open corre- 
spondence, and to be able to accord the same favors which were extended 
to the crew of the Buena Ventura. 

I recommend likewise to the kind consideration of the Department 
of State the request of the families of the crew and of the passengers 
of the Panama, begging it to put me, if possible, in a situation to reply 
to the proper requests made by them. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

ISTo. 27.] Washington, May 18, 1898. 

Excellency: Acknowledging the receipt of your note of yester- 
day's date, asking that permission be accorded the captain and crew of 
the Spanish vessel Panama to correspond, through the medium of your 
embassy, with their families, who are anxious to learn of their welfare, 
I have the honor to state that copy of your note was at once communi- 
cated to the proper departments of this Government, with the request 
that, if possible, the permission you ask be granted. Upon being 
informed of the decision reached in the matter I shall be pleased to 
immediately advise you. 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

Kb. 31.] Washington, May 31, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to the inquiries as to the situation of 
the master and crew of the captured Spanish steamer Panama, I have 
the honor to inform you that instructions have been sent to the author- 
totes of the United States at Key West to transmit to the proper 



29 G TREATY OF PEACE. 

authorities of the United States in this capital any open letters 
addressed by the officers and crew of the steamer in question to their 
families, to the end that such letters may be forwarded to their destin- 
ation through your embassy. 

Accept, etc., William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 33.] Department of State, June 9, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to your inquiries in relation to the 
Spanish subject, Mr. Jiminez Zapatero, who is reported in Madrid to be 
held in the United States as a spy, I have the honor to inform you that 
I am advised by the Navy Department that a prisoner captured on the 
Panama, and supposed to be the person to whom your excellency's 
inquiries refer, has been sent north on the U. S. S. Cincinnati and is now 
at Fort Monroe. It appears that when the Panama was captured he had 
in his possession a lot of coast charts, which he threw overboard; that 
he had in his trunk epaulets and a sword, and that he admitted having 
been some years ago an officer in the Spanish navy. The evidence 
therefore indicated that he was a military person; and he was sent to 
Fort Monroe merely as a prisoner of war, and not as a spy. Orders 
were given to furnish him with accommodations and to treat him accord- 
ing to the rank that he should claim. On his arrival at Fort Monroe 
he gave the name of F. J. Jiminez, but refused to make any further 
statement. In consequence he is now held as a private. 
Accept, etc., 

William E. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 34.] Department of State, June 20, 1898. 

Excellency: I have just received a communication from my col- 
league the Attorney-General, in which he asks for information as to 
the consular officers to whom Spanish subjects at Key West who have 
been seized on prizes, or who have been paroled as prisoners of war, 
should be delivered. 

I shall be greatly obliged to your excellency if you will be so good 
as to enable me to answer the inquiry of the Attorney-General. 
Accept, etc. 

William E. Day 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 37.] Department of State, June 24, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to my note of the 20th instant, iu 
relation to the disposition of certain Spanish subjects taken on vessels 
captured as prizes, I have the honor to inform you that the Depart- 
ment has just received from the Attorney-General a further communi- 
cation on the subject. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 297 

By this communication it appears that it is the intention of the 
United States authorities at Key West to send the prisoners in ques- 
tion on the steamers Gatalina and Jover to Spain, if those steamers 
shall return to that country; but that, if appeal bonds should not be 
given, the steamers would then be sent to New York, and carry the 
prisoners to that port. It is stated that at least one hundred of them 
have families in Cuba and do not wish to go to Spain, and that some- 
thing must be done to provide for them if they are detained beyond 
the sailing of the vessels on the 27th of the present mouth. 

In view of these circumstances it seems desirable that some definite 
arrangement should immediately be made for the transportation of the 
prisoners in question from the United States. 

With reference to the question raised as to the safety of the prisoners 
on their way to any place of embarkation, the Attorney-General states 
that he will give suitable instructions for their subsistence and protec- 
tion on their way to or in charge of any consular officer to a place of 
departure. 

Accept, etc., William It. Day. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bay. 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, June 25, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : In reply to the note which you did me 
the honor to address to me on the 24th instant, relative to the repatria- 
tion of the Spaniards who have been taken prisoners on board of the 
vessels captured as prizes since the beginning of the war, I have the 
honor to inform you that I think, as you do, that it is desirable that 
a final arrangement should be concluded as speedily as possible. 

But before taking the measures necessary to this end, allow me to 
call your attention to the fact that the information which you were 
pleased to communicate to me by your aforesaid note is still incomplete. 
You state that a certain number of prisoners whose families are in 
Cuba do not desire to be sent back to Spain, but you do not give the 
number of those who are to be sent to Europe on board of the steamers 
Gatalina and Jover, or taken to New York by said vessels. Now, this 
number is indispensable to enable me to ask of the Spanish Govern- 
ment an appropriation sufficient for the repatriation of these prisoners. 

I have, moreover, reason to infer from your note that the steamers 
Gatalina and Jover will sail direct from Key West to Spain, if security 
is given in case an appeal should be taken from the decision which has 
released them, and that, in the contrary case, they will not take the 
prisoners farther than New York. No decision can therefore be 
reached until it is known whether this security has been furnished, 
and yet you likewise inform me that these vessels are to sail on the 
27th instant — that is to say, day after to-morrow — which would, indeed, 
allow us too little time to settle these different questions. 

I feel that I must thank you and the Attorney-General for all the 
measures that you have taken, and that you will be pleased to take here- 
after, in order to secure the subsistence and safety of these prisoners. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

Jules Cambon. 



298 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Gambon. 

No. 40.] Department of Sta TE, 

Washington, June 27, 1898. 
Excellency: With reference to your note of the 25th instant, in 
relation to the return of the crews of Spanish ships captured as prizes, 
I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of a telegram received by 
the Attorney-General from the United States marshal at Key West, 
giving the names of the persons composing the crews in question. 

The Department has transmitted to the Attorney-General the request 
made in your note of the 25th instant, for more definite information as 
to the destination of the persons who are to be sent away. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Ganibon, 

Department of State, June 29, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to previous correspondence in relation 
to the removal from the United States of the crews of the Spanish 
prize vessels at Key West, I have the honor to say that I am just 
advised by the Attorney- General that the vessels Gatalina and Miguel 
Jover are to remain in the custody of the United States marshal pend- 
ing an appeal which has been taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and that it will consequently be necessary to provide 
for the transportation of the Spanish subjects in question by some 
other means. 

The Attorney- General is advised by the United States marshal at Key 
West that 284 of the men desire to be sent to Spain, 22 to the Canary 
Islands, 52 either to Cuba or to Mexico, and 21 to England. There are 
11 as to whose wishes no information has been obtained. 

The Attorney-General desires to be advised as to whether the infor- 
mation which he has now been able to furnish will be sufficient for the 
purpose of making arrangements for the transportion of the men in 
question. 

Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Ganibon. 

No. 42.] Department of State, June 30, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to previous correspondence as to the 
disposition of the crews of prizes at Key West, I now have the honor 
to say that this Government will attend to their transportation from 
Key West to New York, aud that it is hoped that you may be able soon 
to arrange for their transportation from the United States at that point. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 299 

Mr. Camion to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, 
Washington, July 1, 1898. (Received July 2, 3.38 p. in.) 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of your letters dated the 27th, 29th, and 30th of last month, rela- 
tive to the prisoners coming from Spanish captured vessels and whom 
the Federal Government has decided to send away from the territory 
of the Union. 

I have hastened to inform my Government that the Federal authority 
will take charge of transporting these 400 men from Key West to New 
York, whence they will be dispatched to their respective destinations 
through the care of the consul-general of Austria-Hungary, to whom the 
protection of Spanish interests in that port is intrusted. I have, at the 
same time, begged the minister for foreign affairs to ask the Madrid 
cabinet to send with urgency to the consul-general of Austria the 
necessary instructions and funds. 

Be pleased to accept, etc. Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 
No. 46.] Washington, July 8, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to previous correspondence on the sub- 
ject of the transportation from this country of Spanish subjects taken on 
board of prizes of war, I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of 
a letter of the 30th ultimo from Messrs. C. B. Richard & Co., of New 
York, to the Assistant Secretary of War, in which it is stated that the 
steamer Trojan Prince, which is to sail from New York on the 12th, 
will stop at Gibraltar if a sufficient number of Spanish passengers 
should be obtained to warrant her stopping at that port. I transmit to 
you a copy of the letter simply with the view that the suggestions 
which it contains possibly may facilitate the making of arrangements 
for the transportation of the Spanish subjects in question. 
Accept, etc., 

William R. Day. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, July 9, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State: Referring to your previous correspond- 
ence upon the same subject, you have been good enough by letter of 
the 8th of this month to inform me that the steamship Trojan Prince, 
which will leave New York the 12th of July for Naples, will be able to 
receive the officers and crews of the Spanish boats which have been 
captured and to land them at Gibraltar at the price of $55 for cabin 
accommodation and $22 for steerage. 



300 TREATY OF PEACE. 

I have the honor to inform you that I have at once forwarded thi* 
information to the minister of foreign affairs at Paris with the request 
that he should make it known to the cabinet of Madrid, to the end 
that a proper credit should be immediately opened for the consul- 
general of Austria at New York. 
Be pleased to accept, etc., 

Cambon. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, July 12, 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has the honor to inform the Secretary of 
State of the United States that he received yesterday, through the 
War Department at Washington, a telegram from Havana, whereby 
Captain-General Blanco expresses a desire to receive a detailed official 
list of the Spanish officers who were taken prisoners after, the naval 
battle which was fought off Santiago de Cuba between Admiral Cer- 
vera's squadron and the Federal squadron. 

Furthermore, at the request of the Spanish Government, the depart- 
ment of foreign affairs at Paris has requested the Ambassador of France 
to send it a list of the dead, wounded, and survivors of Admiral Cer- 
vera's squadron. As the crew lists were probably lost with the vessels, 
it is to be presumed that an exact list of the dead can not be prepared 
here; that of the survivors will, however, doubtless suffice to enable 
the Spanish authorities to prepare a list of those who have disappeared. 

This information being intended for the families of the persons con- 
cerned, who are naturally anxious to be informed as to their fate, the 
Ambassador of France will be grateful to the Secretary of State if he 
will have the kindness to send him, as speedily as possible, a list of the 
Spanish officers, noncommissioned officers, and seamen who have been 
made prisoners, together with a statement of the vessels to which they 
respectively belonged, and also one of the localities where they are held 
or of the hospitals where they are being treated. 

Mr. Jules Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. 
W. R. Day the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

Embassy of the French Republic 

Washington, July 12, 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has the honor, by order of his Govern- 
ment, to inform the Secretary of State of the United States that the 
families of the Spanish officers and seamen who have been made pris- 
oners desire to send them some money. As the interested parties are 
unable to do this by means of postal money orders, owing to the sus- 
pension of the postal service between the United States and Spain, the 
Ambassador of France would be glad to know how, in the opinion of 
the Federal authorities, money may be sent to the officers and seamen 
in question. 

Mr. J. Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. W. R. 
Day the assurances of his highest consideration. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 301 

Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, July 13, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to acknowl- 
edge the receipt of the note of the Ambassador of France of the 12th 
instant, in which inquiry is made as to the means by which the families 
of Spanish officers and seamen who have been made prisoners of war 
may be enabled to send them money. The Secretary of State ventures 
to suggest that perhaps the best way of dealing with the matter would 
be to bave the money sent to Paris, and from Paris to the Ambassador 
of France in Washington, by whom it might be delivered to this 
Department and sent to its proper destination. 

Mr. Wm. R. Day avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. J. 
Cambon the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, July 13, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States, with reference to the 
request of the Ambassador of France of the 12th instant for infor- 
mation as to the Spanish officers who were taken prisoners by the 
United States fleet off Santiago de Cuba, and as to the Spanish dead 
and wounded in that engagement, has the honor to inclose herewith a 
copy which he has just received of a list of the Spanish prisoners 
brought north on board the U. S. S. St. Louis. This list of survivors 
contains all the information which the Navy Department is at the 
moment able to afford as to the officers and crews of the Spanish ships 
in question. The Department will take pleasure in communicating to 
the Ambassador of France any other information that may be obtained 
on the subject. 

Mr. W. K. Day avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. J. 
Cambon the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, July 13, 1898. 
The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to inclose 
herewith to the Ambassador of France a copy of a letter of the 9th 
instant, addressed by Admiral Cervera to Captain Goodrich, of the 
U. S. S. Saint Louis, as to the treatment of the Spanish prisoners on 
board of that ship. 

Mr. W. R. Day has the honor to renew to Mr. J. Cambon the assur- 
ances of his highest consideration. 



Capt. CAsrER F. Goodrich, 

U. S. M. S. St. Louis. 
My Dear Sir: I have the greatest pleasure in acknowledging by the present, in 
my own name and also in that of all captains and officers actually on board this 
eliip, that we consider ourselves under the greatest obligation to you for the many 



302 TREATY OF PEACE. 

kindness and excellent treatment which you and all the officers under your command 
have shown to us during this passage. I must also mention the careful aud most 
valuable medical assistance which has been given to our wounded and sick men; 
your kind feelings are gone as far in this respect as to order them to be put in one 
of the saloons of the ship, in order to provide more effectually to their comfort. 

I kuow nothing wi ich does not agree with what I have just written; the case of 
D. Enrique Capriles being wholly unknown to me, since neither you nor him have 
spoken me about. 

I thank you again lor the delicate and manifold acts of kindness through which 
you have endeavored to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfortuue. I assure 
you tbat I shall never forget them, and I am, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, Pascual Cerveka. 

At Sea, July 9, 1S9S. 



Mr. Gambon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, 
Washington, July 14, 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has tbe honor to inform the Secretary of 
State of tbe United States that he has been requested to furnish news 
of the Spanish second lieutenant ("l'enseigne de vaisseau") Arderius, 
aid-de-camp of Commodore Villamil, who was wounded during the 
naval combat of Santiago, and who is reported to be at present under 
treatment upon the hospital ship Solace. Tbe Ambassador of France 
would be pleased were tbe competent Federal authorities invited to 
supply to this officer tbe money of which he may stand in need. Tbese 
advances will be immediately reimbursed by tbe " Credit Lyonnais," 
which has given the necessary orders to this end to its agent at New 
York. 

Mr. Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. Day the 
assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Gambon. 

Department of State, 
No. 54.] Washington, July 19, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to your note of the 14th instant, requesting 
that any sum of money needed by the Spanish second lieutenant 
Arderius, aid de camp of Admiral Villamil, now under treatment on 
board the U. S. S. Solace, be advanced to him by tbe United States 
authorities, I have tbe honor to inform you that the Department has 
received a letter from the Acting Secretary of tbe Navy stating tbat 
instructions have been given to the commanding officer of the Solace 
to comply with your request. 
Accept, etc., 

William ft. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 55.] Department of State, July 20, 1898. 

Excellency: With reference to previous correspondence in relation 
te the case of Mr. Jiminez Zapatero, the Spanish subject who was cap- 
tured on the steamer Fanama while having in his possession the evi- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 303 

dences of his being in the military service of Spain, I have the honor 
to inform yon that I am advised by the Secretary of War that it lias 
been decided, after a full investigation, that the Spanish subject in 
question is properly held as a prisoner of war. 

He will receive during his detention the consideration and treatment 
due to an officer. 

Accept, etc., William E. Day. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 
No. 58.] Washington, July 23, 1898. 

Excellency : I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy, furnished 
by the Secretary of the Navy, of the muster roll of the Spanish prisoners 
of war brought from Cuba to the United States by the U. S. S. Harvard. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 59.] Department of State, July 23, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to inclose herewith, at the request 
of the Secretary of the Navy, an original report made by Eear- Admiral 
Cervera to the minister of marine at Madrid concerning the battle of 
July 3, off Santiago de Cuba. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, July 25, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: I am informed that the Spanish sailing 
vessel Amapala, on her way to Mexico from Havana, had, by reason of 
bad weather, to take shelter at Tampa, where she was held as a prize. 

The situation of the passengers landed at Tampa will attract the 
attention of the Federal Government, which will undoubtedly be of 
opinion that they must be transported to Mexico by some means similar 
to those previously adopted in the case of the crews and passengers of 
vessels captured by the Navy of the United States. 

However, in view of the vis major circumstances which led the 
Amapala to seek a shelter in the harbor of Tampa, I am fain to believe 
that the Federal Government will not consider that vessel as a prize 
taken in consequence of an act of war, but will allow her to proceed on 
her voyage, as other governments have generously decided under simi- 
lar circumstances. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



304 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Day to Mr. Gamboti. 

Department of State, 
No. 65.] Washington, July 27, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to your note of the 14th instant, requesting* 
that any sum of money needed by Lieutenant Arderius, aide-de-camp 
of Admiral Villamil, be advanced to him by the United States author- 
ities, the Credit Lyonnais having given the necessary instructions to 
its agent at New York to reimburse the Government, I have now the 
honor to inform you that the Secretary of the Navy, to whom I com- 
municated a copy of your note, has received its return from the naval 
hospital at Norfolk, Va., where Lieutenant Arderius is now having 
medical attention, with the following indorsement: 

Lieutenant Arderius thanks the Ambassador of France and begs to say that he 
does not require any money at present, as his funds are sufficient for all purposes. 

C. J. Cleborne, 

Medical Director, U. S. JV. 

Accept, etc., 

William R. Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Gambon. 

No. 66.] Department of State, July 28, 1898. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 25th instant, relative to the case of the Spanish sailing ves- 
sel Amapala, said to be held as a prize at Tampa, and to inform you in 
reply that the matter in question is receiving the attention of this 
Government. 

Accept, etc., Wm. R. Day. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bay. 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, July 28, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State : The consul of France at San Juan de 
Porto Rico telegraphs me that at the joint request of the consuls the 
captain general has recognized, in writing, the neutrality of a point 
selected outside of the city where the foreigners have taken refuge. 

Our consul adds that as soon the Federal vanguard shall make its 
appearance he intends to notify the general commanding the American 
army of this humane arrangement. 

I have the honor to bring this fact to your knowledge in order that 
you may be able to send General Miles such instructions as you may 
think proper. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Gambon. 

No. 68.] Department of State, July 30, 1898. 

Excellency: As I had the honor to inform you by my note of the 
28th instant, I communicated on that day to the Attorney-General a 
copy of yours of July 25, in relation to the Spanish sailing vessel 
Amapala, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 305 

I am now advised by the Acting Attorney-General that the United 
States attorney for the southern district of Florida has been instructed 
to forward to his Department the prize master's report, together with 
the facts and circumstances attending the capture and detention of the 
vessel, and to furnish his opinion as to the propriety of pursuing 1 he 
course indicated by you. 

Accept, etc., J. B. Moore. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 69.] Department of State, August 2, 1S98. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 28th ultimo by which you advise me that the consul of 
France at San Juan, Porto Eico, has telegraphed you that at the joint 
request of. the consuls, the Captain-General has recognized in writing 
the neutrality of a place outside the city where foreigners have taken 
refuge, and that as soon as the United States forces make their appear- 
ance a notification of this humane arrangement will be given to the 
general in command. This fact you state you bring to my knowledge 
in order that such instructions may be sent to General Miles as may be 
thought proper. 

I have accordingly communicated a copy of your note to the Secre- 
tary of War. 

Accept, etc., William E. Day. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 74.] Department of State, August 4, 1898. 

Excellency: With further reference to your note of the 25th ultimo, 
in relation to the Spanish brig Amapala, I have the honor to inform 
you that I am just in receipt of a letter from my colleague, the Attor- 
ney General, inclosing a copy of a report of the United States district 
attorney at Jacksonville, Fla., on the case in question. 

By the report of the district attoruey it appears that the statement 
made to your excellency by the parties in interest that the Amapala 
was compelled by bad weather to seek shelter at Tampa, is wholly 
incorrect. The evidence taken in preparatorio discloses the fact that 
the brig was captured off Havana while flying the colors of the Repub- 
lic of Honduras and attempting to run the blockade. The brig has 
accordingly been condemned and ordered to be sold. 

It appears that there is no desire on the part of the authorities of the 
United States to detain the passengers who were on board of the brig 
at the time of the capture. It is thought, however, that this Goveru- 
nie>it is not under any obligation to provide them with the means of 
transportation, especially as the devices resorted to by the brig for the 
purpose of escaping lawful capture must have been known to those od 
board. _, _ 

Accept, etc., William E. Day. 

tp 20 



306 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 81.] Department of State, August 6, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to your note of the 28th ultimo advising- me 
that at the request of the consuls the captain-general of Porto Rico had 
recognized, in writing, the neutrality of a point outside the city of San 
Juan for the refuge of foreigners, I have the honor to inform you that 
the Secretary of War has telegraphed General Miles so far as practica- 
ble to recognize this arrangement. 

Accept, etc., William R. Day. 



[On August 12, 1898, there was signed by the Secretary of State on 
behalf of the United States and by the Ambassador of France at Wash- 
ington on behalf of Spain a Protocol of Agreement preliminary to the 
final establishment of peace between the United States and Spain.] 



Memorandum left at the Department of State. 

Ambassade de France, August 15, 1898. 

May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished between 
Spain and Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines? 

Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish 
bottoms to Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines? 

Will Spanish tank steamer Cadagna, chartered by French merchants 
and now lying in Havre, be permitted to proceed to Philadelphia to 
take mineral oil for industrial purposes? 

The French Embassy has been unofficially requested by the Spanish 
Government to learn the names, rank, number of American commis- 
sioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico, for the peace negotia- 
tion at Paris, as it is the desire of the Spanish Government to appoint 
commissioners of same rank, etc. 

In which delay should a claimant appeal from a decision of United 
States prize court to the United States Supreme Court? 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, August 16, 1898. 

Dear Mr. Cambon: In response to one of the inquiries left at the 
Department yesterday in behalf of the embassy by Mr. Th ieb.au t, I 
have the pleasure to inform you, by direction of the President, that the 
American commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico 
are as follows : 

For Cuba: Major-General Wade, Admiral Sampson, Major-General 
Butler. 

For Porto Rico : Major-General Brooke, Admiral Schley, Brigadier- 
General Gordon. 

Believe me, etc., J. B. Moore, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 307 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. 

No. 96.] Department of State, August 16, 1898. 

Excellency: This Government is advised that the Eastern Tele- 
graph Company will at once proceed to restore cable communication 
between Hongkong and Manila if the United States and Spain will 
consent to that measure. 

This Government desires such communication to be reopened and, 
as we have restored Spain to full telegraphic communication with Cuba, 
it is not supposed that she will object to the reestablishment of cable 
communication between Hongkong and Manila. 

The Department will be greatly obliged to your excellency if you will 
be so good as to communicate with the Spanish Government on the 
subject. 

Accept, etc., J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, 
Washington, August 17, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : The Spanish Government, not wishing 
to make use any longer of the good offices which the Government of the 
Republic has rendered it in its diplomatic communications with the 
Federal Government, wishes to send to Washington one of its consuls 
in Canada, who would be authorized to attend to all the questions of 
detail, the settlement of which the cessation of hostilities will, of course, 
permit or necessitate. 

By order of my Government, I have the honor to notify you of this 
wish of the cabinet of Madrid, and I would be much obliged to you il 
you would inform me whether the Federal Government is disposed to 
permit such consul to be sent to Washington in the capacity of an 
unofficial agent. 

Accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 98.] Department of State, August 17, 1898. 

Excellency: In a memorandum left at the Department on the 15th 
instant, in behalf of your Embassy, I note the following inquiries: 

1. May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished 
between Spain and Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines? 

li. Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish 
bottoms to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines? 

3. Will the Spanish tank steamer Cadagna, chartered by French 
merchants and now lying in Havre, be permitted to proceed to Phila- 
delphia to take mineral oil for industrial purposes? 

It is understood that these inquiries are made with reference to the 
fact that, although a suspension of hostilities between the United 
States and Spain has been proclaimed, the state of war between the 



308 TREATY OF PEACE. 

two countries still continues, and that intercourse between them not 
having been formally restored must, so far as it is allowed, be the sub- 
ject of special understanding. 

With this observation, I proceed to answer your inquiries in the 
order in which they have been stated. 

1. This Government will interpose no obstacle to the reestablishment 
of the postal service by Spanish steamers between Spain on the one 
side and Cuba, Porto liico, and the Philippines on the other. 

2. The United States will not object to the importation of supplies 
in Spanish bottoms to Cuba and the Philippines, but it has been decided 
to reserve the importation of supplies from the United States to Porto 
liico to American vessels. 

3. The Spanish tank steamer Cadagna, chartered by French mer- 
chants and now lying at Havre, will be permitted to proceed to Phila- 
delphia and to take mineral oil for industrial purposes, provided such 
oil is not to be transported to Porto Eico. 

The concessions contained in these answers are made upon the under- 
standing that American vessels will not for the time being be excluded 
from Spanish ports, as well as upon the understanding that, if hostili- 
ties should at any time be renewed, American vessels that might hap- 
pen to be in Spanish ports would be allowed thirty days in which to 
load and depart with noncontraband cargo, and that any American 
vessel which, prior to the renewal of hostilities, should have sailed for 
any Spanish port or place would be permitted to enter such port or 
place and discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart 
without molestation, and, if met at sea by any Spanish ship, to continue 
her voyage to any port or place not blockaded. These rules were 
observed by the United States at the outbreak of the war and would 
again be observed by this Government in the event of a renewal of 
hostilities. 

Accept, etc. J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 99.] Department op State, August 19, 189S. 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
note of the 17th instant, in which you state that the Spanish Govern- 
ment, not wishing to make use any longer of the good offices which the 
Government of France has rendered it in its diplomatic communications 
with the United States, wishes to send to Washington one of its consuls 
from Canada, who would be authorized to attend to all the questions of 
detail, the settlement of which the cessation of hostilities will naturally 
permit or necessitate. You therefore inquire, by order of your Govern- 
ment, whether the Government of the United States is disposed to 
permit such a consul to be sent to Washington in the capacity of an 
unofficial agent. 

The general terms in which the Spanish Government has caused its 
suggestion to be conveyed leave the Department in some doubt as to 
the precise object with which it is made or as to the precise capacity in 
which the proposed unofficial agent is to act; but the statement that 
the Spanish Government does not wish any longer to make use of the 
good offices which your Government has rendered it in its diplomatic 
communications with the United States indicates that such agent, who, 



% TREATY OF PEACE. 309 

although a consul accredited to another Government, would have no 
official standing with reference to this Government, would be expected 
to discharge in some sense diplomatic functions. 

To such a measure there are, it is conceived, two objections. In the 
first place, although hostilities have been suspended, the state of war 
between the United States and Spain still continues. 

In the second place, the Department is not informed as to the ques- 
tions of detail to which the suggestion of the Spanish Government 
refers. Arrangements have already been made for the treatment of 
the particular matters with reference to which the suspension of hos- 
tilities was proclaimed. The immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Kico, 
and other Spanish islands in the West Indies is to be carried out by 
commissioners specially appointed for that purpose, and the question 
of peace is to be treated of by specially appointed commissioners who 
are to meet in Paris. 

Under these circumstances, it seems to this Government to be desir- 
able that diplomatic communications between the United States and 
Spain, in relation to any questions other than those above mentioned, 
should for the present continue to be conducted through the very accept- 
able channel through which they have heretofore been made since the 
beginning of the war. 

Accept, etc., J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Gamoon. 

[Personal.] Department of State, August 19, 1S08. 

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: Referring to your oral request, I have 
now the pleasure to transmit herewith, for the files of your embassy, a 
typewritten copy in English of the peace protocol signed August 12, 
181)8, of the President's order directing the Secretary of State to sign 
that instrument, and of the President's proclamation. 
I am, etc., 

J. B. Moore. 



Mr. Gambon to Mr. Bag. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, August 20, 1898. 
Mr. Secretary of State: In response to the wish which I had 
the honor to express to you verbally, you did me the favor, on the IDth 
of this month, to transmit to me, for the archives of my embassy, a 
copy of the protocol signed on the 12th of August, of the powers con- 
ferred upon the Secretary of State to sign this instrument, and of the 
proclamation suspending hostilities issued by the President of the 
United States on the same day. 

I have the honor to thank you for the transmission of these docu- 
ments, and I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you, Mr. Secre- 
tary of State, the assurances of my very high consideration. 

Jules Oambon. 



310 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Mr. Gambon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, August 20, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State: In a communication under date of the 
19th of this month you made known to me the objections which would 
be entertained by the Federal Government to the sending to Washing- 
ton of a Spanish consul under the conditions indicated in my note of 
the 17th of August. You add that the settlement of the principal ques- 
tions to which the suspension of hostilities gives rise having been 
intrusted to special commissions designated to meet, respectively, in 
Cuba, Porto Rico, and at Paris, it seems to you desirable that diplo- 
matic communications relative to other questions should continue for 
the present to be exchanged between the Cabinets of Washington and 
Madrid by the same intermediary through which they have passed 
since the commencement of the war. 

I have the honor to inform you that I have communicated this infor- 
mation to the Spanish Government, and 1 avail myself of this occasion 
to renew to you, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my very high 
consideration. 

Jules Cambon. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, August 20, 1808. 

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of your communication, under date of the 17th of this month, in 
which you inform me, in response to the inquiries contained in my note 
of the 15th, that- 
First. The Federal Government will oppose no obstacle to the 
reestablishment of the royal mail postal service between Spain, Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and the Philippines. 

Second. That it will permit Spanish merchants to transport, under 
the Spanish flag, provisions destined for Cuba and the Philippines, but 
that the importation into Porto Rico of provisions from the United 
States will be reserved to American vessels. 

Third. That the Spanish reservoir ship Gadagna, freighted by French 
merchants, may proceed to Philadelphia and there receive on board a 
cargo of distilled petroleum for industrial purposes, on the condition 
that this cargo is not taken to Porto Rico. 

You add that, the suspension of hostilities allowing a state of war to 
subsist between the two countries, the above concessions are granted 
with the following reservations: 

First. During the present period access to Spanish ports shall not be 
denied to American vessels. 

Second. Should hostilities be resumed, American vessels shall enjoy 
the immunities accorded to Spanish vessels by articles 4 and 5 of the 
President's proclamation of April 26 last. 

I have hastened to communicate the foregoing information to the 
Spanish Government. 

Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 311 

Mr. Camion to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, August 22, 1898. 

The telegram by which the French Ambassador communicated to the 
Spanish Government the objections stated by the Secretary of State of 
the United States, in his letter of August 19, with regard to the pro- 
posed dispatch to Washington of a Spanish consul, crossed a dispatch 
from the Madrid cabinet, proposing, for the execution of that unofficial 
mission, M. Torroja, ex-consul of Spain at Philadelphia, who speaks 
English very well, and who is said to have left a very good impression 
in the United States. 

The French ambassador would be thankful to the Secretary of State 
if he would inform him as speedily as possible whether there appears 
to be any prospect that this new proposition of the Madrid cabinet 
will be favorably entertained by the Federal Government. 

M. J. Cambon avails himself, etc. 



Mr. Camion to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, 
Washington, August 22, 1898. 

At the request of the Spanish Government, the French Ambassador 
has the honor to inform the Secretary of State of the United States 
that the royal commissioners who have been designated to arrange 
the details of the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles are: 

For Cuba: The General of Division Gonzales Parrado, Rear-Admiral 
Pastor y Landero, and Marquis de Montoro. 

For Porto Rico: General of Division Ortega y Diaz, Naval Captain 
of the First Class Vallarino y Carasco, and Auditor of Division (military 
judge) Sanchez del Aguila y Leon. 

Mr. J. Cambon takes advantage of this opportunity, etc. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Camion. 

Department of State, 
No. 102.] Washington, August 23, 1898. 

Excellency: Referring to your inquiry of the loth instant, I have 
the honor to inform you that by the statutes of the United States an 
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from all final decrees of any 
district court in prize cases where the matter in dispute, exclusive oi 
costs, exceeds the sum or value of $2,900; and that an appeal is allowed 
in such cases, without reference to the value of the matter in dispute, 
on a certificate of the district judge that the adjudication involves a 
question of general importance. The law requires that the Supreme 
Court shall receive, hear, and determine such appeals, and shall always 
be open for the entry thereof. Power is vested in the Supreme Court 
also, if, in its judgment, the purposes of justice require it, to allow any 
amendment either in form or substance of any appeal in prize causes. 



312 TREATY OF PEACE. 

It is provided that appeals in such causes shall be made within thirty 
days after the rendering of the decree appealed from, unless the court 
previously extends the time for cause shown in the particular case. 
The Supreme Court is empowered if, in its judgment, the purposes of 
justice require it, to allow an appeal in any prize case if it appears that 
any notice of appeal or of intention to appeal was tiled with the clerk 
of the district court within thirty days after the rendition of the final 
decree therein. 

This answer to your inquiry is based in substance upon sections 695, 
1006, and 1009 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. 
Accept, etc., 

William R. Day. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, August 24, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States has had the honor to 
receive the communication of the French ambassador of the 21M instant, 
in which it is stated that the Spanish Government, in pursuance of its 
previous proposal to send a consul to Washington to conduct in an 
unofficial capacity diplomatic correspondence with this Government, 
has designated for that function Mr. Torroja, ex-consul of Spain at 
Philadelphia, who speaks English, and who is said to have left a good 
impression in the United States. 

In view of the fact that the telegraphic dispatch of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment, conveying this designation, is understood to have crossed the 
telegram of the French embassy conveying our objections, as stated iu 
our note of the 19th instant, to the original proposal, it does not appear 
to be necessary for the Department now to do more than refer to that 
note as having answered by anticipation the present communication. 

Mr. William R. Day avails himself of this opportunity to renew to 
M. Cambon the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, August 24, 1898. 

The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to inform 
the Embassy of the Republic of France that it is expected that the 
commissioners appointed on the part of the United States for the pur- 
pose of arranging and executing the details of the evacuation of Cuba 
by Spain will soon depart for Havana in a public ship. It is deemed 
proper to give notice of this intention in order that the mines in the 
harbor of Havana may now be removed, if, indeed, this has not already 
been done. 

The Secretary of State will be greatly obliged if the Embassy will 
cause the substance of this cominunicatioixto be conveyed by telegraph 
to the Spanish Government, and advise him of that Government's 
reply, in order that preparations may immediately be made for the 
departure of the United States commissioners. 



TREATY OF PEACE. did 

Mr. Camion to Mr. Day. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, August 24, 1898. 

In order to comply with the wish expressed by the Secretary of State 
of the United States ill bis note of August 24, the Embassy of France 
this day informed the Spanish Government, by cable, that the United 
States commissioners charged with the arrangements to be made for 
the evacuation of Cuba were shortly to proceed to Havana, and asked 
that orders be issued for the removal of mines from that harbor, in the 
event of this not having already been done. 

The Embassy of Fiance will Lave the honor of communicating to the 
Department of State the reply of the Spanish Government as soon as 
it receives it. 



Mr. Dag to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

August 20, 1898. 

The Secretary or* State of the United States has the honor to inform 
the French Embassy that an inquiry has been made by a firm of ship 
brokers in the city of New York as to whether an American schooner 
would be received at Las Palmas, Canary Islands, if cleared for that 
port. In view of the position taken by this Government in reply to 
certain inquiries of the Government of Spain as to the reception of 
Spanish ships in the ports of this country, it is supposed that the 
schooner in question would be received at Las Palmas if cleared from 
the United States during the suspension of hostilities. The shippers, 
however, are unwilling to clear the schooner without a positive assur- 
ance to that effect, and as the Department has not as yet received from 
the Spanish Government a response to its note to the French embassy 
of the 17th instant, the Secretary of State ventures to express the hope 
that the French embassy will cause an inquiry to be made of the Span- 
ish Government as to whether the schooner in question will be received 
at Las Palmas if she should clear lor that port pending the suspension 
of hostilities. 



Mr. Dag to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, August 26, 1898. 

The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
the note of the'ambassador of France of the 22d instant, advising him 
of the composition of the commission designated on the part of Spain 
to arrange the details of the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles, and 
to say in reply that translations thereof have been communicated to 
the Secretaries of War and the Navy. 

Mr. William R. Day has the honor to renew to Mr. Jules Cambon the 
assurances ot his highest consideration. 



814 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Camion to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, Washington, August 29, 1898. 

Referring to a communication from tlie honorable Secretary of State 
of the United States, dated August 24, concerning the approaching 
departure of the American commissioners charged with settling the 
details of the evacuation of Cuba, the French embassy has the honor 
to state that the Spanish Government has given orders to the Havana 
authorities for the removal of any mines which may still be in that 
harbor. 

In this connection the Madrid cabinet has expressed a wish to know 
in what kind of vessel the American commission will take passage. It 
would prefer that it should not be a Federal war vessel, the presence of 
which, in Havana harbor might, by calling up the recollection of the 
Maine, give rise to demonstrations which it would not be easy to pre- 
vent, and which both parties would evidently be interested in avoiding. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, Washington, August 29, 1898. 

The French embassy has just received a telegram from Havana in 
which Captain General Blanco expresses the wish to know whether the 
Federal Government would see any objection to officers of the Spanish 
army returning singly to Spain by way of the United States. 

The French embassy would be much obliged to the Department of 
State if it would enable it to reply to this question by telegram. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

French Embassy, Washington, August 29, 1898. 

According to news received at Madrid from the Philippines, the 
insurrection is spreading more and more in the archipelago. By the 
help of five vessels at their disposal, the insurgents are said to be 
threatening various points where the Spanish forts are not able to 
oppose a successful resistance, and the peaceable population is thus 
exposed, without defense, to the barbarous treatment of the rebel bands. 

The Boyal Government, whose duty it is to provide for the protection 
of the life and property of the Spanish subjects in the Philippines, has 
expressed the wish that the Federal Government be informed of the 
fears which this situation causes it, and which might be advantageously 
remedied in the following manner: 

The Spanish troops whom the capitulation of the city of Manila baa 
reduced to inaction might be placed at once at the disposal of Spam, 
who would use (hem for the defense of the islands against the insur 
gents. 

The minister of state at Madrid thinks that if the United States 
Government sees any objections to this arrangement, it will, at least, 
have no reason to oppose the dispatch of troops directly from the 
peninsula to the Philippines. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 315 

Mr. Cambon to Mr. Bay. 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, August 29, 1898. 

The French Embassy has been requested to inform the Federal Gov- 
ernment that the families of the officers of the garrison of the archi- 
pelago of the Ladrones are in a state of entire destitution. 

The Spanish Government is confident that as soon as the attention 
of the Department of State has been called to this painful situation the 
United States will act in accordance with the feelings of humanity and 
the responsibility which it has assumed in sending those officers to 
Manila, and will take the necessary steps to have their families sent to 
Cavite. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

No. 103.] Department of State, 

Washington, August 30, 1898. 
Excellency: Referring to previous correspondence concerning Mr. 
Jimenez Zapatero, I have the honor to advise you that he has been 
released from confinement as a prisoner of war at Fortress Monroe, but 
that he still remains at the post because of lack of funds. 
Accept, etc., 

J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. 



Department of State, September 1, 1898. 
The Department of State, replying to the inquiry of the French em- 
bassy of the 29th ultimo, has the honor to say that this Government 
does not, under the present circumstances, object to officers of the Span- 
ish army returning singly to Spain by way of the United States. 



Mr. Thiebaut to Mr. Moore, 

[Personal.] 

French Embassy, Washington, September 3, 1898. 

Dear Mr. Moore: In reference with the informal note of this 
Embassy, dated August 29, and with our conversation of this morning, 
I have the honor to call your attention to the following statements: _ 

From advices received at Madrid, negotiations are said to be carried 
on by the Federal authorities for the purpose of chartering at Hong- 
kong ships for the transportation to Spain of the Spanish troops 
surrendered at Manila. 

These troops or part thereof are needed by Spain to protect the 
Philippine Islands in her possession against the insurgents. 

A ship with some 700 insurgents on board is said to have left Manila 
with a view of attacking some of the islands in Spain's possession. 



316 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Similar expeditions are said to be preparing in Luzon and starting 
therefrom with the same purpose; these vessels are Hying a flag which 
has not been recognized by the maritime powers, and are therefore 
liable of being denounced as pirates. 

These expeditions can hardly be carried on without the knowledge 
of the commander of the American forces in the bay of Manila; as 
Spain is scrupulously observing the dispositions of the protocol, it is 
believed by the Spanish Government that the Government of the 
United States will, on the other hand, cause the hostilities, from what- 
ever quarter, to be suspended in the Philippines pending the peace 
negotiations. 

Yours, most sincerely, TniEBAUT. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Thiebaut. 

[Personal.] 

Trench Embassy, Washington, September 5, 1898. 

Dear Mr. Thiebaut: Since the receipt of your informal note of 
the 29th ultimo and your personal letter of the 3d instant consideration 
has been given to the matters therein referred to, and pertinent advices 
have been received from our military and naval commanders in the 
Philippines. 

As the result of our investigations it appears that some of the reports 
which you have brought to our attention in behalf of the Government 
at Madrid have no solid foundation, while others relate to matters that 
occurred before the signing of the protocol of August 12. 

The rumor that the authorities of this Government are carrying on 
negotiations for the purpose of chartering at Hongkong ships for the 
transportation to Spain of the Spanish troops that surrender at Manila 
appears to be wholly groundless. No such negotiations have to our 
knowledge been undertaken. None have been authorized. 

In our conversation of the 3d instant you disclaimed any intention 
on the part of the Spanish Government to impute to the commanders 
of the American forces at Manila connivance with any recent hostile 
proceedings of the insurgents. I am now able to say that they have 
no knowledge of the incidents referred to as having lately taken place 
at Manila. 

As to the rumor that a ship with 700 insurgents on board has lately 
left Manila with a view to attack some of the islands in the Philippines, 
we are advised that no insurgent vessel having troops on board has 
recently left either Manila or Manila Bay. It is stated, however, that 
about August 10, before the protocol was signed, two vessels with from 
one to two hundred troops left Manila Bay, destination unknown. 

The report that similar expeditions are preparing in Luzon with a 
hostile purpose against other islands appears also to be inexact. Our 
advices are to the effect that the insurgents have three or four small 
vessels, only two of which have guus, and that the largest of these 
vessels will not carry more than 250 men. 

In your informal note of the 29th ultimo it is stated that the Spanish 
Government suggests that, for the purpose of checking insurgent hos- 
tilities, the Spanish troops now held as prisoners of war by the Ameri- 
can forces may be placed at the disposal of Spain, to be used against 
the insurgents; or, if this be objected to, that the Spanish Government 



TREATY OF PEACE. 317 

may be allowed fco send troops from the peninsula to the Philippines. 
It can scarcely be expected that this Government would even consider 
the question of adopting the first alternative, in view of the fact that 
for sometime before the surrender of Manila the Spanish forces in that 
city were besieged by the insurgents by land while the port was block- 
aded by the forces of the United States by sea. As to the second 
alternative, it wdl be a matter for regret if it should be adopted on the 
strength of rumors, some of which have been shown to be groundless, 
while others yet are unconfirmed. The Government of the United States 
will, through its military and naval commanders in the Philippines, 
exert its influence for the purpose of restraining insurgent hostilities 
pending the suspension of hostilities between the United States and 
Spain. 

It would be unfortunate if any act should be done by either Govern- 
ment which might, in certain aspects, be inconsistent with the suspen- 
sion of hostilities between the two nations, and which might necessi- 
tate the adoption of corresponding measures of precaution by the other 
Government. 

Very sincerely, yours, J. B. Moore. 



Mr. Cambon to Mr. Moore 



[Translation. 



Embassy of the French Republic, 

Washington, September 6", 1898. 

The Ambassador of France has the honor to inform the Secretary of 
State of the United States that the Spanish Government has accepted, 
by way of reciprocity, the proposition for a modus vivendi, as regards 
navigation, which formed the subject of the communication of the 
Department of State of the 17th ultimo. 

In consequence of this acceptance, and in order to reply to the 
inquiry made by the Department of State in its note of August 20, the 
Royal Government has given to the competent authorities in the Canary 
Islands the necessary orders to the end that the American schooner 
which the ship brokers in New York propose to send to Las Palmas 
may be at perfect liberty to enter that port. 

Mr. Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Hon. 
J. B. Moore the assurances of his highest consideration. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. 

Department of State, 

Washington, September 6, 1898. 

By a note of the 29th ultimo, the French embassy communicated 
to the Department of State a report received from the Spanish Govern- 
ment to the effect that the families of the officers of the garrison of the 
archipelago of the Ladrones were in a state of destitution; and the 
embassy was so good as to say that the Spanish Government was con- 
fident that as soon as the attention of the Department was called to 
the painful situation, the United States would act in accordance with 



318 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the feelings of humanity and the responsibility it had assumed in send- 
ing those officers to Manila, and would take the necessary steps to have 
their families sent to Cavite. 

Immediately upon the receipt of the note of the embassy, the Depart- 
ment, desirous of heeding every dictate of humanity, caused inquiries 
to be made as to the situation of the families in question. A reply to 
those inquiries has just been received, in the form of a telegram from 
Admiral Dewey, dated at Manila on the 5th instant. Admiral Dewey 
states that the families of the Spanish officers are still at Guam, and 
that, according to the testimony of all the United States naval officers 
who have visited the island, the reports of their destitution are wholly 
groundless. 

The Spanish governor informed Captain Glass that all the families 
were provided for before leaving. When the Monterey and Monadnoek 
were there they found no signs of destitution and heard no complaints. 
Spanish officers now held as prisoners at Manila received letters from 
Guam by both vessels, and in these letters no mention was made of 
any destitution. It further appears that Spanish officers at Guam are 
still collecting taxes, and are able to relieve any want. 

Mr. J. B. Moore takes this occasion to renew to his excellency, Mr. 
Jules Cambju, the assurances of his highest consideration. 



CONSULAR REPORTS ON PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS. 



AFFAIRS IN THE PHILIPPINES. 

Mr. Williams to Mr. Gridler. 

No. 8.] Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, February 21, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that during the year 1897 the 
record of arrivals and departures of vessels of all flags from Manila, 
Iloilo, and Cebu, the open ports of the Philippine Islands, is as follows: 





Arrivals. 


Total. 


Departures. 




Flag. 


Steam- 
ships. 


Ships. 


Barks. 


Steam- 
ships. 


Ships. 


Barks. 


Total. 




1 

150 
28 
47 
10 
19 


15 

20 
1 


8 

22 

2 


24 

192 

31 

47 

10 

21 

2 

3 

1 

1 


1 
149 

28 
47 
10 
18 
2 


13 
23 


8 

18 

1 


22 




190 




29 






47 












10 


d apan . . 


1 


1 




1 


19 






2 






3 
1 




1 
1 


1 












1 


France 


1 




1 




1 


















332 






322 




1" 




1 







Certain defects as to tonnage, etc., exist in the records supplied me. 
These 1 hope to have remedied for the current year, so that my 1898 
report may be nearer complete. 

I have the honor, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United States Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Gridler. 

E"o. 9.] Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, February 22, 1898. 

Sir: Without specific instructions it seems my duty at this critical 
period to inform the Washington Government somewhat as to political 
conditions here. But as I have been here less than a month vigilance 
has not overcome all difficulties, and the rigid censorship of the press 
in general and the suppression of such publications as uttered the truth 
have made news gathering onerous. 

I have before me a lengthy dispatch giving dates of many warlike 
and political matters, with rumors, observations, and conclusions, but 
deem it wise to write more briefly to-day, to bide events and wait 
specific instructions from you. 

Peace was proclaimed, and since my coming festivities therefor were 
held; but there is no peace, and has been none for about two years. 
Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles 
are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, 

319 



320 TREATY OF PEACE. 

and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without 
trial, and Manila is under martial law. 

The Crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within 
10 miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 11), a battle was there 
fought and 5 dead left on the held. Much of such information is found 
in my longer dispatch, referred to, and which is at your command. 

The Governor-General, who is amiable and popular, having resigned, 
wishes credit for pacification, and certain rebel leaders were given a 
cash bribe of $l,<>f>0,000 to consent to public deportation to China. This 
bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants and fanned the tires 
of discontent. 

Insurgents demand fewer exactions from church and state, a half 
of public offices, and fewer church holidays, which seriously retard 
business. 

A republic is organized here, as in Cuba. Insurgents are being 
armed and drilled; are rapidly increasing in numbers and efficiency, 
and all agree that a general uprising will come as soou as the governor- 
general embarks for Spain, which is fixed for March. 

While some combatant regiments have recently been returned to 
Spain, it was for appearance only, and all authorities now agree that 
unless the Crown largely reinforces its army here it will lose possession. 

Command me for any desired information. 
Your obedient servant, 

Oscar F. Williams, Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Gridler. 

No. 2, special.] Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, March 19, 1898. 

Sir: Matters are in a serious state here. I have daily communica- 
tion by cable and letter with Commodore Dewey, but we pass letters 
by British and other shipmasters and by private parties, because cables 
and letters are tampered with. 

Insurrection is rampant; many hilled, wounded, and made prisoners 
on both sides. A battle ship, the Bon Juan de Austria, sent this week 
to the northern part of Luzon to cooperate with a land force of 2,000 
dispatched to succor local forces, overwhelmed by rebels. 

Last night special squads of mounted police were scattered at danger 
points to save Manila. 

I caution Americans against bearing arms in violation of local law, 
although threats have been made by Spaniards that all Americans 
would soon have their throats cut. Certain ones are so frightened as 
to frequently come to my consulate and hotel, and spies watch all my 
movements. 

Yesterday I examined stock of an American who had been threat- 
ened and abstracted his ledger. To-day his inventory and accounts 
were placed in my safe. To-day two others came to me to send their 
effects to some American ship lying in the bay, and I have so planned. 

I have no instructions from you as to these delicate complications, 
but so far have gotten on well. I fly our flag all the time, give double 
hours to the consulate, and have notified Americans that they can find 
me all the time at the consulate, or at my hotel, or on the path between. 
We have many holidays, but I keep open consulate every day, including 
Sundays, so Americans may find me. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 321 

Eebellion never more threatening to Spain. Rebels getting arms, 
money, and friends, and they outnumber the Spaniards, resident and 
soldiery, probably a hundred to one. 

Report says that Holy Week the insurgents plan to burn and cap- 
ture Manila. But, if so, you will learn it by wire before you receive 
this dispatch. 

My March quarterly reports may be delayed or captured. If no 
trouble thwarts my work, all reports from here will be sent by first 
mail after March 31, but my consular agents at Cebu and Iloilo are 
both absent, and hence I may not receive their reports for transmission 
as early as I send my own. 

All news comes direct from Washington. I bear nothing as to rela- 
tions between United States and Spain, and, depending upon unofficial 
reports, I must act as if peace reigned. I can only assure you of vig- 
ilance and loyalty, await your instructions, and remain, 
Your most obedient servant, 

Oscar F. Williams, Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Gridler. 

Special.] Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, March 27, 1898. 

Sir: Because of having given daily information to Commodore 
Dewey as to disturbances here I have assumed that he informed the 
Washington Government, and I have written little on war matters. 

Cuban conditions exist here possibly in aggravated form. Spanish 
soldiers are killed and wounded daily, despite claimed pacification, and 
the hospitals are kept full. 

The majority of casualties are reported from the ranks of the native 
insurgents, and the cruelties and horrors of war are daily repeated. 

Cavite is the naval port of Luzon, situated about S miles across the 
bay from Manila, and about twenty miles distant by way of bay shore 
and public highway, and last Thursday, March 24, a Crown regiment of 
natives, the Seventy-fourth, stationed there was ordered to advance 
against native insurgents near by. The regiment refused to obey 
orders, and 8 corporals were called out and shot to death in presence 
of the regiment, which was again ordered to advance and threat made 
that a refusal would be death to all. All did refuse and were sent to 
barracks to await sentence. On the morning of the following Friday, 
March 25, the entire regiment, with arms and equipment, marched out 
of the barracks and deserted in a body to the insurgents, saying they 
were willing to tight the foreign enemies of Spain, but would not fight 
their friends. 

Since beginning this dispatch I learn of the desertion to the insur- 
gents of another entire regiment. These are said to be the severest 
set-backs received by Spain during the two years' insurrection here. 

On Friday morning, March 25, a church holiday, a meeting of 
natives was being held near my consulate in Manila, the natives being 
unarmed. The building was surrounded by police and military, the 
meeting broken up, twelve natives wantonly shot to death, several 
wounded, and sixty-two taken prisoners. Saturday morning, March 26, 
the sixty-two prisoners were marched in a body to the cemetery and 
shot to death, although it was shown that several were chance passers-by 
or employees in ships adjoining, not being in attendance at the meeting. 
T p 21 



322 TREATY OP PEACE. 

It was cold comfort to the widows and orphans of innocent men to 
have Spanish officers present them the mangled corpses of husbands 
and fathers. 

Such horrors, but usually on a smaller scale, but at times attended 
by greater disregard for modern rules of war, occur almost daily, and 
the piteous cry goes up, "Will it ever stop?" 

The Crown forces are now building a cordon of small forts on city's 
outskirts for defense against provincial natives, who are expected to 
soon attack Manila. In fact, two detectives and one messenger have 
come to me this evening with information that attack was to be made 
to-night, and everybody is anxious, as 8,000 native insurgent soldiers 
are encamped only live miles away. 

The insurgents seem to lack arms and organization, but, so far as I 
can learn, outnumber the Spanish forces and inhabitants twenty to one. 
Arms are being obtained and organization slowly effected, and all 
classes fear the near future. It is said that the only reason why 
Manila has not been taken and burned is because a vast majority ot 
its population is in perfect accord with the insurgents. 

Because of anxiety among Americans and my wish to keep in reach 
of all demands, I keep the consulate open double hours and on all holi- 
days and Sundays, with biggest flag flying, so any needing a refuge 
may find it. 

Barbarities are reported as daily practiced, such as placing prisoners 
and suspects in black-hole dungeons in the walls of old Manila, so 
placed that with rise of tide prisoners are drowned; several hundred 
reported to have so perished. 

Cruelties too horrid for an official report are detailed to me every 
day, and it seems that the cry of outraged humanity would soon com- 
pel Spain to abolish Middle Age methods of warfare. 

Christian nations are such only in name when such atrocities as 
daily blacken the calendar are known to be perpetrated here and no 
effort made to protect the weak. 

There is to-day no Christian nation — policy and mock diplomacy 
govern all; the vilest cruelties of war are added to the mangling of old 
men, women, and children to make full the measure of iniquity. 

The American Indians would not permit one of their tribes to prac- 
tice such barbarities. Why should so-called Christian nations decline 
to call a halt upon Spanish outrages'? 

All information as to defenses of Manila has been sent to Commodore 
George Dewey at Hongkong. 

For fear of confiscation this dispatch and other mail go by messen- 
ger to Hongkong, to be there mailed. 

Cable is cut in three places. I keep copies of dispatches, etc., but 
at present, for reasons, they are not copied on the register at consulate. 
I remain, etc., 

Oscar F. Willtams, 
United States Consul, Manila, 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay. 

United States Consulate, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, March 31, 1898. 
Honored Sir: My returns and accounts for March quarter to both 
your Department and the Treasury haviug been perfected and mailed, 
I turn with reluctance, but ironi a sense ot duty, to somewhat miorm 



TREATY OF PEACE. 323 

you, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of the insurrection whic.i for about 
two years Las devastated these marvelously fair islands, "covered 
them with blood, often of the innocent, aud has bereft thousands of 
homes of the husbands and sons who were the sole breadwinners." 

Last week Thursday, March 24, at Cavite, near here, the Seventy- 
fourth Spanish Regiment, recruited among the natives of the southern 
islands of this group, refused to obey orders aud attack the native 
insurrectionists. Eight corporals were called out and shot to death in 
presence of the regiment. Again orders to advance were given and 
disobeyed, when death to all was threatened. The regiment expressed 
a willingness to right the foreign enemies of Spain, but said they would 
all be shot rather than fight their friends. All were sent to barracks 
to be punished later, but the next morning all took arms and deserted 
to the insurgents. 

On Friday, March 25, a church and legal holiday, unarmed natives 
were holding a meeting near my consulate. The building was sur- 
rounded by police and the suspicious military, the meeting broken up, 
twelve natives shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two prisoners 
taken, certain of whom were mere passers by, not having attended the 
meeting. The next morning these sixty-two prisoners, without form of 
trial, were marched in a body to the cemetery and all shot to death. 

Hardly a day passes without such scenes of middle-age treachery 
and barbarity. A recent uprising at Cape Bolinao, on the northwest 
coast of this island (Luzon), about 300 miles from Manila, was crushed 
by united action of two regiments of infantry aided by the battle ship 
Don Juan de Austria. A British shipmaster there at the time reports 
about forty killed and forty wounded. After surrender, the Spaniards 
put dead and wounded together in a house and by burning it cremated all. 

In the old walls of "Walled Manila," built about 300 years ago, are 
said to be several "black hole " dungeon prisons, in which incarceration 
is almost sure death. Two of these, both of which I have seen, with 
apertures at summit of wall, have floors below low tide, so two or three feet 
of slime, mud, and water floor the dungeons. In these hundreds of so- 
called insurgents have lately been placed, aud all drowned by the rising 
tide. No judge, no jury — simply hate, suspicion, treachery. Of this 
several reports have been made to me, one that above two hundred 
victims were counted in one of these prisons. No reliance can be 
placed upon the public press. Censorship is rigid, and the oldest daily 
there, El Diario de Manila, and another, have been suspended by 
public order because truth was told. 

Months ago pacification was claimed by the Governor-General. It 
was false. A truce had been bought with $1,650,000, during which the 
Governor-General hoped to embark for Spain, but all was a hollow farce. 

The Madrid Government seems now to understand all, and the 
Governor-General has been ordered to remain, and his appointed suc- 
cessor sent to one of the provinces. 

Now 5,000 armed rebels, which for days have been encamped near 
Manila and have been reen forced from the mountains, plan to attack 
the city to-night. All is excitement and life uncertain. 

News came this afternoon of the wounding of a governor of one of 
the southern provinces and the defeat of the Crown forces under his 
command. 

The only church permitted here is the Roman Catholic, and its inter- <p 
ference with the Government, its intolerance, immorality, and despotism 
are perhaps the greatest bar to progress in these islands. 



324 TREATY OF PEACE. 

From consensus of opinion received from men of several nationalties, 
from oldest foreign residents, from natives, Chinese, and a few Spaniards, 
I believe that of the Philippine people, estimated at fifteen millions, 
not five per cent are loyal to Spain. 

But officials and priests, the leeches of the people, are in authority, 
have money, influence, and cunning, so that the natives and half-breeds 
(Chinese and European) are more or less controlled. 

During the period when war between the United States and Spain was 
expected, which seems happily now to be disappearing, I daily heard 
the assurance that the natives, half-breeds, Chinese merchants, and 
such Spaniards as were in business were all ready to welcome our fleet, 
fight with it to hoist over these islands the United States flag, and 
swear allegiance to it; and once done, all interests here would thrive, 
be settled and happy. 

I have daily felt it a duty to inform you, but for nearly the entire 
period of my incumbency every odd hour of day and many of evenings 
have beeu given to inspection of forts, arsenals, and battle ships in 
order to fully inform Commodore Dewey at Hongkong. 

And because his means of communication with Washington were 
better than my own, I have trusted all to him. Another fact, I have 
not had money to cable Commodore Dewey as asked, but needed to 
borrow for it. 

Fortunately I have been well every hour, so that by double hours at 
the consulate, and by keeping it open, with flag flying on holidays and 
Sundays, the Americans have felt sure of a refuge if trouble came, and 
threats were freely made that all Americans would have their throats 
cut. I have not dared to fully trust the post-office or telegraph com- 
pany, as letters and cables have been freely tampered with, and hence 
have, until to-day, sent much mail by private messengers to Hongkong, 
and have received mail the same way. 

To day's mail being returns and accounts, etc., and having no chance 
to send to Hongkong, all was mailed here. This will be sent by mes- 
senger to China. 

Now bubonic plague exists at Hongkong, and quarantine here delays 
ships, and Governor-General has ordered that ships take no passengers 
from these islands. 

By discoveries here and by a plan devised, I have saved the United 
States Treasury in two months nearly double the amount of my salary, 
and each year hereafter it will be saved $200 from one item alone. 

My hotel room has been searched, and, I believe, my consulate also, 
and friends have daily called to advise me to seek safety in hiding or 
in flight; but I have not shared their fears sufficiently to leave a post 
at which you had expectations that I would remain and perform every 
loyal duty to your Department and to our Government. 

All officials have treated me well except one underling, whose head 
I threatened to smash, and with a return of cordiality between nations 
I shall make all official calls anew, as I have but just received my exe- 
quatur from Madrid. 

My work for the commodore now lighter, I shall prepare reports on 
Philippine tariff, import wants, products, and institutions for the de- 
partments at Washington. 

I do not copy this on the records of the consulate, because it may 
be there read any night by spies, and if so, my usefulness as well as 
my personal comfort would be impaired. I dare not even intrust my 
cipher cables and code to the old office safe, but carry all in my pockets. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 325 

I regret to burden you with a report so unfavorable, and hope ere 
long to be able to write of better conditions; but being your antipodes, 
the news is old before it passes between us. 

For economy's sake I have not used the cable to United States, but 
have, as said, intrusted Commodore Dewey to inform you. 

Believing that before you receive this you will have succeeded the 
venerable Mr. Sherman as premier, I beg you to accept congratula- 
tions, a moiety of which go to our country and its good President and 
a moiety to you, with the hope that your career as a national servant, 
may be as long, as honored, and as beneficial as has been that of you/ 1 
illustrious predecessor. 

I am, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United States Consul, Manila, Philippine I»londa, 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Dap. 

Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, 

Consulate of the United States, 
Bay of Manila, Philippine Islands, May 4, 1898* 

Sir: I have the honor to briefly report to you concerning the battle 
of Manila Bay, fought on May 1, 1898. 

Heeding your mandate, and by repeated request of Cotnmodoie 
George Dewey, of the United States Asiatic Squadron, I left Manila 
on Saturday, April 23, and on Wednesday, April 27, at about 1 o'clock 
p. m., boarded the flagship Ohjmpia in Mirs Bay, near Hongkong 
After meeting the commodore and his captains and commanders in 
council, the commodore at once ordered his fleet to start at 2 p. m. for 
Manila Bay. 

On Saturday, April 30, Subig Bay was recounoitered because of 
reported hiding of Spanish fleet in its inner harbor, but no fleet being 
there found, the commodore proceeded at once to the south channel 
entrance to Manila Bay, and while by many reports mines, torpedoes, 
and land defenses obstructed entrance, yet the flagship led the van, 
and between 10 p. in., April 30, and 2 a. m., May 1, our fleet of six war 
ships, one dispatch boat, and two coal-laden transports passed all 
channel dangers unharmed, despite shots from forts, and at 2 a. m. were 
all safe on the broad expanse of Manila Bay. 

After my departure, April 23, and by drawing fire to save Manila if 
possible, all Spanish war ships went to their strongly fortified naval 
station at Cavite, where the inner harbor gave refuge and where poten- 
tial support could be had from several forts and well-equipped batteries 
which extended several miles right and left from Port Cavite. 

At about 5.30 a. m., Sunday, May 1, the Spanish guns opened fire at 
both the Manila breakwater battery and at Cavite from fleet and forts. 

With magnificent coolness and order, but with greatest promptness, 
our fleet, in battle array, headed by the flagship, answered the Spanish 
attack, and for about two and a half hours a most terrific fire ensued. 

The method of our operations could not have shown greater system, 
our guns greater effectiveness, or our officers and crews greater bravery. 
And while Spanish resistance was stubborn and the bravery of Spanish 
forces such as to challenge admiration, yet they were outclassed, weighed 
in the balance of war against the methods, training, aim, and bravery 
shown on our decks, and after less than three hours' perilous and intense 



326 TREATY OF PEACE. 

combat one of Spain's war ships was sinking, two others burning, and 
all others with land defenses had severely suffered when onr squadron, 
with no harm done its ships, retired for breakfast. At about 10 o'clock 
a. m. Commodore Dewey renewed the battle and with effects most fatal 
with each evolution. 

No better evidence of Spanish bravery need be sought than that, after 
the castigation of onr first engagement, her ships and forts should again 
answer our tire. But Spanish efforts were futile. Ship after ship and 
battery after battery went to destruction before the onslaught of Ameri 
can energy and training, and an hour and a half of onr second engage- 
ment wrought the annihilation of the Spanish fleet and forts with several 
hundred Spaniards killed and wounded and millions in value of their 
Government property destroyed. While amazing, almost unbelievable 
as it seems, not a ship or gun of our fleet had been disabled, and, except 
on the Baltimore, not a man had been hurt. 

One of the crew of the Baltimore had had a leg fractured by slipping 
and another hurt in the ankle in a similar manner, while four received 
slight flesh wounds from splinters thrown by a 6-inch projectile which 
pierced the starboard side of the cruiser. 

But iu the battle of Manila Bay the United States squadron of six 
war ships totally destroyed the Spanish fleet of eight war ships, many 
forts and batteries, and accomplished this work without the loss of a 
man. 

History has only contrasts. There is no couplet to form a compari- 
son. The only finish fight between the modern war ships of civilized 
nations has proven the prowess of American naval men and methods, 
and the glory is a legacy for the whole people. Our crews were all 
hoarse from cheering, and while we suffer for cough drops and throat 
doctors we have no use for liniment or surgeons. 

To every ship, officer, and crew all praise be given. As Victoria was 
answered years ago, "Your Majesty, there is no second," so may I report 
to your Department as to our war ships conquering the Spanish fleet 
in the battle of Manila Bay: There is no first; there is no second. The 
cool bravery and efficiency of the commodore was echoed by every 
captain and commander and down through the lines by every officer 
and man, and naval history of the dawning century will be rich if it 
furnishes to the world so glorious a display ot intelligent command and 
successful service as must be placed to the credit of the United States 
Asiatic Squadron under date of May 1, 1898. 

It was my lot to stand on the bridge of the Baltimore by the side of 
Captain Deyer during the first engagement, and to be called to the 
flagship Olympia by the commodore, at whose side, on the bridge, I 
stood during the secoud engagement. And when the clouds roll by, 
and I have again a settled habitation, it will be my honor and pleasure 
to transmit a report showing service somewhat in detail, and for which 
commanders promise data. 

Meanwhile our commodore will officially inform you of events which 
will rival in American history the exploits of Paul Jones. 
1 have, etc., 

Oscar F. Williams, 
United States Consul. Manila, Philippine Islands. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 327 

Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay. 

Special.] Cruiser Baltimore, 

Consulate of the United States, 

Manila Bay, Opposite Cavite, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, May 12, 1898. 

Sir : To aid you, if possible, permit me to give assurance of the friend- 
liness of the Philippine natives to our country and to me as its 
representative. 

Daring the period of my residence in Manila, every week was a his- 
tory of barbarities by Spaniards, and of efforts, often futile, of the 
natives to obtain rights and protect their homes. 

Scores of times I have heard hopes expressed that either United 
States or Great Britain would acquire these islands. In all this foreign 
residents, other than Spanish, concurred; and all such classes are 
most friendly to me. 

In the struggle between Spain and the insurgents, the deaths have 
been many and greater among the natives. First, because the Spaniards 
have been much better armed. Second, because the Spaniards killed 
many noncombatants, old men, women, and children, while the natives 
refrained from such barbarities. 

From consensus of opinions of many reliable people, I estimate 
Spanish forces here about as follows: 

First. Naval force, in ships annihilated in the notable battle of 
Manila Bay, in which ten Spanish war ships were burned and sunk — 
two auxiliary gunboats, ditto — and about thirty steamers, schooners, 
tugs, etc., captured. 

Second. About 4,000 Spanish infantry, nearly a half of whom are in 
hospitals. 

Third. About 6,000 native troops under Spanish officers, but if such 
officers were deported their soldiers would eagerly follow our flag. 

An insurgent leader, Major Gonzales, reported to me last week on 
the Olympia, that they had 37,000 troops under arms, good and bad, 
surrounding Manila, endeavoring to cooperate with us. In the main 
they are very poorly armed, but have about 6,600 ritles taken from the 
Spaniards. They have captured the entire railroad line and the Kiver 
Pasig, thus cutting off supply lines, while we by cutting off supply by 
bay and sea can soon starve Manila into surrender. 

These natives are eager to be organized and led by United States 
officers, and the members of their cabinet visited me and gave assur- 
ance that all would swear allegiance to and cheerfully follow our flag. 
They are brave, submissive, and cheaply provided for. 

To show their friendliness for me as our nation's only representative 
,j in this part of the world, I last week went on shore at Cavite with 
J British consul, in his launch, to show the destruction wrought by our 
I fleet. As soon as natives found me out, they crowded around me, hats 
off, shouting "Viva los Americanos," thronged about me by hundreds 
to shake either hand, even several at a time, men, women, and children 
striving to get even a finger to shake. So 1 moved half a mile, shak- 
ing continuously with both hands. The British consul, a smiling 
spectator, said he never before saw such an evidence of friendship. 
Two thousand escorted me to the launch amid hurrahs of good feeling 
for our nation, hence I must conclude: 

First. Our squadron can force surrender in a day. Spaniards are all 
cooped up in Manila. 



328 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Second. Spanish officers of native regiments away, these (5,000, 
together with selections from the 37,000 insurgents, can give us ample 
land force, and can be well armed with rifles of Spanish soldiers and 
from barracks and arsenals. 

Third. Few United States troops will be needed for conquest and 
fewer still for occupancy. Expulsion of Spaniards, naval, civil, mili- 
tary, and clerics, will remove all discord and danger, and civil govern- 
ment, crude in the beginning but better than the present, will be easy 
and be well received, while native priests, of which there are many, 
can fully and with perfect acceptability meet all religious requirements 
so far as present established religion is concerned. 

All natives, all foreigners other than Spanish, and certain Spaniards 
in mercantile and retired life will aid us to every extent. The people 
crave a change of flag. Hence ! believe ample assurances are at hand 
that civil government by us will be easy of organization and gratefully 
received by the people. 

My communications to your Department are, these war days, supra 
consular, but on other lines I endeavor to serve our fleet and thus serve 
our nation. 

All rejoice over the merited promotion of our commodore to the rank 
of rear-admiral, but every man of the fleet proved a hero, and it seems 
as if the shield of Providence warded off the enemy's shot, leaving our 
men unharmed, our ships and guns intact, and gave us the most impor- 
tant and unique victory of history. 

The student of the next century will read with pride that the right 
arm of Spain was broken at the battle of "Manila -Bay," and from this 
must come the acquisition of these islands, many times more extensive, 
more populous, and more valuable than Cuba, or else their capture will 
force Spain to conditions of peace on basis of honor, so much sought 
by our nation. 

I have, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United States Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, 

Consulate of the Unitkd States, 

Manila Bay, off Cavite, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, May 24, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report successful efforts on the part of the 
insurgents of these islands in preparation for more successful war 
against Spain. 

Officers have visited me during the darkness of night to inform the 
fleet and me of their operations, and to report increase of strength. 

At a conference with General Aguinaldo, the head of the movement, 
I was told that they had now above 4,500 Mauser rifles taken from the 
Spaniards, and had also abundant ammunition. Until the present they 
have been fatally crippled in these respects. 

Last week Major Gonzales captured two buffalo cart loads of rifle 
ammunition from the Spaniards. To day I executed a power of attor- 
ney whereby General Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys in fact 
$400,000, now in bank in Hongkong, so that money therefrom can pay 
for 3,000 stand of arms bought there and expected here to-morrow. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 329 

The same sources informed me that about 37,000 insurgents stand 
ready to aid United States ibices, and General Aguinaldo'a headquar- 
ters were this a. m. at 7 o'clock surrounded by 500 to 1,000 men eager 
to enlist. I was there at that hour and saw the men. 

My relations with all are cordial, and I manage to keep them so pro 
bono publico. 

When General Merritt arrives he will find large auxiliary land forces 
adapted to his service and used to this climate. 
I am, sir, 

Oscar F. Williams, 

United Mates Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, 

Consulate of the United States, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, June 16, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that since our squadron destroyed 
the Spanish fleet on May 1, the insurgent forces have been most active 
and almost uniformly successful in their many encounters with the 
crown forces of Spain. General Emilio Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief, 
who was deported late in 1897, returned recently to Cavite and resumed 
direction of insurgent forces. lie is not permitted by his people to 
personally lead in battle, but from headquarters governs all military 
movements, lie told me to day that, since his return, his forces had 
captured nearly 5,000 prisoners, nearly 4,000 of whom were Spaniards, 
and all of whom had riiles when taken. General Aguinaldo has now 
about 10,500 rifles and 8 field pieces, with 8,000 more rifles, 2 Maxim 
guns and a dynamite gun bought in Ghina and now in transit. The 
insurgents have defeated the Spaniards at all points except at fort 
near Matate, and hold not only North Luzon to the suburbs of Manila, 
but Batanyes Province also and the bay coast entire, save the city of 
Manila. 

While the Spaniards cruelly and barbarously slaughter Filipinos rt 
taken in arms, and often noncombatants, women, and children, the 
insurgent victors, following American example, spare life, protect the 
helpless, and nurse, feed, and care for Spaniards taken prisoners and 
for Spanish wounded as kindly as they care for the wounded fallen from 
their own ranks. 

For future advantage 1 am maintaining cordial relations with General 
Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treat- 
ing for their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to 
form provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best 
to decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Agui- 
naldo told me to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines 
would be held as a colony of United States of America. 

It has been my effort to maintain harmony with insurgents in order 
to exercise greater intiuence hereafter when we reorganize government. 

Manila is hemmed in; foreigners other than Span. aids have, by kind- 
ness of Rear- Admiral Dewey, been allowed to leave the beleaguered city 
and are cared for on merchant ships in the bay. 

The Baltimore leaves early to-morrow to meet the troop ships north- 
east of Luzon, and incidentally to reconnoiter Dagupan Bay, the north- 
ern terminus of the Manila railroad, for Spanish cruisers and merchant 
ships. 



330 TREATY OF PEACE. 

We are impatient, made doubly so by the miraculous battle of May 
1, which after iuspectiou of waters aud wrecks proved to be more signal 
than detailed in my dispatch on that subject. 

The Spanish fleet, comprised of the following vessels, was annihilated 
so far as Spain is concerned, viz: Cruiser (flagship) Beina Christina, 
cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, cruiser Don Juan de Austria, cruiser 
Isle de Cuba, cruiser Isle de Luzon, gunboat General Lezo, gunboat 
Marques del Duero, gunboat Velasco, gunboat Argos, and armed trans- 
port Isle de Mindanao. 

The above destroyed and sunk; the armed transport Manila was 
captured and soon appears as a United States cruiser, and the cruiser 
Callao has since been captured and augments our fleet. 

The superb cruisers Isle de Cuba and Isle de Luzon were almost 
uninjured when sunk, by scuttling, to defeat capture. These are 
rich prizes which, later on, I hope to see flying our flag. We have 
had neither death nor serious sickness since we came. Manila is at the 
mercy of our fleet, and I believe its capture may be effected, so far as 
the fleet's part is concerned, without the loss of a man or the disabling 
of a vessel. Eear- Admiral Dewey only awaits troops to insure order 
and good government once we are in possession. We fear the city 
may fall too soon. For this reason Admiral Dewey asked me to remain 
here, where he could command such service as I may be able to render 
in event of his taking the city. 

I expect that on July 4 we will celebrate in Manila under the folds 
of "Old Glory," and write in living letters a page of history that this 
magnificent insular empire has become a part and parcel of the United 
States of America. 

I have the honor, etc., Oscar F. Williams, 

United States Consul. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Williams. 

No. 18.] Washington, August 4, 1898. 

Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your special dispatch of 
the 16th of June last, copy of which has been sent to the Secretary of 
War and the Secretary of the Navy. Your course, while maintaining 
amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any partici- 
pation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government, is 
approved. 

Respectfully, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary, 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, Manila Bay, 

Manila, Philippine Islatids, July 2, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report the arrival here on June 30 of 2,500 
United States troops under command of General Anderson, the flotilla 
being convoyed by the Charleston. 

To General Anderson and all I am rendering every possible assist- 
ance, and have been asked by him to treat with General Aguinaldo as 
to American interests. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 331 

We a^Yait second flotilla, and also Monterey, but may take Manila 
to-morrow. 

The health of men, naval and military, is excellent; all eager for 
great results. Cavite and navy-yard have been put in excellent sani- 
tary condition and soldiers are most comfortably quartered. 

Weather is superb for the latitude — mercury hovering about 80° to 
85° in the shade during day, with cooler nights. Frequent rains make 
air pure and climate healthful. 

En route the Charleston made conquest of the Ladroue group of the 
Philippine Islands by taking Guam and bringing away its government 
officials and Spanish residents as prisoners of war. 

If long occupation or possession on the part of our Government be 
considered, I believe early and strenuous efforts should be made to 
bring here from the United States men and women of many occupa- 
tions — mechanics, teachers, ministers, shipbuilders, merchants, elec- 
tricians, plumbers, druggists, doctors, dentists, carriage and harness 
makers, stenographers, typewriters, photographers, tailors, blacksmiths, 
and agents for exporting — and to introduce American products, natural 
and artificial, of many classes. To all such I pledge every aid, and now 
is the time to start. Good government will be easier the greater the 
influx of Americans. 

My dispatches have referred to our present percentage of export 
trade. If now our exports come here as interstate duty free, we have 
practical control of Philippine trade, which now amounts to many mil- 
lions, and because of ingrafting of American energy and methods upon 
the fabulous natural and productive wealth of these islands can and 
probably will be multiplied by twenty during the coming twenty years. 
All this increment should come to our nation, not go to any other. 
Those who come early will reap great rewards and serve patriotic pur- 
pose at the same time, while their prompt and successful work will fur- 
nish outlet for the glut of United States products. Each American 
concern in each of the hundred ports and populous towns of the Phil- 
ippines will be a commercial center and school for tractable natives 
conducive to good government on United States lines. Spanish or 
native language not essential. With Spaniards expelled, it should 
apply that our language be adopted at once in court, public office, 
school, and in newly organized churches, and let natives learn English. 

I hope for an influx this year of 10,000 ambitious Americans, and all 
can live well, become enriched, and patriotically assist your represent- 
atives in the establishment and maintenance of republican government 
on these rich islands so extensive in area as to form an insular empire. 

I hope in your own good way my idea may be effectively placed 
before the American people. 

I have the honor, etc., O. F. Williams, Consul. 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

[Special.] 

Consulate of the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, 
JJ. S. 8. Baltimore, Manila Bay, August 4, 1898. 
Sm: It has been my study to keep on pleasant terms with General 
A.guinaldo for ultimate objects. By so doing I have avoided certain 
troubles and aided our forces. Admiral Dewey says I have planted 
the seeds of cordial cooperation. 



/ 



332 TREATY OF PEACE. 

My argument with General Aguinaldo has been that the conditions 
of government by U. S. A. in the Philippine Islands would be vastly 
better for him and his people in honor, advancement, and profits than 
could exist under any plan fixed by himself and Filipinos. 1 have 
traversed the entire ground of government with him in council, and he 
has called his officials from fifteen provinces to meet me for their dis- 
cussion, all stated as friendly but unofficial on my part, Our relations 
are cordial, while certain antagonisms have arisen between the general 
and certain other Americans. 
I hope to bring about harmony and cooperation for mutual good. 
I have the honor to b'e, sir, your most obedient servant, 

Oscar F. Williams, 
United States Consul, Manila, Philippine Islands, 



Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

[Special.] 

Consulate or the United States, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, 
TJ. S. 8. Baltimore, Manila Bay, August 5, 1898. 

Sir : Because of my isolation and of your many duties I have left 
to representatives of our Navy and Army much of the duty of corre- 
spondence. 

Presumably when Manila falls and the Philippine Islands become by 
conquest a part of our national domain, my duties as consul will end. 
In view of such probabilities I seek your appointive favor, and with 
pride recall to your mind the report of the then Commodore Dewey, 
made to Secretary Long and by him transmitted to you— this under date 
of April IS — says of me: "His assistance has been invaluable." This 
report was made before I ever saw the admiral, and made without my 
knowledge, and I know that my services to our Navy, Army, citizens, 
and nation have since been much greater than before. 

Your commendations of my service have been most gratifying to me, 
and because of narrow resources I hope to have honorable and profitable 
station here or elsewhere in the United States public service. Could I 
be appointed general commissioner of customs of the Philippine Islands, 
light-house inspector, or general commissioner of agriculture, I should 
be honored and pleased. For many years I have made special study of 
tariffs and economic questions; have translated the Philippine tariff, 
and so have a measure of fitness. Thin 1 was reared a farmer, and my 
business interests having always been along such lines, I have kept 
fully abreast with agricultural matters. Am a graduate of Cornell 
University, and for above twenty years was a teacher, lecturer, and 
author, and might well serve as superintendent of public instruction, 

I need your recognition, and hope by cable or otherwise to have relief 
from present anxieties. 

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, 

Oscar F. Williams, 
United States Consul, Manila, Philippine Islands. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 333 

Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Manila, September 5, 1898, (Eeceived 10.20 a. m.) 
To-day delegation from 4,000 Viscayan soldiers, also representing 
southern business interests, came to me pledging loyalty to annexation. 
Several insurgent leaders likewise. Spain can not control; if we evac- 
uate, anarchy rules. 

Williams. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Bay. 

No. 19.] Hongkong, November 3, 1897. 

Sir: Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called upon several 
times by Mr. F. Agon cilia, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of 
the new republic of the Philippines. 

Mr. Agoucilla holds a commission, signed by the president, members 
of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of Philippines, empow- 
ering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign 
governments. 

Mr. Agoncilla offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive 
and defensive with the United States when the United States declares 
war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon. 
In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in 
the Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and L'00,000 rounds of ammunition 
for the use of his government, to be paid for on the recognition of his 
government by the United States. He pledges as security two 
provinces and the custom-house at Manila. 

He is not particular about the price — is willing the United States 
should make 25 per ceut or 30 per cent profit. 

He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great admirer of 
the United States. 

On his last visit he surprised me with the information that he had 
written his government that he had hopes of inducing the United 
States to supply the much-needed guns, etc. 

In case Senor Agoncilla's dispatch should fall into the hands of an 
unfriendly power and find its way into the newspapers, I have thought 
it wise to apprise the State Department of the nature of the high com- 
missioner's proposals. 

Sehor Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he will proceed at once 
to Washington to conclude the proposed treaty, if I advise. 

I shall not advise said step until so instructed by the State Depart- 
ment. 

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 

ROUNSEVILLE WlLDMAN, GOUSU. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Wildman. 

No. 23.] Washington, December 15, 1897. 

Sir : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 19 of 
November 3, 1897, in which you announce the arrival at your post of 
Mr. F. Agoncilla, whom you describe as foreign agent and high com- 



334 TREATY OF PEACE. 

missioner of the new republic of the Philippines, and who holds full 
power to negotiate and conclude treaties with foreign powers. Mr. 
Agoncilla offers an alliance "offensive aud defensive with the United 
States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. 
Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon," and suggests that 20,000 
stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition be supplied to his 
government by that of the United States. 

You may briefly advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon 
you, that the Government of the United States does not negotiate such 
treaties and that it is not possible to forward the desired arms and 
ammunition. 

You should not encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncilla, 
and should courteously decline to communicate with the Department 
further regarding his alleged mission. 
Respectfully, yours, 

Thos. W. Cridler, 
Third Assistant Secretary. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Bay. 

No. 42.] Consulate of the United States, 

Hongkong, May 6, 1898. 

Sir: Supplementary to my cable of this date, I have the honor to 
inclose, by request, statement of Don Dorotes Cortes, Don Maximo 
Cortes, and Dona Enstaquia, wife of Don Maximo; also like statement 
of Arcadio Kosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and Don Jose Maria Basa, all very 
wealthy landholders, bankers, and advocates of Manila. 

They desire to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of their 
powerful families in Manila to the United States. They have instructed 
all their connections to render every aid to our forces in Manila. 

The letters to the President, inclosed, explain themselves. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

liOUNSEVILLE WlLDMAN, Consul. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Wildman, 

No. 42.] June 16, 1898. 

Sir : The Department has received your dispatch No. 42, of the 6th 
ultimo, reporting that a number of influential families of Manila desire 
to tender their allegiance to the United States. 

In reply I have to inform you that a copy has been sent to the War 
Department, with the suggestion that the information be conveyed to 
General Merritt. 

Kespectfully, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary. 



Air. Wildman to Mr. Day. 

No. 43.] Consulate of the United States, 

Hongkong, May 14, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to inclose, by request, the statements of 
Severino Rotea, Claudio Lopez, A. H. Marti, and Eugenia Plona, all 
wealthy and prominent landholders of the Philippine Islands. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 33. r ) 

They desire to submit their allegiance and the allegiance of their 
families iu the Philippine Islands to the United States. 
The letters to the President inclosed explain themselves. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

BOUNSEVILLE WlLDMAN, 

Consul. 



To the President of the United States of North America: 

Severino liotea and Lopez, proprietor and farmer, native of Negros 
Oriental (Visayas), Philippine Islands, with great consideration exposes: 
Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal and 
rightful nation of the United States, he willingly adheres to the Gov- 
ernment in annexing his country, and it will be for him a great honor 
to be joined it as soon as an additional star to the victorious flag of the 
United States of America and considered him as one of its citizens. 
Hongkong, May 11, 1898. 

(Signed) Severino Rotea. 

To the President of the United States of America: 

Claudio Lopez, merchant and proprietor and vice-consul of Portugal 
at Iloilo, native of the Philippine Islands, emigrant to this colony of 
Hongkong for political causes, exposes with great consideration: 

Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal and 
rightful nation of the United States of America, he, for the present, 
adheres to the Government in annexing his country, and considers that 
it will be for him a great honor to join his country as an additional star 
to the always victorious flag of the United States of America and 
to count him as one of its citizens. 

Hongkong, 9th May, 1898. 

(Signed) Claudio Lopez. 

To the President of the United States of America: 

We, the subscribers, natives of the Philippine Islands, emigrants to 
this colony, for political causes, with great consideration expose: 

Having known the history and the Constitution of the noble, liberal, 
and rightful nation of the United States of America, for the present, 
they adhere to the Government, considering that it will be for them a 
great honor to join their country as an additional star to the always 
victorious flag of the United States of America and considered them 
as its citizens. 

(Signed) A. H. Marti. 



To the President of the United States of Worth America: 

Eugenia Plona and Padillo, proprietor and farmer, native of Negros 
Occidental (Visayas), Philippine Islands, and emigrant to this colony 
for political causes, with great consideration, exposes : 

Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal 
and rightful nation of United States, he willingly adheres to the Gov- 
ernment in annexing his country, and it will be for him a great honor 
to be joined it as an additional star to the always victorious flag of the 
United States of North America and considered him as one of its 
citizens. 
Hongkong, May 10, 1898. 

(Signed) Eugenia Plona. 



336 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Wildman to Mr. Bay. 

[Telegram received in cipher.] 

Hongkong, May 19, 1898. (Received 19th— 4.55 a. m.) 
Day, Washington : 

This answers Long's cable to Dewey. From best information obtain- 
able Dewey can not reply under week. Twenty-one thousand Spanish 
troops, of which 4,000 native, L',000 volunteers. All but 1,000 at Manila. 
They have ten mountain guns; no large held artillery; proven last 
rebellion not practicable. Plenty good ponies, 12 hands high. No food 
Philippines but rice. Large supply of ritles should be taken for insur- 
gent allies. 

Wildman. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore. 

No. G3.] Consulate oe the United States, 

Hongkong, July 18, 1898. 

Sir: 1 am taking the liberty of calling your attention to the continu- 
ous repetition of telegraphic information reaching this port that it is 
the policy of the United States Government to allow the Philippine 
Islands to return to Spain on the conclusion of the war. 

Without placing any reliance in these statements, I desire to use 
them as a text upon which to respectfully submit the result of my 
experience with the leaders of the present Philippine insurgents, and 
to suggest the utter impossibility of Spain, even with the aid of the 
United States, ever regaining a foothold on these islands. 

I have lived among the Malays of the Straits Settlements and have 
been an honored guest of the different sultanates. I have watched 
their system of government and have admired their intelligence, and I 
rank them high among the semicivilized nations of the earth. The 
natives of the Philippine Islands belong to the Malay race, and while 
there are very few pure Malays among their leaders, I think their stock 
has rather been improved than debased by admixture. 1 consider the 
forty or fifty Philippine leaders, with whose fortunes I have been very 
closely connected, both the superiors of the Malays and the Cubans. 
Aguinaldo, Agoncilla, and Sandico are all men who would all be lead- 
ers in their separate departments in any country, while among the 
wealthy Manila men, who live in Hongkong and who are spending 
their money liberally for the overthrow of the Spaniards and the annex- 
ation to the United States, men like the Cortes family and the Basa 
family, would hold their own among bankers and lawyers anywhere. 

I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the 
moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to 
the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United 
States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides 
to decline the sovereignty of the islands. In fact I have had the most 
prominent leaders call on me and say they would not raise one finger 
unless I could assure them that the United States intended to give them 
United States citizenship if they wished it. In my opinion, Spain with 
the aid of the entire world can never reestablish herself, outside of a 
few of the large cities. An attempt at reconquest would reduce the 
islands to a state of anarchy, and reduce them to a level of Acheen. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 337 

There lias been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Agui- 
naldo and his cabinet, on account of the questionable terms of their 
surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. It has been said 
that they sold their country for gold, but this lias been conclusively 
disproved, not only by their own statements but by the speech of the 
late Governor General Rivera in the Spanish Senate June 11, 1898. 
He said that Aguiuaklo undertook to submit if the Spanish Govern- 
ment would give a certain sum to the widows and orphans of the 
insurgents. He then admits that only a tenth part of this sum was 
ever given to Aguinaldo, and that the other promises made he did not 
find it expedient to keep. 

1 was in Hongkong September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders 
arrived under contract with the Spanish Government. They waited 
until the 1st of November for the payment of the promised money and 
the fullillment of the promised reforms. Only $400,000, Mexican, was 
ever placed to their credit in the banks, and on the 3d of November Mr. 
F. Agoncilla, late minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo's cabinet, 
called upon me and made a proposal which I transmitted to the State 
Department in my dispatch No. 19, dated November 3, 1897. In reply 
the State Department instructed me " to courteously decline to com- 
municate with the Department further regarding the alleged mission." 
I obeyed these instructions to the letter until the breaking out of the 
war when, after consultation with Admiral Dewey, 1 received a dele- 
gation from the insurgent junta, and they bound themselves to obey 
all laws of civilized warfare and to place themselves absolutely under 
the orders of Admiral Dewey if they were permitted to return to Manila. 
At this time their president, Aguinaldo, was in Singapore negotiating 
through Consul General Pratt with Admiral Dewey for his return. 

On April 27, in company with Consul O. F. Williams, we received 
another delegation, composed of Senor Sandigo, Jose J\J aria Basa, Tomas 
Mascardo, Lorenzo L. Zialcita, Andres E. de Garchitorena, Manuel 
Malvar, Mariano Llanza, Salvatore Estrella. We agreed on behalf of 
Dewey to allow two of their number to accompany the fleet to Manila, 
consequently on the same day I took in the tug Fame Alizandrino and 
Garchitorena, accompanied by Mr. Sandico, to the Olympia in Mir's 
Bay. On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately 
called on me. It was May 10 before I could obtain permission from 
Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States shit) 
McGulloch, and I put him aboard in the night so as to save any compli- 
cations with the local Government. Immediately on the arrival of 
Aguinaldo at Cavite he issued a proclamation, which I had outlined for 
him before he left, forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offense 
to maltreat neutrals. lie, of course, organized a government of which 
he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he hoped to maintain 
control over the natives, and from that date until the present time he 
has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and dignified and just 
as the head of his government. According to his own statements to 
me by letter, he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the 
Germans, and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic 
Church. He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Con- 
sul Williams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of 
moment has occurred which would lead any one to believe that he was 
not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in this consulate. 

The insurgents are fighting for freedom from the Spanish rule, and 
rely upon the well known sense of justice that controls all the actions 
of our Government as to their future. 
T P 22 



338 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In conclusion, I wish to put myself on record as stating that the 
insurgent government of the Philippine Islands can not be dealt with 
as though they were North American Indians, willing to be removed 
from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the 
United States decides not to retain the Philippine Islands, its 10,000,000 
people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign 
nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the 
same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards. 
1 have the honor, etc., 

ROUNSEVELLE WlLDMAN, 

Consul- General. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Wildman. 



[Telegram sent.] 



Department of State, 
Washington, August 6, 1898. 
Wildman, Consul, Hongkong: 

If you wrote Aguiualdo, as reported by Hongkong correspondent 
Daily Mail, your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make 
pledges or discuss policy. 

Moore. 



[Telegram received in cipher.] 

Hongkong, August 8, 1898. (Received 9.10 a. m.) 
Moore, Washington : 

Never made pledges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo 
further thau to try and hold him to promises made before Dewey took 
him (to) Cavite, believing it my duty, it being understood that my 
influence is good. If report contrary, I disavow it. Wildman. 



Mr. Wildman to 2Ir. Moore. 

No. 60.J Consulate of the United States, 

Hongkong, August 9, 1898. 
Sir : On August 7 I received the following cablegram : 

Washington, August 7, 1898. 
Wildman, Consul, Hongkong : 

If you wrote Aguinaldo as reported by Hongkong correspondent Daily Mail, youi 
action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy. 

Moore. 
To which I replied on August 8, 1898 : 

Moore, Washington: 

Never made pledges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo further than 
to try and hold him to promises made before Dewey took him (to) Cavite, believing 
it my duty, it being understood that my influence is good. If report contrary, I 
disavow. 

Wildman. 

I feel it only justice to myself to make some explanation regarding 
the numerous newspaper reports that go from this city, and to the 
many opinions that are put into my mouth regarding the conduct of 



TREATY OF PEACE. 06J 

the war by my friends of the press. I have never so far taken occasion 
to deny any of them, knowing that the Department would realize that, 
through the accidents of war and the geographical situation of Hong- 
kong, I have been placed in a position, through no desire of ray own, 
which has made me a mark for the representatives of all the big news- 
papers of the world. 

In my dispatch, Ko. 63, of July 18, 1808, 1 tried to briefly outline the 
position Consul Williams and myself have taken toward the insur- 
gents. We believed that they were a necessary evil, and that if Agui- 
naldo was placed in command, and was acceptable to the insurgents as 
their leader, that Admiral Dewey or General Merritt would have some 
one whom they could hold responsible for any excesses. Tlie other 
alternative was to allow the entire islands to be overrun by small 
bands bent only on revenge and looting. We considered that Agui- 
naldo had more qualifications for leadership than auy of his rivals. We 
made him no pledges and extracted from him but two, viz, to obey 
unquestioningly the commander of the United States forces in the Phil- 
ippine Islands, and to conduct his warfare on civilized lines. He was 
in and out of the consulate for nearly a month, and I believe I have 
taken his measure and that I acquired some influence with him. I 
have striven to retain his influence and have used it in conjunction 
with and with the full knowledge of both Admiral Dewey and Consul 
Williams. 

Aguinaldo has written^me by every opportunity, and I believe that he 
has been frank with me Regarding both his actions and his motives. I 
do not doubt but that he would like to be President of the Philippine 
Republic, and there may be a small coterie of his native advisers who 
entertain a like ambition, but I am perfectly certain that the great 
majority of his followers, and all the wealthy educated Filipinos have 
but the one desire — to become citizens of the United States of America. 
As for the mass of uneducated natives they would be content under auy 
rule save that of the friars. My correspondence with Aguinaldo has 
been strictly of a personal nature, and I have missed no opportunity to 
remind him of his antebellum promises. His letters are childish, and 
he is far more interested in the kind of cane he will carry or the breast- 
plate he will wear than in the figure he will make in history. The 
demands that he and his junta here have made upon my time is excess- 
ive and most tiresome. He is a man of petty moods, and I have repeat- 
edly had letters from Consul Williams requesting me to write to 
Aguinaldo a friendly letter congratulating him on his success, and 
reminding him of his obligations./" I do not care to quote Admiral 
Dewey, as his letters are all of a^strietly personal nature, but I feel 
perfectly free to refer you to him as to my attitude and actions. I do 
not say this because I feel that I need to make any defense, but because 
I believe that the Daily Mail to which you refer in the above telegram 
has misconstrued my attitude, and placed me in a false position. 

I find on investigation that the letter you refer to as published in the 
London Mail was a personal one, written by me on July 25 at the request 
of Consul Williams, and on lines with which we have been working with 
Aguinaldo from the first. Aguinaldo had for some weeks been getting 
what Admiral Dewey called a "big head," and writing me sulky, 
childish letters. In consequence I wrote him in part as follows: 

"If you stand shoulder to shoulder with our forces, and do not allow any small dif- 
ferences of opinion and fancied slights to keep you fr< in the one set purpose of 
freeing your island from the cruelties under which you rflaim it has be-en groaning 
for so many hundred years, your name in history will be a glorious one. There are 



340 TREATY OF TEACE. 

greater prizes in the world than being the mere chief of a revolution. Do not forget 
that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans 
from the cruelties under which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest 
or the hope of gain. Whatever the final disposition of the conquered territory may 
be you can trust to the United States that justice and honor will control all their 
dealings with you. The first thing is to throw off the Spanish yoke. Do not let 
anything interfere with this." 

If the newspapers can make anything out of this personal letter that 
looks like a pledge or an assumption on my part of powers that are not 
vested in me, I must decline to accept their interpretation, and inso- 
much as Aguinaldo himself does not so construe it, I trust the Depart- 
ment will not consider that I have exceeded the bounds of discretion 
or embarrassed the Department in any way. 
I have the honor, etc., 

EOUNSEVELLE WiLDMAN, 

Consul- General. 



Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore. 



[Telegram received.] 



Hongkong, August 15, 1898. (Received 3.20 a. m.) 
Moore, Washington: 

Spanish consul received dispatch Sunday ordering surrender Manila. 
Shall I offer to deliver personally and save more delay 1 ? Believe can 
be of service to Dewey should Aguinaldo make trouble. 

Wildman. 



The above telegram from Wildman was answered by the Secretary 
thus : 

"Spanish consul should deliver dispatch in his own way. Take no 
action respecting Aguinaldo without specific directions from this 
Department." 



June 22, 1898. 
For the /Secretary: 

Here are two dispatches from Mr. Pratt, consul-general at Singapore, 
respectively numbered 214 and 217. 

No. 214 incloses a copy of Mr. Pratt's confidential No. 212, to which 
you have already replied. 

It also incloses a copy of his No. 213, narrating his parting interview 
with General Aguinaldo. Mr. Pratt states that in this interview he 
enjoined upon General Aguinaldo the necessity, under Commodore 
Dewey's direction, of assuming absolute control over his forces in the 
Philippines, since no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the 
United States, the President having declared that the present hostili- 
ties with Spain were to be carried on in strict conformity with the prin- 
ciples of civilized warfare. Mr. Pratt states that to this injunction 
General Aguinaldo gave his full assent, assuring him that he intended, 
and was able, when in the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, 
in check and lead them on "as our commander should direct." Gen- 
eral Aguinaldo, as Mr. Pratt reports, "further stated that he hoped 
the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at 
least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government 
of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American 



TREATY OF PEACE. 341 

advice and assistance." "These questions," says Mr. Pratt, "I told 
him 1 had no authority to discuss. 1 ' This confirms Mr. Pratt's state- 
ment, in his recent telegram, that he confined his action to bringing 
General Aguinaldo and Commodore Dewey together. 

In his No. 217, of the 5th of May, he incloses an article from the Singa- 
pore Free Press containing an account of his conferences with General 
Aguinaldo. The statements in this article Mr. Pratt pronounces to be 
substantially correct, and it seems to be the source of the article which 
was published in the New York Herald the other day from Vancouver. 

These dispatches of Mr. Pratt seem to be covered by the instruction 
already sent him, which stated that it was proper for him to obtain the 
unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo, but not to make 
any political pledges. 

J. B. M. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. 

No. 214.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, May 1, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to submit the inclosed copies of my reports, 
Nos. 212 and 213, of the 28th and 30th ultimo, respectively, regarding 
my action in arranging for the cooperation with the American forces of 
General Bmilio Aguinaldo, leader of the insurrectionary movement in 
the Philippines, and departure of the latter to join Commodore Dewey. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. 

[Confidential.] 

No. 212.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, April 28, 1898. 
Sir : I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th instant, 
and confirmed in my dispatch No. 211 of that date, a telegram, which 
deciphered read as follows : 

Secretary of State, Washington: 

General Aguinaldo gone my instance ITongkong arrange with Dewey cooperation 
insurgents Manila. 

Pratt. 

The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday the 23d instant, I 
was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme 
leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. 
H. W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen 
years' residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been 
compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanisli 
misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom 1 had 
previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey 
regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the 
islands. 

Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the 
insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over 
them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once 



342 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly 
arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the 24th, in which, besides 
General Aguinaldo, were only present the General's trusted advisers 
and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter. 

At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of 
and object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary move- 
ment, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, 
I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to 
speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing inde- 
pendent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expe- 
diency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained 
the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with 
Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I tele- 
graphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul- 
general at Hongkong: 

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, bere. Will come Hougkong arrange with Commo- 
dore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. 

Pratt. 

The Commodore's reply reading thus: 

Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. 

Dewey. 

I received it late that night, and at once communicated to General 
Aguinaldo, who, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, all under 
assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer 
Malacca, which left here on Tuesday the 20th. 

Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with 
General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by next 
mail. 

/'"The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and cour- 
age, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him. } 

I thiuk that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the com- 
mander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and 
facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines. 

If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, as I 
trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I con- 
sider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services 
rendered. 

How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to 'decide. 
I have, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

No. 213.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, April 30, 1898. 
Sir: Referring to my dispatch Njo. 212, of the 28th instant, I have 
the honor to report that in the second and last interview I had with 
Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I 
enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, 
of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no 
excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Govern- 
ment, the President having declared that the present hostilities with 
Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of 
civilized warfare. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 343 

To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he 
intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, 
the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should 
direct. 

The general further stated that he hoped the United States would 
assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow 
the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organi- 
zation of which he would desire American advice and assistance. 
These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss. 
I have, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

No. 217.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, May 5, 1898. 

Sir: I regret to have to report that the circumstances attending the 
departure from here of General Emilio Aguinaldo to join Commodore 
Dewey, which I had endeavored so hard to prevent being disclosed, 
were, in substance, made public in yesterday's edition of the Singa- 
pore Free Press, from the inclosed copy of which you will note, by 
reference to my reports Nos. 212 and 213 of the 28th and 30th ultimo, 
respectively, that though the facts are, in the main, correctly given, 
the dates are not quite accurate and a certain amount of conjecture 
has been indulged in as regards my action in the matter and that of 
the commodore. 

Almost immediately after the occurrence the editor of the above 
journal told me that he had been informed, but declined to say by 
whom. 

I endeavored to get him to promise to keep the whole affair quiet, 
but, though he would not agree to this, he gave me his word not to 
mention it until after sufficient time should have elapsed to admit of 
General Aguinaldo's reaching Hongkong, which he must already have 
done. 

Hence no harm can come of the disclosure, and, though it is annoy- 
ing, I suppose I should rather congratulate myself that the secret pos- 
sessed by such a number was kept so long. 
I have, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul General. 



[Inclnsure. — The Singapore Free Press, Wednesday, May 4, 1893.] 

TITE WAR— IMPORTANT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT— AGUINALDO IN SINGAPORE — AN 
INCOGNITO VISIT — HE JOINS ADMIRAL DEWEY — PLAN CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN 
CONSUL-GENERAL. 

Just before the actual outbreak of hostilities between Spain and the United States 
Singapore has been the scene of a secret political arrangement by which Gen. Emilio 
Aguinaldo y Fami, the supreme head of the revolutionary movemeut in the Philip- 
pines, has entered into direct relations with Admiral Dewey, commander of the 
American squadron in China waters, while that officer was still at Hongkong. 

In order to understand and appreciate this interesting historical incident properly, 
it will be necessary to allude to the causes leading to the second appearance of the 
rebellion in the Philippines, which was almost coincident with, though not instigated 
by, the strained relations between Spain and the United States. 

In December last General Primo de Rivera, who above all other Spanish generals 
has an intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, found the position 



344 TREATY OF PEACE. 

untenable for both parties. Neither of these had the remotest chance of terminal 
ing the rebellion decisively, the rebels secure in their mountain fastnesses, the 
Spaniards holding the chief towns and villages on the coast. Primo de Rivera 
therefore sent two well-known Philippine natives, occupying high positions in 
Manila, to propose terms of peace to General Aguiualdo in Biac-na-Bato. A coun- 
cil of the revolutionary government was held, in which it was agreed to lay down 
arms on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal of these 
were: 

1. The expulsion, or at least secularization, of the leligious orders, and the inhi- 
bition of these orders from all official vetoes in civil administration. 

2. A general amnesty for all rebels, and guarantees for their personal security and 
from the vengeance of the friars and parish priests after returning to their homes. 

3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration. 

4. Freedom of the press to denounce official corruption and blackmailing. 

5. Representation in the Spanish Parliament. 

6. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of political suspects, etc. 

Primo de Rivera agreed to these reforms in sum aud substance, but made it a con- 
dition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during His Majesty's 
pleasure. As these had lost all their property or had had it confiscated and plun- 
dered, the Government agreed to provide them with funds to live in a becoming 
manner on foreign soil. 

The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner 
had they done so and returned to their houses than the intransigeant religious orders 
commenced at once to again persecute them and trump up imaginary charges to pro- 
cure their rearrest. The .Spanish Government, on its side, imagining itself secure, 
desisted from carrying out the promised reforms, thinking another trick like that 
played on the Cubans after the peace of Zanjon, arranged by Martinez Campos, might 
succeed. The Philippines, however, with this business before them, refused to be 
made dupes of, and have taken up arms again, not alone in the immediate districts 
round Manila but throughout the Archipelago, which merely awaits the signal from 
General Aguiualdo to rise en masse, no doubt carrying with them the native troops 
hitherto loyal, and for which loyal service they have received no thanks but only 
ingratitude. 

Gen. Einilio Aguiualdo, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Col. Marcelo H. del 
Pilar, and his private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in Singapore from 
Saigon on April 21, 1898. In Saigon, where Aguiualdo had remained for one 
week, he had interviews with one or two old Philippino friends now resident there. 
The special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to consult other friends 
here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray, an old and intimate English friend, for fif- 
teen years resident in the Philippines, about the state of affairs iu the islands gen- 
erally — particularly as to the possibility of war between the United States and Spain, 
and whether, iu such an event, the United States would eventually recognize the inde- 
pendence of the Philippines, provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in 
the conquest of the country. The situation of the moment was this, that the condi- 
tions of the honorable peace concluded on December 14, 1897, between President 
Aguinaldo, on behalf of the Philippine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General Primo 
de Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out, although their immediate 
execution had been vouched for in that agreement. 

These reforms would have provided protection to the people against the organized 
oppression and rapacity of the religious fraternities, would have secured improved 
civil and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed, in many ways, improve- 
ments in the fiscal and social conditions of the people. The repudiation by the Span- 
ish Government of these conditions, made by General Primo di Rivera, now left the 
rebel leaders, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong, free to act. And it was 
in pursuance of that freedom of action that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his 
friends in Saigon and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of opera- 
tions in the Philippines. 

Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on matters connected with 
the Philippines has been very considerable, as our readers will have seen, was intro- 
duced by the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt, consul-general 
of the United States, who was anxious, in view of contingencies, to learn as much 
as possible about the real condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after 
this that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once met his friends, 
including Mr. Bray. 

Affairs now becoming more warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. 
Spencer Pratt, eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and General 
Aguinaldo, w r hich took place late on the evening of Sunday, the 24th April, at " The 
Mansion," River Valley road. There were present on that occasion Gen. Emilio 
Aguinaldo y Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of America; 
Mr. Howard W. Bray; Aguinaldo's private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba; Col. M. H. del 
Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino Santos. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 31") 

During this conference, at which Mr. Bray acted as interpreter, General Aguinaldo 
explained to the American consul-general, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of 
th« late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of the country. General 
Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail tbe nature of the cooperation he could give, in 
which he, in the event of the American forces from the squadron lauding and taking 
possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order and discipline amongst the 
native troops and inhabitants in the same humane way in which he had hitherto 
conducted the war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenseless 
Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared 
his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and 
would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intend 
giving to Cuba. 

The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the general views 
expressed during the discussion, placed himself at once in telegraphic communica- 
tion with Admiral Dewey at Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent 
interchange of telegrams consequently took place. 

As a result another private interview was arranged at the American consular 
residence at the Raffles Hotel between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer Pratt, Mr. 
Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to General Aguinaldo. 

As a sequel to this interview, and in response to the urgent request of Admiral 
Dewey, General Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available 
steamer, the Peninsular and Oriental Malacca, on Tuesday, the 26th April, at noon, 
accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private 
secretary. 

The only interview or conversation with any strangers that General Aguinaldo 
had during his stay in Singapore other than the above interviews was during a 
visit paid by General Aguinaldo to Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore Free 
Press, at the office of this journal. On that occasion General Aguinaldo was 
accompanied by Mr. Bray and Mr. Leyba. 

Throughout the whole stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore the editor was kept 
fully informed daily of the progress of affairs. Naturally, however, all statement 
of what occurred has been withheld by us until what has been deemed the fitting 
moment has arrived. 

The substance of the whole incident in its relations to the recent course of affairs 
in the Philippines has been very fully telegraphed by the editor both to New York 
and Londoa. 

The influence of the incident on the future of the Philippines may prove to be of 
a far-reaching historical character. 

AGUINALDO'S POLICY. 

General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose 
internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. Amer- 
ican protection would be desirablo temporarily, on the same lines as that which 
might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The porta of the Philippines would be free 
to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese 
aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country. There 
would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under 
experienced European law officers. Eutire freedom of the press would be estab- 
lished, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious 
toleration, and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyran- 
nical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil 
administration. Full provision would be given for the exploitation of the natural 
resources' and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and by the removal of 
hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be 
removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The 
preservation of public safety and order, and the checking of reprisals against Span- 
iards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the government in the new state of 
things. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. 

No. 223.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

gapore, May 20, 1898. 
Sir: I Lave the honor to submit for your consideration a proclama- 
tion in Spanish, issued prior to the departure of our fleet for Manila 
by the insurgent leaders in Hongkong", calling upon the Filipinos not to 
obey the appeal of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to rally 
in support of these, as they came as their friends and liberators. 



346 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Three copies of the English translation of the above I also inclose 
for handing to the press, should that, in your opiniou, seem advisable. 
I have the honor to be, 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



[Inclosure.] 

America's allies — the manifesto of the filipinos. 

The following is a translation from tlie Spanish of a proclamation of the rehel 
leaders in Hongkong, sent over to the Philippines in advance of the American 
squadron : 

Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach, 
and in a way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for. 

The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and 
the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune to 
extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country, now that they have been 
obliged to sever relations with Spain, owing to the tyranny this nation is exercising 
in Cuba, causing enormous injury to the Americans, who have such large commercial 
and other interests there. 

At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philip- 
pines. 

We, your brothers, are very much afraid that you may be induced to fire on the 
Americans. No, brothers, never make this mistake. Rather blow your own brains 
out thau fire a shot or treat as enemies those who are your liberators. 

Your natural enemies, your executioners, the authors of your misery and unhappi- 
ness, are the Spaniards who govern you. Against these you must raise your weapons 
and odium ; understand well, against the Spaniards and never against the Americans. 

Take no notice of Ihe decree of the Governor-General calling you to arms, although 
it may cost you your lives. Rather die than be ungrateful to our American liberators. 

The Governor-General calls you to arms. What for? To defend your Spanish 
tyrants? To defend those that have despised you, and even in public speeches asked 
for your extermination — those that have treated you little better than savages? No ! 
No! A thousand times no! 

Give a glance at history and you will see that all Spain's wars in Oceania have 
sacrificed Philippine blood. We have been put to fight in Cochin-China to assist the 
French in an affair that in no way concerned the Philippines. We were compelled 
to spill our blood by Simon de Anda against the English, who in any case would have 
made better rulers than the Spaniards. Every year our children are taken away to 
be sacrificed in Mindanao and Sulu, on the pretense of making us believe these 
people are our enemies, when in reality they are our brothers, like us fighting for 
their independence. 

After having sacrificed our blood against the English, against the Annamites, 
against the people of Mindanao, etc., what recompense or thanks have we received 
from the Spanish Government? Obscurity, poverty, the butchery of those dear to 
us. Enough, brothers, of this Spanish tutelage. 

Take note, the Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reenforcements 
coming from Spain; therefore we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you 
will have more than sufficient arms, because the Americans have arms and will find 
meam? to assist us. 

There, where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our 
redeemers. 

Our unworthy names are as nothing, but one and all of us invoke the name of the 
greatest patriot our country has seen, in the sure and certain hope that his spirit will 
ae with us in these moments and guide us to victory — our immortal Jose" Rizal. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. 

No. 225.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, June 2, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to submit inclosed a telegram from Hongkong 
of the 25th ultimo, on the situation in the Philippines, published in 
Singapore yesterday afternoon, the 1st instant. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 347 

Considering the enthusiastic manner General Aguinaldo lias been 
received by the natives and the confidence with which he already 
appears to have inspired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted, I think, 
that I did not overrate his importance and that I have materially 
assisted the cause of the United states in the Philippines in securing 
his cooperation. 

Why this cooperation should not have been secured to us during the 
months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events in Hongkong, 
and that he was allowed to leave there without having been approached 
in the interest of our Government, I can not understand. 

ISTo close observer of what had transpired in the Philippines during 
the past four years could have failed to recognize that General Agui- 
naldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the Filippino insur- 
gents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners in the islands, 
all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice and honor. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



flnelosnre in dispatch Ko. 125.] 

[The Singapore Free Press. Wednesday, June 1, 1898. Hongkong Telegraph, 25th.] 

THE WAR — THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES. 

The Japanese cruiser Alcitsushima arrived here yesterday from Manila, and the fol- 
lowing is the latest news: 

General Aguinaldo arrived hy the McCulloch on the 19th instant, and was received 
with great enthusiasm by the natives. 

Admiral Dewey was very much pleased with him, and has turned over to him two 
modern field pieces and 300 rifles, with plenty of ammunition. 

General Aguinaldo is now organizing an attack on the Spanish land forces, and a 
decisive battle may he expected soon. 

The Manila papers are publishing sensational articles hourly, among which is that 
the U. S. S. Baltimore is so used up in the late engagement that the American admiral 
decided to scuttle her. 

The archbishop has assured the people that four Spanish battle ships are on their 
way out, and that God has informed him that in the next engagement the armies of 
the most Christian Spain will be victorious. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

No. 228.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, June 8, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to submit an article from the London Spec- 
tator, which was reproduced in the Singapore Free Press of yesterday, 
and a reply thereto, published to-day in the same paper, which last, 
I think, is deserving of special consideration as being the expression of 
opinion of Mr. H. W. Bray, one of the best authorities on the Philip- 
pines and the Filipinos. 

I have the honor to be, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



348 TREATY OF PEACE. 

[Inolosure 1. — Singapore Free Press, June 7, 1898.] 
THE FATE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 

We take it to be certain, in spite of interruptions in the telegraphic service, that 
Manila has surrendered ; that the Tagal population will hold the larger Philippine 
Islands, subject to guidance from leaders recognized by the Americans; and that the 
latter will never, whatever the ultimate issue of the war, hand the colony back to 
Spain. They are more governed by moral considerations than their enemies choose 
to think, and a conviction that Spaniards are incurably cruel, are, in fact, born 
inquisitors, has sunk deeply into their minds. To an American the Spaniard, it 
should be remembered, is not the man of the Peninsular war, but the man who con- 
quered the Americas and so misgoverned them that his own people rose upon him 
in unquenchable fury. The Americans will have, therefore, at the close of the war, 
to decide how their newly acquired property shall be disposed of, and already fierce 
jealousies and far-reaching ambitions have been awakened throughout Europe. 

America, it is said, will not keep the islands; and ii they are to be sold, either for 
money or for territory, to whom are they to go? Their possession might disturb 
"the balance of power" in the far East. England, it is said, must not have them, 
because she has already too much; Germany, because her designs upon China would 
thereby be facilitated; Russia, because she would be too near Australia; and France, 
because she may choose in the next war to act as Russia's obedient ally. Japan, as 
a pagan power, is out of the question when two aud a half millions of Christians 
have to be disposed of; and it is very doubtful whether Holland would undertake 
the laborious task of reducing the Philippines to order. She succeeds in Java after 
a fashion, and might make a heavy bid for a second tropical estate, but the attempt 
to form a colonial army seems beyond her strength. She has been trying through a 
whole generation to conquer Acheen, and the fierce little Malay State holds her 
successfully at bay. These arguments and many like them will be urged on the 
Americans by the chancelleries of Europe, which are already twittering with excite- 
ment and putting out little feelers, and looking at Manila like children at a cake 
which they want badly but think it decorous not to ask for or see. 

We think the Americans will keep the Philippines; we hope they will, most heart- 
ily, and we can show that they have the means of doing so with little trouble to 
themselves. We think they will keep them because we think that the Americans 
will emerge from this war with' new ideas and larger ambitions. They will have 
defeated a second-class European State, and will feel acutely that as matters stand 
they would have been defeated by a first-class one. They could not have fought 
France, to say nothing of Great Britain, without; suffering great defeats at sea and 
enormous losses by land. That is not a position which suits the American temper, 
and Washington will therefore set itself to construct a first-class iron fleet. They 
can do that at home with twice the rapidity of the Japanese, because ihey have a 
hundred times the Japanese command of money, and they can man the fleet when 
constructed by sweeping all the shiftless boyB of the Union, as they are doing already, 
into great naval schools, one for each State. That fleet once built, the desire for a 
position in the world equal to their position among nations, for islands as coaling 
stations, for posts of vantage if Europe threatens them, will induce, or, indeed, com- 
pel them to give up their idea of nonintervention, which already, as we see, has 
given way the moment their deeper emotions are stirred. 

Already, before the war has Avell begun, they are threatening Cuba, Porto Rico, 
Hawaii, and the Philippines, and as soon as it is over aud the fleet built they will open 
the Nicaragua Canal, claiming right of free passage through it for their battle ships, 
and change their Monroe doctrine into a direct and effective protectorate of the two 
Americas. They will, we believe, from the first hesitate to give up the Philippines, 
partly because the islands provide admiral stations for their fleet, but chiefly because 
they are determined that China, which is their biggest natural foreign market, shall 
not be closed to their trade. They must be ready to strike, if need be, on the Chinese 
coast, and to strike hard; and seeing that, they will not give up islands which offer 
them impregnable defenses for their dockyards, their coal vaults, and their arsenals. 
To retain them is, of course, to give up their traditional policy of noninterference in 
the politics of the world ; but we confess we have not much faith in self-denying 
politics of that kind. To shake down an ancient European throne is surely inter- 
ference with Europe of a definite kind, aud they are doing that already. The people 
of the United States have not realized their new position yet, but when they do, we 
shall hear, we feel confident, much less of nonintervention. 

We think America will keep the Philippines and we heartily hope it. She will 
govern them well enough, much better than any power except ourselves, and we 
have more of the world's surface than Ave can well manage. It is true that the posi- 
tion in the Pacific would be magnificent; that we can create a civil service by a 
mere advertisement in the Gazette, the educated middle class thirsting for more 



TREATY OF PEA \E. 349 

careers," and that we could garrison the islands with Sikhs and Afridis, to the 
delight of hotli, without risking a singlo bone of "Tommy Atkins," but we can net 
undertake to govern the whole dark world. The envy we excite is already too great, 
and the strain upon the mental power of those who govern is already excessive, so 
excessive that we fear there is already a faltering at the center of affairs, produced 
not by timidity, but by a just sense that for England to do anything anywhere is to 
stir the water which envelops the world and drive a wave upon some coast it is not 
intended to attack. 

It would be a relief if another English-speaking power would take up a portion 
of our. task, and in taking it perform the duty of repaying something to the world 
which yields her such advantages. The "weary Titan," in fact, needs an ally while 
traversing "the too vast orb of his fate," and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, 
and language are like his own is the great American people. The Frenchman is too 
lickle, the Russian too full of guile, and the German too harsh in his treatment of all 
who do not think that to be drilled is the lirst, if not the only duty of man. 

We hope the Americans will keep the Philippines, and that they can keep them we 
have no doubt whatever. Europe, to put the truth in its most brutal form, can not 
attack them without our permission, and the constitutional difficulty is all rubbish, 
as Congress can make laws for territories, or declare the islands to be held, like 
Bosnia, as lands "in temporary military occupation" of the United States. The 
Americans are not governing Manila to-day through the universal suffrage of the 
Tagals, and need not therefore govern it to-morrow, while as to the means of hold- 
ing the islands they have a resource of which no one has spoken hitherto, but to 
which, as an instrument of power, there is hardly a limit. Jv'o one doubts that the 
States can produce and train any amount of officers, and they have, like ourselves, 
the means of enlisting a large and effective Sepoy army. 

They have already 4,000 or 5,000 negro troops who have distinguished themselves 
in the Indian wars, and who are now about to be dispatched to Cuba because they 
are "immune" from yellow fever. Nothing stops the Americans from raising the 
negro force to 20,000 men — there are now 9,000,000 of colored people under the Stars 
and Stripes— and with them holding the Philippines, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, pay- 
ing them out of local revenues. With such a garrison those islands would be as 
safe as drawing-rooms and as full of business as Broadway or the Strand. There is 
really no obstacle, for the prejudice of color, as tierce as it is in the States, would 
not operate against a colonial army, more especially if that army were a good one. 
And it would" be a good one. The bravery of the trained negro is never questioned, 
he is accustomed not only to obey, but to respect white officers, and the tropical 
regions in which he would be stationed exactly suit not only his constitution, but 
his notion of that which constitutes happiness in life. Instead of remaining a source 
of weakness to the Union, he can be turned by wise and lenient management into an 
instrument of empire. 

We do not, be it observed, give way for one moment to the theory that white men 
can not retain their energy in the tropics— nearly the whole of Brazil is within 
their limit; but if white Americans dislike service in lands so warm they have mil- 
lions of dark Americans who do not, and Avho are as proud of the greatness of the 
Republic, and, if decently treated, as faithful to its flag, as any of their lighter 
brethren. The Americans are waking up to a perception of the value of this instru- 
ment offeree, and when once they have fully realized it we shall hear little of their 
difficulty in garrisoning distant possessions inhabited by dark tribes. The Tagals 
will not feel insulted because the garrison which keeps their villages safe is only 
white at the top. 



[Inclosnre 2 — Singapore Free Press, June 8, 1898.] 
THE FATE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 

The author of the Spectator article quoted in your yesterday's issue under the 
above heading has put forward one sensible proposition. His theories on other 
points may be all right, but I am afraid he has reckoned without his host. America 
has not yet conquered the Philippines — not by a long way — but will occupy them 
with the assistance and good will of the Filipinos. The possession of Manila no 
more means the possession of the Philippines than the possession of New York 
means the possession of America, and without this good will and assistance of the 
inhabitants I must beg leave to state that neither the United States nor any other 
nation could ever hope to take the Philippines, except with an army of 200,000 men 
or more, if even then, no matter what theorists may say to the contrary. The solu- 
tions which the European papers have been kind enough to put forward re the dis- 
posal of the Philippines may be dismissed with the words of General Augustin's 



350 TREATY OF PEACE. 

proclamation: "Vain designs, ridiculous boasts!" When the time comes I am 
inclined to think the inhabitants themselves are going to have the biggest say in 
this question, especially after the events of May 30 to June L last. 

Spain, with an army of 35,000 men fully armed, has been able to do nothing against 
an army of imperfectly organized Filipinos, who have never disposed to more than 
600 rifles. Yet nobody can taunt the Spanish soldier with want of valor, whilst his 
patient endurance of hardships and privations, indifferent food, and entire absence 
of personal comforts give him the advantage over other European soldiers, who 
require an efficient commissariat and transport department. In a country like the 
Philippines a soldier to be effective must be able to skip from crag to crag like a goat, 
without hindrance or paraphernalia, to be evenly matched witli the inhabitants. 

The Tagals will feel very much insulted if they try to garrison their villages by 
troops of the type proposed by the writer of the article under review. It would be 
a dangerous experiment. I would not advise the Americans or any one else to try. 
Such crass ignorance on the state of the Philippines and its inhabitants exists on 
every side, that it is almost useless to try and explain to outsiders that the Philip- 
pines are as different from British India, Ceylon, Burma, the AY est Indies, etc., as 
light is from darkness. The people are the most enlightened and vigorous branch 
of the Malay race, and have been Christians for centuries, in fact longer than the 
principles of the Reformation were established in Great Britain, and are the nearest 
akin to Europeans of any alien race, and it is simply ridiculous to imagine that 
eight to ten millions of such people can be bought and sold as an article of com- 
merce without first obtaining their consent. Let all those who are greedy for a slice 
of the archipelago ponder well over this before burning their fingers. 

To put them on a level with Sikhs and Afridis is simple nonsense. The much over- 
estimated Sikh would find his match pretty soon with the sturdy Philippine native, 
and those who think differently had better read what no less an authority than 
General Gordon says of his Philippine troops in the Taiping rebellion. 

No decent or respectable Filipino will tolerate any social relations with the pagan 
Chinese. 

The only possible solution of the Philippine question is an independent govern- 
ment, under American protection, and this is the policy I recommended General 
Aguinaldo and his compatriots to accept, and which will, no doubt, be carried out. 
Time will show. 

H. W. Bray. 

Singapore, 8th June, 1898. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

No. 229.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, June 9, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the occasion 
of the receipt of the news of General Aguinaldo's recent successes near 
Manila, I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in Singapore and 
presented an address which, though written in Spanish, was delivered 
in French, and which I accordingly replied to in that language. 

The reports of the proceedings sent me by the editors of the Singapore 
Free Press and Straits Times, both of whom were present, I submit 
herewith, with duplicates for the press should you consider their publi- 
cation desirable. 

The original address in Spanish was not left with me, but I am prom- 
ised it as soon as properly written out, and will then forward it. 

My reply, however, I can not forward, as it was not written, but extem- 
poraneous, and has been correctly rendered from the French into English 
in the within reports, from which you will note that I avoided touching 
upon the question of our future policy re the Philippines. 
I have the honor, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt, 
United States Consul- General. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 351 

[Inclosures.— The Straits Times, .Tnne 9.] 

MR. SPENCER PRATT SERENADED— MEETING OF FILIPINO REFUGEES AT THE UNITED 
STATES CONSULATE— THE V PRESENT AN ADDRESS TO MR. SPENCER PRATT AND DRINK 
TO AMERICA, ENGLAND, AND ADMIRAL DEWEY. 

The United States consulate at Singapore was yesterday afternoon in an unusual 
state of bustle. That bustle extended itself to Raffles Hotel, of which the cousulate 
forms an outlying part. From a period shortly prior to 5 o'clock, afternoon, the 
natives of the Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the consulate. 
Their object was partly to present an address to Hon. Spencer Pratt, United 
States consul-general, and partly to serenade him, for which purpose some twenty- 
five or thirty of the Filipinos came equipped with musical instruments. Gradu- 
ally the crowd gathered in the vicinity of the United States consulate, and, after a 
little quiet preliminary music, Dr. Santos, as representing the Philippine community 
in Singapore, proceeded to read the following address, which was originally drafted in 
Spanish and then translated into French. The address was read in French, and the 
following is an English translation : 

THE ADDRESS. 

"To the Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States of North America, 

Singapore : 

"Sir: The Philippine colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of 
all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate repre- 
sentative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our 
eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey 
to our trusted leader Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, who has been driven to take up arms 
in the name of 8,000,000 Filipinos, in defense of those very principles of justice and 
liberty of which your country is the foremost champion. Our countrymen at home, 
and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our 
beloved native laud, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its 
humane policy will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, 
and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independ- 
ence under the protection of the United States. Our warmest thanks are especially 
due to you, sir, personally, for having been the first to cultivate relations with 
General Aguinaldo, and arrange for the cooperation with Admiral Dewey, thus sup- 
porting our aspirations which time and subsequent actions have developed and 
caused to meet with the applause and approbation of your nation. Finally, we 
request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American people, and to 
Admiral Dewey, our sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most fervent wishes 
for their prosperity. 

"Singapore, June 8, 1S98." 

Dr. Santos, having presented the above address to Mr. Spencer Pratt, proceeded, 
speaking in French, to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were 
now proving themselves tit for self-government. While it would be very desirable 
that such a government should be under American protection, yet it would be found 
that the brave Filipinos, who were now driving the Spanish troops before them, 
were quite fit also to fill offices of civil administration. Referring to certain news 
which had been telegraphed from Europe, Dr. Santos deprecated the transfer of the 
Philippines from Spain to any power. He was quite confident that the sympathy of 
the American people would be with a nation who were struggling to be free. 

THE UNITED STATES CONSUL-GENERAL REPLIES. 

After listening to the address the United States consul-general, also speaking in 
French, said: 

"Gentlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can 
not find appropriate words with which to thank you and with which to reply to the 
eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, though, that I fully under- 
stand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action 
and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated 
to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people— from whom I am 
sure that they will meet with full and generous response. A little over a month ago 
the world resounded with the praises of Admiral Dewey and his fellow-officers and 
men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the Bay of 
Manila. Now we have news of the brilliant achievements of your own distin- 
guished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at 



352 TREATY OF PEACE. 

6ea. Yon have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished 
by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six 
weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I 
immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the 
man for the occasion ; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly 
arranged for him to join the latter, which he did, at Cavite. The rest you know. 

"I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of 
bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, 
which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventful outcome will be all 
that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My parting words 
to General Aguinaldo wore, 'General, when you have proved yourself great, prove 
yourself magnanimous,' and from the treatment accorded to the recent Spanish pris- 
oners it would appear that he had done so." [Applause.] 

At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech refreshments were served, and as the Fili- 
pinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, there was no difficulty in arranging as to 
refreshments. " Long life and prosperity " were drunk to Mr. Consul-General Spencer 
Pratt. Then the American Republic was cheered. Then Commodore Dewey was 
cheered for his gallant victory. Then England was cheered for sheltering the Fili- 
pino refugees. 

PRESENTING A FLAG. 

Then Dr. Santos, as the spokesman of the Filipino refugees, again addressed the 
audience with many complimentary remarks on the gallantry of Admiral Dewey 
and the skill and foresight of United States Consul-General Pratt, and with glow- 
ing forecasts of the prosperity that awaited the Philippine Islands under the new 
regime. He expressed a desire to have an American flag as a reminiscence of the 
day's proceedings. Mr. Spencer Pratt, again speaking in French, replied, saying: 

"This flag was borne in battle, and is the emblem of that very liberty that you 
are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood that was shed for the 
cause; the white represents the purity of the motive; the blue field stands for the 
azure of the sky ; the stars are the free and independent States of the Union. Take 
the flag and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion." 

At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, he handed anAmerican flag to Dr. Santos, 
who received it reverently, and waved it exultantly amidst the cheers of the assem- 
bled Filipinos. The flag would, said Dr. Santos, be preserved so that future gen- 
erations might look at it with pride. 



[Singapore Free Press, June 9, 1S98.] 

MR. SPENCER PRATT AND THE FILIPINOS OF SINGAPORE — AN ADDRESS OF 

CONGRATULATION. 

A little after 5 p. m. last evening a numerous deputation, consisting of all the 
Filipinos resident in Singapore, waited upon the American consul-general, Mr. 
Spencer Pratt, at his residence, and presented him with an address congratulatory 
of the American successes in the present war, and expressive of the thanks of the 
Filipino community here for the aid now being given by the United States to the 
aspirations of the Filipino people for national freedom. There were also present 
Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore Free Press; Mr. A. Reid, editor of the 
Straits Times, and Mr. Howard W. Bray, whose active sympathies with the P^ili- 
pino nation are so well known as to entitle him to be styled " Aguinaldo's English- 
man." Mr. Spencer Pratt and Mr. Bray both wore the badge of the Liga Filipina, 
presented to them by General Aguinaldo during his incognito visit to Singapore. 

After Mr. Bray had performed the ceremony of introducing the deputation to 
Consul-General Spencer Pratt, Dr. Santos, the chief Filipino refugee here, who 
has been educated at Barcelona and Paris, delivered the address of which the follow- 
ing is a translation: 

"To the Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt, 

" Consul- General of the United States of North America, Singapore. 

"Sir: The Filipino colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of 
all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate repre- 
sentative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our 
eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey 
to our trusted leader Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, who has been driven to take up arms 
in the name of 8,000,000 Fillipinos in defense of those very principles of justice and 
liberty, of which your country is the foremost champion. 

Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish 
misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your 
nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme 



TREATY OF PEACE. 353 

arranged between you, sir, and General Agninaldo in this port of Singapore, and 
secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States. 

Our warmest thanks are especially due to you, sir, personally, for having been the 
first to cultivate relations with General Aguinaldo and arrange for his cooperation 
with Admiral Dewey, thus supporting our aspirations which time and subsequent 
actions have developed and caused to meet with the applause and approbation of 
your nation. 

"Finally we request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American 
people, and to Admiral Dewey, our sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most 
fervent wishes for their prosperity. 

" Singapore, June 8, 1898." 

The address, which was written in Spanish, and read in French by Doctor Santos, 
the spokesman, was replied to in Freneh by Mr. Spencer Pratt, to the following 
effect : 

"Gentlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can 
not find appropriate words with which to thank you, with which to reply to the 
eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, however, that I fully 
understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present 
action, and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully 
repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people, from 
whom, I am sure, they will meet with full and generous response. A little over 
a month ago the world resounded with the praise of Admiral Dewey and his fellow 
officers and men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the 
bay of Manila. To-day we have the news of the brilliant achievements of your own 
distinguished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating ou laud with the Ameri- 
cans at sea. You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accom- 
plished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. 
When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in 
Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that 
he was the man for the occasion, and having communicated with Admiral Dewey, 
I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest 
you know. 

"I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of 
bringing about the arrangement between General Agninaldo and Admiral Dewey, 
which has resulted sohappilv. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be 
all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My part- 
ing words to General Aguinaldo were, 'General, when you have proved yourself 
great, prove yourself magnanimous,' and from the generous treatment that we under- 
stand he has accorded to the Spanish prisoners taken in the recent fight he has done 
bo." [Applause.] 

Dr. Santos then addressing his fellow-countrymen (Paysanos), called for suc- 
cessive vivas for the President of the United States, for Admiral Dewey, and for 
Consul-General Pratt; for England, the "nation hospitaliere," and for the editors of 
the Singapore Free Press and Straits Times. Consul-General Pratt called for "vivas" 
for General Aguinaldo and the Filipino people. 

Mr. Spencer Pratt subsequently presented an American flag to Dr. Santos, for the 
Filipino deputation. This flag, he said, was borne in battle, and is the emblem of 
that very liberty that you are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood 
that was shed for the cause, the white the purity of the motive, the blue field the 
azure of the sky, the stars the free and independent States of the Union. Take it 
and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion. 

On receiving the flag from the consul's hands Dr. Santos called for three cheers for 
the American nation, waving the flag on high, and stating that the Filipinos would 
always cherish this emblem, which would be preserved for future generations to 
look upon with pride. 

A band of Filipino musicians was in attendance and played a selection of music, 
including some very pretty melodies of their native land. 

This interesting ceremony terminated about 6 p. in. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Pratt. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, June 16, 1S98. 
Two hundred twelve received and answered. Avoid unauthorized 
negotiations with Philippiiie insurgents. 

T P 23 DAY ' 



354 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Day to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 78.] Department of State, 

Washington, June 16, 1898. 

Sir: I have to acknowledge receipt of your confidential dispatch 
No. 212, of the 28th of April last, in which you report your proceedings 
in bringing together the insurgent general Emilio Aguinaldo and 
Admiral Dewey, before the latter's departure for Manila. It appears 
that your meetiug with General Aguinaldo was brought about through 
the good offices of Mr. H. W. Bray, a British subject, who had been 
compelled by the disturbed condition of things in the Philippines to 
abandon his property and business there, and that, after an interview 
with General Aguinaldo, you telegraphed to Admiral Dewey that the 
insurgent leader would come to Hongkong to arrange for a general 
cooperation of the insurgents, if this should be desired. The admiral 
telegraphed in reply: "Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible." As 
a consequence General Aguiualdo, with his aid-de-camp and private 
secretary, left Singapore for Hongkong ou the 26th of April for the 
purpose of joining Admiral Dewey. You promise the Department a 
fuller account of your interview with General Aguinaldo by the next 
mail, and say that in arranging for his "direct cooperation" with the 
commander of the United Sfates forces you have prevented a possible 
conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administer- 
ing the Philippines. 

The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo that 
you had no authority to speak for the United States; and, in the 
absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assumed that you 
did not attempt to commit this Government to any alliance with the 
Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance 
of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so 
doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practi- 
cable to gratify. This Government has known the Philippine insurgents 
only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not 
acquainted with their purposes. While their contest with that power 
has been a matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor 
received from this Government any recognition. The United States, in 
entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military 
operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of the rights which 
the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without 
regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that 
obedience which will be lawfully due from them. 

If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you 
acted upon the assumption that this Government would cooperate with 
him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his 
cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political 
claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and 
can not be approved. 

Eespectfully yours, William R. Day. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 355 

Mr. Pratt to Mr. Moore. 

No. 235.] Consulate General of the United States, 

Singapore, June 20, 1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to report that I have received the Depart- 
ment's cipher telegram reading thus: 

Washington, June 17. 
Pratt, Consul-General, 

Singapore : 
Two hundred and twelve received and answered. void unauthorized negotia- 
tions with Philippine insurgents. 

Day. 

and that I have sent the Department the following cipher telegram in 
reply: 

Singapore, June 19. 
Secretary op State, 

Washington: 
No intention negotiate. Left that Dewey who desired Aguinaldo come. 

Pratt. 

which means that I neither have nor had any intention to negotiate 
with the Philippine insurgents, and, in the case of General Aguinaldo, 
was especially careful to leave such negotiations to Commodore Dewey. 

My action in the matter was indeed limited to obtaining the assurance 
of General Aguinaldo's willingness to cooperate with our forces, com- 
municating this to Commodore Dewey, and, upon the latter's express- 
ing the desire that he should come on as soon as possible, arranging 
for the general to do so. 

I shall anxiously await the instruction your telegram refers to for the 
Department's opinion of my above course, but can scarcely believe, in 
view of the motives which prompted it and the excellent results which 
have ensued, that it can be altogether disapproved. 
1 have, etc., 

E. Spencer Pratt. 



Mr. Pratt to Mr. Moore. 

No. 23G.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, June 21, 1898. 

Sir: In continuation of my dispatch No. 235, of the 20th instant, I 
beg to state that if, in regard to General Aguinaldo, I arranged directly 
with Commodore Dewey without obtaining the Department's previous 
authorization it was because of the little time there was in which to 
act and the practical impossibility of explaining by cable to the Depart- 
ment the value of the general's cooperation, of which I felt the com- 
modore would already be in a position to judge from what he must have 
learned of the situation while at Hongkong. 

I beg further to state that it was not only on account of the material 
aid I was contident he could lend us that I regarded the cooperation 
of General Aguinaldo as so desirable, but also because, as the recog- 
nized leader of the insurgents, he was, I considered, the one best able 
to direct and- influence them, and therefore the one most important for 
our commander to have under immediate control, both as concerned 
the present and future policy of our Government in the Philippines, 
whatever that policy might be. 



356 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Had it not been arranged for General Aguinaldo thus to cooperate 
with us it is more than probable that he would have returned to the 
islands of his own accord and undertaken independent operations, 
which might, I fear, have caused us serious embarrassment. I am not 
having, nor do I propose to have, any further dealings here with the 
Philippine insurgents. 

I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, 

United States Consul- General. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 82.] Department of State, 

Washington, June 25, 1898. 
Sir : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches, Nos. 214 
(May 1) and 217 (May 5,1808), in regard to arrangements made with 
Aguinaldo for cooperation with our Navy. 

In reply I have to inform you that the Department is pleased to learn 
that you did not make any political pledges to Aguinaldo. 
Eespectfully, yours, 

Tnos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary. 



Mr. Cridler to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 84.] Department of State, 

Washington, July 9, 1898. 
Sir : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 222 bis 
of May 18 last, in regard to the expenses incurred in relieving the Amer- 
ican refugee from the Philippines. 

You will please ascertain and report the amount necessarily expended 
in this matter by the British vice-consul at Cebu. 

The $30 expended by you in sending Mr. Dorr to Hongkong is cov- 
ered by the Department's telegram to relieve immediate necessities. 
Kespecti'ully, yours, 

Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 87.] Department of State, 

Washington, July 20, 1898. 

Sir: Your No. 229 of the 9th ultimo, inclosing printed copies of a 
report from the Straits Times of the same day, entitled "Mr. Spencer 
Pratt's Serenade," with a view to its communication to the press, has 
been received and considered. 

By Department's telegram of the 17th of June you were instructed 
to avoid unauthorized negotiations with the Philippine insurgents. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 35 7 

The reasons for this instruction were conveyed to you in my No. 78 of 
the 16th of June, by which the President's views on the subject of your 
relations with General Aguinaldo were fully expressed. 

The extract now communicated by you from the Straits Times of the 
9th of June has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as to 
whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and pro- 
duced an impression which this Government would be compelled to 
regret. 

The address presented to you by the twenty-five or thirty Filipinos who 
gathered about the consulate discloses an understanding on their part 
that the object of Admiral Dewey was to support the cause of General 
Aguinaldo, and that the ultimate object of our action is to secure the 
independence of the Philippines " under the protection of the United 
States." 

Your address does not repel this implication, and it moreover repre- 
sents that General Aguinaldo was " sought out by you," whereas it had 
been the understanding of the Department that you received him only 
upon the request of a British subject named Bray, who formerly lived, 
in the Philippines. Your further reference to General Aguinaldo as 
" the man for the occasion," aud to your "bringing about" the "arrange- 
ment" between "General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which has 
resulted so happily," also represents the matter in a light which causes 
apprehension lest your action may have laid the ground of future mis- 
understandings and complications. 

For these reasons the Department has not caused the article to be 
given to the press, lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to 
views the expression of which it had not authorized. 
Bespectfully, yours, 

William R. Day. 



[Confidential.] 

Mr. Pratt to Mr. Moore. 

No. 240.] Consulate-General of the United States, 

Singapore, July 2, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that I have learned from reliable 
private sources that the Sultan of Sulu, who, on his return home from 
Mecca, stopped over in Singapore, where he still remains, has nego- 
tiated or is in the way of negotiating for the transfer of the protectorate 
of his territory in the Philippines from Spain to British North Borneo, 
to which, as will be seen by the map, it is adjacent. 

This would seem to have special significance at the present juncture, 
and I have considered that you might deem it of sufficient importance 
to demand investigation. 

After the Sulu war of 1876, it will be remembered, Spain's suzerainty, 
hitherto disputed, was formally admitted by the Sultan and recognized 
by both England and Germany in the protocol signed by the powers on 
the 11th of March, 1877. 

I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, 

United States Consul- General. 



358 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. 

[Confidential.] 

No. 250.] Consulate- General of the United States, 

Singapore, July 28, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your instruction 
No. 78, of the 16th ultimo, in reply to my dispatch No. 112, of the 28th 
of April last, reporting- my proceedings in bringing together the insur- 
gent leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, and Admiral Dewey before the 
latter's departure for Manila. 

I have carefully considered your observations upon my action in this 
matter and beg to repeat what I have stated in my later dispatches on 
the same subject, that I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo 
the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to 
the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed 
the Government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confi- 
dences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would 
cooperate with him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of any 
plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would 
consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he 
might put forward. 

I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, 

United States Consul- General. 



Mr. Cridlcr to Mr. Pratt. 

No. 90.] Department of State, 

Washington, August 2, 1898. 
Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 235 and No. 236 
of June 20 and 21, 1898, concerning the Philippine insurgents and your 
action regarding them. 

In this connection reference is made to the Department's instruc- 
tions No. 78 of June 16 and No. 87 of July 20, 1898, as well as to the 
concluding paragraph of your No. 236, wherein you say that you are 
not having nor do you propose to have any further dealings with the 
Philippine insurgents. 

Eespectfully, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, 

Third Assistant Secretary, 



Mr. Johnson to Mr. Moore. 

No. 26.] Consulate of the United States, 

Amoy, China, July 8, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to submit a few facts and comments on con- 
ditions prevailing here which are suggested by the supposition that our 
Government contemplates taking charge of the Philippines, either tem- 
porarily or permanently. If the information I offer is already in your 
possession, then this dispatch can be of no service. 

There is a large Chinese population in the Philippines, who constitute 
the most intelligent class of common laborers, as well as many wealthy 
merchants. It is estimated that over 90 per cent of these are from 
Amoy and speak the Amoy dialect. There is a regular line of steamers 
between Amoy and Manila, and the traffic both in passengers and 
freight is an important industry. 

The Spanish Government maintains a consulate at Amoy for the sole 
purpose of looking after this trade with the Philippines, and it is 



TREATY OF PEACE. 359 

given out here, I am informed, that the consulate will be closed and 
the affairs turned over to a merchant as soon as the islands pass from 
Spanish control. 

The largest British firms here inform me that Amoy is the most 
important Chinese port, so far as the Philippines are concerned, and 
that should we retain them the business in this consulate will increase 
many fold. 

It would under such conditions be inimical to our interests for any 
other nation to secure any exclusive rights in this province, especially 
in the vicinity of Amoy. It is reported in the press that Japan is now 
endeavoring to secure the exclusive right to develop the mines of this 
province. These include large coal fields near Amoy, as well as exten- 
sive deposits of lead, iron, and precious minerals. These coal fields 
are not yet worked. The Japanese recently secured a concession on the 
island of Amoy, which is to be developed in the interest of her Formosa 
trade. She has within a year let the contracts for buildings to the 
extent of 70,000 yen, and many moves which have attracted my atten- 
tion confirm the rumor that she has in view a monopoly of the coal and 
iron and lead of the surrounding mountains. 

Amoy has probably the finest harbor in southern China, which is 
also taken into consideration. 

The leading British merchant here, Mr. Francis Cass, who during the 
past twenty years has frequently acted as American vice-consul, and 
whose knowledge is extensive and judgment good, thinks these are 
facts which should be considered in the event America retains the Philip- 
pines. 

Amoy's trade with the United States leads that of all other China 
ports, and is chiefly in the hands of the British. The entire community 
is jubilant over the prospect of the Manila trade passing under our 
control. So enthusiastic are they that every possible demonstration 
of good will has been resorted to. On July 4 every American flag 
which they could secure was hoisted over their commercial houses dur- 
ing the entire day, and every firm called at the consulate to express 
congratulations. The German firms were scarcely less cordial in their 
congratulations. They have suffered in their extensive trade with the 
Philippines because of certain annoying regulations, and realize that 
if put upon a similar fair basis to that now prevailing with the United 
States great good will result. 

Not knowing whether these facts are known in the Department or 
not, I refrain from further details until I know your pleasure. 
I have the honor, etc., 

A. BURLINGAME JOHNSON, 

United States Consul. 



Singapore, June 30, 1896. 
To His Excellency the President of the United States of America. 

Your Excellency: Confirming my letter of 20th instant, I have 
now the honor to inclose a cover just received from General Aguinaldo, 
the Philippine insurgent leader, with instructions to forward it by first 
mail to Your Excellency. 

In the letter which General Aguinaldo writes me he states that he 
incloses a telegram which he desires me to transmit to Your Excellency, 
but both this and other documents I regret to say have been extracted 
from the cover during transit. 

The envelope arrived here with the side torn away and a note written 
on the same by your consul-general in Hongkong, through whom it was 



360 TREATY OF PEACE. 

forwarded, that it had been received iu bad condition from H. M. S. 
Linnet. 

I have taken steps to find the missing document, which will be for- 
warded to Your Excellency if the search proves successful. 
I have the honor, etc., 

Howard W. Bray. 



[Translation.] 



Cavite, June 10, 1898. 
To the President of the Republic of the 

Great North American Nation. 

Dear and Honored Sir: I come to greet you with the most tender 
effusion of my soul, and to express to you my deep and sincere grati- 
tude, in the name of the unfortunate Philippine people, for the efficient 
and disinterested protection which you have decided to give it, to shake 
off the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination, as you are 
doing to the equally unfortunate Cuba, which Spain wishes to see anni- 
hilated rather than free and independent, giving her, to quiet her and 
to cicatrize the deep wounds made in her heart by the iniquities com- 
mitted upon her children, a false autonomy, of which one bold blow of 
the Governor- General may deprive her immediately, as she has no 
colonial army to serve as a counterpoise to the almost sovereign powers 
of that supreme authority. 

At the same time, as I am always frank and open, I must express to 
you the great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading in the 
Times, a newspaper of the greatest circulation and reputation in the 
whole world, in its issue of the 5th of last month, the astounding state- 
ment that you, sir, will retain these islands until the end of the war, 
and, if Spain fails to pay the indemnity, will sell them to a European 
power, preferably Great Britain ; but we found a palliative to our sor- 
row in the improbability and suddenness of that statement, as common 
sense refuses to believe that so sensible a public man as you would 
venture to make an assertion so contrary to common sense, before events 
are entirely consummated, as you well know that if God favors the 
triumph of your arms to-day, to-morrow He may defeat them and give 
the victory to Spain, and because such an assertion is not consistent 
with the protection of which you make a boast toward this unfortunate 
people, which has been groaning for more than three centuries in the 
clutches of a nation which has for its shield (emblem) the lion, one of 
the ferocious animals, although she displays it as a symbol of nobility, 
which she certainly does not possess, besides the fact that it is opposed 
to your noble and generous sentiments to wish to sell these islands to 
a European power such as England, thereby making us pass under the 
domination of that nation, which, although it has a truly liberal gov- 
ernment, partakes none' the less of the nature of a tyranny as it is 
monarchical. 

Oh, sir, you are greatly injured by this statement, which ought to be 
regarded merely as a diplomatic trick invented by the friends of Spain 
to induce us to help her by using this vile slander which has been 
hurled against you to arouse our hostility to that powerful nation over 
whose destinies you happily preside. 

The Philippine people, however, have not given credit to that awk- 
wardly invented fable, and have seen in your nation, ever since your 
fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish fleet which was here, in spite 
of its being assisted by the guns of their two forts, the angel who is 
the harbinger of their liberty ; and they rose like a single wave when, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 861 

as soon as I trod these shores, I addressed them to gain them over; 
and they captured, within the period of ten days, nearly the whole 
garrison of this Province of Oavite, in whose port I have my govern- 
ment — by the consent of the admiral of your triumphant fleet — as well 
as the garrison of the adjoining Province of Bataan, together with the 
governors and officials of both provinces; and my valiant hosts are 
now besieging Manila, the capital, on the south and east, while my 
forces in the Province of Bulacan, which adjoins this province on the 
north, and the chief town of which is likewise being besieged by them, 
nearly surround Manila on the north. 

Such is the astouishing triumph which this suffering people has 
gained in a few days over the conquering race whose traditional valor, 
of which ir is continually bragging, has been humbled on these battle- 
fields and has been succeeded by a great terror; and a people of such 
warlike qualities, which is, moreover, thoroughly civilized, as nearly 
two thirds of them can read and write, and as they have in their midst 
many men of high attainments in the sciences and arts, should not be 
sold as if it were a lamb to be sacrificed and exploited for the greed of 
another nation. 

I close by protesting once and a thousand times, in the name of this 
people, which knows how to fight for its honor by means of its impro- 
vised warriors and artillery men, against the statement published by 
the Times, mainly for the purpose of casting a blot in history upon its 
glorious name; a people which trusts blindly in you not to abandon it 
to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and independent, even if 
you make peace with Spain, and I offer fervent prayers for the ever- 
increasing prosperity of your powerful nation, to which and to you I 
shall show unbounded gratitude, and shall repay with interest that great 
obligation. 

Your humble servant, 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



Consulate-General of the United States, 

Hongkong, August 4, 1898. 
Sir: By request I have the honor to confirm the following telegram 
sent you on the 2d instant : 

Cortes family, representing wealthy educated families Manila, implore you through 
Consul-General Wildman, in name humanity and Christianity, not to desert them, 
and aid to obtain annexation Philippines to America. Please see the President. 

I may add in explanation of this telegram that there is a large 
colony of wealthy Filipinos who have been driven out of Manila, and 
the bulk of whose fortunes have been confiscated, resident here. They 
are people of education as well as wealth, and they are intensely loyal 
to the United States. The Cortes family are particularly so, and they 
have contributed money liberally to aid Aguinaldo on the understand- 
ing that he was fighting for annexation of the Philippines«to the United 
States. Naturally I sympathize with them in their desire to become a 
part of the United States, and have advised them that you would give 
their cablegram your kindly consideration. 

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 

Kounsevelle Wildman, 

Consul- General. 
Hon. Marcus Hanna, 

United States Senate, Washington. 



STATEMENT OF MA J. GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, U. S. A, OCTOBER 4, 
1898, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT 
PARIS, AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. 



Commissioners of the United States, 

Paris, October 4, 1898. 

Gen. Wesley Merritt appeared before the Commission. 

The first matter offered was a communication from Gen. F. V. 
Greene, U. S. V., which was read by the secretary. 

Mr. Day. What have you to say, General, as to the qualifications, 
knowledge, and ability of General Greene to speak on this subject? 

General Merritt. This communication was written without a 
knowledge on his part that it would be laid before the Commission, 
so he probably expresses himself a little more strongly than he would 
if he knew he was talking to you gentlemen having this matter \v 
charge. I consider his views exceedingly good, and they are sup 
ported by the views of the others who have reported on the different 
subjects mentioned there, and I can say that generally they are all 
men of ability and men whose views would have a great deal of weight 
with me. 

Mr. Frye. What experience has General Greene had? 

General Merritt. In what direction? 

Mr. Frye. In any direction as an investigator? He was in Russia 
a while? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and wrote the best and most authentic — 
the best received — book on the Russian-Turkish war published yet. 
He is a man who reads a great deal, quite a student, a very bright 
man. 

Mr. Davis. Is he a Regular Army officer? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; graduated from the Academy, I think 
in 1867, and has since that time been instructor of engineering at the 
Academy and was when I knew him — while I commanded at the 
Academy, about five years. 

Mr. Reid. What opportunities has he had for observation in the 
Philippines? 

General Merritt. He went at the same time I did and left at the 
same time. He was out on the lines all the time, and took a great 
deal of interest in investigating with the citizens and soldiers. He 
knew some of the ranking officers, although he did not know Agui- 
naldo nor have anything to do with him. It was part of my policy 
that we should keep ourselves aloof from Aguinaldo as much as pos- 
sible, because we knew trouble would occur from his wanting to go to 
Manila at the time of its surrender. 

Mr. Frye. He is a gentleman on whose judgment you would have 
a great deal of reliance? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

362 



TREATY OF PEACE. 363 

The Chairman. When did General Greene get to the Philippine 
Islands? 

General Merritt. He got there about the middle of July. 

The Chairman. And left about what time? 

General Merritt. The latter part of August. 

The Chairman. Your army occupied Cavite and vicinity? 

General Merritt. When General Greene got there he was put at once 
beyond Aguinaldo's headquarters at Bacu, on the beach and opposite 
Manila, where he established his lines. When I got there I found the 
insurgents were holding the lines in front of him, and I directed him, 
peaceably if he could and if not by force, to get his lines in front, so 
there would be no mixture of troops. It was rather an anomalous 
condition, and the general in command there agreed to take part of 
the lines 

The Chairman. The insurgent general? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. General Greene saw a great deal of 
them in moving around his lines and prospecting in other directions 
to learn the character of the country. 

The Chairman. Was he in the interior of the country? 

General Merritt. No, sir. 

The Chairman. How long in Manila? 

General Merritt. About two weeks; from the 13th of August to 
the 29th of August. 

The Chairman. What do you regard as the principal means of 
information as to the character and needs of the people? 

General Merritt. His means of information ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General Merritt. Merely the contact that would naturally occur 
from an active man moving around and seeing more or less of them 
and hearing them talk. 

The Chairman. Principally with the insurgents? 

General Merritt. As well as the British and other foreign residents 
and some few Spaniards. 

The Chairman. After you occupied Manila? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. Before that, of course, it was mainly 
the insurgents and such English as came out to visit us. 

After the reading of General Greene's statement General Merritt 
made the following statement: 

General Merritt. I would add to my remarks in regard to General 
Greene's report that immediately upon the occupation of Manila I 
appointed General Greene chief of the bureaus of collection. He 
occupied a position in Manila which was analogous to the position of 
the Secretary of the Treasury in the United States, and in that way 
he got a good deal of information, which came to him from different 
sources. 

In that connection it might be remarked that Augustino, the Gov- 
ernor-General up to the 5th of August, borrowed from the Philippino 
Bank in Manila $2,000,000, and they have nothing to show for it nor 
no place to be repaid from. We had to bolster up the bank in order 
to keep it from going to pieces. There would have been a run on it 
at once; but the other banks, the Hongkong and English banks— all 
managed by Engbshmen — stepped in and said they would guaranty 
the payment of bills by this Filipino bank up to a certain amount, 
I think $200,000, and we transacted business with them through the 
custom-house the same as the other banks. Of course when they 
arrive at that limit we will have to have additional security or the ■ 



364 TREATY OF PEACE. 

bank will have to be closed. For a while we protected it by closing 
it and putting a guard over it. 

The statement of Major (and Dr.) Bournes was read by the sec- 
retary. 

Mr. Frye. Please make a statement about him, General. 

General Merritt. He was at Atlanta, Ga., when the expedition 
started. I had an interview — he came to me at Governors Island — 
and I was so well satisfied that he knew more than anyone else who 
had applied to go as interpreter that I got the War Department to 
appoint him a surgeon in the service, and I sent him ahead with Gen- 
eral Greene. He was a man who had been there three or more years — 
I was under the impression that he had been there longer than the 
date he gives in his report — is a man of great intelligence, knows 
the different languages of the islanders, talks with them fluently, 
knows Spanish and English of course ; and his views, while modestly 
put, are entitled to a great deal of credit. 

The Chairman. Are we to understand that he had a three years' 
residence in the islands — the Philippine Islands? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; he had been there as a naturalist or 
something of that kind. 

The Chairman. Had been on the other islands from Luzon? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; Iloilo and Mindanao, and some others 
perhaps. Major Bournes is a very intelligent and very honest man. 
I place more weight to his views than any other man I know of, 
because he has had a better opportunity to judge, and he states his 
views mildly. 

Mr. Reid. He has had longer experience than others? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

The statement of Maj. J. L. Bell, major of engineers, was then read 
by the secretary. 

General Merritt. Major Bell was an officer on my staff, and went 
out there before I did, conducted the secret service, and was very 
active. He moved around in the insurgent lines, and, to a certain 
extent, in the Spanish lines, though I forbade bis being disguised or 
anything of that kind. All the risk he took was as an officer of the 
army. He knows the army and navy officers from Aguinaldo down, 
and had frequent conferences with him and his officers. His report 
relates more particularly to the situation as -regards the Filipino 
army. 

Major Bell got his information before I arrived there and at the 
time I was there. I think he exaggerates the number of troops and 
arms they have for the service. The largest estimate outside of his 
has been 15,000 guns — small arms. I doubt very much whether the 
insurgents have that many. The Spaniards, who are supposed to 
have lost quite a number of arms because of the desertion of the 
natives whom they armed, have more arms than troops there. They 
surrendered 22,000 stands of arms of the latest patterns and millions 
of cartridges. 

Mr. Reid. Mausers? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and others. 

Mr. Frye. To us? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and they claimed to surrender 14,000 
soldiers, but up to the time I left we could not count more than eight 
or ten thousand, and that is probably about the number. 

Mr. Gray. Spanish soldiers? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; except two regiments, who were natives. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 365 

They wanted to dismiss the natives and send them off, bnt I objected 
to that and said they had armed them and must treat the native* as 
the Spaniards. 

The Chairman. Where are those soldiers? 

General Merritt. In the city's different convents. We made them 
vacate the barracks and used them for our own troops. They are in 
the public squares, churches, convents, etc. 

The Chairman. In and about Manila? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and in the suburbs. 

Mr. Gray. Under guard? 

General Merritt. No, sir. 

Mr. Gray. Under parole? 

General Merritt. No, sir; they would not take parole. I believe 
there is something in the Spanish military regulations that makes it 
capital punishment for the Spanish soldiers to take parole. 

Mr. Davis. Under any circumstances? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; so they told me. They consider it a 
breach of honor, and they are liable to trial by court-martial, and the 
officers subject to capital punishment if they did it. I, however, made 
them promise for themselves and their men, and sign a roll, that they 
would not take up arms during this war against us; but that was 
scarcely necessary, for there was not a possibility of their doing so. 
They surrendered all their arms except the side arms of the officers. 

Mr. Reid. Are they well behaved? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; the officers were a little bumptious at 
first. They would march around the streets with their side arms, and 
it created some little friction, and I had a letter written to General 
Arderius, and said that it would look better if they discarded their 
arms and did not parade the streets so much, and that had the desired 
effect, and there has been no trouble since. I did not exact it in the 
note, but I would have done so if necessary. 

The next statement was that of Admiral Dewey, dated August 29, 
1898, which was read by the Secretary. 

During the reading: 

Mr. Frye. Is there anything more recent from Admiral Dewey than 
that? 

General Merritt. Not to my knowledge. This is a copy of a dis- 
patch sent by him in reply to a question propounded from Washington. 

Mr. Gray. Is not 3,000,000 an overestimate of the population of 
the Island of Luzon? 

General Merritt. I think not; they generally put it larger. 

The Chairman. It was first stated by Admiral Dewey at 825,000. 
Do you know how he got that estimate? 

General Merritt. I do not. 

After the reading of Admiral Dewey's statement: 

The Chairman. 1 would like to ask about Admiral Dewey's views. 
He selects the Island of Luzon as the one to be obtained. Do you 
understand that that is Admiral Dewey's view? 

General Merritt. I understand the question was asked from Wash- 
ington, "If we took but one island, which is the best to seize upon?" 

The Chairman. Do you know, aside from that question, what 
Admiral Dewey's view is as to taking one island, or all the islands? 

General Merritt. I do not. I am inclined to believe, however, 
that he is in favor of taking the entire archipelago; but I would not 
so state it. 
The Chairman. You never heard him say so? 



366 TREATY OF PEACE. 

General Merritt. We have talked the matter over many times, 
but I would not state that he expressed himself in this way, as I might 
talk to this commission. 

Mr. Reid. This statement was made in reply to a question asking 
which island would be best to retain if only one was kept? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; and he naturally selects the largest and 
most populous. I did not have a chance to talk with him after read- 
ing this dispatch, or I would have asked him to express himself in 
that regard. He told me that reply was to a question from Wash- 
ington asking, If we retained only one island, which is the better one 
to retain? 

The Chairman. That was the question in June? 

General Merritt. I think he said his telegram in June referred to 
the capacity of the natives to govern themselves as compared with 
the Cubans. 

The next statement was that of Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, 
judge-advocate, U. S. V. 

Before it was read General Merritt said : 

I think you will not find much in what Colonel Jewett says. He 
was a gentleman highly recommended to me from Indiana as judge- 
advocate, and I appointed him, although he did not know enough 
about the business to give him charge of the whole business; and I 
gave him something to occupy him. He was very anxious to come 
here, and wanted me to ask Washington to send him, but he does not 
know very much, and his views are not worth much. He intimates 
he knows a good deal, but does not give it in his statement. 

The statement was then read by the secretary. 

The next statement was that of Mr. Andre, Belgian consul at 
Manila. 

Before it was read: 

General Merritt. That is rather important. The man is an intel- 
ligent man. He expresses himself very poorly in English, and I have 
tried to have his report corrected to an extent, but I think a good deal 
of reliance can be placed upon it. He is very earnest in hoping that 
the Spanish will be excluded and the Filipinos not allowed to govern 
themselves, but some government established there which will protect 
the merchants and business men. It might be remarked that he is 
largely interested in business matters, and has been there, I think, 
for about fourteen years; is quite a wealthy man, and gives his views 
from that standpoint. 

The statement was then read by the secretary. 
, Mr. Frye. How old a man is he? 

General Merritt. He is quite a young man. He tells me he has 
been there fourteen years. He states his case entirely from the point 
of view of a rich merchant. He does not sign himself as the Belgian 
consul, because he said he could not do so, but he gives his statement 
as his personal opinion. He seems to think the United States is 
engaged in a crusade for the benefit of the oppressed of all lands. 

Mr. Gray. Where is this Belgian consul resident? 

General Merritt. In Manila. 

The next paper consisted of correspondence between General Ander- 
son and General Aguinaldo. 

Before it was read : 

General Merritt. I do not know that the Commission will be inter- 
ested in that. It is correspondence between General Anderson and 
Aguinaldo, and relates largely to Aguinaldo's growing views. The 



TREATY OF PEACE. 367 

whole correspondence was deprecated by Admiral Dewey before I got 
there, and I suppressed the whole thing after I arrived, because it was 
not the wish of the Government to make any promises to the insurgents 
or act in any way with them. 

The correspondence was read by the secretary. 

Mr. Frye. In obtaining supplies in what money did you pay? 

General Merritt. The money of the country. 

Mr. Frye. Mexican silver? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. With reference to the last letter read, 
that letter and one other letter received from Aguinaldo, which has 
been mislaid and which I can not reproduce, I made no reply to, except 
to tell him he must withdraw his forces outside those limits. 

The commission he refers to was brought to me by General Ander- 
son. He asked me if I would talk to them, and I said I would. It 
was a few days after the surrender, and I received them at my head- 
quarters in Manila, and they agreed the insurgents should withdraw 
outside any lines I might designate. I detailed two officers, General 
Greene and General MacArthur, to designate a line in red pencil, and 
gave it to them on a map, and told them I should insist on the with-: 
drawal of his troops. It took in part of the lines Aguinaldo's troops 
had occupied previous to our getting there, but it was necessary to 
enforce a proper status between the insurgents and our own forces and 
to keep them out of Manila. 

Before that time, rather early after my arrival there at Manila, I 
had telegraphed to the War Department of the possible trouble that 
might arise with the insurgents, and asked for instructions as to 
whether I should consider them as enemies and treat them accordingly 
in such case. To that request I had no reply, and the consequence 
was I had to mix diplomacy with force in order to avoid a tilt with 
them. I knew, if bloodshed was once had, that would be the end of 
an amicable status there, and to that end I was careful only to enforce 
that which was proper and which I conceived must be executed in 
order to have my troops fully occupy the ground we had taken. In 
his letters to General Anderson he speaks of concessions they made 
there in the occupation of lines. They did. I told General Greene — 
gave him the instructions — to try to get these positions by an amicable 
arrangement if possible, but, if necessary, to report the faot to me, 
and I should use force to secure them. At the time I went there I 
found we had no lines, no base upon which to approach Manila. The 
insurgents had their pickets to the front of ours, and our main guard 
was in the rear of their main guard, and I gave General Greene orders 
to change that status, which he did, and purely by arrangement with 
that general of whom Major Bell speaks as being a very sensible fel- 
low and a good fellow. It appears, when the request was made of 
him, he corresponded with Aguinaldo, and the latter agreed to it. 

Mr. Reid. Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably 
remote? 

General Merritt. I think there is no danger of conflict as long as 
these people think the United States is going to take possession there. 
If they imagine, or hear from any source, that the Spaniards are to 
be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent. 
Mr. Davis. What do you mean by "there"? 

General Merritt. I mean at Manila ; in the military lines ; in the 
positions they held. 
The Chairman. Suppose the United States should acquire even the 



368 TREATY OF PEACE. 

island of Luzon and set up there its own government, do you think 
Aguinaldo and his followers would submit to it? 

General Merritt. On the island of Luzon alone? 

The Chairman. Yes; taking that now under consideration only. 

General Merritt. Only with the understanding that eventually it 
should be restored to the Filipinos, in the event of the United States 
vacating. 

Mr. Davis. Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with 
Spain, should take Luzon, all the Philippines, or a part, by virtue of 
a treaty, paying no attention to the insurgents, how would that be 
taken by Aguinaldo? 

General Merritt. I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following 
would resist it, but whether he could resist to any extent I do not 
know, because his forces are divided. I believe that as matters go 
on Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there. This oppo- 
sition he speaks of in the last letter read on the part of his chiefs 
arises principally from this fellow Pelo (?), who is an insurgent and a 
freebooter and a very bad man, and he is only favorable to Aguinaldo 
as long as Aguinaldo heads a war party against all comers. 

Mr. Davis. He is in for booty? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. If the United States should say that we shall take 
this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would 
submit to it? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Even Aguinaldo? 

General Merritt. Aguinaldo without his party would not amount 
to anything. 

Mr. Frye. Suppose, by treaty, we take Luzon alone and establish 
our Government there, raise our flag there, give to the people the 
freedom from taxation and other burdens, from slavery, etc., that 
we give to our own people, how long, in your opinion, would it be before 
there would be insurrections in all these other islands we have 
returned to Spain or that Spain retains? 

General Merritt. These other islands, as Dr. Bournes and this 
Andre point out, are scarcely in revolt against Spain now. Whether, 
resulting from example in Luzon, they would be incited to insur- 
rection is a question. Aguinaldo is the head and front of the 
insurrection so far as it extends. 

Mr. Frye. Suppose we had the possession as I suggest, with a good 
government as I suggest, the knowledge of which would be in time 
conveyed to these other islands, that these people in Luzon were so 
much better off than they were, do you think the natives of Luzon 
would abstain from sending filibustering expeditions and inciting 
rebellion in these other islands? 

General Merritt. I think, as Major Bell has pointed out, there are 
a good many of these insurrectionists who like the business because 
they have nothing to lose and something to gain in the way of booty. 

Mr. Frye. Do you not think, if we retain Luzon, and the other 
islands remain under the sovereignty of Spain, we should be in con- 
tinual danger of a conflict with Spain? 

General Merritt. I think so, unquestionably. 

Mr. Davis. I did not understand the General to answer clearly the 
first question, which was that if we should set up a government in 
Luzon which, by its fairness, would invite comparison with that of 
Spain, what would those other islands do about it? 



TREATY OF PEACE. 369 

General Merrttt. I do not know enough about those other islands 
to give an opinion. 

Mr. Gray. Are they intelligent enough to appreciate the difference? 

General Merritt. I doubt if they are, because they are not much 
on the seacoast, and they do not know much about it. As Senator 
Frye suggests, filibustering expeditions might be raised at Luzon. 

Mr. Gray. Suppose, by final treaty with Spain, we should abandon 
Luzon and all the Philippines, exacting such terms and conditions 
and guaranties as we should think necessary, and abandon them 
entirely, reserving only a coaling station, perhaps ; what do you think 
they would do about it? 

General Merritt. I think in the island of Luzon they would fight 
to the bitter end. I have talked with a number of them, intelligent 
men, who said their lives were nothing to them as compared with the 
freedom of the country, getting rid of Spanish government. 

Mr. Davis. Do you think Spain would be able to reduce them? 

General Merritt. No, sir. 

Mr. Gray. Do you think, in the event of such an abandonment, it 
would be possible for them to set up a self-government? 

General Merritt. It would take time to do it. They would have 
to be educated up to it. They want a protectorate, but they do not 
exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they should 
collect the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we 
should be at the expense of maintaining an army and a navy there 
for their protection, which is the kind of a protectorate they would 
like very much. 

Mr. Frye. I suppose their idea of government is practically derived 
from the Spaniards? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What they desire is a government for their benefit, 
maintained and paid for by us? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Davis. Do you understand that condition of slavery prevails 
which is described in that letter read? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; entirely as described by Mr. Andre. 

Mr. Gray. If Admiral Dewey had sailed away after accomplishing 
that naval achievement and left this people as he found them, except 
for the destruction of the Spanish fleet, what, in your opinion, would 
have been the condition of the island as to Spanish supremacy and 
their ability to suppress the rebellion? 

General Merritt. If the Spaniards had replaced their fleet with 
another, I do not believe the revolutionists could have taken Manila. 
Along the bay it is 30 miles, 17 by water, and the coast shows the 
evidences of where the Spaniards have used the guns of their fleets, 
riddled the houses with shells, and prevented the insurgents from 
approaching the town; and the insurgents would have been driven to 
approach the town from the interior, where the Spanish troops were 
concentrated against them. It was only after the destruction by 
Dewey of the fleet and his occupation of the bay that these people 
surrounded the place and held their positions and took possession of 
the waterworks, which they held for some two or three months. For 
two months, perhaps three months, the water had been cut off from 
the town. 

Mr. Reid. What is the nature of that supply? 

General Merritt. Very good. 
t p 24 



370 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Reid. Good aqueducts, and from a stream? 

General Merritt. Yes, sir; fresh water from a stream in the 
mountains. 

Mr. Davis. How many troops, in your opinion, will be necessary to 
administer the government of this island — to secure the administra- 
tion of our Government there? 

General Merritt. From 20,000 to 25,000 would be necessary at first. 

Mr. Davis. And after that? 

General Merritt. After that they might be very materially reduced, 
because you could get natives into the occupying forces there who 
would make perfectly good soldiers. 

Mr. Frye. I was going to inquire whether it would not be possible 
to get natives to enlist, and whether Aguinaldo could not be given a 
command? 

General Merritt. Perfectly so, perfectly. 



PAPERS TO ACCOMPANY THE STATEMENT OE MAJ. GEN. WESLEY 
MERRITT, U. S. A., OCTOBER 4, 1898, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES 
PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. 



INDEX. 

OPINIONS ON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

Page. 

Greene, Brig. Gen. F. V.. 374 

Bourns, Frank S. , major and chief surgeon 375 

Bell, J. F. , major of Engineers . 379 

Dewey, Rear- Admiral George . 383 

Jewett, Charles L. , lieutenant-colonel, judge-advocate 385 

Belgian consul at Manila 386 

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL AGUINALDO. 

Anderson, Gen. T. M. (July 4) Advises commanding general Philippine 
forces of the entire sympathy with the United States of the native 
people of the islands. Desires amicable relations with the people and 
their cooperation. It will be necessary to occupy the town of Cavite 
as a base of operations, but no interference will be made with the func- 
tions or privileges of General Aguinaldo or the other native citizens. 
Asks that the officers of the insurgent forces be instructed not to inter- 
fere with United States officers in the performance of their duties in 
Cavite. 390 

Aguinaldo, General. (July 5) Expresses gratitude to General Anderson for 
the sympathy of the United States. Has already ordered noninterfer- 
ence with United States officers. Asks that he be informed of any mis- 
conduct of any of his people - 390 

Anderson, General. (July 6) Acknowledges letter of 5th instant from 
Senor Aguinaldo, commanding Philippine forces, and says he is anxious 
to come to a definite understanding. Expects large addition to his 
forces, and will need more camping room. Is anxious to avoid any con- 
flict of authority, but must have place for landing of supplies and storing 
of same - 391 

Jones, Major and Quartermaster. (July 17) Informs General Aguinaldo 
that the second expedition of United States troops (five to seven thousand 
men) will encamp in vicinity of Paranaque. Certain assistance will be 
required in the way of horses, etc. Payment will be made forthis. Sup- 
plies must be had even if it is necessary to seize them. Request made 
by General Anderson's direction . . 391 

Memorandum. (July 17) General Aguinaldo and secretary called upon 
General Anderson to say that two Americans assuming to be officers had 
called and presented a letter, as to which he requested a statement 
whether it was authorized - - 392 

Anderson, General. (July 19) Acknowledges letter of General Aguinaldo 
of the 18th instant, and returns thanks for the offer of assistance. Says 
there will be no confiscation of property, and that a fair compensation 
will be given for all supplies. . 392 

Anderson, General. (July 19) Introduces to General Aguinaldo Maj. J. F. 
Bell, and asks that he be afforded every facility for obtaining informa- 
tion 393 

371 



372 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Pago. 

Anderson, General. (July 21) Asks passes and such other assistance as 
practicable be given Lieut. E. J. Bryan and party for reconnoitering the 
country 393 

Anderson, General. (July 22) Replies to letter of General Aguinaldo in 
regard to property of Don Antonio Osorio. The property in question will 
be held subject to investigation. Has no authority to recognize the 
assumption of dictatorship by Aguinaldo 393 

Anderson, General. (July 23) Advises General Aguinaldo of his request 
of three weeks ago as to the necessity of means of transportation for the 
American army, and to which he has hitherto received no response. 
Makes requisition for 500 horses, 50 oxen, and ox carts. If Aguinaldo 
can not secure these, requisition will have to be made directly upon the 
people - 394 

Aguinaldo, General. (July 24) Replies to General Anderson's strictures 
as to seizure of a storehouse of Antonio Osorio in Cavite. Says he came 
from Hongkong to prevent his countrymen from making common cause 
with the Spanish against the United States. He then proclaimed himself 
dictator and established a revolutionary government, which exists to-day. 
"While such government has not been recognized by foreign powers, he 
expects the United States will look upon it with greater benevolence than 
any other nation. Considers it inadvisable for United States troops to 
be landed in places conquered by Filipinos from the Spanish without 
previous notice to him. Such act might be misunderstood by the people. 
Is well aware of what he and his people owe to Admiral Dewey, but 
very anxious to prevent foreign intervention prejudicial to the United 
States as well as to the native population of the Philippines 394 

Agiiinaldo, General (July 24). States that he misunderstood the desires of 
the United States forces before, but now he will assist in supplying all 
requisitions for transportation necessities if given reasonable notice 395 

Anderson, General. Refers to letter of 24th instant of Senor Aguinaldo, 
touching the property of Don Antonio Osorio. Advises him that same 
has been referred to General Merritt (July 27) 396 

Anderson, General. Acknowledges General Aguinaldo's letter of 26th as 
to the cattle, horses, etc. Regrets misunderstanding, but was informed 
that nothing could be supplied except by order of Aguinaldo. The United 
States quartermaster will establish a depot near the American camp and 
will receive and pay for all supplied. This communication bears date 
July 24 396 

Anderson, General (July 27) . Transmits last letter he received from insur- 
gent chief, dated Bacood, July 24. Also submits entire correspondence 
of insurgent chief - 397 

Anderson, General (July 27). "With a view to obtain information as to 
approaches to Manila, requests Aguinaldo to give the officers making 
reconnoissance all possible assistance 397 

Aguinaldo, General (August 1). Informs Consul Williams that he is 
impressed by the note of July 8, and thanks him for kind words therein. 
Thinks the islands will be in effect one of the richest and pleasantest 
countries of the globe if the capital and industry of North Americans 
come to develop the soil. In reference to annexation, does not think his 
people can be made to believe this. Makes suggestions as to the expecta- 
tions of his people and desires that Mr. Williams inform Washington that 
the Filipinos have abandoned savagery, etc 397 

Aguinaldo, General (August 14) to General Anderson with regard to his 
being allowed to enter Manila, and the desirability of preventing conflict 
between the two forces - - 399 

Aguinaldo, General (August 13) to General Anderson in reference to diffi- 
culties between Filipino forces and American forces, and the strict orders 
he gave his chiefs to preserve great respect for American forces - - - 399 

Merritt, General. With regard to a memorandum from General Aguinaldo 
addressed to General Anderson which purports to contain a statement of 
certain desires on the part of the Filipinos. Sets forth concessions which 
will be granted Fihpinos after certain conditions are complied with. 
Dated August 20 _ 400 

Aguinaldo, General. (August 21.) Agrees to withdraw his forces from the 
suburbs to the line indicated by General Merritt if the within promises 
and conditions are agreed to 400 



TREATY OF PEACE. 373 

Page. 

Aguinaldo, General. (August 24.) Telegram to General Merritt in regard 
to the death of an American soldier at Cavite. Promises full investiga- 
tion, but is of the opinion that his people are not responsible for the 
trouble - - -- 40 1 

Merritt, General. Letter to Aguinaldo acknowledging communication of 
21st instant. Refers him to Admiral Dewey in regard to protection of 
American squadron. Promises good will of American people 401 

Merritt, General. (August 25.) Reply to telegram from Aguinaldo dated 
August 24. Thanks him for notifying him so promptly and trusts that 
harmony will prevail - 402 

Aguinaldo, General. (August 27.) Is surprised that the General thinks his 
commissioners committed themselves in regard to the withdrawal of 
troops outside the line designated. Is disposed to sacrifice to friendship 
everything not prejudicial to the rights of the Philippine^ city. Compre- 
hends inconvenience of a double occupation of the city. Asks that the 
aid of the Filipinos be not made light of and promises to withdraw his 
troops to certain lines. Does not believe that the acceptance of the con- 
ditions proposed would be prejudicial to the rights of the city. Is forced 
to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the grumblings of his chiefs 
and soldiers, who have already sacrificed much 402 



MEMORANDUM CONCERNING TOE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

[Made August 27, 1898.] 

By Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V. 

If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war 
will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insur- 
gents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Navy prior 
to our arrival, and we can not ignore obligations, either to the insur- 
gents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. 
The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish 
power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be 
unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. Spaniards 
individually stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish Gov- 
ernment is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large 
floating debt. The loss of property has been great. On the other 
hand, the Filipinos can not govern the country without the support 
of some strong nation. They acknowledge this themselves, and say 
their desire is for independence under American protection; but they 
have only vague ideas as to what our relative positions would be — 
what part we should take in collecting and expending the revenue 
and administering the government. 

The hatred between the Spanish and natives is very intense and 
can not be eradicated. The natives are all Roman Catholics and 
devoted to the church, but have bitter hatred for monastic orders — 
Dominican, Franciscan, and Recollects. They insist that these be sent 
out of the country or they will murder them. These friars own the 
greater part of the land, and have grown rich by oppressing the native 
husbandmen. Aguinaldo's army numbers 10,000 to 15,000 men in 
vicinity of Manila, who have arms and ammunition, but no regular 
organization. They receive no pay, and are held together by hope of 
booty when they enter Manila. They are composed largely of young 
men and boys from surrounding country, who have no property and 
nothing to lose in a civil war. Aguinaldo has two or three ships, and 
is sending armed men to the northern portions of Luzon and to other 
islands. TheSpaniards there, being cut off from communication with 
Manila and Spain, can not be reenforced. 

The result will be an extension of the civil war and further destruc- 
tion of property. There are in Manila itself nearly 200,000 native 
Filipinos, among whom are large numbers with more or less Spanish 
and Chinese blood who are men of character*, education, ability, and 
wealth. They hate the Spanish, are unfriendly toward other nations, 
and look only to America for assistance. They are not altogether 
in sympathy with Aguinaldo, fearing the entry of his army into 
Manila almost as much as the Spaniards fear it. They say Aguinaldo 
is not fitted either by ability or experience to be the head of a native 
government, and doubt if he would be elected President in an honest 
election. Principal foreign interests here are British, and their feel- 
374 



TREATY OF PEACE. 375 

ing is unanimous in favor of American occupation. They have 
already forwarded a memorial to their Government asking for it as 
the only way to protect life and property. 

Altogether the situation here is somewhat similar to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1878, and Egypt in 1882, and the only practicable 
solution seems to be on lines somewhat similar to those adopted in 
those cases. The length of our occupation would depend on circum- 
stances as developed in the future, but should be determined solely 
in our discretion without obbgation to or consultation with other 
powers. This plan can only be worked out by careful study by the 
Paris Commission, and they should have advice and full information 
from some one who has been here during our occupation and thor- 
oughly understands the situation. It is not understood in America, 
and. unless properly dealt with at Paris will inevitably lead to future 
complications and possibly war. 

The currency of the country is silver. The Mexican dollar is pre- 
ferred, and worth about 47 cents gold, but the gold dollar will not 
buy in labor or merchandise any more than the Mexican dollar, and 
any attempt to establish a gold basis for currency would ruin any 
business in the islands. 

The total revenue is about $17,000,000 Mexican, derived about 35 
per cent from customs, 50 per cent from internal taxes, and 15 per 
cent from state lottery and sale of monopolies. More than two-thirds 
of the internal revenue comes from poll tax or cedula, which is very 
unpopular. The country was self-supporting and free of debt until the 
insurrection broke out about two years ago, but the expenses of the 
civil war have disorganized finances. There is a bonded debt, Series A, 
$15,000,000 Mexican, held in Spain, for which the colony never received 
any consideration, and another debt, Series B, same amount, which 
was forced on the people here, and the validity of which is open to 
question. Both debts are secured by first bens on custom-house 
receipts, but this does not appear to have been respected. 



Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 189S. 

Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., 

Manila, Philippine Islands. 

Sir : In obedience to your request I have the honor to submit the 
following : 

Although the Island of Luzon is the largest of the Phibppine group, 
and Ukewise the most important, there are others of great importance, 
especially from the commercial view-point. The most important of 
these are known as the Visayas, and include the islands of Panay, 
Negros, Zebu, Samar, Leyte, Masbate, Romblon, Tablas, and 
Cibuyan. 

The Island of Zebu, on which the City of Cebu is situated, is almost 
entirely under cultivation, there being but bttle of the original for- 
ests to be found. Here are cultivated sugar, to a bmited extent 
hemp, Indian corn, and other products. Here, likewise, are found 
mines of coal and deposits of petroleum, both as yet undeveloped. 

Panay, on which the city of Iloilo, the second port in commercial 
importance in the islands, is situated, is also well under cultivation, 
there being but few places in the northwest and west still covered 
with forests. Both of these islands are inhabited by the Visayan race, 



376 TREATY OF PEACE. 

all of whom have adopted Christianity and all of whom are nnder 
tribute to Spain. 

The island of Negros, situated between these two islands, is also of 
great importance from an agricultural view-point. There still exists 
in the interior of this island a great amount of forests, and some of 
the tribes in the interior have never been made tributory to Spain. 
It is a great sugar-producing island, almost all of the lowlands near 
the coast being under cultivation. 

Samar and Leyte, to the east, are not so well developed, but a great 
deal of hemp of the best quality is produced there, the most of which 
finds its way to markets by way of Manila, although some is shipped 
from Cebu. Most of the sugar produced in the three islands first 
mentioned is marketed at Iloilo. 

The smaller islands mentioned — Masbate, Romblon, Tablos, and 
Gibuyan — are of more importance as supporting large herds of cattle, 
the island of Masbate being especially noteworthy for this. The 
products of the islands just mentioned are marketed almost entirely 
in Manila. All of the people in these islands, with the exception of 
the few mentioned in the interior of Negros, are docile, well disposed, 
and easily managed. They are somewhat less energetic than the 
Tagologs of Luzon, and have never been involved in the insurrections 
occurring in these islands, to my knowledge, except in Cebu in 1896, 
and then through the influence of Tagologs sent there for the purpose 
of stirring up the insurrection. 

Mindanao, Basilan, and the Sulu group are inhabited for the most 
part by Malay tribes belonging to the Mohammedan faith. The inte- 
rior of the great island of Mindanao has never been conquered by the 
Spaniards. The important Spanish towns on this island are located 
on the seacoast and are inhabited largely by the emigrants from the 
other islands. 

The Sulu group has recently been brought under partial control of 
Spanish authority, but as yet the inhabitants do not pay tribute to 
Spain, or at least they did not up to the year of 1893. 

The island of Palawan, on the west, is almost entirely undeveloped, 
there being perhaps a half dozen small Spanish towns along the sea- 
coast on either side. The most important settlement is at Puerto 
Princesa, where there is a fine harbor. The most of the inhabitants 
are known as Tageannas, a Malay tribe just being brought under the 
influence of Spanish methods. 

The Caliaimanes, northeast of Palawan, are inhabited by the same 
tribe, but more emigrants are found here than in Palawan. Cattle 
are shipped from here to Manila, grazing being the principal industry. 

The large island of Mindoro, just south and west of Luzon, is almost 
entirely undeveloped, there being but a few Spanish towns along the 
coast. The few agricultural products of this island are almost entirely 
consumed by the inhabitants themselves, the principal exports being 
jungle products, such as rattan and woods. The sago palm grows 
abundantly throughout this island, and sago flour is the principal 
breadstuff of the uncivilized tribes of the interior. This island is 
supposed to contain large deposits of coal, and I myself at one time 
found outcroppings indicating a coal deposit at a place within easy 
communication of the seacoast. 

In regard to the island of Luzon I do not deem it necessary to say 
much, as it is the best-known island of the group. Large areas are 
under cultivation and large areas are still covered with the primeval 
forests. The majority of the people have been christianized and are 



TREATY OF PEACE. 377 

under the control of Spain, but many tribes in the forests and moun- 
tains have never been influenced by the Spanish Government. The 
products of the island are, as known varied — sugar, hemp, tobacco, 
chocolate, and coffee being the important ones. 

As is probably well known to you, the forests of the Philippines 
produce most valuable woods in almost unlimited quantities. These 
have never been properly cared for or developed, owing to the restric- 
tions and hindrances of the Spanish law. This same applies to all 
industries in the Philippines. 

In regard to the people of the entire archipelago and the feasibility 
of bringing them under our control, I see no reason to change the 
opinion I gave to you before we left the United States. I believe that 
the masses of the people will accept oar government as soon as they 
understand the form of government that we would offer. The people 
are for the most part easily controlled by proper methods, the essence 
of which can be expressed in two words — justice and firmness. 

It has been my observation, and this is backed by the statements of 
many intelligent natives and half-casts with whom I have talked, that 
the Philippine native will accept merited punishment without com- 
plaint and without the feeling of injury having been done him. 

I still believe that if a few of the ambitious chieftains now in 
control of the insurgent army could be disposed of, the masses of 
the people could be handled without difficulty. At the present it is 
my opinion that these chieftains find themselves in a difficult posi- 
tion on account of the promises made to their followers in regard to 
looting Manila, said promises being so far unfulfilled. Their troops 
have been serving up to the present time almost without remunera- 
tion, promises being made that their reward would come when Manila 
capitulated. 

Since my arrival I have availed myself of every opportunity to talk 
with natives and half-castes, both in the insurgent territory and in 
Manila. I find that many of them would be perfectly willing to accept 
an American government, and many of them are very anxious that 
we should take full possession of the islands. Many others hold to 
the desire of the insurgent chiefs for a Philippine government under 
the protection of the United States. These people express themselves 
as being confident of their own ability to govern the islands. Many 
of these would not be satisfied until the experiment had been tried, 
but I do not believe that such a government would be a success, and 
that the United States would ultimately have to take hold of the gov- 
ernment. This for several reasons : First, because the only example 
of government ever seen by these people is that given by Spain, and 
they would naturally follow quite closely the methods heretofore pur- 
sued; second, lack of unity, not only among the important men here 
in the island of Luzon, but likewise on account of lack of union and 
full understanding with the various other races of the archipelago, 
such, for instance, as the Visayas of the central islands; third, 
because of the three other elements in the islands — the uncivilized hill 
tribes, the Mohammedans of the south, and the Chinese residents 
found in all parts of the islands. 

The feeling existing between the Filipinos and the Chinese resi- 
dents can be seen any day, by anyone who will take the trouble to 
notice it, in the streets of Manila. The Chinese, being naturally more 
industrious and more thrifty than the Filipinos, usually succeed bet- 
ter, the result being a feeling of extreme jealousy on the part of the 
Filipinos. I know from observation that this racial feeling would 



378 TREATY OP PEACE. 

be very hard to overcome, as between the Catholic Filipinos and 
the Mohammedans of the south questions would constantly arise 
difficult of adjustment by any but a third and stronger party. 

In regard to the hill tribes, or what are called savage tribes, I have 
observed in various parts of the island that they are illtreated, 
imposed upon in every way, and generally considered to be of a very 
inferior race, to be treated without consideration by the Catholic 
natives. 

Another reason for supposing that difficulty would arise in case 
of self-government is the jealousy among the chieftains themselves. 
These observations have been made since my arrival here, and are 
substantiated by conversations with many natives and half-castes. 
They themselves state that as soon as a Filipino is appointed to office, 
such as lieutenant or captain, or to a higher rank, he immediately 
considers himself far above his fellow-Filipinos, treats them with 
severity and disdain, and, in short, attempts to imitate as closely as 
possible the methods pursued by Spanish officials in their treatment 
of the natives. I have definite information also that at least three or 
four of the leading men of the provinces to the north and east of 
Manila are not at all in harmony with those in authority around 
Manila. All of these conditions would, in my opinion, soon bring 
about a distressing condition. 

The only point on which all the natives and half-castes I have 
talked with agree is that they will never, so long as they have arms, 
ammunition, or men, submit again to Spanish authority. Their bit- 
terness of feeling against the Spaniards can scarcely be exaggerated. 
This fact I have had abundant opportunity to know. 

The feeling against the monastic orders is, as you know, not against 
the church itself, as they are all good Catholics and wish well toward 
the Catholic Church. The bitterness is directed against all the mem- 
bers of the monastic orders, with the exception of the Jesuits, whose 
only work here is missionary, scientific, and educational. Even the 
most rabid among them have expressed to me their appreciation of 
the work being done by the Jesuits. 

Taken as a whole, the Philippine Islands are as rich and productive 
islands, with as good climate and as good natural advantages, as are 
to be found anywhere in the tropics. 

In conclusion, I wish to state that these opinions are only my per- 
sonal opinions, founded upon extensive observations in these islands 
and comparison with other tropical regions which I have visited. I 
give them to you in obedience to your request, and whether they prove 
to be right or wrong I can only assure you that they are my honest 
convictions, and founded only upon personal observations made dur- 
ing a three years and a half residence in these islands. 

From a personal interest in such matters I have always talked freely 
with the people of whatever place I have visited, not expecting that 
my views would be needed in any such emergency. I do believe, how- 
ever, that in the main they are fairly accurate, and that my estimate 
of the people and of the islands and their resources is not far amiss. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Frank S. Bourns, 
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 379 

[Headquarters United States Expeditionary Forces and Department of the Pacific— Office of 

Military Information.] 

Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. 
Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. s. A., 

Manila, Philippine Islands. 

Sir: Pursuant to your verbal instructions, I have the honor to 
report the following facts and opinions : 

In the city of Santa Cruz, the capital of La Laguna, about 600 
Spaniards are besieged by insurgents. 

Albay, held by a detachment of Spanish forces, number not known, 
is also besieged by insurgents. 

All the Spanish in the Province of Tayabas have just been captured 
by insurgents, together with a considerable amount of money and 
other property. 

The Spanish still hold Daet, the capital of Camarines Norte, and 
Nueva Caceres, the capital of Camarines Sur, but both places are 
besieged by insurgents. 

The four provinces, Llocos Sur, Llocos Norte, Isabella, and Cagayan 
are still in the possession of the Spanish, but 400 insurgents have 
been dispatched to attack the Spanish in these provinces. 

About 250 Spaniards hold Morong, the capital of the province of 
the same name. 

There is one company of Spanish infantry in Yap, the capital of 
Ponape, one of the Caroline Islands. 

There are also a considerable number of Spanish troops in Cebu, 
Iloilo, Leyte, and Mindanao. 

The island of Mindoro and the provinces of Batangas, Pampangas, 
Pangasenan, Bulacan, La Union, Tayabas, Bataan, Zanbales, Tarlac, 
and Cavite (all in the island of Luzon) are under the control of insur- 
gents. 

Concerning the insurgents now under arms and about the city, it is 
practically impossible to count or estimate their number for several 
reasons : First, they are being continually sent away to other prov- 
inces; second, many of them have laid aside their arms temporarily 
to raise crops for their families. As the organization is very loose, no 
captain knows the exact number of his following. No reports have 
ever been made to General Aguinaldo. The closest estimate that can 
be made of the available armed insurgent force is based upon the 
number of arms recently captured from the Spanish militia, from the 
arsenal at Cavite, from Spaniards captured in battle, and bought from 
Jackson and Evans. Together with the number it is fair to estimate 
were in the hands of Filipinos, who got them in previous insurrection, 
this foots up about 40,000, as follows: 

From militia 12,000 

From arsenal - - - 2, 500 

From Jackson and Evans - 2,000 

From Spanish -- 8.000 

In hands of Filipinos (about) - - 15,000 

Total -- 39,500 

From this number there should probably be deducted several thou- 
sand guns recaptured by the Spanish and turned in under the pro- 
visions of a proclamation offering $50 and amnesty to each insurgent 
who would come in and give himself and his rifle up to the Spaniards. 

It is assumed that every Filipino who has a gun is ready material 



380 TREATY OP PEACE. 

for an armed insurrectionist, providing sufficient provocation exists 
to appeal to the resentment of all. 

Aguinaldo's following, however, is not so great, nor can all of those 
who are under arms be considered equal in loyalty to their chief. 
Great differences of opinion exist among them, and General Aguinaldo 
is just now experiencing considerable difficulty in maintaining con- 
trol over his loosely organized forces. He has certain men among his 
leaders who are dishonest and unworthy, and are now guilty of con- 
duct which seriously reflects upon the character of the insurgent. 
This is well known to General Aguinaldo, but he is powerless to pre- 
vent it, because he realizes that an effort to do so would be an end of 
their subordination to him. 

Concerning the capacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves, I 
regret to say that I see no reason to change the opinion previously 
expressed, that they are unfit. I wish my opinion might be other- 
wise, for I prefer to believe them capable of self-government. There 
are a number of Filipinos whom I have met, among them General 
Aguinaldo and a few of his leaders, whom I believe thoroughly trust- 
worthy and fully capable of self-government, and the main reliance 
for small official positions and many larger ones would be upon people 
who know no standard of government other than that the Spaniards 
have furnished. Their sense of equity and justice seems not fully 
developed, and their readiness to coerce those who come under their 
power has been strongly illustrated in this city since our occupation. 
A regularly organized system of blackmail has been instituted under 
the guise of making subscriptions to the insurgent cause. None of 
this money ever reaches the treasury of the so-called Filipino govern- 
ment, but is doubtless divided among the petty chiefs who assume to 
authorize subordinates to collect it. 

The Filipinos themselves, living in the outskirts of the city, are 
daily terrorized and interfered with by small bands of marauding 
insurgents, who molest them for no other purpose but the accumula- 
tion of booty. 

Aguinaldo has in Hongkong about $300,000 and in Bacoor about 
$220,000 of public funds. He has commissioned an agent to purchase 
all the nitrate of soda to be found in Manila, and a lot more in China 
and Japan. He has a cartridge factory at Imus capable of working 
400 people. He proposes soon to move his headquarters to Malolos, 
on the railroad, north of Manila and only about thirty minutes' ride 
from the city. 

There is not a particle of doubt but what Aguinaldo and his leaders 
will resist any attempt of any government to reorganize a colonial 
government here. They are especially bitter toward the Spaniards, 
but equally determined not to submit any longer to being a colony of 
any other government. What they would like best of all would be a 
Filipino republic with an American protectorate, for none realize their 
inability more clearly than they to maintain a republic without pro- 
tection of some stronger power. Though they would prefer protec- 
tion from America, they would accept it from any government save 
the Spanish. 

Aguinaldo has not a universal following among the Filipinos. 
Though he is undoubtedly the most popular leader there is at present 
among the Filipinos, there are many of the wealthiest, most promi- 
nent, and most influential Filipino citizens who do not follow him and 
would not vote for him as president of their own free will and 



TREATY OF PEACE. 381 

accord. The native population of Manila are generally opposed to 
insurrectionists. 

A number of the rich and prominent Filipino citizens have told me 
that if the United States would govern this country for one year Agui- 
naldo's following would so dwindle that he would have no army left. 

All the people except the Spaniards, foreign residents and natives 
alike, feel that a native government would be better than the contin- 
uation of Spanish rule; and I guess it would, for nothing could possi- 
bly be worse than the Spanish regime as it has long existed here. 
There is a very respectable and considerable number of Spaniards 
who openly condemn the corruption that has existed under Spanish 
dominion, and doubtless many more would so express themselves if 
they dared. 

Aguinaldo has recently sent all of his adjutants (eight in number) 
into the city and assigned them regular districts, in which they are 
expected to observe for the purpose of preventing interference with 
citizens by members of the insurrectionary forces. He is anxious to 
maintain the best appearance and credit for his waning cause. 

It is openly asserted by many of his sympathizers that some of his 
agents are collecting subscriptions with a view of running away into 
the mountains with sufficient cash to maintain themselves in ease. 
No one is better aware of all these facts than Aguinaldo himself, and 
realizing that he was losing instead of gaining ground he has recently 
called into counsel a number of prominent and wealthy Filipinos, who 
have never allied themselves with his cause and at least one of whom 
has fought in the trenches against him within the past month. From 
among these men he has organized a committee to take charge in the 
city of Manila of all affairs affecting his cause and the good of the 
people. Few of these men are really favorable to a Filipino gov- 
ernment, and all those who have much property at stake are praying 
that the Americans will continue in the country; so are all the for- 
eign residents, except the Spanish. 

In an effort to catalogue and describe the principal leaders among 
Aguinaldo's following I have arrived at the following conclusions, 
which are believed to be practically correct: 

Aguinaldo. — Honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a 
natural leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and ability; has 
the power of creating among the people confidence in himself, and is 
undoubtedly a very popular man, highly respected by all; but there 
are many better educated and richer natives who do not think he has 
sufficient education or experience to be a suitable president. He was 
a ' ' little governor " of a small town in one of the provinces. It is also 
said that he was a school teacher, but I have been unable to verify 
this assertion. 

There is no secretary of state, the place being kept open for one 
Cayetano S. Arellano, a prominent native citizen who is said to be the 
best lawyer and best man among the native prominent men. He is 
now in Pagsanjan, and has been repeatedly sent for but does not 
return, stating as an excuse that he can not get through Santa Cruz, 
which is held by the Spanish. He is an avowed annexationist, and 
does net believe the Filipino people sufficiently advanced in the arts 
and laws of civilization to govern themselves. 

Baldomero Aguinaldo, a first cousin of Don Emilio, is secretary of 
war, and is a swelled dunce, and was once a schoolmaster. 

Mariano Trias, an educated, honest man of mediocre capacity, is 
secretary of the treasury. He was the vice-president of a former revo- 



382 TREATY OF PEACE. 

lution, and of all the insurgent leaders he stands next to Aguinaldo 
in popularity with the people. 

Leandro Y. Barra, a lawyer and good, honest man, is secretary of 
the interior. 

One Estefan de la Rama, a rich and educated man, who speaks 
English, is commandante de marina, or commander in chief of the 
navy. He is reported honest and capable. 

Aguinaldo's interpreter and secretary is one Escamilla, a good lin- 
guist, speaking Latin, French, Spanish, and English — Spanish fluently 
and English well, to my personal knowledge. He was a teacher of 
the piano in Hongkong, and is one of the best interpreters I have 
ever seen. 

One Malabini, a student of law and notary public, honest, but not 
especially talented, is one of his councilors. There is a prominent 
and wealthy citizen of this city who is also a councilor, but I prefer 
not to mention his name. He is an avowed annexationist, and sincerely 
hopes the Americans may remain here. 

Don Felipe Agoncillo is a highly respected lawyer, and has for some 
time been the Filipino agent in Hongkong. I understand it is he who 
has been designated by Aguinaldo to go to Paris and America to repre- 
sent the insurgent cause. 

C. Sandico, a skilled and well-educated machinist, who speaks 
English quite well, is a prominent man, and coadjutor of Aguinaldo. 
His present commission is to appear on behalf of political prisoners 
before the officer charged with investigating such cases. He has 
been generally useful to Aguinaldo as a delegate and negotiator with 
Americans. 

Lieut. Gen. Emiliano Riego De Dios, the military governor of Cavite, 
is said to be an honest man, but with little education. 

Major-General Ricati, in command of operations along the southern 
zone of trenches, appears and is said to be a well-meaning, honest 
man, with a fair education. 

Maj. Gen. Panteleon Garcia, in command of operations along the 
northern zone, is not educated very well, but is an able, honest, polite, 
and agreeable man, who has been a schoolmaster of the primary 
grade. 

Brig. Gen. Pio Del Pilar, a vicious, uneducated ignoramus and 
highway robber. 

General Estrella, commanding the military forces in Cavite, has the 
credit of being an honest man with little education. 

Brigadier- General Mascardo, fairly educated and honest, but pos- 
sesses little ability. 

Gen. Gregorio Del Pilar is young, well educated, and honest, but 
with little experience. He belongs to a wealthy family of Nueva 
Ecija. 

General Nori el, an honest, fairly educated, well-meaning, reasonable, 
and agreeable fellow, who has done good service and gained the repu- 
tation of a good soldier. 

Colonel Montenegro, a very conciliatory fellow to meet. Young, 
small, and well educated. Speaks French, English, and Spanish, the 
latter fluently; the others very well. He is a considerable of a "talk 
a heap." Is "kinder" honest and was a clerk in Lalla's hotel, where 
he received his lessons in honesty. 

There are other leaders of lesser grade who it is hardly necessary 
to mention here. Aguinaldo has many adjutants, most of whom are 
young, smart, and well educated. In fact nearly all of the adjutants 



TREATY OF PEACE. 383 

of all the generals belong to the jeunesse doree Filipino, in whom 
insurrectionery ideas seem to breed spontaneously. They are all 
bright, ambitious, active, and well educated. Among them is one 
Captain Arevela, Noriel's adjutant, who is a dentist, having learned his 
profession from an American, who also taught him very good English. 
He has always possessed great partiality for Americans and it is 
thought has impressed this partiality upon his chief, Noriel, who on 
this account has been not only perfectly willing but strongly desirous 
of doing anything the Americans wished. 

In conclusion, I might add that I have met no one cognizant of the 
conditions now existing in these islands and in Spain who believes 
that Spain can ever again bring the Philippine Islands under subjec- 
tion to its Government. 

Very respectfully, J. F. Bell, 

Major of Engineers, in Charge. 



U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, 

Flagship Baltimore, 
Manila, Philippine Isla7ids, August 29, 1898. 

Sir: Referring to the Department's telegram of the 28th instant, I 
have the honor to transmit by the hand of Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, 
U. S. V., the following views and information upon the subject of the 
Philippines. A copy of this communication is also given to Major- 
General Merritt. 

The most important islands of the Philippines are Luzon, Panay, 
Cebu, Negros, Leyte, and Mindanao. The others, owing either to the 
character of the inhabitants, the limited amount of civibzation, or the 
almost entire absence of cultivated land, may be neglected in any con- 
sideration of the relative importance or desirability of these islands, 
especially those of the southern group, which are almost wholly given 
over to savages. 

Luzon is in almost all respects the most desirable of these islands, 
and therefore the one to retain. In it is situated Manila, the most 
important commercial as well as the most populous port of all the 
islands — a port that in our hands would soon become one of the first 
ports of the world. Not only is tobacco produced in large quantities, 
but all the tobacco of fine quality grown in the Philippines comes 
from the northern provinces of this island. The interior has as yet 
not been developed. 

There is but one short railroad, from Manila to Dagupan, and no 
highways, so that almost all the commerce is carried on by water. 
Were railroads and highways built — and labor is very cheap — there 
is little doubt that this island would rapidly increase in productive- 
ness and wealth. The population of Luzon is reported to be some- 
thing over 3,000,000, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and, 
under just laws and with the benefits of popular education, would 
soon make good citizens. 

In a telegram sent to the Department on June 23 I expressed the 
opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence and 
more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am 
familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them has 
confirmed me in this opinion. 

As Luzon is the farthest north of the large islands, its climate is 
naturally the most temperate. In this connection it may be men- 



384 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tioned that out of a force of over 2,000 on the ships of my squadron 
the number of men on the sick list at any time has not exceeded forty, 
nor has there been any considerable sickness among our troops on 
shore, though they were much exposed for three weeks in the trenches 
during the rainy season. As a matter of fact, Manila is far from 
being an unhealthy city, and the climate is as fine as that of any place 
in the tropics. 

About 60 miles from Manila and to the northward and westward 
is Subig Bay, decidedly the best harbor in the Philippines, having no 
equal as a coaling station or naval and military base. 

The entrances are narrow, the shores bold, the water deep, the bay 
landlocked, easily defended from attack by sea or land, and the 
fresh- water supply ample. As it is just off the trade route between 
Manila and China and Japan, it strategically commands Manila. It 
is there that the Spanish Government had planned to place its prin- 
cipal naval arsenal in the East. Already a great deal of money has 
been expended, many buildings erected, and much work done. A 
contract has been made with an English company to construct a float- 
ing dock of 12,000 tons capacity; some of the material has been 
delivered and payments made. The arsenal is on the south side of the 
harbor, at the village of Olongapo. It is expected that a connection 
will be made with the railroad from Manila to Dagupan, thus putting 
Subig in easy reach of Manila. 

The principal naval station in the Philippines is now at Cavite, in 
Manila Bay. It has very fair workshops for light work and ways 
for vessels of less than 1,000 tons. But it is capable of little expan- 
sion, and the small depth of water precludes the building of dry 
docks for large ships, or even the use of floating docks of much 
capacity. 

Luzon has other decided advantages both in a commercial and mili- 
tary sense. It is nearest the great centers of trade in the far East, 
such as Hongkong, Canton, Shanghai, Pekin, Nagasaki, and Yoko- 
hama, and nearest the trade routes from the United States and Hono- 
lulu to those centers; consequently its influence would be greater if 
held by us. It also commands San Bernadine Strait, the principal 
water route through the Philippines from east to west. 

From all the above facts it seems patent that Luzon is by far the 
most valuable island in the group, whether considered from a com- 
mercial or military standpoint. 

Panay, Cebu, Negros, and Leyte are very thickly populated and 
well cultivated. In these islands the natives are conceded to be the 
best educated and furthest advanced in civilization. 

In Panay is situated Iloilo, the second commercial port of the Phil- 
ippines and the center of the sugar trade. It has a good harbor, with 
two entrances, and one that has great strategic importance. 

Cebu, the third commercial port, in the island of the same name, 
has a harbor much like that of Iloilo. 

From the best information obtainable it appears that the Philip- 
pines contain varied and valuable mineral resources, as well as admi- 
rable timber. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

George Dewey, 
Bear-Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station. 

The Secretary of the Navy, 

Washington, D. C. 



treaty ob peace. 385 

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, 

Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. 
Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., 

Military Governor, Manila, Philippine Islands. 

Sir: In compliance with your order of to-day I submit the following 
report : 

June 1, in compliance with Special Orders, No. 110, War Depart- 
ment, I reported to you in person at San Francisco, and was verbally 
notified that you would not assign me to duty with any of the troops 
at that place, and that when you arrived in the Philippines I would 
act as your legal adviser. That meanwhile I was to make such prep- 
aration as I could to properly discharge such duty. 

June 13 I was verbally directed by you to accompany the second 
detachment of the Philippine expeditionary forces, and on said day 
received the following letter: 

[Headquarters United States Expeditionary Forces and Department of the Pacific.] 

San Francisco, Cal., June 13, 1898. 
Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, 

Judge- Advocate, United States Volunteers, San Francisco, Cal, 
Sir: The Commanding General directs you to accompany the commanding gen- 
eral of the forces en route to the Philippine Islands in the capacity of legal adviser, 
and requests you to be governed by verbal instructions heretofore given you. 
Very respectfully, 

J. B. Babcock, Adjutant-General. 

I arrived at Cavite, Luzon, July 16, 1898, and remained there, mak- 
ing my headquarters in the house of the commandante of Cavite 
Arsenal, which had been reserved for your headquarters ashore, until 
the surrender of Manila. Upon your arrival I reported orally to you 
on the steamer Newport, and by your direction remained in Cavite, 
pursuing the line of work marked out in your original instructions in 
San Francisco. 

Four weeks were thus employed in the investigation of the political 
and social condition of the people of that territory, which, until the 
surrender of Manila, was accessible. Since the surrender of Manila 
I have continued to prosecute the investigation among the leading 
business and financial residents of Manila, principally Europeans. 

SOURCES FROM WHICH INFORMATION WAS SOUGHT. 

First. From Rear- Admiral Dewey, who cheerfully afforded full 
information as to his own relations to the people of the adjacent ter- 
ritory, and his own transactions with and treatment of them since the 
day he destroyed the Spanish fleet. 

Second. Information furnished by General Anderson in the shape 
of letters, documents, proclamations, and communications from the 
insurgent leaders, and interviews with them. 

Third. Daily association with the native people, and almost daily 
association and contact with officers and leaders of the insurgent forces 
in their barracks, official headquarters in Cavite, and through social 
intercourse in the homes of some of them. I was frequently at the 
house of Don Felipe Beuncamino, near Cavite, where I met a number 
of persons selected for military or civil positions under the proposed 
government which Aguinaldo claimed to have established. One of 
the most intelligent and satisfactory of these was Senor Ibari, selected 
by Aguinaldo's alleged government as minister of the interior. 
T P 25 



386 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Fourth. Observation, conversation with, and investigation of cases 
of the prisoners held by the insurgents for alleged political offenses, 
and also military prisoners held by the same or our own forces in 
Cavite. 

Fifth. Daily communication with the native people engaged in busi- 
ness or in service, investigating their habits, customs, and questioning, 
through an interpreter, as to the reason of the dissatisfaction of the 
native people and Mestizos with the Spanish Government. 

Sixth. General observation, as above stated, intercourse, inquiry, 
and investigation among the European residents of Manila since the 
surrender. 

From the foregoing investigation I have reached the following con- 
clusions: 

1. The mass of the people are docile and well disposed, and would 
cheerfully submit to any government that without insolence or oppres- 
sion would firmly control and intelligently direct them. 

2. The rebellion against the authorities of Spain was originally only 
an outbreak against the abuses and irritations, the agents and instru- 
ments of that government, and did not include any well-defined notion 
of independent national existence. 

3. The people are not now fitted for local self-government or citizen- 
ship as those terms are used and understood iD the United States. 

4. Spain can not anywhere in the near future discharge the duty 
of government toward life and property in the island of Luzon. 

5. The insurrectionary government, so called, could not sustain 
itself, even in this island. 

6. The form of government maintained in the Territories of the 
United States, prior to their being admitted as States of the Union, is 
not practicable here at the present time. 

Very respectfully, 

Charles L. Jewett, 
Lieutenant- Colonel, Judge- Advocate, Eighth Army Corps. 



Manila, August 29, 1898. 

The future of the Philippine Islands is an eager and most interest- 
ing question; and if the United States does not take these islands 
under their protection, the country will be utterly ruined and all the 
foreign merchants will leave these islands. 

The retention of the island of Luzon only is not enough, and only 
a half measure, and the United States must take all or nothing. If 
the south of the Philippines remaius in the hands of Spain, the insur- 
gents will attack these islands and they will be in a constant revolt, 
exactly as happened in Cuba, and the United States will have a sec- 
ond edition of what has happened already, and will prepare a sec- 
war for the same reasons. 

Spain will always remain as she is now. She will even be exactly 
the same under any form of government. The numerous empleados 
(officeholders) will always be the plague of all the ministers and 
always want lucrative posts with a high pay. They will never admit 
that it would be better for them and their country to work. As the 
positions of these empleados (officeholders) are very uncertain, their 
only object is, as soon as they occupy their posts, to make as much 
money as they can. Even those who occupy the very highest posts in 
the Philippines only attend to their own fortune and hardly pay atten- 
tion to public affairs. As they give the example of a most corrupt 



TREATY OF PEACE. 387 

administration, they are unable to prevent their subordinates to do 
the same. The justice is likewise mismanaged, and when the accused 
does not bribe the judges they will leave them in jail for years with- 
out paying the slightest attention to these unfortunates, and some of 
these prisoners have been in jail more than ten years. 

The monks, more united, have always taken advantage of the 
troubled state of affairs and offered their protection to those who con- 
sented in allowing the money of the government to go in their hands. 
They exacted all the money that they could of the Indians, and the 
Spanish governors protected openly these extortions. Such state of 
things exasperated the Filipinos, and those who suffered the most 
began the rebellion with a fury that astonished everybody. 

The rebellion broke out from the lower classes, and they still pre- 
dominate in the actual rebellion. Even the chiefs are ancient tenants 
of the monks. The rebellion has no committee or representatives in 
the United States, as the Cubans. This proves that those who revolted 
only act as mechanics and not as an intellectual people. Those who 
are in Hongkong, and represent there the revolution, went there as 
fugitives to escape from Manila, and later on they formed a meet- 
ing, and no serious man will admit that they are leading men of the 
revolution. Their names are not even known in Manila. 

The Indians are good soldiers, and suffer very little of the war. 
They can stay for days in the swamps, or can make a long march in 
this hot climate without injury. White men can not stand it, and it 
must be recognized that if the Indians are very poor leaders in poli- 
tics they are good enough soldiers to be taken in good consideration. 

Since the Americans arrived in the Philippines a new period seems 
to take place, and many members of the upper classes of the Mestizos 
appeared amongst the rebels, and since then it has been possible to 
discuss some matters and to demonstrate to them that if they wanted 
to be taken into consideration that they must act as civilized people, 
and not retain as prisoners private citizens, women, and children, and 
drop many abuses that they commit exactly as the Spaniards have 
done and taught them. During the blockade of Manila many promi- 
nent families of Mestizos preferred to take refuge amongst the insur- 
gents rather than stay at the mercy of the Spanish authorities in 
Manila, whose arbitrary acts are too well known. 

There is actually in Europe and Paris an important colony of Fili- 
pinos belonging to the leading families of Manila, and these appear 
to be actually the representatives of the rebels. The principal of 
them pretended, however, that he never rebelled, and claimed his 
properties seized by the Spanish Government. He bribed the judges, 
and they publicly recognized that he never was a rebel, and restored 
his properties. Now he is the chief representative of the rebels. 
His name is P. P. Roxas. This duplicity is not much in his favor, 
but it reveals the character of the Indians or Mestizos, and in all 
their acts it will be remarked that they never are sincere. 

Money is what misses the most to the rebellion, and this leads the 
rebels to many unlawful acts. Until the present time most all the 
money has been raised from the lower classes. The higher classes 
gave very little, and these are very unwilling to facilitate funds. This 
class is composed entirely of usurers and pawnees. All the pawn- 
shops and gambling houses belong to the principal Mestizos families. 
There is not one family free of that stigma. This proves enough 
the morality of them, and what can be expected of them. They 
surely will not risk their capital in the rebellion, because they are 



388 TREATY OF PEACE. 

not sure enough that they will be repaid with interest. They do not 
care a snap for the country, and many told me that they would be 
glad to see the United States take these islands under their protection 
and put an end to the constant appeal of funds from the rebels. 
This was said to me by Bemito Legarda, a rich Mestizo, who was with 
Aguinaldo in Bacoor and acted as counsel, and this deceived him. 

In the plantations belonging to the rich families of Mestizos or 
Indians, the workmen are treated very inhumanly. If they do not 
work quick enough they treat them exactly as slaves were treated in 
South America. The most common punishment is to lash their backs 
with a thin bamboo; 25 lashes is the most ordinary punishment. I 
saw some receive 100 lashes in Negros Island, in the estate of Aniceto 
Lacson, an Indian. One hundred and twenty-five lashes were given 
to a man in Albay (south of Luzon) by the Indian mayor of Albay. The 
same man threatened to give 100 lashes to one of my workmen, but his 
wife warned me and I stopped it. Since then I stopped always this treat- 
ment when I happened to know it, and more than once had rows about 
it with the Spanish governor of the province, Mr. Valdes. This was 
in 1892. He told me that he would put me in prison if I interfered 
with the authorities. The custom all over the Philippines is to 
engage men and to pay for them their personal papers. This is the 
beginning of a debt that will make a slave of a man for each dollar 
advanced; an interest of 5 cents is added. At the slightest fault the 
man is fined and his debt grows. Whenever he needs money to 
baptize a baby or bury a parent the planter pays the fees direct to 
the curate, and always adds to the small sum advanced two or three 
dollars and the 5 cents for interest. This last way is the most heavy 
yoke. At the end of the year he owes his master $50 or $60, and as 
long as he does not pay his debt he is considered as a slave, and if he 
runs away he will be arrested and returned to his master and is 
awfully lashed. 

When an estate is sold, nearly always the papers are accompanied 
with a list of the debtors. The buyer makes a bargain and buys the 
debts, and those who owe the money become his slaves. This is 
about the same as buying the slaves with a plantation. Now the 
Mestizos and Indians are the hardest masters, and if ever they dom- 
inate they will be most despotical to the Indians. The Spanish Gov- 
ernment always tolerated this, and even protected those who used to 
treat the men as slaves and allowed the pirates to abuse the poor 
Indians. Therefore it is easy to show the Indian that it would be 
much better for him to be ruled by Americans than by his own coun- 
trymen. Whatever may be the education of the Mestizos they always 
will behave just the same as the Indians, from whom they descend. 
They will eat with their hands, go barefooted, and sit on the ground. 
There is an enormous difference between them and a white man. 

In the assemblies of the chiefs of the rebels and of the Mestizos of 
Manila, even when very serious matters were discussed, they used to 
joke one with the other and give his neighbor a nip and a laugh and 
behave as monkeys would do. This happened the 21st of June in the 
house of P. Paterno in Manila, and in Cavite in the house of Ozorio 
on the 3d of August. 

The Chinese Mestizos join the sordidness of the Indian to the craft- 
iness of the Chinaman, and give the type of the rapacious Pawnee. 
The Spanish Mestizo joins the presumption of the Spaniard with the 
duplicity of the Indian, and give the type of the . 

This is enough, I believe, to give a very slight idea of what the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 389 

Filipinos are and to demonstrate that they belong to an inferior race, 
unfitted to rule a country, and with such individuals distinguished 
rules must not be expected. 

Of course the education and example given by the monks and Span- 
iards is the principal cause, but even then they are worse than their 
masters, and that proves their inferiority, and therefore it is more 
than time that the United States should have pity on these people and 
show them better. 

The Spaniards, with their accustomed carelessness, are unable to 
manage properly the Philippines, and these rich islands, which con- 
tain gold, iron, coal, etc., and on which splendid forests are aban- 
doned, there is only one very little railway, hardly some good bridges, 
and no harbors. Nothing has been done with the $15,000,000 that 
these islands give annually. 

The foreign merchants in Manila are constantly robbed by the 
custom-house officers, and no protection is given to them. If a mer- 
chant makes a claim, he will be bothered all the year round. The 
United States can assure a steady government in these islands, and 
in their hands the country will increase in wealth, and will, in a short 
time, be able to return to the United States the money laid out; and 
it would be certainly much cheaper and more humane to take the 
entire Philippines than to keep only part of it and to run the risk of 
a second war with Spain for the very same reason that provoked the 
present conflict. It is a duty of the United States to do so and to pro- 
tect the entire country. Everybody in the Philippines begs them for 
protection ; even the Spanish merchants. Now, it is to be hoped that 
the United States will not deceive those who anxiously await the result 
of the meeting in Paris. 

The Indians do not desire independence. They know that they are 
not strong enough. They trust the United States, and they know that 
they will be treated rightly. The present rebellion only represents a 
half per cent of the inhabitants, and it would not be right to oblige 
6,000,000 inhabitants to submit to 30,000 rebels. Luzon is only partly 
held by them, and it is not to be expected that a civilized nation will 
make them present with the rest of the island, which is hostile to the 
tagals of Luzon. The Spanish officers refuse to fight for the sake of 
the priests, and if the Spanish Government should retain the Philip- 
pines their soldiers will all fall prisoners in the hands of the Indians 
in the same way as they did already, and this is because the army is 
sick of war without result, and only to put the country at the mercy of 
the rapacious empleados and luxurious monks. 

The monks know that they are no more wanted in the Philippines, 
and they asked me to help them to go away as soon as possible, and it 
is principally for them that I asked for the transports to the United 
States Government, and to send them to Hongkong. The Indians 
will be delighted to see them go, and will be grateful to the United 
States. 

If some chiefs of the rebellion will be a little disappointed in their 
personal pride, they will be convinced that it is better for them to 
submit in any case, for most of these chiefs prefer American authority, 
and they are very anxious to know the result of the meeting of Paris. 

If the United States keeps the islands, they will remain quiet, but if 
the Spanish authority is restored in the islands, or part of them, they 
will attack the Spaniards and be in a constant revolt. This has been 
told to me by Aguinaldo, Landico, Ziroma, Mabim, and other principal 
chiefs, and repeated on Sunday, 28th of August. 

Very respectfully, Andre. 



390 treaty of peace. 

Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 4, 1898. 
Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon. 

General : I have the honor to inform you that the United States 
of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this 
vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympa- 
thy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philip- 
pine Islands. 

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with 
you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military 
operations against the Spanish forces. 

In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town 
of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this, I do not wish to 
interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and 
other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent 
with military rule. 

I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of sol- 
diers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to 
maintain order, and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and 
kindness. 

I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your 
officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their 
duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without per- 
mission. 

Assuring you again of my most friendly sentiment and distinguished 
consideration, I am, with all respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers , Commanding. 



Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, 

Commanding the United States Volunteers. 

General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I 
have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound grate- 
fulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the natives 
of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your 
excellency. 

I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly rela- 
tions with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, 
which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satis- 
faction whenever occasion represents. 

I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with 
your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their 
being unfulfilled ; hoping that you will inform me of whatever mis- 
conduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to repri- 
mand them and correspond with your wishes. 

I beg of your excellency to accept in return the assurance of my 
most respectable consideration. 

I remain, respectfully, Emilio Aguinaldo. 



treaty of peace. 391 

Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Co rite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 6, 1898. 

Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, 

Commanding Philippine Forces. 

General: I am encouraged by the friendly sentiments expressed 
by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant 
to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be 
advantageous to both. 

Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be 
apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more 
room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For 
this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooperation, 
as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country. 

It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here 
inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy; but for 
a short time we must organize and land supplies and also retain a 
place for storing them near our fleet and transports. 

I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result 
from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the 
same place. 

I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precautions. 
Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections 
with mine and fear epidemic disease, if the vicinity is not made clean. 
Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the 
advice of the surgeons? 

I again renew my assurances of distinguished consideration. 
I am, with great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters Expeditionary Forces 

to the Philippine Islands, 
Chief Quartermaster's Office, 
Cavite, Philippine Islands, July 17, 1898. 

Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Addressed. 

Sir: General Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition 
having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paranaque 
from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, 
it will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neigh- 
borhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transporta- 
tion, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are 
willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the 
native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly 
as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we 
will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We 
would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the 
Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces 
here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the 
whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. 

General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are 
here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and 
material at the current market prices. 



392 TREATY OF PEACE. 

We are prepared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but can not 
undertake to bargain for horses with each individual man. 

I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is 
of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as 
soon as possible. 
I will await your reply. 

Sam R. Jones, 
Major and Quartermaster, U. 8. Volunteers, 
Chief Quartermaster. 



At 3.30 p. m. July 17, General Aguinaldo and secretary called to 
say that two Americans assuming to be officers had called and pre- 
sented a letter as to which he requested a statement whether it was 
authorized. 

The following indorsement was put upon it — 



[First indorsement.] 

Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 17, 1898. 
The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster, was 
made by my direction. 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. 8. Volunteers, Commanding. 






Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 19, 1898. 
SeSor Don Emtlio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding General, Philippine Forces. 
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your let- 
ter of the 18th instant. Your offer of assistance is appreciated and 
your assurances of good will are most gratifying. 

The difficulty of collecting supplies, referred to by you, is appre- 
hended, and will be considered in fixing compensation. 

As a medium of communication with your people, we will be pleased 
to have you assure them that there will be no confiscation of their 
property, that our requisitions will be reasonable, and that a fair 
compensation will always be given. 

I remain, General, with all respect, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. 8. Volunteers, jCommanding. 



treaty of peace. 393 

Headquarters First Brigade, 

United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 19, 1898. 

Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding General, Philippine Forces. 
General: The bearer, Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. A., was sent by Maj. 
Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., to collect for him, by the time of 
his personal arrival, certain information concerning the strength and 
positions of the enemy and concerning the topography of the country 
surrounding Manila. 

I would be obliged if you would permit him to see your maps and 
place at his disposal any information you may have on the above 
subjects, and also give him a letter or pass addressed to your subor- 
dinates which will authorize them to furnish him any information 
they can on these subjects, and to facilitate his passage along the 
lines upon a reconnoissance around Manila on which I propose to 
send him. 

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters, First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898. 

Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding General, Philippine Forces. 
General : I have the honor to request that passes and such other 
assistance as practicable be given to the bearer, Lieut. E. J. Bryan, 
and party, who are making a reconnoissance of the surrounding 
country. 

Thanking you for assistance given on previous occasions, 
I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. 8. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, July 22, 1898. 
Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding General Philippine Forces. 
General : Replying to your excellency's letter in relation to the 
property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to state that if he 
transferred the property to you personally, before the capture of 
Cavite by our forces, it will give me great pleasure to transfer the 
property in question to you. If, however, the property was not 
transferred to your excellency until after the capture of Cavite, the 
property would appear to have been public Spanish property or con- 
traband of war and subject to capture. 

This property will be held subject to investigation, but Don Osorio 
must make his claim and offer his proof to the commanding officer of 
the American Army. 



394 TREATY OF PEACE. 

I observe that your excellency has announced yourself as a dictator 
and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capac- 
ity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders 
from my Government on the subject; and so far as I can ascertain 
your independent status has not been recognized by any foreign 
power. Your fine intellect must perceive that, happy as I am to see 
you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I 
can not, without orders, recognize your civil authority. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters First Bric4ade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 28, 1898. 
Senor Don Emilo Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Philippine Forces. 
General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your 
excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of trans- 
portation for the American army, as it was to fight in the cause of 
your people. So far we have received no response. 

As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requi- 
sition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. 

If you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make 
requisition directly on the people. 

I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



[Translation.] 

Bacoor, July 2b, 1898. 
Senor Don Thomas M. Anderson, 

Brigadier- General, Commanding 

Expeditionary Forces of the United States. 

General: In answer to the letter of your excellency, dated the 22d 
of the current month, I have the honor to manifest to you the fol- 
lowing: 

That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of 
Don Antonio Osorio were subject to capture, when I established 
myself in the plaza (town) of Kavite, Admiral Dewey authorized me 
to dispose of everything I might find in the same, including the arms 
which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But I was aware that the said 
effects belonged to the personal property of a Filipino, who traded 
in them by virtue of the payment of a contribution to the Spanish 
Government. I would not have touched them if the owner had not 
placed them at my disposition for the purposes of the war. 

I came from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making 
common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledg- 
ing before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] 
to any internal discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had 



TREATY OF PEACE. 395 

the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establish- 
ing a government according to their desires. 

Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and 
afterwards when some of the provinces had already liberated them- 
selves from Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary gov- 
ernment that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular char- 
acter as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order 
that they [the provinces] might be justly represented, and adminis- 
tered to their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not 
been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected 
that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its 
independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now 
actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it 
with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we 
have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude. 

Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors 
we have received through Admiral Dewey, and (being) more desirous 
than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as 
a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, 
not alone to my nation but also to that of your excellency, I consider 
it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North 
American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the 
Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no 
formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine 
people might consider the occupation of its territories by North 
American troops as a violation of its rights. 

I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron 
the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Be- 
cause of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the 
necessity that, before disembarking, you should communicate in writ- 
ing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the 
object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form 
and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friend- 
ship. 

I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident 
proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not 
answer for that which another nation whose friendship is not well 
guaranteed might inspire in it [the people] ; and it is certain that I do 
this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere 
friendship which I have always professed for the North American 
people, in the complete security that it will find itself completely 
dentified with our cause of liberty. 

With the greatest respect and consideration, 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



[Translation.] 

Bacood, July U, 1898. 
Senor Don Thomas M. Anderson, 

Brigadier- General, Commander of the 

Expeditionary Forces of the United States. 

General: Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor 

to manifest to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure 

at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any 

response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked of me in 



396 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I replied in a precise 
manner, through the bearer, that I was disposed to give convenient 
orders whenever you advised me of the number of these with due 
anticipation (notice). 

I have circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in 
the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I can not 
assure your excellency that we have the number of 500 that is needed, 
because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths 
caused by epizootic diseases in January and March last. 

Whenever we have them united (or collected), I shall have the pleas- 
ure to advise your excellency. 

I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall 
place at your disposition whenever necessary, always (premising) that 
you afford me a previous advice of four days in anticipation. 
Remaining, with great respect, 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 

United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 27, 1898. 

Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Philippine Forces. 
General: Referring to your letter of the 24th instant, relative to 
the alleged property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to inform 
you that it has been forwarded to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, com- 
manding United States Expeditionary Forces, for his action. 
Very respectfully, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. 8. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 
United States Expeditionary Forces, 
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 2J/., 1898. 
Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Philippine Forces. 
General: Your favor of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions 
for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory. I regret that there should 
have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we 
applied even for the hiring of caramates, etc., told our people that 
they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am 
pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part. 

We are not so unreasonable as to suppose that all we want can be 
supplied at once or from one place. We may even have to send to 
other islands. Our quartermaster will establish a depot near the 
American camp, where he will receive and pay for supplies, and 
from which he will send out parties to whatever places your excel- 
lency will indicate to transact business with your people. 
With great regard, your obedient servant, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



treaty of peace. 397 

Headquarters First Brigade, 

United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 27, 1898. 

Adjutant-General, 

United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Manila Bay, Philippine Islands. 
Sir : I have the honor to transmit to you the last letter I received 
from the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo^ dated Bacood, July 24, 1898. 
This letter has not been answered by me. 

My whole correspondence with him is also inclosed. 
Very respectfully, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. 



Headquarters First Brigade, 

United States Expeditionary Forces, 

Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 14, 1898. 

Seilor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Philippine Forces. 
General : Wishing to get complete information of the approaches 
to Manila in every direction, I therefore have the honor to request 
that you give my officers all possible assistance in making recon- 
noissance to the lines and approaches, and that you favor them with 
your advice. Officers coming from me will have a note to that effect. 
With great respect, 

Thomas M. Anderson, 
Brigadier-General, U. 8. Volunteers, Commanding. 



August l, 1898. 
Mr. Willtams. 

Dear Sir and Distinguished Friend : Impressed by the note of 
July 8 past, I can only confess that the people of North America have 
excited, and now excite, the universal admiration not only for the 
grade of progress and culture to which they have arrived in a very 
short time, but also for their political constitution, so admirable and 
inimitable, and for the generosity, honesty, and industry of the men 
of the Government who have so far ruled the destinies of that great 
people without an equal in history. 

Above all, I thank you sincerely for the kind words which you 
express in your note quoted above, and I congratulate you with all 
sincerity on the acuteness and ingenuity which you have displayed 
in it in painting in an admirable manner the benefits which, especially 
for me and my leaders, and, in general, for all my compatriots, would 
be secured by the union of these islands with the United States of 
America. Ah! that picture, so happy and so finished, is capable of 
fascinating not only the dreamy imagination of the impressionable 
Oriental, but also the cold and calculating thoughts of the sons of the 
North. 

This is not saying that I am not of your opinion. I am fully per- 
suaded that the Filipinos will arrive at the height of happiness and 
glory if in future they can show with raised heads the rights which to- 



398 TREATY OF PEACE. 

day are shown by the free citizens of North America. These islands 
will be in effect one of the richest and pleasantest countries of the 
globe if the capital and industry of North Americans come to develop 
the soil. 

You say all this and yet more will result from annexing ourselves to 
your people, and I also believe the same since you are my friend and 
the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But Adry should we say 
it? Will my people believe it? 

I, with true knowledge of the character and habits of these people, 
do not dare assure you of it, since I have only wished to establish a 
government in order that none of those powers which you call ambi- 
tious should be able to take advantage of our good faith, as has been 
done in the past by the Spaniards. I have clone what they desire, 
establishing a government in order that nothing important may be 
done without consulting fully their sovereign will, not only because 
it was my duty, but also because acting in any other manner they 
would fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations and 
would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by another more careful 
of his own honor and dignity. 

I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right 
of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not forget for a 
moment the favors which we have received and are now receiving, 
but however great those favors may be it is not possible for me to 
remove the distrust of my compatriots. 

These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these 
islands, why not recognize the government established in them in 
order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation? 

Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the 
Filipino generals and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive? 

Is it intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of 
these people, distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolu- 
tionary government is the genuine representative by right and deed 
of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it 
wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and friendship? 

It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the favors received 
through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present the 
American forces have shown not an active, only a passive cooperation, 
from which they suppose that the intention of these forces are not for 
the best. They assert, besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was 
brought from Hongkong to assure those forces by niy presence that 
the Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and 
that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned by the 
former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, 
fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war with Spain would cost. 

But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions. I have full confi- 
dence in the generosity and philanthropy which shine in characters 
of gold in the history of the privileged people of the United States, 
and for that reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me 
and the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly, as 
also the distinguished generals who represent your country in these 
islands, that you entreat the Government at Washington to recognize 
the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, and I, for my part, 
will labor with all my power with my people that the United States 
shall not repent their sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of 
an oppressed people. 

Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people 



TREATY OF PEACE. 39{i 

abominate savagery, that in the midst of their past misfortunes they 
have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life, and that 
they are not able to lay aside their own wishes when their future lot 
and history are under discussion. Say also that I and my leaders 
know what we owe to our unfortunate country, that we know how to 
admire and are ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, 
and the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands 
preeminent the immortal General Washington. 

You and I both love the Filipinos; both see their progress, their 
prosperity, and their greatness. For this we should avoid any con- 
flict which would be fatal to the interests of both peoples, who should 
always be brothers. In this you will acquire a name in the history of 
humanity and an ineradicable affection in the hearts of the Filipino 
people. (From General Aguinaldo to Mr. Williams, United States 
consul.) 



AUGUST 13 AND 14. 

General Anderson: 

My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always 
been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and can not 
deny, and for this reason and on account of the many sacrifices made 
of money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the 
contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, 
I hope that you will allow the troops to enter, because we have given 
proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Paranaque, 
Pasay, Cingalon, and Mytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, 
and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and 
avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will 
commission Don Filipe Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out 
from our lines to hold a conference with you, and that they will be 
safe during the conference. 

E. A. Aguinaldo. 



[Most urgent.] 

President of revolutionary government to General Anderson, Ermita. 

Pineda (received from Baccoor 10.50 a. m. 13th). 
General Anderson, Ermita: 

I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite; in consequence 
of this I have not answered till now. My troops are forced by yours, 
by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is 
necessary, to avoid conflicts, which I should lament, that you order 
your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have 
conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. 

I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict 
respect to American forces and to aid them in case they are attacked 
by a common enemy. I do not doubt that the good relations and 
friendship which unite us will be continued if your soldiers correspond 
to the conduct imposed upon mine. (Communication received by 
General Anderson from Aguinaldo the day of the attack on Manila.) 



400 TREATY OF PEACE. 

V 

Headquarters Department op the Pacific 

and Eighth Army Corps, 
Manila, Philippine Islands, August 20, 1898. 
The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces. 

Sir: The commanding general of American forces has received a 
memorandum addressed to General Anderson, which purports to con- 
tain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos. As 
most of them seem to be reasonable, it gives him much pleasure to say 
that he agrees to the following: 

The forces of the Filipinos are to withdraw entirely beyond the 
jurisdiction of the old municipal limits, or walled city, and its 
suburbs — Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, 
Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando dilo. The 
Filipinos will repair at once whatever may be needed, in order that 
the water may be turned on to the city, and the expenses of the repairs 
and the current expenses of the works will be paid by the city. The 
commander of the Filipinos agrees to be responsible for order and 
security at the pumping station. 

Permission for the free navigation of the Patria to entrance and 
exit of the port and river Pasig, and that country products for sale 
be admitted free of duty is granted. 

Free entrance and departure from the city for all Filipinos with- 
out arms is granted. Chiefs and officers of the Filipino army may, 
as a matter of courtesy, wear their side arms, though this is deprecated 
as possibly leading to the disturbance of the quiet of the city. No 
pistols should be carried. 

The major-general having taken, for his own use, the palace at 
Malacanan, the request that it be turned over to the Filipinos can 
not be granted, and the convents at Malate, Ermita, and Paco can not 
be turned over and must be evacuated. The civil offices at Manila 
are being filled as rapidly as possible by Americans, and the com- 
manding general will be glad to receive recommendations for appoint- 
ments to offices of such Filipinos as may be considered fitted for the 
duties of subordinate offices. 

American soldiers without arms are to be allowed to pass through 
the Filipinos' positions outside of the city, just as the Filipinos with- 
out arms are permitted to enter the city. 

The return of the arms of the hundred and fifty men will be granted 
by the general in immediate command. 

The opening of the waterworks at once and the retirement of your 
soldiers from the positions now occupied within the municipal juris- 
diction will be sufficient notice on your part that everything is satis- 
factorily arranged on the terms of this letter. With the sincere hope 
that it may be speedily accomplished. 
I am, very respectfully, 

Wesley Merritt, 
Major- General Commanding. 



Bakor, August 21, 1898. 

Commanding-General of the American Forces of the Pacific. 

Sir: The commanding-general of the Philippine forces has been 

favored by a letter from your excellency, dated the 20th of the present 

month, which contains the conditions to be accepted by the Filipinos, 



TREATY OP PEACE. 401 

namely, that they should evacuate the places which they now hold 
within the suburbs of Manila. 

The before-mentioned letter speaks of the freu navigation of the 
Pair la, and as no boat of this name is counted by the Filipinos, he 
who subscribes would be pleased to have this point made more clear. 
It is understood that the Filipinos desire the protection of the Amer- 
ican squadron, that they may have free navigation for all their boats, 
and free entrance to and departure from all ports which may be in pos- 
session of the same (squadron); but besides, in substitution of the 
proposed conditions, which the said letter does not mention, the Fili- 
pinos desire to continue in the occupation of that part of the suburbs 
of San Fernando de Dilao, or Paco, which is nearest the east of the 
bridge and stream of the same name, he who subscribes assuming 
responsibility for foreign interests which exist at said point. Equally 
they desire that in consequence of a treaty of peace which may be 
signed between the United States of America and Spain, the Philip- 
pines should continue in possession of the last named, that the Ameri- 
can forces should turn over to the Filipinos all of the suburbs in con- 
sideration of the cooperation given by them in the taking of the Plaza 
of Manila. With these conditions and the others which are accepted 
in said letter, he who subscribes promises, in the name of the Filipi- 
nos, to evacuate the places which they now hold in the suburb; and 
the acceptation of the same by your excellency will be a further proof 
that he holds in consideration the innumerable lives sacrificed by the 
siege of Manila, and that he appreciates the newly arisen friendship 
which will be preserved at all cost. 

Very respectfully, Emilio Aguinaldo. 



[Copy of telegram from General Aguinaldo to Major-General Merritt.] 

August 24, 1898. 

I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 
wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They 
fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among them- 
selves. 

General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on 
account of which I have .ordered investigation to ascertain the truth 
and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the 
Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order 
severe punishment. 

Yours, respectfully, Aguinaldo. 



Office of the Military Governor, 
Headquarters Department of the Pacific, 

Manila, August 2Jf, 1S9S. 
Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, 

Bakor, Philippine Islands. 
Sir: The commanding general of the American land forces has the 
honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 
21, and in reply to inform you as follows: 

The error you speak of which needs clearing up as to the naviga- 
tion of the Patria seems to have arisen from a request on your j>art 
P T 26 



402 TREATY OF PEACE. 

that the Filipinos of the country should be permitted to trade freely 
and navigate without obstruction the streams and bay surrounding 
Manila. So far as the products of the country are concerned this has 
been acceded to, and there will be no obstruction placed by the Ameri- 
can land forces between the residents of the island and the city of 
Manila. 

The protection that you ask from the American squadron rests with 
Rear- Admiral Dewey, and it is for him to determine whether it can 
be granted or not. 

A commission of your appointment, which had an interview with 
the undersigned about the 15th instant, agreed that if a line were 
designated by a proper commission on my part, the armed Filipinos 
should retire beyond it. While this has been done in some instances, 
it has been neglected in others, and it is now desired to call your 
attention to the fact that the occupation of the suburbs of Manila, or 
any part of them, can not be acceded to by the undersigned. It has 
already been pointed out to you that a dual occupation of Manila was 
impossible in the interests of either party; and as the troops of the 
United States are in possession of Manila, I must insist upon the 
carrying out of the original agreement between your commission a id 
myself. I am the more insistent in this particular because recent 
instructions from my home Government contemplate this course. 

So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a 
conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is con- 
cerned, it is utterly impossible for me, as the military representative 
only of the United States, to make any promises such as you request. 
As you have already been informed you may depend upon the good 
will of Americans out here and the Government of which you already 
know the beneficence to determine these matters in the future. 

This answer to your communication has been delayed by a press of 
business which could not very well be neglected. 

I thank you in the name of my country for the good will expressed 
toward it, and feel assured that nothing will occur to mar the friendly 
feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good 
feeling which now exists between us should be carefully fostered and 
maintained. 

Very respectfully, Wesley Merritt. 



[Telegram. — Reply to telegram from General Aguinaldo, dated August 34.] 

Malacanan, August 25, 1898 — 8.06 a. m. 
General Aguinaldo, 

Commanding Philippine Forces^ Bakor: 
Thank you for your telegram. Am glad to learn of j^our intention 
to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmony should 
prevail, and request you always in event of trouble to communicate 
directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time. 

Merritt. 



Bakoor, August 27, 1898. 
Gen. Wesley Merritt, Manila. 

My Dear Sir: Though informed by your letter of the 24th of th( 
current month, I can not the less express my surprise at learning tha' 
you have formed the opinion that my commissioners committed them 



TREATY OF PEACE. 403 

selves at the conference of the 15th to the withdrawal of my troops 
outside the line that you designate. I hold it is agreed and under- 
stood, as do the commissioners, that the evacuation by my troops of 
the places that they to-day occupy in the outskirts was to take place 
as the propo&ed conditions were accepted by you. Among them was 
one putting this agreement in writing, for this reason, as you had 
not accepted any of the proposals nor those which had been put in 
their place in my former communications. I do not believe that I 
have up to this time contravened the said obligations. 

Since I have permitted the use of water before the formal declara- 
tion of the treaty, you can easily see that I am disposed to sacrifice 
to friendship everything not greatly prejudicial to the rights of the 
Philippine city. 

I comprehend, like yourself, the inconvenience of a double occu- 
pation of the city of Manila and its environs, considering the condi- 
tions of the capitulation with the Spaniards, but you must also under 
stand that without the wide blockade maintained by my forces vou 
would have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never 
the surrender of the Spanish forces, who would have been able to retire 
to the interior towns. 

Now, do not make light of the aid formerly given by us to secure the 
capitulation mentioned. Greatly though justice may suffer, and risk- 
ing well-founded fears in regard to my city, I do not insist upon the 
retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the 
environs at the cost of much bloodshed, unspeakable fatigue, and 
much money, I promise to withdraw them to the following line: 

In Malate the continuation of the highway (calzada of Singalong) 
as far as the bridge that unites it with this highway ; from this bridge 
in a straight line to that of the Paco, and leaving outside the district 
of Zanque as far as the River Pasig; following this river and enter- 
ing the estuary which runs to the bridge of Aviles ; from this bridge, 
following the highway of the same name and that of Santa Mesa, 
which are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the town of Pan- 
dacan, to the limits of the jurisdiction of the outskirts of Sampaloc, 
Turzo, and Tando. But before making this withdrawal I beg that 
you obtain from Admiral Dewey protection for the free navigation of 
our boats, and grant me permission to at least insist upon the restitu- 
tion of the positions that we are going to give up if in the treaty of 
peace which is being arranged between Spain and the United States 
the recognition of the dominion of the former in the Philippines shall 
follow. I also hope that you will order the entrance into the city of 
the American forces which are outside the line traced, as has been 
already agreed. 

I do not believe that the acceptance of the conditions proposed will 
be prejudicial in the smallest degree to the rights of the city, since it 
means only the recognition of the rights of a friendly town. I am 
forced to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the grumblings of 
my chiefs and soldiers, who have exposed their lives and given of their 
interests during the siege of Manila. 

I hope that this time a spirit of justice will be manifest which is 
worthy of a free and admirably constituted government such as that 
of the United States of America. 
Yours, very respectfully, 



MEMORANDA CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 
ON AUGUST 30, 1898, BY F. V. GREENE, MAJOR-GENERAL, VOLUN- 
TEERS, AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. 

[Washington, September 30, 1898.] 



INDEX. 

1. The Philippine Islands: Page. 

(a) Area and population 404 

(6) Climate 406 

(c) Mineral wealth 406 

(d) Agriculture 406 

(e) Commerce and transportation 407 

(/) Revenue and expenses 409 

2. Spanish troops 413 

3. Spauish navy 414 

4. Spanish civil administration 414 

5. Insurgent troops 419 

6. Insurgent civil administration 421 

7. United States troops 425 

8. United States Navy 425 

9. United States civil administration 425 

10. The future of the islands 425 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

(a) Area and population. — These islands, including the Ladrones, 
Carolines, and Palaos, which are all under the government of Manila, 
are variously estimated at from 1/200 to 1,800 in number. The greater 
portion of these are small and are of no more value than the islands off 
the coast of Alaska. The important islands are less than a dozen in 
number, and 90 per cent of the Christian population live on Luzon and 
the live principal islands of the Visayas group. 

The total population is somewhere between 7,000,000 and 9,000,000. 
This includes the wild tribes of the mountains of Luzon and of the 
islands in the extreme south. The last census taken by the Spanish 
Government was on December 31, 1887, and this stated the Christian 
population to be 0,000,000 (in round numbers). This is distributed as 
follows: 





Area. 


Population. 


Per 

square 
mile. 




44,400 
4,700 
2,400 
3,800 
1,300 
3,300 


3, 426, 000 
735, 000 
504, 000 
270, 000 
245, 000 
242, 000 


79 




155 




210 




71 


Bohol 


188 




73 








69, 800 


5, 422, 000 


91 



404 






TBEATY OF PEACE. 



405 



The density of population in these six islands is nearly 50 per cent 
greater than in Illinois and Indiana (census of 1890), greater than in 
Spain, about one-half as great as in France, and one third as great as 
in Japan and China; the exact figures being as follows: 





Area. 


Population. 


Per 

square 

mile. 




56. 000 
35, 910 


3, 826, 351 
2, 192, 404 


68 




61 










91,910 


6, 018, 755 


64 




197. 670 


17, 565, 632 
38,517,975 
42, 270 620 
383, 253, 029 


88 




204, 092 

147, 055 

1, 312, 328 


186 




286 




292 






The next most important islands in the order of population are: 




Area. 


Population. 


Per 
mile. 




34, 000 

4,800 

4, 000 

600 

1,400 


209, 000 

180, 000 

67, 000 

35, 000 

21, 000 


6 




38 




17 




58 




15 










44, 800 


518, 000 


11 



Various smaller islands, including the Carolines, Ladrones, and 
Palaos, carry the total area and Christian population to, area, 140,000; 
population, 0,000,000; per mile, 43. 

This is considerably greater than the density of population in the 
States east of the Rocky Mountains. Owing to the existence of moun- 
tain ranges in all the islands, and lack of communications in the inte- 
rior, only a small part of the surface is inhabited. In many provinces 
the density of population exceeds 200 per square mile, or greater than 
that of any of the United States, except Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island. The total area of the Philippines is about the same as that of 
Japan, but its civilized population is only one-seventh. 

In addition to the Christian population, it is estimated (in the Official 
Guide) that the islands contain the following: 

Chinese (principally in Manila) 75, 000 

Moors or Mohammedans in Paragan and .Jolo 100, 000 

Moors or Mohammedans in Mindanao and Basalau 209, 000 

Heathens in the Philippines 830, 000 

Heathens in the Carolines and Palaos 50, 000 

Total 1,264,000 

The Official Guide gives a list of more than thirty different races, 
each speaking a different dialect, but five-sixths of the Christian popu- 
lation are either Tagalos or Visayas. All the races are of the Malay 
type. Around Manila there has been some mixture of Chinese and 
Spanish blood with that of the natives, resulting in the Mestizos or 
half-breeds, but the number of these is not very great. 

As seen in the provinces of Cavite and Manila, the natives (Tagalos) 
are of small stature, averaging probably 5 feet 4 inches in height and 



406 TREATY OF PEACE. 

120 pounds in weight for the women. Their skin is coppery brown, 
somewhat darker than that of a mulatto. They seem tc be industrious 
and hard-working, although less so than the Chinese. 

By the Spaniards they are considered indolent, crafty, untruthful, 
treacherous, cowardly, and cruel, but the hatred between the Spaniards 
and the native races is so intense and bitter that the Spanish opinion 
of the natives is of little or no value. To us they seemed industrious 
and docile, but there were occasional evidences of deceit and untruth- 
fulness in their dealings with us. The bulk of the population is engaged 
in agriculture, and there were hardly any evidences of manufactures, 
arts, or mining. The greater number seemed to be able to read and 
write, but I have been unable to obtain any exact figures on this 
subject. They are all devout Roman Catholics, although they hate the 
monastic orders. 

In Manila (and doubtless also in Cebu and Iloilo) are many thousands 
of educated natives, who are merchants, lawyers, doctors, and priests. 
They are well informed and have accumulated property. They have 
not traveled much, but there is said to be quite a numerous colony of 
rich Philippines in Madrid, as well as in Paris and London. The bib- 
liography of the Philippines is said to number 4,500 volumes, the greater 
part of which have been written by Spanish priests and missionaries. 
The number of books on the subject in the English language is probably 
less than a dozen. 

(b) Climate. — The climate is one of the best known in the Tropics. 
The islands extend from 5° to 21° north latitude, and Manila is in 14° 
35'. The thermometer during July and August rarely went below 79° 
or above 85°. The extreme ranges in a year are said to be 01° and 97°, 
and the annual mean 81°. There are three well-marked seasons, 
temperate and dry from November to February, hot and dry from 
March to May, and temperate and wet from June to October. The 
rainy season reaches its maximum in July and August, when the rains 
are constant and very heavy. The total rainfall has been as high as 
114 inches in one year. 

Yellow fever appears to be unknown. The diseases most fatal 
among the natives are cholera and smallpox, both of which are brought 
from China. Low malarial fever is brought on by sleeping on the 
ground or being chilled by remaining without exercise in wet clothes; 
and diarrhea is produced by drinking bad water or eating excessive 
quantities of fruit. Almost all of these diseases are preventable by 
proper precautions even by troops in campaign. The sickness in our 
troops was very small, much less than in the cold fogs at camp in San 
Francisco. 

(c) Mineral wealth. — Very little is known concerning the mineral 
wealth of the islands. It is stated that there are deposits of coal, 
petroleum, iron, lead, sulphur, copper, and gold in the various islands, 
but little or nothing has been done to develop them. A few concessions 
have been granted for working mines, but the output is not large. The 
gold is reported on Luzon, coal and petroleum on Cebu and Iloilo, and 
sulphur on Leyte. The imports of coal in 1894 (the latest year for 
which statistics have been printed) were 91,511 tons, and it came prin- 
cipally from Australia and Japan. In the same year the imports of 
iron of all kinds were 9,632 tons. 

If the Cebu coal proves to be of good quality, there is a large market 
for it in competition with coal from Japan and Australia. 

(d) Agriculture. — Although agriculture is the chief occupation of the 
Philippines, yet only one-ninth of the surface is under cultivation. 






TREATY OF PEACE. 407 

The soil is very fertile, and even after deducting the mountainous 
areas it is probable that the area of cultivation can be very largely 
extended and that the islands can support a population equal to that 
of Japan (42,000,000). 

The chief products are rice, corn, hemp, sugar, tobacco, cocoanuts, 
and cacao. Coffee and cotton were formerly produced in large quan- 
tities — the former for export and the latter for home consumption; but 
the coffee plant has been almost exterminated by insects and the home- 
made cotton cloths have been driven out by the competition of those 
imported from England. The rice and corn are principally produced 
in Luzon and Mindero and are consumed in the islands. The rice crop 
is about 705,000 tons. It is insufficient for the demand, and 45,000 
tons of rice were imported in 1894, the greater portion from Saigon 
and the rest from Hongkong and Singapore; also 8,669 tons (say 60,000 
barrels) of flour, of which more than two-thirds came from China and 
less than one- third from the United States. 

The cacao is raised in the southern islands, the best quality of it at 
Mindanao. The production amounts only to 150 tons, and it is all 
made into chocolate and consumed in the islands. 

The sugar cane is raised in the Visayas. The crop yielded in 1894 
about 235,000 tons of raw sugar, of which one-tenth was consumed in 
the islands, and the balance, or 210,000 tons, valued at $11,000,000, was 
exported, the greater part to China, Great Britain, and Australia. 

The hemp is produced in southern Luzon, Mindoro, the Visayas, and 
Mindanao. It is nearly all exported in bales. In 1894 the amount was 
96,000 tons, valued at $12,000,000. 

Tobacco is raised in all the islands, but the best quality and greatest 
amount in Luzon. A large amount is consumed in the islands, smoking 
being universal among women as well as the men, but the best quality 
is exported. The amount in 1894 was 7,000 tons of leaf tobacco, valued 
at $1,750,000. Spain takes 80 per cent and Egypt 10 per cent of the 
leaf tobacco. Of the manufactured tobacco 70 per cent goes to China 
and Singapore, 10 per cent to England, and 5 per cent to Spain. 

Cocoanuts are grown in southern Luzon and are used in various 
ways. The products are largely consumed in the islands, but the 
exports in 1894 were valued at $2,400,000. 

Cattle, goats, and sheep have been introduced from Spain, but they 
are not numerous. Domestic pigs and chickens are seen around every- 
where in the farming districts. 

The principal beast of burden is the carabao, or water buffalo, which 
is used for plowing rice fields as well as drawing heavy loads on 
sledges or on carts. 

Large horses are almost unknown, but there are great numbers of 
native ponies from 9 to 12 hands high, possessing strength and 
endurance far beyond their size. 

(c) Commerce and transportation. — The internal commerce between 
Manila aud the different islands is quite large, but I was unable to 
find any official records giving exact figures concerning it. It is carried 
on almost entirely by water, in steamers of 500 to 1,000 tons. There are 
regular mail steamers once in two weeks on four routes, viz: North- 
ern Luzon, southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao; also a steamer 
every two months to the Carolines and Ladroues, and daily steamers 
on Manila Bay. These lines are all subsidized. To facilitate this 
navigation extensive harbor works have been in progress at Manila 
for several years, and a plan for lighting the coasts has been made, 



408 TREATY OF PEACE. 

calling for 43 principal lights, of which 17 have already been con- 
structed in the most substantial manner, besides 16 lights of secondary 
importance. 

There is only one line of railway, built by English capital, running 
from Manila north to Dagupan, a distance of about 120 miles. The 
roads in the immediate vicinity of Manila are macadamized and in 
fairly good order; elsewhere they are narrow paths of soft black soil, 
which become almost impassable in the rainy season. Transportation 
is then effected by sledges drawn through the mud by carabaos. There 
are telegraph lines connecting most of the provinces of Luzon with 
Manila, and cables to the Visayas and southern islands and thence to 
Borneo and Singapore, as well as a direct cable from Manila to Hong- 
kong. The land telegraph lines are owned by the Government, and the 
cables all belong to an English company, which receives a large sub- 
sidy. In Manila there is a narrow-gauge street railway, operated by 
horsepower, about 11 miles in total length; also, a telephone system 
and electric lights. 

Communications with Europe are maintained by the Spanish Trans- 
Atlantic Company (subsidized), which sends a steamer every four weeks 
from Manila and Barcelona, making the trip in about twenty-seven days ; 
the same company also sends an intermediate steamer from Manila to 
Singapore, meeting the French Messageric steamer each way. There 
is also a nonsubsidized line running from Manila to Hongkong every 
two weeks, and connecting there with the English, French, and German 
mails for Europe, and with the Pacific Mail and Canadian Pacific 
steamers for Japan and America. 

There has been no considerable development of manufacturing indus- 
tries in the Philippines. The only factories are those connected with 
the preparation of rice, tobacco, and sugar. Of the manufactures and 
arts in which Japan so excels there is no evidence. 

The foreign commerce amounted, in 1891, to $23,558,552 in imports 
and $33,149,984 in exports, 80 per cent of which goes through Manila. 
About 60 per cent of the trade is carried in British vessels, 20 per cent 
in Spanish, and 10 per cent in German. 

The value of the commerce with other countries in 1894 was as follows : 

[In millions of dollars (silver).] 






Spain 

Great Britain... 

China 

Germany 

Saigon 

United States. .. 

France 

Singapore 

JVpan 

Australia 

Other countries. 

Total 



Imports. 
10.5 


Exports. 


2.9 


7.1 


8.7 


4.6 


6.8 


1.9 

.9 
.7 






7.4 


.7 


1.2 


.4 


1.7 


2 


1.2 


.1 


2.6 


1.5 


■ 6 



It is interesting to note that next to Great Britain we are the largest 
consumers of the Philippines, and that they export to us nearly three 
times as much as to Spain. On the other hand, Spain sells to the 
Philippines fifteen times as much as we do. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 
The articles of import arid their value in 1894 were as follows: 

[Iu millions of dollars (silver).] 



409 





Spain. 


Great 
Britain. 


China. 


Ger- 
many. 


United 
States. 


Other 
countries. 


Total. 




3.9 
1.2 

1.8 


4.0 
.9 


.4 

.2 


.3 

.1 




.7 

.1 

.1 

d.8 


9.3 




2.5 




i.n 






.2 

1.0 

.7 


. 2 


.4 


1.4 




.2 


.7 


.1 


1.2 






.1 


1. 1 


Flour 








.2 


.9 




.5 
.4 
.1 
.1 
2.3 




.3 
.2 
.3 
.2 


.8 








.t: 


.7 




.1 


.1 






.6 


Hats .. 


.3 
.9 




.6 




1.4 


2.0 


.i .9 


7.6 






Total. 


10.5 


7.1 


4.6 


1.9 .7 


3.8 


28.6 











a Russia. 



The articles of export and their values were as follows : 

[In millions of dollars (silver).] 





Spain. 


Great 
Britain. 


China. 


United 
States. 


Aus- 
tralia. 


Other 
countries. 


Total. 






5.3 

2.7 

.1 


.9 

4.0 
.7 


6.6 

.7 


.6 

1.9 
,1 


al.l 
61.3 

.3 


14.5 




.4 
.2 
1.1 
.3 


11.0 




1.8 




1.4 






.1 

.1 

1.0 






.4 




.6 








.7 




.9 


.1 




1.3 


3.3 








Total 


2.9 


8.7 


6.8 


7.4 


2.6 


4.7 


33.16 











a Principally to Singapore. 



6 Principally to Japan. 



With these islauds in our possession and the construction of railroads 
in the interior of Luzon, it is probable that an enormous extension 
could be given to this commerce, nearly all of which would come to the 
United States. Manila cigars of the best quality are unknown in 
America; they are but little inferior to the best of Cuba and cost only 
one-third as much. The coffee industry can be revived and the sugar 
industry extended, mainly for consumption in the far East. The min- 
eral resources can be explored with American euergy, and there is every 
reason to believe that when this is done the deposits of coal, iron, gold, 
and lead will be found very valuable. On the other hand, we ought to 
be able to secure the greater part of the trade which now goes to Spain 
in textile fabrics, and a considerable portion of that with England in 
the same goods and in iron. 

(/) Keren lie and expenses. — The budget for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1807, was as follows: 



(1) Direct taxes $8,496,170 

(2) Indirect taxes (customs) 6, 200, 550 

(3) Proceeds of monopolies 1, 222, 000 

(4) Lottery t 1,000,000 

(5) Income of Government property 257, 000 

(6) Sundry receipts 298,300 

Total 17,474,020 



410 TREATY OF PEACE. 

EXPENSES. 

(1) General expenses, pensions, and interest $1, 506, 686 

(2) Diplomatic and consular service 74, 000 

(3) Clergy and courts 1, 876, 740 

(4) War department 6, 035, 316 

(5) Treasury department 1, 392, 414 

(6) Navy department 3, 562, 716 

(7) Civil administration 2,195,378 

(8) Education 614,895 

Total 17,258,145 

The direct taxes were as follows : 

(1) Real estate, 5 per cent on income $140, 280 

(2) Industry and commerce 1,400, 700 

(3) Cedulas (poll tax) 5,600,000 

(4) Chinese poll tax 510, 190 

(5) Tribute from sultan of Jolo 20,000 

(6) Railroads, 10 per cent of passenger receipts 32, 000 

(7) Income tax, 10 per cent on public salaries 730, 000 

(8) Sundry taxes 63,000 

Total 8,496,170 

Indirect taxes were as follows : 

(1) Imports $3,600,000 

(2) Exports 1,292,550 

(3) Loading tax 410, 000 

(4) Unloading tax 570,000 

(5) Fines and penalties 27, 000 

(6) Special tax on liquors, beer, vegetables, Hour, salt, and mineral oils.. 301, 000 

6, 200, 550 

Monopolies : 

(1) Opium contract 576,000 

(2) Stamped paper and stamps 646, 000 

Total 1,222,000 

Lottery : 

(1) Sale of tickets, less cost of prizes 964, 000 

(2) Unclaimed prizes 30,000 

(3) Sundry receipts 6, 000 

Total 1,000,000 

Income of Government property: 

(1) Foresty privileges 170, 000 

(2) Sale and rent of public land and buildings 85, 000 

(3) Mineral privileges „ 2, 000 

Total 257,000 

Sundry receipts : 

(1) Mint (seigniorage) 200, 000 

(2) Sundries 98,300 

Total 298,300 

The largest source of income is the eedula or poll tax. Every man 
and woman above 18 years of age, residing in the Philippines, whether 
Spanish subject or foreigner, is required to have in his or her posses- 
sion a paper stating name, age, and occupation, and other facts of per- 
sonal identity. Failure to produce and exhibit this when called upon 
renders anyone liable to arrest and imprisonment. This paper is 



TREATY OF PEACE. 411 

obtained from the internal-revenue office annually, on payment of a 
certain sum, varying, according to the occupation and income of the 
person, from 75 cents to $20, and averaging about $3 for each adult. 
An extra sum of 2 per cent is paid for expenses of collection. The tax 
is collected at the tribunal in each pueblo, and 20 per cent is retained 
for expenses of local administration and 80 per cent paid to the gen- 
eral treasury. This tax falls heavily on the poor and lightly on the 
rich. The tax on industry and commerce is similarly graded according 
to the volume of business transacted by each merchant or mercantile 
corporation. The tax on real estate is absurdly low and is levied only 
on municipal property and on the rent, not the value. 

The tax on imports is specific and not ad valorem ; it amounts to 
about 13 per cent of estimated values. The free list is very small, 
nearly everything of commercial value which is imported being subject 
to duty. The revenue from imports has increased from $506,143 in 
1805 to $3,095,446 in 1894. It was about the same in 1897. On the 
other hand, the export tax, which was nothing in 1892, the loading tax, 
which was nothing in 1893, and the unloading tax, which was nothing 
in 1894, have all been increased in the last few years in order to meet 
the expenses of suppressing the insurrection. These three items yielded 
nearly $2,700,000 in 1897. 

The monopoly of importing and selling opium is sold by auction to 
the highest bidder for a term of three years. The present contract runs 
until 1899, and yields $48,000 per month. 

Every legal document must be drawn up on paper containing a 
revenue stamp engraved and printed in Spain, and every note, check, 
draft, bill of exchange, receipt, or similar document must bear a revenue 
stamp in order to be valid. These stamps and stamped paper yielded 
a revenue of $646,000 in 1897. 

The lottery is conducted by the Government, the monthly drawings 
taking place in the treasury (hacienda) department. The sale of tickets 
yielded $1,000,000 over and above the prizes in 1897. 

In a report to General Merritt on August 20, 1 recommended that the 
opium contract be canceled and the lottery abandoned during our occu- 
pation of Manila; and as the poll tax and tax on industry and com- 
merce had been paid for the most part in the early part of the year, 
our chief sources of revenue were from the custom house, the sale of 
stamps and stamped paper, and the sale of such licenses as the law 
allowed (amusements, liquor saloons, etc.), for the benefit of the city of 
Manila as distinguished from the general revenues. I estimated the 
total at about $500,000 per month. 

The expenses of administering the military government of occupation 
(apart from the expenses of the army) will consist of the current 
expenses of the office at the provost-marshal- general's office and its 
various bureaus; at the custom-house, internal-revenue office, and other 
offices; and the salaries of interpreters and minor employees, who are 
anxious to resume work as soon as they dare do so. An estimate of 
these expenses was being prepared at the time 1 left, but was not com- 
pleted. It can hardly exceed $200,000 per month, and may be much 
less. This should leave $300,000 (silver) excess of income per month 
to go toward the military expenses of occupation. 

As soon as it is decided that we are to retain the islands it will be 
necessary to make a careful study of the sources of revenue and items 
of expense for all theislands, with a view to thoro uglily understnding 
the subject, before introducing the extensive changes which will be 
necessary. 



412 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Currency. — The standard of value has always, until within a few 
years, been the Mexican milled dollar. The Spanish dollar contains a 
little less silver, and in order to introduce it and profit by the coinage 
the Spaniards prohibited the importation of Mexican dollars a few years 
since. Large numbers of Mexican dollars remained in the country, 
however, and others were smuggled in. The two dollars circulated at 
equal values. 

All valuations of goods and labor are based on the silver dollar, and 
a change to the gold standard would result in great financial distress 
and many failures among the banks and mercantile houses in Manila. 
Their argument is that while an American 10-dollar gold piece will bring 
21 silver dollars at any bank or house having foreign connections, yet 
it will not buy any more labor or any more hemp and sugar from the 
original producer than 10 silver dollars. The products of the country 
are almost entirely agricultural, and the agricultural class, whether it 
sells its labor or its products, would refuse to accept any less than the 
accustomed wages or prices on account of being paid in the more 
valuable coin. The result o'f this change would be that the merchant 
and employee would have to pay double for what they buy, and would 
receive no increase for what they sell. While trade would eventually 
adjust itself to the change, yet many merchants would be ruined in 
the process and would drag some banks down with them. 

The Mexican dollar is the standard also in Hongkong and China, and 
the whole trade of the Far East has for generations been conducted on 
a silver basis. Japan has within the last year broken away from this 
and established the gold standard, but in doing so the relative value of 
silver and gold was fixed at 32£ to 1, or about the market rate. 

Public debt. — I was unable to obtain any precise information in regard 
to the colonial debt. The last book on statistics of imports and exports 
was for the fiscal year 1894; and the last printed budget was for 
1896-97, which was approved by the Queen Regent in August, 1896. 
Subsequent to this date, according to the statements made to us by 
foreign bankers, the Cortes authorized two colonial loans of $14,000,000 
(silver) cash, known as Series A and Series B. The proceeds were to 
be used in suppressing the insurrection. Both were to be secured by a 
first lien on the receipts of the Manila custom-house. 

Series A is said to have been sold in Spain and the proceeds to have 
been paid in to the colonial office, but no part of them has ever 
reached the Philippines. Possibly a portion of it was used in sending 
out the 25,000 troops which came from Spain to the Philippines in the 
autumn of 1896. 

Series B was offered for sale in Manila, but was not taken. An 
effort was then made to obtain subscribers in the provinces, but with 
little or no success. The Government then notified the depositors in the 
Public Savings Bank (a branch of the treasury department similar to 
the postal savings bureaus in other countries) that their deposits 
would no longer be redeemed in cash but only in Series B bonds. 
Some depositors were frightened and took bonds, others declined to do 
so. Then came the blockade of Manila, and all business was practically 
suspended. 

No printed report has been made concerning the debt, and I was 
unable to obtain any satisfactory statement of the matter from the 
Treasury officials. The exact facts in regard to the Series A bonds can 
be learned in Madrid, but it will be difficult to learn how much of Series 
B was issued and what consideration was received for them. As 
already stated, both series of bonds rest for security on the receipts of 
the Manila custom-house. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 413 

SPANISH TROOPS. 

The Spanish prisoners of war number about 13,000, including about 
400 officers. The infantry arms are about -22,000, the greater part 
Mauser, model 1895, caliber .28, and the others liemingtons, model 1889, 
caliber .43. The ammunition is about 22,000,000 rounds. The field 
artillery consists of about 12 breech loading steel guns, caliber 3.5 inches, 
and 10 breech-loading mountain guns, caliber 3.2 inches. There are 
six horses (ponies) for each gun, but the harness is in bad order. 
Ammunition, about 60 rounds per gun, with possibly more in the 
arsenals. There are about 500 cavalry ponies, larger than the average 
horses, with saddles and equipments complete. There is also a bat- 
talion of engineers. The fortifications of the walled city are a fine 
sample of the Vauban type, on which military engineers expended so 
much ingenuity 150 years ago, and of which Spain possessed so many 
in her Flemish dominions. 

The first walls of Manila were built about 1500, but the present 
fortifications date from a short time after the capture and occupation of 
the place by the English, in 1762-17G4. They consist of bastions and 
curtains, deep-set ditch, covered way, lunettes, demilunes, horn works, 
and all the scientific accessories of that day. They are in a good state 
of preservation, and mount several hundred ancient guns, but they are 
chiefly of interest to the antiquarian. On the glacis facing the bay, and 
also on the open space just south of the walls, are mounted 9-inch 
breechloaders, four in all, made at Hontoria, Spain, in 1884. They are 
well mounted between high traverses, in which are bomb proof maga- 
zines. These guns are practically uninjured, and Admiral Dewey has 
the breechblocks. While not as powerful as the guns of the present 
day of the same caliber, they are capable of effective service. Their 
location, however, is very faulty, as they are on the shore of the bay, 
with all the churches, public buildings, and most valuable property 
immediately behind them. 

On the day after the naval battle Admiral Dewey sent word to the 
Governor-Geueral that if these guns fired a shot at any of his vessels 
he would immediately reply with his whole squadron. Owing to their 
location this meant a bombardment of the city. This threat was effect- 
ive; these guns were never afterwards fired, not even during the great 
attack of August 13; and in return the navy did not fire on them, but 
directed all their shells at the forts and trenches occupied by the troops 
outside of the suburbs of the city. 

Within the walled city are the cathedral and numerous churches, 
convents, and monasteries, the public offices, civil and military, military 
workshops and arsenals; barracks for artillery, cavalry, and engineers; 
storehouses, and a few dwellings and shops. 

The infantry barracks are outside of the walls, four in number, viz, 
Neysig, Portin, Calzada, and Ermita. They are modern and well con- 
structed and will accommodate about 4,000 men. They are now occu- 
pied by United States troops. 

Under the terms of the armistice the arms laid down by the Spanish 
troops on August 14 are to be returned to them whenever they evacuate 
the city or the American Army evacuates it. All other public property, 
including horses, artillery, public funds, munitions, etc., is surrendered 
to the United States unconditionally. 

The question of sending back the troops to Spain is left absolutely 
to the decision of the authorities in Washington. They are all within 
the walled city, but as the public buildings are insufficient to accom- 



414 TREATY OF PEACE. 

modare them they are quartered in the churches and convents. These 
buildings are not adapted for this purpose; they have no sinks, lava- 
tories, kitchens, or sleeping apartments, and there is great danger of 
an epidemic of sickness if the troops are not soon removed. 

Pending their removal they are being fed with rations furnished by 
the United States Commissary Department, and the officers receive 
from the United States sufficient money for their support. 

SPANISH NAVY. 

At the outbreak of the war the naval force in the Philippines con- 
sisted of 10 cruisers, 19 gunboats, 4 armed launches, 3 transports, -^ 
survey boat. 

Of these Admiral Dewey destroyed on May 1, 10 cruisers and 1 trans- 
port, and he has since captured 2 gunboats. The Spaniards have sunk 
2 transports and 2 or 3 gunboats in the Pasig River. There remain 
13 or 14 gunboats, which are scattered among the islands. They are of 
iron, from 140 to 200 tons each, are armed with 1 breech-loading rifle, 
caliber 3.6-inch, and 2 to 4 machine guns each, caliber .44 to 1 inch. 
One of the captured boats, the Gallao, under command of Lieutenant 
Tappan, U. S. N., and a crew of 18 men, rendered very efficient service 
in the attack of August 13. These boats would all be useful in the 
naval police of the islands. They will, however, probably be scuttled 
by the Spaniards before the islands are surrendered. 

The navy yard at Cavite has barracks for about 1,500 men (now occu- 
pied by United States troops), and has shops and ways for light work 
and vessels of less than 1,000 tons. Many of the gunboats above men- 
tioned were built there. The shallow depth of water in Canacoa or 
Oavite Bay would prevent the enlargement of this naval station to 
accommodate large vessels, and the plan of the Spaniards was to 
create a large naval station in Subig Bay, on which considerable 
money has already been spent. 

• SPANISH CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. 

The government of the Philippine Islands, including the Ladrones, 
Carolines, and Palaos, is vested in the Governor-General, who, in the 
language of the Spanish Official Guide or Blue Book, "is the sole and 
legitimate representative in these islands of the supreme power of the 
Government of the King of Spain, and as such is the supreme head of 
all branches of the public service and has authority to inspect and 
supervise the same, not excepting the courts of justice." The office is 
held by a lieutenant-general in the Spanish army; and he is also vice- 
royal patron of the Indies, exercising in these islands the ecclesias- 
tical functions conferred on the King of Spain by various bulls of the 
Popes of Rome, captain-general in chief of the army of the Philippines, 
inspector-general of all branches of tbe service, commander in chief of 
the naval forces, and president of all corporations and societies which 
partake of an official character. 

What corresponds to his cabinet or ministry of (a) the archbishop 
of Manila and four bishops, who administer ecclesiastical affairs in the 
five dioceses into which the islands are divided for this purpose; the 
appointment of parish priests and curates, however, is vested in the 
governor-general. The various religious orders which exercise so 
large an influence in the politics and business of the islands, viz, 
Agustinians, Dominicans, Recollects, Franciscans, Capuchins, Benedic- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 415 

tines, and Jesuits, are all under the management of the bishops, sub- 
ject to the supervision of the Pope and the prerogatives of the King as 
royal patron, which prerogatives are exercised by the Governor- 
General as viceroy. 

(b) The high court of justice in Manila, which is the court of appeals 
in civil and governmental cases for all the islands; there are two prin- 
cipal criminal courts, in Cebu and Vigan (northern Luzon), and appeal 
in criminal cases lies to these courts or to the high court of Manila; in 
every province there is a court of primary jurisdiction in both civil and 
criminal cases. 

(c) The general second in command, who is a general of division in 
the Spanish army. He is the subinspector of all branches of the mili- 
tary service, is military governor of the province and city of Manila 
and commands all the troops stationed therein, and in the absence or 
sickness of the captain-general he commands all the military forces in 
the islands. 

(d) The general commandant of dockyards and squadron. This post 
is filled by a vice-admiral in the Spanish navy, and he commands the 
naval forces, ships, and establishments in the islands. 

(e) The minister of finance, or intendente general de hacienda, who is 
charged with the collection of customs and internal taxes, the expend- 
itures of public money, and the audit and control of public accounts. 

(f) The minister of the interior, or director- general of civil adminis- 
tration, who is charged with all public business relating to public 
instruction, charities, health, public works, forests, mines, agriculture, 
industry and commerce, posts and telegraphs, and meteorology. 

For the purpose of local administration the islands are divided into 
provinces and districts, classified as follows 19 civil governments, 
24 political-military governments, 23 political-military commands, 15 
military commands. 

The most important of the provinces are Manila, with a population of 
400,238 (of which 10 per cent are Chinese) and Cebu, with 504,076; 
and the least important districts are Balabas and Corregidor, with 420 
and 320, respectively. 

The governor or commandant has supreme control within his province 
or district of every branch of the public service, including the courts of 
justice, and each reports direct to the Governor-General. The guardia 
civil, or gendarmerie, is subject only to his orders, and for arrests and 
imprisonment for political offenses he is responsible, not to the law, 
but to the Governor-General and the King. 

The civil governments are governed by civil governors of the rank 
in the Spanish civil service of chiefs of administration of the second 
class. The political military governments and commands are in charge 
of military and naval officers of various grades, according to their size 
and importance, ranging from general of division at Mindanao, brig- 
adier-generals at Cebu and Iloilo, captain in the navy at Paraguay, 
down to lieutenant at Balabas and Corregidor. 

The civil or military governor is assisted by a secretary, a judge, an 
administrator of finances, a postmaster, and a captain of police. 

The affairs of cities are managed by a council (ayuntamiento) con- 
sisting of a presidente, a recorder (sindico), one or more mayors 
(alcalde), six to ten aldermen (regidores), and a secretary. 

Outside of the cities each province or district is divided into a num- 
ber of villages or parishes (pueblos). The total number of these is 
1,055. In each there is a parish priest, a municipal captain, a justice 
of the peace, a schoolmaster, and schoolmistress. The number of cities 



416 TREATY OF PEACE. 

is very small, and the social life of the community depends almost 
wholly on the form of government of the pueblos or villages. In 1893 
this was reorganized with the alleged intention of giving local self- 
goveminen'. The scheme is complicated and curious, and only an out- 
line of it can be given here. It is contained in full in the royal decree 
of May 19, 1893, a long document supplemented by still longer regula- 
tions for carrying the same into effect. 

In brief, every pueblo in which there are paid more than 1,000 cedulas 
(poll tax) shall have a municipal tribunal, consisting of live members, 
by whom its local affairs and funds shall be managed. The members 
are a municipal captain, senior lieutenant, lieutenant of police, lieuten- 
ant of agriculture, lieutenant of cattle; and the village priest is 
required to attend all the important meetings. 

The captain holds office for four years and is eligible for indefinite 
reelection; the lieutenants hold office for four years also, one half of 
them going out of office every two years, and they are ineligible for 
reelection until two years after the expiration of their term. Both 
captains and lieutenants are elected on a day designated by the gov- 
ernor, and in the presence of the village priest and the outgoing cap- 
tain, by the principalia or body of principal men of the village. The 
village is subdivided into barangayes or group of about 100 families 
each, and for each barangay there is a chief or headman (cabeza), who 
is appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the municipal 
tribunal. The principalia is made up of former municipal captains, 
former municipal lieutenants, former gobernadorcillos, chiefs of baran- 
gayes. 

All inhabitants paying more than $50 annually in taxes. The prin- 
cipalia choose the 13 electors, as follows : Six from the chiefs of baran- 
gayes, 3 from former municipal captains, and 3 from the largest tax- 
payers. 

The electors hold office for six years, and one-third go out of office 
every two years. 

The municipal captain must be a resident of the village, more than 
25 years of age, read and speak Spanish, and be a chief of a barangay. 
While the municipal tribunal nominally controls the local affairs, yet 
the captain has the right to suspend all its acts which he considers 
against the public welfare, and report the matter to the provincial 
governor, who has power to rescind them. The captain appoints all 
village employees and removes them at will. He can also fine and 
punish them for petty offenses. He issues orders to the police and col- 
lects the taxes. He holds a commission as delegate or representative 
of the Governor-General, and, in fact, he exercises within his little 
bailiwick the same supreme power that the governor exercises in the 
province and the Governor-General in the whole archipelago. 

In each province there is a junta or council, whose membership con- 
sists of the administrator of finance, two vicars, the public physician, 
four members. 

The latter four members must be residents of the capital of the 
province, and they are elected by the municipal captains, from a list 
of names submitted to them by the junta, with the approval of the 
governor. 

The functions of this junta or council are solely those of inspection 
and advice. It watches over the affairs of the municipal tribunals, and 
reports to the governor its advice and recommendations concerning 
them.' The municipal captain is obliged to deposit the taxes in the 
provincial treasury, the keys of which are held by three members of 



TREATY OF PEACE. 417 

the council. He draws out the money in accordance with a municipal 
budget, and his accounts must be approved by his lieutenants, coun- 
tersigned by the village priest, passed upon by the provincial council, 
and finally approved by the governor. 

The governor has power to suspend the municipal captain or any of 
his colleagues for a period of three months, and the governor general 
can remove one or all of them from office at will, and "iu extraordi- 
nary cases or for reasons of public trauquillity the governor shall have 
power to decree, without any legal prowess, the abolition of the muni- 
cipal tribunals." (Article 45.) 

In December, 1896, General Polavija issued a decree suspending the 
elections which were to take place that month for one-third of the 
municipal electors, and directed the governors of provinces to send in 
names of persons suitable for appointment, together with the recom- 
mendations of the village priest in each case. 

An examination of this unique scheme of village government shows 
that one-half of the electors are to be chosen from persons holding a 
subordinate office and appointed by the governor; that the village 
priest must be present at all elections and important meetings; that 
the captain has all the responsibility and he must also be of the class 
holding a subordinate office by appointment of the governor; that the 
acts of the municipal tribunal can be suspended by the captain and 
rescinded by the governor, and finally, if the municipal tribunal is 
offensive to the Governor General he can either remove its members 
and appoint others in their place or can abolish it altogether. 

Such is the Spanish idea of self-government. The minister of the 
colonies in submitting the decree to the Queen Regent, expatiated on 
its merits in giving the natives such full control of their local affairs, 
and expressed the confident belief that it would prove "most beneficent 
to those people whom Providence has confided to the generous sover- 
eignty of the Spanish monarchs." 

This scheme of government by municipal tribunals was highly 
approved by the natives, except that feature of it which placed so 
much power in the hands of the governor and Governor General. This, 
however, was the essence of the matter from the Spanish standpoint, 
and these portions of the decree were the ones most fully carried out. 
The natives complained, on the one hand, of the delay iu putting the 
decree into operation, and, on the other hand, that so much of it as was 
established was practically nullified by the action of the governors. 
Seeing that the tribunals had really no power, the members soon turned 
their sessions (which the decree required to be secret) into political 
meetings in favor of the insurrection. So the whole project is thus far 
a failure, and the local administration is in considerable disorder, apart 
from that caused by the insurgents. In point of fact, self government 
and representation are unknown in these islands. 

The archbishop and the four bishops are appointed by the Pope. 
The Governor-General, military and naval officers, and all officials with 
a salary exceeding about $4,000 (silver) are appointed by the King or the 
minister of the colonies. Yet all the expenses are paid from the Philip- 
pine treasury. The salaries of all officials— military, naval, civil, and 
ecclesiastical— the expenses and pensions of the army, navy, and church, 
the cost of the diplomatic and consular service in Japan, China, and 
Singapore, even a portion of the expenses of the colonial office at 
Mrnlrid and of pensions paid to the descendants of Columbus, all come 
out of the taxes raised iu the islands. The natives have no place in 
T P 27 



418 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the government, except clerks in tlie public offices at Manila and the 
petty positions in the villages ai d the ayuntemientos of cities, where 
their powers and responsibilities, as we have seen, are at all times 
limited and subject to revocation whenever disapproved by the governor. 

Though the population of the islands is 40 per cent of that of Spain, 
they have no representation in the Cortes. 

There is a widespread report, almost universally believed by native 
Filipinos and by foreign merchants, and even acknowledged by many 
Spauiards, that pecuniary dishonesty and corruption exist throughout 
the whole body of Spanish officeholders, from the highest to the low- 
est. Forced contributions are said to be levied on the salaries of minor 
officials, the regimental paymasters and commissaries are said to have 
sold part of the regimental stores for their own profit, the collector of 
customs and the minister of finance to have imposed or remitted fines 
at the custom house and internal-revenue office according to payment 
or nonpayment of presents by merchants, the judges and court officials 
to have "borrowed" from attorneys large sums which are never paid, 
and even the Governor General is reported to have organized a regular 
system of smuggling in Mexican dollars, the importation of which was 
prohibited by law, on a fixed scale of payment to himself. The current 
report is that Weyler carried away over $1,000,000 as his savings dur- 
ing the three years, from 1888 to 1891, that he held the office of 
Governor General, on a salary of $40,000 a year. Of the proof of these 
reports I have naturally no personal knowledge, but they are matters 
of common talk and belief, and they have been stated to me by responsi- 
ble persons who have long resided in the islands. 

As above stated, the Governor-General is supreme head of every 
branch of the public service, not excepting the courts of justice. How 
this power was exercised is shown in the hundreds of executions tor 
alleged political offenses which took place during the years 1895, 1896, 
and 1897, by the thousands deported to Mindanao and Fernando Po, 
and by the number of political prisoners in jail at the time of our entry 
into Manila. On the first examination which General MacArthur, as 
military governor, made of the jail, about August 22, he released over 
60 prisoners confined for alleged political offenses. One of them was a 
woman who had been imprisoned for eleven years, by order of the 
Governor-General, but without any charges ever having been presented 
against her; another was a woman who had been in jail for three years 
on a vague charge, never formulated, of having carried a basket of 
cartridges to an insurgent. 

The day of reckoning for three centuries of this sort of government 
came when Admiral Uewey destroyed the Spanish squadron on May 1, 
1898. An insurrection had been in progress from August, 1890, to 
December, 1897. Unable to suppress it, the Government made a 
written treaty with the insurgent leaders, paying them a large sum of 
money and promising to introduce various reforms on condition that 
they would leave the country. Hardly had the Spanish officials 
recovered from this when the appalling disaster of the destruction of 
their fleet occurred under their very eyes. 

Then followed in rapid succession the naval blockade, the arrival of 
the insurgent leaders from Hongkong, the raising of an insurgent 
army, which blockaded Manila on the land side, and finally the Ameri- 
can troops. At the end of 104 days after the destruction of the Spanish 
fleet the city surrendered to a combined laud and naval attack of the 
American forces. On the day after the capitulation the American 
commander in chief issued his proclamation establishing a military 



TREATY OF PEACE. 419 

government, appointed a military governor, a minister of finance, a 
collector of customs, collector of internal revenue, postmaster, and 
judge of the provost court; took possession of all public funds (about 
$900,000) and all public offices, and as rapidly as possible put this 
government in operation. 

The machinery of the Spanish Government was thoroughly disorgan- 
ized when we entered Manila. The courts of justice, except the inferior 
criminal courts, had not been in session since early in May; the officials 
had been cut off from communication with the other islands and with 
Spain for over three months; there had been no customs to collect, and 
owing to the entire suspension of business, but little internal revenue; 
a forced loan of $2,000,000 for military purposes had been extracted 
from the Spanish-Philippine Bank, and yet the troops were several 
months in arrears of pay; all Government officers outside the walled 
city had been moved to temporary quarters within the walls, and their 
records had been lost or thrown into confusion; the officials, seeing the 
inevitable end in sight, were intent only on planning for their return to 
Spain. 

This disorganization was completed when the American military offi- 
cers took charge of the government and every Spanish official without 
exception refused absolutely to continue in service. They were immedi- 
ately dismissed and dispersed. 

The situation thus created is without precedent in American history. 
When Scott captured the City of Mexico it was acknowledged on both 
sides that his occupation was only to be temporary, and there were no 
insurgents to deal with. When the Americans entered California 
they found only a scanty population, who were soon outnumbered by 
theAmerican immigrants. But in the Philippine Islands there is a 
population of more than 7,000,000, governed by an alien race whose 
representatives present in the islands, including military and naval 
forces, clergy, and civil employees, do not exceed 30,000 in number. 
Against this government an insurrection is in progress which claims 
to have been successful in provinces containing a population of about 
2,000,000. The city and province of Manila, with a population of 
400,000 more, have been captured and occupied by a foreign army, but 
whether its occupation is to be temporary or permanent has not yet 
been decided. 

Finally the Government officials of all classes refuse to perform 
their functions. The desire of the most of them is to escape to Spain. 
It was stipulated in the capitulation that they should have the right 
to do so at their own expense, and numbers of them, as well as friars, 
have already takeu their departure. The Spanish officials have intense 
fear of the insurgents; and the latter hate them, as well as the friars, 
with a virulence that cau hardly be described. They have fought them 
with success and almost without interruption for two years, and they 
will continue to fight them with increased vigor and still greater pros- 
pects of success if any attempt is made to restore the Spanish 
government. In its present disorganized condition the Spanish Gov- 
ernment could not successfully cope with them ; on the other hand, it 
would not surrender to them. The result, therefore, of an attempted 
restoration of Spanish power in any of the islands would simply be 
civil war and anarchy, leading inevitably and speedily to intervention 
by foreign nations whose subjects have property in the islands which 
they would not allow to be destroyed. 

Insurgent troops. — It is very difficult to give exact figures for the 
numbers of insurgent troops. In his message to foreign governments 



420 TREATY OF PEACE. 

of August 6, asking for recognition of belligerency and independence, 
Aguinaldo claims to have a force of 30,000 men, organized into a regular 
army. This included the force in the provinces of Luzon outside of 
Manila. What was in evidence around Manila varied from 10,000 to 
15,000. They were composed of young men and boys, some as young 
as 15 years of age, recruited in the rural districts, having no property 
and nothing to lose in a civil war. They have received no pay, and 
although Aguinaldo speaks in his proclamation of his intention and 
ability to maintain order wherever his forces penetrate, yet the feeling 
is practically universal among the rank and tile that they are to 
be compensated for their time and services and hardships by looting 
Manila. 

Their equipment consists of a gun, bayonet, and cartridge box; their 
uniform of a straw hat, gingham shirt, and trousers and bare feet; 
their transportation of a few ponies and carts, impressed for a day or a 
week at a time; for quarters they have taken the public building in 
each village or pueblo, locally known as the Tribunal, and the churches 
and convents; from these, details are sent out to man the trenches. 
Their food while on duty consists of rice and banana leaves, cooked at 
the quarters and sent out to the trenches. " After a few days or a week 
of active service they return to their homes to feed up or to work on 
their farms, their places being taken by others, to whom they turn over 
their guns and cartridges. 

Their arms have been obtained from various sources — from purchases 
in Hongkong; from the supply which Admiral Dewey found in the 
arsenal at Cavite; from capture made from the Spaniards. They are 
partly Mausers and partly Remingtons. Their ammunition was ob- 
tained in the same way. They have used it freely, and the supply is 
now rather short. To replenish it they have established a cartridge 
factory at the village of lmus, about 10 miles south of Cavite, where 
they have 400 people engaged in reloading cartridges with powder and 
lead found at Cavite or purchased abroad. They have no artillery, 
except a few antique columbiads obtained from Cavite, and no cavalry. 
Their method of warfare is to dig a trench in front of the Spanish posi- 
tion, cover it with mats as a protection against the sun and rain, and 
during the night put their guns ou top of the trench above their heads 
and fire in the general direction of the enemy. When their ammuni- 
tion is exhausted, they go off in a body to get a fresh supply in baskets, 
and then return to the trenches. 

The men are of small stature, from 5 feet to 5 feet inches in height, 
and weigh from 110 to 130 pounds. Compared with them, our men 
from Colorado and California seemed like a race of giants. One after- 
noon, just after we entered Manila, a battalion of the insurgents fired 
upon the outposts of the Colorado regiment, mistaking them, as they 
claimed, for Spaniards. The outpost retreated to their support and 
the Filipinos followed; they easily fell into au ambush, and the sup- 
port, numbering about 80 men, surrounded the 250 Filipinos, wrenched 
the guns out of their hands, and marched them off as unarmed pris- 
oners, all in the space of a few minutes. Such a force can hardly 
be called an army, and yet the service which it has rendered should 
not be underestimated. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Spanish native troops 
surrendered to it during the months of June and July; it constantly 
annoyed and harassed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up 
at night and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila 
early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the 
inhabitants, as well as the Spanish troops, were forced to live on horse 



TREATY OF PEACE. 421 

and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs. It 
captured the waterworks of Manila and cut off the water supply, and if 
it had been in the dry season would have inflicted great suffering on 
the inhabitants for lack of water. 

These results, it is true, were obtained against a dispirited army con- 
taining a considerable number of native troops of doubtful loyalty. 
Yet from August, 1890, to April, 1897, they fought 25,000 of the best 
regular troops sent out from Spain, inflicting on them a loss of over 
150 officers and 2,500 men killed and wounded, and they suffered still 
greater losses themselves. Nevertheless, from daily contact with them 
for six weeks, I am very confident that no such results could have 
been obtained against an American army, which would have driven 
them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerrilla warfare. 
If they attack the American army this will certainly be the result; 
and while these guerrilla bands might give some trouble so long as 
their ammunition lasted, yet with our navy guarding the coasts and 
our army pursuing them on laud, it would not be long before they were 
reduced to subjection. 

Insurgent civil administration. — In August, 1896, an insurrection 
broke out in Cavite under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, and 
soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued 
with varying successes on both sides, and the trial and execution of 
numerous insurgents, until December, 1897, when the Governor-General, 
Primo de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the 
substance of the document, which is in possession of Senor Felipe 
Agoncillo, who accompanies me to Washington, being attached hereto 
and marked A. In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other 
insurgent leaders should leave the country, the Government agreeing to 
pay them $800,000 in silver and promising to introduce namerous re- 
forms, including representation in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of the 
press, general amnesty for all insurgents, and the expulsion or secular- 
ization of the monastic orders. 

Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A 
portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, 
and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordi- 
nate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very 
honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division 
of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo 
claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit 
until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their prom- 
ised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the 
expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by 
paying Artacho $5,000. 

No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms, more than 2,000 
insurgents, who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places, 
are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to 
carry on the operations of the present insurrection. 

On the 24th day of April Aguinaldo met the United States consul 
and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in con- 
junction with the operations of the United States Navy at Manila. 
This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey, and by his consent, or at his 
request, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong on April 26; and 
when the McGulloch went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news 
of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other 
revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They 
soon after landed at Cavite, and the Admiral allowed them to take such 



422 TREATY OF PEACE 

guns, ammunition, and stores as lie did not require for himself. With 
these, and some other arms which he had brought from Hongkong, 
Aguinaldo armed his followers, who rapidly assembled at Cavite, and 
in a tew weeks he began moving against the. Spaniards. Part of them 
surrendered, giving him more arms, and the others retreated to Manila. 

Soon afterwards two ships which were the private property of Senor 
Agoncillo and other insurgent sympathizers were converted into cruis- 
ers and sent with insurgent troops to Subig Bay and other places to 
capture provinces outside of Manila. They were very successful, the 
native militia in Spanish service capitulating with their arms in nearly 
every case without serious resistance. On the 18th of June Aguinaldo 
issued a proclamation from Cavite establishing a dictatorial government, 
with himself as dictator. In each village or pueblo a chief (jefe) was 
to be elected, and in each ward a headman (cabeza) ; also in each pneblo 
three delegates — one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. These 
were to constitute the junta or assembly, and after consulting the junta 
the chiefs of pueblos were to elect a chief of province and three coun- 
cilors — one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. They were also 
to elect one or more representatives from each province to form the 
revolutionary congress. 

This was followed on June 20 by a decree giving more detailed 
instructions in regard to the elections. On June 23 another decree tol- 
lowed changing the title of the government from dictatorial to revo- 
lutionary, and of the chief officer from dictator to president; announcing 
a cabinet, with a minister of foreign affairs, marine, and commerce, 
another of war and public works, another of police and internal order, 
justice, instruction, and hygiene, and another of taxes, agriculture, and 
manufactures; the powers of the president and congress were defined, 
and a code of military justice was formulated. 

On the same date a manifesto was issued to the world explaining the 
reasons and purposes of the revolution. On June 27 another decree 
was issued containing instructions in regard to elections. On August 6 
an address was issued to foreign governments stating that the revolu- 
tionary government was in operation and control in 15 provinces, and 
that in response to the petition of the duly elected chiefs of these 
provinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligerency and inde- 
pendence. Translations of these various documents are all appended, 
marked B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. 

The scheme of government is set forth in the decree of June 23, 
marked D. An examination of this document shows that it provides 
a dictatorship of the familiar South American type. All power is cen- 
tered in the president, and he is not responsible to anyone for his acts. 
He is declared to be "the personification of the Philippine public, and 
in this view can not be held responsible while he holds office. His term 
will last until the revolution triumphs." He appoints not only the heads 
of departments, but all their subordinates, and without reference to 
congress. This body is composed of a single chamber of representa- 
tives from each province. The election is to be conducted by an agent 
of the president, and the qualifications of electors are "those inhabit- 
ants most distinguished for high character, social position, and honor- 
able conduct." 

If any province is still under Spanish rule its representative is to be 
appointed by the president. Congress is to deliberate on "all grave 
and transcendental questions whose decision admits of delay and 
adjournment, but the president may decide questions of urgent charac- 
ter, giving the reasons for his decision in a message to congress." The 



TREATY OF PEACE. 423 

acts of congress are not binding until approved by tbe president, and 
he has power of absolute veto. 

Congress was to bold its first session at Malolos about September 20. 

While this scheme of government is a pure despotism, yet it claims 
to be only temporary, and intended to "prepare the country so that a 
true republic may be established." It also provides a rude form of 
governmental machinery for managing the affairs of the provinces. To 
wbat extent it has actually gone into operation it is difficult to say. 
Aguinaldo claims in his address of August that it is in force in fifteen 
provinces whose aggregate population is about 2,0U)),000. They include 
the island of Mindoro and about one half of Luzon. None of these 
(except Oavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all communi- 
cation with tlieni by the Spanish Government at Manila has been cut 
off since May 1. 

In the Province of Cavite and that portion of the Province of Manila 
outside of the city and its suburbs which was occupied by the insur- 
gent troops, as well as those of the United States, their military forces, 
military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence, occupying the 
principal houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there 
were no signs of civil government or administration. It was reported, 
however, that Aguinaldo's agents were levying taxes or forced contri- 
butions not only in the outside villages, but (after we entered Manila) 
by means of secret agents in the market places of the city itself. At 
Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were signs of activity and 
business, and it was reported that his cabinet officers were in constant 
session there. Aguinaldo himself never failed to claim all the preroga- 
tives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country. 

The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communica- 
tion with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this 
officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for 
his troops, and he went so far in a letter of July 23 (copy herewith 
marked J) as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops 
on Philippine soil without his consent— a notice which it is hardly 
necessary to say was ignored. The day before the attack on Manila 
he sent staff officers to the same general asking for our plans of attack 
so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had 
previously been made to me by one of his brigade commanders, to 
which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired. 

Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, aud this 
enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct 
or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then re- 
ceived one of Aguinaldo's staff officers in his office as military governor. 
The interview lasted more than an hour. General Merritt referred to 
his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American 
troops had come to Manila and the nature of the military government 
which would be maintained until further orders from Washington. He 
agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila up to which the 
insurgent troops could come, but no farther, with arms in their hands; 
he asked for possession of the waterworks, which was given; and while 
expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine people, he 
stated very positively that the United States Government had placed 
at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and 
even if the services of Aguinaldo's forces had been needed as allies he 
should not have felt at liberty to accept them. 

The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo's government and troops 
will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and 



424 TREATY OF PEACE. 

will require much tact aud skill in its solution. The United States 
Government, through its naval commander, has to some extent made 
use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz, to harass and annoy the 
Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila 
on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish 
Government prior to the arrival of our troops: and for this purpose the 
admiral allowed them to take arms and munitions which he had cap- 
tured at Cavite and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in 
tlieir expeditions against other provinces. But the admiral has been 
very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurances of recognition and no 
pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo 
and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila 
are certainly entitled to consideration; but, after all, they were small in 
comparison with what was done by our own fleet and army. 

There is no reason to believe that Agninaldo's government has any 
elements of stability, in the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of 
28 years; prior to the insurrection of 1890 he had been a schoolmaster 
and afterwards goberuadorcillo and municipal captain in one of the 
pueblos of the Province of Cavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he 
is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent 
Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be 
at the head of affairs, but if an election for president was held he 
would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of insurgents, 
has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides him- 
self on his military ability, and if a republic could be established the 
post he would probably choose for himself would be geueral-in-chief of 
the army. 

In the next place, Aguinaldo's government, or any entirely inde- 
pendent government, does not command the hearty support of the 
large body of the Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who have 
property, education, and intelligence. Their hatred of Spanish rule is 
very keen, and they will cooperate with Aguinaldo or anyone else to 
destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must 
have the support of some strong nation for many years before they 
will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. The nation to 
which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine republic 
under American protection, such as they have heard is to be granted 
to Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and 
the respective rights aud duties of each under it — what portion of the 
government is to be administered by them and what portion by us; 
how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proportion the ex- 
penses are to be divided — they have no clearly defined ideas at all; nor 
is it to be expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish 
rule, without any experience in self government. The sentiment of this 
class — the educated natives with property at stake — looks upon the 
prospect of Aguinaldo's government and forces eutering Manila with 
almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards 
themselves. 

Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo insurrec- 
tion. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines, each speak- 
ing a different dialect; but five-sixths of the entire Christian population 
is composed of the Tagalos and Visayas. The former live in Mindoro 
and the southern half of Luzon, and the latter in Cebu, Iloilo, aud 
other islands in the center of the group. The Tagalos are more numer- 
ous than the Visayas, but both races are about equal in civilization, 
intelligence, and wealth. It is claimed by Aguinaldo's partisans that 



TREATY OF PEACE. 425 

the Visayas are in sympathy with his insurrection and intend to send 
representatives to the congress. But it is a fact that the Visayas have 
taken no active part in the present insurrection, nor in that of L806; 
that the Spanish Government is still in lull control at Cebu and Iloilo 
and in the Visayas' islands, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no 
effort to attack them. The Visayas number nearly 2,000,01)0, or about 
as many as the population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo 
claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will 
support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that, on account 
of racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes, they will oppose him. 
Upon one point all are agreed, except possibly Aguinaldo and his 
immediate adherents, and that is that no native government can main- 
tain itself without the active support and protection of a strong for- 
eign government. This being admitted, it is difficult to see how any 
foreign government can give this protection without taking such an 
active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to 
governing in its own name and for its own account. 

United States troops and navy. — I assume that the reports received at 
the War and Navy Departments give all the desired information in 
regard to the military forces of the United States. 

At the time I left (August 30) the Eighth Corps consisted of two 
divisions, numbering in all about 12,000 men, with 10 field guns and 6 
mountain guns. No wagons or animals had then arrived. 

One regiment was stationed within the walled city guarding its gates 
and the captured guns and ammunition; a small force was at Cavite, 
and the bulk of the troops were in Manila outside of the walled city. 
They were quartered in the Spanish barracks, which were all in good 
condition, and in convents and private houses. The health of the 
troops was excellent, notwithstanding the extraordinary hardships to 
which they had been subjected in the trenches before Manila. 

Admiral Dewey had under his command the Charleston, Monterey, 
and Monadnock, which arrived in July and August; the Gallao and 
Leyte, which had been captured from the Spaniards, and the ships 
which were in the battle of May 1, viz, the Olympia, Boston, Baft i more, 
Raleigh, Concord, Petrel, and MeCulloch. The health of the squadron 
was excellent. The Olympia and Concord were being docked and 
cleaned at Hongkong. Permission to use the docks at Nagasaki during 
the suspension of hostilities had been declined. 

United States civil administration.— We entered Manila on the after- 
noon of August 13. On the 14th the capitulation was signed, and the 
same day General Merritt issued his proclamation establishing a mili- 
tary government. On the loth General McArthur was appointed mili- 
tary commandant of the walled city and provost-marshal-geueral of 
the city of Manila and its suburbs, and on the 17th I was appointed 
to take charge of the duties performed by the intendente general de 
hacienda, or minister of finance, and all fiscal affairs. Representatives 
of the Post-Office Department had arrived on the steamship China in 
July, and they immediately took charge of the Manila post office, 
which was opened for business on the 16th. The custom-house was 
opened on the 18th with Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier as collector, and 
the internal-revenue office with Major Beinent as collector, on the 22d. 
Captain Glass, of the Navy, was' appointed captain of the port, or 
naval officer, aud took charge of the office on August 10. 

The collections of customs during the first ten days exceeded 
$100,000. The collection of internal revenue was small, owing to the 
difficulty and delay in ascertaining what persons had or had not paid 



426 TREATY OF PEACE. 

their taxes for the current year. The administration of waterworks 
was put in charge of Lieutenant Connor, of the Engineers, on August 
25. The provost court, with Lieutenant-Colonel Jewett, judge-advocate, 
United States Volunteers, sitting as judge, was appointed and held its 
first session on August 23. 

The provost-marshal-general has charge of the police, fire, health, 
and street-cleaning departments and the issuing of licenses. The 
guardia civil, or gendarmerie, of the city proving indifferent and ineffi- 
cient, they were disarmed and disbauded. The Thirteenth Minnesota 
Regiment was detailed for police duty, and one or more companies 
stationed in each police station, from which patrolmen were sent out 
on the streets to take the place of the sentries who had constantly 
patrolled them from the hour of entering the city. 

The shops were all closed when we entered on Saturday afternoon, 
the 13th. On Monday morning some of them opened, and by Wednes- 
day the banks had resumed business, the newspapers were published, 
the merchants were ready to declare goods at the custom-house, the 
tram cars were running, and the retail shops were all open and doing a 
large business. There was no disorder or pillage of any kind in the 
city. The conduct of the troops was simply admirable, and left no 
ground for criticism. It was noted and commented upon by the for- 
eign naval officers in the most favorable terms, and it so surprised the 
Spanish soldiers that a considerable number of them applied for per- 
mission to enlist in our service. 

At the time I left General McArthur had fully established his office 
as provost-marshal-general, and was organizing one by one the various 
bureaus connected with it, all with United States military officers in 
charge; the provost court was in daily session, sentencing gamblers 
and persons guilty of petty disturbances, and a military commission 
had just been ordered to try a Chinaman accused of burglary. 

At the various public offices I collected the following Spanish funds: 

At the general treasury $795, 517. 71 

At the mint 62, 856. 08 

At the internal-revenue office 24, 077. 60 

882, 451. 39 
Of this amount there was — 

Gold coin $4,200.00 

Gold bars 3,806.08 

Silver coin 190, 634. 81 

Copper coin 297,300.00 

Spanish bank notes 216,305.00 

Accepted checks 170,205.50 

882,451.39 

The money was counted by a board of officers and turned over to 
Maj. C. H. Whipple, paymaster, United States Army, as custodian of 
Spanish public funds. A few thousand dollars in other public offices 
were still to be collected. 

The money received at the custom-house and other offices is turned 
in daily, at the close of business, to Major Whipple. Money for curreut 
expenses is furnished to heads of departments on their requisition, by 
warrant drawn by the intendente-general on the custodian of Spanish 
public funds. The heads of departments are to submit their vouchers 
and accounts monthly to an auditing department, which was being 
organized when I left. 

All these public offices and funds were surrendered to me only on 



TREATY OF PEACE. 427 

threat of using force and on grantiug permission to file a formal pro- 
test. None of these had been received at the time I left, but the ground 
of verbal protest was that the officials recognized no authority in these 
islands but the Governor-General appointed by the King of Spain, and 
without his order they were unwilling to surrender them. On the other 
hand, J recognized no authority of the Spanish Governor-General, who 
was merely a prisoner of war; 1 acted under the orders of General 
Merritt, as the United States military governor, and in accordance with 
the terms of capitulation. The claim will probably be made by the 
Spanish officials that as we captured Manila a few hours after the 
peace protocol had been signed at Washington, this property still 
belongs to the Spaniards. But I believe that the law in such cases 
was clearly defined in decisions made by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1815. We captured Manila, and the capitulation (under which 
these funds became United States property) was signed by both parties 
before either had received notice of the protocol or suspension of hos- 
tilities. 

On the opening of the custom-house several important questions arose 
for immediate decision. The first was in regard to Mexican dollars. 
The importation of these has for several years been prohibited, with a 
view to forcing the Spanish coinage (which contains less silver) into cir- 
culation. The large English banks represented that there was a 
scarcity of currency, owing to the amount which had been hoarded and 
sent away during the siege, and they agreed, in consideration of being 
allowed to import Mexican dollars free of duty, to guarantee the notes 
and accepted checks of the Spanish bank which should be received by 
us in payment of customs up to $-!00,000 at any onetime. The Spanish 
bank was in difficulty, owing to the enormous amount which the Gov- 
ernment had taken from it under the form of a forced loan, and any 
discrimination on our part against it would result in its failure, entailing 
widespread financial disturbance. As there seemed no reason against 
allowing the importation of Mexican dollars, and many in favor of it, I 
recommended that the custom house continue to receive the notes and 
checks of this bank in payment of customs (for which we were amply 
protected by the guaranty of the strong English banks), and, with 
General Merritt's approval, wrote to those banks authorizing them to 
import Mexican dollars free of duty until further notice. 

The next question was in regard to the rate of duties on imports and 
exports. 

After a careful examination of the matter I recommended that the 
tariff be not changed until the question had been fully studied and 
ample notice given. General Merritt approved this, and the customs 
are being collected on the Spanish tariff. 

About a week after the custom-house was opened certain parties 
came to me representing that Consul-General, Wildman, of Hongkong, 
had informed them that United States goods would be admitted free of 
duty in Manila; that acting on this they had purchased a cargo of 
American illuminating oil in Hongkong, and that the payment of the 
heavy duty on it ($30 per tou, or about 8 cents per gallon) would ruin 
them. On consulting Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, judge advocate of 
the Eighth Army Corps, he pointed out the language of paragraph 5 
of General Merritt's proclamation, which followed literally the instruc- 
tions of the President, viz : 

The port of Manila * * * will be open while onr military occupation may con- 
tinue, to the commerce of all neutral nati.ins as well as our own, in articles not con- 
traband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force 
at the time of the importation. 



428 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Under this there was clearly no authority for discriminating in favor 
of American goods, either coming direct from a United States port or 
by transshipment at Hongkong. 

The collector of customs was directed to act accordingly. 

Another question was in regard to the importation of Chinamen into 
Manila. The consul at Hongkong telegraphed to know if they would 
be admitted. As there had been no time for examining the treaties and 
laws in force on this subject, I replied, with General Merritt's approval, 
that for the present it was not practicable to admit Chinese laborers 
into Manila. 

Another very important question which arose was in regard to trade 
with the other Philippine Islands. Nearly all the hemp and the greater 
part of the sugar is grown in the Visayas. The hemp is bought by 
foreign merchants in Manila, who bring it there from the other islands 
and export it, paying large duties to the Manila custom-house. These 
merchants were anxious to bring up their stock, of which a large 
amount had accumulated during the war, and ship it abroad. The 
ships engaged in this island trade were idle in the Pasig. They 
belonged to a Spanish corporation owned entirely by Scotch capital, 
and had a Spanish regisler. The owners were ready to transfer them 
to the American flag. Could these vessels be allowed to clear for the 
ports of Cebu and Iloilo, which were in Spanish possession? The 
judge- advocate advised me that they could not without the express 
authority of the President. I so notified the owners of the ships and 
the hemp merchants. 

The day before I left Manila, however, Admiral Dewey received a 
cable from the Navy Department, stating that Spanish ships had been 
granted the privilege of trading to American ports during the suspen- 
sion of hostilities, and that American ships could be granted a similar 
privilege for Spanish ports. I understood that on the strength of this 
cable General Otis intended to allow the United States consul at 
Manila to grant these vessels an American register, and then allow 
them to clear for the other islands. I do not know what arrangement, 
if any, was made in regard to the payment of export duties at Iloilo. 
Clearly the hemp can not pay export duties at both Iloilo and Manila, 
and the Spaniards are not likely to allow it to leave Iloilo free while we 
collect an export duty on it at Manila. Incidentally this illustrates 
the complications and losses that will arise if the islands are subdivided. 
The principal merchants for all the islands are at Manila, and 80 per 
cent of the duties on imports and exports are collected at its custom- 
house. A large part of the imports are redistributed through the 
islands, and all the hemp and Sugar, which form the principal exports, 
come to Manila from other islands. If, then, we retain Luzon, and give 
the other islands back to Spain, or some other nation, that nation will 
impose import and export duties on everything coming from or to 
Manila. The foreign trade of that city will be lost, and its prosperity 
will be destroyed; moreover, the Government revenue from that trade 
will be lost. 

In view of the fact that Spanish officials declined to cooperate or 
assist in any way in the American government of Manila, the ease and 
rapidity with which order was maintained, the machinery of govern- 
ment put in operation, and business reestablished after our entry into 
Manila, is very remarkable. For every position in the Government 
service — legal, administrative, financial, mechanical, clerical — men could 
be found in our volunteer ranks who were experienced in just that 
class of work at home, aud they took charge of their Spanish positions 
with promptness and confidence. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 429 

Even in the matter of language no serious difficulty was encountered, 
for no less than 30 good interpreters were found in the California and 
Colorado regiments. 

The military government as now organized and administered fulfills 
all the requirements of preserving order and collecting the public 
revenue. 

The civil courts, however, have yet to be organized, and their organ- 
ization will present many difficulties. 



PAPERS ACCOMPANYING GENERAL GREENE'S MEMORANDA 

Appendix A. 

Notes by Senor Felipe Agoncillo concerning — Page. 

(a) Relations between Admiral Dewey and Senor Aguinaldo 429 

(b) Terms of peace made bv Spanish governor-general with insurgents, 

December, 1897 - 430 

(c) Lawsuit between Aguinaldo and Artacho 431 

(d) Aguinaldo's proclamation of May 24. 1898 431 



A. 
BRIEF NOTES BY SENOR AGONCILLO. 

September 15, 1898. 

On the same day that Admiral Dewey arrived at Hongkong Senor Aguinaldo was 
in Singapore, whither he had gone from Hongkong, and Mr. Pratt, United States 
consul-general, under instructions from the said Admiral, held a conference with him, 
in which it was agreed that Senor Aguinaldo and other revolutionary chiefs, in 
cooperation with the American squadron, should return to take up arms against the 
Spanish government of the Philippines, the sole and most laudable desire of the 
Washington Government being to concede to the Philippine people absolute inde- 
pendence, as soon as the victory against the Spanish arms should be obtained. By 
virtue of this agreement Senor Aguinaldo proceeded by the lirst steamer to Hong- 
kong for the express purpose of embarking on the Olympia and going to Manila; 
but this intention of his was not realized, because the American squadron left Hong- 
kong the day previous to his arrival, Admiral Dewey having received from his Gov- 
ernment an order to proceed immediately to Manila. This is what Mr. Wild man, 
United States consul-general in Hongkong, said to Seiior Aguinaldo in the inter- 
view which took place between them. 

A few days after the Spanish squadron had been totally destroyed in the Bay of 
Manila bv'the American squadron, the latter obtaining a most glorious triumph, 
which deserved the fullest congratulations and praise of the Philippine public, the 
MeCulloch arrived at Hongkong, and her commander said to Senor Aguinaldo that 
Admiral Dewey needed him (le necesitaba) in Manila and that he brought an order 
to take him on board said transport, as well as other revolutionary chiefs, whose 
number should be determined by Senor Aguinaldo; and in fact he and seventeen 
chiefs went to Cavite on the MeCulloch. 

Senor Aguinaldo began his campaign against the Spaniards the very day he 
received the 1,902 Mauser guns and 200,000 cartridges which came from Hongkong. 

The first victory which he obtained from the Spaniards was the surrender or capitu- 
lation of the Spanish general Senor Pefia, who was the military governor of Cavite, 
had his headquarters in the town of San Francisco de Malabon, and his force was 
composed of 1,500 soldiers, including volunteers. 

The revolutionary army, in six days' operations, succeeded in getting possession 
of the Spanish detachments stationed in the villages of Bacoor, Inius, Benakayan, 
Noveleta, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Rosario, aud Cavite Viejo. 

On the 9th of June last the whole Province of Cavite was under the control of the 
provisional revolutionary government, including many Spanish prisoners and friars, 
7,000 guns, great quantities of ammunition, and some cannon. 

At the same time that the Province of Cavite was being conquered, other revoh: <ion- 
ary chiels were carrying on campaigns in the Batangas, Laguua, Tayabas, Nueva 



430 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Eciza, Bulacan, Batangas Pampanga, and Morong, which were under control of the 
revolutionary army by the 12th of June; and such progress was made by the Phil- 
ippiue revolution in the few days of campaign against the Spaniards that by the 3d 
of August last it held under conquest lifteen important provinces of the island of 
Luzou, These provinces are being governed by laws emanating from the provi- 
sional revolutionary government, and in all of them perfect order and complete tran- 
quility reign. 

It is to be noted that the Spanish Government has sent to Senor Aguinaldo various 
emissaries, who invited him to make common cause with Spain against the United 
States, promising him that the Government of the Spanish nation would concede to 
him anything he might ask for the Philippine people. But Senor Aguinaldo has 
invariably replied to those emissaries that it was too late, and that he could not 
consider any proposition from the Spanish Government, however beneficial it might 
be to the Philippines, because he had already pledged his word of honor in favor ol 
certain representatives of the Government at Washington. 

In view of this positive resolution of Senor Aguinaldo there began forthwith the 
intrigues of the Spanish enemy, directed against the life of Senor Aguinaldo. 

PEACE CONVENTION (DECEMBER, 1897). 

Senor Aguinaldo, in his own name and in that of the other chiefs and subordi- 
nates, obligated himself to lay down their arms, which, according to an inventory, 
were to be turned over to the Spanish Government, thus terminating the revolution. 
His excellency the Governor and Captain-General, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, 
as the representative of His Majesty's Government in the Philippines, obligated 
himself, on his side: (1) to grant a general amnesty to all those under charges or 
sentenced for the crime of rebellion and sedition and other crimes of that category; 
(2) to introduce into the Philippines all reforms necessary for correcting in an effect- 
ive and absolute manner the evils which for so many years had oppressed the coun- 
try in political and administrative affairs; and (3) an indemnity of $800,000, paya- 
ble at the following dates: A letter of credit of the Spanish Filipine Bank for 
$400,000 against the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, in Hongkong, was to be delivered 
to Senor Aguinaldo on the same day that he should leave Biak-va-Bato, wherehe had 
established his headquarters, and should embark on the steamer furnished by the 
Spanish Government. This letter of credit was, in point of fact, delivered; $200,000 
was to be paid to the said Senor Aguinaldo as soon as the revolutionary general, 
Senor Ricarte, should receive his telegram ordering him to give up his arms, with an 
inventory thereof, to the commissioner designated by his excellency the Governor 
and Captain-General, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera; and the remaining $200,000 
should be due and payable when the peace should be a fact, and it should be under- 
stood that peace was a fact when the Te Deum should be sung by order of his excel- 
lency the Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines. 

Senor Aguinaldo complied in every respect, so far as he was concerned, with the 
peace agreement. But the Spanish Government did not observe a similar conduct, 
and this has been deplored and still is deeply deplored by the Philippine people. 

The general amnesty which was promised has remained completely a dead letter. 
Many Philippinos are still to be found in Fernando Po and in various military prisons 
in Spain suffering the grievous consequences of the punishment inflicted upon them 
unjustly and the inclemencies of the climate to which they are not accustomed. 
Some of these unfortunates who succeeded in getting out of those prisons and that 
exile are living in beggary in Spain without the Government furnishing them the 
necessary means to enable them to return to the Philippines. 

In vain has the Philippine public waited for the reforms also promised. After the 
celebration of the compact of June and the disposition of the arms of the revolution- 
ists, the Governor-General began again to inflict on the defenseless natives of the 
country arbitrary arrest and execution without judicial proceedings solely on the 
ground that they were merely suspected of being secessionists; proceedings which 
indisputably do not conform to the law and Christian sentiments. 

In the matter of reforms, the religious orders again began to obtain from the 
Spanish Government their former and absolute power. 

Thus Spam pays so dearly for her fatal errors in her own destiny. 

In exchange for the loftiness of mind with which Senor Aguinaldo has rigidly 
carried out the terms of tlie peace agreement, General Primo de Rivera had the 
cynicism to state in the Congress of his nation that he had promised no reform to 
Senor Aguinaldo and his army, but that he had only given them a piece of bread in 
order that thev might be able to maintain themselves abroad. This was reechoed in 
the foreign press, and Senor Aguinaldo was accused of having allowed himself to be 
bought with a handful of gold, selling out his country at the same time. There were 
published moreover in those Spanish periodicals caricatures of Senor Aguinaldo, 
which profoundly wounded his honor and his patriotism. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 431 

Senor Aguinaldo and the other revolutionists who reside in Hongkong agreed 
not to take out one cent of the $400,000 deposited in the Chartered Bank and the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the only amount which Senor Agninaldo received 
from the Spanish Government on account of the stipulated indemnity, hut to use it 
for arms in order to carry on another revolution in the Philippines in case the 
Spanish Government should fail to carry out the peace agreement, at least in so far 
as it refers to general amnesty and reforms. All the above-named revolutionists, 
Senor Agninaldo setting the example, resolved to deny themselves every kind of 
comfort during their stay in Hongkong, living in the most modest style, for the 
purpose of preventing a reduction by one single cent of the above-named sum of 
$400,000 which they set aside exclusively for the benefit of thoir country. 

LAWSUIT BETWEEN DON J. ARTACIK) AND DON E. AGUINALDO. 

Senor Artacho, induced by the father solicitor of the Dominicans and the consul- 
general of Spain, filed in the courts of that colony a summons against Don E. 
Agninaldo, asking for a division of the above-mentioned $400,000 between those 
revolutionary chiefs who resided in Hongkong ; Artacho and three others who joined 
the revolution iu its last days and rendered little service to it were the only ones who 
desired adivision of thismoney, whereas forty-seven revolutionaries, nianyof whom 
were most distinguished chiefs, were opposed to it, supporting the resolution which 
Senor Aguinaldo had previously taken in regard to it. Senor Agninaldo, in order to 
avoid all scandal, did everything possible to avoid appearing in court answering the 
summons of Artacho, who, realizing that by his conduct he had made himself hated 
by all Filipinos, agreed in a friendly arrangement to withdraw his suit, receiving 
in exchange $5,000. In this way were frustrated the intrigues of the solicitor of the 
Dominican order and of the Spanish consul, who endeavored at any cost to destroy 
the $400,000 by dividing it up. 

Artacho is now on trial before a judicial court ou charges preferred by various 
revolutionists for offenses which can be proved; he has no influence in the revolu- 
tionary party. 

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL AGUINALDO, MAY 24, 1808. 

Filipinos: The great nation North America, cradle of true liberty, and friendly 
on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyr- 
anny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here 
a protection which is decisive as well as disinterested townrd us, considering us 
endowed with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy laud. 
To maintain this so lofty idea, which we deserve from the now very powerful nation 
North America, it is our duty to detest all those acts which belie such an idea as 
pillage, robbery, and every class of injury to persons as well as to things. With a 
view to avoiding international conflicts during the period of our campaign, I order 
as follows: 

Akticle I. The lives and property of all foreigners, including Chinese and all 
Spaniards, who either directly or indirectly have joined in taking arms against us, 
are to be respected. 

Art. II. The lives and property of those who lay down their arms are also to be 
respected. 

Art. III. Also are to he respected all sanitary establishments and ambulances, and 
likewise the persons and things which may be found in either one or the other, 
including the assistants iu this service, unless they show hostility. 

Art. IV. Those who disobey what is prescribed in the preceding articles will be 
tried by summary court and put to death, if such disobedience shall cause assassina- 
tion, fire, robbery, and violation. 

Given at Cavite the 24th of May, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



Appendix — Continued. 

AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATIONS. 

Pape. 

B.— June 18, 1898, establishing dictatorial government 432 

C. — Juue 20, 1898, instructions for elections, etc 433 

D.— June 23, 1898, establishing revolutionary government 433 

E. — June 27, 1898, instructions concerning details 437 

F. — June 23, 1898, message to foreign powers - 437 

G. — August 6, 1898, message to foreign powers asking recognition - 438 

H.— August 1, 1898, resolutions of revolutionary chiefs asking for recognition .. 438 

J.— July 23, 1898, letter from Senor Aguinaldo to General Anderson 440 



432 TREATY OF PEACE. 



AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION OF JUNE 18, 1898, ESTABLISHING THE DICTATORIAL 

GOVERNMENT. 

No. 1. 

To the Philippine Pitoltc: 

Circumstances have providentially placed me in a position for which I can not fail 
to recognize that I am not properly qualified; but since I can not violate the laws 
of Providence nor decline the obligations which honor and patriotism impose upon 
me, I now salute you, Oh my Beloved People. 

I have proclaimed in the face of the whole world that the aspiration of my whole 
life, the final object of all my efforts and strength, is nothing else but your inde- 
pendence, for I am firmly convinced that that constitutes your constant desire, and 
that independence signifies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining 
our liherty, and entrance into the concert of civilized nations. 

I understand, on the other hand, that the first duty of every government is to 
interpret faithfully popular aspirations ; with this motive, although the abnormal 
circumstances of the war have compelled me to institute this dictatorial govern- 
ment which assumes full powers, both civil and military, my constant desire is to 
surround myself with the most distinguished persons of each province, those that by 
their conduct deserve the confidence of their province, to the end that, the true 
necessities of each bteing knowu by them, measures may r be adopted to meet those 
necessities and apply the remedies in accordance with the desires of all. 

I understand, moreover, the urgent necessity of establishing in each town a solid 
and robust organization, the strongest bulwark of public security and the sole means 
of securing that union and discipline which are indispensable for the establishment 
of the Republic, that is, government of the people for the people, and warding off 
the international conflicts which may arise. 

Following out the foregoing considerations, I decree as follows: 

Article I. The inhabitants of every town where the forces of the Spanish Govern- 
ment still remain will decide upon the most efficacious measures to combat and 
destroy 1hem, according to the resources and means at their disposal, according to 
prisoners of war the treatment most conformable to humanitarian sentiments and to 
the customs observed by civilized nations. 

Art. II. As soon as the town is freed from Spanish domination the inhabitants 
most distinguished for high character, social position, and honorable conduct, both 
in the center of the community and in the suburbs, will come together in a large 
meeting, in which they will proceed to elect by a majority of votes the chief of the 
town and a headman for each suburb, considering as suburbs not only those hitherto 
known as such, but also the center of the community. 

All those inhabitants who fullill the conditions above named will have the right 
to take part in this meeting and to be elected, provided Til ways that they are friendly 
to the Philippine independence and are 20 years of age. 

Art. III. In this meeting shall also be elected by a majority of votes three dele- 
gates, one of police and internal order, another of justice and civil registry, and 
another of taxes and property. 

The delegate of justice and civil registry will aid the chief in the formation of 
courts and in keepiug of books of registry of births, deaths, and marriage contracts 
and of the census. 

The delegate of taxes and property will aid the chief in the collection of taxes 
and administration of public funds, the opening of books of registry of cattle and 
real property, and in all work relating to encouragement of every class of industry. 

Art. IV. The chief, as presideut, with the headman and the above-mentioned 
delegates will constitute the popular assemblies, who will supervise the exact fulfill- 
ment of the laws in force and the particular interests of each town. 

The head man of the center of the community will be the vice-president of the 
assembly and the delegate of justice its secretary. 

The head men will be delegates of the chief within their respective boundaries. 

Art. V. The chiefs of each town after consulting the opinion of their respective 
assemblies will meet and elect by majority of votes the chief of the province and 
three councilors for the three branches above-mentioned. 

The chief of the province as president, the chief of the town which is the capital 
of the province as vice-president, and the above-named councilors will constitute 
the provincial council, which will supervise the carrying out of the instructions of 
this government in the territory of the province and for the general interest of the 
province, and will propose for this government the measures which should be 
adopted for the general welfare. 

Art. VI. The above-named chiefs will also elect by a majority of votes three rep- 
resentatives for each one of the provinces of Manila and Cavite, two for each one of 



TREATY OF PEACE. 433 

the provinces classified as terminal in Spanish Legislation, and one for each one of the 
other provinces and politico-military commands of the Philippine Archipelago. 

The above-named representatives will guard the general interests of the archi- 
pelago and the particular interests of their respective provinces, and will constitute 
the revolutionary congress which will propose to this Government the measures con- 
cerning the preservation of internal order and external security of these Islands, and 
will be heard by this Government on all questions of grave importance, the decision 
of which will admit of delay or adjournment. 

Art. VII. Persons elected to any oftice whatsoever in the form prescribed in the 
preceding article can not perform the same without the previous confirmation by 
this Government, which will give it in accordance with the certificates of election 

Representatives will establish their identity by exhibiting the above-named cer- 
tificates. 

Akt. VIII. The. military chiefs named by this Government in each province will 
not intervene in the government and administration of the province, but will con- 
fine themselves to requesting of the chiefs of provinces and of the towns the aid 
which may be necessary, both in men and resources, which are not to be refused in 
case of actual necessity. 

Nevertheless, wheu the province is threatened or occupied by the enemy, in whole 
or in part, the military chief of highest rank therein may assume the powers of the 
chief of the province until the danger has disappeared. 

Art. IX. The government will name for each province a commissioner specially 
charged with establishing therein the organization prescribed in this decree in 
accordance with instructions which this government will communicate to him. 
Those military chiefs who liberate the towns from the Spanish domination are com- 
missioners by virtue of their office. 

The above-named commissioners will preside over the first meetings held in each 
town and in each province. 

Art. X. As soon as the organization provided in the decree has been established 
all previous appointments to any civil office whatsoever, no matter what their origin 
or source, shall be null and void, and all instructions in conllict with the foregoing 
are hereby annulled. 

Given at Cavite the 18th day of June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



C. 

No. 2. 



For the execution and proper carrying out of what is prescribed in the decree of 
this government concerning the management of the provinces and towns of the 
Philippiue Archipelago I decree as follows: 

instructions 

concerning the management of the provinces and towns. 

(Then follow 45 r.iles concerning the elections, formation of the police, the courts, 
and the laying and collection of taxes.) 

Given at Cavite the :20th of Juue, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



D. 



AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION OF JUNE 23, ESTABLISHING THE REVOLUTIONARY 

GOVERNMENT. 

NO. 3. 

Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, president of the revolutionary government of the 
Philippines and general in chief of its army. 

This Government desiring to demonstrate to the Philippine people that one of its 
ends is to combat with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish administra- 
tion, substituting for personal luxury and that pompous ostentation which have made 
it a mere matter of routine, cumbrous aud slow in its movements, another adminis- 

T P 28 



434 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tration more modest, simple, and prompt hi performing the public Bervice, I decree 
as follows: 

CliArTER I. — Of the revolutionary government. 

Article I. The dictatorial government will be entitled hereafter the revolution- 
ary government, whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines 
until all nations, including the Spanish, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare 
the country so that a true republic may be established. 

The dictator will be entitled hereafter president of the revolutionary government. 

Art. II. Four secretaryships of government are created — one of foreign affairs, 
navy, and commerce; another of war and public works; another of police and inter- 
nal order, justice, education, and hygiene; and another of finance, agriculture, and 
manufacturing industry. 

The government may increase this number of secretaryships when it shall find in 
practice that this distribution is not sufficient for the multiplied and complicated 
necessities of the public service. 

Akt. III. Each secretaryship shall aid the president in the administration of ques- 
tions concerning the different branches which it comprises. 

At the head of each one shall be a secretary, who shall not be responsible for the 
decrees of the presidency, but shall sign them with the president to give them 
authority. 

But if it shall appear that the decree has been promulgated on the proposition of 
the secretary of the department the latter shall be responsible conjointly with the 
president. 

Art. IV. The secretaryship of foreign affairs will be divided into three bureaus — 
our of diplomacy, another of navy, and another of commerce. 

The first bureau will study and dispose of all questions pertaining to management 
of diplomatic negotiations with other powers and the correspondence of the govern- 
ment with them; the second will study all questions relating to the formation and 
organization of our navy, and the fitting out of such expeditions as the necessities 
of ihe revolution may require; and the third will have charge of everything relat- 
ing to the internal and external commerce, and the preliminary work which may be 
necessary lor making treaties of commerce with other nations. 

Art. V. The secretaryship of war will be divided into two bureaus; one of war, 
properly speaking, and the other of public works. 

The first bureau will be subdivided into four sections — one of campaigns, another 
of military justice, another of military administration, and another of military 
health. 

'Ihe section of campaigns will have charge of the appointment and formation of 
the certificates of enlistment and service of all who serve in the revolutionary mili- 
tia; of the direction of campaigns; the preparation of plans, works of fortification, 
and preparing reports of battles; of the study of military "tactics for the army and 
the organization of the general staff, artillery, and cavalry; and, finally, of the 
determination of all the other questions concerning the business of campaigns and 
military operations. 

I he section of military justice will have charge of everything relating to courts 
of war and military tribunals, the appointment of judges and counsel, and the 
determination of all questions of military justice. The section of military adminis- 
tration will be charged with the furnishing of food and other supplies necessary for 
the use of the army, and the sectiou of military health will have charge of every- 
thing relating to the hygiene and healthiulness of the militia. 

Art. VI. The other secretaryships will be divided into such bureaus as their 
branches may require, and each bureau will be subdivided into sect ons according 
to the nature and importance of the work it has to do. 

Art. VII. The secretary will inspect and supervise all the work of his secretary- 
ship and will determine all questions with the preside nt of the government. 

At the head of each bureau will be a director, and in each sectiou an officer por- 
vided with such number of assistants and clerks as may be specilied. 

Art. VIII. The president will appoint the secretaries of his own free choice, and 
in concert with them will appoint all the subordinate officials of each secretaryship. 

In order that in the choice of persons it may be possible to avoid favoritism it 
must be fully understood that the good name of the country aud the triumph of the 
revolution require the services of persons truly capable. 

Art. IX. The secretaries may be present at the revolutionary congress, in order 
that they may make any motion in the name of the president or may be interpo- 
lated publicly by any one of the representatives; but when the question which is 
the object of the motion shall be put to vote, or after the interpolation is ended, 
they shall leave and shall not take part in the vote. 

Art. X. The president of the government is the personification of the Philippine 
people and in accordance with this idea it shall not be possible to hold him responsi- 
ble while he fills the office. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 435 

His term of office 8hall last until the revolution triumphs, unless under extraor- 
dinary circumstances he shall feel obliged to offer his resigr ation to congress, in 
which case congress will elect whomsoever it considers most tit. 

Chapter II. — Of the revolutionary congress. 

Art. XI. The revolutionary congress is the body of representatives of thfc prov- 
inces of the Philippine Archipelago elected in the manner prescribed in the decrees 
of the 18th of the present month. 

Nevertheless, if any province shall not be able as yet to elect representatives 
because the greater part of its towns shall have not yet been able to liberate them- 
selves from Spanish domination, the government shall have power to appoint as 
provisional representatives fortius province those persons who arc most distinguished 
for high character and social position in such numbers as are prescribed by the above- 
named decree, provided always that they are natives of the province which they 
represent or have resided therein for a long time. 

Art. XII. The representatives having met at the town which is the seat of the 
revolutionary government, and in the building which may be designated, will pro- 
ceed to its preliminary labors, designating by plurality of votes a commission com- 
posed of Ave individuals charged with examining documents accrediting each rep- 
resentative, and another commission composed of three individuals who will examine 
the documents which the five of the former commission exhibit. 

Art. XIII. On the following day the above-named representatives will meet again, 
and the two commissions will read their respective reports concerning the legality 
of the said documents, deciding by an absolute majority of votes on the character of 
those which appear doubtful. 

This business completed, it will proceed to designate, also by absolute majority, a 
president, a vice-president, and two secretaries, who shall be chosen from among 
the representatives, whereupon the congress shall be considered organized and shall 
notify the government of the result of the election. 

Art. XIV. The place where congress deliberates is sacred and inviolable, and uo 
armed force shall enter therein unless the president thereof shall ask therefor in 
order to establish internal order disturbed by those who can neither honor' them- 
selves nor its august functions. 

Art. XV. The powers of congress are: To watch over the general interest of the 
Philippine people and the carrying out of the revolutionary laws; to discuss and 
vote upon said laws; to discuss and approve prior to their ratification treaties and 
loans; to examine and approve the accounts presented annually by the secretary of 
finance as well as extraordinary and other taxes which may hereafter be imposed. 

Art. XVI. Congress shall also be consulted in all grave and important questions 
the determination of which admit of delay or adjournment; but the president of 
the government shall have power to decide questions of urgent character, but in 
that case he shall give account by message to said body of the decision which he 
has adopted. 

Art. X VII. Every representative shall have power to present to congress any pro- 
ject of a law, and every secretary on the order of the president of the government 
shall have similar power. 

Art. XVIII. The sessions of congress shall be public, and only in cases which 
require reserve shall it have power to hold a secret session. 

Art. XIX. In the order of its deliberations as well as in the internal government 
of the body the instructions which shall be formulated by the congress itself shall 
be observed. 

The president shall direct the deliberations and shall not vote except in case of a 
tie, when he shall have the casting vote. 

Art. XX. The president of the government shall not have power to interrupt in 
any manner the meetings of congress nor embarrass its sessions. 

Art. XXI. The congress shall designate a permanent commission of justice, which 
shall be presided over by the auxiliary vice-president or each of the secretaries, and 
shall be composed of those persons and seven members elected by plurality of votes 
from among the representatives. This commission shall judge on appeal the crimi- 
nal cases tried by the provincial courts, and shall take cognizance of and have orig- 
inal jurisdiction in all cases against the secretaries of the government, the chiefs of 
provinces and towns, and the provincial judges. 

Art. XXII. In the office of the secretary of congress shall be kept a book of honor, 
wherein shall be recorded special services rendered the country and considered as 
such by said body. Every Filipino, whether in the military or civil service, may 
petition congress for notation in said book, presenting duly accredited documents 
describing the service rendered by him on behalf of the country since the beginning 
of the present revolution. For extraordinary services which may be rendered here- 
after the government will propose said notation, accompanying the proposal with 
the necessary documents justifying it. 



436 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Art. XXIII. The congress will also grant on the proposal of the government 
rewards in money, which can be given only once, to the families of those who were 
victims of their duty and patriotism as a result of extraordinary acts of heroism. 

Art. XXIV. The acts of congress shall not take effect until the president of the 
government orders their fulfillment and execution. Whenever the said president 
shall be of the opinion that any act is unsuitable or against public policy or per- 
nicious, he shall explain to congress the reasons against its execution, and if the 
latter shall insist on its passage the president shall have power to oppose his veto 
under his most rigid responsibility. 

Chapter III. — Of military courts and justice. 

Art. XXV. When the chiefs of military detachments have notice that any sol- 
dier has committed or has perpetrated any act of those commonly considered as 
military crimes, he shall bring it to the knowledge of the commandant of the Zone, 
who shall appoint a judge and a secretary who shall begin suit in the form pre- 
scribed in the instructions dated the 20th of the present month. If the accused 
shall be of the grade of lieutenant or higher, the said commandant shall himself be 
the judge, and if the latter shall be the accused the senior commandant of the Prov- 
ince shall name as judge an officer who holds a higher grade, unless the same senior 
commandant shall himself have brought the suit. The judge shall always belong to 
the class of chiefs. 

Art. XXVI. On the conclusion of the preliminary hearing the senior commandant 
shall designate three officers of equal or higher rank to the judge, and the military 
court shall consist of the said officers, the judge, the councilor, and the president. 
The latter shall be the commandant of the zone if the accused be of the grade of 
lieutenant or higher. This court shall conduct the trial in the form customary in 
the provincial courts, but the judgment shall be appealable to the higher courts 
of war. 

Art. XXVII. The superior court shall be composed of six members, who shall hold 
rank not less than brigadier-generals, and the judge-advocate. If the number of 
generals present in the capital of the revolutionary government shall not be suffi- 
cient, -the deficiency shall be supplied by representatives designated and commis- 
sioned by congress. The president of the court shall be the general having the 
highest rank of all, and should there be more than one having equal rank the presi- 
dent shall be el oted from among them by absolute majority of votes. 

Art. XXVIII. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting the 
higher commandants, the commandants of zones and all officers of the rank of major 
and higher. 

Art. XXIX. Commit military crimes: First, those who fail to grant the necessary 
protection to foreigners, both in their persons and property, and those who similarly 
fail to afford protection to hospitals and ambulances, including persons and effects 
which may be found in possession of one or the other, and those engaged in the serv- 
ice of the same, provided always they commit no hostile act ; second, those who fail in 
the respect due to the lives, money, and jewels of enemies who lay down their arms, 
and of prisoners of war; third, Filipinos who place themselves in the service of the 
enemy, acting as spies or disclosing to them secrets of war and the plans of the revo- 
lutionary positions and fortifications, and those who present themselves under a flag 
of truce without justifying properly their office and their personality; and fourth, 
those who fail to recognize a flag of truce duly accredited in the form prescribed by 
international law. 

Will commit also military crimes: Those who conspire against the unity of the 
revolutionists, provoking rivalry between chiefs, and forming divisions and armed 
bands; second, those who solicit contributions without authority of the govern- 
ment and misappropriate the public funds; third, those who desert to the enemy, or 
are guilty of cowardice in the presence of the enemy, being armed; and fourth, those 
who seize the property of any person who has done no harm to the revolution, vio- 
late women, and assassinate or inflict serious wounds on unarmed persons, and who 
commit robberies and arson. 

Art. XXX. Those who commit the crimes enumerated will be considered as de- 
clared enemies of the revolution, and will incur the penalties prescribed in the 
Spanish Penal Code, and in the highest grade. 

If the crime shall not be found in the said code, the offender shall be imprisoned 
until the revolution triumphs, unless the result of this shall be an irreparable dam- 
age which, in the judgment of the tribunal, shall be a sufficient cause for imposing 
the penalty of death. 

additional clauses. 

The government will establish abroad a revolutionary committee composed of a 
number, not yet determined, of persons most competent in the Philippine Archipel- 
ago. This committee will be divided into three delegations: One of diplomacy, 
another ol the navy, and another of the army. 



TREATY OF PEACE. . 437 

The delegation of diplomacy will arrange and conduct negotiations with foreign 
cabinets with a view to the recognition of the belligerency and independence of 
the Philippines. 

The delegation of the navy will be charged with the studying and organizing of 
the Philippine navy and preparing the expenditures which the necessities of the 
revolution may require. 

The delegation of the army will study military tactics and the best form of organi- 
zation for the general staff, artillery, and engineers, and whatever else may be nec- 
essary in order to fit out the Philippine army under the conditions required by 
modern progress. 

Art. XXXII. The government will issue the necessary instructions for the proper 
execution of the present decree. 

Art. XXXIII. All the decrees of the dictatorial government in conflict with the 
foregoing are hereby annulled. 

Given at Cavite the 23d of June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



INSTRUCTIONS. 



Desiring to bring about a proper execution of the decree dated the 23d of the 
present month, and to provide that the administrative measures shall not result 
hereafter in the paralysis of public business, but that on the contrary it shall con- 
stitute the best guaranty of the regularity, promptitude, and fitness in the trans- 
action of public business, I give the following instructions and decree: 

(Then follow ten rules concerning the details of installing the government.) 

Cavite, the 27th of June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



F. 

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION. 

If it is true, as it is true, that political revolutions properly understood are the 
violent means which people employ to recover the sovereignty which naturally belongs 
to them, usurped and trampled upon by a tyrannical and arbitrary government, no 
revolution can be more righteous than that of the Philippines, because the people 
have had recourse to it after having exhausted all the pacific means which reason 
and experience could suggest. 

The ancient kings of Castile felt obliged to consider the Philippines as a brother 
people, united to'the Spanish iu a perfect participation of aims and interests, so 
much so that when the constitution of 1812 was promulgated at Cadiz, on account of 
the war of Spanish independence, these islands were represented in the Spanish 
Cortes; but the interests of the monastic corporations, which have always found 
unconditional support in the Spanish Government, overcame this sacred duty and 
the Philippines remained excluded from the Spanish constitution and the people at 
the mercy of the discretionary or arbitrary powers of the Governor-General. 

In this" condition the people claimed justice, begged of the metropolis the recog- 
nition and restitution of their secular rights by means of reforms which should 
assimilate in a gradual and progressive manner the Philippines to the Spaniards; 
but their voice was quickly throttled and their sons received as the reward of their 
self-denial deportation, martyrdom, and death. The religious corporations with 
whose interests, always opposed to those of the Philippine people, the Spanish 
Government has been identified, scoffed at those pretensious and answered with the 
knowledge of that Government that Spanish liberties had cost blood. 

What other recourse then remained to the people for insisting as in duty bound 
on regaining its former rights? No alternative remained except force, and con- 
vinced of that it has had recourse and revolution. 

And now it is not limited to ashing assimilation to the Spanish political constitu- 
tion, but it asks a definite separation from it. It struggles for its independence in 
the firm belief that the time has arrived in which it can and ought to govern itself. 

There has been established a revolutionary government under wise and just laws, 
suited to the abnormal circumstances through which it is passing, and which in 
proper time will prepare it for a true republic. Thus taking as a sole model for ite 



438 TREATY OF PEACE. 

acts reason, for its sole end justice, and for its sole means honorable labor, it calls 
all Filipinos its sons without distinction of class and invites them to unite firmly, 
with the object of forming a noble society, not based upon blood nor pompous titles, 
but upon the work and personal merit of each one; a free society, where exists 
neitber egotism nor personal politics, which annihilate and crush; neither envy 
nor favoritism, which debase; neither fanfaronade nor charlatanism, which are 
ridiculous. 

And it could not be otherwise. A people which has given proofs of suffering and 
valor in tribulation and in- danger and of bard work and study in peace is not des- 
tined to slavery ; this people is called to be great, to be one of the strongest arms of 
Providence in ruling the destinies of mankind. This people has resources and energy 
sufficient to liberate itself from the ruin and extinction into which the Spanish Gov- 
ernment has plunged it, and to claim a modest but worthy place in the concert of 
free nations. 

Given at Cavite the 23d of June, 1898. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



G. 

To Foreign Governments: 

The revolutionary government of the Philippines on its establishment explained 
through the message dated the 23d of June last the true causes of the Philippine 
revolution, showing according to the evidence that this popular movement is the 
result of the laws which regulate the life of a people which aspire to progress and 
to perfection by the sole road of liberty. 

The said revolution now rules in the provinces of Cavite, Bataugas, Mindoro, 
Tayabas, Laguua, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Nueva-Ecija, Tarlac, Pan- 
gasiuan, Union, Infanta, and Zambales, and it holds besieged the capital of Manila. 

In these provinces complete order and perfect tranquillity reign, administered by 
the authorities elected by the provinces in accordance with the organic decrees 
dated 18th and 23d of June last. 

The revolution holds moreover about 9,000 prisoners of war, who are treated in 
accordance with the customs of war between civilized nations and humane senti- 
ments, and at the end of the war it has more than 30,000 combatants organized in 
the form of a regular army. 

In this situation the chiefs of the towns, comprised in the above-mentioned prov- 
inces, interpreting the sentiments which animate those who have elected them, have 
proclaimed the independence of the Philippines, petitioning the revolutionary gov- 
ernment that it will entreat and obtain from foreign governments recognition of its 
belligerency and its independence in the firm belief that the Philippine people have 
already arrived at that state in which they can and ought to govern themselves. 

This is set forth in the accompanying documents subscribed by the above-named 
chiei's. 

Wherefore the undersigned, by virtue of the powers which belong to him as 
president of the revolutionary government of the Philippines and in the name and 
representation of the Philippine people, asks the support of all the powers of the 
civilized world and earnestly entreats them to proceed to the formal recognition of 
the belligerency of the revolution and the independence of the Philippines, since 
they are the means designated by Providence to maintain the equilibrium between 
peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining the strong, to the end that by these 
means shall shine forth and be realized the most complete justice in the indefinite 
progress of humanity. 

Given at Bacoor, in the Province of Cavite, the 6th day of August, 1898. 

The president of the revolutionary government. 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



H. 

STATEMENT. 

Tbe undersigned chiefs of towns comprising the provinces hereinafter named, 
elected as such in the manner prescribed by the decree of the 18th and the instruc- 
tions dated the 20th of June last, after having been confirmed in their respective 
offices by the president of the government and having taken the prescribed oath 
before him, have met in full assembly previously called for that purpose, for the 
purpose of discussing the solemn proclamation of Philippine independence. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 439 

The discussion took place with the prudence and at the length which so important 
a question demands, and after suitable deliberation the following declarations were 
unanimously adopted: 

The Philippine revolution records, on the one hand, brilliant feats of arms realized 
with singular courage by an improvised army almost without arms, and, on the other, 
the no less notable fact that the people after the combat have not entered upon great 
excesses nor pursued the enemy further, but have treated him on the contrary with 
generosity aud humanity, returning at once to their ordinary and tranquil life. 

Such deeds demonstrate in an indisputable manner that the Philippine people was 
not created, as all believed, for the sole purpose of dragging the chains of servitude, 
but that it has a perfect idea of order and justice, shuns a savage life, and loves a 
civilized life. 

But what is most surprising in this people is that it goes on giving proofs that it 
knows how to frame laws commensurate with the progress of the age, to respect 
them and obey them, demonstrating that its national customs are not repugnant to 
this progress; that it is not ambitious for power, nor honors, nor riches, aside from 
the rational and just aspirations for a free and independent life and inspired by the 
most lofty idea of patriotism and national honor; and that in the service of this 
idea and for the realization of that aspiration it has not hesitated in the sacrifice of 
life and fortune. 

These admirable— and more than admirable, these wonderful— deeds necessarily 
engender the most firm and ineradicable convictions of the necessity of leaving the 
Philippines free and independent, not only because they desire it, but because they 
are prepared to defend to the death their future and their history. 

Filipinos are fully convinced that if individuals have need of material, moral, 
and intellectual perfection in order to contribute to the welfare of their fellows, 
peoples require to have fullness of life; they need liberty and independence in order 
to contribute to the indefinite progress of mankind. It lias struggled and will 
struggle with decision and Constance, without ever turning back or retrograding 
before the obstacles which may arise in its path, and with unshakable faith that it 
will obtain justice and fulfill the laws of Providence. 

And neither will it be turned aside from the course it has hitherto followed by the 
unjustifiable imprisonment, tortures, assassinations, and the other vandal acts com- 
mitted by the Spaniards against the persons of peaceful and defenseless Filipinos. 
The Spaniards believe themselves released from every legal obligation toward the 
Filipinos for the sole reason that the belligerency of the revolution has not been 
recognized, taking no account of the fact that over and above every law, whether 
writteu or prescriptive, are placed with imprescriptible characters culture, national 
honor, and humanity. No, the Filipinos have no need ever to make use of reprisals, 
because they seek independence with culture, liberty with unconditional respect 
for the law as the organ of justice, and a name purified in the cru ible of human 
sentiments. 

In virtue of the foregoing considerations the undersigned, giving voice to the 
unanimous aspiration of the people whom they represent and performing the offices 
received from them and the duties pertaining to the powers with which they are 
invested — 

Proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the independence of the Phil- 
ippines; 

Recognize and respect Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as president of the 
revolutionary government organized in the manner prescribed by decree of the 23d 
and instructions of the. 27th of June last, and beg the said president that he will 
ask and obtain from foreign governments the recognition of its belligerency and 
independence, not only because this act constitutes a duty of justice, but also 
because to no one is it permitted to contravene natural laws nor stifle the legitimate 
aspiration of a people for its amelioration and dignitication. 

Given in the Province of Cavite the 1st day of August of the year of our Lord 1898, 
and the first year of Philippine independence. 
Follow the signatures of the local presideuts of the provinces, of Cavite and many 

others. 

* * * * * * * 

The undersigned, secretary of the interior, certifies: That the present document is 
a literal copy of the original, which is deposited in the secretaryship under his 
charge, in proof of which he signs it with the approval of the president of the revo- 
lutionary government in Bacoor the 6th day of August, 1898. 
V. B. 

El Presidente del G. R. 
Emilio Agkinaldo. 
El Secretario del Interior, 
Leandro Ibarra. 



440 TREATY OF PEACE. 

J. 

letter from senor aguinaldo to general anderson. 

July 23, 1898. 
Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. A. etc., 

('(trite: 

In answer to the letter of your excellency dated the 22d of the present month, I 
have the honor to manifest to you the following: 

That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of Don Antonio 
Osorio were subject to capture, when I established myself in the plaza (town) of 
Cavite Admiral Dewey authorized me to dispose of everything that I might rind in 
the same, including the arms which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But ;is he was 
aware that said effects belonged to the personal property [ownership] of a Filipino, 
who traded with them by virtue of a contribution to the Spanish Government, I 
would not have touched them had not the owner placed them at my disposition for 
the purposes of the war. 

1 came from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause 
with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral 
Dewey to not give place to [to allow] any internal discord, because [being] a judge 
of their desires I had the strong couviction that I would succeed in both objects, 
establishing a government according to their desires. 

Thus it is that at the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, 
when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domina- 
tion, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a demo- 
cratic and popular character as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, 
in order that they (the provinces) might be justly represented and administered to 
their satis taction. 

It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign 
powers; but we expect that the great North American nation, which struggled first 
for its independence and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually 
struggling lor the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevo- 
lence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the 
right of preference to our gratitude. 

Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans and to the favors which we have 
received through Admiral Dewey, and being more desirous than any other of pre- 
venting any conliict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must 
be extremely prejudicial not alone to my nation, but also to that of your excellency, 
I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North 
American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, with- 
out previous notice to this government, because, as no formal agreement yet exists 
between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its 
territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights. 

I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Phillip- 
pine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the 
liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that before disembarking 
troops you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to 
be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised 
in due form, and (thus; preveut the commission of any transgressions against friend- 
ship. I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of 
their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not answer for that which 
another nation, whose friendship is not well guaranteed, might inspire in it (the peo- 
ple) ; and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the 
true and sincere friendship which I have always professed to the North American 
people in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with 
our cause of liberty. 

I am, with respect, your obedient servant, 

Emilio Aguinaldo. 



STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN FOREMAN, OCTOBER 8, 1898, BEFORE 
THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. 



Examination by the Chairman: 

Q. Where do you live?— A. No. 1, Dodge place, Kegent's Barracks, 
London. 

Q. You are the author of a book published about 1801 on the Philip- 
pine Islands? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How long have you lived in the Philippine Islands? — A. Sum- 
ming up the different times of being there, eleven years. 

Q. Covering what period of time?— A. Thirteen years and a half, 
off and on; altogether, eighteen years. 

Q. About what years were you there?— A. I was there from Septem- 
ber, 1880, to the middle of 1885. 

Q. That would be about live years?— A. Yes, sir. Then I was away 
six months; I made a voyage around the world, and 1 returned to the 
islands and remained there another four years, until the end of April, 
1889. 

Q. That would make nine years?— A. Yes, sir. Then I went to 
China; was there two years, and then I went out in 1893; and was 
there, really, in the islands abont six months. 

Q. Six months in 1803?— A. Yes, sir; and then again in 1894 about 
six mouths. In 189.") 1 was again fully six months, a little over per- 
haps, and in 1890 again six months— quite six months— nearer seven, 
perhaps. 

Q. Then you have been there as late as 1896?— A. Oh, yes. I left 
the islands in 1890— the last week of November— and the rebellion broke 
out on the -0th of August that year. 

Q. The last insurrection was in progress, then, when you left?— A. 
It was; yes, sir; about three months when I left. 

Q. In which of the islands have you lived?— A. I had my fixed resi- 
dence in Manila, but, of course, I traveled all over the islands. I have 
been practically all over the island of Luzon, of course; several times 
over in a number of years; I have been everywhere in Megros; I have 
been all over Panay ; I have bet-n in the Island of Zelu or Jolo, and 
was a guest of the Sultan. I have been in three-fourths of the places 
occupied by the Spaniards in Mindanao. 1 went on foot from Zain- 
boanga, right through the Province of Zamboanga, up to Misamis on 
the north. 

Q. What was your business or occupation while thus in the islands?— 
A. I had an interest in a firm in the city of London of engineers, princi- 
pally for sugar machinery, but everything in the line of machinery for 
the development of colonies. I had an interest in the concern, and I 
practically did all the foreign work connected with it. 

Q. Did you also make some explorations and examinations with a 
view to writing the book you afterwards wrote? — A. Yes, sir. I visited 
a great many parts of the islands with the intention of recording my 

441 



442 TREATY OF PEACE. 

observations. My position was independent, you may say. Of course, 
I was working for my own account, that of the firm, and of course I 
was quite at liberty to take any course I chose. 

Q. You became interested in the islands? — A. Yes, sir; I became 
extremely interested. No book had been written which rightly repre- 
sents the islands, or pretends to, before this since the year 1859, when 
a German named, I think, Jago wrote one. 

Q. What, from this acquaintance with the islands, do you say as to 
the character of the inhabitants, and if there are differences among the 
people give us an idea of them? — A. The most plastic nature, that 
which can be most easily molded and attracted, and drawn to accom- 
modate themselves to and accept a new system which might be estab- 
lished for their future government, would be certainly the inhabitants 
of the Island of Luzon. The central islands, known as the Vizcayas 
Islands 

Q. Please point out the names of those islands? — A. That is Luzon, 
and these here are the Vizcayas, Panay, and Negros, and Cebu and 
Bojol and Leyte and Samar. That is Tagal. Those islands there and 
there and there [indicating on map] are known as Vizcayas. Mindanao 
is spoken of separately. 

Q. Is Mindora spoken of with them? — A. No; that is spoken of 
separately. 

Q. Name the Vizcayas Islands? — A. Panay Island, Negros Island, 
Cebu, Bojol, Leyte, Samar, and Masbate. They are considered the 
Vizcayas Islands. 
Mr. Eeid : 

Q. Will you kindly point out theSulu Archipelago at the same time? — 
A. There is the Island of Zulu, called by the Spaniards Jolo, the Sultan 
of which resides in a place called Maybun. 

The Chairman: 

Q. How far does his jurisdiction extend? — A. Of course the Span- 
iards have tried to reduce it to his own island, but the inhabitants of 
this island of Mindanao give allegiance to him and acknowledge him as 
their chief, and also the Batnos tribes on the island of Palawan, and 
the islands running down to the island of Bilhaoc there, upon which 
faces the Spanish settlements of this coast, including uiose on the island 
of Bilbaoc. This island is, in my opinion, worthless. 

Q. What island? — A. Palawan. Because the whole west coast can 
not be approached to within less than three miles, except by very care- 
ful navigation. Here and there there are a few shoals, but such ex- 
tremely careful navigation is required that it is practically useless. 
The island of Palawan produces very little. I have been across the 
island. I went with bearers and walked across it. 

Q. You would divide the group into Tagals, who inhabit Luzon and 
Mindora — the tribes who occupy the central islands you have named; 
and the tribes in the island of Mindanao and the Zulu group as another 
group and class of inhabitants? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Davis: 
Q. How are they made? — A. They have no special denomination. 
In Spanish they speak of them always as the Moros or Moors, because 
they are Mussulmans, and therefore follow the same religion as the 
inhabitants of Morocco. They are also spoken of as Moros from the 
dominion of the Moors in Spain, which lasted nearly eight centuries. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 443 

Mr. Day : 

Q. Will you take up tlie three classes and give, briefly, the charac- 
teristics of each?— A. The Tagals are of a very easy, plastic nature- 
willing in their nature, I should say, to accommodate themselves and 
take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, 
and I think they would fall into any new system adopted. The inhab- 
itants of the central islands, or Viscayas, are more uncouth, decidedly 
less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations 
with outsiders than the Tagals— those of Luzon— but I think they would 
easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would 
have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of 
the iron hand used than in Luzon. 

There is a very peculiar class in the island of Panay, in the neighbor- 
hood of Iloilo and in the Province of Iloilo. They are Chinese half- 
castes, the issue of Chinese men and Vizcayas women, and they hold 
the trade, as far as it is in native hands outside the foreign houses, with 
Iloilo. They are called Chinese mestizos or half castes. They are very 
abrupt and not very sociable, but have no power, can not organize 
themselves, could not do anything, and, of course, would have to 
knuckle under to anything that might be established. You would 
probably find them rather cantankerous at first. They are perfectly 
civilized so far as the civilization of the Philippines goes; they are the 
cream of the civilization of the island of Panay, and they trade there 
and deal with the foreign houses. They are the middlemen, and they 
practically inhabit two towns near Iloilo, viz, Molo and Jaro. In the 
island of Negros there are very few persons of importance or who have 
much to say in their ruling matters, because they do not care to live in 
that island more than they can help. They look upon it as a planting 
land and do not care to live there. 

Many of the planters who own estates in Negros live in these towns 
of Molo and Jaro. Negros Island is the richest island in the archi- 
pelago for the production of sugar. It was regarded as a terra incog- 
nito certainly up to the year 30 of this century. It seemed to be a 
sort of refuge for those who ran away from justice, or injustice, or perse- 
cution. But about the year 1852 or 1853 steam navigation was first 
introduced into the archipelago. It was the first time they had running 
the interisland steamers, and the planters, therefore, being able to 
chase away the Mussulmeu from the south, who constantly raided 
Negros, they really made life more possible for settlers on this island, 
and things quieted down. They appointed a governor, and he had his 
residence at Quilo Milan. The governor was murdered because he was 
going to make raids into the interior of the island and brush it up gen- 
erally, and build roads, etc., and as he was to do this so as to cost 
nothing to the state, he seized people on the pretext of being criminals 
and on all sorts of pretexts to get large gangs of men to utilize them 
for the purpose of making these roads. Of course the most of them 
were not criminals, and they saw that they were going to have a hard 
time, and so they dispatched the governor. Another governor was 
selected, and when he heard what had been done there he did not want 
to go. 

Q. And he did not go there?— A. No, sir; and so he removed the seat 
of government to Baquil. 

Q. What are the characteristics of the inhabitants of Mindanao 
and the Zulu Archipelago?— A. From the beginning of the occupation 
of the islands by the Spaniards in 1751 they used to make periodical 
piratical raids upon the other islands. They did not interfere with 



444 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Spanish dominion, because the Spaniards had never hitherto pretended 
to trouble themselves much about the Vizcayas or central group. But 
the Spaniards thought it would be an easy matter to wipe out these 
people in a little while, in an easy campaign, but they found they had 
opened up a hornet's nest. They went down to attack these people, 
known as the Moros, and ever since that time these people have made 
a dead set upon them. They never left them any peace. One time 
they ca ue with their craft, known as vinitos, right up the Bay of 
Manila, though they have never touched the city, and from that time 
until year before last there has been constant trouble with these people. 
They have been determined that they would not be subjected by the 
Spaniards at least. 

The last little war — and it became quite a custom, a thing understood, 
that almost every Governor- General should win an honor, a decoration, 
a medal, or something of that sort in his career by making war in 
Mindanao — the last war was known as the campaign of Maraout in the 
north of Mindanao. That was year before last, and so it would prob- 
ably have been the custom forever. They will not acknowledge the 
Spaniards; they positively refuse their dominion. The Spaniards kill a 
few and break up some ot their strongholds, and then the thing goes on 
as before; they never will admit the Spaniards there. For other foreign- 
ers it is very different. T know there are Germans there. There is 
one, whose name I think is Schultz, who, some years ago, was seized 
by the Spaniards for having introduced commodities and arms, etc., 
into the island. He was taken prisoner, and escaped into the interior 
and ingratiated himself with the natives so well that he received in 
marriage a Zulu wife, and I have seen his two nephews down there 
at 

Q. How far is Mindanao and the Zulu group under Spanish con- 
trol? — A. The Spaniards hold Zulu or Jolo town itself in Zulu Island. 
Frequently there are raids made into the town. When I was there once, 
just a few days before they had made a swoop on the town and killed 
two or three officers who were sitting outside a cafe, a drinking shop 
or shanty; and this used to go on all the time. Frequently it was so. 
They really do not hold on the island of Zulu more than the town 
itself. 

Q. How on the island of Mindanao? — A. They hold several little 
posts here — Zamboango,Cottabato, Butuwan, Misainis,Davao,Dapitan, 
etc. The latter is a small place where they can go. Davao is on the 
Surigao coasts, and they have one or two missions along there. In the 
interior, nothing whatever. 

Q. Who controls the interior? — A. No one. It is in quite a primitive 
state. 

Q. Inhabited by these tribes? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. They are not subject to the Spaniards at all? — A. No, sir; they 
are really independent. I never heard that a Spaniard ever crossed 
the island from one side to the other. 

Q. You know the city of Manila pretty well? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How many people are there there? — A. I estimate about 400,000, 
including, of course, all the inhabitants, including 00,000 Chinese. The 
Chinese hold entire streets, and especially there is one street, the Calle 
del Bosalio, which is nine-tenths Chiuese. 

Q. How would you divide the population, briefly, into classes — you 
have said there are 60,000 Chinese? — A. Yes, sir. I should say that, 
in normal times, there would be 6,000 Spaniards. There would be 
about 250 English; 250 to 300 Germans — I think they are rather in 



TREATY OF PEACE. 445 

excess of the English. There might be 300 British Indians, probably 
5,000 Chinese half-castes born in Manila, and perhaps 50,000 Spanish 
half-castes. 

Q. By Spanish half-castes you mean the descendants of Spaniards 
who have married native women? — A. Ves, sir. And a sprinkling of 
other foreigners, and the balance Tagal natives; of course, here and 
there, a few of all nations, Italians and others. The Tagal natives are 
extremely hospitable. It is a notable feature that there is no such 
thing as a hotel in the whole of the island of Luzon outside of Manila. 
It is an extraordinary thing — they are so hospitable that the extent 
can not be realized by anyone who has not been there. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Then there is no difficulty in obtaining hospitality anywhere? — 
A. Oh, no; for anyone not a Spaniard, and even a Spaniard, can find 
means to get a lodging. Anyone not a Spaniard can receive hospitality 
anywhere except among the hostile tribes. 

Mr. Beid : 
Q. Can they tell a Spaniard any way except by the language? — A. 

Oh, yes. 

The Chairman: 

Q. How many people are there on the island of Luzon? — A. I think 
the island of Luzon is thinner populated than is generally considered. 
I do not consider that there are more than a million and a quarter. 

Q. How many natives on the islands? — A. Subjected natives who 
have accepted the dominion of Spain and are nominally boman Cath- 
olics, about 5,000,000. Those who have not accepted the dominion, who 
have never been subjected, and who are supposed to be the aborigines, 
and unconquered tribes, including the Mussulmen of Mindanao, 
another million— 0,000,000 total. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. 11,000,000?— A. Oh, no; 5,000,000 Roman Catholics, subjected, 
and 1,000,000 more; 0,000,000 in all. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Will you explain what are the relations of the church and the 
ecclesiastical orders to the people and the government ? — A. The island 
was first discovered in 1520 by Magellanes, who died there fighting the 
battles of the new vassal of the King of Spain. The islands were 
then abandoned for about fifty years. They were called the Philippine 
Islands in honor of Prince Philip, son of the King. Fifty years passed 

and a priest called , who resided in the city of Mexico, pressed 

the matter of the annexation of the islands for the saving of souls 
upon the King very forcibly. At last the King gave way, and orders 
were issued tor an expedition to leave Mexico tor that purpose. The 
man appointed to lead the expedition was 

Q. What we wish to know is the present relations rather than the 
history. What is the relation of the church to day to land titles, to the 
people, and to the government? — A. There are four orders of monks, the 
Augostinos, or Augustinian friars, the Dominican friars, theBecolletto 
friars, and the Franciscan friars. These are the monks who are alleged 
to have usurped the incumbencies and are vicars of parishes. In addi- 
tion to them are the Jesuits, who now, for some years past, have had 
nothing whatever to do but to take care of the education of the people. 
There is not anything like the same animosity against them that there 



446 TREATY OF PEACE. 

is to the others, and I am inclined to tliink that the people look upon 
them very well. They do not interfere with the personal liberty of tlie 
people. 

Mr. Eeid. 

Q. The morality of the Jesuits is better, also, is it not 1 ? — A. Yes, sir; 
it is very good. There is nothing to be said against them now. The 
head of the church is the archbishop. The archbishop is usually, but 
it is not absolutely necessary that he should be, an individual of one of 
these orders. The immediate chief of each of these orders is called a 
provincial. The provincial is the business man of the order, and these 
provincials are not very much subjected — they are nominally, but not 
very much really — to the archbishop. In fact, they sometimes, it is 
well known, have shown insolence and insubordination to the arch- 
bishop. The present archbishop seems to have very little hold upon 
them; what the provincials wanted to do they did. The case against 
the friars is this, and it showed itself in a little outbreak, called the 
rebellion of Cavite, in 1872. The secular clergy — these monks are the 
regular ordained clergy — claimed, under the conditions of the Council 
of Trent, that these monks, as missionaries, were not entitled to hold 
the incumbencies; that by a papal bull which settled this matter when 
it was raised these monks were allowed to be only missionaries, and 
could only open and establish missions, but that when these missions 
became parishes and when the people around them adopted the Catholic 
faith, they should then retire from these parishes and the incumbency 
should be taken by the secular clergy. 

Q. What do you mean by "incumbency"? — A. The position occupied 
by the parish priest — the incumbency of the parish. 

Q. The titles to lands are usually in the hands of these monks? — A. 
Yes, sir; they hold large tracts. 

Q. How did they get these lands? — A. Usually they simply took 
possession — appropriated it. They have in their orders what are called 
"brothers." There are "fathers" of the orders and "brothers." "Broth- 
ers" are simply persons who have taken certain vows, but who are not 
allowed to celebrate mass — simply workmen — and they put these in 
charge to take possession of the land. 

Q. They took possession. Did they have no decree from the Spanish 
Government, or the Governor-General, authorizing them to take posses- 
sion of the land ? — A. Not at first. Subsequently they received decrees, 
but never could they get title deeds, owing to the opposition of the 
natives. The lands taken were not devoid of settlers, but most of them 
were simply squatters, and in some instances they passed several gener- 
ations of squatters. 

Q. Practically, were they not all of that class? — A. Practically they 
were, as there was no one to give title deeds. 

The Chairman : 

Q. They do have title deeds? — A. Yes; but it was such a long, pon- 
derous matter that they have given up the idea. 

Q. These titles were not recorded? — A. No, sir. 

Q. How did it work or was it operated? — A. They let the land out 
in parcels for rent, called canons. The man to whom they were rented 
held them generally for three years — that is, usually, I think — over all 
these estates three years' holdings. No guaranty of any kind passed. 
At the end of the three years all improvements made by the man in 



TREATY OF PEACE. 447 

possession, the tenant, were capitalized by the corporation, and they 
say that they regard the land is of so much more capital value, on 
which they base the rent, and require a higher rental. So really they 
steal the fruits of the labor of the tenant, and they charge a new rent 
on the new valuation, and this new valuation has come from the work 
of the tenant. The natives kick very much at this; it is a very sore 
point with them. 

In the Province of Laguna, where the Dominican corporation had 
their lands, they eveu pretended so far as to say that cane mills and 
machinery for crushing the cane should be left on the estate if you go 
out at the end of your three years and do not renew the lease — that 
you should leave them the machinery. A very great question arose, 
and then there appeared a certain man called Dr. liizal, who was exe- 
cuted in the first week of last November or the week previous, and he 
went down to his native town - and raised this question as to title 
straightway with the Dominican order, and he said, " Show us your 
title deeds; it will satisfy me and the people around here and it will 
be better for yourselves, because it will restore peace and order and it 
will not do you any harm;" and they could not show their title deeds. 

Q. Are all these lands held in this way, or do the natives have some 
holdings of their own ? — A. Oh, yes; here and there some of the natives 
have holdings of their own. 

Q. What proportion are held in this way?— A. It does not amount 
to very much ; 3 per cent probably. 

Mr. Reid : 

Q. Three per cent of all the lands in Luzon constitute the whole 
holdings of these corporations? — A. Yes, sir; it would not amount to 
more than a thirtieth, I think. 

Q. What per cent of the cultivated or valuable land? — A. I am 
speaking of the cultivated, valuable land; 3 per cent, not more than 
that. 

The Chairman: 

Q. The rest held by natives?— A. Yes, sir; and by Spaniards, and I 
suppose there are possibly six estates held by foreigners not Spaniards. 

Mr. Reid : 
Q. What is the size of these estates in English acreage?— A. Not 
large. What is called a Luge estate there would be about 3,000 acres. 
That would be considered a large estate. 

The Chairman : 
Q. What do you know of the moral character of these friars; how 
do thev conduct themselves in that respect?— A. A very large per- 
centage of them lead loose lives. They encroach upon the virtue of 
the women. In the towns, for that purpose, they get up what they call 
a "Cofradia." They will call a thing a "Cofradia of St. Paul" or " St. 
Joseph," and they get women to join, and these women really become 
the servants of the priests. They do not, of course, say that it is that, 
but that is what it really amounts to, and they are called upon every 
once in a while for a "Cofradia," and I knew a place in Negros where 
they taught the women to consider it quite an honor to clean out the 
parish priest's house, and in this way they have the women at their 
call, and there are a great many, a very great many of the sons and 
daughters of the priests throughout the islands. There is no secrecy 
about this; they do not tell it in whispers, and the natives allow their 



448 TREATY OF PEAC3. 

daughters to marry the sons of these priests freely. They do not seem 
to mind it much. I remember one notable case. I was staying with a 
friend of mine down in Laguimauce 

Q. In the island of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir. My friend's name is Henry 
George Brown. He lives now at Saffron -Walden in Essex, England. 
I have known him about seventeen years, and I was staying at his 
place, and a letter came from the corporation, saying that Father 
So-and-So is going to pass through your town on his way to Tamina, 
due north of this place, and will you please take charge of his goods 
and parcels, and see that they are sent on to Tainana. I was there at 
the time the small steamer came in, and a drenching rain came down, 
and simply drenched the things, and Brown said that it would be a 
good act to open these things and dry them, and so we had the cases 
opened and the things spread out to dry, and he called to me and said, 
"Just look here; is this not astonishing 1 ?" and he showed me some 
filthy prints, photographic slides for a sort of kaleidoscope arrange- 
ment, slides and prints of a most filthy nature. He said: "I show you 
this because it does not seem possible that, coming in the package of a 
priest, these things could be possible." He said it was no business of 
ours, but that he showed them to me for their moral effect, and I men- 
tioned it in my book. And that is the man who was to take charge of 
the souls of the parish he was appointed to. That man had been 
turned out of the parish he had because he was so obnoxious; he was 
simply a human beast. 

There was another case. When I first went to Manila there was 
quite a hubbub about a certain priest called Pierre, who held a parish 
in Pampanga Province, and he had beaten a boy to death, so he was 
taken away from there and sent farther north to a town called San 
Miguel de Mayamo. I had occasion to go to that town and they told 
me about it — it was notorious. A woman came to see him, and he 
kicked her in the abdomen and she fell down badly hurt, and died. 
This became too notorious, and they removed him from there, it was 
talked about freely, what a scandal it was, etc. That was when I 
arrived, seventeen years ago, and they said, "Is it possible we are 
going to have these priests free from justice, and that they can do as 
they like with us?" so he was taken away and sent down to the prov- 
ince of Cavite, and there the rebels caught him in this last rebellion, 
and, more to ridicule him than anything else, I think, they made him 
their bishop. They said, " Mind what you do. You can be our bishop 
and take charge of our clergy, but don't you attempt anything behind 
our backs." He thought he was quite safe, and he was found taking 
sketches and notes of their strongholds. He had already made arrange- 
ments with the monks for their delivery. They caught him, and they 
said it was treachery — he had made negotiations with the Augustine 
monks in Manila — and after proper trial he was condemned to death. 
He was tied to a post, without a hat and without water, and died of 
sunstroke, fever, and hunger, and that was his end. And no one/ 
regrets it. 

Q. How much influence on the civil government and the administra- 
tion of the courts do these orders have? — A. The priests can not be 
summoned to an ordinary court, nor can they pursue others in court; 
they can not appear in court at all, but when a priest makes a declara- 
tion it is accepted as a fact, and no proof is necessary. It is quite suf- 
ficient that Father So-and so signs it. The administration of Manila 
may be regarded as purely and simply the executive of the priests, which 
are the ruling order there. Over and over again Governors-General 



TREATY OF PEACE. 449 

have been sent away on the recommendation of the monastic orders in 
recent times. At the end of 1892 I was in Spain, and the son of Gen- 
eral Despujols came to visit me, knowing that I was well acquainted 
with the country, and he told me that his father was going out as 
Govenor-General of the islands and he would like to have a chat with 
me. I asked him how his father stood with the priests. He said he 
stood very well, that he would try to recognize their power and stand 
in harmony with them, and I said that if he did that he was all light. 

General Despujols went out, and I went out there in 1893, and he 
had just left. He had been eight months in power. Appointed for 
three years, at the end of eight months he had been obliged to clear 
out, from the influence of the monastic power. The main points 
against him were these: This man, Dr. Eizal, who went down and 
raised the point of the deeds, etc., with the monks, had been to Europe 
and had studied in Germany. He was a very clever man, quite an 
exception to the general rule, and had published three books against 
the priests — ojie called Noli me Tangere, another Filibustero, and 
another was a reproduction of a book written by a priest years ago, 
who was also an exception. For this he was looked down upon by the 
priests as a disturbing element. He came to Hongkong, and from 
there he was cajoled to Manila on the promise that he would not be 
molested. He went there to the Governor-General, but they detained 
his baggage and pretended that he carried incendiary leaflets for the 
purpose of raising a rebellion. 

The priests required that he should be executed, but the governor- 
general refused to allow it; said that it was utterly impossible that he 
should be executed for what he had written, and refused. All they 
could get out out of the governor was, "Very well, you are banished 
to the island of Mindanao." This is the place to which he was ban- 
ished, and where he remained for four years, Dapitan. I saw his little 
hut there on the bay, and visited him there. That displeased the 
priests very much. They had strife and questions between tliem and 
the governor-general, and the latter said, "I am going to see how you 
are working," and, all of a sudden, he had a raid made upon the resi- 
dences of the Augustino monks in a place north of Manila, and had 
the place suddenly seized and raided, and it is very well known that he 
found a printing press printing these same incendiary leaflets, and the 
priest who was employed in doing so was perfectly well known to 
everyone in Mailabau, to Americans and English, where there is a big 
sugar-refining establishment owned by Americans and English, the 
English resident in Manila and the Americans in Hongkong, and 
known personally to them. The man disappeared and was never seen 
again. I can not say where he went. These leaflets were seized, and 
from that moment the governor-general was a condemned man, and 
he left. I went out in 1893 and he was not there. 

Q. You regard these orders as the dominating power 1 ? — A. Yes, sir. 
General Blanco was out there in Manila, where I saw him nearly every 
day. He was there at the beginning of this insurrection in 1891!. The 
archbishop is the most bloodthirsty man there. I knew him perfectly 
well. I used to meet the priests and hear what they had to say, and 
they said that what Blanco had done did not please them at all; did 
not suit their view of it, though, of course, I had very little to say — 
nothing to say, in fact. But their complaints were that General Blanco 
was not sufficiently bloodthirsty for them, and that is the reason he 
went away from there. Their idea was that he should take the few 
T P 29 



450 TREATY OF PEACE. 

troops he had and spread fire and sword broadcast among all the islands. 
And Blanco was practically exiled from there because he was not 
sufficiently bloodthirsty to satisfy the priests. 

Q. What can you tell us about the climate? — A. Of course, everyone 
must act on certain lines in all tropical countries, but I consider the 
climate excellent for a tropical country. 

Q. White men live there in comfort? — A. Perfectly. I never had 
any sickness there; I never knew what fever was; I had only one little 
experience of it there, for a few days. 

Mr. Eeid : 

Q. Are there any prevalent fevers there? — A. People do get fever, 
but very seldom. 

Q. Is it a pernicious fever, such as they have in Cuba? — A. Oh, no; 
very light, indeed; and the natives will get a fever more often than 
Europeans; it is owing to their mode of living. 

Q. Is it a malarial fever? — A. No, sir; I consider malarial fever to 
be that which comes from the opening of new ground. 

Q. Would it be with chills? — A. Not malarial fevers, as I understand 
them. I was once at Vera Oruz, and 1 saw that there was a lot of fine 
land back of the city which was not used at all, and I asked why it was 
not utilized, and tliey explained to me that the minute they turned the 
sod the people were attacked by the fever and dropped down with it, 
and died within eight hours after. 1 never knew or heard of men being 
troubled from the opening of new ground in Manila or the Philippines. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Which is the best and farthest advanced of these islands? — A. 
Luzon I consider the most advanced, owing, of course, to the close asso- 
ciation with the Europeans. 

Q. More insurrections break out there. — A. Yes; and it is just 
because they are able to see other things. What they ask is perfectly 
just. Their insurrection is not from a love of quarreling or opposition 
to white men at all. There is no such thing as any hostility to white 
men; such a thing does not exist. 

Q. What are the causes, briefly, of insurrections? — A. Very broadly 
speaking, the main cause is the persecution of the priests, their inter- 
ference in the little petty details of a man's life, his wife, his daughter, 
the constant persecution, the petty revenge. These parish priests 
interfere in a man's own home and household, in the interior workings 
of a man's house. And all of a sudden a priest will take a dislike for 
some little thing, or nothing, and then that man is marked, and period- 
ically the priest will take a piece of paper and write on it and say that 
he has reason to believe the individuals marked in the margin are — 
whatever he wants to call them — disturbers of the peace, etc., and will 
request that they be removed from his district, and the man will be 
taking his coffee in the morning, getting ready to go to his estate, and 
the civil guard will appear and say, "You are wanted." "What for?" 
"By order of the governor." And he is walked off, and if he shows 
the least disposition to dispute his arms are tied behind him and he 
has to tramp, tramp, tramp, down, and down, and down to Manila. 
That is one of the points especially raised by Aguinaldo, that arbitrary^ 
power to arrest at any time simply on the name of the governor. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Has the person so arrested no chance for a judicial inquiry? — A. 
No, sir 3 the Governor-General has the exclusive power. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 451 

The Chairman: 
Q. And he takes the word of* the friar! — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Eeid : 
Q. To where do they banish them? — A. Generally to the south of 
Mindanao. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Is there any such thing as a fair administration of justice in the 
courts? — A. That is one of the greatest misfortunes, and as a foreigner 
1 would make many sacrifices to avoid a cause in the courts. You might 
as well leave the islands. They will follow you to the last dollar, and 
the thing will go on as long as there is anything to be got. There is a 
remarkable instance of that in the case of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
bank, which had some question with the house of Jurado & Co. The 
question is still on. They went to court over it. The bank certainly 
did make a mistake in wishing to close down upon them for certain 
promissory notes before they were due, but they put it on the ground 
that the promissory notes had been indorsed by everybody and any- 
body, even by boys back of the counter. 

The thing came into court, and Jurado & Co. found themselves in 
bad shape, and it came out and back again, and went from civil court 
to criminal court, and sometimes one side would get the best of it and 
sometimes the other. The bank was shut up, and Mr. Townsend, the 
manager of the bank there, was notified that he must consider himself 
a prisoner. The consul protested against it, and he was ordered to be 
sent to Bombay or Calcutta as a persona non grata. He removed his 
things, and the whole thing was shut up. They sent for an English- 
man who was a machinist to pry the locks of the safe, and he said he 
could not do it. He was working on it for a week, and then said he 
could not do it, that he could not possibly pry these locks, and then 
they got up a little syndicate of natives, a little banker there whose 
name I forget, and some others, to personate the bank, and they 
thought they would be able to make a large claim out of it, and the 
last I heard of it the claim was for $930,000 Mexican, the claim made 
by this house of Jurado & Co., and they have ke*pt on and can not get 
a settlement, and it is still pending. I bank myself with the bank. 
It has its offices in London at 31 Lombard street, and the brother of 
this man Jurado is also living in London, I believe in Chelsea, but his 
office is at 21 Billeter street. 

Q. They will never get a settlement? — A. No, sir; never. Years 
after this came up I was in Madrid, and I was going down by the 
offices of the minister of war, and I met this man Jurado from Lon- 
don, and he said the whole thing would be settled in a fortnight, and 
that he would get his claim. I went on to the minister of war, with 
whom I had an engagement, and he said I was a little late, and I told 
him that I had been detained by meeting thisman and his conversation 
with me, and that he said the whole thing would be settled in a fort- 
night. He asked me if 1 would meet the man again, and I said that I 
might, perhaps. "Tell him it is a lie, and that the matter is not settled 
yet." 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Are those things managed by Spaniards? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Reid : 
Q. Peninsulars?— A. Yes, sir. 



452 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Appointed by the home government 1 ? — A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What about the other causes? — A. I think I have said enough 
about the priests. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Your remarks do not apply to the Jesuits? — A. No, sir. 

Mr. Davis : 
Q. Nor to the native priests? — A. No, sir. They want to clear out 
the priests, except the Jesuits as educators and schoolmasters. I do 
not think they would have much cause to object to them. Another 
thing they object to is they have fifteen days' forced labor. The natives 
must give fifteen days' labor, which they can redeem by paying so much 
money down. Every governor when he comes to a province inquires 
how many "polistas" or men subject to this tax there are, and then he 
goes to the towns and makes a bargain with the petty governors of the 
towns, the headmen of the towns, called "capitans:" "How much will 
you get together to liberate so many men?" And then the governor 
will put down, say 5,(100 men's work, when, as a matter of fact, only a 
thousand work, and he pockets the money paid by the 4,000 to get off, 
and they object to this method very much, because it is a constant 
source of worry. 

Mr. Davis : 
Q. Is that compulsory labor? — A. Yes, sir; and can be redeemed by 
a payment. 

Q. Enforced by punishment and slavery, if necessary? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. To whom does the money go? — A. It is supposed to go to the 
Government, but it really goes only to the governor of the province. 

The Chairman : 

Q. He reports a great many, of whom only a few work, and pockets 
the money paid by the rest? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What other grounds of complaint? — A. There is the civil guard. 
The institution, theoretically, is very good; it is no doubt necessary to 
have a civil guard. 

Mr. Eeid : 

Q. What is the civil guard?— A. A mounted military police. 

Q. Natives? — A. The officers are Spaniards and the line natives. 
They call it the civil guard, what we call the constabulary, but their 
functions are in rural districts; there are none whatever in towns 
except where specially appointed, or in mere villages, but in the city 
of Manila they have no functions. In my opinion the civil guard is 
very necessary — theoretically, a very good thing. It is necessary to 
have an armed force, a sort of military police, to prevent raids by real 
brigands on property; I should be very sorry to see the civil guard 
disestablished. 

Mr. Davis : 
Q. Wherein is the abuse? — A. The abuse is this: An officer will send 
a patrol of two men to walk through the district, and generally to patrol 
it and see what is going on around there. These men, as they go along 
from hut to hut will steal — the people are miserably poor, and it is a 
great thing for them to lose two or three chickens or a little tobacco or 



TREATY OF PEACE. 453 

sugar — and they go along and pick up anything they like. They will 
go to a man and say: " Where is your document of personal identity .'" 
and the man is out in the field, perhaps, and he says: " 1 have not got 
it; I left it somewhere else, at the house," and they arrest him at once. 
He says: u Let meoff." " How much?" and he gets off if he pays. They 
do this on their own account. They will also trump up charges against 
the natives. If an officer of the civil guard can not get milk delivered 
as he wants it, or sugar, or whatever else he wants, or can not get a 
man to run his horses gratis, or anything whatever he wants for his 
use, he will trump up a charge, and the man is taken off to the princi- 
pal town of the province on some trumpery charge. Then they will 
allow a certain license in the cock fighting. It is supposed to be pro- 
hibited, but it is alleged that it is so set in the native character that it 
can not be eradicated, and on Sundays and certain other days they 
allow it, and the guards will go in, and if they do not get a certain per- 
centage of the bets, etc., they are down on them. They are also con- 
stantly interfering with the internal workings of the households amongst 
the natives. 

Q. Any other ground of complaint? — A. No, sir; so far as I know. 

Mr. Eeid : 

Q. What about the poll tax? — A. That is the sedula of which I have 
spoken. They give in exchange for the payment of the tax a state- 
ment of personal identity, and require every one to have one, from the 
Governor General down. 

Q. How much does that amount to? — A. It is very light, in my opin- 
ion. The lowest grade, I think, is $1.25, Mexican, per annum, and it 
goes up to $25, the highest. It is not a very high tax. Of course, the 
general complaint, which does not press so very hard upon the natives, 
nor so particularly, is the impossibility of obtaining justice in the 
courts. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Is the poll tax confined to the adult males?— A. No; women as 
well; every adult male. 

Mr. Davis: 

Q. Children? — A. They are put upon the list, but are not taxed until 
they are 18. 

Q. All persons over 18? — A. Yes,sir. You are, theoretically, counted 
as not existing unless you have the paper of personal identity. If you 
appear at any Government department, the first thing they ask is, 
"Where is your cedula?" If you can not show it, you are called "non- 
existing." 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Do you know anything about the port charges? — A. I can not 
give the rates, but I do not think it works hardly. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Do you know of the existence of any coal in any of the islands 
you have traveled on? — A. In the Island of Cebu. 

Q. Was it good coal, or simply lignite? — A. Liguite, I think. 

Q. Is it coal that can be used for running steam vessels? — A. No; it 
would not be safe to use it alone for steam vessels. 

Q. It has been tried? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. There is no other coal? — A. Yes, sir; in the island of Luzon. 

Q. Has it been worked? — A. Oh, yes; but I think it was a failure; 
and here and here [indicating on map]. That was much better coal. 



454 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Can tliat be used by itself for the operation of steam vessels'? — A. 
I do not think it would be safe; I do not think it is good enough. 

The Chairman: 

Q. What do you say, from what you know, as to these natives being 
capable of self-government if left to themselves? — A. To speak briefly, 
I say "No." The native has no expansive ideas; be can not go far 
enough to understand what it is to mle matters for the benefit of the 
oommon weal; he can not get past his own most personal interests, or 
his town, at the most. I think the greatest length he could go would 
be his own. town. But constructing laws, and obeying them, for the 
benefit of the commonwealth, I do not think he is capable of it at all. 
1 think an attempt at a native government would be a fiasco altogether. 

Q. Do you think they would submit to a free government, well man- 
aged and equitable? — A. Oh, yes; of course, there would be some little 
dissatisfaction at first — it would not go down, I think, very agreeably 
at present; they would suffer a disappointment for the moment; but in 
a few months they would get over that. Aguinaldo has ideas now that 
he would like to be president. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. Would the passing into the hands of an anti-Catholic power be 
a source of irritation? — A. No, sir; the matter of religion would not 
trouble them at all. 

The Chairman : 

Q. They submit to the present religion because it is a matter of policy 
to do so? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What do you say as to whether or not, if it should be concluded 
that Luzon should be separated from the rest of the group, a govern- 
ment could be maintained there of sufficient resources in that island for 
the maintenance of government? In short, what would be the effect of 
seeking to establish a colonial government on the island of Luzon by 
itself first? — A. For the moment there would be a difficulty of labor. 
Nature is so prolific there that man can get along almost entirely with- 
out work. Of course in the city of Manila it is not the same, but the 
people from among whom you would draft for labor can almost live 
without work and get all they want, construct their houses entirely of 
wood, get wearing apparel to merely cover their nudity, and can get 
all they want to eat and drink without the necessity of working. 

But I think if Luzon were kept by yourselves, they would be so 
startled by the perfect paradise it would seem to them under the Gov- 
ernment of the United States that the natives of the other islands 
would hear of it from all sides. There would be steamers and canoes 
coming to and fro, and they would hear that they could walk the streets 
perfectly free, without being obliged to carry a piece of paper to show, 
and they would be as much astonished as was Aguinaldo when he 
found that he was on free soil and could open his mouth when he was 
at Hongkong. It was months before he could open his mouth to 
speak freely concerning the Philippines. I think that would draw 
large immigration from the other islands to Luzon, assuming that the 
other islands were under Spanish dominion. Conditional on that, I 
think it would draw very large numbers from there, and that you 
would thus get over the labor difficulty, and the island of Luzon, 
being worked up, would be sufficient to establish a very prosperous 
colony. I think it would be a very fine colony. 

Q. What would be its relation to other places in the East, such as 



TREATY OF PEACE. 455 

China and Japan? — A. There is a large trade in sugar for Hongkong, 
a large reiinery at Taku; and sugar is also sent to Shanghai, and the 
hemp is also shipped, principally to America; probably 90 per cent of 
the hemp, quite 90 per cent of the coffee. A disease has come to the 
coffee plants, and the trade was injured, and it has been wiped out 
almost entirely — is said not to exist. 

Q. Is a considerable part of the island said not to be cultivated — as 
yet undeveloped? — A. Yes, sir; I should say that a third of Luzon is 
virgin soil. 

Q. And is capable of being worked and developed? — A. Oh, yes. I 
should say, taking into account the neglected estates — merely possessed, 
not worked, because of no means of transportation, merely owned by 
so-and so — putting the two together, I should say one half of Luzon is 
agriculturally dormant. 

Q. What kind of crops can be grown there ? — A. The center of Luzon, 
called the Black Bush, is a very tine valley watered by the Bio Grande, 
a river rising in the center of Luzon and emptying itself in the extreme 
north of Luzon'at a place called Taal, where steamers drawing 7 feet 
can get up. There is a steamer going up very occasionally, and you 
can go up L'o miles. I have been up it some distance myself, and it is 
navigable for a big boat, canoe — a canoe drawing a foot and a half 
draft. In such a canoe I have been very near to the source. With a 
litile attention it would be made very navigable for light-draft craft. 
It runs through a very tine valley, and the specialty of that soil is the 
cultivation of tobacco. The other islands produce tobacco. Negros 
produces tobacco, but it has been found that Luzon produces the finest. 
I have smoked the tobacco of the Viscayas, and it is decidedly inferior 
to Luzon tobacco. It is the elements of the soil. There is no getting 
over it. The land is also very good for coffee in Luzon. Coffee has 
been found elsewhere, but not found to prosper so well in the other 
islands as in Luzon. 

Coffee has been tried in Cebu. I have seen it growing there, and 
Bell, Smith & Co. had some of this coffee brought down to see what 
they could make of it, but it has been proved not to be so good as that 
from Luzon. Luzon seems to have the very best soil for all products of 
the islands except sugar. Sugar seems most prolific in Negros, though 
I do not know that that makes much difference, as cane sugar cultiva- 
tion is a declining industry, and I think more attention should be given 
to coffee and tobacco than to the other, because cane sugar is being cut 
out entirely. As to the trouble of keeping Manila, assuming the other 
islands to be occupied by other nations, if it should be suggested that 
the Spanish should regain possession of those other islands, I would 
suggest that it should be on certain conditions, and they are as follows: 
First, the expulsion of the monastic orders and every individual apper- 
taining thereto, Spain to bind herself never to readmit them. Second, 
no impediment of any kind, passport, license, permit, or any official 
formality, is to be put in the way of anyone, of any class whatever, who 
wishes to leave the islands, and every person shall be freely permitted 
to leave, excepting and in the case of a judicial warrant having been 
issued against him for some alleged crime. Third, a Philippine com- 
mercial treaty to be made between the United States of America and 
Spain specially regulating the commerce and trade interest in all its 
features relating to the interislaud traffic, i. e., the commercial relations 
between Luzon (American) and the other islands (Spanish). Fourth, 
no alienation without permission of the United States. Fifth, Spain 
not to impose any export duties. 



456 TREATY OF PEACE. 

In regard to the second condition, it is not a mere theory; it has a 
practical object. In it the free exit would mean that they should not 
put an impediment in the way of the people going to Luzon. It is most 
necessary, in my opinion, that that should be an expressed condition, 
that there should not be an impediment to the egres^ of those people 
from those islands, and by it you will have the great advantage of get- 
ting over the labor trouble, and through immigration and propagation 
in a generation the labor question will disappear entirely. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Free commercial intercourse between the islands'? — A. There 
should be a treaty of commerce for interislaud traffic, treating of rela- 
tions between Luzon and the other islands. I do not think you could 
ask Spain to open free ports unless you make yourself Manila a free 
port. If you make Manila a free port, no custom-houses 

Q. I did not mean no custom-houses. — A. I should also put on Spain 
the condition of no export duties, and then that will permit produce 
coming from Spanish islands to Luzon. 

Mr. Be id: 

Q. Do you think it would add greatly to the complexity and difficulty 
of the problem to govern the whole group rather than Luzon alone! — 
A. It would add to the size of the establishment. 

Q. Would it add to the complexity of the problem to govern the 
eutire group! — A. No, sir; I do not think it would. 

Q. You do not regard the problem as different in the southern part 
from the northern! — A. No, sir; I think to allow the natives of Mindanao 
to follow their own ideas, to be a little less rigid on the laws of individuals 
on the Mussulmans of Mindauao, would answer the purpose. The diffi- 
culty is that they have never been subjected to any power, whereas the 
others have. I would suggest that you take that into account. You 
are taking over a people who have been subjected to a European 
power in Luzon; in Mindauao they have not beeu subjected, so, of 
course, how much they would regard it as a brand-new conquest would 
enter into consideration. 

The Chairman: 
Q. You think the entire group could be taken and governed, or that 
Luzon could be taken and governed, with the free-trade regulations 
between the islands and the other stipulations you mentioned! — A. Yes, 
sir; either course could be pursued. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Do you think the native priests would assist in establishing and 
maintaining good government there! — A. Oh, yes; you would certainly 
have no opposition from the native priests. 

Q. Would we have their active aid! — A. The native priests would 
not oppose at all; they would not take a hostile course; there would be 
no difficulty there. 

The Chairman: 

Q. How would they regard the Protestant missionaries? — A. I think 
it would be a matter of indifference to them. 

Q. You think the only trouble would be with the monastic orders! — 
A. From a religious point of view only 5 I do not think the native 
priests would give the least trouble. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 457 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Are these priests supported by the state? — A. Yes, sir; by the 
govern mental funds. 

Q. Would the withdrawal of government support make trouble with 
them? — A. I do not think they could get up auy trouble. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Would they be disposed to do so? — A. I do not think it would go 
past each individual feeling a little sore. You must remember they 
constitute the secular clergy, and the secular clergy are not bound by 
any vow of poverty. They are very good fellows, indeed; very hospi- 
table, and will put you up any time for a night or two. I should say 
that 75 per cent of the secular clergy have quite sufficient to live upon. 
And they have lands. 

Q. State, if you know, what the amount of aid furnished, per annum, 
to one of these secular priests will average. — A. It is very trifling all 
around; I should say possibly §300 Mexican to each one would be a 
fair average; about §40 per month. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. What do you think the exactions of the church are on individ- 
uals? — A. 1 had some figures which I went over for the purpose of an 
article. If you would allow me to leave that until another time, I have 
some notes in a book, and if you can raise that questiou a little later I 
could give you a more exact answer. 

The Chairman: 

Q. I think you stated in your book that about seven tenths of the 
revenues of the island are turned over to the church. How is that? — 
A. I must have calculated it closely at that time. 

The commission here took a recess until 2.30 p. m. 

The commission met at 2.30 p. m. 

Mr. Foreman. In answer to the last question asked this morning, I 
will read an extract from an article written by me which it may be 
interesting to you to hear. 

The total revenues for the island, estimated, for 1896, were, in round 
numbers, 80,000,000 pesetas. If you will divide that amount by ten, it 
will give the amount in gold dollars, or $8,000,000. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. That is the real value? — A. In gold. 

Mr. Davis : 
Q. About twice that in silver? — A. Yes, sir. The disbursements to 
be made included the following items, viz — these are the actual figures 
for 1890-97. I will give it in pesetas 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Where do you derive that? — A. From statistics sent me from 

Madrid for the purposes of my literary work. To the clergy I suppose 

we might call it an allowance made by the Government to the clergy, 

general allowance, 7,000,000 pesetas out of a total of 86,000,001) pesetas. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. $700,000? — A. Yes, sir. For the Franciscan College in Spain, and 

passages of priests from Spain to the islands, 271,000 pesetas, or $27,500 

gold. For the maintenance of Manila Cathedral, 291,000 pesetas, or 

$29,400 gold. For the maintenance of the choir school, 20,000 pesetas, 



458 TREATY OP PEACE. 

$2,000 gold. Total, 7,589,000 pesetas, or $758,900 gold; sothatthe net 
result is three-quarters of a million dollars gold out of a total of 
$8,000,000 gold. 

Mr. DAVI : 
Q. About 10 per cent of the entire amount? — A. Yes, sir; it comes 
to something like what I put in my book. Of course the total amount 
varies from year to year. Another curious item comes out of this total 
revenue which, of course, would cease to exist under new arrange- 
ments — pensions and allowances paid outside the colony, of absolutely 
no interest to the Philippine Islanders. I have not noted it here, but 
tliey are pensions to the descendants of Christopher Columbus, to a 
man known as the Marquis de Bademont, the maintenance of consuls 
in the far East, which are absolutely of no value to the Philippine Isl- 
ands. The consuls, as at Hongkong, are under the jurisdiction in no 
sense of the Governor-General of the islands; if the Governor-General 
wants to make use of them, he telegraphs to Spain and Spain tele- 
graphs back to Hongkong, while, as a matter of fact, the distance is 
only 030 miles from Manila to Hongkong. This amount is 5,890,000 
pesetas, or $589,000 gold. For public works, highways, bridges, and 
public buildings, nothing. Besides the above amounts, paid direct to 
the clergy, the sums extorted by the priests for marriages, sale of indul- 
gences, feasts, msisses, burials, baptisms, scapularies, etc., are estimated 
at about 10,000,000 pesetas, or $1,000,000 gold. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Does the church there have a right to levy a tax on the people? — 
A. Yes, sir; I think it was about the year 1883, but, however, leaving 
the date, but certainly it was during the administration of Governor- 
General Jovelar. Up to the time of his administration the priests used 
to get 1£ reals — the Mexican dollar, or the dollar out of Spain, is 8 
reals; in Spain the dollar is 20 reals. The dollar is distinguished this 
way: In Spain you speak of reals veiute, 20, and 8 reals fuertes, 
strong, hard reals, make a dollar outside of Spain; in the colonies 1£ 
reals had to be paid by every individual living within the district of a 
parish within a certain parish priests' jurisdiction. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Is there a tax levied by Spain on real estate? — A. No, sir. 

Q. A tax on personal property levied in the islands? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Any direct tax of any kind, except a capitation tax, levied in the 
islands by Spain? — A. No, sir; there is a trading tax. 

Q. That is a license? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. That license is levied there on all traders? — A. Yes, sir; if I 
wished to day to start a business of any kind, from that of a peddler to 
the establishment of a commercial house, in Manila I would have to 
get a license in order to do so. 

Q. Tell us the range of those taxes — from what sum to what sum? — 
A. I think it is from about $.) to $250. 

Q. What tax is levied upon the lottery there, if any, or what license 
is required for the lottery? — A. There is no tax on the lottery, of 
course, because it is run by the Government, but it is generally under- 
stood that the prizes and the income of the lottery are so arranged in 
such a manner that the Government will assuredly get 25 per cent 
profit. 

Q. Is there an income tax? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Is there a cock-fighting tax in any way, by license or otherwise? — 
A. Yes, sir. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 459 

Q. How much license? — A. lean not tell exactly what it amounts to, 
but it is regulated in this way: They put it up to a tender or at auc- 
tion, and a number will go forward with tenders for the term of three 
years, and they undertake to pay a lump sum of so much, payable in 
periodical installments. 

Q. It has been stated that the church appropriated, or had some 
portion of the proceeds of that license? — A. I never heard that. 

Mr. Frye : 

Q. Did you get through with your answer to my question as to 
the taxing power of the church — they tax everyone so much? — A. Up 
to the time of Jovelars administration, I think 1883, the church 
used to have 1£ reals a head for the sanctorum tax. Since that period 
they have no direct tax of so much a head, but now it is collected by 
the treasury, and they receive what is estimated to be an equivalent 
from the treasury, so the tax remains the same, but is paid to the church 
by the authorities. 

Q. Do the priests have any way of plundering the people of money ? — 
A. Oh, yes. I will just read that little piece again. Pesetas income the 
same, etc. The amount extorted by the church for attestation is esti- 
mated at about 10,000,000 pesetas— $1,000,000 gold. 

There is another way the priests will get money out of the people. 
They will say that the Feast of Our Lady of So and So is to take place on 
the L'Oth of this mouth, "i shall look to you to pay something to that;" 
and they will go to Captain So and So and say, "You are generous, and 
we expect so much," and if he says he can not pay so much, they will 
keep asking, and perhaps reducing the amount, and he is afraid to 
refuse entirely, and they will finally squeeze out anything up to $.">00. 
How the money goes nobody knows. It goes into the hands of the 
priests and the feast conies off, the candles are there and lighted, and 
all the necessary paraphernalia, etc., usual at such times, and they have 
to be content. I suppose a large revenue comes from that. 

Mr. Davis: 
Q. Is there a stamp tax on the island ? — A. Oh, yes ; the same stamps 
as in other countries. 

The Chairman: 
Q. A stamp tax for instruments, deeds, etc.?— A. Yes, sir; the lowest 
value is 25 cents of a Mexican dollar. 

Mr. Davis : 

Q. Are those stamps required on all instruments? — A. Yes, sir; you 
can not communicate with the authorities without paying the tax. 

Q. Official documents, notes, deeds, etc.?— A. Yes, sir; and you can 
not even communicate with any of the authorities without using 
stamped paper. 

Q. Have you any estimate of the amount of revenue derived from 
that source? — A. I do not know whether it is mentioned in my book. 
I find the stamps are included in a lump item, Government monopolies: 
Stamps, cockfighting, opium, gambling, etc., one million one hundred 
and eighty-one thousand odd. 

Q. Is there an inheritance tax?— A. Xo, sir; but there is something 
which is tantamount to it. It is very rarely that oue party can inherit 
from another without going through judicial legal formalities. You 
can not, in a simple way, become an heir and have your trustees and 
executors put the thing through nonjudicially ; you are obliged in some 
way to appeal to the courts, and the latter squeeze terribly. 



460 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Are those subject to any exactions? — A. Nominally; only utamps 
on the documents relating to it. 

Mr. Gray : 

Q. But really? — A. As a matter of fact, when you put in your papers 
they will lie for a while, and the interested party will go to the fountain 
head, the person finally having the matter in charge, and he will pooh 
pooh the matter and send you back to the lowest man in the office, and 
you talk to him and cajole him and put about a dollar in his hand, and 
he will push it along a little further, and you go from him to another, 
and you pay him, and so it goes up the scale. It might cost you a 
thousand Mexican dollars to get your inheritance. Of course, the same 
thing obtains in Spain. I was in Spain five years before I went to the 
Philippines. I just mention this to let you know that I went to the 
islands not as a foreigner to their methods and language; I was quite 
familiar with the language and the character of the Spaniards; I went 
knowing the language and knowing the character. 

When I was in Spain, my occupation was mining. I put capital in 
some mines and worked those mines very successfully for three years. 
They paid admirably, and I had some house property and sheds which 
were utilized during the Carlist war. I made a little claim, simply the 
damage done on the different sides, particularly by the Government 
troops. They used to fire at one house and knock down another. 
There were no Carlists at my house, but there was a Frenchman who 
had a house across the way very near, and the Government soldiers 
used to fire at his house and hit mine and knock down portions of it, 
and I made a little claim of about $2,000 — the dollar was worth about 
three shillings, four pence. I was very young, and I thought 1 would 
go to Madrid and collect my claim. Every time that a shell would hit 
my place I would put in a protest with the local officials and with the 
British consul at Bilbao. 

I went to Madrid and put in a claim at the office of the home office, 
and I was talking to some friends, and I had been waiting some time, 
and they asked who had charge of it, and I told them no one, and 
they said for me to go to a court agent. I said, "If you will recom- 
mend one I will go to him, and perhaps it will get better attention." 
They said that the court agent would go to one and another about the 
matter, and perhaps would reach the minister, and that it would cost 
me probably about $50 or $00. I went to the man they recommended, 
and he came to my hotel and took two or three dollars at different times, 
up to $50. He came to my hotel and said this and that, and I said I 
was not satisfied, that I wanted the thing pushed; that it was not our 
way of doing business, and that I did not want anything more to do 
with him unless he could show me some satisfactory results. He grew 
very indignant and said, "Oh, you think I am cheating you?" And I 
said, "Yes;" I thought he was a rascal; and he jumped around and 
ranted and said he should require satisfaction, and I took off my coat 
and said, "I am prepared now to give it," and he rau down the steps, 
and I have not seen him from then to now. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. What would be the effect of stopping cockfighting and lotteries? — 
A. Lotteries you can stop at once. 

Q. There would be no trouble about that? — A. No, sir. 

Q. How about the cockfighting? — A. 1 think there would be cock- 
fighting carried on secretly. I think it would be advisable to tolerate 
it. The life of these people is very dreary, these natives; they live in 



TREATY OF PEACE. 461 

these rural districts and see nothing but mountains and planted 
lands, and if this is prohibited their vices will break out in some other 
form; they would have to have some form of amusement. 1 do not 
think it would be practicable to absolutely suppress the cock lighting. 

Q. You think the lottery could be abolished without any trouble? — 
A. Yes, sir. The natives are so used, when they do get a prize, to hav- 
ing to tip so many people and to having so many squeezes that they get 
very much disgusted and say it is a fraud, but it is not a. fraud. I 
I believe the matter is entirely fair; but the base of a lottery system is 
about as strong as a house built of a pack of cards put on end. If the 
general idea got abroad that the lottery was a fraud the whole thing 
would vanish. It is not an involuntary thing. If 1 myself thought the 
Spanish lottery was a fraud I would abandon it, and if the whole com- 
munity got that idea the lottery would vanish like a pack of cards at 
a breath of wind. The lotteries could be suppressed, to answer your 
question. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Do you suppose, to change the subject, with your knowledge of 
the administration of the government in the Philippines and Spanish 
administration elsewhere, that if they were to agree with another Gov- 
ernment to institute reforms in the method of dealing with the people, 
and taxing the people, and permitting the priests to do as you say they 
do, etc., and the whole matter was left to this treaty or contract or 
engagement, it would be carried out by the Spanish authorities? — A. 
Please permit a little preamble to my answer. The Spaniards are such 
a proud people, and such sticklers in the matter of honor, and, as I 
understood, they were rigorous enough on the point to cross swords 
with yourselves on a matter of honor, for I can not conceive any politi 
cians could have dreamed of doing anything more than walking out ot 
Cuba, it was utterly absurd to think they could do anything morethan 
sustain their honor — honor comes so vividly into what they do — that 
they would agree to do anything to get back the island of Luzon. 

Mr. Davis : 
Q. Would they keep their word? — A. Very broadly speaking, I think 
there would be all sorts of attempts, not from the Government, nor on 
account of instructions from the Government, but I think individual 
officials would interpret it very broadly indeed. I must say that Span- 
iards, speaking of the character of the Spaniards, are not loyal to their 
engagements, as Americans and English are; they do not think "This 
is very repugnant to me, I dislike this very much, but I have given my 
word and must live up to it;" but they look to see if there is not some 
way they can get out of it. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. They do not live up to the Psalmist's idea of "swearing to their 
own hurt and changing not?" — A. No, sir. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Have they not engaged to make reforms, heretofore, and not done 
so? — A. Yes, sir; I was going to state two remarkable examples. 
Gen. Martinez Campos was out in Cuba in the ten years' war which 
terminated in 1878. I was in Spain, and I remember the news came 
that the war was terminated', and flags were flying and bunting, 
etc., at Bilbao to celebrate the termination of the war, but later came 
a letter to say that it was all a humbug, and they were all laughing 



462 TREATY OF PEACE. 

about it, but finally came the news tbat Martinez Campos bad signed 
tbe treaty of Zanjon, and it was found tbat be bad signed an agree- 
ment which about corresponds to the system of autonomy which was 
granted in January of this year. He came back to Spain and became 
the idol of the people. He bad terminated the war by this agreement, 
and the populace would have him go into power as prime minister. 
The King called Canovas, and the latter said, "You better let him go 
in; the higher he goes, the lower he will fall." 

He went in, and the object of his going into power was of course to 
have carried through Parliament, or the Cortes, the treaty which he had 
signed, for which he thought himself responsible in a certain sense, but 
be was pooh-poohded and laughed at. They said, "The Cubans have 
laid down their arms, everything is quiet; why should we do anything 
more ; we have accomplished what we wanted." He said, " I have given 
my word of honor; my personal honor is affected." But they said, " Oh, 
you have fallen out of power, and you will never come in again. It is 
a very good trick. You have got each one to lay down his arms and go 
to his house, and now let the reforms go; never mind the engagement." 
They have done the same with the treaty or agreement of Biac-na-bato, 
made with Emilio Aguinaldo, the rebel general. They paid, of course, 
the first installment, which had to be paid simultaneously with the exile 
of Aguinaldo aud the 3U rebel leaders, and which was deposited in the 
Shanghai bank, but they paid no more. One of the conditions was that 
the families and others connected with the rebellion should not be 
molested in any form or sense whatever; but immediately that Aguin- 
aldo left for Hongkong the priests started to persecute those left 
behind, and the result was that another chief turned up — I knew his 
father very well — Alejandrino. He had fled, but returned, and is one 
of the leaders now. 

Mr. Gray : 

Q. If that exodus of the friars, these priests of the monastic orders, 
was carried out, either voluntarily on their part or with some degree 
of compulsion applied to them, what disposition would be made of their 
holdings of laud; what would become of the land? — A. What the 
natives, I think I may say pretty decidedly, would aspire to would be 
that the land should be declared to be the possession of those actually 
in possession as tenants to day, holding it in rent from these corpora- 
tions. It is let in parcels. They would say, " the priests are gone, let 
us, as we stand, hold the land," and with very little disturbance at all 
the man in possession holds his patch of land. 

Q. They hold by a legal title now? — A. Only by a contract with the 
priests. 

Q. I mean the monastic orders hold by a title? — A. No, sir. That is 
to say, I draw my information from this source — that Dr. Rizal chal- 
lenged the priests to bring forward their titles. He said, "If you will 
exhibit your title deeds, it will be satisfactory for you and for us; I 
shall be satisfied, my agitation will end, the people interested round- 
about will be satisfied, and you certainly will insure to yourselves 
tranquillity by settling this matter on the exhibition of your title 
deeds," and they could not do it. They would go to the length of 
intriguing for three or four years to bring about the execution of this 
Dr. Rizal rather than show their title deeds, and we can only surmise 
that the title deeds did not exist. * 

Q. How long have they been flourishing there and holding these 
titles, so called? — A. I can not say. 

Q. It is an old business? — A. Yes, sir; very old. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 463 

Q. Would not the church claim the land 1 ? — A. It would belong to 
the order. For instance, the Order of Augustine Friars would be the 
owners in collectively of those lands; you would not be troubled by 
any individual claims. 

Q. The church as a corporation? — A. The corporation of friars. 

Q. Would not they not claim to succeed to the title by the bishop 1 ! — 
A. Oh, no; the corporation of the friars itself is quite distinct. 

Q. Suppose they go out? — A. If all the friars go, they might as well 
remove their establishment. 

The Chairman : 

Q. The orders that now claim the title would still claim to own the 
lands, although their people were not there, would they not? — A. I 
should think not. 

Q. What would become of the land then? — A. Confiscate it from the 
orders . 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. On what ground? We have no law which will allow us to arbi- 
trarily do so. — A. They have no title deeds, aud it would not be con- 
fiscation exactly. 

Q. They have a possessory title? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Have been in possession for a hundred years or so? — A. Yes, sir; 
but it would be a great anomaly to have these native planters working 
these different patches of land and have a religious corporation claim- 
ing the lands. I would rather take the bull by the horns and say, 
" You clear out." 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. But you could impose upon them terms? — A. Yes, sir; you could 
make them give leases, ninety-nine-year leases, such as we have in Eng- 
land, which are the nearest approaches to freeholds which we have in 
England. Spain is very desirous of holding the balance of the islands 
in the first place 

The Chairman: 
Q. What do you mean by "the balance of the islands?" — A. I mean 
all except Luzon. In the first place, on the score of honor, dignity, 
etc., to show that they are not turned out entirely, and also as a refuge 
for the priests. I do not think that they dream that any conditions 
are to be put upon them. But it would be a terrible calamity for the 
people if the priests should repossess themselves of the islands by your 
generosity, it would be a terrible calamity, and to take these islands 
would be an extention of your policy of humanity. It would be a ter- 
rible thing to return them unconditionally to Spain. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Any of them? — A. Any of them. I should give none of them back 
unconditionally, for the reasons I have already suggested. 

Mr. Moore: 
Q. You stated they had a system of registration of property therein 
the islands, though it was very imperfect and not generally resorted to. 
Are these lands registered under that system, these monastic lauds? — 
A. I can not tell you positively. A decree came out some few years 
ago to the effect that offices of registration of real property — real 
estate — were being organized, and calling upon everybody to put in 
the documents necessary for the registration of his estate. Upon this 



464 TREATY OF PEACE. 

a great many hurried up with their documents, but they waited so long 
for the processes of registration that many withdrew their papers and 
thought they would take their chance, and I learned from an official 
who is one of the principal men in this department, he said to me quite 
confidentially, "I can tell you that, with the present staff we have for 
the registration of estates, with the enormous number of formalities we 
have to go through with, it would take seventy years before we could 
get through the registration of the estates at the same rate we are now 
going." 

Q. Is this system a recent one? — A. Only within the last twelve 
years. 

The Chairman : 

Q. It is not what we know as a registration system, where a man 
merely takes in his deed and leaves it for registration? — A. What they 
mean is, you simply put in your proofs to the possession of the estate, 
and you get title deeds. As we understand the registration of title 
deeds in England, you register your title deeds; if you want to get a 
loan on the security of your real estate, the man to whom you apply 
asks if you have registered your title deeds, and you say, "O, yes," 
and he says he will loan you the money, but if you say you have not 
registered your title, he tells you that he will have to look into the 
matter to make sure that another loan has not been made prior to this. 
I would never loan a cent on real estate in the Philippines, because I 
would have no knowledge as to whether the property had not had one 
or two or a number of loans on it previous to mine; there would be no 
security on it at all. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. The process there would be a sort of judicial process by which 
you would have your title quieted 1 ? — A. Yes, sir. The last man who 
signs these titles is called the "intendente" or chief "of the treasury," 
the man who gives the final signature. 

Mr. Frye : 

Q. Bo you have to keep paying every step until you get to him? — A. 
Oh, no; you pay at the end. 

Q. There is no robbery? — A. Except to get it expedited in the shape 
of tips to one and au other. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Is there any island in this group which has a good harbor and 
but few people, sparsely populated, large enough to have an ample 
harbor, like Samoa, separated from the other islands? — A. Not in Luzon. 

Q. Such as the English have at Hongkong, separated from the 
others of the group? — A. Oh, yes; Gubat. That is in the island of 
Luzon. There is au Englishman living there, Mr. Collingwood. 

Q. That is in the island of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Subig Bay is the best, is it not? — A. Yes, sir. At one time they 
thought of establishing a naval station there. It has been for a long 
time on the tapis to establish a naval station there, transferring it from 
Cavite, but the objection is that tho land runs very abruptly down to 
the sea; it is very hilly, and you have no expanse of flat land running 
back from the bay. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. What is the land back? — A. It would be a very high level. The 
approach to the bay as a port weald be rather difficult. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 465 

Q. Is that on the west side? — A. Yes, sir; the west coast of Luzon. 

Q. Is that protected against the winds of the China Sen? — A. 5Tes, 
sir; you have only a little swell from the southwest monsoon; it is a 
very good port indeed. 

Q. What is that bend there [indicating on map] ? — A. That is 
Manila Bay, and that white place to the right is the lake, called the 
Laguua. 

Q. How deep is the water in Manila Bay? — A. Any ships can anchor 
there. 

Q. How near can they approach the shore; big ships — say, 2(5 feet? — 
A. I should say a mile from the city; the bay is well protected. 

Q. Is Manila a province by itself? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Called the Province of Manila? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. There are docks and wharves there? — A. They have started a 
dock, but as fast as it has been built up it has been washed out, and 
there is no use of the work. It was started, I think, in 1680; there is 
no use. 

Q. Is all the commerce lightered? — A. Yes, sir; except the inter- 
island steamers, which have fortnightly departures. They have estab- 
lished a line of steamers which rims from the river every fortnight, 
touching every capital of every province in the islands. These steamers 
go everywhere, I think. 

Q. That steamer goes away up in the river? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What is the draft? — A. By jetties, sea walls, etc., you could carry 
it out, and then dredge the entrance, and I think steamers of pretty 
fair draft could go up — carry it out, say, half a mile and then dredge 
the entrance. Vessels drawiug up to 13 ieet can enter the river. 

Q. Then there must be a depth of about II feet of water. Do you 
know what the tide is? — A. 1 think they reckon the variation at 2 feet; 
the rise and fall at springs may be taken at 5 feet; the tides are very 
irregular. There is a small slip for ships established, just ten minutes' 
walk from Cavite, at a place called Kaukow. It is a small slip witha 
hauling power of 500 tons, and small ships can be repaired there. 

Q. If we take Luzon alone, establish our Government there, and give 
the place all the freedom and comfort that we ordiuariiy bestow, and 
leave these other islands under Spanish dominion, is it not likely to 
provoke insurrections and revolutions in these other islands? — A. Most 
decidedly, unless you impose certain conditions on the Spanish. One 
condition alone would obviate anything very serious in the way of insur- 
rection — that is, an absolutely free exit from the islands; no license, 
permit, passport, or any kind of impediment, unless there is a warrant 
issued for their detention from the courts. 

Q. That is the most important? — A. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman: 
Q. You are dealing with the Spaniards. Suppose they want to keep 
people in their islands. You have that condition that they shall freely 
leave, unless some kind of judicial warrant has been properly issued 
which shall keep them there. Would it not be easy for them to get up 
some kind of procedure to detain whoever they wanted or whole groups 
of people? — A. I thought of that myself, and saw that they could trump 
up charges against individuals, but they could not do so to any yreat 
extent. Suppose whole families wanted to make a general exit, how 
could they possildy trump up a charge against whole families? It 
would be so visible to everybody. 
Q. In other words, you would have free trade among the islands, and 

T P 30 



4G6 TREATY OF PEACE. 

free right to come and go, exit and entrance? — A. Tes, sir; I would 
say, of course, it might suit you to make a revenue port of Manila, and 
I presume you would open any other ports where vessels of large draft 
could come, to have as many entrances and exits as possible for trade 
if it could be found. That port in the extreme north of Luzon should be 
dredged and fitted for trade which now goes to Manila. It would be 
absurd to make vessels come down to Manila when they could come 
from Hongkong to Gubat and discharge. 

Mr. Reid : 

Q. What would be the distance from that port to Hongkong? — A. I 
did know once 

Q. Not more than half the distance?— A. Three hundred and twenty- 
three miles, I think a captain of a steamer told me. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Is there a harbor there?— A. Yes, sir; a very fair one. I have 
been there myself in a steamer belonging to the Smith-Goddin Com- 
pany. On one occasion the captain said he had to go to Cape St. 
Vincent, and we were talking about the matter, and I think it was 
about 323 miles; something like that; only about half the distance. 

Mr. Gray : 
Q. What is the distance from the little isthmus— not the great long 
tail, but from that little neck — to the northernmost point [Indicating 
on map] ? — A. We can tell from the degrees, CO miles to a degree. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. Is that on the northwest corner? — A. No, sir; about the center 
of the north. 

The Chairman: 

Q. There is talk about the number of islands being all the way from 
800 to 1,500. They must count all the little islands?— A. Oh, yes. 

Q. Those three groups you pointed out this morning are practically 
all the islands? — A. Yes, sir. Two hundred and seventy miles would 
appear to be the distance from north to south of the island, taking off 
this piece indicated. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. That is, in geographic miles; it would be a little more in statute 
miles, parhaps 275 to 280 miles? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Is there egress for ships through these islands, anywhere a chan- 
nel or strait? — A. Through the island of Luzon any channel? 

Q. No, sir; a strait between the islands. — A. Yes, sir; the Strait of 
San Bernardino is the trading exit. Small steamers can not manage it, 
and for sailing ships it is dangerous; the currents are tremendous. 
For a steamer drawing less than feet it would be very dangerous — a 
steamer that would run into the small creeks — or for launches. I have 
made particular inquiry into the navigation, because in the archipelago 
navigation counts very largely, and they have said to me, "Do not trust 
yourself in anything that draws less than G feet, because you are sud- 
denly twisted and turned around here and there." It is like it is in the 
Straits of Messina. 

Q. A big steamer could go through all right? — A. Yes, sir. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 467 

The Chairman: 
Q. Is Mindora thickly populated? — A. No, sir; thinly populated, aiad 

the Spaniards hold in Mindora oidy three little coast towns, and — I do 
not know why, but they will not, most persistently, allow people to 
workup Mindora. A number of capitalists proposed to form a com- 
pany, and they proposed to take the whole island of Mindora and 
indemnify the Government. They had an idea it was very valuable. 
But they would not allow it. From what I know, it is very valuable. 
My information came from a personal friend, a timber merchant who 
made his fortune there. I know he sent cutters to Mindora and found 
very fine hard wood, and as far as he could judge there was plenty of 
it. When I received my information from him his men were out pros- 
pecting and had found very fine wood. I have samples of it hanging in 
my study in London; they are on slabs hanging from strings, and I 
think there are 22 of the very finest hard woods on the string. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Any mahogany? — A. None. 

Mr. Reid : 
Q. What is the character, better than mahogany, richer in grain or 
color? — A. The finest is known as malave. It has rather the appear- 
ance of oak. But the bad feature about these hard woods of the Tropics 
is want of elasticity. Oak has a great deal of elasticity compared with 
these, consequently you could not get so much resistance out of a given 
thickness of malave as out of the same slab of oak. 

Mr. Frye : 

Q. That would nothave the same effect as to finishing? — A. Oh, no, sir. 
Mr. Reid. 

Q. Are they introduced and used anywhere now? — A. Yes sir; in 
China. There are two species, the dark and the light, of a wood called 
narro. I have seen it used. On one occasion a man had a caprice for 
using them, and he had a portico made of it, and it was splendid 
indeed — beautiful. It is curious that Europeans out there generally 
like the dark narro, but natives have a fancy for the light. There is a 
large trade with Hongkong in it. 

Q. Does it resemble bird's-eye maple? — A. It is not so prettily 
spotted, but something of that nature, about that tint; that yellowish 
tint. In the Island of Mindanao, speaking of woods, there is known 
to be the irouwood, an extremely hard wood. It is very, very hard 
indeed. Of course, at the same time, it has the defect of being some- 
what brittle, but in substantial sizes, say in 3-inch growth, it is tre- 
mendously strong. I have a chapter on woods in my book. 

/ Mr. Frye. 

Q. Is there not oil in those islands? — A. Only in one place has it 
been discovered so far; that is in the island of Cebu, on the estate 
known as Calumampao, belonging to an Englishman named Pickford 
and a Mr. Wilson, an American. I know this young Wilson very well. 
He is a working partner of Mr. Pickford. The estate is situated close 
to the town of Toledo, and called Calumampao, and on that estate was 
discovered oil, petroleum, and a little syndicate was formed, in which 
two or three persons connected with the firm of Smith, Bell & Co., 
and connected with the firm of McLeod & Co., of Manila, were con- 
cerned, and they were working it when I left there. 



468 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Q. Successfully 1 ? — A. It was not refined oil, quiteprimitive, but it 
was there and I saw it. The oil as it comes from the deposit looked 
like chocolate, and I saw some of it. 

Mr. Beid. 

Q. What is the nature of the carriage-making industry in Manila? — 
A. It is very advanced. To keep a carriage in Manila does not signify 
anything socially. Everybody keeps a carriage; there is a great 
demand for them. 

Q. They are small? — A. Yes, sir; little victorias. 

Q. Well built?— A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Would there be a chance for an export trade in carriages? — A. 
The question of freight would be a rather cumbersome thing. Singa- 
pore would be the nearest place to do anything with carriages; in 
Hongkong there is no such thing. I think there exist there six omni- 
buses which are looked upon as very wonderful, but which are very 
primitive, and which are only used by the Chinese. Mr. Keswick, of 
Jordan, Mason & Co., I think has a carriage; I have seen it once or twice, 
but it is a heavy sort of thing which is put away six mouths at a time, 
and only brought out when any big personage came to Hongkong. 
But everyone of any importance resides more or less up on the Peak. 
When I lived in Hongkong I lived GOO feet up, and that was very low 
down indeed. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. How did you go up and down? — A. By the use of coolies. I had 
four coolies, two in front and two behind, and they carried me in a sort 
of car swung on poles. 

Mr. Beid : 

Q. Can you give the cost of those carriages? — A. You can get a 
nicely built carriage for $350 Mexican. 

Q. A victoria? — A. Yes. sir. Something might be done with horses 
in Singapore. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Do they breed horses very largely? — A. Yes, sir. They are 
ponies, as we call them in England. They do not come above II hands, 
but they are very sturdy little things, and a splendid race of animals, 
very useful indeed, quite docile, of great endurance. The China pony 
is a very cantankerous, bad-teinpered animal, but the Manila pony is 
of very good temper. 

Q. Large enough for cavalry? — A. Oh, yes. And there is a great 
field there for breeding horses. Heretofore the people have not liked 
to go on breeding, because as soon as any official knows that you have 
a good pony he will come down on you. He will meet you on the 
highway, and if he sees you with a good pony he will want to know if 
you have a license to have the pony, and if you cannot satisfy him he 
will take your pony away. Bight on the highroad, like a highwayman. 
The Spaniards would almost compel you to carry every kind of docu- 
ment in your waistcoat pocket; it is perfectly absurd. 

Q. What is that island directly south of Luzon? — A. Mindora. 

Q. That is the island on which you say the Spaniards do not allow 
anyone to do anything? — A. Yes, sir; it is a great mystery why. 

Q. A good harbor on the island? — A. No, sir; very open. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 469 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. What about the earthquakes ? — A. In this century the greatest 
of the earthquakes which may be considered of very great importance 
was that in the year 1803, when, amongst other damage done, the 
whole of the roof of the cathedral came oil' and the building collapsed, 
and it is estimated 2,000 people were killed, [t shook down also the 
Governor-General's residence in the same square where the cathedral 
was situated. It shattered it to pieces. That was in L863, and two 
years ago only they started to rebuild this official palace. Since 1863 
the Governor-General has resided outside of Manila, in a place called 
Malacanan. 

Q. Have there been any earthquakes since? — A. In 1880 there was a 
serious earthquake, seventeen years after, and a great deal of damage 
was done, and all the people very much scared. All the foreigners 
escaped to the ships in the bay. Very serious damage was done, 
although there was but little loss of li/e. In 1882 there was a cholera 
epidemic, which was a very rare thing, and I suppose 20 Europeans died 
and about 40,000 natives, and a typhoon came after the epidemic, and 
the whole thing vanished in twenty-four hours. 

Q. What did the typhoon do?— A. Carried off the roofs of 50 or 60 
houses. Some of the corrugated iron work from the roofs was carried 
oil' into the streets, and a number of Chinamen risked their lives to get 
it, and one had his head cut off. 

Q. Are they frequent?— A. There are more or less every year, but 
they are not so serious. Once every six or seven years there is one 
rather serious, and there is a certain amount of loss in schooners and 
sailing vessels and the interisland carrying trade. 

Q. There are volcanoes there? — A. Yes, sir. When the volcanoes 
are in eruption they know there is no danger. In this lake near 
Manila, known as the Laguna del Bayo, there is a very pretty and 
famous volcano known as the one of Taal, which was in eruption when 
I last heard from Manila. There is a business to be done there — the 
export of sulphur. At one time it was permitted, but all of a sudden 
the Government expressly prohibited it. There is another volcano 
there which is very famous, and one of the finest things to be seen, 
with the most perfect cone to be seen. In nature it is like an enormous 
limpet shell, and the most perfect, on the clean cut style, and that is 
the volcano of Mayon, in the extreme east of the island of Luzon, in 
the province of Albay. That is a very fine volcano; a grand sight to 
see it at night. Of course the whole island is supposed to be volcanic 
origin, aud when the volcanoes are in eruption you know there is no 
danger; you know that there will be no earthquakes, and they do no 
damage. Of course some of the natives are stupid enough to live in 
the immediate vicinity and occasionally get killed. 

Q. When is the rainy season? — A. The middle six months of the 
year; the first three months and the last three months is the dry 
season. 

Q. From April to October? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. It is rather an uncomfortable season? — A. Yes, sir; drenching 
rains come, frightful downpours sometimes, but everything dries so 
quickly. 

Q. How in the other six months, from October to April? — A. Out of 
those six mouths, four mouths absolutely not a drop; approaching it, 
it shades off. 

Q. Pleasant months? — A. Delightful. I would not choose any other 
place to live in the month of December. Anywhere in the islands is 



470 TREATY OF PEACE. 

simply delicious; a most wonderful climate; altogether it is very agree- 
able living, a very pretty place. 

The Chairman : 

Q. Suppose that the island of Luzon were taken, and we should 
have a stipulation for free trade, for free intercourse between the islands, 
and that Spain shall never alienate any of the islands to any other 
power, what have you left of Spanish sovereignty in any of the other 
islands, what is left to Spain, practically, in the islands not taken? — A. 
Their honor. 

Q. Then, you have, practically, the islands deserted and no right to 
change the ownership? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. In a case of that kind, would it not be as well to take the entire 
property and be done with it? — A. By taking the whole of the islands, 
it would be a favor to Europe by setting aside all chance of rivalry. 

Q. You do not seem to think it would be much of a burden? — A. No, 
sir; only a little more expense % of administration, which I think would 
be covered by the islands themselves. 

Mr. Reid : 

Q. Do you have any doubt that, with a judicious administration of 
the revenues of the islands, those revenues would be sufficient to cover 
the expenses of the islands? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. You think they would be sufficient? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Do you think we would be able to recruit a sufficient number of 
native soldiers to form a garrison of sufficient defense? — A. I am in 
doubt about the island of Mindanao. It is a large island, and you could 
not think of recruiting any Mussulmans. 

Q. Do you think we could recruit, exclusive of Mindanao, enough 
native soldiers to maintain and defend our sovereignty over the whole 
group? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Frye : 
Q. I understand Spain has not much to do with that lower island of 
Mindanao?— A. Oh, no. 

The Chairman: 

Q. What would be the effect — suppose we keep Luzon — if Spain 
should tind it too expensive to undertake to maintain her sway and 
sovereignty over the rest of the islands, of the establishment of some 
other power there? — A. I should make strenuous efforts to keep out 
the Germans. 

Q. Why? — A. Because Germany is just now Great Britain's very 
strong competitor in trade, and I think in the next generation will be 
the same with America. Perhaps it would be all right with this gen- 
eration, or for twenty-five years, but I think Germany is, with the next 
generation, destined to be the great competitor. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Do you not think any government, with Christian civilization and 
better government, would be better than Spain? — A. I am looking at 
the material 

Q. The material comes with that; if you are looking at mere trade 
rivalry, that is another thing. — A. I do not think Germany has shown 
that she is capable of governing. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Your idea, in short, is this: You would prevent the alienation of 
the rest of the group because, peradventure, Spain might alienate to 



TREATY OF PEACE. 471 

Germany? — A. Yes, sir. As to France, I always regard France as like 
taking a map, and it is practically blotted out commercially. It pre- 
vents others coming in, but there is nothing to be got out of it. Meta- 
phorically speaking, it is simply blotting out that portion of the map. 
France does not develop anything; there is no development of any 
kind, and there is nothing to fear from France in competition of 
any kind, now or in the future, that I can see. May I make an obser- 
vation? The name of Japan lias been brought up. It is, of course, 
quite out of the question, because it is a pagan nation. The natives 
have been brought up as Christians, and I am sure it would be opposed 
to the popular opinion in Europe, and in America, I should think. 
That excludes Japan, in my opinion. 

Mr. Frye : 

Q. Do you not think Japan will improve in that direction as slie has 
in others I — A. I do not think so. 



STATEMENT OE COMMANDER R. B. BRADFORD, U. S. ST., OCTOBER 
14, 1888, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT 
PARIS. 



Examination by the Chairman: 

Q. Will you please state your name, residence, and position in the 
United States Navy? — A. R. B. Bradford, commander, United States 
Navy, Chief Bureau of Equipment, Navy Department, Washington, 
D. C. 

Q. How long have you been in the naval service of the United 
States?— A. Since 1861. 

Q. State briefly in what positions and capacities. — A. I have per- 
formed service in all the subordinate grades of the Navy, including 
command afloat and at various stations on shore. 

Q. In the course of your duties have you had occasion to visit the 
group of islands known as the Philippine Islands? — A. I have visited 
Manila on three different occasions. I have never visited any of the 
islands other than Luzon, except the coast along their shores. 

Q. When were you at Manila? — A. I was there first in 1867, again 
in 1868, and again in 1869; not since. 

Q. Have you had any occasion recently to investigate the situation 
on these islands? — A. During the past two months I have made a study 
of the islands and their value as colonies of the United States. 

Q. State briefly what sources of information, other than your own 
visits there, you have had access to and had occasion to examine. — A. 
All the publications on the subject I could find, particularly those 
bearing on maritime and naval matters, coal to be found, and harbors 
suitable for coaling and naval stations, and as bases for naval opera- 
tions. 

Q. Will you state what islands or places in your judgment are suited 
for naval bases, harbors, etc.? — A. I think the entire group would be 
a very valuable acquisition for naval and commercial purposes. The 
group is composed of over 400 islands, excluding rocks and islands 
not inhabited. These islands are so crowded together that anyone 
would in time of war require a large force for its defense, if the neigh- 
boring islands were in possession of an enemy. It would be less diffi- 
cult to defend the entire group under such circumstances than a single 
island. In case a division of the islands is made, those, in my opinion, 
of the most value from a strategic point of view are Luzon, Mindoro, 
the Calamianes group, Palawan, and Balabac. These command all 
the entrances to the China Sea from the north en I of Luzon to Borneo. 
The best harbors for coaling stations are the following, mentioned in 
order of their relative importance so far as known: 

1. Manila, or Cavite, island of Luzon, latitude 14° 29' north, longi- 
tude 120° 55' east; Subig Bay, island of Luzon, latitude 14° 46' north, 
longitude 120° 13' east, might be taken as an alternative. 
472 



TREATY OF PEACE. 473 

2. Malampaya Sound, island of Palawan, latitude 10° 53' north, 
longitude 122° 35' east. 

3. Iloilo, island of Panay, latitude 10° 42' north, longitude 122° 35' 
east. 

4. Cebu, island of Cebu, latitude 10° 18' north, longitude 123° 54' 
east. 

5. Pollok (or Polak), island of Mindanao, latitude 7° 21' north longi- 
tude 124° 13' east. 

There are many harbors in the Philippine group. Some of thorn, 
upon examination and survey, might prove more valuable than some 
of those mentioned above. Itshould be borne in mind that portions 
of the group are not well surveyed. There are almost numberless 
anchorages sufficiently sheltered for the transfer of coal from one ves- 
sel to another. 

So far as I can ascertain, coal is found in almost all of the large 
islands of the Philippine group. Its presence in the islands of Negros 
and Cebu has been known for a long time. Considerable quantities 
have been mined in Cebu, and coal mining there only ceased because 
of the difficulties of transportation, the latter rendering it unprofita- 
ble. The German naval commander in chief reported to his Govern- 
ment during the present year that the Cebu coal was of good quality. 
The London Board of Trade Journal for May, 1898, states that the 
Cebu coal is superior to the Japanese coal and slightly inferior to the 
Australian. Coal is found in the northern and southern parts of Lu- 
zon; also in Masbate and Batan. It is thought to exist in Samar and 
Mindanao. A few years ago the American ship Richard Parsons was 
wrecked on the west coast of Mindoro. Her master, Captain Joy, of 
Nantucket, Mass., was obliged to cross the island with his crew to ob- 
tain passage to Manila. While doing so he discovered immense out- 
croppings of coal in the interior mountainous regions of the island. 
The Spanish Government, upon learning of this discovery, confiscated 
the lands, but nothing has ever been done toward developing this great 
discovery. The coal mines of the island of Batan, near the Straits of 
San Bernardino, are now being worked by Messrs. Gil Hermanos, of 
the island of Catanduans. The island of Palawan, on account of its 
proximity and similarity to North Borneo, where large amounts of 
coal are found, probably contains coal. 

Q. Where do you get this information that there is coal in these 
various islands? — A. From data compiled in the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. In connection with the subject of coal, I desire to call 
attention to the fact that the Philippine Islands are on the range and 
midway between the great coal-producing islands of Formosa and 
Borneo. It is therefore natural to expect coal to be found in this 
group. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Formosa to the north and Borneo to the south? — A. Yes. The 
geological characteristics of the Philippine Islands also indicate the 
presence of coal. I do not think that any positive statements can be 
made as to the quality of the coal in these islands until shafts are 
sunk and a thorough investigation made below the surface croppings. 
We do know, however, that it is used at present by coasting steamers, 
sometimes by itself alone and sometimes by mixing it with a better 
quality, such as Cardiff. 

Not all the coal used in the Philippine Islands, however, is mined 
there, considerable amounts being imported. Coal is mined in quan- 



474 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tities in the north end of Borneo, and also on the British island of 
Labuan. The latter is of a good quality and supplied for steaming 
purposes to British men-of-war and mail steamers. It is sold for 
about $4.50 a ton. This coaling station has recently been established 
and is becoming important. I think we may believe, judging from 
the doctrine of probabilities, that good coal will eventually be found 
in the Philippine Islands. I may mention that all of the important 
coal deposits of the world, so far as known at present, with the 
exception of those in the Philippines, are in the possession of either 
the United States, Great Britain, or Japan. While on the subject of 
coal, I desire to add that it is the duty of the Bureau of Equipment 
of the Navy Department to supply coal for naval purposes. As the 
chief of that bureau, I have been much impressed during the recent 
war with the necessity of acquiring coaling stations all over the world. 
I do not suppose any arguments are necessary to impress this fact 
upon the commission, but I will say that if the Hawaiian Islands had 
not been treated from the first as American territory, so far as using 
them as a coaling station is concerned, the operations undertaken at 
Manila would not have been successful. 

The necessity for coal at Honolulu was foreseen and a large amount 
collected there. The first three squadrons of troop ships en route to 
Manila were supplied with coal from that in store for the Navy. 
There was no other coal at Honolulu. Admiral Dewey, as soon as war 
was declared, was, of course, without a base of supplies, without coal, 
and without even a harbor of refuge. He had been authorized, before 
war was declared, to purchase two large steamers and to fill them 
with coal. He took these with him to Manila. Had he been defeated, 
he would have been obliged to abandon the Asiatic station. With the 
coal in the two steamers, had they remained in his possession, he 
probably could have reached Hawaii, but not San Francisco. I am 
positive, if this country is to possess any colonies, however insignifi- 
cant, in the vicinity of the China Sea, that coaling stations are abso- 
lutely necessary in the Pacific along the route of communication from 
our coast. 

I do not think that the facilities afforded by the Ladrone Islands 
are sufficient for this purpose. It should be remembered that the 
Ladrone group of islands run north and south, and therefore practi- 
cally afford but one port of call between Hawaii and the Philippines; 
in fact, there is but one harbor in this group, San Luis d'Apra, on the 
island of Guam, which is of much value. The Caroline Islands, 
including the Pelews, running east and west, and covering a distance 
of about 2,000 miles, are on the southern flank of the direct route to 
the Philippines. They possess many excellent harbors which will 
serve admirably as coaling stations and harbors of refuge. In the 
hands of an enemy they would offer a serious menace to the line of 
communication between the Pacific coast and the Philippines. It so 
happens that the extreme eastern and the extreme western islands 
of the Caroline group possess excellent harbors. 

Q. Will you name those islands? — A. The extreme eastern island is 
Ualan or Kusaie, and Yap is the extreme western, not counting the 
Pelew group. Between these is the important island of Ponapi, 
already recognized as a valuable port of call. The Pelew group is 
sometimes considered as part of the Carolines. 

Q. How far are the Carolines from the Ladrones, as to their relative 
position? — A. There [indicating on a chart] are the Carolines; here 
the Ladrones. The latter run north and south; the Carolines east 



TREATY OF PEACE. 475 

and west. Here are the Marshall Islands, under German control, 
directly to the eastward of the Carolines. They are not so important 
as the Carolines, because their harbors are not so good. The Mar- 
shall Islands are almost wholly of coral formation and afford but little 
vegetation. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Where are the Philippine Islands? — A. West of the Ladrones. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. North of the equator? — A. Yes. The Philippines extend from' 
latitude 4° 45' north to latitude 21° 30' north. 

Q. Have you a map showing the American and Asiatic shores, 
both? — A. Yes; here it is. There are the Ladrones; here the Caro- 
lines; there the Marshalls; here are the Hawaiian Islands, and there 
are the Philippines. 

Mr. Davis: 

Q. How far north of the Ladrones are the Carolines? — A. The Caro- 
lines are south of the Ladrones. 

Q. Just turn the question round. — A. The island of Guam, the 
extreme southernmost of the Ladrones, is almost directly north of the 
island of Wolea of the Caroline group and a little less than 300 miles 
from it. Wolea has a good harbor and is inhabited. Guam is in lati- 
tude 13° 15' north, and the Northern Carolines are between latitude 
9° north and latitude 10° north. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Then, if we understand you, you do not think the island in the 
Ladrones, assuming it to be Guam, the southern island, is sufficient 
for a coaling station between Hawaii and the Philippines? — A. I do 
not. Guam has the advantage of being farther north, and therefore 
more on the direct route from Hawaii to the Philippines than the Caro- 
lines, but it has not a very good harbor. 

Q. It is more in the direct line from the Hawaiian group to the 
Philippines than any one of the Carolines? — A. Yes; it has that 
advantage. 

Q. You would not expect to go from the Ladrones to the Carolines, 
on the way to the Philippines, would you? — A. No; I should not. 

Q. Then what is the disadvantage in not having one or more of the 
Carolines, from our point of view? — A. The Carolines possess better 
harbors; they are on several highways of commerce; they are uncom- 
fortably near the Ladrones, and they extend east and west along the 
route between the Pacific coast and the China Sea nearly 2,000 miles, 
affording numerous coaling stations and harbors of refuge. 

Mr. Reid: 

Q. That is, in the hands of another nation they would be trouble- 
some or disagreeable? — A. They might be. Here are the Pelews [indi- 
cating on a chart] about 600 miles from the Philippines. I am firmly 
convinced that the Pelews, Carolines, and Ladrones should all be 
acquired if we are to possess any territory near the China Sea. 

The Chairman: 
Q. If the United States could have one of the Carolines, which one 
would you designate as the one best suited for our purposes? — A. 
Ponapi. 



476 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Where is that? — A. It is about 300 miles west of Ualan, in lati- 
tude 7° north and longitude 158° 20' east. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. It is the largest, is it not? — A. No ; not the largest, but it has 
some very good harbors, is high and well watered and well wooded. 
Ualan, or Kusaie, the headquarters of the American missions, has also 
good harbors, and is similar in its characteristics to Ponapi. Yap, the 
extreme western island, excepting the Pelews, has good harbors, and 
is valuable. It is the seat of government for the western Carolines. 
Ponapi is the seat of government for the eastern Carolines. Truk 
Islands are the largest group of the Carolines and the most densely 
populated. This small group has about 10,000 inhabitants. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Yap is more in the line of travel to the Philippines than any of 
the others of these islands? — A. No; I do not think it is. It is only 
on the route between the Fiji Islands and the North China Sea. Here 
is a chart showing the usual routes of full-powered steamers. Upon 
examination it appears that Ponapi is more directly on the commercial 
routes traversed by steamers than any island of the Caroline group. 
Guam and Ponapi are both on the route from the Samoan Islands to 
the north end of Luzon. 

Q. We have a place in Samoa? — A. We hope to have a coaling 
station there soon. In conjunction with Great Britain and Germany 
we exercise a protectorate over the Samoan Islands. This is the only 
claim we have to the vast territory known as the Polynesian Islands. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Is not the great-circle route the shortest from the Pacific coast 
oo the Philippines? — A. Yes. It is 6,300 miles from San Francisco to 
the Philippines by the great-circle route, and 7,000 miles via Hawaii 
and Guam. 

The Chairman: 
Q. We hold the Aleutian Islands? — A. Yes. Unalaska is the best 
coaling station there. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Any harbor there? — A. Yes; Dutch Harbor, a fairly good one. 
The great circle-route from San Francisco to the China Sea and its 
neighboring islands is not often used, because of fogs near the Aleu- 
tian Islands in summer and heavy gales during the winter. The 
regular trans-Pacific steamers avoid the Aleutian Islands for these 
reasons. The presence of fog also makes it difficult to enter the har- 
bors of the Aleutian Islands. This colored map of the Pacific 
islands is very instructive. The land colored red and all islands 
under whose names a red line is drawn belong to Great Britain; yel- 
low indicates German possessions; and blue, French. Islands too 
small to color, belonging to Germany and France, have their owner- 
ship indicated by finely engraved names. 

Q. What is the green? — A. The green islands are those that were 
independent when the map was constructed, or over which a joint pro- 
tectorate is exercised. Of the former, the Hawaiian Islands, now 
belonging to the United States, is the only example. Of the latter, 
the Samoan group, under the joint protection of the United States, 
Great Britain, and Germauy; the New Hebrides, under the joint pro- 
tection of Great Britain and France; and the Tonga, or Friendly, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 477 

Islands, under the joint protection of Great Britain and Germany, 
are examples. Attention is called to the fact that there is nothing 
in all Polynesia remaining for any nation to acquire. Although the 
United States, by exploration, survey and discovery, and by the work 
of her missionaries, has been interested in these islands in the past, 
her only claims now remaining to any is a joint interest in the Samoan 
group. England has made herself mistress of the seas and grown 
very rich by her colonial enterprise, and other countries are profiting 
by her example. Even little Holland has colonies with 30,000,000 of 
inhabitants which yearly export products to the value of $125,000,000 
to $150,000,000. 

Q. You spoke of one selection, Luzon and Palawan. What other 
propositions did you find with regard to other coaling stations? Sup- 
pose Luzon alone, what is the difficulty? — A. I do not know that I 
quite understand you. You mean, which is the best coaling station 
in the entire group? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. Manila, probably, though Malampaya Sound, 
island of Palawan, is exceedingly valuable as a site for a naval 
station. 

Q. And, as I understand you, the only trouble about Manila is the 
closeness of the neighbors; that the other islands might be in some 
other hands? — A. Yes, sir. The harbor of Manila, without the island 
of Luzon, would be a source of weakness rather than strength. 

Q. What is the difficulty about taking Luzon alone? — A. The prox- 
imity of the other islands of the Philippine group. There are over 
400 islands in the group, crowded together. A cannon shot can be 
fired from one to another in many instances. To illustrate, we have 
the Hawaiian Islands. Suppose we had but one, and the others were 
possessed of excellent harbors, coal mines, valuable products, and 
minerals; suppose also the others were in the hands of a commercial 
rival, with a different form of government and not over friendly. 
Under these circumstances we should lose all the advantages of 
isolation. 

Mr. Davis: 

Q. Would not you thereby build up commercial rivals all over the 
archipelago? — A. I should suppose so. I have been speaking mainly 
from a military point of view. Speaking from a commercial point, I 
believe the Philippine Islands are capable of great development and 
valuable trade. They possess about 8,000,000 inhabitants, and are 
rich in products. There is not one which does not produce something 
we need. After Great Britain we are the largest importers from 
these islands. Their mineral wealth is unknown, but we do know 
that there are valuable minerals in these islands. 

The Chairman: 

Q. From your point of view as a naval expert, what is the objection 
to the division you have indicated there, taking in Luzon, Mindoro, 
Palawan, and the islands between Mindoro and Palawan? — A. I think 
it a fairly good division, if a division must be made. This division is 
much more valuable than Luzon alone. I do not advocate taking a 
part, however. 

Q. What is your objection to taking that part? — A. The difficulties 
of defense, which I have already alluded to, and the fact that a whole 
loaf is better than half a loaf. 

Q. That is, if one has a chance to take more, he better do it? — A. 
Yes. A.11 of these islands are very valuable. 



478 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Q. From a military point of view, would you not be well protected 
from the rest of the group? — A. Only fairly so. The straits and chan- 
nels between the different islands are in many cases very narrow. 

Q. If you had the four islands, following the red line and to the left 
thereof as we face the map? — A. Yes. 

Q. Would you not then be fairly well separated, in a naval and mili- 
tary point of view, from the rest of the group, and have a controlling 
situation in that part of the ocean? — A. Yes; fairly so. 

Q. Is it not a fact that Mindoro, Palawan, and Busuanga are 
sparsely populated islands? — A. They are. 

Q. Is it not a fact that, with relation to the China Sea, Palawan is 
the best of the islands? — A. I think it is. 

Q. Do you think vessels can get in there of large draft, on the west 
coast? — A. The harbors of Palawan? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. Yes, sir; without doubt. 

Q. How many harbors on the west coast? — A. There are five bays 
Avith good anchorages at any time or with any wind. There are about 
10 other anchorages, good with certain prevailing winds only. 
Steamers that can weigh and go to sea in case of bad weather can 
anchor almost anywhere off the coast. The bottom is almost univer- 
sally mud, affording excellent holding ground. 

Q. Name them please; indicate by degrees. — A. The five first men- 
tioned are as follows, commencing to the southward: 

1. Eran Bay, latitude 9° 5' north, longitude 117° 38' east. 

2. Tebeyu Bay, latitude 9° 17' north, longitude 117° 58' east. 

3. Ulugan Bay or Banog, latitude 10° 6' north, longitude 118° 46' 
east. 

4. Port Barton, latitude 10° 29' north, longitude 119° 5' east. 

5. Malampaya Sound, latitude 10° 53' north, longitude 119° 23' east. 
The last mentioned presents one of the most valuable sites for a 

naval station of any harbor of which I have any knowledge. In this 
respect it is sufficiently valuable to excite the cupidity of any nation. 
It is 19 miles deep, with a width of from 2 to 4 miles. The entrance 
is six-tenths of a mile wide, and between bold and high headlands. It 
has been aptly named "Blockade Strait." The sound is divided into 
parts of about equal depth. The channel to the inner section passes 
between islands commanding the approaches and affording the most 
perfect means of defense. Within is a broad sheet of water from 6 
to 10 fathoms deep, affording excellent anchorage and good holding 
ground. On this inner sound are the Spanish settlements Paukal and 
Baulae. The entire sound is surrounded by high lands, is well 
wooded, and affords an abundance of good water. It is the best place 
for supplies on the western coast. The Malampaya River empties 
into the inner sound. Boats can ascend this river 2 miles, from which 
point a good footpath leads to the eastern shore, a distance of 2 miles. 
In this respect it is like Ulugan Bay, which is said to be 3 miles from 
the eastern shore, with a good road the entire distance. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Three miles from the eastern shore? — A. Yes; one authority 
gives it 3, and another 5. The chart makes it 5. 
Mr. Davis: 

Q. Any harbor on the eastern shore? — A. An anchorage, but not a 
harbor. There is an excellent harbor, known as Port Royalist, about 
15 miles south of this anchorage. It has a small arsenal, a slip, and 
a harbor light. Spanish gunboats have generally been stationed 
there. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 479 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Is it not a fact that the eastern shore is more approachable than 
the western shore? — A. Both shores are more or less fringed with 
shoals, rocks, and islets, making navigation with the present charts 
dangerous in places. These dangers generally extend farther to sea- 
ward on the west shore than on the east. The Philippine islands are 
not well surveyed, and it is unknown dangers that are most feared. 

The Chairman: 

Q. You have not any personal acquaintance with the character of 
the inhabitants of what is known as the Vizcayas group, between 
Luzon and Mindanao?— A. No, sir. 

Q. Nor with the inhabitants of Mindanao and the Zulu group? — A. 
No, sir. 

Q. The possible division proposed would give the United States the 
western part of the group according to your line. Can you state how 
that would divide the group with reference to population? You have 
then Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, etc. — A. Practically it is the popula- 
tion of Luzon, which, according to the latest estimate, is about 
3,000,000. Mindoro has about 40,000, the Calamianes group about 
12,000, and Palawan about 15,000. 

Q. A little more than the population of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. By that division you would have control, practically, of the 
China Sea side of the group? — A. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Fry: 
Q. Do you understand that Germany is trying to get Palawan? — A, 
Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. How do you know that Germany is trying to get it? — A. It has 
been so reported by the press for years; their cruisers frequent the 
islands and their engineers have explored them. 

Q. How have they been trying to get it? — A. By purchase, I pre- 
sume, but of this I have no knowledge. 

Mr. PvEiD: 

Q. Would that division which you have indicated there remove 
your objection to the dangerous proximity of the other islands if in 
unfriendly hands? — A. No, sir; the division was made with a view to 
taking as little as possible in addition to Luzon, and at the same time 
maintaining control of a fairly good strategic line of outposts. 

Q. You would consider that the least evil, on a division of the 
group? — A. I do. 

Q. But as not removing the evil, from a military point of view? — 
A. Precisely. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Still, you recognize the point that sometimes you have to submit 
to dangerous neighbors? — A. Possibly. I am only advocating it be 
avoided, if feasible. 

Q. Suppose you take the group, would you not have Borneo for a 
neighbor? — A. But north Borneo is English and the balance Dutch. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. When j t ou have the option as to whether you will expose your- 
self to bad neighbors or not, do you think it the part of wisdom to 
abandon that option? — A. I do not. 



480 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Do you not think we would rid ourselves of the possibility of 
bad neighbors by keeping out of there altogether? — A. I will answer 
that question 

Q. Will you not answer it directly, first, please? — A. Will you please 
repeat it? 

Q. I ask you if we would not rid ourselves of bad neighbors by 
keeping out of there altogether? — A. Yes, sir; I would like to qualify 
that reply by saying it is my belief, if we are going to be a commercial 
or naval people, that it is absolutely necessary to have coaling stations 
and colonies the world over. 

Mr. Davis: 

Q. If we should leave them in the possession of Spain we would 
have a very bad neighbor there? — A. Most assuredly. 

The Chairman: 

Q. How much more of a military establishment will it require to 
occupy and maintain the supremacy of the United States in the entire 
group than in the group to the west of the line you have drawn? — A. 
None, whatever. 

Q. How do you make that out? — A. Because there is an element of 
safety in possessing the entire group which is not obtained by possess- 
ing only part of it. There is also an element of great uncertainty as 
to the disposition of the balance which can not be lost sight of. 

Q. That would also depend somewhat, would it not, on the char- 
acter and submissiveness of the inhabitants of the islands? — A. 
Naturally; but I do not believe there are any people anywhere in the 
Philippines more difficult to civilize than the North American Indians. 
We have civilized them. I think the enterprise of our people suffi- 
ciently great to civilize and settle the Philippine Islands and make 
them very valuable colonies; not only paying for their government, 
but providing a revenue; not immediately, perhaps, but before long. 
They are the richest colonies possessed by Spain. 

Q. That is rather an expression of hope than any statement you 
can make from personal knowledge? — A. Certainly. I am only giving 
my opinion, but it is based on the experience of other countries. It 
appears to me that Great Britain has made herself powerful and rich 
by her colonial enterprise. This is recognized by the Germans, by 
the French, and by the Dutch. The latter are now trying to follow 
in the footsteps of Great Britain, and with some success. If these 
countries possess all the island territory of the world, their govern- 
ments will be able to discriminate against the introduction of the 
manufactures and against the commerce of our country. This I 
believe to be their object. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Whose object? — A. The object of the countries which are annex- 
ing the island territory of the world and dividing up the coast of 
China. 

Q. You will have to except Great Britain, so far as her policy is 
developed. — A. It is not difficult for a nation possessing colonies to 
discriminate by means of duties and port charges. 

Q. The ports of Great Britain are free A. Her home ports are 

free to most goods, but how about Canada and other colonies? Are 
they free to our goods and our fisherman? 



TREATY OF PEACE. 1 s 1 

The Chairman: 

Q. You answered the question as to a military establishment. In 
your judgment, how much more naval establishment would ii require 
to maintain ourselves in the entire group than in the pari to the 
west? — A. I included both in my answer. I inferred that you in- 
cluded both the Army and Navyin your question, and I had partiular 
reference to both in my reply. 

Q. Have you any means of forming a judgment as to how large an 
army would have to be maintained? — A. Only by reference to1 he army 
that has been maintained by Spain, which, so far as Europeans are 
concerned, has been very small. 

Q. How large a naval squadron would it be necessary to have in 
and about there? — A. The present squadron, the usual Asiatic Squad- 
ron, could take care of the Philippines. Probably some small coast 
guard and revenue vessels would be required in addition. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Would the present naval squadron be adequate if we were at 
war with Germany, in regard to Luzon? — A. It is impossible to answer 
that question, because it would depend upon the movement of German 
ships. If they went to the East, we would have to send more slops 
there; if they came to the West Indies, we would have to meet 
them there. In considering such a question, available coaling sta- 
tions, both for the Germans and ourselves, are of the first and greatest 
importance. 

The Chairman: 

Q. You base your opinions upon the belief that these islands will 
readily submit to the control of the United States Government, and 
that there would be no great expenditure required for either naval 
or military force to subdue the islands to the United States? — A. Some- 
what. I think the islands can be subdued, if there is any serious 
trouble, by a blockade. The inhabitants are entirely dependent upon 
the coast for their supplies and for a market. They are a pleasure-loving 
people, and would not care to submit long to the inconvenience of a 
war under these circumstances. It has been their custom to produce 
a few articles, such as hemp, sugar, and tobacco, for the general mar- 
ket, and with the proceeds of their sale to purchase all necessary 
commodities. They are not a manufacturing people, nor do they pos- 
sess the means of carrying on war any length of time. 

Q. Do you not think a commercial station in those islands is much 
more valuable to the United States, with a view to its trade in China 
and Japan and other parts of that sea, than it is with reference to any 
trade with the islands themselves? — A. I think a commercial station 
at the Philippines valuable for that purpose. How valuable depends 
largely upon our influence in China. The balance of trade there has 
been against us. Foreign powers seem to be at present in control of 
Chinese affairs, and if they are able to discriminate against us, our 
trade may not be valuable. 

Q. If the United States is to have a hand in the Chinese trade, oui 
location in Manila and Luzon would be very valuable in that direc- 
tion? — A. Very, indeed. 

Q. And probably much more valuable than any interisland trade 
would be?— A. It ought to be. It would be fatal to profit if our trade 
with China was obliged to pass through foreign hands. 

Q. Have you any means of estimating the value of these islands; 
T P 31 



482 TREATY OF PEACE. 

and if so, will you give us an .estimate, supposing they were to be 
acquired by purchase? — A. No, sir; I have none. 

Q. You meau you could not form any estimate? — A. I do not think 
I could. 

Q. You might form an estimate, possibly? — A. I can only state that 
which you already know, viz, the price paid for Alaska and that asked 
for the Dutch islands in the West Indies. 

Q. Suppose, to put it another way, you were taking this group of 
islands as a war indemnity, could you form an estimate as to how much 
you were getting? — A. It is a subject I have not studied. I did not 
expect to be asked to give an opinion on such matters, and I should 
prefer not to do so until I can study the question. I will say, I think 
them extremely valuable, both from a commercial and from a military 
point of view. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. If our Government once thought Cuba worth an offer of $100,- 
000,000, what would you think the Philippine Archipelago worth? — A. 
Double that. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Have you stated what, in your opinion, ought to be done rela- 
tive to these positions in the East and in the Pacific from investiga- 
tions which you have made? — A. I think that the entire Philippine 
group of islands, the Carolines, including the Pelevvs, and the 
Ladrones should be annexed to the United States. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Annexed by what means; taken forcibly? — A. Yes, primarily; 
and if they can not be fairly taken, then purchased. I would like to 
say that the Carolines and Ladrones are mere dependencies of the 
Philippines, and it is so stated in the Blue Book of the Captain- 
General of the latter. 

Q. That is, they had the same captain-general, but different local 
governors? — A. Yes. 

Q. How far are the Philippines from the CaroUnes? — A. The Pelews, 
generally included in the Caroline group, are about 600 miles from 
the Philippines. The Caroline group, including the Pelews, extends 
about 2,000 miles east and west; the Ladrones about 540 miles north 
and south. Relatively, the CaroUnes and Ladrones form an inverted 
T. It is about 180 miles from the westernmost Caroline proper to the 
Pelews and 220 miles from Yap to the Pelews. Yap is about 750 
miles from the Philippines. 

Q. How far is Guam from Manila? — A. Guam is about 2,575 miles 
from San Bernardino Strait. 

Q. How far to the Carolines? You say about 600 miles A. 

From Guam to the Carolines? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. Guam is a little less than 300 miles north of Wolea, 
one' of the Caroline group. 

Q. What are the objections, in your judgment, to taking Luzon 
alone, leaving off now the three lower islands of your western group? — 
A. From a military point of view or from a commercial point of view, 
or both? 

Q. Cover both points, if you will. — A. It is difficult to foresee what 
would happen should the Philippine Islands be divided after having 
always been under a single government. It is certain, however, that 
trade and commerce would seek new channels, and if Luzon were 



TREATY OF PEACE. 483 

detached from the other islands, Manila would no longer be the com- 
mercial center of the group. The islands of the entire group are so 
closely connected that it is almost impossible to separate them in any 
scheme for an offensive or defensive war. There is no possible isola- 
tion with Luzon alone, nor would it be practicable to prevent smug- 
gling. Luzon would be open to attack from almost every direction; 
control over important strategic points in its immediate vicinity would 
be lost; control over contiguous waters would be lost; ports of refuge 
near by would be lost; coal, teak and other valuable timber, and 
hemp produced in the south would be lost, and the opportunity to 
intercept a possible enemy passing through various straits extending 
from Luzon to Borneo would be sacrificed. We would also lose the 
richest and most productive islands of the entire group, particularly 
with reference to the hemp-producing districts. 

Q. Where are they? — A. In Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Bohol. 

Q. Is there any good harbor near to Luzon, in the Vizcaya group to 
the south of Luzon? — A. Yes; several in the islands of Samar, Leyte, 
Panay, and Masbate. The latter, very near to Luzon, is celebrated 
for its good harbors. Vessels can anchor in many of the sounds 
between the islands, and I estimate there are not less than 100 
regular harbors in the group. Cebu and Iloilo are the largest com- 
mercial harbors outside of Manila. 

Q. A considerable distance south of the extremity of Luzon? — A. 
They are about 135 and 160 miles respectively from the island of 
Luzon. The best harbor near Manila is Subig Bay. 

Q. On the island of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir; I do not know as I fully 
understand your question. 

Q. Suppose the United States was looking for a naval station and 
base of operations, and no more. What place would be the best, in 
your judgment, to take in the group? — A. Manila, probably. 

Q. Then you would have the entire surroundings in the hands of 
somebody else? — A. I am in favor of selecting Manila because there is 
already a navy-yard there, a slip, and other facilities for repairing and 
building ships. There are also skilled workmen and other labor in 
abundance. Manila being a commercial port, I should expect a naval 
station might be maintained there without expense to the General 
Government. If a port without trade or many inhabitants be selected, 
I should expect a naval station would be a constant and considerable 
expense to the Government. In the event of the latter course, I 
would recommend Malampaya Sound, island of Palawan. I do not 
advocate taking any port without at least the island in which it is 
located. 

Q. Do you think the group, or the group divided, taking the west- 
ern part of your possible division, would be self-sustaining? — A. I 
think the entire group would. 

Q. Taking the western group, do you think that would be self- 
sustaining? — A. It would under present conditions; but should the 
remaining islands fall into the hands of some other power, able to 
divert the trade from Manila, it might not. 

Q. Manila might be very much improved if the Chinese and Jap- 
anese trade of the United States should be developed with that as a 
base? — A. I should think so. 

Q. You think Formosa is valuable to Japan? — A. I do. I know the 
coal obtained there is of fair quality and the products are valuable. 
The soil is fertile, produces excellent tea, and I think the Japanese 
will soon have it under a high state of cultivation. 



484 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. Have you been there since Japan acquired it? — A. No, sir. 

Q. Do you know from the Japanese reports that it costs more than 
it amounts to, from the hostility of the natives? — A. The natives at 
the south end of Formosa are untamed and fierce savages. The Jap- 
anese have much to contend with, no doubt, but they do not appear 
to be stopping colonial progress on that account. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. If we should adopt your line of demarcation, what do you think 
Spain would do with the balance of those islands? — A. Sell them to 
Germany. 

Q. Is not Germany about as troublesome a neighbor as we could 
get? — A. The most so, in my opinion. I think it probable that the 
balance of the Spanish possessions in the Pacific not acquired by us 
will go to Germany. Germany has long desired to possess the Caro- 
lines, and she hoisted her flag at Yap in 1886. Our missionaries have 
been in the Caroline Islands for fifty years, and all that has been done 
to educate and civilize the natives there has been done by American 
missionaries. 

Q. They are still there? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. The Morning Star makes its trips? — A. I believe so. Much of 
our knowledge of the harbors of these islands has been acquired from 
her voyages. 

Q. That vessel is not permitted to go to Ponape? — A. I understand 
that the Spanish have excluded the missionaries and their vessel from 
the islands of Yap and Ponape, where the Spanish governors reside. 

Q. We have captured the entire Philippine Islands, have we not? — 
A. Practically; we have captured their capital. 

Q. "Well, if there had been no armistice could we not have taken 
the whole group? — A. Yes, sir; I believe so, with little loss or expense. 

Q. Would you, as a naval officer and as interested also in the 
development of the commerce of the United States, be content, rea- 
sonably content, with the division you made in your red line? — A. No; 
I do not think I would. The red lines were drawn for the purpose of 
showing what we should by no means omit, rather than to indicate 
what islands we should annex. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Put the question a little differently. We started to free the 
island of Cuba, which, say, we have accomplished. That was the 
purpose of the war. We hold Porto Rico and the other islands in the 
West Indies and the Ladrones as an indemnity in lieu of money. The 
only people of the Philippines with whom we have come in contact 
and to whom we owe an obligation because of supposed or actual 
cooperation or change of their situation are the inhabitants of the 
island of Luzon, where the insurrection has been carried forward at 
the same time, at least with our own military operations, so that, 
strictly, our obligation of cooperation is limited to that island. Now, 
if we add to Porto Rico, the islands in the West Indies, our possible 
and even probable interest in Cuba, the islands from Luzon down to 
Borneo to the west of your line of possible division, would you not 
think we had made a pretty fair, reasonable, and just settlement of 
the matters growing out of this war? — A. From a commercial point of 
view? 

Q. From an international point of view, as a great and generous 
nation. — A. Am I to understand that your question refers to an 



TREATY OF PEACE. 485 

exchange of values in connection with the cost of the war and a, suit- 
able recompense therefor? 

Q. Yes, sir; take it that way, if you wish. — A. I answer in the 
affirmative. I would like, however, to add something, with yoar per- 
mission, in connection with the Philippines which I think yoa have 
omitted. It is the moral aspect of the case. If we take a portion of the 
islands only, are we not open to the accusation of taking the best and 
leaving the poorest? Have we a moral right to make a selection? We 
have driven the Spanish Government out of the Philippines; there is 
bo Spanish authority there now, or practically none. Are we going 
to take what we want and leave the remainder in a state of anarchy? 
I believe we have incurred a moral obligation to take all of the islands, 
govern them, civilize the natives, and do the best we can with them. 

Another consideration. We were driven into this war. A war 
with Spain over Cuba has been foreseen for years. We did not want 
it, the sentiment of the people was against it, and we are not respon- 
sible for the results. We went into it against our will, and we made 
as good fight as we could. The result is we have practically taken 
i islands, an d we ought to keep them .y Of course, I am interested,/! 
IfEaTy potht or view, on account of my profession." 
I drew those lines, and they are original with me, to preserve so far 
as possible the military advantages which we had won, fearing that 
Luzon alone would be taken. I made commercial obligations and 
moral obligations entirely secondary, but I recognize that they exist, 
and so do the people of our country. 

Q. What foundation have you for saying the islands other than 
the island of Luzon are in the military possession of the United 
States? — A. Simply because we have captured the seat of government 
and practically all of the Spanish forces. 

Q. Have you any doubt of the ability of the Spanish to maintain 
their government in the Vizcayas? — A. The greatest doubt. There is 
no question in my mind that they are not doing it. Spain has no 
colonial authority to-day; she has no navy; and she is a bankrupt 
nation. 

Q. What do you know of the disposition of the natives beyond 
Luzon? — A. Only what I read. 

Q. Do you know that this insurrection is confined to the island of 
Luzon? — A. No, sir. 

Q. It has been? — A. The Spanish have never had full control of the 
southern islands of the group. 

Q. No one has ever had control of Mindanao and the other islands 
except the Mohammedan natives there; they have never submitted to 
any civilized government? — A. The Spaniards have suppressed piracy 
in the Sulu Sea. 

Q. But the natives have never submitted to the Spaniards? — A. No, 
sir; I believe not, outside of certain fortified towns. 

Q. What I want to get at is on what you predicate your opinion of 
our moral obligation, after we have done what we think is necessary 
to be done? — A. On the same ground that we interfered in Cuba. It 
is missionary work for some civilized nation, and a great deal of sim- 
ilar work has been done in Polynesia; moral obligations are not con- 
trolled by distance. 

Q. Such cultivation has been for the commercial advantage of the 
nation, as a rule? — A. Yes, probably a combination of missionary 
work and self-interest. 

Q. It comes to this, if I understand you, that, looking at it purely 



486 TREATY OF PEACE. 

as a commercial indemnity, the cost of the war would be indemnified 
by the portion of the group indicated and what we have taken in the 
West Indies, if it is to be taken by the United States, but you think 
there is a moral obligation on our part to take the rest of the group as 
well? — A. Yes; also a commercial advantage and an increased mili- 
tary advantage. I do not wish to be understood as saying that I 
think the Spanish islands west of the red line are as strong, from a 
military standpoint, as the entire Philippine group. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. In reckoning the indemnity, do you include Cuba? — A. I did. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Your idea is that the United States should have a strong hand 
in the future of Cuba? — A. Yes, sir, by all means. Self-defense 
requires it. 

Q. If we were not in the Philippines, were not taken there by the 
power of war, and they had a government to-day to apply for annex- 
ation to the United States, you think it would be a valuable acqui- 
sition to the United States? — A. Yes, sir, I do. In reaching this con- 
clusion I am much influenced by the recent action of Great Britain, 
Germany, and Russia in China. It seems to me that they are parcel- 
ing out the coast of China, and we should be in it, or as near it as 
possible. 

Q. Do you think to be "in it" in China we need to be all over the 
Philippine Islands? — A. I think it will be a great advantage to possess 
all of them. 

Q. We could be "in it" in China without being "in it" in the 
Philippines? — A. Perhaps, but I confess I do not see how. If we 
possess the Philippines we will not be far away. 

Q. How far is it from top to bottom of the Philippine group? — 
A. About a thousand miles. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. If we were at war with a first-class power, would it require a 
greater naval establishment to defend ourselves if we were confined 
within what had been our limits up to the present year, or if we had 
islands and possessions and coaling stations, such as have been talked 
t ibout here to-day , ^I Lover the Pacific Ocean :y -A. That is a very 
{extensive question. Naturally the more territory a country has to 
I defend the greater the force, both naval and military, will be required. 
I On the other hand, during a war with a naval power, with coaling sta- 
| tions and ports of refuge the world over, similar coaling stations and 
l ports of refuge outside of our own country then become, in my opin- 
ion, a source of strength rather than weakness. The necessity for 
such stations has already been referred to by me while speaking of 
the experience of the war, which was of short duration and with a 
weak power. If we are going to inclose ourselves within a shell, like 
a turtle, and defend ourselves after the manner of a turtle, then any 
possession outside o»* our own country may be said to be a source of 
weakness. 

Q. Recurring, then, to the question whether it would take a larger 
naval establishment to successfully hold our own in case of a war 
with a first-rate power if we were in the condition we were in up to the 
present time, your answer would be as we are at present situated, it 
would take a less naval establishment? — A. No, sir; that is not my 
answer. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 487 

Q. Then you think that if we had the Philippines for instance — 
the Hawaiian Islands we have, which we had not up to the present 
year — it would require a less naval establishment to defend the 
places where we had placed our flag:, 7,000 miles away from our pres- 
ent coast, than it would to defend the compact territory now known as 
the United States of America? — A. I have answered that question 
already to the best of my ability. I can not call our territory compact. 

Q. With the exception of Alaska it is, is it not? — A. Part of it is on 
the Atlantic and part on the Pacific; that is not very compact. 

Q. Let me ask another question: Is there any nation in the world 
which has so large an extent of contiguous and compact territory as 
the United States? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. Is it not exceptional? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Is it not to our advantage? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Is it not, within our territory, absolutely self-sustaining as no 
other country is? — A. Probably. 

Q. Therefore, I repeat the question. I do not mean you to under- 
stand that you have not given an intelligent answer to my question. 
Still, I think you have missed the point whether, as a matter of fact, 
if we had continued in the situation in which we were up to the pres- 
ent year, with this compact territory of such vast extent, and with 
our population and resources such as they are, it would not take, in 
case of a foreign war with a naval power, a less naval establishment 
than if we had these islands in the Philippine Archipelago, extend- 
ing a thousand miles, open to attack, north and south? — A. I must 
answer "no." 

Q. You answer that it would take less to defend the coasts of the 
United States, plus the Philippine Islands? — A. Yes, sir; and I would 
like to give my reasons. For the purpose of illustration, let us sup- 
pose that war is declared and that the theater is in the neighborhood 
of the China Sea. Suppose we have on the Pacific coast 100 ships 
and no naval supply stations between that coast and China. Now, 
the point I make is, that we would be better off and more powerful 
with a chain of naval-supply stations stretching from the Pacific coast 
to China and 50 ships, or one-half the force under the conditions first 
mentioned. Few realize the great changes that have taken place 
since the days of sails and muzzle-loading guns. With the rapid- 
firing guns of to-day the entire supply of ammunition may be expended 
in a few hours. Ships are helpless without coal. We must be able 
to follow the enemy with our ships the world over, as Nelson did. 

Q. Have not they to go with us? — A. That depends upon whether 
they desire to act on the offensive or defensive. 

Q. Will they not go where we are, to the most vulnerable point? — 
A. Naturally. 

Q. Would not they consider a point in the Philippine Islands, 7,000 
miles away from our home territory, more vulnerable than any point 
on our coast? — A. Not necessarily. 

Q. Why not? — A. Because of its small value. What is the value 
of all the Philippine Islands compared with that of New York? 

Q. Would not we be bound to defend our flag there? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Would not it require a larger establishment? — A. Possibly. 
We certainly want a larger one than we have now. 

Q. Would we not possibly require a larger establishment? — A. Yes, 
sir. An increase of colonies, the merchant marine, and the Navy 
naturally go hand in hand. 



488 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Q. I presume that we will act on the defensive only? — A. I hope 
not. 

Q. We would not be weakened by having these far places to 
defend? — A. Naval warfare can not now be carried on without coaling 
stations. 

Q. Would it not require more to defend Manila and Hawaii and 
Cuba? — A. We must always take the disadvantages with the advan- 
tages. 

/ Q. We would require a larger naval establishment than if we had 
'not those places to defend? — A. Perhaps. 

Q. Now, Commander, as you said something about the moral point 
of view, you consider that we have a moral duty, unless I misunder- 
stood you, to take the whole of the Philippine group? — A. That is 
quite correct. 

Q. I suppose that you would recognize that one of the bases of the 
moral obligation is an adherence to declarations which, from a national 
standpoint, amount to premises, would you not? — A. Yes, sir; cer- 
tainly. 

Q. Good morals require adherence? — A. Certainly. 

Q. Having undertaken a war with a specific declaration that it was 
undertaken with an utter absence of intention to acquire territory, 
with a definite object defined and declared, and having accomplished 
(that object so defined and declared, would not you believe there is 
some moral obligation to adhere to that declaration? — A. Nations, as 
well as individuals, have a right to change their minds. 

Q. Having made in the present war just such a declaration as I 
have described, and having, in the course of that war, carried it on as 
a civilized nation is entitled to carry it on, by striking the enemy 
wherever we can find him, we struck Spain in her territory in the 
Philippines, did we not? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Now, the war having been accomplished, and the declared end 
in view achieved, are we not pledged morally by the declaration we 
have made to content ourselves with that achieved object and to 
relinquish that territory we occupied merely as an act of war? If, for 
instance, we might have attacked and seized as an act of war the city 
of Barcelona on the peninsula, would we not, when we achieved the 
object of the war, in morality have been bound by the position we took 
at the outset to abandon Barcelona? — A. No, sir; not by the rules of 
war. 

Q. I am speaking of the rules of morality now? — A. Nor by the rules 
of morality either. We had a right to take it, and it is not immoral 
to keep what is our own. Besides, even when a contract is broken, 
the law, founded on justice and morality, requires a loss by one party 
to be shown, before damages can be awarded. I do not believe that 
Spain relaxed her efforts to defeat us on account of the declaration 
you have referred to. Spain, by her oppression and misrule has lost 
most of the vast colonial territory she once possessed. History has 
applauded those who brought about the separation and inscribed 
their names among the benefactors of the world. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. I would like to ask just one question in that line. Suppose the 
United States in the progress of that war found the leader of the 
present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hongkong 
and sent for him and brought him to the islands in an American ship, 
and then furnished him 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms, and allowed 



TREATY OF PEACE. 489 

him to purchase as many more stands of arms in Hongkong, and 
accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of a nation, in lli<> 
eyes of the world, we would appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and 
his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they please? — A. We 
become responsible for everything he has done, he is our ally, and 
we are bound to protect him. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Suppose that cooperation, whether wise or unwise, was limited 
to the island of Luzon, where the insurrection of the Tagalos, a separate 
class of people inhabiting the other islands, existed, and we bound 
the United States in the forum of morals not to leave those people 
and not to leave a condition of warfare and chaos on that island, if 
we take that island, compose everybody on that island, great and 
small, and protect them — does not that discharge the moral obligation 
to the people we have had as so-called allies? — A. I do not think I 
quite understand the question. 

Q. (Question repeated.) — A. No ; for this reason : During the course 
of our naval operations at Manila, we destroyed or rendered useless 
all forces subject to the control of the representative of Spain at the 
capital of the islands. The power of Spain having become largely 
paralyzed, the native people of the southern islands have been enabled 
to practically take charge. We, therefore, are responsible, in a more 
or less degree, according to the amount of power in Spanish hands 
before being attacked by us, for what has since taken place in the 
southern islands and what is taking place there now 

Q. We have simply put the inhabitants of the southern islands in 
a better condition, so far as overcoming the objectionable power of 
Spain is concerned, than they were before; is not that true? — A. Pos- 
sibly, if they succeed. But there are interests in southern islands 
affecting civilized people of different nationalities which have suffered. 
Again, I doubt very much if any native government is better than the 
Spanish Government was. 

Q. There you are getting outside of the moral obligation to relieve 
them from an oppressive power. — A. I intended to confine myself to 
the indirect results of our action at Manila. 

Mr. Davis: 
Q. Do you think this so-called moral question at all impairs the 
right of the United States to take indemnity for the cost of the war, 
whether in money or territory? — A. I do not. Judging from the prac- 
tice of all nation's for the last hundred years, indemnity for the cost 
of war seems to be the first point to be considered by a successful 
belligerent. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. The question I wish to ask you relates to the point of its being 
easier or more difficult to defend the coast of the United States when 
we had some outlying possessions. In the late war, suppose Admiral 
Dewey had been defeated in the harbor of Manila, instead of being 
successful, and suppose the Spanish fleet had been as powerful as we 
believed the Spanish fleet to be, and had been capable of ravaging 
our coasts on the Pacific if we were not ready to defend them, would we 
have been then in a better position to defend the Pacific coast against 
that triumphant fleet with or without the Hawaiian Islands?— A. 
Incalculably better off with the Hawaiian Islands. They form a 
salient point which no force coming from the westward can afford to 
pass without first reducing. 



490 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. It would take more ships to defend the Pacific coast with them 
than it would without them? — A. No, sir; I think not. A fleet would 
be stationed at the Hawaiian Islands 

Q. And leave your coast unprotected? — A. No, sir; the coast would 
not be unprotected. That duty would be performed by harbor defense 
ships, torpedo vessels, submarine mines, and batteries. 

Q. Would it be safe to defend the coast with torpedo boats? — 
A. They would form an important element in its defense. 

Q. You would have to detach some of the ships to go to Hawaii? — 
A. The fleet would be best disposed at Hawaii, with cable communi- 
cation with San Francisco. 

Q. They would be detached from the number on the coast? — A. A 
fleet must be organized and kept intact somewhere to meet an enemy's 
fleet. 

Q. Given a certain number of ships, adequate and necessary to 
protect the coast, would it not be necessary to have a number in addi- 
tion to that to protect Hawaii? — A. No, sir; not if the enemy's fleet 
is to come from the west. If it is to come from the north or south 
this would not be the best disposition. The enemy's fleet must be 
struck before it can coal, and its near presence must be ascertained 
by scouts. The acquisition of coal is the great problem in naval war- 
fare. How to get it and how to prevent the enemy from getting it 
are the first and greatest considerations. 

Q. Suppose they should pass to the north and not touch there at 
all? — A. Very well. Then the coast defenses must stand them off 
until the fleet arrives and gives battle. 



STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. WHITTIER, U. S. V., BEFORE THE 
UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. 



Examination by Mr. Day: 

Q. Please state your name, the length of time you have been at 
Manila, and the opportunities you have had for observation there. — 
A. Charles A. Whittier, brigadier-general, United States Volunteers. 
I left San Francisco on June 28 last, and went to Honolulu, which I 
left on July 8, and arrived at Manila on July 25. Remained in the 
harbor meeting the merchants, who came out to the ship as frequently 
as they could, until a prohibition was put on their frequent visits. 
Officers constantly came aboard of our ship on the way to and from 
camp, and reported the different stories about the conduct of the 
insurgents and the Spaniards, and of the small engagements occur- 
ring, different evenings. After communications addressed by Admiral 
Dewey and General Merritt to the acting captain-general, asking him 
to remove his noncombatants, and next demanding the surrender of 
the city, which requests were both denied, the Belgian consul, as a 
semi-intermediary, came repeatedly to Dewey and proposed different 
methods of giving up the city after we had made an attack, which, he 
said, was necessary to satisfy the Spanish honor. So the guns opened 
on August 13, and after the white flag was shown I was sent, in com- 
pany with Lieutenant Brumby, on the launch of the Belgiam consul, 
to receive the surrender. 

We landed by a stone pier running out into the water, which was 
rough and getting rougher, but we got ashore very comfortably at 
about noon, much better than those who went later in the afternoon. 
Two carriages awaited us, and an interpreter by the name of Carlos 
Casademunt, together with Colonel of the Staff Don Jose M. Olaguer 
and Captain of Artillery Don Francisco Chavairi, who also spoke 
English, conducted us to the house of the captain-general, where we 
found about 40 officers awaiting us. They had a number of pages of 
stipulations, to two of which I could not consent, being that their 
arms should be given to them and the army sent back to Spain, though 
I think now it would have been wise to do so. Admiral Montojo, 
who had commanded their vessels in the fight, was there, and seemed 
to have his wits about him better than the rest. I think the captain- 
general was much frightened. He reported in great trepidation that 
the insurgents were coming into the city, and I said that I knew that 
that was impossible, because such precautions had been taken as 
rendered it so. The subject had been broached two days before and 
all the arrangements had been made. A little later they said that 
our people were on the front of the city, the corner of the walled city, 
and were firing there. I wrote a letter to the commander of the 
troops, who turned out to be General Greene, and asked that the 
firing should be suspended, which it was, and Brumby returned to 
Admiral Dewey. 

491 



492 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Going through the city we passed perhaps L,500 Spaniards, with 
rude, old-fashioned artillery, and the men looked very well, infinitely 
better than the Southerners did at the surrender of our other war. I 
wrote a note to General Merritt asking him to come to the city. They 
said that the town hall, their hotel de ville, or the Ayuntamiento was 
the best place for headquarters. We adjourned there, and I asked 
them to deposit their arms in the courtyard, to which they demurred, 
saying that it was not yet a formal surrender, but they did stack 
them, and I went down to meet Merritt, missed him, and when he 
arrived he found about 3,000 people there with arms. About 9 o'clock 
a memorandum was made of the surrender, and the next day General 
Greene, Captain Lamberton of the Navy, Colonel Crowder, and myself 
were on the commission for the terms of surrender. After that I 
made it a point to know all the merchants in the town. I knew all 
the English, the principal traders there. The only Americans in the 
place were Mr. Daland, a custom-house broker, and a Mr. Russell, 
whose father was an American; he is now connected with one of the 
leading firms. I went over the line of the only railroad in the Philip- 
pines, leaving one Saturday morning and going up 120 miles through 
the rice fields, a country of marvelous and most extraordinary fertility. 

The next morning we started out early and went up to Dagupan 
Bay, the terminus of the road, that little niche on the left (indicated 
on the map). We found about 300 insurgents in the cars, who were 
going down to some points on the line. They said they had been up 
at Vigan, where the Spaniards had a custom-house, and had been 
driven out. This station was all battered to pieces by the Spaniards 
in some previous engagement. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. What sort of looking people are the insurgents? — A. They are 
somewhat undersized, are fairly good in appearance, are brave, will 
stand any amount of hunger and hardship, and, well led, would be 
very good soldiers. The country on the line of railroad is divided into 
four parts or zones. There was one General Macabulus, whose head- 
quarters were at Tarlac, and it was said that Aguinaldo rather dreaded 
his popularity, and wanted to transfer him. There was good feeling 
between them, however, and he sent down by Higgins $36,000 as a 
contribution. This was Mexican, of course. In all my talk it will 
be of Mexican dollars, about 47 cents' worth in our money or in gold. 
That trip was most interesting, but I have stated most of these things 
in my little story. We were the first officers who had been anywhere 
in the island outside the immediate environs of Manila. 

The next Sunday, in company with a member of one of the chief 
mercantile houses and the senior British medical officer at Hongkong, 
Colonel Evatt, we went up the river Pasig on the launch of the former. 
We went up about 28 miles to the laguna. Paixanang would have 
been better to see, but time would not permit. We went to Banos, a 
health resort. There is an enormous tract of land on the laguna on 
the market, held by the priests. They wish to sell it for $1,700,000. 
It is an enormously productive country. You pass cascos loaded with 
cocoanuts and enormous quantities of nipa thatching for roofs. At 
this time I was collector of the port, and during this time I heard all 
sorts of expressions, and I think I had a very fair opportunity, being 
amused with the natives and studying their peculiarities, to form a 
fair judgment. I stand a little isolated in my opinions, however, per- 
haps. Men so quickly dismiss the natives from their minds as simply 



TREATY OF PEACE. 493 

"niggers" and "savages," but when you think of all they have done 
you must give them credit for great capacity. I think there is a very 
good authority on this subject, Sir Frank Swettenham, of the British 
Straits Settlements Colony, from whom I have a Letter written to Mr. 
Pratt, our consul at Singapore. Sir Frank Sweden ham lias written 
a very clever book of local stories. 

Mr. DAY: 

Q. Does he live in the Philippines?— A. No, sir; in the Straits Set- 
tlements in the Malay Peninsula. His letter is as follows: 

Carcosa, Selangoe, Malay Peninsula, October 28, 1898. 

Dear Mr. Spencer Pratt: I send you all I have at present available. It may- 
be all you want. 

The Philippines are Malays, with more intelligence, more education, more 
courage, perhaps, than their confreres in the Peninsula. 

In one sense they would be easier to govern, because they have been for many 
years in contact with white men and understand their ways. Moreover, the 
majority are not Mahommedans. 

But, on the other hand, they have aspirations for political institutions and the 
management of affairs without the necessary experience, perhaps without the 
essential qualities to secure success. 

I should say that our experiment in the Malay Peninsula might be successfully 
repeated in the Philippines, provided that the controlling power made it clearly 
understood at the start that they meant to control and not only to advise and 
educate. 

If that point were never in doubt, and the means of enforcing authority were 
in evidence for a short time, the rest would be easy, and I firmly believe the 
results would surpass all anticipations. 
Yours, sincerely, 
(Signed) Frank Swettenham. 

The above is very much my idea of the situation. I have prepared 
a little statement in regard to the Philippine Islands, their resources, 
etc., which I will read if you desire. 

The Chairman: 

Q. Please read it. 

General Whittier here read the following statement : 

"The Philippine Islands are estimated to be in number between 
600 and 1,000, the latter, if we include the Sulu archipelago and 
Paragua, extending over about 12 degrees of latitude, including the 
Protectorate, extreme south of the Sultanate of Sulu (Jolo), with an 
area of about 114,500 square miles and a population estimated from 
5,500,000 to 8,000,000. About 25 islands are of commercial impor- 
tance, from practically all of which supplies of produce are collected 
and sent to Manila for baling, pressing, classification, and shipment 
to foreign ports. The principal islands are Luzon, Panay (of which 
Iloilo, the second port of the Philippines, is the important town), 
Negros, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Mindanao. The last named has a 
port of Zamboanga. Foreman, in his book (1872), says of this island 
and of Sulu, etc. : 

"Half of the Philippine archipelago still remains to be conquered, 
but only its Mussulman inhabitants have ever taken the aggressive 
against the Spaniards in regular warfare. (A change since with the 
effective action of the natives.) It is at a great sacrifice that the 
Spaniards can retain the little possession they have acquired in 
the south, and frequent acts of violence are still perpetrated on them 
by the turbulent Mussulmans who virtually refuse to recognize other 
rights than those of their sultans, to whom they give allegiance. 



494 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



Indeed it may be unhesitatingly asserted that the Spaniards hold no 
more domain in Mindanao and the Sultanate of Sulu than that of a 
day's march from their respective garrisons ; and in Mindanao par- 
ticularly not one-hundreth part of the territory." 

This same condition exists to a lesser degree in the other islands ; 
large tracts of unexplored country, occupied by various tribes, with 
more rumors than is actually known about their habits, ferocity, etc., 
this particularly the case with the mountainous country in the center 
part of the northern portion of Luzon. It will require the intelligent, 
systematic work of years to open, develop, and govern these places. 
"For ages it has been the Spanish official system to declare territories 
to be under their rule, without taking steps to make their possessions 
manifest to the rest of the world " — or to themselves. 

The Spaniards have apparently never known the number of the 
islands owned by them for all these years or the population. The 
last census — that of 1881(?) — is very vague. 

The products of the islands are : Sugar, rice, hemp, coffee (reduced 
of late years), tobacco, cocoa (small), cocoanuts (large and increas- 
ing), napa palms, bamboo for rafts, furniture, carts, baskets, boats, 
bridges, carrying poles, floats, etc., hardwoods of great variety. 
Fruits: Mangoes, bananas, pomela (larger than our grape fruit, of 
same family), oranges, citrons, chicos, guavas, lemons, pineapples 
(not of best quality, cultivated for the leaves to make pina and jusi, 
dress and fine handkerchiefs, etc., fabrics), tamarinds, vanilla, sago 
(small products). No doubt it will be a great field for cotton. In 
fact, no country has such diversified possibilities. 

Account of four products exported to different countries, and all 
imported from the interior of the Philippine archipelago during the 
year 1897 : 



Product. 



Where raised. 



Amount 
paid for 
export 
duties. 



Destination. 



Hemp.. 

Sugar... 
Coffee... 
Tobacco 



Provinces of Sarsogan (Albay), Legas- 
pi, Jabaco, Camarines, S. & N. Ma- 
rinduque, Mindoro, Calbayez, Cebu, 
Iloilo, and other southern provinces. 

Batangas, La Laguna, Cebu, Iloilo 
(small quantities), N. nocos, S. no- 
cos, Pangasinan, Negros. 

Batangas, Laguna, Cairti (province of 
Manila), Zamboanga, both nocos, 
Camarines. 

This article is produced in almost all 
the Provinces of the Archipelago, 
and especially in Cagayan, Isabella, 
de Luzon, nocos (S. and N.), and in 
all the southern Provinces and in 
the Visayas. 



$562,033 



75,884 



Free. 



553,805 



Spain, Australia, China, the 
United States, Prance, Eng- 
land, Japan, Singapore, and 
other foreign ports. 

America, Australia, China, 
Japan, Spain, England. 

Spain, China, Japan, Singa- 
pore. 

Dutch possessions, England, 
France, Saigon, Singapore, 
English possessions, Aus- 
tralia, Spain, China, Egypt, 
France. 



Products. 



Quantity. 



Value of 
same. 



Hemp, raw and manufactured . . 

Sugar 

Coffee --- 

Tobacco, raw and manufactured 



Kilograms. 
74.936,394 
75,883,919 
105,638 
33,135,020 



11,820.536 

10,810,451 

61,858 

9,350,219 



Manila hemp has a world-wide reputation, and is used for cordage, 
bonnets, hats, tapestry, carpets, hammocks, and other network, etc. 

The sugar product is enormous. More capital is required, and the 
combination of the producers, with modern machinery and improved 



TREATY OF PEACE. 495 

roads. It seems strange, entering the harbor of Hongkong, to see the 
magnificent plant of a sugar refinery there, which has made great 
profits, while at the Philippines practically the old rude methods 
prevail. 

The growth of the cocoanut palm, a most profitable industry, may 
be greatly increased, and its use for domestic purposes, in desiccated 
form (a new method), and in the manufacture of oil and soap is enor- 
mous. Of this product in Ceylon, Sir J. West Rklgway, governor, 
after giving surprising figures as to its development, naming the value 
of the local consumption then at 20,000,000 rupees (say $G, 600,000 in 
gold), adds: 

That the cultivation of the cocoanut palm is rapidly increasing is a matter of 
congratulation, but should not be the cause of surprise. There is no cultivation 
so simple, so cheap, and of which the returns are so certain. 

There is an enormous production of tobacco and a ready market 
for all of the cigars and cigarettes made in the large factories of 
Manila. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. All the sugar product of the Philippines is shipped to the 
East? — A. They must send a great deal to Hongkong now, because of 
the refinery there, which I mentioned, but some is shipped to America, 
Australia, China, England, Japan, Spain. I suggested to the pro- 
prietor of one of these cigar factories that they send their product to 
America, but he said they did not know about opening a new trade; 
they had all the orders they wanted and for months ahead, and did 
not know whether it was worth while. 

There are good reports as to the coal mines opened in Mindoro and 
Cebu, but further examination by experts is necessary. I have no 
doubt there will be large discoveries of this and of iron. Many stories 
about gold — not confirmed — all from a country of which little is known. 
While the soil and conditions of other tropical countries permit pro- 
duction of one or .two articles only in each place, there is no doubt 
that these islands will yield everything possible for all of the others. 

The great necessities are roads, railways, improvements in sanita- 
tion, and establishment of cold-storage houses. Profit and comfort 
will also come from the operation of banks, cotton mills, paper mills 
(the best material for paper making is easily obtainable), soap and ice 
factories. Road making should be undertaken on scientific princi- 
ples. The walls of the walled chVv of Manila should be demolished 
and the offensive moats filled, adding in good health what is lost in 
picturesqueness, and giving the Government a large tract of valuable 
land to be sold or leased. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Have you any idea what proportion of the land is now Govern- 
ment land? — A. There are two or three classes of lands occupied by 
the natives. On some of it they have erected houses; and there is a 
great deal which has absolutely no ownership of record, particularly 
in the mountains; and there is also much, especially in Mindanao, 
which should come to our Government. But this question needs full 
investigation by a land department. 

statement — resumed. 

Railways built to the mountains — distances from 20 to 250 miles — 
will give a new climate, where one can find at night a temperature of 



496 TREATY OF PEACE. 

from 40 to 60 instead of the monotonous all-night 82, even at this 
season, of Manila, and where vegetables and fruits in variety may be 
raised. The country to be opened by well considered new lines will 
populate and develop fine sections. All this, of course, will take 
time. 
Field-Marshal Roberts says : 

It (the Mutiny) hastened on the construction of the roads, railways, and tele- 
graphs, which have done more than anything to increase the prosperity of the 
people and preserve order throughout the country. 

Tli is, true of India, will be most effectively the case of the Philip- 
pines. I quote a portion of an article by Mr. John Foreman in the 
Contemporary Review for June, 1898 : 

The islands are extremely fertile, and will produce almost anything to be found 
in the tropics. I estimate that barely one-fourth of the tillable land is now under 
cultivation. There is at present only one railway, of 120 miles. A number of lines 
would have to be constructed in Luzon, Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao 
islands. Companies would probably take up the contracts on ninety years' 
working concession and ninety-nine years' lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed 
interest. The lands would become immensely valuable to the railway companies, 
and an enormous source of taxable wealth to the protectorate. Road making 
should be taken up on treasury account and bridge construction on contract, to 
be paid for by toll concessions. The port of Iloilo should be improved, the 
custom-houses abolished, and about ten more free ports opened to the world. 

U nder the protectorate undoubtedly capital would flow into the Philippines . The 
coal beds in Luzon and Cebu islands would be opened out; the marble deposits 
of Montalban and the stone quarries of Angono (both near Manila) would surely 
be worked. The possibilities of development under a free, liberal government 
are so great that the next generation would look back with astonishment at the 
statistics of the present day. 

If we compare Egypt under British control (in fact, if not in name), 
Mr. Edward Dicey says: 

The British occupation has now lasted for over fifteen years. During the first 
five comparatively little was accomplished, owing to the uncertain and provi- 
sional character of our tenure. 

In this time (fifteen years) the population increased from a little 
under 7,000,000 to close upon 10,000,000— this is not due to foreign 
immigration — "and can only be accounted for by the fact that con- 
ditions of life amid the mass of population are more favorable, mar- 
riages more frequent, families larger, infant mortality, which before 
kept the population at dead level, is less frequent, that the general 
health of the people has improved. To put the same idea in plainer 
words, the natives are better fed, better paid, better housed, better 
clothed," etc. 

That, I think, is rather pertinent to our probable status in the 
Philippines. 

I made the following jottings of a trip over the line of the only rail- 
road in the islands: 

On Saturday, September 3, upon the invitation of Mr. Higgins, manager of the 
Manila railroad, who furnished his private observation car, and of Mr. Wood, of 
the firm of Smith, Bell & Co., who was our host, the party, consisting of Major 
Bement, Mr. Millet, Wood, Price, Higgins, and myself, made a trip over the line 
of the railroad, leaving at about 10 in the morning. One hundred and twenty- 
three miles of railroad in fair order, telegraphic communications destroyed in 
many places, probably requiring a month for their restoration. 

The line runs through a country of most extraordinary fertility. Rice is the 
principal product, much sugar, possibilities of cotton, coffee, or almost anything. 
A small amount of indigo is grown on the northern part of the line. The stations 
are at short intervals, in accordance with orders from the Spanish Government. 
It is a country of splendid productive power, almost all of it is at present under 



TREATY OF PEACE. 497 

cultivation. We spent the night at Baulista (Bayamban), where Smith, Bell, & 
Co., have a rice mill and a new house just completed, about 100 miles from 
Manila. At 7 the next morning we started for Dagupan, a different country, 
prettier, high cocoanut palm trees, a house in one tree, and on the whole the pret- 
tiest scenery I have yet seen in Luzon. At Dagupan we saw about 250 insurgents 
on the cars en route to Tarlac, one of the headquarters. The station is almost 
totally destroyed, uselessly, by the Spaniards in one of their battles. 

The insurrectionists practically hold all of the country between Caloocan, 3 
miles from Manila, and the road's terminus; but they are nowhere in evidence in 
great numbers. The plan seems to be to have one or two men on duty, while the 
others in numbers of fifty or so concentrate in the small pueblos in which the 
country abounds. At Malinta, about 6 miles out, a new fort and small earth- 
works were being prepared; at Angelos, two stone barricades. 

Though everyone expresses a doubt as to unanimity and cohesion in the rebel 
ranks, I think Aguinaldo has a comprehensive plan. His influence is constantly 
apparent and his orders, in the main, respected by the offeers and soldiers. One 
colonel, formerly a general (Gregorio Mayor), was waiting at the station for the 
the train, that he might report at Cavite to Aguinaldo, under the latter's orders; 
and a commission from the latter, the chief of which we saw about 85 miles from 
Manila, had just succeeded in making an alliance with the leaders of the Iglesia, 
an independent band computed at 5,000 and organized by the priests and under 
their domination, in opposition to the insurgents. 

It is impossible to forecast how far the natives will adhere to Aguinaldo, but 
any little show of force and good government by us will, I think, put these prov- 
inces in a tractable condition and result in peace and increased prosperity for all 
concerned. The people want peace. They have had enough fighting and dis- 
turbance, and will be happy in a firm and just control. 

The country on the railroad is divided into four zones or military districts: the 
southern, from Caloocan to Polo, commanded by Gen. Pantaleon Garcia; the 
next, from Polo to Calumpit, by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar; the next, from Calum- 
pit to Paruao, by Thomas Mascardo, and the northern, from Paruao to Dagupan, 
by Macabulus. 

There are about 450 Spanish prisoners at Tarlac, and, strange to say, they are 
receiving good treatment. A few (six or seven) are at Gerona, among these two 
governors of provinces. 

The following extensions and new lines are under consideration by the railroad 
company and would be most valuable in the development of the island of Luzon: 
First, Manila to Batangas, south; second, Dagupan to Laoag, north; third, a 
branch, Gerona to Alliaga, 18 miles; fourth, a branch from Guiginto to the 
Cagayan Valley for the tobacco district. 

Manila is naturally a healthy place, and the sanitary reforms necessary are very 
easy, especially as compared with much of the work in the east, particularly at 
Rangoon, the chief town of Lower Burma. 

Tne islands have a small population when their area is considered. Luzon, 
larger than England, has only about 3,500,000, or a little over one-tenth of 
England's; Panay, 2,000,000; Negrosand Cebu, 1,500,000; Mindanao, 2,000,000. 

The Chairman : 

Q. Mindanao 2,000,000? — A. That is what was stated to me. 

Q. That is beyond any estimate we have had. — A. I think it is all 
conjecture. No one lias been through there to know about it. These 
figures were given to me by Neil MacLeod, esq., large owner and 
manager of the Compania Marftima, the important steamship com- 
pany, engaged in interisland and coast trade. 

statement — resumed. 

If any sensible nation governs those islands for the purposes of 
development, a bureau of science, with the ablest chief and staff to be 
obtained, should at once be established, this to comprehend depart- 
ments of geology, zoology, botany, and ethnology. The results obtained 
will be great and surprising. Also a land and forestry commission or 
a department of lands, surveys, and works. There are immense tracts 
to fall into the hands of the Government, which could be sold or leased, 
all of which possibilities have received no attention from the Spaniards. 
T P 32 



498 TREATY OP PEACE. 

I went to Manila without prejudice against the Spaniards there, 
perhaps a little doubtful, on account of the Maine massacre, for 
which, up to the time of the finding of the court of inquiry, I had 
been unwilling to believe that Spain was responsible, but testimony 
from all classes of people, English merchants, the general manager of 
the railway, also the general manager of the cable company (both of 
the last married Spanish women), a Frenchman and his wife, the 
advertisements in the papers, their treatment of their dead, their 
actions in battle and in civil administration, all convince me that they 
are without principle or courage, and brutally, wickedly cruel, with 
no improvement on three hundred and twenty-five years ago in the 
days of Philip II. The bones (skulls, arms, legs) of their dead lie 
without the honor of a covering of earth, exposed in their fashiona- 
ble cemetery, exhumed on account of a failure by their descendants to 
pay rent for the tomb. The shooting in the Luneta (their favorite 
driveway) of dozens of so-called "rebels" and conspirators, notably 
Dr. Rizal, a man of Uterary merit, with no trial, vague charges of 
belonging to secret societies, with the hope of making their victims 
confess to what, in many cases, did not exist, was made a fete, adver- 
tised in the papers, "There will be music," and I have been frequently 
told that women and children attended in their carriages. The tortures 
inflicted with the same, view of eliciting confessions, are too brutal to 
commit the narrative to paper. 

I have brought from Manila for the inspection of the Commissioners 
four carvings in wood representing tortures inflicted by the Spaniards 
upon the natives. They were executed by Bonifacio Arevelo, who is 
now practicing as a dentist in Manila. He is a man of fine presence, 
benevolent aspect, not sensational at all in his utterances, and in sub- 
mitting them to me he wrote the wish that upon reaching Paris I 
would not forget that the Filipinos begged me to use my efforts to 
convince all concerned of the utter impossibility of the return by them 
to Spanish domination. He also gives a description of the models: 

Figure No. 1. — This figure represents the chastisement which one 
of the municipal authorities of Jaen (Nueva Ecija) suffered in the 
prison of that town, the Spanish employees of the prison entertaining 
themselves by applying the most horrible tortures. 

Figure No. 2. — This represents an honorably and peaceably inclined 
resident in a village of the province of Nueva Ecija, taken prisoner, 
brutally treated for being suspected, without cause, of belonging to 
the Katipunan, and afterwards shot. 

Figure No. S. — This figure represents one of the many natives of 
the PhiUppines whom, during the late insurrection, the Spaniards shot 
without previous trial, in the outskirts of the village, leaving their 
corpses without burial. 

Figure No. 4- — This figure represents Mr. Moses Salvador, a young 
Tagalo, who studied several years in Europe. He is a native of Manila, 
and was imprisoned in September, 1896, for being a Freemason, was 
horribly martyrized in the headquarters of the police, and, after many 
months of imprisonment, was shot by order of the Spanish General 
Polavieja in the Luneta, in company with several of his countrymen, 
all condemned on the same charge, of which several were absolutely 
innocent. 

The opinion of Alexandre Dumas, sr., in regard to the Spaniards 
was often quoted in the Philippines, that they possess "honor without 
honesty, religion without morality, pride with nothing to be proud of." 

The rapacity, stealing, and immoralities of the priests are beyond 






TREATY OF PEACE. 499 

question, and the bitterness of the natives against them has been 
caused and aggravated by years of iniquity. To demand a wife or 
daughter from a native has been a common occurrence. Failing to 
obtain acquiescence, the husband's or father's goods have been seized, 
he deported or thrown into jail, under an order easily obtained from 
the government in Manila. The priests' influence was paramount — 
they are rich, and fathers (not only of the church), despised and hated 
by the people. 

The inefficiency, to put it mildly, of the Spaniards in war has been 
so clearly demonstrated in this war that I will call attention only to 
the facts in Manila Bay and the defenses of the town. When it was 
absolutely known by everyone there, on the last day of April, that 
our ships were on the way and very near, that night many of their 
naval officers spent in town, far from the fleet. All their ships were 
destroyed, and every man of the American fleet (except one upon 
whom some heavy metal on one of our ships fell) reported for duty 
the next day. And yet Admiral Montijo applied to Dewey for a cer- 
tificate of good conduct on that occasion to show to the Madrid author- 
ities, who lately ordered him home. v 

Their inefficiency (and the creditable work of the insurgents as J 
well) is further proved by the fact that they were driven by the 
natives from Cavite 20 odd miles into the defenses of Manila, with 
never a successful attack, never a capture of arms or men. All the 
success was on the native side, and yet the Spaniards surrendered 
between 7,000 and 8,000 men, well armed, plenty of ammunition, and 
in good phjrsical condition. The excuse of the latter may be that 
their enemy was in small bands — but they never captured one of 
these — and the small bands drove them to their walls. Jaudenes, the 
acting Captain-General, in reply to Merritt and Dewey's notice to 
remove his noncombatants, acknowledged that the insurrectionists 
surrounded the city, and that he could not move women, children, 
etc., out. (His fear and solicitude about the natives entering the 
city when I received the surrender of Manila were almost painful to 
witness.) This admission demonstrates as well the military ability 
shown by the Filipinos, whose characteristics I will now enumerate. 

Aguinaldo went to Cavite, under the permission of Admiral Dewey, 
in reply to a telegram sent by Spencer Pratt, esq., our consul-general 
at Singapore, who offered that chief money for his expenses. The 
offer was declined. After arrival (on one of our ships) he went ashore, 
accompanied by 13 staff officers, to organize his army; but no adher- 
ents appeared the first day, and Aguinaldo, rather discouraged, medi- 
tated returning to Hongkong. I think Dewey advised him to make 
another effort, at the same time saying that he must leave the public 
buildings at Cavite, where he had made his headquarters. Soon, from 
across the bay and from all sides, men gathered. The fact that Dewey 
permitted the armed men to move from the surrounding districts and 
for the rebels to take arms (not many, says the Admiral) in the arsenal 
was the only help we gave him, excepting, of course, the most impor- 
tant destruction of the Spanish navy. From that time the military 
operations and the conduct of the insurgents have been most credit- 
able. Positions taken and the movements of troops show great ability 
on the part of some leader — I do not say it was necessarily Aguinaldo,/ 
but he gave the directions. 

The Chairman: 
Q. How many men did he get together? — A. His forces went around 
the city, taking the waterworks and the north part of the city, and 



500 TREATY OF PEACE. 

running up the railroad. I asked that question of several, and the 
opinions differed widely— all the way from 8,000 to 30,000 or 40,000 
men. 

Q. Do you think he had as many as 8,000 men before the surren- 
der? — A. Yes, sir; the environment of the city took a great many 
men. There is a vast extent of country there, including the water- 
works and running around the city, and they certainly had to have 
more than that to do so. 

Q. How many arms did Dewey turn over to them? — A. I never 
knew exactly. I asked him that question and he said a very few. 

Q. Where did they get the rest of their arms? — A. Some captured 
from the Spanish, some brought to him by deserters, and there were 
some shipments of arms from Hongkong — I believe Americans brought 
them in — and they have lately taken some to Batangas in the southern 
part, and have taken some new Maxim guns in there, too. 

Mr Gray: 

Q. To the insurgents? — A. Yes. 

Q. Since the capitulation? — A. Yes; they changed the name of a 
vessel and used it. She had had a Luzon name, the Pasig, and they 
changed it to the Abby. Dewey sent down and seized the boat, and 
the insurgents followed to Manila Bay, hoping to reclaim it. In other 
respects their demands, from their point of view, have not been 
unreasonable, and show a proper appreciation of the status. 

STATEMENT RESUMED. 

The day after the surrender (August 13) four representatives of 
Aguinaldo called on General Merritt, who assured them in general 
terms that "we are the friends of the Filipinos." At that time they 
occupied a portion of Manila. We soon demanded that they should 
give that up, to which Aguinaldo's representative agreed, but in 
seeking confirmation from him the condition was made that in case 
we gave up the country they should be restored to the positions then 
occupied and which they had taken greatly by their own merits. 
However, matters have been" amicably settled. Aguinaldo's head- 
quarters are at Malolos, 23 miles up the railroad. His troops control 
all the settled part of the island (except Manila), as well as much of 
the southern country. • 

The Chairman: 

Q. What do you mean by the "southern country" — those islands 
)elow? — A. Yes. 

Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of the 
praise of all the world. With hatred of priests and Spaniards, fairly 
held on account of the conditions before narrated, and with every 
justification to a savage mind for the most brutal revenge, I have 
heard no instance of torture, murder, or brutality since we have been 
in the country. 

The Chairman: 
Q. Did you ever talk with Admiral Dewey about his relations with 
Aguinaldo? — A. Yes, sir. He read me a copy of his dispatch in 
answer to the one in which he is asked the question whether he had 
made any promises, and he said he had not. Aguinaldo went down 
with his concurrence, without doubt, and the Admiral allowed armed 
people to cross the bay and join him and made no remonstrance. 






TREATY OP PEACE. 501 

Q. Did he furnish him any arms? — A. He says not, except the few 
furnished them from Cavite. Foreman, in his article, makes the state- 
ment that he has a treaty with Aguinaldo, and I went one morning 
and left the article with the Admiral to read, and he said it was not 
true. 

Q. This relation — whatever Admiral Dewey did — took place before 
he got the dispatch of inquiry from the Navy Department — some time 
before? — A. Yes. 

Q. How far does the Admiral say he encouraged Aguinaldo? — A. 
I do not think he says he gave him any encouragement, except that 
he rather dissuaded him from returning to Hongkong when he was 
discouraged. 

Q. Did you get that statement from Dewey? — A. Yes. Aguinaldo 
was rather discouraged when any of the people failed to come to his 
banner on the first day. That dispatch also included a statement 
that he knew well the Filipinos and the Cubans, and that the Filipinos 
were a far superior people — I think that was in that dispatch; it was 
in one. 

Mr. Frye: 
Q. Were they of material assistance to us? — A. Very great. If the 
protocol had not been signed I think the Spanish at home would have 
insisted upon their army doing something. They dismissed AugustLn 
because he was not disposed to fight, and I think if they had not had 
this experience of having been driven back into the city and the water 
cut off, so even that Jaudenes said he could not remove his noncom- 
batants, the Government would have insisted on his making a fight, 
and he could have made a very good one, for his position was strong, 
if they had any fight in them at all. But every place had been taken 
from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and occupa- 
tion of the country in an able manner. 

The Chairman: 
Q. The insurrection had been ended in December, 1897, by an t 
arrangement under which money was paid in Hongkong and certain I 
reforms promised. Were these promises ever carried out? — A. Not! 
at all, and Primo de Rivera stated lately in the Cortes that he never 
made any. I was surprised at reading that statement. 

STATEMENT RESUMED. 

I talked with Spanish prisoners at Tarlac, an important military 
station on the line of the railroad, and they said that they had had 
good treatment only. The wives of two officers had lately visited their 
husbands in jail (one at Dagupan, 123 miles north), and gave same 
testimony. Aguinaldo, in a letter of August 1 to our late consul at 
Manila, Mr. Williams, said, "Say to the Government at Washington 
that the Filipinos people abominate savagery; that in the midst of 
their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, 
and civil life." I believe the natives to be brave (under good leader-* 
ship), most tolerant of fatigue and hunger, and amenable to command! 
and discipline, if justice and fair dealing rule. They are very tem- 
perate, as most of the natives of the East are. I have never seen a 
drunken one, and this with the example of our soldiers, whom they 
imitate in everything else; very quiet, no loud quarrels, very good 
house servants and cooks. 



502 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Their skill in trades, occupations, and professions is very great. 
Critics will call this imitation, but imitation of good things is not 
reprehensible. I refer now to the common people, and so will omit 
very able lawyers (one or two having ranked as the best of all nation- 
alties in the Philippines), and the higher professions. 

As accountants, they are excellent. In the custom-house sixty (more 
before) were employed during my administration. Any information 
desired, say the amount of imports and exports of last year, kind of 
articles, whence obtained, and where going, duties, etc., was sought 
from them, and the reply was always given in writing in a neat, satis- 
factory manner. All the cash was received by a native — $1,020,000, 
from August 22 to October 21, much of this in silver — all counterfeits 
and filled dollars were detected at once by his skill, and only $1 was 
returned to us from the banks. His neighbor, who kept the record of 
receipts, was most systematic and able. The Spaniards depended 
absolutely on them for the clerical work of the office, and the same 
in the other departments. 

I visited three factories for the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes : 
First, that of H. J. Andrews & Co., where 150 to 200 natives were 
employed ; second, the Alhambra, which had 300 in April, now 600 ; 
third, the Insular, with 2,000. The Tabacallera, largely owned in 
Paris, I was unable to see ; it has 4,000. These working people seemed 
to me of the best — quiet, diligent, skillful. The same qualities were 
apparent in the one cotton mill of the place, where at least 200 were 
employed. 

As mariners, quartermasters of large boats, and managers of small 
ones, their skill has been proverbial over the East for years, and we 
had great opportunities during our three weeks in the bay of proving 
their abibty and cleverness. 

Manila straw hats have been famous for years; also pina cloth and 
jusi cloth, the former made of pineapple fiber and the latter made of 
pineapple fiber and hemp. 

The station masters and employees of the Manila Railway compare 
favorably with any I have ever seen at ordinary way stations. Clean, 
neat, prompt, well disciplined, their superiority is largely due to 
excellence of the general manager, Mr. Higgins, a man of great ability. 
Still the quality is in the men. The three servants in his house (on 
the line) have all learned telegraphy by observation and imitation. 

I have also some fine samples of their embroidery. 

They are admittedly extraordinary musicians, and their orchestras 
and bands have found places all over the East, playing without notes 
with great harmony and sweetness. It seems to be instinct, and is all 
instrumental, with little or no vocal talent. All these accomplish- 
ments do not argue greatness, but they do show that they are some- 
thing more than ignorant and brutal savages. I do not mean to 
ascribe to them all the virtues — they may be bars and thieves, it is a 
wonder they are not worse after the environment and example of 
centuries — but to my mind they are the best of any barbaric or 
uncivilized race I have ever seen, and open, I trust, to a wonderful 
development. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. Is Mr. Higgins an Englishman or an American? — A. An Eng- 
lishman. The railroad is an Enghsh one. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 503 

STATEMENT RESUMED. 

And now comes the vital question, What is be done with these 
islands, and, if we hold them, what form of government is to prevail? 
Whatever grave doubts one may have as to colonial extension on the 
part of America, we have gone too far, either by design or chance, to 
recede. It can not be denied that we owe it as a duty to the natives 
and to humanity that the islands should not bo restored to Spain 
(even if they were they could not be held for a year). Any division 
of them is absolutely impracticable. This would induce constant 
friction, the ruin of Manila as the great commercial center; the impor- 
tant products would be shipped direct from the southern islands and 
goods sent directly there in exchange. One owner must hold the 
whole country and prescribe uniform duties and government. 

I will digress here to say that the British at Manila, at Hongkong, 
Singapore — all over the East — are more than anxious we shall hold 
the islands. There is such a contrast in the expression of good will 
and admiration of our country with the feelings of only a few years 
ago. It seems to me that everyday for the last six weeks some 
Englishman has said to me in the strongest terms, "There should be 
an Anglo-American alliance." They speak in the warmest terms of 
praise and surprise at our moderation, absence of looting, thefts, and 
every kind of outrage after the taking of Manila. Strange that they 
should make so much of a thing which, to our officers and people, 
seemed so obviously the proper and necessary thing. A few days 
before the surrender some British and other merchants and bankers 
came to our transports, asking from General Merritt safeguards, or 
the assurance of protection for the houses and persons of foreign resi 
dents. I assured Mr. Wood, at the head of one of the largest houses 
(Smith, Bell & Co.), that they were in no danger. Noticing a look of 
incredulity, I said: "You don't believe me?" "Well, I think the men 
getting away from their officers will take possession of the spirit shops 
and commit outrages." I replied: "It is not possible; it is not in 
accord with the temper of our people. If you will consider our civil 
war, where after the terrible losses, running over four years, no pun- 
ishment of a single person or appropriation of property was made, 
you may believe that we shall behave in no other way as the result of 
this little affair." I doubt if anything has inspired so much the 
respect of foreigners for us as this, which seems to me so natural a 
thing. . 

To take all the islands and ignore the natives would be impracti-[| 
cable-an d unwis or — ~~ — — — W 

On October 25 I went, in the company of H. L. Higgins, general 
manager of the Manila Railway, Limited, to Malolos for an interview 
arranged the day before with Aguinaldo. I found his headquarters 
were in a very nice house, ten minutes' drive from the railway station ; 
a guard of twenty or thirty soldiers in the courtyard below. 

We were soon ushered by one of his officers, who spoke English, to 
the waiting room upstairs, and I met Buen Camino, a wise-looking 
counselor, whom I met at Ayuntamiento the day after the fall of 
Manila. He carried us to the presence of the insurgent leader and 
president, who was dressed, contrary to his usual daily garb, in a 
black smoking- jacket, of low-cut waistcoat and trousers, both black, 
large white tie — in fact, the evening dress common at our clubs and 
during the summer. 



504 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Buen Camino left us. I started the talk by announcing to Agui- 
naldo that I was to leave in a few days to appear before the Peace 
Commission, and that I had a very friendly feeling for the Filipinos 
and admiration for many of their good qualities, their quiet, cleanli- 
ness, temperance, and great imitative power, and a possibility of 
learning almost any profession or business; that I would like to be 
able to present to the Commission his and his people's views and 
demands and what relation they expected to hold to the United 
States in case we decided to keep the islands. 

Aguinaldo replied, rather naively, that his people were divided into 
two parties — those in favor of absolute independence and those of an 
American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that he is 
waiting to see who will have the majority, in that case to take his 
position. I pointed out to him that it would probably be useless to 
try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to any change of 
opinion, but they must consider that they are without any navy and 
without capital, which is greatly needed for the development of the 
country; that the Philippine government alone did not possess the 
element of strength to insure the retention of the islands without the 
assistance of other governments. They would be at the mercy of any 
of half a dozen powers striving to take either a part or the whole 
of the islands, and they must consider that their greatest prosperity 
would come by the gradual accession of power under American 
auspices. 

He said: "But the civilized nations of the world would see that our 
possessions were not taken from us." I replied: " How has it been 
in China, where England, Russia, France, Germany, etc., all strive to 
control territory?" To this he could make no reply. I further asked 
what that side would expect America, acting the role of protector, to 
do. He said: "To furnish the navy, while the Filipinos held all the 
country and administered civil offices with its own people." "And 
what then would America get from this," said I. "That would be a 
detail," he said, "which would be settled hereafter." 

I asked how far they controlled Luzon and other islands. "Almost 
entirely," he said. That the different bands, Little by little, were 
expressing their desire to join him. The Igorrottos had sent in some 
of their leaders the day before and were acting with him. That he 
had had three representatives from Iloilo within a few days on the 
same mission. 

We pursued all this subject of a protectorate for some time without 
getting any nearer any satisfactory result. Mr. Higgins felt that 
Aguinaldo had been simply repeating a lesson, but I did not feel so 
sure of that. He said that he had had many Americans to interview 
him, most of them reporters, I fancy, and he had always told them 
the same thing. Thereupon I stated that this was quite a different 
case. "I am ordered, as an officer of the United States Army, to pro- 
ceed to Paris and give evidence on points which may be of vital inter- 
est to you. " After that his tone was different. Buen Camino returned, 
and Aguinaldo reported to him everything he had said to us. After 
a Little talk between the two, Buen Camino said he, and he was sure 
the president, was in favor of an American protectorate, and seemed 
to approve the suggestion that we should have the nucleus of an army; 
that his people should be joined to it, filling the places of minor offi- 
cers; and the possibility and the hope within a few years that they 
should fill tho most important civil and military functions. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 505 

Buen Camino said I could be certain that if a protectorate were 
granted that they would do their best to have it accepted by their 
people on the lines that I have stated, agreeing with me fully that to 
hold one island and giving the others to other powers would be most 
unfortunate, and not to be considered. 

They expressed pleasure at my having come to them, feeling that 
they had been rather neglected by the Americans. 

This I dictated hastily just after the visit, and it does not give the 
impression which the interview left upon me — a great desire for our 
protection, for the improvement of their people materially and intel- 
lectually, the wish to send their young people to America for 
education. 

Subsequently (October 31, the day I left Manila) he sent three 
officers to me with the friendliest messages, expressing the wish that 
I should use my best influence with the commission in their favor. 

Many methods of government, with them as allies or subjects, are 
possible. I had often thought that it might be expedient at first to 
admit them to some of the minor offices in army and civil govern- 
ment, and if they show capacity, to enlarge their powers and oppor- 
tunities, until finally they should have entire control, after proper 
compensation or an agreed subjection to us for our work and 
assistance to them. But, and I hope that I shall not be considered 
English mad in my deference to their practice, the result of so many 
years of successful colonial government — I am told by a governor of 
one of their colonies, Sir William McGregor, when I suggested such 
a course, that they have never thought it safe or expedient, when 
they have a colony of so many (in this case millions) of blacks, and so 
few white men, to intrust the government to the former. If of whites, 
as in Australia, yes, after trial trust the government to them, with 
what are practically supervising, or perhaps honorary governors, who 
maintain the connection with the mother or controlling country. 

It will be admitted that England has been the only successful 
administrator of colonial government in the world. Holland has had 
a great career, but possibly things are not so well with it just now in 
Java and Sumatra; at any rate, it is not comparable to England. 
"The British colonial empire comprises forty distinct and independent 
governments, besides a number of scattered dependencies under the 
dominion of protection of the Queen." "Of the forty, eleven have 
elected assemblies and responsible governments." The other twenty- 
nine are divided into three classes: (1) No legislative council; legis- 
lative power delegated to officer administering the government, with, 
in most cases, power reserved by Crown of legislating by order in 
council. (2) Legislative council nominated by the Crown, with some 
power reserved, as in No. 1. (3) Legislative council partly elected, 
with reserve power in three countries, no general power reserved in 
five. 

The different conditions of country, races, traditions, etc., have 
made absolutely different laws necessary — one country a gold cur- 
rency, others silver; free trade, open ports, tariffs, duties, internal 
and personal taxation prevail without following any precedents or 
existing laws of England, varying throughout the colonies. 

Field-Marshal Roberts ("Forty-one years in India") says: 

It is difficult for people who know nothing of natives to understand and appre- 
ciate the value they set on cherished custom, peculiar idiosyncrasies, and fixed 
prejudices, all of which must be carefully studied by those who are placed in the 
position of their rulers, if the suzerain power is to keep their respect and gain 



506 TREATY OF PEACE. 

their gratitude and affection. The natives of India (and I think this is true of the 
Filipinos) are particularly observant of character and intelligent in gauging th6 
capabilities of those who govern them; and it is because the English Government 
is trusted that a mere handful of Englishmen are able to direct the administra- 
tion of a country with nearly three hundred millions of inhabitants, differing in 
race, religion, and manners of life. Throughout all the changes which India has 
undergone, political and social, during the present century this feeling has been 
maintained, and it will last so long as the services are filled by honorable men, 
who sympathize with the natives, respect their prejudices, and do not interfere 
unnecessarily with their habits and customs. 

The condition exists in very many colonies, that hundreds of thou- 
sands of natives are governed with a handful of soldiers — in many 
cases with none. The moral influence, justice, and fair dealing rule. 

This we may be able to accomplish in the Philippines, but we must 
have a colonial service; and to make this effective changes of officers 
must not be made with every change of government. There must be 
the surety of promotion to induce a good man to live — often alone — 
so far from home and in such a climate. Good pay for civil and mili- 
tary officers is most essential; and here I quote an article on this sub- 
ject from the Spectator of September 24, 1898: 

First of all, the Americans must realize that they are now face to face with a 
military problem which can not be solved by makeshifts. No doubt in the civil 
war they did wonders by means of makeshifts, but then the country was on fire 
with energy, and the theater of operations was, after all, a comparatively small 
one, or, at any rate, all on the settled portions of the North American continent. 
Makeshifts will not avail to keep 90,000 men, scattered from the Philippines to 
Cuba, regularly supplied with the munitions of war and with those " reliefs " that 
are essential to the welfare of an army when in foreign places and in unhealthy 
climates. The wastage in this army of 90,000 men caused by death, by disease, 
and owing to a short term of enlistment, will be very great, and the gaps will con- 
stantly have to be filled from America. That there will be little trouble in finding 
new recruits we are well aware, but it is not finding the recruit that is the diffi- 
culty. When he is enrolled he will have to be equipped and transported to the 
place where he is needed, possibly a hitherto unsurv eyed island in the southeastern 
Pacific. But this means an elaborate system of transports and a relief system 
such as exists in the British army, with probably 6,000 or 7,000 soldiers always 
afloat, either coming home or going out to America's new colonial empire. 

All this, of course, presents no insoluble problem, but it does present one which 
will have to be tackled in earnest, unless there is to be a serious breakdown. Mil- 
itary organization means primarily an efficient headquarters staff, and this the 
the Americans will have to provide as quickly as they can. They have in' their 
West Point officers as good material as exists in the world, but for the moment 
the supply is by no means equal to the demand. Still, Americans learn new work 
with extraordinary rapidity; and if only young men, and not "fossils," are put at 
the head of departments, things will soon shake down. As we have found in 
Egypt, if you are only careful to put the right men at the top and give them a 
free hand, they will soon discover and develop efficient subordinates. 

There is yet another point most vitally connected with the efficiency of a large 
military force stationed abroad and in tropical and half -savage places to which 
the Americans must give attention. They must pay their military officers well. 
Pay on what is practically active service in the Tropics ought to be double what 
it is at home. The colonels, captains, and even subalterns in Cuba and the 
Philippines will be set to do most arduous and responsible work; and if good 
work is to be done, they must be well paid. There is no truer maxim in state- 
craft than that power will be paid. If it is not paid officially, it will sooner or 
later pay itself. But such self -payment means ruin and demoralization. That 
the private soldiers will be liberally treated goes without saying. What is not so 
certain is that the American people will realize that the officers to whom immense 
powers will be given must also be paid in proportion. Good salaries are the only 
instruments which can be permanently relied on to kill corruption, and it is abso- 
lutely essential that America should start her new colonial empire free from the 
slightest taint of corruption. If the salaries are good, it will be possible to intro- 
duce stringent rules against executive officers holding land or engaging in any 
kind of speculation in the regions which they are occupying. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 507 

It is to such rules, coupled with good salaries, that in the last resort we owe our 
success in India. Put an American officer, civil or military, in a great position of 
trust and responsibility in some outlying district in the Philippines where his word 
will virtually be law, and pay him well and make it a matter of honor that he 
shall get no indirect gain from his position, and he will turn out a Lawrence. 
Give the same man poor pay, and expose him, as he must be exposed, to great 
temptations in the way of illicit gain, and you will in practice be unable to main- 
tain a high standard of official duty. The Americans must not be misled by the 
fact that they will be able to get plenty of men, and apparently sound men, at 
small salaries. As Lord Cornwallis told his masters in the East India Company, 
they could get a dozen men to be governor-general for no salary at all, but that did 
show that it would be wise not to give their governor-nni-Tal proper remunera- 
tion. Depend upon it, this apparently simple matter of salaries is of the utmost 
importance. If a man has a good salary, and therefore a desirable post, he has a 
perpetual reminder that he has forfeited any right to private gain. If he is inade- 
quately paid, he has a sense of grievance and tells himself when he is tempted 
that he has a moral right to do for himself what the country ought to have done 
for him. 

Side by side with the problem of military organization, and closely allied to it, 
is the problem of civil administration. Very soon after the troops have taken 
possession of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines there will be an urgent need 
for civil administrators, including judges, of all kinds. Here, again, the need for 
a satisfactory tenure of office and high salaries will become urgent, more urgent, 
indeed, than in the case of the soldiers, who are always largely protected by the 
sense of esprit de corps. It is in reference to this question of how to provide these 
civil administrators that we see the only signs of hopelessness and pessimism that 
have yet been exhibited by the Americans. Grave Americans of experience and 
high standing are apt to say that they do not see where or how they are to obtain 
men of the kind we obtain for the Indian civil service. The material, they infer, 
does not exist. We do not believe it for a moment. The material does exist, 
only as yet it is in the raw. It will be the duty of America, in the course of the 
next few years, to develop a body of Indian civilians — men who, if turned into a 
tropical swamp or forest and told to organize a government and administer it, 
will do so straight away. 

No doubt making a start will be a difficulty; but that once made, a tradition of 
good service will soon develop, and thousands of young men will come forward. 
After all, the States have never found any difficulty in filling West Point and 
tbeir Naval College, and exactly the same stamp of man will do for civilian work. 
Look, too, at the success of the American missionaries. The same zeal and the 
willingness to work away from home among savages and semisavages will, we 
are certain, be placed at the disposal of the state. The men who fill our Indian 
civil service are mainly the sons of naval and military officers, of professors, of 
schoolmasters, of doctors, and, above all, of clergymen. All these classes are to 
be found in the States, and when once the need and the opportunity are realized 
they will give their sons to the service of the state. Only one thing is necessary — 
the parent who thinks of bringing up a son for imperial work must be made to 
feel that his boy will have a real career open to him, good pay, a secure tenure of 
his post, a pension when he retires, and an office conveying a certain amount of 
distinction and consideration. When America has developed, as we believe she 
will develop, a class of civilians, she will have added a most valuable element to 
her population. Once create a high standard of administration in Cuba and the 
Philippines, and the effects will be felt in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. 

A form of government (among the many) worthy of consideration is : 
1. A governor with an executive council of six members, say, 

Official members of legislative council: 

Colonial secretary (lieutenant-governor). 

Treasurer. 

Attorney-general. 

Commanding officer of army. 

Commanding officer of navy. 

Commissioner of lands, or collector of customs, 

and also six unofficial members. 

The official members in many cases are advisory only, but must 
vote in legislative council with the governor. In many oases " To the 
natives a large share of self-government has been conceded ; their sys- 



508 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tern of village and district councils has been recognized and improved 
and supplemented by an annual meeting of the high chiefs and rep- 
resentatives from each province, presided over by the governor. The 
regulations recommended by these bodies have, however, to receive 
the sanction of the legislative council before acquiring the force of 
law." 

To this should be added a commissioner or minister of native affairs, 
with a salary which should impart a dignity and importance to the 
office, which should be purely advisory and given to one of their 
leaders. 

2. Or, like the government of Ceylon, "administered by a gov- 
ernor, aided bj 7 an executive council of five members and a legisla- 
tive council of eighteen, including the governor and executive council. 
The legislative council contains representatives of the principal races 
and interests in the island. For administrative purposes the island 
is divided into nine provinces, at the head of each of which there is 
a government agent. The larger towns have a local board, and in 
the country districts" (of which the Philippines will mainly consist) 
"the natives retain their village councils and tribunals for matters of 
minor importance." 

I believe that it will be an easy matter to secure the loyalty and 
fidelity of the natives, with the maintenance by us of a small and 
J very quickly decreasing army. If we attempt the unwise thing of 
I ignoring the natives, an army of 50,000 men will be none too small, 
including the exploration and absolute control of the southern islands 
and government of the whole of all of them. Enlisting the natives, 
and giving them what is very small food and pay compared with our 
allowances, will make a good army of any size we wish, easily subdue 
any hostile tribes, open all the country, and reduce our present force 
of 20,000 to 10,000 men. I am confident, after a short time, to very 
much less. 

In connection with the settlement of the question of form of gov- 
ernment will come necessary legislation in the four most important 
questions of currency, revenue, opium, and the admission of the 
Chinese. That silver must remain the currency for a long time seems 
certain. This is a question (apart from whatever views we entertain 
on a gold standard or bimetallism) on which it would be difficult to 
educate the natives to the belief that our silver dollar is worth double 
the Mexican of the same weight and fineness, so an attempt to intro- 
duce it would result in double wages and cost of products; hence, 
though the British are as tenacious as anyone of the gold standard of 
currency, by an order in council in 1894 a British dollar was author- 
ized to be issued for circulation in the East. It is identical in weight 
and fineness with the Japanese yen (same as Mexican dollar), and has 
been made legal tender in Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, and 
Labuan. Notes payable in this are issued by the Hongkong and Shang- 
hai Bank, the manager of which, with its twenty-six branches, the 
recognized authority in the East, expressed to me the opinion that we 
might to advantage repeat the experiment with the trade dollar in the 
Philippines. 

I have no doubt that it will be a popular and successful currency, 
and an American bank of issue, abundantly secured, will be of great 
utility and preclude the cumbrous method of handling such masses of 
silver; but the question, as well as the other three, on all of which 
the wisest differ, should be considered by a commission of experts. 
This especially in regard to revenue. Shall we have an open gate, a 






TREATY OP PEACE. 509 

free port? Shall we discriminate in favor of American goods, a policy 
not successful with the French in Cochin China? They admit theii 
goods free there and have heavy duties on those of other countries at 
their four ports. Shall we have a land tax, source of the greatest 
revenue in India and the greatest permanent source of revenue in 
Egypt? 

I am inclined to believe in a personal tax, the peninsula system of 
a document of identity (cedula personal), which was adopted in 1884, 
and which, with some modifications, will be serviceable. These have 
ranged from $3 to 637.50. Of the higher amounts of taxation there 
seems to be no complaint. The lowest might be reduced to $1 or 
$1.50. The cedula serves as a passport, and must be produced by 
the interested parties to make legal documents effective, and is noted 
in the legal instrument. 

In Ceylon a salt tax, road tax, and tax on consumers of imported 
rice is levied, running from 2.12 rupees (75 cents) to 9.99 rupees 
($3.30), or a little more with a large family, the latter applying to 
males, the head of a family of five. This was practically the same 
contribution by the natives to the support of the government. 

Further, great revenue should come from opium and tax on Chinese 
admitted. The British opium commissioner decided in effect that the 
reported ill-effects of opium have been greatly exaggerated ; that it has 
not been a great injury to the Chinese as a nation, no more than spirits 
and tobacco have been to other countries. I have not the report at 
hand, but this is my impression. At all events the trade in it has not 
been suppressed and is a source of great revenue. In India, 7,000,000 
rupees; in Hongkong, a small area, $286,000 a year. To obtain this 
revenue by any import duty is impossible. Smuggling is too easy 
and the Chinese, the only consumers, too adroit. The farming sys- 
tem, selling by auction or by advertisement for public tenders the 
monopoly to the highest bidder, is the only method. For Manila and 
the adjoining district, $550,000 was received for the privilege for three 
years, and it is probable that a large sum in addition was paid to 
some officials. The farmer paid also a duty of 2 pesos per 100 kilos 
(220 pounds). Our Treasury officials, not being aware of the farming 
custom, in their new regulations simply left the 2 pesos duty, which 
would be less than $1 (gold) on 220 pounds, where the American would 
be $1,320. It would be absolutely impossible to collect any proper 
duty or prevent smuggling, but the farmer has been able to do this, 
and will be. 

Then the question of the admission of Chinese, with the strong 
arguments on both sides. The merchants of Manila are unanimous 
in their representations of the necessity for more coolie labor. They 
and many others require it in Manila, and think that it will be nec- 
essary in railroad building, and in the development of the country, 
saying, "There is no question of competing with American labor 
here, there being no such in the country, nor can there be, the climate 
prohibiting that. Cheap labor and plenty of it is the life blood of the 
Philippines. There is room for three to four millions of Chinese 
comfortably, while 90,000 is the present estimate." 

The Chairman: 
Q. Room for them where? — A. In the island of Luzon. "Were 
any road making, new railway, or agriculture work being done, a 
million would be absorbed at once, and next year another million, 
and so on." This is the argument of those favoring admission. 



. 



510 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Statement resumed : Taxes on the admission of these could be easily 
made $10. In fact, it has been $40; has run on for years at varying 
rates, and still the Chinaman will come. I have no doubt that many 
might be admitted to advantage ; probably there should be limitations 
as to tenure of stay, numbers, and character of employment and pur- 
suits. Then admission will be opposed by the natives, but it is my 
conviction that they can be brought in this, as in other matters, to 
look upon it in a reasonable light, after our determination as to what 
is expedient. 

With strength, firmness, justice, and fair dealing, we can do any- 
thing with the native, and make a happy and prosperous country 
beyond any present expectations. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. I would like to ask a question which occurs to me now. It was 
stated that one-half of the Spanish troops in the Philippine group 
was native. Do you know anything of that? — A. I think quite that. 
The best figures we could have at the time of the surrender and before 
that and pretty well carried out, was that they had between 13,500 
and 14,000 men at Manila. I asked Jaudenes how many Spaniards 
there were, and he said 7,500 to 8,000. We took 22,000 rifles, but 
many were in the arsenal. In the other islands the proportion would 
be greater than that. 

Q. How did they succeed while this war was going on — this insur- 
rection — in keeping these soldiers within their allegiance? — A. I think 
'' the way many of the insurgents got their arms was through desertions. 
But there were, of course, large numbers of men who had lived under 
Spanish rule and in contact with the Spaniards, who regarded the 
natives as a low order of people, the Spaniards as their masters, and 
they clung to them, as I suppose the negroes did in our civil war to 
their white masters. 

Q. What kind of soldiers did the natives make with the Span- 
iards? — A. I think very much the same as the army Aguinaldo had. 
The Spanish army made a most wretched showing when you come to 
think of it, for Aguinaldo to go there without a man and then to 
drive even 7,000 Spaniards alone 25 miles to their defenses. It is 
about as feeble as their naval conduct. 

Q. What proportion of native soldiers do you think it would be 
safe for us to have acting with our command, under white field 
officers but under native company officers, in our control of the Phi- 
lippine Islands? — A. I think the question of native company officers 
might have to be put off for some time, except the noncommissioned 
officers. I would first see what turn things took in that way. I think 
the Filipinos have had enough fighting and want peace, and they will 
gain respect for us, and I think in a little while it would require very 
few soldiers, possibly none. You take it in Burma. I talked with 
an Englishman on our steamer, who is deputy chief of police or dep- 
uty collector, and he said he had a considerable force under him and 
he was the only white man for 40 miles, and that he would not see 
another one for three months. 

Q. You think it would be safe to take half and half? — A. I think 
three to one would be safe. I think 10,000 men would soon suffice for 
us, and after a year it could be reduced to a much smaller number. 

Mr. Reid: 
Q. You would want the commissioned officers white just now? — 
A. Yes; I would let the civil offices go to some of them, and see how they 



TREATY OF PEACE. . 511 

got on, and I have no question of the result. In some of the English 
provinces they have a civil governor and a native governor. The 

moment the latter rebels at any action of the governor ho is speedily 
brought to agreement. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. In your judgment, from what you have seen of the islands, how 
near will the revenues of the islands support the government? — 
A. That is going to depend on which way you makjo the revenue, and 
also the expenses — how much the army and navy will cost. The 
custom-house gave last year — which was, I suppose, a wretched year 
for business — between four and five millions of revenue at Manila. 
The personal tax was a great source of revenue, and the real-estate 
tax and the licenses were very great. But with a laud tax and with 
a personal tax it is easy enough, without making it irksome, or without 
complaint, to pay the expenses of the islands. 

The Chairman: 

Q. And raise how much revenue? — A. That is hard to say. 

Q. They have been raising nine millions, we understand? — A. It 
should have been much more. Thefts and extortions prevailed. 
Monopolies were sold for which the Government received paltry sums; 
the concessions granted from Madrid, e. g., for the manufacture of 
beer, the sole privilege with immunity from all duties, the Govern- 
ment receiving only $120 a year. The largest tobacco company had 
most valuable privileges with apparent^ little payment. The opium 
monopoly for Manila and the adjoining province paid the very inade- 
quate amount of about $180,000 a year. Special fees pertaining to 
the custom-house, etc., were paid to the archbishop. 

Mr. Gray: 

Q. Those things have been stopped. How do they take it? — A. The 
merchants like it very much. 

Q. Are the priests making any difficulty? — A. No, sir; they are too 
frightened, and many of them have gone away. 

Mr. Frye: 

Q. Do you think they will go home, all of them? — A. The thing 
will be so much changed that there is no profit to them or danger 
from their remaining. 

Q. As I understand it, then, your opinion is that with a fair and 
reasonable imposition of taxes in the islands, and reasonable duties 
on imports, the islands will support themselves in all the forms of 
government necessary, military and civil? — A. I think certainly it 
will. I do not say that the first year it is going to do that; you have 
to give time for it; but I think there will be so much capital going 
into the place which will be willing to pay for privileges that it will 
only be a question of a short time. 

Mr. Reid: 

Q. Would it be possible, by a fair and reasonable tariff, equally 
applicable to the importation of all nations, collected at the principal 
custom-houses there, to raise money enough to administer the govern- 
ment? — A. A tariff alone? 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. On imports and exports? 

Q. On imports alone. — A. I should rather doubt that. But I've 
never heard complaints of the export charges, and very likely those, 



512 TREATY OF PEACE. 

with the imports, will suffice. I do not see any objection to the cedula 
tax. 

Q. Has not that been the one of which the most complaint was 
made? — A. It has been too high; I think that is the reason. I do not 
see the objection to the land tax. See how well it has worked in 
Egypt, and in India. Dicey says in his article that it is paid more 
readily than under the old government, because they know that they 
are being treated fairly, and that when it was once paid they would 
not be called upon to pay it again. I will read from Mr. Dicey's 
article: "Up to 1882 the acreage of taxable land in Egypt was calcu- 
lated at 5,000,000. It is now increased by over 600,000 acres, or close 
upon 13 per cent. Yet the total amount of the land tax — the great 
permanent source of revenue in Egypt — is actually less in 1897 than 
it was in 1881." 

According to Sir Edwin's figures the average land tax per acre has 
been diminished during the above period from 22s. to 18s. 3d. The 
arrears of land tax, which formerly attained colossal proportions, 
have now been practically paid off. The fellah, when once he had 
paid his annual contribution, has no longer any apprehension, as he 
had in the days of Ismail, of being called upon to pay again in 
advance long before the date of the next installment had become due. 

Mr. Gray: 
Q. As you understood Mr. Reid's question in regard to the produc- 
tion of revenue from the taxes collected at the custom-houses; they 
were to be levied equally upon all nations, including the United 
States?— A. Yes. 



PRELIMINARY REPORT OF DR. GEORGE F. BECKER, OF THE 
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ON THE GEOLOGICAL 
AND MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



Department of State, 
Washington, November A, 1898. 
SIR: I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the com- 
mission, copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Interior, trans- 
mitting a copy of a preliminary report made by Dr. George F. Becker, 
of the United States Geological Survey, in regard to the geological 
and mineral resources of the Philippine Islands. 

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 

John Hay. 
Hon. William R. Day, 

Chairman of the United States Peace Commission, Paris, France. 
(Inclosure: From Interior Department, October 29, 1898, with 
inclosure.) 



Department of the Interior, 

Washington, October 29, 1898. 

Sir: In May, 1898, by arrangement between the honorable the Sec- 
retary of War with this Department, Dr. George F. Becker, geologist, 
of the United States Geological Survey, accompanied the military 
expedition to the Philippine Islands, for the purpose of procuring 
information touching the geological and mineral resources of said 
islands. 

Dr. Becker has made a preliminary report on the subject, a copy of 
which, together with a copy of a letter from the director of the Geo- 
logical Survey, submitting the same for my consideration, are here- 
with transmitted for your information. 
Very respectfully, 

C. 1ST. Bliss, Secretary. 

The honorable the Secretary of State. 

T p 33 513 



MEMORANDUM ON THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE 
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



By George P. Becker, United States Geological Survey. 



This brief memorandum, prepared at the request of Admiral Dewey, 
probably covers all the main discoveries in the geology of the Philip- 
pines which are of economic interest. It is drawn up from data 
recorded in the Spanish mining bureau (Inspecciou de Minas), but not 
published, manuscript mine reports by the late William Ashburuer, 
verbal information obtained in Manila, and from various technical 
publications, of Semper, Santos, Roth, Drasche, Abella, and others. 

Only about a score of the islands are known to contain deposits of 
valuable minerals. These are arranged below in the order of their 
latitude to give an idea of their geographical distribution, and to facili- 
tate finding the islands on the map. The latitude of the nothern end 
of each is taken as that of the island. The character of the valuable 
minerals stated in the table will afford a general notion of their resources. 

Mineral-bearing islands and their resources. 



Island. 



Lat 


N. 


end. 





, 


18 


40 


14 


8 


13 


34 


13 


32 


in 


21 


13 


19 


13 


15 


12 


37 


12 


37 


12 


36 


12 


30 


12 


7 


11 


56 


11 


43 


11 


35 


11 


17 


11 




10 


10 


10 


10 


9 


50 


6 


30 



Character of mineral resources. 



Luzon 

Catanduanes 

Marhuluque 

Mindoro 

Carraray 

Batan 

Rapu Rapu 

Masbate 

Romblon 

Samar 

Sibuyan 

Semerara 

Panay 

Bilikan 

Leyte 

Cebu 

Negros 

Bohol 

Panaon 

Mindanao 

Sulu Archipelago 



Coal, gold, copper, lead, iron, sulphur, marble, kaolin. 

Gold. 

Lead, silver. 

Coal, gold, copper. 

Coal. 

Do. 

Do. 
Coal, copper. 
Marble. 
Coal, gold. 
Gold. 
Coal. 

Coal, oil, gas, gold, copper, iron, mercury ( f). 
Sulphur. 

Coal, oil, mercury ( ?)• 
Coal, oil, gas, gold, lead, silver, iron. 
Coal. 
Gold. 

Do. 
Coal, gold, copper, platinum. 
Pearls. 



The distribution of each mineral or metal may now be sketched in 
somewhat greater detail. In many cases the information given in this 
abstract is exhaustive, so far as the available material is concerned. 
The coal fields of Cebu, however, have been studied in some detail by 
Mr. Abella, and in a few other instances more extended information 
has been condensed for the present purpose. 
514 



TREATY OF PEACE. 515 

COAL. 

So far as is definitely known, the coal of the Philippine Islands is all 
of Tertiary aye. and might be better characterized as a highly carbon- 
ized lignite. It is analogous to the Japanese coal and to that of 
Washington, but not to the Welsh or Pennsylvania coals. Such lig- 
nites usually contain considerable combined water (8 to L8 per cent 
and bear transportation ill. They are also apt to contain much sul- 
phur, as iron pyrite, rendering them subject to spontaneous combus- 
tion and injurious to boiler plates. Nevertheless, when pyritous 
seams are avoided and the lignite is properly handled, it forms a vain 
able fuel, especially for local consumption, in these islands it would 
appear that the native coal might supplant English or Australian coal 
for most purposes. Lignite is widely distributed in the archipelago; 
some of the seams are of excellent width, and the quality of certain of 
them is high for fuel in this class. 

Coal exists iu various provinces of the island of Luzon (Abra, Cam 
arinos, Batan, Sorsogon). The finest beds thus far discovered appear 
to be in the small island of Batan, lying to the east of the southern 
portion of Luzon, in latitude 13° 19'. These seams vary from 2 feet 
6 inches to 14 feet 8 inches in thickness. Analyses have been made 
in the laboratory of the Inspeccion de Minas, and the mean of seven 
analyses gives the following composition: 

Per cent. 

Water * 13.52 

Volatile matter i]7. 46 

Fixed carbon 44. 16 

Ask 4 !i 

Sum 100.00 

One pound of this coal will convert G.25 pounds of water at 40° C. 
into steam at 100° C. The heating effect is about three-fourths of that 
of Cardiff coal. The same beds are known to exist in other small adja- 
cent islands, Carraray and Rapu-Rapu. A number of concessions for 
coal mining have also been grauted on the main island of Luzon, just 
south of Batan, at the town of Bacon. No doubt the beds here are either 
identical or, at least, closely associated with the coal seams in the little 
islands. 

The coal field of southern Luzon is said to extend across the Strait of 
San Bernardino into the northern portion of Samar. Here coal is 
reported at half a dozen localities, but I have been able to ascertain no 
details as to the thickness or quality. 

In Mindoro there are large deposits of coal in the extreme southern 
portion (Bulacao) and on the small adjacent islands of Semarara. This 
fuel is said to be similar to that of Batan. 

The islands of Masbate and Pauay contain coal, the deposits of which 
thus far discovered do not seem of much importance. Specimens from 
the southwestern portion of Leyte, analyzed in the laboratory of the 
inspeccion de minas, are of remarkably high quality, but nothing 
definite about the deposit is known to me. 

The first discovery of coal iu the archipelago was made in the island 
of Zebu in 1827. Since then lignitic beds have been found on the 
island at a great variety of points. The most important croppings are 
on the eastern slope, within some 15 or L'O miles of the capital, also 
named Cebu. Though a considerable amount of coal has been extracted 
here the industry has not been a proii table one hitherto. This is at 



516 TREATY OF PEACE. 

least in part due to crude methods of transportation. It is said, how- 
ever, that the seams are often badly faulted. 

At Uling, about 10 miles west of the capital, the seams reach a 
maximum thickness of . 5£ feet. Ten analyses of Cebu coal are at my 
disposal. They indicate a fuel with about two-thirds the calorific 
effect of Cardiff coal and with only about 4 per cent ash. Large quan- 
tities of the coal might, I suspect, contain a higher percentage of a>h. 

The island of Negros is nearly parallel with Cebu and appears to be 
of similar geological constitution, but it has been little explored and 
little of it seems to have been reduced to subjection by the Spaniards. 
There are known to be deposits of coal at Calatraia, on the east 
coast of Negros, and it is believed that they are of important extent. 
In the great island of Mindanao coal is known to occur at eight differ- 
ent localities, but no detailed examinations of any kind appear to have 
been made. Seven of these localities are on the east coast of Mindanao 
and the adjacent small islands. They indicate the presence of lignite 
from one end of the coast to the other. The eighth locality is in the 
western province called Zamboanga, on the gulf of Sigbuguey. 

PETROLEUM. 

Iii the island of Cebu petroleum has been found associated with coal 
at Toledo on the west coast, where a concession has been granted. It 
is also reported from Asturias, to the northwest of Toledo, ou the same 
coast, and from Algeria to the south. Natural gas is said to exist in 
the Cebu coal fields. On Panay, too, oil is reported at Janiuay, in the 
province of Iloilo, and gas is reported from the same island. Petroleum 
highly charged with paraffin is also found on Leyte, at a point about 4 
miles from Villaba, a town on the west coast. 

GOLD. 

Gold is found in a vast number of localities in the archipelago from 
northern Luzon to central Mindanao. In most cases the gold is detri- 
tal, and found either in existing water courses or in stream deposits 
now deserted by the current. These last are called " aluviones " by 
the Spaniards. It is said that in Mindanao some of the gravels are iu 
an elevated position, and adapted to hydraulic mining. There are no 
data at hand which intimate decisively the value of any of the placers. 
They are washed by natives largely with cocoanut shells for pans, 
though the batea is also in use. 

In the Province of Abra, at the northern end of Luzon, there are 
placers, and the gravel of the Kiver Abra is auriferous. In Lapanto 
there are gold-quartz veins as well as gravels. Gold is obtained in 
this Province close to the copper mines. In Benguet the gravels of 
the Kiver Aguo carry gold. There is also gold in the Province of 
Bontoc and in Nueva Ecija. The most important of the auriferous 
Provinces is Camariues Norte. Here the townships of Mambulao, 
Paracale, and Labo are especially well known as gold-producing locali- 
ties. Mr. Drasche, a well-known German geologist, says that there 
were 700 natives at work on the rich quartz veins of this place at the 
time of his visit about twenty-five years since. At Paracale there are 
parallel quartz veins in granite, one of which is 20 feet in width and 
contains a chute in which the ore is said to assay 38 ounces of gold per 
ton. One may suspect that this assay hardly represented an average 
sample. Besides the localities mentioned, many others of this Prov- 
ince have been worked by the natives. 



TREATY OF PEACE. O 1 7 

The islands of Mindoro, Catanduanes, Sibuyan, Simar, Panay, Oebu, 
and Boliol are reported to contain gold, but no exact data are acces 
sible. 

At the south end of the small island of Panaon, which is just to 
the south of Leyte, there are gold quartz veins, one of which has been 
worked to some extent. It is feet in thickness, and lias yielded from 
$0 to $7 per ton. 

In the island of Mindanao there are two known gold-bearing dis- 
tricts. One of these is in the province of Surigao, where Placer and 
other townships show gravels and veins. The second district is in the 
province of Misamis. Near the settlement of Imponan and on the 
Gulf of Macajalar, there are said to be many square kilometers of 
gravel carrying large quantities of gold with which is associated 
platinum. The product of this district was estimated some years since 
at 150 ounces per month, all extracted by natives with bateas or cocoa- 
nut-shell dishes. 

COPPER. 

Copper ores are reported from a great number of localities in the 
Philippines. They are said to occur in the following islands: Luzon 
(provinces of Lepanto, Benguet, and Camarines), Mindoro, Capul,* 
Masbete, Panay (province of Antique), and Mindanao (province of 
Surigao). Many of these occurrences are probably unimportant. The 
great island of Mindanao, being practically unexplored, is full of possi- 
bilities; but as yet no important copper deposit is known to exist there. 
An attempt was made to work the deposit in Masbete, but no success 
seems to have been obtained. On the other hand, northern Luzon con- 
tains a copper region which is unquestionably valuable. The best known 
portion of this region lies about Mount Data, a peak given as 2.500 
meters in height, lying in latitude 10° 53', longitude 120° 58' east of 
Greenwich or 121° 38' east of Madrid. The range of which data forms 
one peak trends due north to Cape Lacay-Lacay and forms a boundary 
for all the provinces infringing upon it. 

Data itself lies in the Province of Lepanto. In this range copper 
ore has been smelted by the natives from time immemorial, and before 
Magellan discovered the Philippines. The process is a complicated 
one, based on the same principles as the method of smelting sulpho- 
salts of this metal in Europe and America. It consists in alternate 
partial roasting and reductions to "matte," and eventually to block 
copper. It is generally believed that this process must have been 
introduced from China or Japan. It is practiced only by one peculiar 
tribe of natives, the Igorrotes, who are remarkable in many ways. 

Vague reports and the routes by which copper smelted by natives 
comes to market indicate that there are copper mines in various por- 
tions of the Cordillera Central, but the only deposits which have been 
examined with any care are those at Mancanyan (about 5 miles west of 
Mount Data) and two or three other localities within a few miles of 
Mancanyan. The deposits of Mancanyan are described as veins of 
rich ore reaching 7 meters in width and arranged in groups. Mean 
assays are said to show over 16 per cent of copper, mainly as tetra- 
hedrite and allied ores. The gangue is quartz. The country rock is 
described as a large quartzite lens embedded in a great mass of trachyte. 



* I am unable to find this island, which probably is a very small one. 



518 TREATY OF PEACE. 

An attempt lias been made by white men to work tbese deposits, but 
with no considerable success. The failure does not seem to have been 
due to the quality or quantity of ore found. 

LEAD AND SILVER. 

A lead mine has been partially developed near the town of Cebu, on 
the island of the same name. 

The most important deposit of argentiferous galena is said to be at 
Torrijos, on the small island of Marinduque (latitude 13° 34'). A metric 
ton, or l,dO() kilograms, is said to contain 96 'grams of silver, 6 grams 
gold, and 565.5 kilograms of lead. * 

In Camarines, a province of Luzon, lead ores occur, but are worked 
only for the gold they contain. 

IRON. 

There is iron ore in abundance in Luzon, Carnbello,* Cebu, Panay, 
and doubtless in other islands. In Luzon it is found in the provinces 
of Laguua, Pampanga, and Camarines JSorte, but principally in Bula- 
can. The finest deposits are in the last-named province, near a small 
settlement named Camachin, which lies in latitude 15° 7' and longitude 
]LM° 47' east of Madrid. A small industry exists here, wrought iron 
being produced in a sort of bloomery and manufactured into plowshares. 
The process has been described in detail, so far as I know. It would 
appear that charcoal pig iron might be produced to some advantage in 
this region. The lignites of the archipelago are probably unsuitable 
for iron blast furnaces. 

QUICKSILVER. 

Rumors of the occurrence of this metal in Panay and Leyte have 
failed of verification. Accidental losses of this metal by prospectors 
or surveyors sometimes lead to the reports of the discovery of deposits, 
and ochers are not seldom mistaken for impute cinnabar. 

NONMETALLIC SUBSTANCES. 

Sulphur deposits abound about active and extinct volcanoes in the 
Philippines. In Luzon the principal sulphur deposits are in Daclan, 
in the province of Benguet, and at Oolasi, in Camarines. The finest 
deposit in the archipelago is said to be on the little Island of Bilirau, 
which lies to the northwest of Leyte. 

Marble of fine quality occurs on the small island of Romblon (latitude 
12° 37'). It is much employed in churches in Manila for baptismal 
fonts and other purposes. Marbles are also quarried at Montalban in 
the province of Manila, and at Binangonan in the province of Marong. 

There are processions for mining kaolin at Losbanos in Laguna 
province. 

Pearl fisheries exist in the Sulu archipelago and are said to form an 
important source of wealth. 

Manila, September 15, 1898. 

*I have not found this island on the map. 



DATA CONCERNING TPIE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: THEIR HISTORY, 
PEOPLE, GEOGRAPHY, GEOLOGY, RESOURCES, AND STRATEGIC 
IMPORTANCE. 



INTRODUCTION AND NOTES ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



By Ensign Everett Hayden, United States Navy. 



The data herewith, selected as carefully as possible in the short time at 
my disposal, consist for the most part of quotations from authoritative 
sources giving' an outline history of the islands, their geology, geogra- 
phy, people, and resources. There is included also a copy of a special 
memorandum of information prepared for the President, by direction 
ot the Secretary of the Navy, on the islands of Sebu and Negros, their 
mineral and other resources and availability as naval stations, and a 
.compilation of data regarding coal and petroleum in the Philippines 
and vicinity, a subject of the greatest importance in connection with 
the present value and disposition as well as the future development of 
the islands. 

Jagor, the well-known German authority, made the following striking 
prediction in the concluding words of his work on the Philippines, 
published in 1873: 

In proportion as the navigation of the west coast of America extends the influence 
of the American element over the South Sea, the captivating, magic power which 
the great Republic exercises over the Spanish colonies will not fail to make itself 
felt also in the Philippines. The Americans are evidently destined to bring to a full 
development the germs originated by the Spaniards. As conquerors of modern 
times, they pursue their road to victory with the assistance of the pioneer's ax and 
plow, representing an age of peace and commercial prosperity in contrast of that 
by-gone and chivalrous age whose champions were upheld hy the cross and pro- 
tected by the sword. A considerable portion of Spanish America already belongs to 
the United States, and has since attained an importance which could not possibly 
have been anticipated either under the Spanish (Jovermuent or during the anarchy 
which followed. With regard to permanence, the Spanish system can not for a 
moment be compared with that of America. While each of the colonies, in order to 
favor a privileged class by immediate gains, exhausted still more the already 
enfeebled population of the metropolis by the withdrawal of tiie best of its ability, 
America, on the contrary, has attracted to itself from all countries the most ener- 
getic element, which, once on its soil and freed from all fetters, restlessly progress- 
ing, has extended its power and influence still further and further. 

The actual present resources of the islands are well indicated in the 
accompanying papers, and in considering their future, under the con- 
trol of one or more governments that develop and foster, rather than 
conceal and suppress, natural resources and native talent, we must bear 
in mind the probable vast increase in production, population, and com- 
merce, accompanied by the introduction of modern methods and all the 
established improvements in transportation, communication, and sani- 
tation. The commercial future of the islands, under such new condi- 
tions, will be a revelation to the world, and their strategic position and 
features must become of supreme importance in this great future held 
of commercial and naval rivalry. 

519 



520 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Tt has been pointed out by a recent writer that the opening- of the 
Suez Canal brought untold misery upon the comparatively happy and 
industrious Malays in the Philippines, inasmuch as it resulted in the 
establishment of a Spanish line of steamers, bringing bureaucratic 
administration in place of the old paternal regime and awakening into 
renewed life and activity the dormant curse of Spanish civil and mili- 
tary rule. It seems sale to predict, however, that with the opening of 
the Nicaragua Canal, which will put 500 miles of the Sulu Sea, from 
Surigao to Balabae, on the direct great-circle route of equatorial steam 
navigation around the earth, the dawn of a new and glorious era of pros- 
perity will succeed the long night of nearly four centuries of Spanish 
domination. 

The Philippines are very nearly as large in area as the British Isles; 
they are larger than New Zealand, and as large as Italy, with her own 
Sicily and Sardinia and French Corsica and British Malta added. 
Indeed, the eastern archipelago may be roughly compared to beauti- 
ful, fertile, volcanic Italy, only more so. Imagine the plains and hills 
of northern Italy rent from the snowy Alps by some volcanic cataclysm 
to form a big island like Luzon, with Genoa for Manila ; southern Italy 
shattered into a score of islands, large and small, Masbate, Samar and 
Leyte, Negros and Sebu, Panay, Bohol; Sieily enlarged to thrice its 
size, like Mindanao, joined by a line of islets and reefs to the project- 
ing cape of Tunis, as the Sulu Islands join that island to northeast 
Borneo; call Corsica Mindoro; elongate Sardinia to almost reach the 
African mainland, as Palawan does the northern point of Borneo. The 
inclosed Tyrrhenian Sea will then correspond to the Sulu Sea, the Med- 
iterranean' of the far East, through which commerce from the Pacific 
must pass on the direct route to Singapore, as it does here from Suez 
to Gibraltar; to the northward, the distant mainland (Austria, France, 
and Spain) will correspond to China, Tongking, and Siain; to the south- 
ward (Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco), to New Guinea, Celebes, 
Borneo, and Sumatra; and the strategic importance of the archipelago, 
in peace or war, is clearly manifest. 

This great inland sea, the Sulu or Mindoro Sea, if once well charted, 
its channels lighted and buoyed, its Malay pirates suppressed, its fer- 
tile islands cultivated and their mineral wealth explored, must become 
the scene of an enormous commerce, composed not merely of the ves- 
sels of a local coasting trade, but the seagoing ships and steamers of 
every nation engaged in the Asiatic, East Indian, and Australasian 
trade. The completion of the Nicaragua Canal may result in the estab- 
lishment of an equatorial steamship line whose vessels will circumnavi- 
gate the globe on schedule trips in eighty days, and the great-circle 
route from Brito, Nicaragua, to Singapore, via Honolulu and Guam 
Island, passes diagonally through 500 miles of the Sulu Sea, from 
Surigao Strait to Balabac. 

Similarly, the shortest route from Hongkong to all Australian and 
New Zealand ports, from Tongking to New Caledonia, from the Yellow 
Sea to eastern Java, Celebes, and west Australia, and from the entire 
North Pacific Ocean to the Straits of Sunda and Singapore, is by way 
of the channels of the Philippine archipelago and its great inland sea. 
Strategically the Philippines are admirably located for commercial 
and naval operation, in peace or in war, but every consideration of 
offensive or defensive war, as well as the preservation of peace, seems 
to me to require that the entire group shall be the property of a single 
power; indeed, it were far better for that power to own also what is 
now British North Borneo, bounding the Sulu Sea to the southward. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 521 

One might thinl-, from a casual glance at a map, that the defense of 

this great inland sea, with its iutricate channels and numerous islands, 
exits, and entrances, would be difficult if not impossible. A closer 
examination of a chart, however, shows but seven clear channels, four 
on the east (San Bernardino, Surigao, Basilan, and Sibntu) and three 
on the west (Verde, Mindoro, and Balabac). Good harbors, timber, 
iron, and coal are prolific, even now when the ultimate resources of the 
islands are not even estimated; hemp, the best in the world, is the 
product par excellence of this region. In fact the entire materiel of 
modern naval warfare is at hand, awaiting only the personnel to utilize 
it. Coal, the very life of modern commerce and naval war, is abundant 
in many islands of the group and may occur in all. The ownership of 
such resources, so near at hand, by a commercial rival and possible 
enemy, and the establishment close by of naval coaling stations and 
dock yards, would not tend toward the preservation of peace or the 
successful finish of a prospective war. 

It is not, probably, either desirable or necessary to go into details here 
regarding the strategic value of the various islands, harbors, and chan- 
nels, better shown on charts than in type, nor to discuss the relative 
value of each. In fact, as stated above, all are so intimately related 
that it is practically impossible to disassociate them in any scheme 
of offense or defense. 

It will be better for the welfare of the native inhabitants, for the com- 
mercial interests of all nations, and for the peace of the world if tiie 
control of the entire group of the Philippine Islands remains perma- 
nently in the hands of the United States. The more one studies the 
subject, in the light of past history and the certainty of a vast future 
expansion of our trade with China and Australasia, the more convinced 
does he become that sovereignty over the entire group, from the little 
islands north of Luzon to the farthest coral reefs that stretch toward 
the equator from Palawan and the Sulu Islands, is essential to our 
future potential energy in the far East. 

Even the wild and unexplored Palawan, which forms a natural break- 
water for 300 miles against the sweep of the southwest monsoon, is cap- 
able, if occupied, developed, and fortified during long years of peace, 
of becoming a formidable base of operations in time of war. The 
importance of Manila is due largely to its being for centuries the capi- 
tal of the archipelago and the reservoir of its productions and supplies. 
Divide the group and you cut off streams of wealth that help till the 
reservoir. With a rival established at Tacloban, Iloilo, Sebu, or even 
Ulugan, the enormous resources of the Visayas and Mindanao might, 
and probably would, be diverted to build up a metropolis that would 
surpass Manila in wealth and importance. Strategically the Philip- 
pines seem, like our Union, to be "one and inseparable." 



SEBU AND NEGROS ISLANDS, PHILIPPINES: THEIR MINERAL 
AND OTHER RESOURCES AND AVAILABILITY AS NAVAL 
STATIONS. 



1. The inclosed data have been prepared for the President in com- 
pliance with the order of the Secretary of the Navy dated August 8, 
1898. 

2. The information has been compiled in this office, from records on 
file here, together with quotations and abstracts of information taken 
from books in the library of the Navy Department and the United 
States Geological Survey. In the latter library a large collection of 
books on this general subject has been made, and a catalogue of pub- 
lications relating to the Philippines. 

3. The data herewith consist of an outline map of the Philippines,* 
upon which the principal coal bearing islands, so far as known, have 
been shaded in green, and quotations and abstracts from various pub- 
lications relating to the two islands under consideration, including 
extracts from recent consular reports published by the State Depart- 
ment, 1 and cablegram from our naval attache in Paris. 

4. Negros and Sebu are about the center of the Philippine group, 
forming part of what are called the Bisayas or Visayas Islands. Negros 
comprises about 5,000 square miles, and Sebu about half as many. They 
are long, in a north-south direction, and narrow, and separated by the 
Strait of Tahan. A volcanic mountain ridge stretches the whole length 
of each island, rising to a height of about 9,000 feet in the north of 
Negros. The flanks of the ridges and the low lauds near the coasts are 
covered with luxuriant tropical vegetation. 

5. The principal coal deposits thus far developed occur in these two 
islands and in Masbate and Batau, 2 farther north. The coal, while 
inferior in quality, makes a good steaming coal wheu mixed with 
anthracite or Cardiff coal, and doubtless, when the mines are developed, 
will prove very valuable for naval and commercial uses. 

6. The geological formation of the entire group seems to be like 
Borneo to the southward and Formosa to the northward, the carbonif- 
erous beds being broken through by volcanic peaks, their exposed 
edges upturned along the flanks of these peaks and partly covered by 
lava flows, etc., thence dipping under the limestone and coral beds near 
the sea. There seems to be no reason to doubt that the coal-bearing 
beds may be found upon any and all of the islands of the entire Philip- 
pine group, connecting the already developed mines of Borneo with 
those of Formosa. All the islands give strong indications of other 
mineral wealth, such as gold, copper, iron, lead, and precious stones. 
Their development hitherto has been haphazard and unscientific, but 
the results achieved are very promising. 

1 Omitted here. 

«A little island southeast of Luzon, lat. 13° 15' N., long. 124° 05' E. 
522 



TREATY OF PEACE. - r >2.°) 

7. With regard to the availability of Negros and Sebu for naval 
stations, the porl of Sebu, one of the oldest in the Philippines, is small, 
but easily defended, and might make a useful naval and coaliDg station, 
not equal, in any way, however, to Iloilo, Manila, or Subig Bay, except- 
ing for its nearness to known coal deposits. It should be noted that 
these islands in the central portion of the group can only be reached 
through narrow straits with intricate navigation, and if light-houses 
and other aids to navigation in these straits were in the hands of anol her 
power than that owning these two islands, they would be more or less 
inaccessible, especially in time of war. 

8. The value of Negros and Sebu as naval stations for this country 
would be greatly lessened if various other nations established stations 
in other islands of the Philippine group; as coal is likely to occur in 
any of the islands, the tendency to establish such stations would appar- 
ently be very great, in addition to the agricultural and mineral wealth 
of the region. 

Everett LIayden, 
Acting Chief Intelligence Officer, 

Office of Naval Intelligence. 

Navy Department, August 9, 1898. 



[Coal Trade Journal, May 1, 1895, p. 349.] 

Coal mining in the Philippine Islands. — The coal deposits in the 
island of Sebu are now being extensively developed. They are receiv- 
ing the support of the Government, in that they are giving preference 
to native over foreign coal. 

[Hongkong, 1893, Chronicle and Directory Cor China, Japan, etc.] 

This is the capital of the Island of Sebu, and ranks next to Iloilo 
among the ports of the Philippines. It was at one time the seat of the 
administration of revenue for the whole of the Visayas, but this was 
removed to Manila in 1840. Sebu is a well-built town and possesses 
fine roads, but the people are devoid of commercial enterprise. The 
trade of Sebu consists principally of hemp and sugar. The neighbor- 
ing islands of Leyte, Mindanao, and Oamiguin possess extensive hemp 
plantations, a large proportion of the produce of which finds its way 
to Sebu for shipment. There are some very valuable and extensive 
coal deposits in the Island of Sebu, but the mines have not as yet been 
worked with any enterprise. The trade in 1892 is represented by the 
following figures: Imports, $165,881; exports, $2,448,433, as compared 
with $2(53,695 and $3,638,039, respectively, in 1891. The principal 
exports of 1893 were: Sugar, 17,246,412 kilograms, and hemp, 23,299,015 
kilograms. 

[Stanford's Compendium of Geography, Vol. II, p. 81-82.] 

Sebu, or Cebu, is a long and narrow island, lying immediately to the 
east of Xegros, from which it is separated by a strait from 5 to 15 
miles wide and over 100 miles in length. Sebu is 130 miles long and 
not more than 20 miles broad in its widest part and contains 2,275 
square miles, or rather less than half the area of ISTegros. Several 
chains of mountains of no great height traverse it from north to south, 
but little is known of its geology except that it produces gold, silver, 



524 TREATY OP PEACE. 

and lead, and has no active volcanoes. Coal occurs abundantly, and 
is of fairly good quality; but the complete neglect of all mineral wealth 
by the Spaniards is exhibited here as elsewhere. The inhabitants are 
almost exclusively Biscayans, but there are said to be a few Negritos. 
The population has greatly increased of late years, owing to the great 
development of the sugar and abaca cultivation, and now numbers 
518,000, but locusts and low prices have recently dealt as heavy a blow 
to Sebu as to Panay. In all these islands sugar growing will probably 
give place to hemp or some more paying crop. In 1800 only 3,000 tons 
were exported, as against 11,000 tons in 1889, and while in the latter 
year 34 vessels — almost all of which were British — entered the port, 
the number in 1890 only amounted to 14. 

The capital, Sebu, dignified by the title of city, is the oldest settlement 
in the Philippines, and was the seat of government until the founding 
of Manila. It was the first place of any importance visited by Magellan 
on his discovery of the group, and it was upon the little island of Mactan, 
which forms the harbor of Sebu, that he met with his death on the 27th 
April, 1521. Fifty years later Legaspi planned and built the city. It 
is picturesquely situated and has a fine cathedral and several churches, 
but the population is not large. The island forms a province of itself, 
under the administration of a military governor. 

[Hongkong, 1895, Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, etc.] 

The island of Negros is extremely fertile and contributes three fourths 
of the sugar shipped from Iloilo, the quality of which is excellent. 

[Stanford's Compendium of Geography, Volume II, p. 80.] 

Negros lies to the southeast of Panay, from which it is separated by 
a strait about 15 miles in width. It is 130 miles long and on the aver- 
age about 30 miles wide. Its area is 4,G50 square miles. Its coast is 
comparatively little broken by bays or inlets, and it has no good har- 
bors. A central chain of mountains runs through its entire length. 
For the most part these are of no height, but the Malaspina or Chalcon 
volcano, situated towards the northern end, forms an exception. Its 
height is estimated at 8,192 feet, and it is in a state of intermittent 
activity. Owing to the narrowness of the island, there are no naviga- 
ble rivers. The inhabitants are chiefly Bisayans, and number with the 
Negritos, from whose abundance the island received its name, about 
226,000. 

The island is fertile, and produces sugar, rice, tobacco, and the tex- 
tile abaca and pina, and in common with Sebu and Samar a large amount 
of cacao. Its coal mines appear to be no longer worked. The capital 
is Bacoled, on the west coast opposite to Iloilo, where the " politico- 
military" governor resides, and there are numerous large villages 
around the coast, though few in the interior. Hinigaran, the former 
capital, contains over 12,000 inhabitants. 

[Stanford's Compendium of Geography, Volume II, p. 34.] 

Lead occurs in Sebu, and iron ores are very abundant in Luzon and 
Mindanao. That there are extensive coal measures in the archipelago 
there is little doubt, but they have been little exploited, and coal forms 
one of the largest imports of the group. The Compostela mine only 
turned out 700 tons in 1881. As yet no deep shafts have been driven, 
and what has been obtained affords very rapid combustion, and is not 
well suited for steamers. Sebu and Negros are especially rich in this 



TREATY OF PEACE. 525 

product. Since the archipelago lies midway between the great coal 
beds of northern Borneo and Formosa, it is probable that the mineral 

will in future be worked to great advantage. 

[British Admiralty, Eastern Archipelago, Parti, Eastern Part, 1890. | 

Ner/ros Island. — ISo called from the number of Negritos or Actus found 
on it by the Spaniards; is about L18 miles long, and though larger than 
Sebu Island is neither so rich nor so populous, its coast is very lit lit; 
broken by bays or inlets, and does not contain any good harbor. A 
central chain of mountains runs through it from north to south, which 
attains its greatest height toward the latter point. The rivers are 
but small, and unfit for the navigation of vessels of burden. 

The island produces the best cocoa in the Bisayas, besides rice, maize, 
sugar, tobacco, cotton, and abaca [a variety of the banana plant from 
which Manila hemp is obtained]. 

Note. — The Encyclopaedia Britaunica says the population in 1887 was 175,000. 
[From same publication as above.] 

Sebu Island. — Sebu is an island of some importance and interest, as 
its port has been thrown open to foreign commerce. It is long and 
narrow, 114 miles in length, with a greatest width of 18 miles in the 
northern part. A chain of mountains traverses the island through its 
entire length, containing beds of mineral coal and, it is stated, veins of 
gold. The rivers are numerous but small, and generally unfit for either 
navigation or irrigation. With the exception of a few fine valleys, cul- 
tivation is confined mainly to the seaboard. The population of the 
island is estimated at 38,000 souls. The chief exports are sugar, oil, 
hemp, tobacco, coffee, and piua silk. The chief imports are European 
goods, coal, and rice. 

[Note. — The Encyclopedia Britannica says the population in 1867 was 452,000. 
Reclus gives it as 518,000.— E. H.] 

[By Sir John Bowsing, London, 1859.1 

Speaking of minerals, it is stated that gold is found in many of the 
islands — " the mountains of Caraga and Zebu are the most productive. 
Many Indian families support themselves by washing the river sands. 
In the time of heavy rains gold is found in the streets of some of the 
pueblos when the floods have passed." Iron is also found iu various 
islands. "A coal mine is being explored in Guila Guila, in the Island 
of Zebu, on the river Manango, at a distance of about miles from the 
town of San Nicholas, which has nearly 20,000 inhabitants, and is by 
far the largest town in the island. There are reported to be strata of 
coal from 1 to 4 feet in thickness." Various copper mines have beeu 
worked from time immemorial, and favorable reports sent to Europe. 

[From the American Naturalist, September, 1886. — By J. B. Steere.] 

The south end of Negros has appeared, as we passed around it, a great 
stretch of grassy plains and hills, now dry and yellow, and burned over 
in some places. The mountains approach nearer at Dumaquete, and we 
could see forests on their heights. They were volcanic, and what we 
judged to be ancient lava streams extended down from a height of two 
or three thousand feet to near sea level, and with such an even grade 
that they looked like gigantic railroad embankments. We 

found it [a variety of plant known as abaca, a so-called mineral hemp] 



526 TREATY OF PEACE. 

growing luxuriously at a height of 3,000 feet, while those varieties used 
for food thrived best near sea level and in the greatest heat. * * * 
Deer and wild hogs were abundant. 

[From Travels in the Philippines.— By F. Jagor, London, 1875.] 

"Sebu, with a population of 34,000, is the chief town of the island of 
the same name, the seat of government and of the bishop of the 
Bisayaiis, and within 48 miles 1 of Manila by steamer. It is as favor- 
ably situated with regard to the eastern portion of the Bisayan group 
as lloilo is in the western, and is acquiring increased importance as the 
emporium for its products." Among products mentioned are sugar, 
tobacco, rice, coffee, wax, Spanish cane, and mother-of-pearl. " The 
island of Sebu extends over 75 square miles.* A lofty mountain range 
traverses it from north to south, dividing the east from the west side, 
and its population is estimated at 340,000—4,533 to the square mile.* 
The inhabitants are peaceable and docile; thefts occur very seldom, 
and robberies never. Their occupations are agriculture, fishing, and 
weaving for home consumption. Sebu produces sugar, tobacco, maize, 
rice, etc., and, in the mountains, potatoes; but the rice produced does 
not suffice for their requirements, th^re being only a little level laud, 
and the deficiency is imported from Panay. The island possesses con- 
siderable beds of coal, the full yield of which may now be looked for, 
as the duty on exports was abandoned by decree of the 5th of May, 1809. 

According to the Mineral Keview, Madrid, 1866, the coal in Sebu is 
dry, pure, almost free of sulphur pyrites, burns easily and with a strong 
flame. The coal of Sebu is acknowledged to be better than that of 
Australia and Labium, but has not sufficient heating power to be used 
unmixed with other coal on long sea voyages. According to the cata- 
logue of the products of the Philippines (Manila, 1866), the coal strata 
of Sebu have, at many places in the mountain range, which runs from 
north to south across the whole of the island, approached a thickness 
of 2 miles. The coal is of middling quality, and is burned in the Gov- 
ernment steam works after being mixed with Cardiff. Average price, 
Sebu, $6 per ton. 

[From Oceanica.— By Elisee Keclus, New fork, 1890.] 

The whole surface of the Philippines is essentially mountainous, the 
only plains that occur being the alluvial districts at the river mouths 
and the spaces left at the intersection of the ranges. Most of the sur- 
face appears to be formed of old rocks, especially schists, and, in the 
north of Luzon, granites. Extensive coal fields are found in the cen- 
tral islands, especially Cebu and Negros, and in many places these 
carboniferous beds seem to have been buried under more recent lavas. 
Later limestones have also been developed by the coral builders round 
all the seaboard, and there is clear evidence that along extensive 
stretches of the coast line these formations have been upheaved to a 
considerable height above sea level. They form at some points broad 
horizontal tables round the headlands, and here are found shells and 
other marine remains belonging to the same species still living in the 
surrounding waters. But about the Gulf of Davao, in South Mindanao, 
the contrary movement of subsidence has taken place, as shown by the 
dead or dying forests invaded by the sea. 

The Philippines abound in minerals. The natives collect gold in the 

1 Evidently German miles, of which 1 (linear) =4| statute. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 527 

alluvia of all the islands, but especially in the province of Benguet, 
central Luzon, and about the northeast point of Surigao, in Mindanao. 
Copper is common in the Lepanto hills, bordering on the same central 
district of Luzon, where from time immemorial the natives have 
extracted the ore and wrought it into implements and ornaments. The 
blacksmiths also have at hand an excellent iron ore for their arms and 
instruments. Cebu is said to contain lead glance yielding nearly hall 
of its weight in pure metal, while the solfataras of many extinct volca- 
noes have formed inexhaustible deposits of sulphur. 

[Extracts from Letters of German Captains. XV, Hansa, Vol. 21, 1884, p. 147.] 

The harbor of Zebu, capital of the Philippine island of the same name, 
is formed by a very narrow arm of the sea separating the island of 
Mactan from that of Zebu. It has a northern and a southern entrance, 
both very small and narrow, especially the northern one, where it is 
quite impossible to pass by a vessel of over 200 or .'500 tons. On the 
other hand, there would be no difficulty in passing even a larger ship 
in the southern entrance. 

There are for both entrances regularly appointed government pilots, 
who are supposed to be stationed in the northeast monsoon, near the 
light-house at the northern entrance, and in the southwest monsoon, 
near the beacons Norma and Lipata, at the southern entrance. When 
I came from Manila and passed the light-house at the northern entrance 
about 4.30 o'clock p. m., there was no pilot in sight (perhaps because it 
was Sunday), but as I had a good Spanish chart, and as the channel 
moreover is well indicated by buoys on both sides, I went on and got a 
pilot shortly before dark not far from the old tower Mandaui. This is 
the narrowest place of the channel, hardly wide enough for a larger 
ship lying at anchor to swing around. Although we now had the cur- 
rent against us, a light laud breeze took us to a safe anchoring place. 
In the northeast monsoon the anchoring place southwest of the fort is 
in 16 to 20 meters depth. Ships are moored with chains of about 00 
meters each. There is a regular ebb and flood tide, but high and low 
water never coincide with the change of the current. Besides, there 
seem to be, at the anchoring places of the larger ships, several counter 
currents (eddies), for the ships lie very uneasy, rolling from side to side, 
and hardly have the chains been made clear during the day when there 
is another half turn or round turn found in them in the morning. 

The best plan is, in case there is already a round turn in the chain, 
to make the two chains fast together, and then to give plenty of play 
to one chain. How great the strain is on a taut chain when the ship 
swings is shown by the fact that from our starboard chain, which was 
pretty taut, a link 2 inches thick was twisted loose and broken. If the 
chains had not been fastened together we should have lost anchor and 
chain. There are three wharves here, but only one of them, the one 
farthest east, is sometimes used by steamers and by sailing vessels 
arriving with cargoes of rice and salt. For use by them tliere are two 
iron mooring-buoys south of the wharf (bridge). * * * 

Hard wood is good and cheap. Calking work can be done by the 
natives; forging, if not too expensive, by Chinese or natives. 

Fresh water, I am told, is paid for at the rate of $1 per barrel. We 
got all of our drinking water ourselves, partly from the well near the 
fort, partly from that near St. Nicholas Church; the latter water is the 
better of the two. * * * — A. L. 



528 TREATY OF PEACE. 

[Copy of cablegram received August 5, 1898, from naval attachfe at Paris.] 

Have received reliable information that the commander in chief (of 
the German squadron iu China recently forwarded to Berlin, Germany, 
extensive report (of the) German engineer on mineral resources of the 
Philippine Islands, particularly coal deposits, all of which described 
containing considerable sulphur, excepting one deposit which, being- 
free from sulphur, is necessary to the development of the mineral 
resource. I can not give name of !he island containing this deposit. 

Note.— A later telegram from naval attache at Berlin states that the island above 
referred to is probably Sebu, 



COAL AND PETROLEUM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND VK'IMTY. 



[Encyclopaedia Britaunica, 9th ed., p. 749.] 

Minerals. — Though hitherto little advantage lias been taken of its 
existence, there appears to be in several of the islands a fair amount of 
mineral wealth. Two coal fields arc known to exist, one beginning in 
Garansan in the south of Luzon, and probably extending southward 
across the Strait of San Bernardino to Catbalongan, in Samar, and 
another occupying the western slopes of Oebu and the eastern slopes 
of NegroSj and thus probably passing under the Strait of Tanon. In 
the first basin there is a bed from 10 to 12 feet thick cropping out of 
Gatbo, which has given good results as a fuel for steamboats; in the 
second Centeno reports at leasts beds, of varying thickness and quality. 
The first discovery of the mineral was made in Cebu in 18.57. Hitherto 
little success has attended the schemes of exploitation. 

[Encyclopaedia Britaunica, 9th ed., Coal, p. 59.] 

In the Dutch settlements, coal has been found in Sumatra and Bor- 
neo, the best known deposit being that at Pengaran, on the southeast 
of the latter island, where a mine has been worked by the Dutch 
authorities for several years. * * * In the British island of Labuan, 
off the north coast of Borneo, five workable seams, together about 27 
feet thick, are estimated to cover the whole island. 

The most important southern coal deposits, however, are those of 
Australia, which extend, with short intervals, from the Gulf of Car- 
pentaria to Bass Straits. In the northern districts the distribution 
appears to be somewhat similar to that seen in South America, Sec- 
ondary and Tertiary basins occupying the ground near the sea, while 
true carboniferous coal is found further inland. 

[Encyclopaedia Britaunica, 9th ed., under Formosa, p. 416.] 

Coal, sulphur, and petroleum are the only mineral productions of 
Formosa which are known to exist in quantities sufficient to make them 
of economical importance. The principal coal fields are in the north of 
the island, near Keluug and Tam-sui, and the coal is all shipped in 
Kelung Harbor: In 1873, 45,000 tons; in 1874, 15,221 tons; in L875, 
L'7,G05 tons; in 1870, 31,593 tons. 

[Prom the Statesman's Tear-Book, 1898.] 

Gold mining is being carried on in Luzon with favorable prospects, 
and coal mining in Cebu, where, when arrangements for carriage are 
completed, the output is expected to be about 5,000 tons per month. 

Longman's Gazetteer of the World, London, 18U5, says that coal 

occurs in Luzon, Caransan, Negros, and Cebu. 

„ oi 529 

T P 34 



530 TREATY OF PEACE. 

[Australasia, Vol. II, Guillemard. In Stanford's Compendium of Geography, London 1894.] 

Philippine Islands (p. 35).— That there are extensive coal measures 
in the archipelago there is little doubt, but they have been little 
exploited, and coal forms one of the largest imports of the group. The 
Compostela mine (Zebu) oidy turned out 700 tons in 1881. As yet no 
deep shafts have been driven, and what has been obtained affords very 
rapid combustion and is not well suited for steamers. Zebu ami 
Negros are especially rich in this product. Since the archipelago lies 
midway between the great coal beds of northern Borneo and Formosa, 
it is probable that the mineral will in the future be worked to great 
advantage. 

Panay (p. 79).— Gold, copper, iron, and quicksilver have been found, 
and coal in Antique, but none of these are worked. 

Neyros (p. 80). — Its coal mines appear to be no longer worked. 

Zebu (p. 81).— Coal occurs abundantly and is of fairly good quality, 
but the complete neglect of all mineral wealth by the Spaniards is 
exhibited here as elsewhere. 

Samar (p. 82). — Coal is fouud, but no attempt has been made to 
investigate the minerals of the island. 

Mindanao (p. 87).— It is probable that gold exists in tolerable quan- 
tities, and coal also. 

Java (p. 105). — Coal, indeed, is plentiful, but it is poor, occurs in 
thin strata, and hardly repays working. Sulphur is abundant, and a 
further exploitation of the mineral oils should give good results. 

(P. 138). The mineral-oil lamps which light nearly every peasant's 
hut consume over 20,000,000 gallons per annum. Concessions were 
granted in 1890, both in Java and Sumatra, for the working of petro- 
leum, and the prospects are said to be very encouraging. 

Sumatra (pp. 208, 209). — The mineral wealth of Sumatra still remains 
for the most part undeveloped, although it is probable that before long 
the rich coal fields of Ombilin, which are situated toward the head waters 
of the Batang Hari, will be opened. They were discovered in 1809, 
and have been estimated by M. de Greve to contain 370,000,000 cubic 
meters. The mineral is of the Tertiary period, as it is probable that 
most of the Sumatran measures will prove to be. M. Forbes found coal 
in the Palembang district, and it exists near Malabu and other places 
in Ache. South of Padang, at Moko-moko, it is worked. * * * 
Concessions were granted in 1891 for working some petroleum wells 
lately discovered. 

Borneo (pp. 219-221).— The abundance and wide distribution of coal 
in the islands is remarkable. In this respect Borneo is by far the 
richest of all the islands of the Malay Archipelago. Schwaner says: 

The occurrence of coal is more widespread than one might be led to think by a 
first examination. In the whole of the hill formation it constitutes a most impor- 
tant and almost never- failing factor. All fissures and openings that have been made 
use of for the investigation of the underground geology have led to the discovery of 
coal seams, and even the banks of the great rivers disclose them in many places. 

As far as is known, there is no coal of greater age than the Tertiary 
period. Most of it belongs to the Eocene, but the brown coals of the 
Miocene also occur plentifully. 

Mr. Motley, in his report on the geology of Labuan and neighbor- 
hood, gives the following interesting description of its peculiarities: 

The coal, dense and perfectly carbonized as it is, yet exhibits most unequivocally 
its vegetable origin, and not only that, but even the kind of vegetation of which it 
has been composed is evident from the most cursory inspection of the heaps of coal 
brought out of the levels. It is clearly the product not of a bed of peat produced 



TREATY OI* 1 PEA OR. 531 

by the decay of small vegetation, but of a mass of huge timber. At least one-half 
of the niMss displays the grain and structure of wood, and frequently it separates 
naturally into the concentric layers of dicotyledonous wood. All the specimens 1 
have examined have exactly the structure of the dipteraceons trees now forming 
the bulk of the timber growing above them. The trees must/ have been of vast 
dimensions. I traced one trunk upward of 60 feet, and for the whole of that dis- 
tance it was not less than 8 feet wide. * * * 

It is remarkable that sueli an evidently recent, formation should be so 
much upheaved, the coal measures of Labuan and Brunei dipping from 
an angle of 24° to nearly or quite vertical, the dip being north north- 
west, or about at right angles to the direction of the great chain oi 
mountains which rises nearly parallel to the coast. Mr. Motley's 
account of this coal formation would lead us to conclude that dense 
tropical forests growing on an extensive plain or river delta have been 
suddenly overthrown by flood or earthquake, or by sudden depression 
of the land, and had been covered with a deposit of clays or sands. 
He well remarks on the quantities of trees and shrubs which in the 
Tropics grow on the seashore, or even in the salt water, and t bus accounts 
for the presence of marine shells in the shales, and even in the coal 
itself. 

(Pages 245-21(5:) The coal measures are practically inexhaustible, and 
have been worked at various places in almost every part of the island, 
both by Europeans and natives. The results, however, have been 
almost uniformly unsuccessful, but this failure must be ascribed to the 
undeveloped state of the country and other causes of secondary impor- 
tance, and the mines will doubtless be worked with remunerative results 
in the future. The "Julia Hermina" mine, near Banjarmasin, which 
promised well, was hardly completed when, in 1850, an insurrection 
took place, the European staff were murdered, and the works com- 
pletely destroyed. The Pengoran coal mine, also in the neighborhood 
of Martapura, was commenced in 1848, but did not average a larger 
annual output than about 6,000 tons, and was abandoned in 1884, as 
was also the neighboring Asahan mine, which had been working four- 
teen years with much the same results. A mine was also working in 
Koti, abandoned, and once more reopened in 1886. 

In Sarawak the raja opened a mine on a tributary of the Sadong 
River in 1880, the prospects of which are promising, nearly 50,000 tons 
having been raised in 1886. He also purchased, two years later, a con- 
cession for the working of the seams at the mouth of the Brunei River. 
On the island of Labuan is a mine, till lately abandoned, which has 
caused the failure of three or more companies, but is now being suc- 
cessfully worked; while in Pulo Laut, the large island at the southeast 
point of Borneo, about 5,000 tons are yearly raised by the natives and 
supplied to Dutch steamers. There is little doubt that petroleum, 
which has been found in many places, will eventually become a work- 
able and most valuable product. 

Labuan (pp. 254-255). — The island of Labuan is situated on the north- 
west coast of Borneo, opposite the mouth of Brunei Bay. * * * The 
coal mines are now being worked by the new Central Bornean Company, 
who have steamers running twice a month to Singapore. 

Celebes (p. 301). — Coal is found in various places in the Makassar 
district. 

(Page 304.) Coal of an inferior quality is found on the island. 

The Moluccas (p. 325). — Near Batjan are some coal mines which have 
been worked intermittently, though to uo great profit, for nearly half a 
century. 

Obi Group (p. 326). — Coal and lignite exist, and probably gold, but 



532 TREATY OF PEACE. 

no explorations have been made, and the existing charts of the island 
are extremely inaccurate. 

Geram (p. 329). — Coal exists, but of what period does not seem clear. 

New Caledonia (p. 457). — Gold, antimony, mercury, silver, lead, cop- 
per, nickel, cobalt, and chrome have all been obtained, as well as coal 
of various kinds. * * * The coal beds are believed to occupy a 
very large area. Of late the Government has charged itself with their 
exploration, and they are about to be worked; but hitherto they have 
produced nothing for want of capital and proper labor. It is esti- 
mated that the coal, which is said to be of good quality, can be sold at 
Noumea for as low a price as 12s. per ton. 

[Coal Trade Journal, May 1, 1895, p. 349.] 

Goal mining in the Philippine Islands. — The coal deposits in the island 
of Sebu are now being extensively developed. They are receiving the 
support of the Government in that they are giving preference to native 
over foreign coal. 

[Hongkong, 1895, Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, etc.] 

Sebu. — There are some very valuable and extensive coal deposits in 
the island of Sebu, but the mines have not as yet been worked with 
any enterprise. 

[British Admiralty, Eastern Archipelago, Part I, Eastern Part, 1890.] 

Sebu Island. — A chain of mountains traverses the island through its 
entire length, containing beds of mineral coal. 

[Bowring, London, 1859.] 

Gebu. — A coal mine is being explored in Guila Guila, in the island of 
Cebu, on the River Manango, at a distance of about 6 miles from the 
town of San Nicholas, which has nearly 20,000 inhabitants, and is by 
far the largest town of the island. There are reported to be strata of 
coal from 1 to 4 feet in thickness. 

[F. Jagor, London, 1875.] 

Sebu. — The island possesses considerable beds of coal, the full yield 
of which may now be looked for, as the duty on exports was abandoned 
by decree on the 5th of May, 1869. 

According to the Mineral Review, Madrid, 1860, the coal in Sebu is 
dry, pure, almost free of sulphur pyrites, burns easily and with a 
strong flame. The coal of Sebu is acknowledged to be better than 
that of Australia and Labuan, but has not sufficient heating power to 
be used unmixed with other coal on long sea voyages. According to 
the catalogue of the products of the Philippines (Manila, 1866), the 
coal strata of Sebu have, at many places in the mountain range which 
runs from north to south across the whole of the island, approached a 
thickness of 2 miles. The coal is of middling quality and is burned in 
the government steam works after being mixed with Cardiff. Average 
price, Sebu, $6 per ton. 

[From Oceanica, Elisee Reclus, New York, 1890.] 

Extensive coal fields are found in the central islands, especially Cebu 
and Negros, and in many places these carboniferous beds seem to have 
been buried under more recent lavas. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 533 

[Board of Trade Journal, London, May, 1898.] 

A dispatch, dated 6th April last, lias been received at the foreign 

office from Her Majesty's minister at The Hague, transmitting state nt 

of the production of petroleum in the Dutch East indies, according to 
which, in the course of the past year or two, there has been a consider- 
able development of this industry, which promises to become very exten- 
sive. The prospective market for the product is a very large one, for 
not only among the natives of the Dutch East Indies is petroleum 
pretty sure to replace to a great extent the cocoanut oil now used for 
lighting purposes, but the whole of the eastern coasts of Asia, and 
especially China, will almost undoubtedly become consumers. 

The oil obtained in Sumatra is reported to be of excellent quality, 
with a higher flashing point and with a smaller loss in refining than 
the current American oils, while the cost of production is asserted to 
be materially lower than that of the latter. 

Among the most important enterprises lately brought before the 
Dutch public is the Mocara Enim Concession in Sumatra. This con- 
cession appears to have been pitched upon by the well known Ameri- 
can monopoly, the Standard Oil Company, for tin- purpose of obtaining 
a footing in Netherlands India. 

Proposals were made to and entertained by the board of the Mocara 
Enim Company by representatives of the Standard Oil Company which 
would have had the effect of bringing the first-named company's opera- 
tions directly under the control of the latter, and a general meeting of 
the shareholders of the Mocara Enim Company was advertised to have 
been held in the last days of February last for the purpose of ratifying 
the proposed agreement. 

Immediately before the day fixed for the meeting, however, the board 
of the Mocara Enim Company received from the Netherlands colonial 
minister a categorical declaration to the effect that the company's con- 
cession, which is of a preliminary nature only, would not be ratified 
should the company be placed under the control of the American 
monster monopoly. The meeting had in consequence to be postponed. 

It is understood that negotiations with the Standard Oil Company 
have been broken off for the present: but it is stated that the latter 
company had already purchased a considerable interest in the Mocara 
Enim Company. 

Since the interference of the colonial minister the Royal Netherlands 
Petroleum Company, for the exploitation of petroleum wells in the East 
Indies, which is the principal undertaking of that nature in Sumatra, 
has also made proposals to the Mocara Enim Company with a view to a 
practical amalgamation, 

As yet, however, no decision has been arrived at by either company 
as to the course to be adopted, but it is thought probable that a meeting 
of the Mocara Enim Company will be held shortly. 

Gebu. — The two coal mines situated in the east coast of the island of 
Cebu are said to yield sufficient coal to supply the local demand, and 
the quality is stated to be a little inferior to Australian and better than 
Japanese. 

Amour Valley. — The Amour Valley and those of several of its tribu- 
taries are rich in coal. In the valley of the Zeya, near its continence 
with the Selendja, is found an inferior mineral, and in the Boureya 
Valley almost vertical seams have been proved in three or four places. 
In the neighborhood of Innokentieva, on the Amour, several lignite 
seams, 3 feet thick, are worked by the inhabitants, and on the lower 
Amour a series of seams, together G£ feet thick, has been discovered 



.534 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Near Vladivostok coal deposits abound, while tliey also occur on the 
shores of the Japan Sea. 

Sakhalin. — Coal has been largely worked for forty years in Sakhalin, 
and at the present time attention is being especially directed to the 
deposits discovered in the immediate neighborhood of the gold mines 
on the shores of the Okhotsk Sea. 

I Engineering, London, August 12, 1898.] 

Gold is also found in some quantity, and there are two coal mines 
situated on the east coast of the island of Oebu, which yield sufficient 
coal to supply the local demand, and the quality is stated to be little 
inferior to Australian and better than Japanese. 

[Advance Sheets of Consular Tteports, No. 181, June 3, 1898.] 

Ambassador Hay sends from London, under date of May 18, 1898, a 
pamphlet, written by Mr. Frank Karuth, F. 11. G. S., entitled A New 
Center of Gold Production, describing conditions in the Philippines. 
Mr. Karuth, who is president of the Philippines Mineral Syndicate, 
Limited, says in the letter to Ambassador Hay accompanying the 
pamphlet: 

* * * I do not know of the occurrence of true coal in the islands. 
The beds which have been intermittently worked in the islands of Cebu 
and Masbate consist of lignite of very good quality. Some years ago 
large outcrops of such coal were found near the beach in the island of 
Masbate; but most of it, which could be got without mining, has been 
removed for the use of interinsular steamers. One of the syndicate's 
engineers, a man of experience as manager of coal mines in Lanca- 
shire, found Masbate coal quite useful for steamers. He calculates the 
quantity of coal available in a concession of about 00 acres at 1,200,000 
tons. The Masbate beds are so tilted as to form an angle of 70° with 
the horizontal. * * * 

Masbate. — The coal which up to present times has been found in the 
Philippine Islands is not true coal, but lignite, probably of the Tertiary 
period, and of a variety which can scarcely be distinguished by the 
eye from true coal. There is no reason why true coal should not even- 
tually be found, for it is found and worked in Japan, whose geological 
formation has much in common with that of the Philippines. There 
has been no systematic search made in these islands for coal, and where- 
ever it has been found it has betrayed its presence by outcrops. Thus, 
in the island of Masbate, a local steamship owner drew his supplies 
from a bed of coal which is so tilted as to have the appearance of a 
vein. He supplied himself as long as his native laborers could get the 
coal with crowbars. 

Mr. Hilton, who examined this bed cursorily, estimated the available 
quantity of coal at about 600,000 tons in that particular concession. 
He is, however, of opinion that very much larger quantities are avail- 
able in adjoining concessions. These mines are practically untouched, 
and, as they are situated within a few miles of the coast, they can be 
worked at a profit by whomsoever should venture to introduce the nec- 
essary capital. Mr. Hilton, after trying it in a local steamer, gives it 
the character of a "very good steam coal." A similar quality of lig- 
nite has recently been found in the district where the Philippines Min- 
eral Syndicate is now working, and it will soon be tried for the production 
of steam. 

Cebu. — The only coal deposits which have been to a certain extent 



TREATY OF PEACE. 535 

developed in the riidippine Archipelago, and of which a scientific and 
reliable, record exists in the shape of a report by the chief inspector <>i 
mines, SeSor Enrique Abella y Casariego, are those in the island oi I 'ebu. 
This report is embodied in a work entitled liapida Description Fisica, 
Geologica y Minera de la Isla de Cebu (Archipelago Filipino). * * * 
The coal deposits of Cebu were lirst examined in L855 by the Govern 
meut mining engineer, Senor Hernandez, who, without hesitation, 
described the coal as "lignita" (lignite). A few years Inter, however, 
another Government engineer, Senor Oenteno, declared the formation 
in which the coal occurs to belong to the true carboniferous system, and 
proclaimed the discovery of a true coal Held of large dimensions, the 
eastern rim of which cropped out in the island of Gebu, while its west- 
ern rim came to the surface in the island of Negros. Analysis proved 
Senor Centeno to be in the wrong, for the contents — or carbon — of the 
coal of Gebu do not exceed 54 per cent, against the minimum of 75 per 
cent, which true coal contains. 

Senor Abella describes the Cebu coal as lignita piciformes (pitchy 
lignite), very black, and in some instances resembling cannel coal. Jn 
carefully conducted official trials, best Oebu coal figured as follows in 
relation to good Australian and British coal, viz, 156 parts Cebu equal 
to 147 parts Australian and 121 parts British coal. 

The carboniferous formation extends over the greater part of the 
island of Cebu. From Balamban and Sogod, as far as Malabuyuc and 
Bojoon, a distance of over 50 miles, there is scarcely a village that has 
not its show of coal outcrops. These have been worked on many points, 
and the aggregate amount of development is not inconsiderable. 

At one time the Government attached so much importance to the 
coal deposits in Cebu that it established a monopoly, but this was soon 
abandoned and the industry thrown open to all comers. For a time 
coal mining in Cebu became quite a rage, any number of concessions 
were taken up, and several companies established for their development. 
In one or two cases a considerable amount of capital was expended. 
Although faults frequently occur, large quantities of workable coal 
were found; but the absence of roads, and the necessity of investing 
large sums in railways, in order to meet the competition from England, 
Australia, and Japan soon caused a reaction and put a stop to the 
industry. The present annual production of Cebu does not meet one- 
tenth of the demand of Manila, where the annual consumption of coal 
exceeds 60,000 tons * * * In the mines of Ulung five beds have 
been ascertained to occur, measuring, respectively, 3 feet 8 inches, 3 
feet 8 inches, 3 feet 8 inches, 5 feet 8 inches, 5 feet. 1 



[Advance sheets of consular reports, No. 152, June 28, 1898.] 

On the small island of Batan, to the southeast of Luzon, just through 
the Straits of San Bernardino, there are extensive coal deposits, now 
worked by Messrs. Gil Hermanos, of Virao, Island of Catanduanes. 
This coal is used by their own steamer Jose/a Gorroiio, plying around 
the coast of Catanduanes and occasionally coming to Manila with hemp, 
and also by other local steamers. The mine is called Visaya and stocks 
of coal are generally on the beach. There is a safe anchorage for ves- 
sels close by during the northeast monsoon. In the southwest monsoon 



1 Note by Mr. Kakuth. — True coal has not been found as yet in the islands. All 
the coal mined in Cebu. Masbate, and elsewhere is "lignite" of very good quality, 
but wanting the proportion of carbon which is characteristic of true coal. True coal 
will perhaps be found in the islands of Miudero and Mindanao. 



536 TREATY OF PEACE. 

vessels can anchor anywhere around in smooth water. The eoai is not 
equal to Japanese, but is good enough for an emergency and easily 
obtainable. The mines are situated in latitude 13° 15" north, longi- 
tude 130° 16" east (meridian of San Fernando), approximately. 

Other extensive coal mines are also being worked in the village of 
Compostela, close to the city of Cebu. This coal is of superior quality 
and stocks are always available. 

******* 

[China Sea Directory, London, 1889, and Supplement, 1893.] 

Northwest coast of Borneo (p. 145). — Coal is obtained from mines in 
the vicinity of Muara Harbor. (Supplement, 1893, says: "These mines 
are known as the JBrooketown collieries. The seam being worked is 28 
feet thick. There are many coal seams in the vicinity of Muara River.") 
The mines now being worked (1888) are connected by a tramway 
with the pier at the village, and are 1 mile distant from it. The coal is 
light, very friable, but of good quality, and is delivered on board for 
$(j per ton. Quantities from 500 to 2,000 tons are kept in store, under 
cover. Two 50-ton schooners and a small tug are available for coaling 
vessels at the anchorage, and 00 tons can be put on board from them in 
twelve hours, the coal being taken off in bulk and put on board in 
baskets. 

In February, 1888, the principal mine was on fire; but as coal seams 
varying in thickness from 18 to 25 feet, running in a north by east and 
south by west direction have been found between Bruni Bluff and 
Pisang Mount, and are believed to exist from the town of Bruni north- 
ward to the sea, the supply in this district, as soon as the necessary 
mining skill and money are forthcoming, may be said to be practically 
inexhaustible. The annual output of the mines, worked with the pres- 
ent crude means, is 10,000 tons, the depth as reached being 85 feet. 
About 220 Malays are employed. 

Labuan (p. 158). — A large supply of coal obtained from the coal mines 
at the north end of the island was formerly kept in store in Victoria 
Harbor; latterly about 300 tons obtained from the Muara coal mines 
has been usually kept in stock and put on board in baskets, either 
from the jetty or from lighters, at $7 a ton. The attendance of lighters 
can not always be depended on. 

Tong-King (p. 42, supplement). — Coal mines have been found a few 
miles off Mines River, east side of Hongai Bay or Port Courbet. A 
railway about 4 miles in length connects the Nagotna mine with the 
port jetty, and a large output was anticipated in 1891, something 
approaching 800 tons daily. The coal is said to be of good quality. A 
steamer of 2,000 tons burden can lie afloat at the jetty, and there is a 
good workshop for small repairs. 

Tong King (p. 480).— Several channels lead from Fai tsi long Bay, 
past Colosse Island, 738 feet high, to Kebao, where important coal beds 
have been found similar to those at Port Courbet. 

Borneo (p. 4). — Borneo appears to be rich in minerals. In the state 
of Landak the great diamond of the rajah of Matan was found. The 
territory of Montrado, north of Landak, has several gold mines. In 
British North Borneo gold, copper, tin, and coals have been found. In 
province Dent a seam of coal rises to the surface and is said to be of 
excellent quality. 

China Sea (p. 6). — Coals can be obtained at the following ports: 
Sarawak, Muara Harbor, Labuan, Kudat Harbor, Manila, Port Sual, 
Bangkok, Saigon, Touron Bay, and Hoihau Bay. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 537 

Northwest Luzon (p. 347). — Coals are brought from Lingayen to Sua! 
at $18 the ton. 

Anam, China, Iat. 10° N., long-. 107° E. (p. 461).— At Hong Sone, two 
days' journey to the southwest of Touron, is a considerable coal mine. 
The coal obtained from it barns quickly when used by itself; its price 
in 1883 was 29 shillings the ton. 

[Eastern Archipelago, Part I. (Eastern Tart), 1800. (British Admiralty).] 

Negros (p. 247). — Layers of coal have recently (1879) been discovered 
in this part of Negros, and outcrops of coal have been found in the 
rivers which enter the sea near the towns of Galatrava and Talabe. 

[Isaac M. Elliott, ex-U. S. Consul at Manila, in Scribner's Magazine for July, 1898, Manila and the 

Philippines, p. 19.] 

Mindoro. — The mineral wealth of these islands is not believed to be 
of great importance, although vast regions are practically unexplored. 
Gold has been found, but not in paying quantities. A discovery of 
immense value was made a few years ago in an accidental manner. The 
American ship Richard Parsons was wrecked on the western coast of 
the island of Mindoro. Captain Joy, of Nantucket, Mass., and his 
crew were forced to cross to a port on the eastern coast, in order to 
reach any vessel that could carry them to Manila. To do this they 
made a seventeen days' journey through the wilderness and over a 
range of mountains. In these mountains they came upon great ledges 
of coal, which are outcropping, and thousands of tons had broken off and 
accumulated at the base of the cliffs. On hearing of this discovery 
the Spanish Government immediately confiscated the lands, but they 
have never done anything toward developing this great deposit of coal. 
All the coal now used in the islands is imported from Australia. 

[Johnson's Cyclopedia, New York, 1894.] 

Japan. — Coal is largely worked on the northern coast of Kiushiu 
(Nagasaki, Karatsu), and in Yezo (Poronai). 

[W. B. Williams, President. Wm. Jamison, Secretary.] 

Hiteman Miners' Committee, 

Hiteman, Iowa, May 31, 1898. 

Dear Sir: I made suggestions to our ^Representative in Congress 
(J. F. Laeey) that it woukl be to the advantage of our Government if 
they would send an organized company of miners to the Philippine 
Islands to help establish and maintain order in those islands, and when 
that is done that we look after the mineral resources of the country. 
Inclosed you will find his reply, which is confidential. I shall now try to 
explain why I think it would be of benefit to us to control the coal 
mines in those islands. In the first place, the mines there have not 
been developed, for the reason that under the Spanish only they were 
taxed so that it was impossible to successfully work them. 

In Caransan there is quite a coal basin — this is south of Manila — and 
in the upper part of the Island of Luzon 1 there are several veins of 
coal, which is of good quality; in some respects it is superior to the 
coal from Vancouver. Now, if we hold those islands and this mineral 
exists there, I think it would certainly show bad management on the 

1 Probably tbe mines near Lingayen are meant. — E. H. 



538 TREATY OF PEACE. 

part of our Government if we neglected to make use of it. And if we 
could supply coal for our vessels in the Indian Ocean from the coal 
mines in the Philippines it would be a great saving to the Government 
and also be an incentive to enterprise and industry. Now, Mr. Curtis, 
from reading your letters in the liecord for the past four years, I know 
you are in a position so that you can call the attention of the proper 
authorities to the suggestions which I advance, and if I have the sane 
tion of the authorities, I can organize a complete company of miners, 
from mining engineers to mule drivers, and all of the skilled labor 
needed around a coal mine, and if it is not too much trouble I wish you 
would call some of the officials' attention to this matter. I am no 
father's son. but I am an American. 

Respectfully, yours, Wm. Jamison. 

William E. Curtis, 

Chicago Record. 

Hiteman, Iowa, September 1, 1898. 
R. B. Bradford, Washington, D. G. 

Dear Sir: My information in regard to coal in the Philippines has 
been gained by intimate acquaintance with a Swede miner named 
Swanson, who had worked for some English company in their mines 
north of Manila. He left here some five weeks since, and said he was 
going back to the islands if he could possibly get there, 
Respectfully, yours, 

Wm. Jamison. 

[Copy of cipher cablegram received August 5, 1898, from naval attache at Paris.] 

Have received reliable information that the commander in chief [of] 
the German squadron in China recently forwarded to Berlin, Germany, 
extensive report [of the] German engineer on mineral resources of the 
Philippine Islands, particularly coal deposits, all of which described 
containing considerable sulphur, excepting one deposit, which being 
free from sulphur is necessary to the development of the mineral 
resources. I can not give name of the island containing this deposit. 

Note— A later telegram from naval attache" at Berlin states that the island ahove 
referred to. is probably Seiu. 

[Ry R. von Drascho, published in Proceedings of the Royal Geological Service, Vienna, Austria, 

March 7, 1876, p. 251.] 

Reference to coal mines of Bakon, in the extreme southeast of the 
island of Luzon; no details given. 



THE PHIMPPINK ISLANDS. 



[Johnson's Universal Cyclopedia (1895).— Article revitod by C. C Adams.] 

A group of over 400 islands, extending across 16 degress of latitude, 
between Formosa and the Malaccas, and forming the northern part 
of the Malay Archipelago. The largest are Luzon. Mindanao. Satnar, 
Mindoro, Panay, Leyte, Negros, Masbate, and Sebu. The total area is 
estimated at 114,326 square miles, all under Spanish rule, and divided 
into 43 provinces. Population about 7,000,000. The Philippine Islands 
are of volcanic origin. Active volcanoes are found throughout the 
whole group, such as Mayon in Luzon and Buhayan in Mindanao, and 
earthquakes are frequent and often violent. In 1803 Manila, the capital 
of Luzon, was nearly destroyed, and in 1864 the whole province of 
Zamboanga, in Mindanao, was fearfully devastated. The soil is exceed- 
ingly fertile, and as water is abundant, both in lakes and rivers, and the 
climate is hot and moist, vegetable life reaches here an almost gigantic 
development. 

The mountains, rising to a height of 7,000 feet, are covered to their 
very tops with forests of immense trees, yielding excellent timber and 
many of the most valuable sorts of wood. Teak, ebony, cedar, and gum 
trees, iron and sapan wood are interspersed with breadfruit and cocoa- 
nut trees, oranges, citrons, mango, tamarinds, and other varieties of 
fruit trees, the whole bound together with floating garlands of huge 
climbing plants and brilliant parasites. On the extensive slopes and in 
the valleys are cultivated abaca, or hemp, of which about 6 >,ooo tons 
are annually exported. In 1890 8,000 tons of tobacco and 110,000,000 
cigars were exported. The other products are cotton, sugar, coffee, 
indigo, rice, wheat, maize, pepper, ginger, vanilla, cinnamon, cocoa, etc. 
Of dangerous wild beasts there are none; oxen, buffaloes, horses, goats, 
sheep, and swine of peculiar but excellent breeds are extensively reared ; 
deer, wild boars, pheasants, ducks, and fine fish are abundant: the for- 
ests swarm with monkeys, squirrels, parrots, sunbirds. and bees; the 
jungles with lizards, snakes, tarantulas, mosquitoes, and other insects. 
Gold is found, also iron, copper, coal, vermilion, saltpeter, quicksilver, 
sulphur (in large quantities, both pure and mixed with copper or iron), 
mother-of-pearl, coral, amber, and tortoise shell. 

The Philippine Islands were discovered in 1521 by Magellan, who 
died here in the same year, and a few years later the Spaniards, under 
Villalobos, took possession of the group and named it in honor of King 
Philip II of Spain. The inhabitants consist partly of negritos, who 
have woolly hair and other characteristics of the negro, ami seemed to 
have formed the aboriginal population. They live in the interior, are 
repulsive and savage in aspect, and roam in bands. There are only a 
few T thousand pure-blood negritos left, as they have long been in process 

539 



540 TREATY OF PEACE. 

of extermination by the Malay immigrants, or of absorption through 
crossbreeding with other peoples. The Malays are in a large part 
Eoman Catholics, settled in villages, and engaged in agriculture and 
fishing. They possess many tine branches of industry, as, for instance, 
their beautiful mats and their elegant linen fabrics, and they imitate 
European industry, shipbuilding, leather dressing, carriage building, 
etc., with great success. The Chinese and the mestizos, descended 
from Chinese fathers and native mothers, are mostly engaged in com- 
merce. Very few Spaniards reside in the islands, but the Chinese are 
very numerous, and natives of the Malayan race form the vast majority 
of the population. 



ABSTRACT OF ARTICLE ON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



[In Longman's Gazotteer of the World, London, 1805.] 

Minerals: 

Gold (Luzon, Benguer, Vicols, Mindanao, Misamis, Surigao). 

Galena (50 per cent pure). 

Copper (arsenical pyrites, 16 per cent pure copper, Luzon, Lepanto, 
Caniarines, Masbate, Fanay). 

Coal (Luzon,' Cavansan [Carausan?], Kegros, Cebu). 

Sulphur (Leyte). 
Products: 

Hemp. 

Sugar. 

Tobacco (only cultivated in all the Philippines since 1882). 

Coffee (principally since 1880). 

Woods. 

Eice. 

Some cacao. 

Cotton. 

Only one-fifth of the islands are under cultivation. 
Industries: 

Making cigars. 

Abaca tissues. 

Straw hats. 

Perfumes. 

Sugar (£2,500,000 exported). 
Imports: Food, dress materials, fuel, arms, machinery, and iron. 
Commerce: Greatest with England, then United States, Spain, and 

Germany. 
Exports and imports: 1891, £10,000,000; 1892, £12,500,000. 
Railroad: Manila to Dagupan, 70 miles. 
Telegraph: 720 miles; also cable to Hongkong. 

541 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



[From Engineering, London, August 12, 1898. j 

The present state of affairs in the Philippine Islands naturally directs 
attention to the condition of their trade and causes speculation to be 
made regarding its future. A glance at the map shows that their 
geographical, and therefore their political, position is very important. 
They, along with Borneo, form the eastern shores of the South China 
Sea, which are therefore one-half Spanish and one-half British, while 
the British Malay Peninsula and French Cochin China form the western 
shores, with Hongkong, our chief far Eastern possession, at the head 
of this narrow storm-tossed sea. Not only do they form an important 
station in the far Eastern seas, and a step to the vast population of 
China, but their great natural resources cause them to be a most desir- 
able possession; so that from various points of view it is of the utmost 
importance that they should not fall into the hands of any foreign 
power except America or Britain, either of which would not only 
develop their natural resources, but also use them for the purpose of 
maintaining an "open door" for the commerce of all countries with the 
far East. 

The Germans are beginning to express the opinion that they do not 
possess their legitimate share of the world, and to insist that in any 
new partition of any part of the earth they should get their fair share. 
They are supposed to have cast longing eyes on the Philippines, but 
they are not likely to interfere by force, for they know that such a step 
would immediately open up a very large question, and nothing has 
happened in connection with the recent events which give them any 
grounds for diplomatic intervention, which the United States would be 
certain to resent. 

It is, indeed, probable that the real difficulties of the United States 
will only begin when they have made peace with Spain. If we are to 
judge from the opinions expressed in the American journals, the future 
government of the Philippines is very uncertain. The New England 
press, as a whole, is decidedly opposed to the permanent holding of the 
islands. It is pointed out that under the Constitution there is no 
machinery for the government of 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 of people who 
could not be admitted to citizenship. Moreover, the possession of the 
islands would rend the Monroe doctrine from top to bottom, and would 
tell very much against the United States in any difficulty with a for- 
eign power. 

On the other hand, some influential journals favor annexation and 
maintain that the time has come when America must abandon her 
isolation and join in the universal search for markets and footholds in 
distant parts of the world. They maintain that the possession of the 
Philippines would support an Asiatic fleet and give the United States 
542 



TREATY OF PEACE. 

a better position among the nations of the world, not only by increas- 
ing their commerce in the far East, but generally by enabling them to 
take that place among nations which the wealth, population, and men- 
tal resources of the country entitle it to. The Pacific coasl papers 
are specially eager in the matter, and insist that with an important 
station in the far East San Francisco and the Pacific coast as a whole 
would become, in time, nearly as important as is the Eas1 now. Ameri- 
can merchants and manufacturers, under the protection of the Stars 
and Stripes, would develop the riches of the islands and create an 
immense held for commercial enterprise. Those journals not in favor 
of annexation are of opinion that the island should be transferred to 
England or Japan, whose interests are essentially the same as those of 
the United States. Such a step, however, would at once raise the 
opposition of Russia, and, probably, also of Germany and France. The 
well known Russian journal, the Novoe Yremya, had the following 
remarks on the subject: 

It looks as if the settlement of the question of the fate of the Philippine Islands 
will be prolonged for some long time to come, since all the powers that have any 
use in their hands take a keen interest in this ripe and tempting bunch of grapes. 
The future fate of the Philippines can be assumed in the following manner: Firstly, 
the United States can rest content with Cuba, and leave the Philippines to Spain; 
secondly, Spain may retain the Philippines, but under the guaranty of the United 
States the necessary reforms shall be introduced into the islands; thirdly, the 
Philippines might be given up by Spain, and then establish a more or less independ- 
ent republic under the protection of the United States; and, fourthly, the Philip- 
pines can be annexed by the United States on the ground of enjoyment of the rights 
of a separate State. The last solution of the question seems to us the least likely 
to be carried into effect if one takes into consideration the distance of the islands 
from the American continent, the general predilection on the part of Americans to 
observe the Monroe doctrine, and the numerous population of the islands; this 
population can scarcely be expected to allow themselves to be turned into American 
citizens without a struggle. 

Whatever solution is arrived at, the writer thinks it desirable that 
Russia should have a coaling station in the Philippines. As the war 
between Japan and China started a great many important questions, 
so in like manner is that between the United States and Spain certain 
to raise some new factors in the complex game which is being played 
in the far East. 

The rebels against Spain in the Philippines evidently mean to insist 
on a republic under the protection of the United States, an arrange- 
ment which they say will not disturb the balance of influence in the 
far East, and they promise to respect and protect the interest of all 
powers. They remember, they say, that the Japanese are their kins- 
men; that England is the great nation that commands 75 per cent of 
their import trade, and whose capital is invested to so large an extent 
in their undertakings; that America is their principal market for the 
export of sugar and hemp; that Germany and France are now opening 
up considerable trade, and that Russia, Austria, and Italy have no 
business connections in the islands. 

The principal articles imported into the islands include: From Spain, 
printed cotton cambrics, colored yarns, gunny bags, hats, umbrellas, 
leather goods, most of the wine, comestibles, etc., lentils, pulse, beans, 
and beer; from the United Kingdom, goods made of tine yarns, such 
as muslins, etc., printed jaconets, corrugated and sheet iron for rooting, 
cast iron and yellow-metal goods, earthenware, tinned provisions, ham, 
bacon, and flour; from Germany, hardware and galvanized and enam- 
eled iron goods, cutlery, paints and oils, and beer; Irom the United 
States, practically all the flour consumed on the Manila market. The 



544 TREATY OF PEACE. 

protective tariff, which came into force in 1891, has caused a large and 
steadily increasing quantity of the trade in cotton goods and yarns to 
be diverted from the United Kingdom to Barcelona, and has also put a 
stop, practically, to the import of linen goods. Gunny bags, which 
used to be imported from Calcutta, come now almost exclusively from 
Barcelona, and Spain likewise provides the greater part of the comes- 
tibles, wine, etc., for the same reason. The staple products and prin- 
cipal articles of export from the Philippines are tobacco (leaf and cigars), 
sugar, hemp, and copra; and of minor importance, coffee, sapau wood, 
and buffalo hides. 

There is a large quantity of sugar machinery imported into the 
Philippines every year, mostly of British manufacture; but lately Ger- 
man manufacturers have been sending out some burnished mills, 
which have taken the fancy of many of the native planters, who like 
show and also long credit. The natural products of the islands are 
timber, including many valuable woods yielding resins, gums, dye 
products, fine-grained ornamental wood, aud heavy timber suitable for 
building purposes, copper, and copper and iron pyrites. Gold is also 
found in some quantity, and there are two coal mines situated on the 
east coast of the island of Cebu, which yield sufficient coal to supply 
the local demand, and the quality is stated to be little inferior to 
Australian and better than Japanese. 

The report on the trade and commerce of the Philippine Islands for 
the year 1897, by Mr. Consul Rawson Walker, contains a considerable 
amount of information, but as it was written before the arrival of the 
United States fleet, many of the conditions are now completely changed. 
The most interesting feature in the report is a plan of the new harbor 
works at Manila, and which in the interval have been the scene of such 
important events. It is stated that when the works are completed at 
the port of Manila, there will be abundance of room, not only for men- 
of-war, but for all kinds of mercantile craft seeking to discharge their 
cargoes, or coming in ballast seeking freight, The possession of this 
harbor will add to the value of the Philippines as a naval and 
commercial station. 






TRADE AND INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



[From the Board of Trade Journal, London, May, 1898.] 

The following information with regard to the economic condition of 
the Philippine Islands is taken from the most recent reports of the 
British consular officials at Manila and other ports: 

The principal islands are Luzon, the most northerly of the group, in 
which is situated Manila, the head center of trade; the Visayas group, 
including Panay and Cebu (where are lloilo and Cebn, the other chief 
ports of the archipelago), and Mindanao in the south. The total popu- 
lation is estimated at 7,030,000 souls. 

The trade of the Philippines is largely in the hands of the Chinese, 
of whom there are 50,000 in Manila alone, engaged in every branch of 
commerce and industry; but there are old established British firms at 
Manila, with branch establishments at lloilo and Cebn, and in latter 
years the Germans, Belgians, and Swiss have been extending their 
trading operations to a remarkable extent. 

The following table shows the value of the import trade of the prin- 
cipal articles into the three chief ports of the archipelago for the years 
1805 and 181*6, the latest obtainable. Owing, however, to the absence 
of official statistics, the figures must be looked upon as approximate 
only, being based on commercial information supplied to Her Majesty's 
consuls by merchants resident at the ports: 





Ports. 


Imports. 




1895. 


1S96. 




£1, 367, 000 
145. 500 


JE1, 587 500 


Iloi lo 


135 000 


Cebu 


2 000 










Total 


1, 512, 500 


1, 724 5U0 







The principal articles imported include — 

From Spain. — Printed cotton cambrics, colored yarns, gunny bags, 
hats, umbrellas, leather goods, most of the wine, comestibles etc., 
lentils, pulse, beans etc., and beer. 

From the United Kingdom. — Goods made of fine yarns, such as book 
muslins etc., printed jaconets, corrugated and sheet iron for roofing, 
cast iron and yellow metal goods, earthenware, tinned provisions, ham, 
bacon, and flour. 

From Germany. — Hardware and galvanized and enameled iron goods, 
cutlery, paints and oils, and beer. 

From the United States. — Practically all the flour consumed on the 
Manila market. 

The protective tariff which came into force in 1801 has caused a large 
and steadily increasing quantity of the trade in cotton goods and yarns 
T r 35 545 



546 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to be diverted from the United Kingdom to Barcelona, and has also 
put a stop, practically, to the import of linen goods. Gunny bags, 
which used to be imported from Calcutta, come now almost exclusively 
from Barcelona, and Spain likewise provides the greater part of the 
comestibles, wine, etc., for the same reason. The staple products and 
principal articles of export from the Philippines are tobacco (leaf and 
cigars), sugar, hemp, and copra, and, of minor importance, coffee, sapan 
wood, and buffalo hides. The following table shows the value of the 
exports of the principal articles for the years 1895 and 1896: 






Articles. 



1895. 



1896. 



Tobacco (leaf) 

Cigars 

Sugar 

Hemp 

Copra 



£450, 000 

145, 000 

1, 205, 000 

1, 665, 000 

283, 000 



£500, 000 

150, 000 

1,600,000 

1, 500, 000 

375, 000 



The latest report of H. M.'s consul at Manila says that for the year 
1897-98, as far as the Luzon sugar crop is concerned, the outlook is 
poor, and that the recent rebellion in the islands will lead to an almost 
total absence of any supplies from some districts and a considerable 
falling off in them. There is a large quantity of sugar machinery 
imported into the Philippines every year, mostly of British manufac- 
ture; but more lately German manufacturers have been sending out 
some burnished mills, which have taken the fancy of many of the 
native planters, who like show and also long credit. 

The principal customers for Philippine goods are the United States, 
the United Kingdom, China, and Japan. In 1896, 81,614 tons of sugar 
were exported to the United States, while China took 65,974 tons, 
United Kingdom 56,327 tons, and Japan 22,025. During the same 
year the United Kingdom imported 50,940 tons of hemp from the 
Philippines, and the United States 45,041 tons. China and Japan 
took 98,310,000 cigars, United Kingdom 26,954,000, and the rest of the 
Continent of Europe 42,890,000. 

The natural products of the islands are timber — including many val- 
uable woods yielding resins, gums, dye products, fine-grained orna- 
mental woods, and heavy timber suitable for building purposes — copper, 
and copper and iron pyrites. In Paracele and North Camarines there 
are veins of gold worked by the natives, and in the rivers of Sapan, 
Casiguran, and New Ecija there are found gold pyrites of good quality, 
while in Mambualao and Camarines there are gold mines in operation. 
There are also many hot springs of iron and sulphur waters, all of 
excellent medicinal properties. The two coal mines situated in the east 
coast of the island of Cebu are said to yield sufficient coal to supply 
the local demand, and the quality is stated to be a little inferior to 
Australian and better than Japanese. 



SPANISH COLONIES. 



|From the Statesman's Tear-Book, 1898.] 

The area and population of the various possessions claimed by Spain 
are as follows: 




Possessions in America: 

Cuba (1890) 

Porto Rico 



Total, America 



2. Possessions in Asia: 

Philippine Islands 

Sulu Islands 

Caroline Islands and Palaos. 
Marianne Islands 



Total, Asia. 



3. Possessions in Africa: 

Rio de Oro and Adrar 

Ifni (near Cape Nun) 

Fernando Po, Annabon, Corisco, Elobey, San Juan. 



Total, Africa 

Total possessions *°5, 458 



Area (Eng- 
lish square 
miles) . 


Population. 


41,655 
3,670 


1,631,687 

806, 7U8 


45, 325 


2, 438, 395 


114, 326 
950 
560 
420 


7, 000, 000 
75, 000 
36, 000 
10,172 


116, 256 


7, 121, 172 


243, 000 

27 

850 


100. 000 

6,000 

30, 000 


243, 877 


136, 000 


405, 458 


9, 695, 567 



For administrative purposes the Canary Islands are considered part 
of Spain. Eio de Oro and Adrar are under the governorship of the 
Canary Islands, with a subgovernor resident at Eio de Oro. The 
country on the banks of the rivers Muni and Cainpo is claimed by 
Spain, but disputed by France. It has an area of 09,000 square miles 
and a population of 500,000. 

The extent of the Sulu Archipelago, under the Spanish protection, is 
defined in a protocol signed at Madrid March 7, 1885, by representa- 
tives of Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, as including all the islands 
lying between the western extremity of the island of Mindanao on the 
one side and the islands of Borneo and Aragua on the other, exclud- 
ing all parts of Borneo and the islands within a zone of three maritime 
leagues of the coast. 

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 

These islands extend almost due north and south from Formosa to 
Borneo and the Moluccas, embracing an extent of 16° of latitude and 
9° of longitude. They are over 1,200 in number. The two largest are 
Luzon (area 40,024 square miles) and Mindanao, and the total area 
is about 52,650 square miles. 1 The population, including army and 

1 Table quoted above Bays 114,326 square miles, which is evidently correct.— E. H. 

547 



548 TREATY OF PEACE. 

navy, numbers about 7,670,000. The capital of the Philippines, Manila, 
has 154,062 inhabitants (1887); other towns are Laoag, 30,642; Lipa, 
43,408; Banang, 35,598; Batangas, 35,587. There is a small resident 
Spanish population and about 100,000 Chinese, in whose hands are the 
principal industries. The native inhabitants are mostly of the Malayan 
race, but there are some tribes of Negritos. The government is admin- 
istered by a governor- general and a captain-general, and the 43 prov- 
inces are ruled by governors, alcaldes, or commandants, according to 
their importance and position. 

The estimated revenue of the Philippine Islands in 1894-95 was 
£2,715,980, and expenditure £2,656,026. There is an export duty on 
tobacco, and almost every article of foreign production is heavily taxed 
on being imported. On muslins and petroleum the duty is about 100 
per cent of the cost. 

The chief products are hemp, sugar, coffee, copra, tobacco leaf, cigars, 
indigo. Gold mining is being carried on in Luzon with favorable pros- 
pects, and coal mining in Cebu, where, when arrangements for carriage 
are completed, the output is expected to be about 5,000 tons per month. 

In the absence of official statistics, only approximate results can be 
given. In 1896 the imports were estimated at £2,187,500, and the 
exports at $4,151,250. The chief imports are rice, flour, wines, dress, 
petroleum, coal. The chief exports in 1896 were: Sugar, £1,600,000; 
hemp, £1,500,000; tobacco leaf, £500,000; cigars, £150,000; copra, 
£375,000. On an. average about 34 per cent of the import value is from 
the United Kingdom, 21 per cent from Hongkong and Amoy, 13 per 
cent from Spain, and 10 per cent from Singapore and British India. 
Imports into Spain from the Philippine Islands in 1895, 24,970,692 
pesetas; exports to Philippine Islands, 25,769,890 pesetas. The total 
imports into Great Britain (board of trade returns) in 1896 were of the 
value of £1,536,533, and the exports of British produce to the Philippine 
Islands, £507,601. The chief articles of import into Great Britain in 
1896 were hemp, of the value of £731,633, and unrefined sugar, of the 
value of £647,370. Of the British exports in 1896, the value of £307,019 
was for cotton manufactures and yarn. In 1895, 304 vessels of 425,025 
tons cleared the ports of Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu. There are 720 miles 
of telegraph in the islands, and 70 miles of railway. 

The coin iu use is the Mexican dollar, with locally coined fractional 
money. The import of foreign money is illegal, but that of Mexican 
dollars is permitted. 






SHIFTING OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN. 



(Deutsche Warte, August 20, 1898.— Translation.] 

The recent changes in the political conditions of Oceania have taken 
place exclusively in the west. The Russian Empire, through its Sibe- 
rian coast province, borders in the .north on the Pacilic Ocean; on its 
coast Russia had heretofore only the port of Vladivostock, blockaded 
by ice in winter; recently she has acquired from China Port Arthur, 
which, as well as the former, she has equipped as a large port for war 
purposes. Thereby Russia has become one of the great powers in east 
Asia, offering strong competition to the hitherto preponderant influence 
of England. 

Germany, through her acquisition of the Bay of Kiao Chou, has 
found what she had hitherto lacked — a basis for her commercial rela- 
tions in that part of the world. Germany also has a share in the Aus- 
tralian Archipelago by reason* of her possessions in New Guinea, the 
Bismarck Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands. 

England has enlarged her old possession of Hongkong, strives for the 
monopoly of the Yang-tse-kiang Valley, which is of the greatest 
importance as the commercial route to the interior of China, and has 
recently also made a settlement at Wei-hai-wei, between Kiao Chou 
and Port Arthur. Her influence in northern China has been consid- 
erably lessened through the Russian rivalry, which is making itself felt. 
The other insular possessions of Great Britain are shown on our map. 

France had in Tonkin the naval station of Saigoon; in addition, she 
has acquired Lai Chou, in the northern part of southern China, opposite 
the Island of Hainan. In the archipelago of Oceania she also has a 
number of smaller groups of islands extending east of New Caledonia. 

The colonial possessions of Holland extend from the East Indian 
Archipelago to New Guinea, of which latter she owns the western part. 
But her colonial possessions lack sufficient security, so that a catas- 
trophe similar to that of Spain is within the range of possibilities. 

Spain is nominally still in possession of the Philippines, the Palau 
Islands, and the Caroline Islands. The Ladrone Islands she will lose, 
as also a station in the Philippines. 

The United States has annexed Hawaii, and, as spoils of the war, the 
Ladrone Islands, with a coaling station on Guam Island, have fallen to 
her share, and for the present also Manila, capital of the Philippines. 
Moreover, she will equip as a naval station the port of Pango Pango, 
acquired by contract, situated on Tutuila, the farthest of the three 
larger islands of the Samoa group. By this measure the power of the 
United States in the Pacilic Ocean, where she also owns some smaller 
groups between the continent and Hawaii, will be very considerably 
increased, at the cost of an independent group (Hawaii), as well as of 
Spain (the Ladrones and Manila) and Germany. 

549 



THE VOLCANIC REGION ABOUT MANILA. 



[Commnnication to Councilor von Hauer. Duod. Manila, January 11, 1876. Contribution by Dr. Rich- 
ard von Drasche. Proceedings of the Royal Geological Service. Vienna, Austria, March 7, 1876.] 

After a short stay in Ceylou, I reached the Philippines, where I have 
been since the 3d of December. I have set myself the task of visiting 
the active volcanoes, as well as exploring the more than 2,000 square 
miles (German) J of which the great Island of Luzon consists, in order 
to obtain a description of its geological formation. As I expect to re- 
main only six months, it is clear that I can not undertake any detailed 
study. The country and its people are such as to render travel diffi- 
cult in every respect. Streets and roads exist only in the level lands; 
as soon as one enters the hill country every communication ceases, and 
every effort to advance is frequently impeded by impenetrable forests. 
The unreliability and astonishing laziness of the natives, left com- 
pletely ignorant by three centuries of priestly rule, contribute to the 
difficulties of travel. An additional hindrance is met in northern 
Luzon in the inimical races (Negritos, Igorrotes, etc.), who so frighten 
the timid Malays that they can not be hired for any price to accompany 
the traveler on his excursions. 

Under such circumstances the scientific results in no wise represent 
the efforts necessary to their attainment; and I trust, Mr. Councilor, 
that these few introductory words will excuse what may seem to you a 
small output for six weeks of work. 

The excursions which I have so far made are grouped as follows: 
(1) Plain of Pampanga, ascent of Arayat and the Cordillera de Zam- 
bales. (2) South shore of Laguna de Bay and ascent of the extinct 
volcano Maquilin, besides a visit to the Solfatara " white land." (3) 
Ascent of the volcano Taal. (4) Paray River and Cueva de San Mateo. 

Let me briefly summarize my observations: 

Manila lies in a wide and fertile plain which belongs to a loamy 
bottom rising slightly above the sea, and contains countless remains of 
mussel shells of the varieties still living in the adjacent seas. This 
plain is surrounded on almost every side by an immense stratum of 
pumice tufa which stretches in rows of low hills as far as the San Mateo 
Mountains aud Laguna de Bay. 

The large and slightly elevated plain of Pampanga, which extends 
north of the bay of Manila, from north to south, as far as the gulf of 
Lingayen, and covers a surface of over 100 square miles (German), con- 
sists in its southern part of loose tufa, in which are found large pieces 
of very porous sanidin-trachyte, often with hornblende crystals From 
the village of Arayat to Porac, at the foot of the Cordillera de Zambales, 
I could always observe the same formation. The Cordillera de Zam- 
bales, more than 20 German miles long, reaches its greatest elevation 
(6,281 feet) in Monte Piuatubo, a ragged peak. Here the Cordillera, 

, l About 40,000 English square miles. — E. H. 
550 



TREATY OF PEACE. 551 

which at first extends in a north and south direction from Monte Taguan, 
turns suddenly to the northwest, then returns to its former north and 
south direction from Monte Iba to Monte Verde on the gulf of Lingayen. 
If one were to draw a line from Monte Pinatubo to the isolated moun- 
tain of Arayat in the plain, one would notice that all the rivers north 
of this line flow in a northeasterly direction, while all those south of it 
flow in a southeasterly direction toward Rio Grande de la Pampanga. 
This circumstance may be observed particularly plainly from the top 
of the Arayat, where I first noticed this slope of the plain in both direc- 
tions, increasing toward Monte Pinatubo. East of Monte Arayat this 
circumstance disappears entirely. 

The latter mountain, which hitherto has been called by all geographers 
an extinct volcano, owing to its isolated position and cone like shape, 
is composed of a hornblende audesite containing olivine, which is the 
most basic stone formation I have so far met with. Its summit does 
not show any crater, but instead three peaks separated from each other 
by large chasms. 

The following brief abstracts will indicate the general character of 
the remainder of this article and articles in Nos. 9 and 11 of same pro- 
ceedings and in the Yearbook of the society for 1876, Volume XXVI, 
page 157 et seq. : 

Description of extinct volcano Maquilin, which forms the western 
extremity of the series of volcanoes south of Laguna de Bay. The 
Maquilin is surrounded by many small crater lakes and hot springs, all 
containing sulphide of hydrogen. The hot springs of Tierra Blauca 
and Los Banos, formerly famous, now abandoned. 

Active volcano Taal; last important eruption in 1754. Other vol- 
canoes: Babuyan Claro and V. Didica in the Babuyan group north of 
Luzon; Oagua, Albay, and Bulusan in Luzon; Malaspina in Negros; 
Camiguin in island of same name; all of them have had recent erup- 
tions and have continually smoking craters. 

On the left bank of the Piuquiang River, in the valley of Bambang, 
rises the Monte Blanco, with many springs containing salt and sulphide 
of hydrogen; the whole mountain is incrusted with salt and gypsum 
crystals; hence its name, Monte Blanco (White Mountain). In the 
valley of the Rio Agno much gold is found and washed by the Igor- 
rotes. Large copper mines at Mancayan in Lepanto, where also sul- 
phide of copper, arsenic, iron and copper pyrites, etc., are found. The 
mines are not now worked. Near Mancayan, medicinal hot springs 
(especially sulphur) of Meynit and Sadanga. 

Coal mines of Bakon, in southeastern Luzon, not visited by writer. 
Much valuable ore of all kinds found on his trip from Laguna de Bay 
to Legaspi, Province of Albay. 

[From Yearbook.] 

The occurrence of salt-water fish and the salt contained in the lake 
of Taal indicate that at some time the interior of the old crater was 
connected with the ocean, and the communication was gradually cut 
off by the products of repeated volcanic eruptions. The whole provinces 
of Cavite and Batangas and the environs of Manila are formed of 
products of eruptions of Mouut Taal. The Laguna de Bay was prob- 
ably formerly a shallow bay of the ocean and was separated from the 
latter by deposits of volcanic eruptions. South Luzon consisted for- 
merly of a number of islands, the oldest of which was probably what 
is now the western part of the Province of Camarin. The landings of 
Calivac and Pasacao are presumably the most recent parts risen from 
the sea. 






THE TAGAL, HIS ABILITIES, AND WHY HE REBELLED. 



[By Frederic H. Sawyer, member Institute Civil Engineers, inclosed to the office of naval intelligence 
by the United States naval attache in London, with his letter No. 269, dated August 30, 1898. Mr. 
Sawyer was acting British consul for the Philippines in 1885, has resided fourteen years in Luzon, 
and has traveled extensively through the Philippines. The following paper was prepared by Mr. 
Sawyer and forwarded under datu: Hotel Altenberg, Miinster, Elsass, August 26, 1898.] 

The question whether or not to annex the Philippines is exciting 
much interest in the United States, especially since the surrender of 
Manila. 

Little is known of the archipelago, either in England or America; 
in fact, before the war only those interested in the islands could say 
where the group is situated. 

I resided in Luzon for fourteen years, visiting all the central and 
southern provinces, and made trips to Mindoro, lloilo, Cebu, Palawan, 
and (Jalamianes. 

My profession as a colonial engineer brought me into contact with 
all classes of the community from the landowner or planter to the 
laborers and mechanics who worked under my direction. 

The most important race in the archipelago is the Tagal or Tagaloc, 
inhabiting Manila and the central provinces of Luzon, and as my long 
experience of them is extremely favorable, 1 am loth to see them 
described as they have been — as ferocious savages, intent on bloodshed. 

The Tagal, as I knew him, possesses a good deal of self-respect, and 
is of a quiet and calm demeanor. On great provocation he is liable to 
give way to a sudden burst of fury, in which condition he is very dan- 
gerous. But in general he shows great docility, and bears no malice if 
justly punished. He is fairly industrious, and sometimes is very hard 
working. Anyone who has seen him poling barges against the current 
of the Pasig will admit this. He is a sportsman, and will readily put 
his money on his favorite horse or gamecock. He is also prone to other 
forms of gambling. He rarely gives way to intemperance. 

The position held by women in a community is often taken as a test 
of its degree of civilization. 

Among theTagals the wife exerts great influence in the family, and 
the husband rarely completes any important business without her con- 
currence and approval. 

Children show great respect to both parents, and come morning and 
evening to kiss their bauds. 

The houses of the well-to-do natives are large and airy, and are kept 
scrupulously clean. The Tagal in general is hospitable, and according 
to his means keeps open house on feast days and family festivals. 

As one who has enjoyed their hospitality on many occasions when 
traveling in the provinces, I can testify to their kindness and liberality. 

The Tagal makes a good soldier; he can march long distances bare- 
footed, and find food in the forests where European soldiers would 
starve. 
552 



TREATY OF PEACE. 553 

In action his officer has more trouble to hold him in than to urge 
him on. 

As sailors the Tagals are unsurpassed in the East. They navigate 
their coasting craft, schooners, and "lorchas," with much skill; they 
serve as sailors and firemen in the fine flotilla of coasting steamers 
belonging to Manila, and they man all the smaller vessels of the Span- 
ish navy in the Philippines. Most of the British and foreign steamers 
in the far East carry four Manila men as quartermasters. They are 
reputed skillful and trustworthy helmsmen. 

Their ability as mechanics is remarkable. They build excellent 
coasting vessels, brigan tines, schooners, and lorchas; also "cascos" 
and other craft for inland navigation or shallow waters. These vessels 
are most ingeniously contrived and admirably adapted to the conditions 
under which they are to be used. They make the most graceful canoes 
and paddle or punt them with remarkable dexterity. 

In Manila and Cavite are to be found numbers of native engine fit- 
ters, turners, smiths, and boiler makers, as well as quarrymen, stone- 
masons, carpenters, bricklayers, and brickmakers. 

Excellent carriages are built in Manila, entirely by native labor. An 
incredible number of carriages and other vehicles are in use there. 

Paiuting and decorating is executed by Manila men in excellent 
style. They learned this art from Italian painters. 

The Tagal is a good fisherman, and is very much at home at this 
work, using many most ingenious traps and nets. Fish of all sorts and 
sizes abound in the Bay of Manila. 

Perhaps the most remarkable talent of the Tagal is his gift for instru- 
mental music. Each parish has its brass band, supplied with European 
instruments and generally wearing a uniform. If the village is a rich 
one, there is usually a string band in addition. These bands perform 
operatic and dance music with the greatest precision, and their services 
at balls and other entertainments can be obtained at a moderate cost. 
Dancing is a favorite amusement among the natives and half-castes, 
and they dance, in the European manner, waltzes, polkas, and the old- 
fashioned rigadoon. The brilliant dresses of the native women produce 
a fine effect in a well lighted ball room. The Grand Duke Alexis 
thought the ball given him by Don Joaquin Arnedo Cruz at Sulipan 
one of the most brilliant sights he had ever seen. 

The Tagals are good agriculturists. Their sugar plantations are 
worked on the "metayage" system, a sort of cooperative arrangement 
which gives good results. All the cultivation is done by natives of the 
islands, no Chinamen being employed on the land, except a few market 
gardeners near Manila. 

I think that the Tagals and other natives might be easily governed. 
Latterly they have shown themselves rebellious against the Spanish 
Government and especially against the priests, but the causes are not 
far to seek. 

In former times, when communication with Spain was by sailing ves- 
sel round the Cape, the number of Spaniards in the islands was small. 

Each province was under an alcalde — mayor — who was both governor 
and judge; a province with a hundred thousand inhabitants had per- 
haps not more than five resident Spanish officials besides the priests. 
All the wealthy parishes had Spanish monks as parish priests. The 
poor ones had native clergy. The government was carried on accord- 
ing to the old "Leyes de Indias." By these wise laws the native was 
aft'orded great protection against extortion. 

He was in some sense a perpetual minor, and could not be sued foi 
more than $5. 



554 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Compare this humane and wise provision with the laws prevailing in 
British India, where the principal occupation of the lower courts is to 
foreclose the mortgages of the wretched ryots at the suit of the village 
usurer. 

These laws also conferred upon the native the perpetual usufruct of 
all the land that he cleared and cultivated, and he could not be removed 
from it. In consequence, most of the cultivated land in Luzon is to this 
day the property of the natives. 

The native also had the right to cut timber in the forests to build or 
repair his house or ship, and could cut bamboos for his roofs and 
fences. 

It should be understood that the above privileges did not extend to 
Spaniards, Chinese, or other strangers, but were a recognition of the 
natives' right to the land. 

The taxes were light, the principal one being a poll tax called the 
" tribute." The customs duties were light and machinery for the sugar 
plantations came in free of duty. A friendly feeling then existed 
between the Spaniard and the native; the maintenance of such an 
economical administration was not burdensome to the latter. 

With the opening of the Suez Canal, and the subsequent establish- 
ment of a Spanish line of steamers, all this changed. Hordes of hungry 
Spaniards arrived by every steamer, for whom places must be found. 
A bureaucratic administration was gradually substituted for the old 
paternal regime. 

New departments were organized and the old ones greatly extended. 
Officials fresh from Spain were poured into every province. There were 
no public works in the islands, but the department was organized with 
assistant engineers, engineers, chief engineers, inspectors, and an 
inspector-general, all with liberal salaries and traveling allowances, 
central and provincial offices, and a staff of writers and draftsmen. 

The pay and allowances of this department for many years exceeded 
the amount of money spent on works, and many of the works are 
wrongly designed and utter failures. 

There were no mines of any consequence, but a department of mines 
was organized — a useless expense. 

A department of woods and forests was organized, with a similar 
staff to that of public works. This became a serious grievance to 
the natives by putting great difficulties in the way of their exercising 
their ancient privileges in the forests. So far as I know, this depart- 
ment never collected enough dues on the timber cut in the forests to 
pay its salaries and expenses. 

A medical service was also organized at great cost and little advan- 
tage. Resident physicians were appointed to the different thermal 
springs, and no one was to be allowed to bathe without paying the 
doctor his fee. 

Model farms and schools of agriculture were started on paper, offi- 
cials were appointed, and their salaries paid, but little or no money 
was forthcoming to lay out or stock these farms. Besides, the direct- 
ors were utterly ignorant of tropical agriculture, and had learned 
what little they knew in a class room. 

A policy was now announced and acted upon to assimilate all the 
institutions of the archipelago to those of the peninsula— a policy 
almost too imbecile for belief, but credible now we have seen to what 
depths of inaptitude a Spanish cabinet can descend. 

Additional and useless ships and troops were provided on the Phil- 
ippine establishment, and unnecessary little wars were got up against 
the sultan of Iola and the dattos of Mindanao. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 555 

These expeditions involved great loss of life from fever among the 
troops and great expense to the treasury. They provided, however, 
pickings for the officials and profits to contractors, titles for the 
governors-general, decorations and promotions for officers who had 
interest. 

Accordingly every year some new and oppressive tax was imposed. 
The customs duties were several times raised and articles formerly 
exempt were made to pay. An export tax on sugar and hemp, a tax 
on all trades and professions, on horses and carriages, a port tax, stamp 
tax, a vexatious tax on all animals slaughtered, taxes on the hand 
looms used by the women in their spare time, taxes on sugar, rice, and 
oil mills, on ships, boats, and lighters; all these and many more were 
imposed. All these duties and taxes, collected by a horde of rapacious 
and unscrupulous employees, might well disgust the native with the 
Government. All classes felt the oppression. The rich were black- 
mailed under threats of being reported as disaffected, while the poor 
suffered from illegal exactions. 

Serious agrarian troubles arose between the monastic orders and the 
tenants on their vast estates. Toward the end of General Weyler's 
government a perilous state of unrest prevailed. But the arrival of 
Gen. Don Etnilio Despujols, Conde de Caspe, to take over the gov- 
ernment soon produced a better feeling. He meted out justice alike to 
priest and tenant, to Spaniard and native, and sent back to Spain sev- 
eral notorious offenders who were a disgrace to the Spanish name. 
The natives, seeing justice done them for the first time, became most 
fervent admirers of the Conde de Caspe, whom they looked upon as a 
savior. He became the idol of the people. This state of things was 
unfortunately of short duration, for the priests seeing that he was not 
their champion obtained his recall by cable. It is said that they paid 
$100,000 in Madrid to obtain this. His departure was a wonderful 
sight; never had there been seen such demonstrations of affection to a 
governor-general. Innumerable multitudes of natives crowded the 
shores to see him embark, and every steamer belonging to the port 
accompanied him far out to sea. 

With the sudden departure of the Conde de Caspe there settled 
down on the native mind the gloomy conviction that force alone could 
plead their cause and that their only hope was to rise in arms. 

Who can wonder at it? With that horde of hungry taxgatherers 
ever vexing them, with all justice denied them, with exile from their 
homes to some distant island ever hanging over them, what else could 
they do? Their fight almost unarmed against the Spaniards was 
heroic and merits the admiration of all brave men. With few excep- 
tions, their humanity has been equal to their valor. 

Altogether, I consider the Tagals to be a brave, kindly, intelligent, 
and interesting people, worthy of a better government than they have 
had. At the same time they are not advanced enough to take the 
administration of the archipelago, nor even of Luzon, entirely into 
their own hands. 

If an honest administration could be conferred upon them, I am con- 
vinced that in a very few years they would attain such a degree of 
prosperity as no other colony has hitherto achieved, and thus fully 
justify their release from the curse of Spanish domination. 



WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE PHILIPPINES? 



[Review of Reviews, July 15, 1808.] 
[1. By an English resident, j 

Mr. John Foreman, aii Englishman who for some years lived in the 
Philippines, and whose articles for the last two or three years have 
been the chief source of popular information on the subject, contributes 
to the Contemporary Review for July an article in which he discourses 
upon the future of the islands. He is hopeful, although under no 
delusion as to the possibility of governing the Philippine Islands on 
the principles of the Declaration of Independence. He says that the 
insurrection which broke out in August, 181)6, was in no sense repub- 
lican in its nature. It had as its object the removal of certain specific, 
well defined grievances. He says: 

The movement had for its objects (1) the expulsion of the monastic orders; (2) the 
abolition of the governor-generals arbitrary power to banish without accusation, 
trial, or sentence; (3) restoration to the natives of the lands held by the religious 
orders; (4) a limitation of the arbitrary powers of the civil guard; (5) no arrest 
without judge's warrant; (6) abolition of the fifteen days' per annum compulsory 
labor. 

Aguinaldo, the leader of the revolt, is a smart, intelligent man of 
about 30 years of age. He is a landed proprietor who has served as 
petty governor of his native town in Cavite. By the arrangement 
between him and Admiral Dewey, Mr. Foreman says: 

It is provisionally agreed that Aguinaldo shall set up a local republic. General 
Aguinaldo's plan is to establish at Manila a congress, to which deputies from all the 
principal islands will be invited. I do not hesitate to prophesy that, unless under 
European or American control, the scheme will end in complete failure. At first, no 
doubt, the islanders will welcome and cooperate in any arrangement which will rid 
them of monastic oppression. The Philippine Islands, however, would not remain 
one year peaceful under an independent native government. It is an utter impossi- 
bility. There is such racial antipathy that the Visayas would not, in this generation, 
submit to what they would always consider a Tagalog republic, and the Tagadogs, 
having procured the overthrow of the Spaniads, would naturally resent a preponder- 
ance of Visaya influence. Families there are very closely united, but as a people 
they have little idea of union. Who would be the electors? The masses are decidedly 
too ignorant to be capable of voting intelligently. The votes would be entirely con- 
trolled by cliques of landowners. 

If the native republic did succeed, it would not be strong enough to protect itself 
against foreign aggression. The islands are a splendid group, well worth picking a 
quarrel and spending a few millions sterling to annex them. I entertain the firm 
conviction that an unprotected united republic would last only until the novelty of 
the situation had worn off. Then, I think, every principal island would, in turn, 
declare its independence. Finally, there would be complete chaos, and before that 
took root America, or some European nation, would probably have interfered, there- 
fore it is better to start with protection. I can not doubt that General Aguinaldo is 
quite alive to these facts; nevertheless, I admire his astuteness in entering on any 
plan which, by hook or by crook, will expel the friars. If the republic failed, at least 
monastic power would never return. 

A protectorate under a strong nation is just as necessary to insure good adminis- 
tration in the islands as to protect them against foreign attack. Either Great Britain 

556 



TREATY OF PEACE. 557 

or America would be equally welcome to the islanders if they had not the vanity to 
think they could govern themselves. Unless America decided to start on a brand 
new policy, it would hardly suit her, I conjecture, to accept the mission of a protec- 
torate so distant from her chief interests. England, having ample resources so near 
at hand, would probably find it a less irksome task. For the reasons given above 
the control would have to be a very direct one. I would go so far as to suggest that 
the government should be styled "The Philippine Protectorate." There might be a 
chamber of deputies, with a native president. The protector and his six advisers 
should be American or English. The functions of ministers should be vested in the 
advisers, and those of president (of a republic) in the protector. In any case the 
finances could not be confided to a native. The inducement to finance himself 
would be too great. All races should be represented in the chamber. 

Should this proposal be carried out, Mr. Foreman thinks the future 
of the Philippines will astonish the world. He says: 

The islands are extremely fertile, and will produce almost anything to be found in 
the Tropics. I estimate that barely one-fourth of the tillable laud is now under cul- 
tivation. There is at present only one railway of 120 miles. A number of lines 
would have to be constructed in Luzon, Panay, Negroa, Cebu, and Mindanao islands. 
Companies would probably take up the contracts on ninety years' working conces- 
sion and ninety-nine years' lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed interest. The 
lands would become immensely valuable to the railway companies, and an enormous 
source of taxable wealth to the protectorate. Road making should be taken up ou 
treasury account and bridge construction on contract, to be paid for by toll conces- 
sions. The port of Yloilo should be improved, the custom-houses abolished, and 
about ten more free ports opened to the world. Under the protectorate undoubtedly 
capital would flow into the Philippines. 

[2. By an American Senator.] 

In the Forth American Eeview for June, Senator John T. Morgan 
discusses what the United States should do with the conquered islands, 
speaking of them, of course, in the prophetic-historical sense, for when 
Senator Morgan wrote the conquest was still to come. Senator Morgan 
is strongly of opinion that, whatever monarchical Europe may say, the 
United States must fulfill its destiny: 

We must respond in our policies to the energy with which our institutions have 
inspired our people in seeking wealth and commercial pursuits. Wheresoever our 
power may extend beyond our continental boundaries it will be confined to the pro- 
tection of the interests of our own people by establishing such military outposts as 
will secure to them the full enjoyment of all their rights and the liberty of commerce. 
The policy of colonization by conquest or coercion is repugnant to our national creed, 
which places the right of free self-government in supremacy over all other sovereign 
rights; and a colonial policy which discriminates between the rights of colonists and 
those of the people who enjoy full citizenship in the United States would be repugnant 
to the principles of our National Constitution. 

This, it must be admitted, is somewhat vague, nor is it exactly 
clear what the Senator is driving at. He would establish a protector- 
ate over the Philippine Islands, but, speaking of the policy of the 
United States, he says : 

It will not inaugurate or support a propaganda in the Philippines, either political 
or religious; but it should not deny to itself the right to give its encouragement to 
good government in those islands, or to give to those people proper support against 
the unjust invasion of their rights by foreign powers. The fortunes of war have 
devolved this duty upon us. Annexation will not be a necessary or proper result 
of such moral or actual protection, because the United States is an American power, 
with high national duties that are, in every sense, American, and the Philippines 
are not within the sphere of American political influence, but are Asiatic, and 
should remain Asiatic. 

As with the Philippines, so with the other Spanish possessions; nor 
does Senator Morgan limit his survey to those possessions that are held 
now by Spain. He says: 

It is a new and iuviting field for American enterprise and influence that opens 
Porto Rico, Cuba, the Isthmian Canal, Hawaii, the Caroline and the Philippine 



558 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Islands to fair trade and good government; and we shall need only the good -will of 
those people to secure to us a just participation in its advantages. This is an allur- 
ing field for conquest and dominion, but no compulsion will be needed to hold it, 
beyond the temporary necessity of preserving the peace in these islands until the 
rightful government of their people can be established on safe foundations. Con- 
quest would dishonor our motives in waging war against Spain, if we should hold 
the subjugated islands only in trust for ourselves. 

If by this last sentence Senator Morgan means that there is to be no 
attempt to enforce the United States tariff against non-American 
goods in the conquered islands, well and good, but it is to be hoped he 
will persist in that good resolution. 

[3. By an American consul.] 

In Seribner's Magazine for June Mr. Isaac M. Elliott, the American 
consul at Manila from 1893 to 1896, gives some account of the islands 
and their inhabitants. Mr. Elliott's narrative is illustrated by a num- 
ber of pictures taken from photographs, which give a rather pleasing 
impression of Manila and its suburbs. Mr. Elliott was much impressed 
by the excessive taxation levied by means of fees, stamps, and other 
imposts. He puts the case in a nutshell when he says that the church 
lives off the natives and the Spanish officials live off the importers. 
There are ninety-nine public holidays observed every year in addition 
to the fifty-two Sundays. The church is immensely rich, but although it 
plunders the natives, Mr. Elliott admits that it has been a civilizing fear 
ture, and has built schools and churches all over the Philippine Islands. 
The insurrection, he thinks, was a righteous uprising on the part of the 
Malays and half-castes, who form the producing classes, against mis- 
government. The savages, or Negritos, have nothing to do with the 
insurrection. Most of the sugar produced on the island goes to the 
United States. Part of it, however, is taken by Hongkong. America 
takes most of the hemp, but none of the tobacco. Until within the last 
few years the United States were supreme in the Philippine trade, but 
of late years English firms have succeeded to the bulk of the business. 
The last American firms were crowded out three years ago by Spanish 
intrigues, caused by the hatred of Americans growing out of the Cuba's 
trouble. In the Island of Mindoro there are mountains so full of coal 
that thousands of tons have broken off the outcropping seam and 
accumulated at the base of the cliffs. The Spanish Government 
immediately confiscated the land where the coal was discovered, but 
nothing has been done toward developing the seam, and all the coal 
used in Manila at present is brought from Australia. 

[4. The Philippines and the Chinese markets.) 

Mr. Truxtun Beale, writing in the North American Eeview on "The 
strategical value of the Philippines," is all for holding them, notwith- 
standing the objections of Senator Morgan. He would retain the 
Philippine Islands, not so much for their own sakes, although that 
weighs with him, but because they would enable America to command 
the Chinese markets. He says : 

Few realize that China is yet a sparsely populated country. It is little more than 
one-third as thickly populated per square mile as the most sparsely populated part 
of Europe. It is not one-quarter as thickly populated as the most thickly populated 
part of Europe. I can confirm the testimony of other travelers as to the great 
extent of uncultivated land in its interior. Its immense mineral deposits have not 
yet begun to be developed, and it is said to contain the largest and finest deposit of 
coal yet discovered. Contrary to the popular impression, the Chinaman is not a 
good business man. He is not an enterprising man. His sole idea in business is to 
turn his capital over rapidly and get quick returns in trade. The idea of laying 



TREATY OF PEACE. 559 

out the profits of capita] for several years in order to drain marshes or irrigate 
wastes never occurs to him. 'flic immensely increased trade that will result from 
the development of this country should bo ours. 

[5. A lady'* account of the islanders.] 

There are several miscellaneous articles in the magazines about the 
Philippine Islands. Miss Lucy M. J. Garnett writes upon the Philip- 
pine Islanders in the Fortnightly Review. She gives some interesting 
pictures of the manners and customs of the people. She has much to 
say of the various saints, who have superseded the ancient idols more 
in name than in fact. The patron saint of Manila is St. Francis the 
Tearful, who on one occasion wept for three hours so copiously over 
the danger of Manila that many cloths were moistened. Another 
favorite saint is the Virgin Autipolo, who appears to have interposed 
more efficaciously for the protection of Manila in the seventeenth cen- 
tury than she was disposed to do when Admiral Dewey entered the 
harbor. Miss Garnett discusses the marriage customs and legal status 
of the women at some length. Concubinage has been largely substi- 
tuted for marriage, owing to the rapacity of the priests, who demand 
such exorbitantly large fees that the natives decide it is not worth the 
money. They are jealous after marriage, but unmarried women are not 
very strictly looked after. 

The Philippine laws relating to the property of married persons are exceedingly 
quaint and interesting, being entirely in favor of the wife. The property of a 
bride is never settled on the husband. If a man is poor and his wife well to do, so 
they remain throughout their married life, he becoming simply the administrator of 
her possessions, but having no right to them. If a husband becomes bankrupt in a 
business in which he has invested some of his wife's fortune, she ranks as a second- 
class creditor under the commercial code. Such being the legal status of women 
in these islands, it naturally follows that they enjoy a considerable degree of per- 
sonal independence, which, in some localities, economic conditions tend to increase, 
especially among the working classes. The chief of these economic conditions has 
been the almost exclusive employment in the Government cigar factories of women. 
The staple industry of the city being thus debarred from men, various occupations 
and industries usually performed by women fall to their share. In their homes, too, 
while the wife is earning the family bread — or rather rice, their staple food — the 
husband looks after the children and cooks the dinner. It is also very difficult to 
get women to act as nurses and maids in European families. 

[6. Dr. Albert Shaw's view.] 

Mr. Bryan and Mr. Cleveland may deprecate extension of American 
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, but Dr. Albert Shaw has 
made up his mind that it has to come, and says so with emphasis in 
the new number of the American Eeview of Reviews : 

The discussion of the future of the Philippines has gone on apace and has brought 
out a great variety of opinions. The surprising thing in the discussion has been the 
remarkable vigor and extent of the American sentiment in favor of the permanent reten- 
tion of the islands as an American possession. It is coming to be understood through- 
out the country that annexation of Hawaii, or the Philippines, or Porto Rico, does 
not by any means imply, either now or at any time in the future, admission into the 
sisterhood of Federal States whose government is provided for under the Constitu- 
tion. It is precisely as reasonable and possible that the United States should exer- 
cise general sovereignty over a distant island without bringing that island into the 
Federal Union as for Holland to exercise dominion in Java without bringing the 
people of that remote realm into domestic relation with the Netherlands. We do 
not intend to hand the people of the Philippines back to the Spaniards; and our 
sense of decency and respect for the enlightened opinion of mankind will not per- 
mit us to abandon them. Nor will the rivalries and conflicts of the European and 
Asiatic powers make it possible tor us to select England or Holland or any other 
power as our residuary legatee. 



560 TREATY OF PEACE. 

PICTURES PROM MANILLA. 

Mr. F. T. Bull en, in a paper entitled "A Beminiscence of Manila," 
gives a very vivid picture of what he saw in the Philippine Islands, 
which he visited many years ago on a sailing ship from Hongkong. 
Mr. Bullen has an extremely high estimate of the value of the Philip- 
pines. He says that they form a magnificent territory, spendidly 
favored with every form of wealth, and capable of supporting with the 
greatest ease fifteen times their present population. Their climate, 
except in the low-lying valleys, is almost perfect. There was no energy 
shown anywhere excepting by the English, American, and German 
merchants, although the most industrious laborers are the Chinese. 
Mr. Bullen thinks that Japan would probably succeed better than any 
other power in administering the Philippines. At the same time, he 
thinks that the tragedy of Formosa would debar them from having a 
chance with the islands. Therefore, as we are out of it, Mr. Bullen 
thinks the United States will have to take in hand the administration 
of the great archipelago. 

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. 



In the Forum, Mr. H. S. Townsend, formerly inspector-general of 
schools at Hawaii, expresses a very strong opinion in favor of annexa- 
tion of the Sandwich Islands by the United States. He speaks very 
highly of the intelligence of the Hawaiiaus. He says: 

When first I came among the Hawaiian people I was surprised to find the school 
children able to put to shame with their knowledge of Garfield, Grant, Lincoln, 
Washington, Gladstone, Beaconsfield, Bismarck, " I'nser Fritz," Nelson, and Napo- 
leon, the American school children with whom 1 had come in contact. Although the 
Hawaiian press has deteriorated somewhat since that time, Hawaiian newspapers 
still give a greater amount of news from foreign lands than would be appreciated by 
the leaders of American country newspapers. 

THE PHILIPPINES. 

Mr. F. F. Hilder, writing in the same magazine on the Philippine 
Islands, thinks that the Americans would do well not to lose their 
hold over the islands which have come into their possession by the for- 
tune of war. He says : 

The world contains no fairer nor more fertile lands, no more promising field for 
commercial enterprise, and no people more worthy to be elevated to a higher place 
in the scale of nations, and to be assisted by education and good government to 
obtain it. This is no imaginative statement, but the result of personal observation 
of the country and of intercourse with its people. 

The Century Magazine for August contains a mass of papers relating 
to the war and the American conquests. They are: "The Island of 
Porto Bico," with pictures from photographs; " Facts about the Philip- 
pines," by Mr. Vanderlip, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, with a 
discussion of pending problems, with a map and pictures from photo- 
graphs; "Life in Manila," with pictures from photographs; "An artist 
with Admiral Sampson's fleet," with pictures from sketches made on 
the spot; "The sanitary regeneration of Havana," by the Surgeon- 
General of the Army; "Cuba as seen from the inside," with pictures 
from photographs. Mr. Vanderlip, one of the brightest and ablest of 
the Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, says of the Philippines : " It 



TREATY OF PEACE. 5(11 

is as a base for commercial operations tliat the islands seem to possess 
the greatest importance. They occupy a favored location, not with 
reference to one part of any pai ticular country of the Orient, but <<> all 
parts. Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire, since the 
acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the pickets of the Pacific, 
standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions of China and 
Korea, French Indo China, the Malay Peninsula, and the islands of 
Indonesia to the south. Australasia may even be regarded as in the 
line of trade. The possession of the Philippines by a progressive com- 
mercial power, if the Nicaragua Canal project should be completed, 
would change the course of ocean navigation as it concerns a large per- 
centageof the water-borne traffic of the world. The project is alluring. 
In the undeveloped resources of the Philippines the sanguine radicals 
see agreat opportunity tor our genius. They recognize that in a decade 
we might make a change greater than has been wrought since Magal- 
hae's discovery until the present time. They see great development 
companies formed to cultivate tobacco and sugar by modern methods, 
others formed to test the richness of the unknown mineral deposits, 
and still others to develop transportation or to reap the treasures of the 
forest. They see also that with honest, intelligent, just, and humane 
government there might be astounding improvement in the character 
of the people." 

THE PHILIPPINES AND THEIR PEOPLE — AN UNPROMISING COLONY 
[Review of Reviews, June 15, 1898.] 

In the Contemporary Review for June Mr. Claes Ericsson, who appears 
to have been an orchid collector, describes a visit which he paid to the 
Philippines in the year 1894. A perusal of his paper is not calculated 
to encourage very joyful anticipations as to the result if the Americans 
should decide to begin their colonizing experiments by taking over the 
2,000 islands with a population of 8,000,000, merely because Admiral 
Dewey destroyed half a dozen ships in the harbor of Manila. For 
what appears most clearly from Mr. Ericsson's paper is that the natives 
of these islands, whether they be Sulus, or Tagals, or Bisayas, are ele- 
ments in the question which will have to be reckoned with altogether 
independently of the fate of the Spaniards. In the island of Palawan, 
Mr. Ericsson says, the Spaniards have no real authority, and never 
interfere with the natives except where Chinamen or Europeans are 
concerned. Again he says, after visiting the other islands, "It would 
have been almost useless to ask the assistance of the Spaniards. I 
never met with one who could speak the Sulu language or any of the 
dialects. As a consequence, the supposed rulers know next t<> nothing 
of the natives, their customs, and wishes. None of the larger islands 
is really under the domination of the Spaniards, whose rule extends 
little farther than the range of their cannon. Of the native soldiery, 
not one in a score knows the name of his officers. 

In the chief town of the Sulu islands the Sulu were in the habit of 
taking potshots at the Spanish sentries every night, and this, be it 
observed, was the former state of Spanish rule in the Sulu islands. 
Mr. Ericsson does not give a very cheerful account of tin 1 country itself. 
It swarms with venomous ants, whose bites suppurate like smallpox. 
Mosquitoes, he says, swarm as they do nowhere else on the earth, while 
as for alligators, he once counted thirteen moving in a troop along the 
beach at one time. Worse than all is a virulent fever, from which, at 
T P 3G 



562 TREATY OF PEACE. 

one place that he visited, half of the Spanish garrison was prostrate. 
Everywhere the people seemed wretchedly poor, and their habitations 
the worst hovels that he had ever seen in the far East. The aborigines 
are little people who are tyrannized over by the Sulus, who appear to 
spend their time in plundering their neighbors. The Sulus are pirates or 
the sons of pirates, who think nothing of murder, and who have never 
been subdued, and, in Mr. Ericsson's opinion, never will be by Spain. 
It is evident that if the Americans are to serve their apprenticeship to 
colonization they will have a pretty tough time in the Philippines. They 
will find it somewhat difficult to apply to those aborigines and their 
Sulu oppressors the great and glorious principles of the American Con- 
stitution; but that, some of the Americans gravely assure us, is precisely 
what they are determined to do. The belief of some Americans in the 
saving efficacy of democratic government is quite touching. It will not, 
however, long survive the test of actual experience in the Philippines. 



FACTS ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES, WITH A DISCUSSION OF 
PENDING PROBLEMS. 



[The Century, Angnst, 1898.] 
[By Frank A. Vanderup, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.] 

The guns of Admiral Dewey did something more than destroy a 
Spanish fleet in the harbor at Manila. Their echo came back to us in 
a question new in the history of our Government. In the shaping of 
the Constitution our fathers evinced a foresight that has ever since 
been our admiration; but their prescience looked ahead to no such 
problem as this one which a naval victory on the other side of the world 
has raised. It is a problem for the solution of which we have surpris- 
ingly little data. Neither precedent nor experience can be satisfac- 
torily drawn on, and we see with sudden clearness that some of the 
most revered of our r>olitical maxims have outlived their force. Wash- 
ington's Farewell Address, and the later crystallization of its main 
thought by President Monroe, had come to possess with us almost the 
force of a constitutional provision, and even to be regarded by the 
nations as one of the fundamentals of our Government. Our stanch 
belief in the value of that doctrine of political isolation has been shaken 
by Dewey's victory. The impending question of what shall be done 
with the fruit of that victory has made us examine in a new temper, 
and with new lights, this political doctrine of ours; and it has sharply 
emphasized to our minds the changed conditions surrounding us now, 
compared with those which gave birth and force to that doctrine. 

The world is much smaller now than when Washington read his fare- 
well address. The Philippine Islands, although almost on the other side 
of the earth, are much nearer the seat of our Government, by the meas- 
ure of transportation and time, than were in that day regions that are 
now populous States. The same factors that have brought compara- 
tively close to us the most distant countries have developed a new main- 
spring that has become the directing force in international affairs — the 
mainspring of commercialism. In the days when Washington enun- 
ciated the policy of political isolation the questions that were before 
parliaments and assemblies were questions of individual freedom, of 
representative government, of civil and political rights. The debates 
of the legislative bodies of the nations are no longer on those lines. 
They are on finance and questions of commercial development. It is 
the age of commerce, and it is commerce that has for a generation 
been shaping the foreign policy of every nation but ours. It has been 
the flag of commerce, rather than of national aggrandizement, that has 
led the troops of England, France, and Germany through Africa. It 
was to plant the flag of commerce that there has been such maneuver- 
ing by the nations of Europe to gain footholds along the Chinese coast. 
And now, without the slightest premeditation on our part, and with 

563 



564 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the most inadequate preparation to handle the question, we have sud- 
denly found ourselves in possession of a vantage point more valuable 
than the prizes for which the great nations of Europe have been 
scheming. With the extraordinary conditions surrounding this sud- 
den acquisition of rights, it is natural that there should be the most 
intense interest in the characteristics and the commercial possibilities 
of these islands and their population of 8,000,000. To reach any 
intelligent opinion in regard to their disposition, we need, of course, 
as clear an idea as possible of just what they are, of the advantages 
to be gained by their retention, and of the difficulties to be encountered 
in their administration. 

It is as a base for commercial operations that the islands seem to 
possess the greatest importance. They occupy a favored location, not 
with reference to one part of any particular country of the Orient, but 
to all parts. Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire, since 
the acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the pickets of the 
Pacific, standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions of 
China and Korea, French Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, and the 
islands of Indonesia to the south. Australasia may even be regarded 
as in the line of trade. A glance at the map will readily show what a 
commanding position the archipelago occupies with reference to adja- 
cent territory. While it is true that the islands lie a little out of the 
direct line of ocean traffic in voyages by way of the eastern passage, 
there are reasons which operate strongly for a discontinuance of navi- 
gation by way of the Straits of Malacca and the China Sea to the 
Orient. 

The voyage by this course is one dreaded by all navigators at certain 
seasons of the year, when the Straits become the center of the worst 
storm disturbances known to the world, and when navigation is conse- 
quently restricted. With the opening of the Nicaragua Canal, how- 
ever, the trade of our Atlantic ports with the Orient will take the safer 
and shorter route thus provided; and in addition to this, the commerce 
of much of Europe which now seeks the East by the voyage through 
the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean, and the Straits, 
or by the Cape route, will turn in the opposite direction. The posses- 
sion of the Philippines by a progressive commercial power, if the Nica- 
ragua Canal project should be completed, would change the course of 
ocean navigation as it concerns a large percentage of the water borne 
traffic of the world. Europe looks to the Nicaragua Canal and the 
Pacific as offering a better route to the far Eastern countries; and in 
the event of its completion, the archipelago will be the gateway to all 
the trade of lower China and the countries south. Hongkong, the 
great warehouse where are stored and whence are distributed the 
products of the earth in the maritime trade of China, may,in the course 
of these changes now in prospect, become scarcely more than a distrib- 
uting point for the trade of the valley of the Sa-Kiang. 

In the trans-Pacific trade the Hawaiian Islands will afford a resting 
place for ships, and their importance will be immeasurably increased 
by the opening of the canal and the diversion of ocean traffic from the 
channels it now follows. The Nicaragua Canal and the Hawaiian 
Islands will be invested with new interest to us by the unexpected 
acquisition of rights in the Philippines, which will then be a key to the 
Orient of vast importance to the United States, or to any other pro- 
gressive nation which may have the opportunity to make of them a base 
for the distribution of far Eastern commerce. 

More than h ilf of the people of the earth live in the countries which 



TREATY OF PEACE. 5G5 

may be easily reached from theriiilippines. There is China, which, acord- 
ing to the latest estimates, has a population of more than 400,000,000 ; the 
East Indies (British. Dutch, and French), 343,000,000; Japan, 42,000,- 
000; British Australasia, 5,000,000; Siam, 5,000,000; and the Straits 
Settlements, 600,0t'0 — all together, a population ten times that of the 
United States. Trade relations can not at once be established with all 
these millions, for many of the populous provinces of China and far 
Eastern Asia lie remote from the coast, and it will be years before 
communication with the interior is opened by rail. Nevertheless, 
since the Chino Japanese war railroad building in China has been 
advancing rapidly. Out of adversity something of good has come to 
the Celestial Empire, and the lesson taught by the victorious Japanese 
has resulted in the birth of a new China. Ancient exclusiveness is 
being laid aside, and the Empire is already on the road to progress. 

How long the dominion of Hongkong over the maritime trade of China 
will last, even should the Philippines not become its rival as a distribu- 
tive market, is a question which may largely be determined by the 
occupation of Kiao Chou, Port Arthur, and Wei-Hai- Wei. Kussia'sgreat 
railway across her Siberian possessions must also be taken into account 
in disposing of the trade of China. Penetrating the rich province of 
Manchuria, with the certain prospect of forming a junction with a road 
to be built from Shanghai, it will be only a few years before that city 
will be connected by rail with Europe. The great rivers of China, the 
Si-Kiang, the Yaug-tse-Kiang, and the Yellow River, have hitherto fur- 
nished the only ready means of reaching the trade of the interior. 
Hongkong, at the mouth of the Si-Kiang, has monopolized the com- 
merce of the valley drained by that river, and the trade of Canton, 
formerly of much magnitude, has dwindled into insignificance. It may 
be easily seen that the recent acquisition of Kiao-Chou Bay, Wei-Hai- Wei, 
and Port Arthur gives Germany, England, and liussia, respectively, 
advantageous locations with reference to the commerce of the valley of 
the Yellow River. The onset made with a view to opening China to 
trade can not fail to result in a remarkable transformation of the empire 
in a few decades — a change as complete as that which has taken place 
in Japan, which twenty-five years ago was as China is to-day, and is 
now a ranking power, a leading member of the family of progressive 
nations. 

The foreign commerce of all the countries of the far East exceeds 
two thousand millions a year. The reports of the Bureau of Statistics 
of the Treasury Department show that the imports are a few millions 
in excess of $1,000,000,(100, and the exports about the same. In the 
total value of the foreign trade the United States has an interest of 
about $150,000,000, a little over 7 per cent. Our chief trade among 
these countries is with Japan. We buy more than 32 per cent of 
Japan's exportable products, and we supply 12 per cent of all the Empire 
buys abroad. We take one twelfth of China's exports, sending in 
return one- twentieth of her imports. Trade with the Hawaiian Islands 
is almost exclusively our own, more than 90 per cent of their exports 
being shipped to the United States, while they take from us 70 per cent 
of all their imports. We enter into the trade of British Australasia to 
the extent of 5 per cent of its total commerce. To the Philippine 
Islands we send but little over one two-hundredth part of their imports, 
while we take more than one-fifth of their entire exports and more than 
one half of their exports of sugar and hemp. The import figures must 
not, however, be taken to indicate the whole of American shipments to 
the countries named, for they represent only the trade direct. 



566 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Many exports of the United States are credited in English and 
American statistics to the commerce of Great Britain. Our interests 
in the Orient, however, may best be understood from the fact that, next 
to Great Britain, we have the largest commerce with these countries. 
Germany and France, although active in securing commercial advan- 
tages in China, have not yet acquired sufficient importance in trade 
returns to be classified, except as " other Europe." There is a promis- 
ing field for our manufactures of cotton in almost all countries of the 
Orient. Within a few years our exports of raw cotton to Japan have 
doubled, and our trade with China has shown a marked tendency toward 
expansion. We have the bulk of the trade in mineral oils, although 
there is a growing competition with Russia, which may be greater when 
the trans Siberian road is completed. American Hour also has gained 
a foothold, and the growers of the hard wheat of California, the best 
shipping wheat in the world, look to the far East as a future market 
for their exportable surplus. Machinery of all kinds is rapidly gaining 
in favor, and within a year one of the Chinese railroads has been 
equipped with Baldwin locomotives. One of the street-railway lines of 
Manila is now provided with American cars made in Philadelphia, and, 
notwithstanding the great expense of transportation, they are pre- 
ferred to those of Germany, which were discarded. 

What is there in the Philippines, aside from their most important con- 
sideration as a base for the extension of trade? This magnificent archi- 
pelago has an area of about 114,000 square miles, or more than two- 
thirds that of the Spanish peninsula, and three times that of Spain's 
possessions in the West Indies. The chain extends in a southeasterly 
direction for a distance of some eighteen hundred miles, and separates 
the waters of the China Sea from the Pacific. Luzon, nearest Formosa 
and the coast of China, and the largest island of the group, is of suffi- 
cient extent to equal the combined area of Cuba and Porto Rico. The 
fertile island of Mindanao, at the southern extremity of the archipelago, 
has an area equal to that of "The Pearl of the Antilles." Between 
these two great islands, Luzon and Mindanao, are others, smaller and 
of varying importance. Upon one of them, Panay, is situated the city 
of lloilo, rapidly developing into a port quite independent of the inllu- 
ence of Manila, which, for the most part, controls the trade of the Phil- 
ippines. Apart from the chain proper lies the island of Palawan, which, 
extending in a southwesterly direction from the island of Panay, reaches 
almost to British Borneo, and is the western boundary of a body of 
water of great depth, known as Mindoro or Sulu Sea. 

The number of islands in the archipelago is variously estimated at 
from 500 to 2,000, the smaller figure relating to those which are sus- 
ceptible of cultivation or are valuable for their timber and minerals. 
Their area is as large as that of the six New England States, with New 
Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. The area of arable land, however, 
is scarcely more than one-third of that contained within the limits of 
the States named. The reason for this is the volcanic origin of the 
islands and the consequent ruggedness of the country. In Luzon, the 
principal island and the one upon which Manila is situated, there is a 
fertile valley drained by the Cagayan, some 200 miles in length and 
100 wide, lying between ranges of mountains on each coast. The val- 
ley of the Cagayan under good government has a bright future before 
it. At the mouth of the river is the town of Aparri, opposite the 
island of Camiguin, which stands guard over an extensive bay. In this 
bay harbor facilities may be found equal to and safer than those in the 
bay of Manila, and persons who have been to the islands investigating 



TREATY OF PEACE. 567 

their possibilities of development look to Aparri as likely to become a 
rival of Manila. This is so for the reason that Aparri is twenty-four 
hours nearer Hongkong and 400 miles nearer San Francisco than the 
capital of the island. As already said, Manila dominates the Philip- 
pine trade, although Iloilo has gained some importance as a sugar 
mart and Cebu is known for its exports of hemp. 

After centuries of Spanish misrule, the islands are scarcely more 
advanced than they were when, in honor of Philip II, they were given 
their name. Their varied resources are virtually undeveloped. Their 
people have never been taught how to take advantage of the bounties 
which nature has placed before them. 

Interest chiefly centers on the Island of Luzon, not only because 
Manila is situated on that island, but because of the diversity of its 
products. In the valley of the Cagayan are great tobacco fields, which 
rival those of the Vuelta Abajo of Cuba. The greater part of the sugar 
exported from the Philippines is produced on the Island of Luzon. 
Hemp, the main product of the group, is grown almost entirely on 
other islands. Rice is a staple crop, because, as with most other 
peoples of the Orient, it is the greatest article of food consumption. 
None is exported, however; and notwithstanding there is abundant 
territory suitable for rice growing, it has not been utilized, for the rea- 
son that the directing agencies have in this, as in all other instances, 
failed to induce the people to make the most of their advantages. 

Coffee also is grown, and the more civilized natives have each a little 
grove of trees, which produce 4 or 5 bushels of the coffee berry a 
year. Only small quantities are sent to the markets for export. A little 
corn is raised, mainly in the vicinity of Manila, where in season it is 
peddled on the streets, boiled or roasted. None is fed to stock, paddy 
rice being used for that purpose. Hay is unknown, its place being 
taken by a swamp grass, upon which the buffalo cattle, the draft animals 
of the Philippines, feed. 

The most important agricultural product is what is known to com- 
merce as Manila hemp. Thousands of tons of this fiber are raised annu- 
ally on the Pacific slopes of the southern islands, where it also grows 
wild. That this is the leading product of the Philippines is due to the 
fact that its cultivation requires the least effort. With only careless 
attention it is possible to raise many tons to the acre. The fiber is 
obtained from a species of plantain called abaca, a tree which grows to 
the height of from 15 to 20 feet and is from 8 to 12 inches in diameter. 
The trunk may be as easily separated as a stalk of celery. An ordi- 
nary knife only is required to cut down the tree, and a rude instrument 
is used to press out the juice and shred the fiber. After a little drying 
in the sun, and packing it into bales of 240 pounds each, it is ready for 
shipment. The United States and England take almost the entire 
crop. Hemp of this kind is grown nowhere else in the world. It is 
said that a fortune awaits one who can invent a machine which will 
accelerate the process of pressing out the juice and pulp, leaving only 
the fiber. A rude knife and a lever for holding it strongly in position 
are the instruments now in use. 

Next in the order of importance as a product of the soil is sugar. 
The poorest sugar in the world is produced in the Philippines, and yet 
the islands are capable of producing the best. The reason for the poor 
quality lies in the method of manufacture, and not in any disadvantage 
of soil, climate, or character of the cane, which is superior in saccharine. 
The methods of sugar manufacture which prevailed in the fifteenth 
century are still in vogue in the Philippines. The last account of mills 



568 TREATY OF PEACE. 

fn operation showed that there were in the islands 5,920 cattle mills, 
239 steam mills, and 3o water mills, while there were only 3 vacuum- 
pan sugar works. The process of making sugar in these islands varies 
with locality, but all the product is what is known as a very low grade 
of muscovado sugar. It is not drained or clarified by any of the modern 
methods, and brings tbe lowest price in the markets of the world, 
except perhaps low grade sugar of a similar character made in Brazil. 
The estimated crop of the islands for the season of 1897-98 is 190,000 
tons. Cuba's crop for the same period is estimated at 200,000 tons. 

Until the year 1890 the United States annually imported from 
110,000,000 to 300,000,000 pounds of Manila sugar, but since that time 
a market has been found nearer the supply, and China and Japan have 
become large consumers of Manila sugar. There are extensive refineries 
at Hongkong, which take a considerable part of the product. Last 
year our imports of sugar from Manila were only a little over 73,000,000 
pounds. This falling off is due to two causes — one the market found 
in China and Japan, and the other the competition of the bounty-aided 
beet sugars of Europe, which have also the advantage of nearness to 
London and New York, the great sugar centers of the world. The 
consumption of sugar is increasing so rapidly, especially in the United 
States, that, properly handled, the sugar resources of the Philippines 
will necessarily be developed in order to add to the world's supply. 
We annually import sugar to the value of $100,000,000, an amount 
which largely offsets our exports of wheat. It is believed by the best 
authorities that by the employment of modern methods the industry in 
the Philippines may be made to rival Cuba in the output and quality of 
cane sugar. It has been a matter of comment that while sugar of 
excellent grade is produced in Cuba, in the Philippines, under the 
dominion of the same country, but little effort has been made to develop 
resources which even surpass those of Cuba. 

One reason for the superior quality of the sugar of Cuba, however, 
is to be found in the proximity of the United States. American capi- 
talists have there entered the held with modern ideas and modern 
machinery. Still other reasons may be assigned: In Cuba, Porto Rico, 
and the British West Indies, notwithstanding a lack of labor, the 
industry advanced until brought into competition with beet bounties. 
In the latter countries it has been necessary to import coolies to culti- 
vate the fields and work the mills, but in the Philippine Islands there 
are many thousands of laborers available for work in the manufacture 
of cane sugar. How to use the surplus labor in the Philippines has 
been, seemingly, more of a problem than the lack of labor in the West 
Indies. With such a redundancy there has been no inducement in the 
Philippines to introduce labor-saving machinery. There are in abun- 
dance two elements of productivity — land and labor. The intelligent 
use of capital, added to these, would revolutionize the industry, and 
make the Philippines a great cane-sugar-producing country. 

The third product of the Philippines in the order of importance is 
tobacco. While the United States furnishes a market for the hemp 
and sugar of Manila, scarcely any of its tobacco or cigars is brought 
to this country, except now and then upon sailing vessels engaged in 
the Eastern trade. But the crop is an important one, aud Manila 
tobacco and cigars have long held the same reputation in the East that 
the Havana product holds in the West. Lately the industry has shown 
a tendency to expand, owing to the fact that the Spanish Government, 
realizing, in one instance at least, the effects of an evil policy, has 
abandoned its monopoly of the trade. Much revenue was formerly 



TREATY OF PEACE. 5G9 

derived by the Government from its exclusive control of the tobacco 
market, and for that reason it was maintained many years, until the 
industry languished. Delivery of the crop under the old system was 
required to be made at the Government warehouses in Manila, and the 
natives were bound to accept for it the standard price fixed by the 
Spanish authorities. Needless to say, this was far below the market 
value of the tobacco. The manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, and cut 
tobacco at Binondo, a populous part of new Manila, has uow assumed 
great proportions. One company employs 10,000 hands, and has a 
capital of $15,000,000. Spain has heretofore taken the bulk of the 
crop grown on the 00,000 acres under cultivation. 

There are few other products of agriculture to be mentioned. Fruit 
is not cultivated, but grows wild in abundance and variety character- 
istic of a tropical country. Bananas of delicious flavor, oranges of poor 
quality, mangos, guavas, and many other native fruits grow wild. 
There are no olives or figs and there is no vine culture. Dairy farming 
has not yet been established in the islands, although there is said to 
be great opportunity in that direction. Butter is imported from London 
in bottles, and naturally is held at a very high price. Throughout all 
the islands of the archipelago agriculture is yet in an undeveloped 
state. Vast opportunities may be found for exploiting modern methods 
of farming. There is not a farm in any of the islands which will com- 
pare favorably with even the worst on the American continent. Plow- 
ing is done with a sharpened stick, and nothing is known of agricultural 
labor-saving implements such as are in use in the United States and 
other civilized countries. Only the most primitive methods areemployed. 

The mineral resources of the islands have never been developed, 
although they are known to be considerable. There is coal in abun- 
dance in Oebu and Negros. Gold is found in the alluvial deposits along 
the streams and at the mouths of rivers, particularly in Luzon and 
Mindanao. Copper exists in the central districts of Luzon, and lead is 
plentiful in Cebu. Immense deposits of sulphur are found in the craters 
of extinct volcanoes, and in some of the islands there is found a good 
quality of iron ore. 

While riches await a progressive people in the development of the 
agricultural and mineral resources of the country, there is still another 
source of wealth not yet drawn upon, and toward which the attention 
of capitalists in this country has already been directed. A company is 
now forming for the purpose of invading the forests which clothe the 
slopes of the mountain ranges and cover thousands of acres of the 
valley lands not yet under cultivation. These forests, abounding in 
rare hard woods, are virtually untouched. More than sixty varieties 
capable of use are known to exist. The rarest are a green and a yel- 
low wood, which retain those colors in the finished product. They are 
susceptible of high polish, and for carving are said not to be surpassed. 
The trees are not large, but the logs cut from them will average a foot 
in diameter, and are quite large enough for all practical purposes. 
Some day, whether the United States retains possession of the Philip- 
pines or not, adventurous and enterprising men will push their way 
into the hearts of these valuable forests, and their treasures will be 
brought forth to decorate the interiors of our palace cars and residences. 

The present foreign commerce does not seem large in comparison with 
our own enormous and growing trade. In the best seasons $30,000,000 
a year will cover the exports and $1^5,000,000 the imports — a total com- 
merce in one year of about half the value of what we sell to foreign 
countries in a single month. 



570 ' TREATY OF PEACE. 

The proposition to retain permanent possession of this important 
group, raising as it does a problem entirely new to our scheme of gov- 
ernment, is not attended with unanimity of public sentiment. Standing 
upon the threshold of a new and momentous venture, it is natural that 
there should be at once two parties — the one radical and in favor of 
holding advantages fortuitously gained, ambitious to participate in the 
world's rivalry for new markets; the other representing the conserva- 
tive element, who, while realiziug the temptation which the occasion 
presents, are nevertheless mindful of the dangers involved in a distinct 
departure from time-honored precepts hitherto regarded as necessary 
to the safety of our institutions. 

To the first of these the project is alluring. In the undeveloped 
resources of the Philippines they see a great opportunity for our genius. 
They recognize that in a decade we might make a change greater than 
has been wrought since Magalhaes discovery until the present time. 
They see great development companies formed to cultivate tobacco and 
sugar by modern methods, others formed to test the richness of the 
unknown mineral deposits, and still others to develop transportation or 
to reap the treasures of the forest. They see also that with honest, 
intelligent, just, and humane government there might be astounding 
improvement in the character of the people. All this is recognized as 
well by the conservative party, to whom the commercial side of the 
question strongly appeals, but who fear the dangers from a govern- 
mental standpoint. To them the character of the population is a cause 
for hesitation in any plan of permanent control. There can be no 
thought of assimilation. It can not be expected that the people of 
these islands will ever be brought to a comprehension of our institu- 
tions. We need not even hope for sympathetic submission. In this 
race of natives and half-castes, with its considerable percentage of Chi- 
nese, our conservative party sees a people who must be governed in a 
manner foreign to our whole system. 

It is foreboded that a strong paternalism, virtually without represen- 
tation, is what the islands must have; and this element sees that the 
administration of such a system would be hampered by a legislative 
power always jealous of the executive, and in this case necessarily 
ignorant of the conditions and requirements of the problem. They 
argue that if we are to enter this field of antipodal development, we 
should clearly comprehend what a departure it would be from the lines 
of our historical growth, and we should recognize its full import; that we 
should at the begiuning understand that our Constitution contemplates 
no such conditions ; that if we are to administer such a government as 
would be required of us, we should start with a solid foundation, laid 
in constitutional amendment, drawn with a full knowledge of the 
necessities of the case. But it is believed by them that if we take the 
time to give this subject the consideration necessary before such a con- 
stitutional amendment can be adopted, there will be little danger that 
we shall finally take an ill-advised or hasty step. 

Alaska might be offered as a precedent, but it is in our own hemi- 
sphere, and sparsely peopled; it involved no problem so difficult of solu- 
tion as would be that of a government for the Philippines. Still there 
are features of its acquisition and administration which, by analogy, 
might be applied to the permanent control of the Philippines. Alaska, 
it will be remembered, was ceded to the United States by Russia on 
March 30, 1807, and was soon thereafter formally delivered into our 
military possession, General Rousseau, of the Army, representing our 
Government. By an act of Congress approved July 27, 1808, the laws 



TREATY OF PEACE. .571 

of the United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation 
were extended over the vast territory thus acquired, and from that 
date until May 17, 1884, a period of sixteen years, these laws were ad- 
ministered and executed by the Treasury Department and its subordi- 
nate officers. 

The act of May 17, 1884, provided for the appointment of a governor 
for Alaska, a United States district court, with marshal, clerks, and 
deputies, and for United States commissioners to be stationed at vari- 
ous points in the Territory. Subsequently laws have been passed 
regarding town sites, and protecting fishing and mining rights; and 
the present Congress has passed a law defining the rights of railway 
corporations, extending the homestead laws over the Territory, and 
limiting the amouut of land to be taken up, purchased, or occupied 
by any one person or corporation upon navigable waters. 

So that Congress has met the necessities of this Territory, as they 
have arisen from time to time, by suitable legislation; but no provision 
has been yet made for a territorial form of government with a legisla- 
ture. That will come in due time, and the future will see one or more 
States carved out of that great Territory, but not until it is peopled 
with men from the States in such numbers as to give assurance of 
stable self government. 

LIFE IN MANILA. 

[By Wallace Cumming-.] 

There is no place in the civilized parts of the world which has been 
so entirely unknown, even to well-informed people, as the Philippine 
Islands. Even the ubiquitous "globe trotter" passes them by, for they 
are off the regular route which runs from Singapore, via Hongkong, to 
Shanghai or Japan, and the China Sea is a specially unpleasant body 
of water to cross. The steamers running between Hongkong and Manila 
are so small that the trip is like a rough channel passage lengthened to 
between sixty and seventy hours. Of the alternative route from Singa- 
pore I will not speak beyond saying that the steamers on this route are 
Spanish, for to most people who have not had the advantage of a Spanish 
bringing up the usual Spanish steamer is not to be thought of. Never 
shall I forget the nightmare horrors of my own first passage from 
Hongkong to Manila. I was hurrying to Manila to enter the American 
house of Peele, Hubbell & Co. as a junior clerk. At that time (the 
autumn of 1882) Manila was being devastated by the worst epidemic 
of cholera ever known there. The death rate rose to 1,300 a day, and 
Peele, Hubbell & Co. having lost two clerks, and not knowing how 
many more might go, cabled me an offer of a position. 

On reaching Hongkong I found that, owing to the quarantine against 
Manila, the next regular steamer would not leave for ten days or two 
weeks. Being blissfully ignorant of the fact that a person entirely 
unacquainted with the life and ways of the East, and not having 
enough knowledge of Spanish to swear by (barely enough, indeed, to 
swear with), is about as useful as the vermiform appendix — and with 
the same capacity of being very troublesome — I allowed myself to be 
persuaded to take passage on a tiny little German tramp steamer about 
to start. She was of less than 200 tons, with her cabin just forward of 
the engine, and separated from it by an iron bulkhead, which gave it 
the benefit of all the heat. It was barely large enough to accommodate 
a fixed table and four chairs, and had on each side a cabin with two 
berths each. There were two other passengers. One doubled up with 



572 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the captain; the other, a young Filipino, shared the other cabin with 
me. We ran into a typhoon just outside of Hongkong - Harbor, and 
did not get out of it until we entered Manila Bay, six days later. 
Never did time pass so slowly. I had forgotten to bring any reading 
material. The cabin was unbearably hot. the deck was under water 
the whole time, and the bridge was the only place of refuge; even that 
was soaked with spray. The night was even worse, for though I was 
not sick, my little Filipino more than made up for my immunity, 
and effectually deterred me from occupying the berth to which I was 
entitled. So I made a bed of the cabin floor, twisting myself around 
the legs of the table to prevent being rolled from side to side. We 
did arrive at last, however, though the steamer had such a list, through 
the shifting of her cargo, that dishes would slide off the cabin table 
even when we were anchored in the calm water of Manila Bay. 

The coast is a bold one at the entrance to Manila Bay, a small rocky 
island dividing the entrance into two unequal passages. The island is 
that Corregidor so often mentioned in the reports of the naval battle. 
After passing through the entrance, the bay widens out, extending 
about 40 miles north and south, and the same east and west. 

Manila is on the eastern shore of the bay. About 7 miles nearer 
the entrance, on the southern shore, is Cavite, the scene of the great 
naval battle, where there are a drydock and an arsenal. We came to 
anchor on Sunday morning about a mile offshore. All vessels drawing 
over 16 feet discharge a part of their cargo in the bay and then enter 
the river Pasig, on which are located the principal business houses and 
wharves. Though any land would have been most welcome after six 
days of such tossing as we had experienced, yet my first view of 
Manila was most unattractive. Two terrible typhoons had visited 
the city six weeks before, and the shores of the bay were literally 
strewn with wrecked vessels. Every vessel lying in the bay at the 
time had been driven ashore, while thousands of native houses were 
destroyed. 

The population of Manila was placed at about 300,000. That is 
probably not an overestimate, for it is certain that at least 60,000 people 
died of cholera during that epidemic. All statistics are, however, mere 
guesswork, for there are no official figures. During all the years the 
Spaniards have owned the islands they have occupied only the mere 
edges, and great areas on the larger islands are as wild and unknown 
as at the lauding of Magalhaes. 

The old city, called there distinctively "Manila," is built in the angle 
made by the River Pasig and the bay. It is surrounded by stone walls 
40 feet thick, and a wide moat, in part double. Bach gate has a port- 
cullis and is approached by a drawbridge, and the top of the wall is 
lined with cannon of two hundred years ago. It is said to be the most 
perfectly preserved type of the old walled city now left. In it are the 
cathedral, the archbishop's palace, most of the Government offices, and 
many convents and monasteries. Many European Spaniards live there. 

Spreading far on the shore of the bay, and on both banks of the 
Pasig, on a perfectly flat, alluvial plain intersected by numerous creeks, 
are the different pueblos or wards (some fifteen or twenty in number), 
which together constitute what is known to the outside world as Manila. 
The population is a mixture of all races. Every color is represented, 
from the blonde Caucasian Scandinavian to the darkest native. The 
latter is least common, and is usually an American negro from some 
ship, or, more rarely, a specimen of the dwarfish aboriginals known as 
Negritos (little negroes). They have the thick lips, flat noses, retreat- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 573 

lDg foreheads, and woolly heads of the West Coast African, and closely 
resemble the Bushman of south central Africa. They are numerous, 
and in the unknown interior of Luzon they live an utterly savage life, 
and have never been even nominally subdued. 

The Spaniard from " the Peninsula," as they call Spain, is invariably 
an office-holder, or in the army or navy. He looks down on everybody 
else, and has come to make as much money as possible, no matter how, 
and then go back to spend it in Spain. Then there are the Filipinos — 
"children of the country," they are called — who are supposed to be pure- 
blooded descendants of Spanish settlers. But there are few of them 
without some touch of Chinese or native blood. There are from forty 
to sixty thousand Chinese. Many of them are wealthy, but the bulk 
of them are coolies earning 20 cents a day. The vast majority of the 
population is made up of every shade and cross, natives (Malays) 
and half-breeds (mestizos). Smallest in number, but controlling the 
entire import and export business, are the "foreigners" — English, Ger- 
mans, Americans, Swiss, etc. Most of the European countries are rep- 
resented. 

Among the first things to impress a stranger are the horses. 
Descended from horses brought from Mexico, they have become much 
smaller, while they are also much more shapely. In fact, I have never 
seen a better-looking breed. There is nothing of the pony about their 
shape, though in size they range between 48 and 52 inches. At first it 
looked absurd to see them ridden by big men whose stirrups hung down 
to the horses' knees; but I soon found out that they easily carried a 
rider weighing 200 pounds. The foreigners have a jockey club, which 
holds two meetings a year at the beautiful turf track at Santa Mesa. 
To avoid sharp practice, members of the club only are eligible to ride. 
This necessitates a scale of weights starting at 132 pounds and rising 
to 154 pounds. It demonstrates the speed and strength of these mini- 
ature horses that a mile has been run in two minutes and ten seconds 
by a pony carrying 150 pounds. Only stallions are used. Mares can 
not even be brought into the city. Nobody walks; everybody rides ; 
and on any special fiesta thousands of carriages fill the streets. I doubt 
if there is a city in the world that can turn out half the number of 
private vehicles in proportion to the population. 

The better houses differ in some ways from any other in the world. 
Always of two stories, there is a high stone basement, with a carriage- 
way through to the court, where are the servants' quarters and domestic 
offices. The upper story is of wood, being complete in itself, so that in 
case of an earthquake it will settle together. The ceilings are covered 
with cloth instead of plaster. A wide stairway leads up from the car- 
riageway. Between 3 and 4 feet above the floor of this story is a wide 
window ledge with grooves running the whole length of every side. In 
these grooves slide blinds, and also frames in which are set small squares 
of oyster shell (called "conchas"). Both blinds and conchas run the 
full length of each side. Either or both can be closed at the same 
time, and both can be slid back to the width of one at each end, leaving 
the whole side open, and allowing the air to circulate as freely as in a 
shed. The roofs were formerly made of heavy curved tiles. Now gal- 
vanized iron is used, as it vastly decreases the chance of the roof falling 
during an earthquake, and lessens the damage if it does. On the other 
hand, the iron roof is much more likely to be blown off by the terrible 
typhoons. 

The native houses are built of bamboo, with thatched roofs made of 
the leaf of the nipa palm, and elevated from to 10 feet on bamboo 



574 TREATY OF PEACE. 

poles. When one builds a house in Manila it is necessary to decide 
whether to make it safe from earthquake or typhoon. The frail nipa 
house may swing like a ship in a heavy sea during an earthquake, but 
is perfectly safe, while the tile or iron roof may fall, killing and destroy- 
ing everything near it. But when the typhoon comes the nipa houses 
go down by the hundred, while the tile and iron roofed ones suffer little. 

Possibly the chief peculiarity of the Philippines is its position as the 
stronghold of the priest and the religious orders. All the great orders 
are established there; black, blue, brown, and white robes swarm in 
the streets. All education is in their hands, and in the country and 
village the priest is virtually all powerful. No translation of the Bible 
is allowed to enter the islands, and no Protestant church can be built, 
no service held. To illustrate the power of the Church, I will describe 
the ceremony I saw on Corpus Christi. There was a great procession, 
with all the officials, troops, and sailors taking part. Finally the pro- 
cession halted, and the archbishop drove slowly by in his carriage, 
drawn by four white horses, with outriders and guards. As he passed 
the colors of each regiment, the carriage stopped and the colors were 
laid on the ground. The archbishop descended, stood on them, and 
elevated the host to the four quarters, and then went forward to repeat 
the ceremony at each regiment. 

Formerly, a serious drawback to a visit to Manila was the lack of 
hotels; but now there are several. If the visitor has letters of intro- 
duction, there is also a pleasant and comfortable foreigners' club at 
which he may stay. Manila loves holidays. At one time there were 
over forty in each year. The number has been sadly diminished, though 
there are still thirteen left, I underhand. Each pueblo has its saint, 
and on that saint's day the inhabitants give themselves over, as they 
do on all the great holidays of the church, to music, fireworks, cock- 
fighting, processions, etc. 

Almost all these processions took place at night, and the effect was 
most picturesque. There would be a line of marchers — men, women, 
and children — walking in single file on each side of the street, every 
one with a lighted candle in his hand. At intervals, in the middle of 
the road, would come images of the Saviour, the Virgin, and the saints, 
borne on the shoulders of from ten to thirty men, surrounded by priests, 
and preceded by a baud of music. Some of the images were covered 
with diamonds and other precious stones, said to be enormously valua- 
ble. In these cases there was always a guard of soldiers with fixed 
bayonets about the image. Often there would be thousands of people 
walking in these processions, and all the while it was moving tens of 
thousands of rockets and bombs would be fired. These rockets and 
bombs are homemade. The rockets consist only of a joint of bamboo 
filled with powder, exploding with a great noise, but with little light. 
The bombs are simply a handful of powder tightly wrapped with hemp. 
They cost a mere trifle, but make a great noise, and no fiesta is com- 
plete without plenty of them. 

The most curious procession is participated in only by natives and 
the poorer mestizos. It takes place, if I remember rightly, during Holy 
Week, and is a high solemnity. Every one walking in the procession 
is robed in his graveclothes. The garment is a long, loose gray robe 
with a hood, and it comes to the ground. The effect is very strange, 
and as the people go they repeat continually: u Santa Maria, madre de 
Dios, orapro nobis!" It may seem strange that graveclothes are pro- 
vided before they are needed; but in Manila they are considered a 
prime necessity, and every native owns those clothes, even if he is bare 



TREATY OF PEACE. 575 

of all others. The ordinary dress of the native man is trousers and 
shirt of "piece goods" (calico), the shirt being worn outside the trousers. 
On holidays they wear a shirt made of pina, which is an expensive 
material. Native servants wear the same articles, but they must be of 
spotless white; and very suitable and nice looking it is, though I sup- 
pose that the idea of being driven by a coachman so dressed would 
shock the habitues of Central and Hyde parks. A curious freak of 
custom was that native servants were required to serve barefooted, 
while it was an insult if a Chinese servant appeared before his superior 
without his shoes. 

Our firm had a mess house, in which the partners lived, and which 
was open to all their American and English employees. Should the 
latter prefer to live elsewhere, $1,000 a year was allowed as the equiv- 
alent. I lived at the mess, finding it much the more comfortable. 
Indeed, it would have been hard to be dissatisfied with our way of liv- 
ing; and as it will show the style in which the great American houses 
in the East are conducted, I think it worth telling with some detail. 
The mess was a fine house, handsomely furnished, in one of the pleas- 
antest parts of the city. The table was supplied by a Chinese cook. 
He was allowed $500 a month, and given certain of the heavier grocer- 
ies, such as flour, rice, etc. He paid his under cooks, and was responsi- 
ble for meals at the mess, and for breakfast (like the French dejeuner 
a la fourchette) and afternoon tea, which were taken at the office by all 
the employees, except on Sundays and fiestas. Then there was a major- 
domo, who had control of all the servants and had charge of the house. 
There was also an extra house servant, and a Chinese porter, who 
opened and shut the great house doors, filled the baths, pulled the 
punka, and watered the street in the dry season. Then everyone had 
a personal servant, who took care of his room, attended to his clothes, 
waited on him at table, prepared his early breakfast (about 7 a. m.), 
and so on. Everybody also owned a horse or horses, which involved 
one more servant at least. Being a junior, I contented myself with 
one pony and a two- wheeled trap, something like a dogcart. The 
others drove victorias and pairs. Three of our mess owned racing 
ponies, which inured to my beuefit, as it gave me as much riding as I 
wished. After the bath and an early breakfast came the drive to the 
office, between 8 and 8.30; then work till 12.15, at which hour break- 
fast was served at the office; then work again until 5.30, interrupted 
between 3 and 4 by afternoon tea; then to the bungalow to dress, to 
drive, and back to dinner at 7.30. 

To a lover of music .Manila is a charming place. The natives have 
wonderful musical talent, and there were numerous bands. Those of 
the three regiments then stationed there were remarkably good, and 
four afternoons each week they played in turn on the Luneta, a sort 
of plaza on the shores of the bay just outside the old walls. I recall 
vividly the open-air concert, by three hundred instruments, given in 
honor of Prince Oscar of Sweden. The glorious full moon of the trop- 
ics, far brighter than in more northern lands, shining on the quiet 
waters of the bay, the innumerable lights, the brilliantly dressed crowd, 
and the thrilling music of the mighty bands, softened in volume on the 
great plain, combined to make it an occasion to be long remembered. 
The " Battle of Castellejos," which they played, was inspiring, and the 
effect was heightened by the repetition of the trumpet calls by soldiers 
who were stationed at intervals far off upon the plains, while the guns 
on the city walls added a touch of reality. 

During the height of the rainy season, from about the middle of June 



676 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to the middle of September, all outdoor pursuits are suspended. The 
violence of the downpour is hardly to be imagined by dwellers in higher 
latitudes. The streets in Manila aud some of the roads for a few miles 
outside are fairly good during the dry season, but quickly become 
nearly impassable when the rains set in. As I have already mentioned, 
Manila is intersected in all directions by creeks, which are traversed by 
hundreds of canoes. These canoes are dugouts, often of great size, 
and the natives are most expert iu handling them. They are indispen- 
sable at times when vast floods come down from the great lake, about 
30 miles from Manila, of which the river Pasig is the outlet. One 
storm will sometimes raise the river and overflow most of the city. 
After a few hours' rain I have gone direct from our steps into a banca 
(canoe) and been paddled through the streets to the office. 

In this lake is found one of the most remarkable phenomena in the 
islands. Not very far from the center rises what is evidently the old 
crater of a submerged volcano. Circular in shape, it comes up abruptly 
from the water, the sides several hundred feet in height, except in one 
place, where it is not more than 30. The natives are dreadfully afraid 
of it, saying it is full of crocodiles; but a party of us who went there 
in a steam launch induced them to drag their canoes over, and paddle 
us about. The interior walls rise perpendicularly, and are masses of 
vegetation which has found foothold in every crack and cranny. The 
water within seems to have no communication with the lake, and is no 
longer water, but a mass of corruption and putridity that fills one with 
shuddering horror. We saw no crocodiles. Perhaps our noise fright- 
ened them; but I can not understand how fish could live in that mass 
of filth, nor where the crocodiles would find food, if fish were lacking. 
The depth of this place is unknown, no bottom having been found in 
the soundings thus far made. 

I have no space here to write of many other interesting topics — the 
venality of the Spanish officials, from the lowest to the highest; the 
almost incredible impediments which they throw in the way of busi- 
ness; the character and customs of the women, Filipina, mestiza, and 
native; the fruits, including the mango, king of all, and the one hun- 
dred and sixty five varieties of bananas, and— but the list itself might 
extend almost to the length of an article. 



A VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES. 



[The Contemporary Review, .June, 1808.] 
[By Claes Ericsson.] 

On June 13, 1894, 1 arrived in Manila Bay, from Singapore, on board 
the Nuestra SeFwra de Santa Loreto. The faith of the pious Spaniard 
who gave the steamer her long name had been abundantly justified, or 
she must have gone to the bottom years before, for a more ramshackle 
craft I never set foot upon. Luckily we had no rough weather, or these 
lines might never have been penned, the protection of "Our Lady of 
Holy Loreto" notwithstanding. It was night when we came to anchor, 
and the spectacle of the lamps on the Luneta gave me a blessed feel- 
ing of security which had been lacking many a day. If the Nuestra 
Senora, etc., should go down at her anchorage I might possibly swim 
ashore. 

Landing at 9 next morning, I visited the custom-house. Officials, 
Spanish and Creole, were lounging about, cigarette or cheroot in mouth, 
and presently one of them condescended to inform me that my luggage 
would be examined at 3 o'clock. It was then 9.30 a. in. At the 
appointed hour I returned ; but in Manila four years ago no one dreamed 
of hurrying, and another hour passed before I was free of the port. 
An acquaintance assured me, however, that my good fortune had been 
great; and when, three days later, I obtained a licensia, or permit to 
stay in the islands, the same gentleman consoled me for the delay with 
the remark that such dispatch was phenomenal — in Manila. During 
my stay I made the acquaintance of one of the leisurely officials, a 
Creole. In a burst of confidence he gave me to understand that a great 
deal of money was received at the Manila custom-house, but the Gov- 
ernment saw very little of it. 

I am told that they have the electric light in Manila to day, but in 
1894 the streets were lit with oil lamps, on posts more or less resem- 
bling the famous tower of Pisa. The fortifications had a very ancient 
look, not surprising when it is remembered that they were built between 
two and three centuries ago. Leaving the Lunetta, I passed through 
a beautiful avenue of feathery bamboos, swaying to the gentlest breeze, 
and so reached the town in time to witness a very pretty sight. It 
was a funeral. Four white ponies, harnessed in sky-blue and silver, 
driven by a coachman similarly arrayed, drew the hearse, which was 
painted white, blue, and gold, and decked with plumes of snowy feathers. 

As my business in the Philippines was to collect plants on the moun- 
tains of South Palawan, I left Manila by the first steamer, taking two 
natives as personal servants. One of them, named Minico, was very 
small, not more than 4 feet in height, but brave enough, nevertheless. 
My ft llow-passengers numbered seven. One of them, a gentleman of 
martial aspect, I addressed in my best Spanish: 

" It is a fine day, Captain." 

t p 37 577 



578 TREAT? OF PEACE. 

"Senor," he answered, giving his moustache an upward twist, "you 
mistake. I am a colonel." And he turned on his heel. There our 
acquaintance began and ended. The Spaniard is so seldom discourte- 
ous—at least, to Europeans— that I fear he was scarcely a good sample. 
Possibly, however, Admiral Dewey has by this time taught the colonel 
better manners. 

Steaming past the Calamianes Islands, we eventually anchored at 
Marangas, in Palawan, which was my destination. 

The settlement comprised two small houses, inhabited by Chinamen, 
and a stockade less than a hundred yards square, containing a hut 
for the officer in command, one for the garrison of 30 soldiers, and 
another for stores. At every corner of the stockade rose a watchtower, 
thatched with "alang-alang" grass, occupied night and day by sentries, 
with loaded rifles, lest the "Moros," as the Spaniards call the natives, 
should attempt a surprise. 

I advise no one to visit this Palawan settlement unless obliged. 
There was scarcely any food to be had for love or money. Mosquitoes 
swarmed as they do nowhere else on earth, I think. One morning I 
counted thirteen alligators marching in a troop along the beach toward 
the mouth of a small river. Ants, millions of them, were every where- 
in the soup, the jam, my bed, my shirt, on the table — wherever an ant 
can crawl. A species more venomous I never encountered. My Manila 
men suffered terribly. Scarcely an inch of their bodies escaped, and 
the wounds, if rubbed, suppurated like smallpox. To crown all, Mar- 
angas is notorious for a special kind of fever of the most virulent 
character. Half the garrison \ ere down while I was there, and their 
commander was hardly ever well. 

The Chinamen were engaged in the "Damar" trade, which is carried 
on in rather a peculiar manner. The Sultan will not allow the natives 
of the interior to sell their resin to the Celestials direct; they must 
dispose of it to the Sulus, who dwell on the coast, and these trade with 
the Chinamen. As may be supposed, the poor natives are plundered 
shamefully. 

Having arranged with Lo-Chang, the principal Chinese merchant, for 
the use of a hut, I paid a visit to Lieutenant Garcia, the officer in 
charge of the stockade. He invited me to a vino tinto and a cockfight. 
The latter I should have preferred to decline, but it was soon over, and 
perhaps cockfighting is excusable in Palawan. It appeared to be the 
soldiers' only recreation, except potting alligators. 

The next day I called upon Paduka Majasari Maulana Amiril Maum- 
inin, Sultan Muhammad Harum Narassid, Iang de per-Tuan, ex-Sultan 
of the Sulu Islands, once the home of the most bloodthirsty pirates 
that ever sailed the China Sea, which is saying a great deal. On arriv- 
ing at the royal village of Bolini Bolini, which comprised the "palace" 
and half a dozen ruinous huts of bamboo, my presence was announced 
by a gong stroke, which brought out the master of the ceremonies. 
Invited to step within, I crawled up the bamboo ladder— the "palace" 
stood on the usual piles — crossed the veranda, and in the farthest apart- 
ment found his highness of the many titles sitting cross-legged on a 
divan. 

The Sultan was not in state attire-, at least there was no suggestion 
of the imperial yellow in his close fitting white trousers and vest, slip- 
pers embroidered with seed pearls, and scarlet fez. The two attendant 
nobles were much more gaily clad. Both wore tight jackets of blue 
silk, decked with gold buttons, and trousers of salmon red, ornamented 
with buttons of gold or gilt from the knee downward. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 570 

His Highness, who appeared to be about 50 years of age, had rather 
a pleasant expression, with a twinkle in his eye that reminded me of 
Arabi Pasha. A chair was brought, also vermouth and chocolate. 
With a cup of the last in my hand, I explained the purpose of my 
visit, which was to crave the Sultan's assistance in exploring Mar an gas 
Mountain. Smiling, he promised as many coolies as I needed, and I 
took my leave. 

The ex- Sultan of Sulu is all-powerful in Palawan. The Spaniards 
have no real authority, and never interfere with the natives, except 
when Europeans or Chinamen are concerned. Some idea of the situ- 
ation may be gathered from the following incident which happened 
during my stay at Marangas. The Sultan's son, a boy of 10, desiring 
to visit Lieutenant Garcia, came with a crowd of retainers at his heels, 
all armed to the teeth with guns, pistols, spears, and the seldom absent 
kris. Every man pressed into the stockade. Had the Spaniards tried 
to keep them out there would have been a fight. The danger was 
great, but all passed quietly, although a few weeks before a Sulu who 
had stolen by the sentries ran amok at the lieutenant, who would have 
lost his life within his own stockade had not half a dozen soldiers come 
to the rescue. At that time there was fighting almost daily in the Sulu 
Islands and in Mindanao. 

As soon as the coolies promised by the Sultan arrived, I set out for 
Marangas Mountain, no great distance. The heat was tremendous as 
we pressed forward, first through tall "alang alang" grass, and then up 
the bed of a mountain stream, strewn with bowlders big and little, many 
sharp as knives. Striking into the jungle, alter traveling some hours 
by the river, we found a track and, following it, presently arrived at 
a native hut — a mere roof on four poles, open at the sides, back, and 
front to all the winds that blew. The owner, a very old man, naked, 
except for a breechcloth, made off at once; but, on Miuico ordering him 
to stop, the poor fellow came to a halt, shivering with fear. However, 
at the sight of a little tobacco and cloth his weather-beaten face wrinkled 
into a smile, and I soon persuaded him to guide us up the mountain. 
He led us to a village, whose inhabitants fled, shrieking; but again a 
little tobacco acted like a charm. We made friends and obtained shelter 
for the night, invited guests. 

Our hosts did their best to dissuade us from proceeding farther. 
My spirit, they said, would remain on the mountain to vex them, and 
many more awful things would be sure to happen. Nevertheless we 
pressed on. Finding the mountain too precipitous, however, we were 
obliged to turn back and try a different route. This took us to another 
small settlement which boasted an Orang Kaya (headman). The vil- 
lagers at our previous halt had told me that he was very rich and would 
entertain us in a royal manner, hoping, no doubt, to induce us to depart 
from their spur of the mountain. I found him very old, and his riches 
appeared to consist of an earthenware plate and a wooden club 3 feet 
long — his only weapon. 

Everywhere the people seemed wretchedly poor, and their habitations 
were the worst hovels I had seen in the far East. But these aborigines 
have no settled places of abode. They sometimes throw a hut together, 
cultivate a tiny plot of ground for a year, then move on. The majority 
are always wandering about. As for the Sulus, they appear to do no 
work at all. When they are not robbing the inland natives they pass 
the time in laments for the bad old days when they, the Orang Laut, 
ruled the seas far and near. The old piratical spirit survives. They 
have never been subdued, and, in my opinion, they never will be — by 
Spain. 



580 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The aborigines of Palawan must be very near the bottom of the 
human scale. I have watched them sleeping round a fire at night in 
as much security as they ever know. Their tiny limbs were never 
still, quivering and stretching, and at the least sound in the jungle 
they were on their feet, wide awake, ready to flee. A mysterious 
people, uncanny, scarcely human, yet, in comparison with their Sulu 
masters, honest and trustworthy. 

We camped near the hut of two old people, a man and a woman, whom 
a few yards of cloth and a little tobacco made more happy than they 
had ever been in their wretched lives, perhaps. So far I had seen no 
large animal in Palawan. There was much talk of some mysterious 
beast, but the descriptions were so indefinite that I was unable to decide 
whether it was a goat or a buffalo. Not one of the natives with whom 
I conversed had ever seen it. 

Three days constant climbing took us to the summit of Marangas 
Mountain. On the bowlders were hundreds of spider like Renantheras 
(orchids). I saw many Phaltenopsis also; and ferns, Lycopods and 
Alocacias, were very plentiful. Leaving coolies to collect the orchids, 
I returned to Marangas with Minico and the other Manila man. 

Desiring to ascend a mountain near Bulugay, I hired a Sulu boat and 
crew. There was trouble immediately. The turbulent Sulus refused to 
put to sea with the men from Manila, and I was obliged to meet them 
halfway, by sending one of my servants home. Minico I contrived to 
retain. Perhaps his insignificant appearance aided me. Anyway, I 
soon had cause to be thankful that I stood firm. Practically I was now 
at the mercy of Sulus, pirates, and sons of pirates to a man. Before 
engaging them I had been warned that two of their number had under- 
gone eight years' imprisonment for the murder of a European; and 
judging by the looks of the remaining five it was not difficult to imagine 
that it would give them the keenest pleasure to cut my throat. Stal- 
wart fellows they were, and not unpicturesque hi their tight blue pants, 
sleeved waistcoat decked with many buttons, gay sarong (a bag-shaped 
sash), and fez, or turban. Each bore in his sarong a kris and pistol, 
while a daredevil glitter in the eyes of every one of them was evidence 
enough that they would use those weapons on the slightest provocation. 

Starting at 2 o'clock in the morning, we reached Bulugay by 8, and at 
once set out for the panglima's (war chief's) village. In reply to an 
inquiry with regard to coolies, the panglima, a big fellow, told me that 
there were plenty of men to be had, but all were very wicked. I could 
quite believe him, but I must admit that the natives here did not look 
nearly so savage as the Kayans in Sarawak or the Muruts of North 
Borneo. 

In the evening one of my Sulus came and whispered in my ear: 
"Tuan, datu, him say, 'Ada orang putih naik disini, baik buleh, tapi 
djangan dia balek,'" which translated means, " Sir, the datu (chief) 
has said, 'Let the white man come here, but take care that he does not 
return.'" 

The prospect was not pleasant. I consulted Minico at once. He 
informed me that it was generally known that the datu of the district 
and the Sultan were not on friendly terms, meaning that if his high- 
ness of Bolini-Bolini could catch the chief, kris or bowstring would 
speedily settle the quarrel; but Minico did not think the datu would 
harm me. He was inclined to believe that the Sulus wished me to 
hasten from the neighborhood of the Panglima's village without coolies 
for some motive of their own. An hour afterwards the faithful fellow 
touched my arm, signing me to follow him. With a finger on his mouth, 
he led the way to the hut occupied by my rascally crew. Approaching 



TREATY OF PEACE 581 

noiselessly, we listened to their conversation. They were talking about 
me. I heard one suggest that a push over a cliff would be the safest 
way to compass my end. Another declared that would be foolish. It 
would be much better to take me a long way up the mountains and hold 
me there for a ransom of $300. The majority seemed to be of this 
opinion, and Miuico and I stole away. Between the Datu and the 
"Men of the Sea" I seemed likely to come to grief, but forewarned is 
forearmed. 

We ascended the mountain next day. Nothing happened, perhaps 
because my revolver was seldom out of my hand. Leaving men to col- 
lect the plants, I returned with the Sulus to the coast and embarked for 
Marangas. Wanting coolies for a journey to Datu Guah's village and 
an ascent of Paniliugan Mountain, I paid the Sultan another visit; but 
the master of the ceremonies whispered that the moment was unfavor- 
able. His highness was susa — that is, he had been vexed or troubled. 

By means of discreet inquiries I learned the nature of his susa. It is 
a rather common story in the far East. Unable to lodge the whole of 
his wives in the "palace," his highness boarded a few of them — not the 
prettiest, I suspect — in the houses of his followers. One of these peris, 
an outcast from the Palawan paradise through want of room, consoled 
herself in the usual way — quite innocently, I was assured. The news 
reaching the Sultan, he sent for the venturesome lover and smilingly 
bade him be seated opposite himself. Not being altogether an idiot, the 
man had come armed. From his sarong the jeweled handle of his kris 
protruded, plain to see. After a few complimentary commonplaces had 
been exchanged his highness remarked the weapon. 

"Allah has been good to you, S'Ali," said he. "Those emeralds are 
very tine, and the diamonds are as stars in the heavens. If the blade 
match the hilt, you have a treasure. Show it to me." 

Thrown off his guard, S'Ali drew the kris from its sheath and, hold- 
ing it by the wavy blade, presented it to the Sultan. Instantly half a 
dozen of his highness's attendants threw themselves upon the unfortu- 
nate fellow. He was overpowered in a moment and his hands securely 
tied behind his back. 

"Take him out," said the Sultan, still smiling. 

SAli was led away and lowered to the ground. Not a word did he 
utter. It was Kismet. Why waste his breath ? I did not learn the 
manner of his end, but it would be either by kris or bowstring. Let 
us hope it was the first. In the hands of a skillful executioner the kris 
is a merciful weapon. He was buried in the jungle behind the Sultan's 
"palace." Such was the susa of Muhammad Harum Narrasid, Iang 
de per-Tuan — "he who ruleth" — in the year of our Lord 1894. And 
the Spaniards were supposed to govern the island of Palawan ! I could 
understand why the Sultan did not care to see a European so soon after 
his crime. However, I obtained the coolies and sent them on. 

It had been my intention to ascend the mountain from Datu Guah's 
village, but before I could make a start the coolies returned burdened 
with plants. Deciding to convey these to Marangas at once, Minico 
and I reembarked in the Sulu boat, putting to sea in half a gale. 

The danger was considerable. To add to it, the two convicted mur- 
derers began to quarrel. One of them was squatting behind me at the 
time, steering the craft. Presently he flung down his paddle and, 
drawing his kris, tried to rush past; but I held my revolver to his head. 

"Sit down/ I said. "I'll shoot the first man that strikes a blow." 

That cooled him, and after a great deal of wrangling I persuaded him 
to pick up his steering paddle, but not before both he and his opponent 
had told me that they did not care a paddy-husk for me or my pistol. 



582 TREATY OF PEACE. 

As the tempest grew more violent the boat tossed perilously, com 
pelling the crew to paddle their hardest to keep her prow straight. 
Loud and frequent were the shouts of " Kayu ! Kayu!" (literally 
"wood," meaning "To the paddles!"). Suddenly, just as the outlook 
was at its blackest, the wind blowing in gusts, and the fragile craft 
threatening to fall in pieces, up jumped my fighting cocks again. Half 
measures are of no use with Sulus. I rose, also, though I had great 
difficulty in keeping my feet. 

"By Allah," I said, "if you idiots don't sit down, I'll give you to the 
sharks!" 

Had either attempted to pass me I should have been compelled to 
fire. An amok Sulu is a terrible being ashore; two of those fiends on 
a small boat at sea would have been too awful to contemplate. Every 
man must have fought, or jumped overboard, for the amok strikes at 
friend and foe indiscriminately. The eyes of both showed all white; 
their krises quivered with the passion that shook their sinewy frames. 
Minico, in the prow, drew his weapon. Firiug a shot into the sea to 
show them that my revolver was not empty, I waited patiently, looking 
first one and then the other in the eye. They sat down at last; indeed, 
the boat rocked so violently that they could not well stand. So the 
danger passed. 

Knowing what I did of those men it may seem foolhardiness to have 
risked my life in their company, and perhaps it was. But I knew the 
worst of them, which was not the case as regards the others. Soon 
after landing at Marangas Minico took me aside. 

"Tuan," said he, "take care Sulu men no catch you alone. Sulu 
him no like to be threatened and not strike. They call him woman." 

The hint was enough. I discharged the fire eaters and went about 
warily. 

After waiting in vain six weeks for the steamer from Labuan, I 
resolved to visit the Sulu Islands, or Islas de Jolo, as the Spaniards 
call them. With this intent Minico and I embarked on the JEolus, 
which carried the Spanish mails. Calling at Simagup, a stockade on a 
hill, about as interesting and healthy as Marangas, we next proceeded 
to Alfonso XIII equally flourishing and desirable as an abiding place. 
Soon after leaving the Molus lost her propeller in a heavy south- 
easter. For three days we drifted, the steamer dragging her anchors. 
Every hour saw us nearer to the rocks, and we could almost count the 
minute that would elapse before we should be ashore, when some- 
one caught sight of smoke on the horizon and joyfully shouted, 
"Canoniero!" 

It was the tiny gunboat usually dispatched round the coast from 
Simagup in the wake of the mail, possibly to prevent piratical attempts. 
She took us in tow, and after a stiff puil got us on the move, hauling 
us through a line of reef, which we had escaped by a miracle, and 
eventually to the Bay of Balabac, where we remained until a larger 
gun vessel came and took on board the passengers for Sulu. Next 
day we anchored off the town of Sugh. In the morning I went ashore 
with Minico. 

Traversing a long narrow bridge, with a watchtower on the left hand 
and a pavilion on the right, we passed through a couple of strong gates 
into the town — a pretty little place, beautifully kept. Every street 
was lined with trees, yet scarcely a leaf could be seen on the roadway. 
At the end of the main road leading from the jetty we came to a neat 
square, where twice a week the residents gather to enjoy the music of 
an excellent band. Sulu ladies, mostly in wide Chinese trousers, bright- 
colored jacket of silk, with many buttons, and gay sarong thrown over 



TREATY OF PEACE. 5^3 

the shoulder, walked about freely. Some wore the sarong over their 
heads. All were clad in garments of the most brilliant coloring, and 
many of them were handsome, but they lost their charm on closer 
acquaintance. 

Thanks to Minico, I found a lodging in the house of a native. It 
would have been almost useless to ask the assistance of a Spaniard. I 
never met one who could speak the Sulu language or any of the dia- 
lects. It is not considered worth while to learn them. In consequence, 
the supposed rulers know next to nothing of the natives, their customs, 
and wishes. Everywhere I found that the people detested the "Cas- 
tillas," some of whose laws and regulations press most hardly upon 
them. For instance, if a Tagal from North Luzon, or a Bisaya from the 
south, can not produce his receipt for taxes at a moment's notice he is 
liable to imprisonment. He is not allowed to go home for it, but must 
carry it on his person. A Tagal told ine that ho was within an ace of 
being sent to the war iu Mindanao through leaving his tax receipt at 
home. The police, he said, steal about at night aud arrest natives 
indiscriminately in the hope of finding some without that safeguard. 
This, however, does not apply to the Sulus. So far the Spaniards have 
failed to compel them to pay taxes. 

None of the larger islands are really under the domination of the 
Spaniards, whose rule extends little farther than the range of their can- 
non. I heard of large reinforcements being sent from Spain, but at 
that time there were very few European soldiers in the Philippines. 
No others can be relied upon. The native soldiery are mostly Luzon 
men. Not one in a score knows the names of his officers, or cares to 
know. Indeed, I once asked a Spanish soldier the name of his captain. 
"Quien sabe?" was the answer ("Who knows?"). 

The town of Sugh is protected by a loopholed wall, which incloses 
three small forts. Outside there are two large ones. The gates, of 
which there are three on the laud side, are opened at 6 a. m. and closed 
at C p. m. All natives entering must give up their arms to the guard 
at the gate. The seaward gate is closed at 10 p. in., after which hour 
no native must leave his house. 

One day I ventured inland for a couple of miles. None of the 
natives, of whom I met not a few, took the slightest notice of me. 
Just about a quarter of a mile from the town I passed a watchtower, 
where fighting, more or less serious, was always going on. Every 
night the Sulus crept up, took pot-shots at the sentries, and then 
bolted into the bush. So at least I was told. Such was Spanish rule 
in the chief town of the Sulu Islands. 

The steam launch arriving from Sandakan, the principal port on the 
eastern coast of North Borneo, I took a passage, and, sending my 
collection on board, bade the faithful Minico good-bye, and left Sugh 
in the launch's boat. I do not remember the launch's name, but the 
Spaniards called her the Gallinero, on account of the large number of 
fowls which formed the greater part of her cargo. 

The navigator of the Gallinero was a Chinaman. I asked him how 
long he had filled his post. He said that was his first trip. The 
owner, in whose office at Sandakan he had been a clerk, had put him 
in charge. I am a pretty well seasoned traveler, but this was too 
much. My equanimity deserted me, for the launch was a wheezy old 
tub which might settle down of her own accord at any moment. 
However, we — that is, the crew, about fifty Sulus, myself, and more 
than two thousand fowls — reached Sandakan safely the next day. At 
New Ceylon I caught the steamer for Singapore. 



SPAIN AND THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



[The Contemporary Eeview, July, 1898 — By John Fobeman.] 

The existing hostilities between Spain and the United States ot 
America have suddenly brought into singular prominence the colony 
geographically known as the Philippine Islands. I say "geograph- 
ically" advisedly, for, owing chiefly to its jealously exclusive adminis- 
tration under Spanish dominion, it has become neither a resort for 
globe trotters nor a place of call en route elsewhere for steamers of 
regular lines. The bulk of the export and import trade is in the hands 
of half a dozen British firms and a few other foreign houses, and not 
many years ago if one talked to a man of average general information 
about the Philippine Islands his knowledge of them went very little 
beyond the fact that the archipelago was somewhere in the vicinity of 
China and that its capital, Manila, was a place whence cigars were 
imported. Literature, too, respecting the islands has been very scant. 
The last comprehensive work descriptive of the colony was published in 
1891, and prior to that no book pretending to give even a partial account 
of the colony was written since 1859. The most northerly island is 
(excepting a few islets of no importance) Luzon, situated about 200 
miles due south of Formosa Island. Manila, the capital (on Luzon 
Island), is some 630 miles from Hongkong, or, say, sixty hours steam in 
the vessels which regularly ply between these ports. The run from 
Singapore to Manila in the regular (Spanish) mail is about five days 
and a half. In normal times there is the monthly Spanish mail from 
Europe (the Oompania Transatlantica), calling at Singapore both ways; 
an intermediate steamer also runs between Manila and Singapore, and 
one may also count on a Hongkong steamer about every five days. 

The archipelago consists of an undefined number of islands and 
islets, usually estimated at about GOO, extending over approximately 
12° of latitude, including the protectorate (in the extreme south) of 
the sultanate of Sulu. The islands of commercial importance, whence 
the supplies of produce are collected for reshipment from the ports 
open to foreign trade, number about twenty-five, the chief of which 
are Luzon, Panay, ISTegros, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Mindanao. Besides 
Manila there are three other ports open to foreign trade, all under very 
vexatious and restrictive regulations, namely, Iloilo, in the Island of 
Panay; Cebu, in the island of the same name, and Zamboanga, in 
Mindanao. 

This last port, however, is rarely visited by a foreign ship on account 
of the prohibitive dues. There are no foreign capitalists present or 
represented there, and the Spaniards being in virtual possession of 
only the coast of this second largest island of the group, while the 
hinterland is held by unsubdued natives, there is almost no traffic with 
Zamboanga. The archipelago may be regarded as ethnologically 
divided into three parts, namely, Luzon and the northern islands con- 
stituting broadly the Tagalog sphere, the southern islands the Visaya 
584 



TREATY OF PEACE. 585 

sphere, and the extreme southern islands, or Sulu Sultanate, the semi- 
independent Mussulman division. Between these three groups there 
exists great racial antipathy. By far the most civilized and amenable 
are the Tagalogs, whose ancestors are supposed to have emanated from 
the Malay Peninsula centuries ago. They are hospitable to a degree 
which can hardly be realized by anyone who has never left Europe. 
The Visayas are hospitable only for mercenary motives, callous, 
uncouth, and of brutal instincts, excepting only the Cebuanos, who 
are the most docile of all, and who, in hospitality, somewhat approach 
the Tagalog. Excepting Cebu people, the Visayas aie supposed to be 
an offshoot of the northern emigrants to a great extent amalgamated 
with the Mussulman occupants of the extreme south. 

The lowlands of Negros (the largest sugar-producing island) are well 
known to have been peopled by generations of criminals who fled 
from civilized jurisdiction in Luzon and the adjacent islands. Indeed, 
up to forty years ago the Negros people were a lawless crowd. In the 
old capital town of Jimamaylan they defied European authority sind 
murdered the governor. The sultanate of Sulu is, nominally, only the 
Island of Sulu (called by the Spaniards T0I6), but, as a matter of fact, 
the tribes of Mindanao and Basilan islands and the Tagbanuas tribes 
of Balabac and Paragua islands, if they acknowledge any authority at 
all above their local chiefs, give allegiance to the Sultan. They abso- 
lutely reject Christianity, and are known in the islands as Moros. The 
theory is that this sultanate, as well as that of Brunei (Borneo), was 
founded by Mussulman emissaries about eight centuries ago. In the 
island of Sulu (Tolo) the Spaniards, after centuries of strife, hold only 
the free port of Tolo, the scene of many massacres of Spaniards, while 
the capital of the Sultan is at Maybun, on the south coast. Punning 
due west from Sulu there is a chain of islets extending toward the 
coast of the British North Borneo Company's possessions. 

The history of the Philippines is extremely interesting; but, like 
that of most Spanish settlements, its pages record far more deeds of 
strife, treachery, and oppression than of glory to the rulers or happi- 
ness to the ruled. Space will not allow me to take more than a rapid 
glance at the most striking incidents. At the dawn of the sixteenth 
century the Pope had been complacent enough to dispose of the known 
and unknown universe. Taking Cape Verde as the starting point, the 
Western Hemisphere was given to Spain and the Eastern Hemisphere 
to Portugal; that is to say, all newly discovered lands within the limits 
defined henceforth came under the respective influences of Spain and 
Portugal with the Papal blessing, and on the condition that the fore- 
most consideration in the colonizing schemes should ever be the salva- 
tion of souls. Every act of the pioneers primarily, and of the estab- 
lished colonial governments which followed, was absolutely subjected 
to the predominant interests of the church. 

The Crown of Spain itself was nominally in the gift of the Pope* 
Hence, while no expedition could sail without the royal warrant, the 
benediction of His Holiness was that which most charmed the warrior, 
who, zealous as he might be in the service of his King, felt that he 
carried with him a still more sacred mission from heaven. No doubt 
every Castilian soldier was guided by those same feelings which finally 
inspired Ignacio de Loyola to hang up his sword in the little Basque 
church and seek that " end which justifies the means." The spirit of 
the times, too, was that of chivalry, a thirst for adventure, a love of 
conquest and domineering sway, only kept within bounds by the super- 
stition and fanaticism of the age. But a more material incentive fired 



588 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tlie enthusiasm of the lower social orders. The soul-stirring tales 
brought back from the newly discovered world beyond the great Atlan- 
tic, the sight of the treasures wrested from the possession of the infidel 
Aztecs and Incas, bore an influence as potent on the minds of the 
masses as the highest ideals of religious chivalry which inflamed the 
ambition of the leaders. 

The treaty of Tordesillas, which embodied the will of the Pope above 
referred to, had for its real motive the laudable and peaceful object of 
terminating the rivalry between Spain and Portugal. It only partially 
succeeded, however, for, while the Spaniards and Portuguese agreed 
to navigate only in their respective spheres, even the Pope himself 
was unable to determine the line of longitude dividing these spheres of 
influence at the other side of the globe. And this is where the point 
of dispute arose which indirectly brought about the discovery of that 
group of islands since known as the Philippines. Each nation claimed 
that the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, fell within its half. 

Then there appeared on the scene in the Portuguese court a certain 
cavalier, named Hernando de Maghallanes (Ferdinand Magellan), who, 
having failed to secure the attention of the king to his scheme for a 
voyage'of discovery, offered his services in the Spanish capital. Here, 
after many tedious delays, he was permitted to approach the Spanish 
King, Charles I, who, in the end, gave his royal assent to the discovery 
of a western route to the Moluccas. A fleet was fitted out, and sailed 
under the command of Maghallanes. It was in this voyage that he 
discovered the channel now known to the world as the Straits of 
Magellan. The Pacific Ocean was crossed, the Ladrone Islands were 
visited en route, and eventually Maghallanes found his way to an 
island which now forms one of the Philippine Archipelago, namely, 
Cebu. 

After a series of negotiations with the native king, he declared the 
King of Spain to be the suzerain lord. Then he went to fight the bat- 
tles of his master's new liege and was unfortunate enough to be fatally 
wounded by an arrow. Half a century had passed away when, in 1570, 
a new expedition was sent out from Mexico to annex the island dis- 
covered by Maghallanes and the group known to be adjacent from 
information received from the crews of Maghallanes' fleet. The leader- 
ship was confided to Miguel de Legaspi, who proceeded to Cebu Island, 
and after protracted efforts and arrangements with the chieftain 
declared the island to be under the suzerainty of the King of Castile. 
Here he founded a colony and initiated the disastrous policy of favor- 
ing the intermarriage of Spaniards with natives, under the mistaken 
impression that it was the true means of drawing closer the ties with 
the conquered race. Then, having heard that there was a kingdom of 
Maynila within a few days' sail, he went in search of it and found him- 
self in Borneo, in the Sultanate of Brunei. There he was informed that 
traders came down with all sorts of fine goods, including silks and 
other fabrics, so, with more or less crude sailing directions, he brought 
his ships up to Maynila. 

The king of that place peacefully accepted the treaty offered, includ- 
ing the suzerainty of the King of Spain, and in 1571 Legaspi proclaimed 
Manila to be the capital of the Philippines in lieu of Cebu, which place, 
however, remained thenceforth an episcopal city. It was found that 
the Chinese, from .time immemorial, were in the habit of coming down 
to Manila, with the northwest monsoon, in their junks laden with Canton 
goods, and the natives went out in canoes to barter alongside. The 
Chinese would not trust themselves on land. With the southwest 



TREATY OF PEACE. 587 

monsoon they returned to China. Legaspi encouraged tin's trade, and 
little by little, under a more settled government, the Chinese ventured 
ashore. They became so numerous that they had to be specially located, 
and an establishment, the Alcayceria, was erected for them outside the 
city. It resembled a big circus, with pigeon-holes all around for their 
dwellings. Later on they were admitted inside the city, and the len- 
ticular place allotted to them was called the Parian. The city gate there 
is still known as the Puerta del Parian. Several times the Chinese 
have unsuccessfully risen against the Spaniards. 

The present population of Manila, which is about 350,000, includes 
some G0,000 Chinese and 10,000 Chinese half-castes. These hold quite 
four- fifths of the retail trade. In the provinces there are about 40,000 
Chinese and Chinese half castes. 

There are three chief channels of speech in the islands which may 
be termed languages, namely, Tagalog, Visaya, and Moro, of which 
the total number of dialects is reckoned at twenty-two. The official 
language everywhere is Spanish. Besides the groups of natives already 
alluded to as being more or less under Spanish dominion, there are 
several independent mountain tribes known as Negritos, Jgorrotes, 
Tiuguianes, Tagbanuas, etc., who never have been subdued. I remem- 
ber meeting the expedition sent north from Manila in 1881 to reduce 
them to submission. It was a total failure; but the general was 
rewarded with the title of Conde de la Union and a Te Deum was 
chanted in the capital in thanksgiving for imaginary victories. 

The theory which soothed the consciences of the first military leaders 
was that either the soul must be prepared for salvation in the living 
man or the body must be annihilated. For generation after generation 
raids were repeatedly made on the natives for the crime of passive 
resistance to what they could not comprehend. With the cry of " Viva 
Castila!" bands of Spanish soldiers opened the way with blood for the 
monk to enter into the breach and palliate the wound with silvery 
phrases to the terror-stricken converts. The cry of Castila came to 
represent everything that was terrible beyond all hope of mercy, and 
was, and is to this day, used in that same sense. Castila in the north 
and Cachila in the south mean the same, and often in the rural dis- 
tricts I have heard the cry of fright, "Castila!" as a child noticed me 
approaching. Mothers, too, in my presence, have often made their 
children cease crying by pointing toward me and pronouncing in sub- 
dued tone the dread word, "Castila!" 

After years of study of the native character, 1 have come to the 
conclusion that the Philippine islander is very matter of- fact. He is not 
unwilling, but unable, to conscientiously accept an abstract theory. 
Christianity, with its mysteries, has therefore no effect on his char- 
acter, but he becomes accustomed to do that which his forefathers 
were coerced to do, namely, to accept the outward and visible signs 
without being imbued by the inward and spiritual grace. The mere 
discipline — the fact that, nolens volens, they must at a given hour on 
a given day appear dressed in their best and attend the church and 
(in the case of headmen) go to the monk's residence to "kiss hands" — 
has certainly had the effect of taming the masses into orderly beings. 
Yet restraint of any kind is repugnant to him. He likes to be as free 
as a bird, but he is of a pliant nature, and easily managed with just 
treatment. He is extremely sensitive to injustice. If he knows, in his 
own mind, that he has done wrong, he will submit to a thrashing with- 
out any thought of taking revenge. If he were punished out of mere 
caprice, or with palpable injustice, he would always have a lurking 



588 TREATY OF TEACE. 

desire to give a quid pro quo. He has an innate contempt for cowards, 
hence his disdain for Chinese, but will follow a brave leader anywhere, 
and will never be the first to yield to hunger, fatigue, or possible 
chances of death. He takes every trouble with profound resignation; 
he promises everything and performs little; his word is not worth a 
straw, and he does not feel that lying is a sin. He is inconstant in the 
extreme, and loyal so long as it suits him, but as a subject he can be 
easily molded into any fashion which a just, honest, and merciful 
government would wish. 

From the foundation of Manila in 1571 up to the year 1819 the colony 
of the Philippine Islands was a dependency of Mexico. During that 
long period there was absolutely no direct intercourse between the 
mother country and her far Eastern eolony. Everybody and everything 
destined for the Philippines passed through Mexico until that American 
colony threw off the Spanish yoke. Thenceforth, for fifty-one years, 
communication with Spain was via the Cape of Good Hope. The com- 
mercial history of the Philippines would be too long to relate here in 
extenso; suffice it to say that it is a series of struggles between the 
colonists, who sought liberty to trade freely with Mexico and China, 
and the Spanish King and his councilors and the trading community 
in Spain, who persistently determined to curtail that freedom as much 
as possible. The policy of the Spanish merchant class was to hold 
Mexico as their exclusive market. They opposed Philippine traffic with 
China because this necessitated silver dollars, which they knew must 
come from Mexico surreptitiously, if the islanders were not openly 
permitted to give goods in exchange. 

The famous galleons, which were so frequently intercepted and seized 
by British privateers from the days of our Queen Elizabeth onward, 
formed the only connection between Mexico (Acapulco) and Manila. 
The regulations for shipping were, however, so restrictive that only 
the favorites of the authorities ever secured a chance. The arrival of 
the galleon in Manila Bay was the event of the season or the year. 
For the Europeans it was a sort of Bobinson Crusoe life, with addi- 
tional possible dangers. The ferocious (at times bloody) contentions 
between church and state authorities were enough to obliterate all the 
moral prestige which the Spaniards ever had or might have had 
among the natives. The galleon usually brought, together with the 
Mexican dollars, fresh restrictive royal decrees aud a motley crowd of 
all sorts and conditions of men; friars who had to relate how they had 
saved the ship from total wreck by an appeal to the Virgin ; a mob of 
notaries who had bought their offices in public auction in the City of 
Mexico; some dignitary who was destined to fan the flame of discord; 
perhaps a crowd of low type fortune seekers, and last, but not least, a 
mysterious individual of gloomy aspect whose mission none understood, 
but who would turn out to be the official "snake in the grass"— a spy 
from the holy office of the Inquisition— a social scourge. 

For about a century and a half after the foundation of Manila the 
provincial government was handed over to the mercy of low-class 
Spanish adventurers. A common soldier would be rewarded for his 
services with an encomienda, i. e., a tract of land over which, together 
with the natives settled thereon, he had almost absolute control. The 
lives of the natives became a perfect misery. Successive reforms 
brought first a functionary who was at the same time governor, judge, 
and licensed trader. 

The abuses were so glaring that, after long entreaty, he was super- 
seded by a judge-governor, and I remember when, a few years ago, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 589 

these offices were divided. Now each branch of government has its 
separate delegate in each province, and there are also two provincial 

supreme courts. There is also a fortnightly subsidized steamer service 
from Manila to each provincial government. All appointments are 
made direct from Spain, and with every new ministry in Madrid comes 
a flock of new favorites to the islands. The Governor-General is usually 
a lieutenant-general in Spain, with the local rank of captain-general, 
but recently captain-generals (in Spain) have been sent out. 

I have so far only alluded to the civil and military government, 
which is virtually nothing more than the executive of the ecclesiastical 
authority. The real rulers of the islands are the four corporations of 
friars — namely, the Austin, Dominican, Franciscan, and Recoleto 
orders. Their influence has been predomineut since the foundation 
of the colony. In times gone by there have been most fierce contests 
between the governors and the monastic orders, in which the former 
have almost invariably been the losers. One governor- general, Busta- 
mente, was murdered in his palace at the instigation of the holy friars, 
who followed up his dead body and hooted as it was being dragged 
through the streets of Manila. They caused Governor-General Solano 
to be poisoned. Only last year a certain father Piernavieja, who had 
committed two murders in the provinees and was still permitted to say 
mass, was put to death by the rebels. Any governor-general who dis- 
pleases the monks is recalled. In recent times, General Despujols had 
to leave in 1892, after eight months of office, because he ceased to be a 
persona grata to the priests. A native, Dr. Eizal, had written and 
published some facts about the monastic orders, and Despujols refused 
to have this man put to death for it. 

Then, again, he ordered a search to be made in a convent of the 
Austrian friars, and there found a printing press and seditious leaflets 
being printed for the priests, who intended, by distributing them, to 
attribute to the natives an attempted revolt. General Blanco (now in 
Havana) was recalled at the instigation of the friars, because he proved 
to be too humane for them when the rebellion broke out. Finally they 
succeeded in having appointed a Governor-General after their own 
hearts, Camilo Polavieja, through whom they had the Dr. Eizal above 
mentioned executed in Manila in January of last year. His widow 
was a Hongkong American girl. 

In 1872 there was some discontent among the secular native clergy, 
because the monks persisted in holding the incumbencies, notwith- 
standing their own rules of community and the council ^of Trent decree 
which prohibited it. The friars, therefore, determined to nip this native 
ambition in the bud. They instigated a little revolt of the troops at 
Cavite and attributed the plot to the native clergy. Four native priests 
fell victims to the intrigue and were publicly executed. Then, following 
up the scheme, native priests were declared incompetent to hold incum- 
bencies. At the same time several of the best families of Manila were 
banished and despoiled of their property. 1 am personally acquainted 
with two of these victims ; one resides in Hongkong, and the other has 
for years past had his office near Leadenhall street, London. 

Manila is an archbishopric and there are six provincial bishoprics. 
The total number of parishes will be about 620, of which the friars hold 
about 95 per cent. As parish priest the Spanish friar is beyond all con- 
trol of the civil government. He can neither sue nor be sued. He is 
quite independent of all State authority. He may prove to be the 
vilest criminal with all impunity. His superiors would pretend to 



590 TREATY OF PEACE. 

punish him, but they would never expel him; they are themselves sheep 
who protect their own lambs. 

He acts, however, as voluntary (and very willing) government agent. 
He meddles in every public affair of the township by recognized right. 
If he can not have things all his own way and influence every public 
act, from the election of native headman downward, he singles out for 
revenge all those who have outvoted him. And this is generally what 
happens, at one time or another, in half the parishes. If a young man, 
who has been educated in Manila or Hongkong, leturns to his native 
town with somewhat advanced ideas, or merely salutes the priest as a 
gentleman instead of kissing his hand as his spiritual father, he, too, 
is marked for social ruin one day. The father of a family of attractive 
daughters has also to be careful lest the charms of his offspring bring 
about his own fall. In short, in one way or another, the native who 
possesses anything worth having has either to yield to the avarice, 
lust, or insolence of the Spanish priest, or to risk losing his liberty and 
position in life. The parish priest has simply to address what is called 
an "oficio" (official advice) to the governor of a province, who remits 
it to the Governor General, stating that he has reason to believe that 
the individuals mentioned in the margin are persons of doubtful mor- 
ality, or conspirators, or disloyal, or whatever he may choose to dub 
them, and recommend their removal from his parish. In due course a 
couple of civil guards will suddenly appear at the door of each named 
individual. Without warrant or explanation of any kind further than 
"by order of the governor," he is marched off to the capital town and 
cast into prison. Later on he is sent up to Manila, and without trial or 
even defined sentence, he is banished to a far-distant island. 

In 1896 I met three old friends of mine on board a steamer, who were 
being transported in precisely similar circumstances. I could hardly 
believe my own eyes. They were well-to-do planters, and the last time 
I saw them, prior to this occasion, I was the guest of one of them in 
their town of Taal (Batangas Province). His well served table, his 
carriage and horses, had been at my disposal. Now, alas ! I found 
these men treated as criminals, with iron anklets slipped on one iron bar 
and padlocked. They were on the upper deck, exposed to the rain, sun, 
and heavy dews day and night. All I could do for them was to secretly 
supply them with food and clothing. In the law courts nothing can be 
obtained without "greasing the palm," and then it only brings a sen- 
tence with a loophole for reopening the case when the judge likes. The 
same system of "squeeze" obtains in all the government departments, 
from the half-dollar slipped into the hand of the native scrivener to the 
thousand dollars or more quietly laid on the table of the dignified holder 
of the scales of justice. 

From the preceding facts it may almost be surmised what are the 
causes of the rebellion. The movement had for its objects (1) the 
expulsion of the monastic orders; (2) the abolition of the Governor- 
General's arbitrary power to banish without accusation, trial, or 
sentence; (3) restoration to the natives of the lands held by the 
religious orders; (4) a limitation of the arbitrary powers of the civil 
guard; (5) no arrest without judge's warrant; (6) abolition of the fifteen 
days per annum compulsory labor. The government was quite unpre- 
pared for this rebellion, which broke out in August, 1896. The first 
official acts were very impolitic. Three hundred representative natives 
were arrested on suspicion, and this probably spread the movement. 
A week after this the first battle was fought (at San Juan del Monte), 



TREATY OF PEACE. 591 

and I rode over the scene of slaughter a few hours after, before the 
slain were removed. A few days later I witnessed the execution of 
the first four who were doomed to pay the extreme penalty. Two 
months afterwards I saw 13 Chinese half castes shot at Cavite. 

Forwantof troops General Blanco acted on the defensive till reenforce- 
ments came from Spain, but meanwhile the altercations with the arch- 
bishop, who pressed for the most bloodthirsty measures, caused Blanco 
to be recalled. General Blanco was succeeded in December, L896, 
by General Polavieja, and he was in turn superseded by General Prinio 
de Rivera, whose place is now occupied by General Augusti,in chronic 
feud with the archbishop. 

The warfare in the northern provinces lasted from September 1, 1896, 
till December, 1897, when the Spaniards sued for peace and commis- 
sioned a well known native of Manila, named Paterno, to negotiate it. 
The terms were drawn up in the treaty of Biacna Bato, and signed 
on December 14 last between General Primo de Eivera and General 
Aguinaldo. As Aguinaldo had obtained all that he had fought for, ho 
and his chiefs retired to Hongkong, accompanied by Colonel Primo 
de Rivera, to await the fulfillment of the terms of the treaty. 

Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo is a smart, intelligent man, of a serious 
mien, small in stature, and apparently a little over thirty years of age. 
He has served as the petty governor of his native town in Cavite 
province and speaks Spanish very well for a native. He is by no 
means an adventurer with all to gain and nothing to lose, but a landed 
proprietor. He is a would-be reformer of his country, but, convinced 
that all appeal to Spain is futile, he has at last resorted to force. Gen. 
Primo de Rivera is now safely back in Madrid, and the Philippine 
Islander and the treaty of Biac-na Bato are laughed at. This is a 
repetition of Cuban policy. 

It is on these grounds that Aguinaldo holds himself justified in 
returning to the scene of his battles, not again to fight for reforms to 
be effected by those who have no honor, but to cooperate in forcing 
the Spaniards to evacuate the islands. In April last General Aguin- 
aldo concluded a secret agreement with Admiral Dewey, subject to 
ratification by the United States Government. Since then we know 
that Aguinaldo has arrived in Cavite and been well received by his old 
followers. 

The climate of Luzon Island is excellent, and the Spanish undisci- 
plined troops of tender age and frail physique will have little chance 
against the swarthy Americans and Aguinaldo's party. It is provi- 
sionally agreed that Aguinaldo shall set up a local republic. General 
Aguinaldo's plan, I am informed, is to establish at Manila a congress 
to which deputies from all the principal islands will be invited. I do 
not hesitate to prophesy that, unless under European or American 
control, the scheme will end in complete failure. At first, no doubt, 
the islanders will welcome and cooperate in any arrangement which 
will rid them of monastic oppression. The Philippine Islands, how- 
ever, would not remain one year a peaceful united archipelago under 
an independent native government. It is an utter impossibility. 
There is such racial antipathy that the Visayas would not, in this 
generation, submit to what they would always consider a Tagalog 
republic, and the Tagalogs, having procured the overthrow of the 
Spaniards, would naturally resent a preponderance of Visaya influ- 
ence. Families there are very closely united, but as a people they 
have little idea of union. The rivalry for prestige at the present 
day between one village and another on the same coast is sufficient 



592 TREATY OF PEACE. 

to prove the tendency to disintegrate. The native likes to localize, 
to bring everything he requires or aspires to within his own small 
circle. If his ambition were to be a leader of men be would be con- 
tent to be a king in his own town. Native ideas are not expansive 
and far-reaching. Then the question arises, Who would be the electors ? 
The masses are decidedly too ignorant to be capable of voting intelli- 
gently. The votes would be entirely controlled by cliques of land- 
owners. 

If the native republic did succeed, it would not be strong enough 
to protect itself against foreign aggression. The islands are a splendid 
group, well worth picking a quarrel and spending a few millions sterling 
to annex them. I entertain the firm conviction that an unprotected 
united republic would last only until the novelty of the situation had 
worn off. Then, I think, every principal island would, in turn, declare 
its independence. Finally, there would be complete chaos, and before 
that took root America, or some European nation, would probably 
have interfered; therefore it is better to start with protection. I 
can not doubt that General Aguiualdo is quite alive to these facts; 
nevertheless, I admire his astuteness in entering on any plan which, by 
hook or by crook, will expel the friars. If the republic failed, at least 
monastic power would never return. 

A protectorate under a strong nation is just as necessary to insure 
good administration in the islands as to protect them against foreign 
attack. Either Great Britain or America would be equally welcome to 
the islanders if they had not the vanity to think they could govern 
themselves. Unless America decided to start on a brand new policy it 
would hardly suit her, I conjecture, to accept the mission of a pro- 
tectorate so distant from her chief interests. England, having ample 
resources so near at hand, would probably find it a less irksome task. 

For the reasons given above, the control would have to be a very 
direct one. I would go so far as to suggest that the government should 
be styled "The Philippine Protectorate." There might be a chamber 
of deputies, with a native president. The protector aud his six advisers 
should be American or English. The functions of ministers should be 
vested in the advisers and those of president (of a republic) in the 
protector. In any case the finances could not be confided to a native. 
The inducement to finance himself would be too great. All races 
should be represented in the chamber by men of their own class, 
otherwise there would be wire-pulling by the half-castes to secure a 
monopoly. " 

The total population of the islands amounts to about six millions. 
The chief products are hemp, sugar, leaf tobacco, and cigars. The 
articles of minor importance for export are choice hard woods, dye- 
woods, copra, rattans, palm-leaf hats, gums, etc. The islands are 
extremely fertile, and will produce almost anything to be found in the 
Tropics. I estimate that barely one-fourth of the tillable land is now 
under cultivation. There is at present only one railway of 120 miles. 
A number of lines would have to be constructed in Luzon, Panay, 
Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao islands. Companies would probably 
take up the contracts on ninety years' working concession and ninety- 
nine years' lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed interest. The lands 
would become immensely valuable to the railway companies, >and an 
enormous source of taxable wealth to the protectorate. Eoad making 
should be taken up on treasury account, and bridge construction on 
contract, to be paid for by toll concessions. The port of Iloilo should 



TREATY OF PEACE. 593 

be improved, the custom-houses abolished, and aboul ten more 
ports opened to the world. 

Under the protectorate undoubtedly capital would How into the 
Philippines. The coal beds in Luzon and Cebu islands would be 
opened out; the marble deposits of Montalban and the stone quarries 
of Angono (both near Manila) would surely be worked. The possibili- 
ties of development under a free, liberal government are so great that 
the next generation would look back with astonishment at the stal 
of the present day. The chamber of deputies would no doubt adopt 
measures to avert the danger of an overwhelming influx of Chinese. 

The city of Manila is situated at the mouth of the Pasig River,on the 
eastern extremity of a bay which is 27 miles across from east to west. 
At the western extremity there is the island of Corregidor, which, if 
fortitied and equipped with modern armament, would command the 
entrance to the bay. Six miles southwest of Manila City there is a 
little neck of land on which stand the fort and arsenal of Cavite. 
Cavite and the headland are now in possession of Admiral Dewey's 
forces. An attack on the Americans by sea is of course out of tin; 
question since the annihilation of the Spanish tleet. Any body of 
troops moving along that strip of land which connects Cavite with the 
mainland of the island could be effectually shelled from the American 
ships. Dewey and his party are therefore perfectly safe pending the 
arrival of reenforcements. 

The city of Manila is practically divided into two parts. The official 
or walled city is built on the left bank of the Pasig Eiver and the 
commercial city is situated on the Island of Binondo, which forms 
the right bank of the same river. They are connected by a well-built 
stone bridge, a little over a mile up the river. Proceeding up the river, 
which is very tortuous, one reaches a lake fed by numerous streams 
which ilow down the crevices of the surrounding mountains. 

The banks of the Pasig are beautifully picturesque, quaint, and 
interesting. For about a mile and a half from the stone bridge men- 
tioned above they are dotted with charming villas, the English club 
at jSTagtajan, the Governor-General's chalet, etc., surrounded by palm 
trees and all the luxurious grandeur of tropical vegetation. In early 
morning the Pasig presents a lively scene, with the hundreds of canoes 
skidding rapidly downstream laden with supplies for the capital. 
Excepting a iew shops and craftmen's workrooms there is no trade in the 
walled city, the principal buildings being the cathedral, many churches, 
the archbishop's palace, the university, high schools, military and civil 
government offices, an ordnance depot, and other official establishments. 
TheGovernor General's official residence was destroyed by an earthquake 
in 1863, and a new one is in course of construction. The walls which 
entirely encircle the city were, no doubt, a formidable defense up to a 
century ago, but are quite useless against modern artillery. This is fully 
recognized by the Spaniards themselves, who have indeed frequently 
discussed their demolition, but tradition and a iust appreciation of 
their worth in case of rebellion have preserved them. Of the ordnance 
mounted on the walls there are two pieces of modern type. According 
to the latest reliable advices, the Spaniards are going to the useless 
trouble of putting the drawbridges in order and flooding the sur- 
rounding moats, and throwing up earthworks and sandbag defenses, 
all of which would be very effectual against an unsupported attack 
of the rebels only. Across the river, the quarter of Binondo (with 
the suburbs) constitutes the trading center. Here are located the 
foreign and other merchants' offices and warehouses, and the whole 
trade of Manila is transacted on this side of the river. It has no 
t P 38 



504 TREATY OF PEACE. 

military defenses of any kind, and the bombardment of the Spaniards' 
stronghold might, for obvious reasons, be very well confined to the left 
bank of the Pasig River. This would, for military purposes, be just as 
effectual as a general bombardment, for surely the Spaniards would 
never attempt to hold out after their walled city had been leveled. If 
they did, the rest could be as well accomplished after the landing on 
the city ruins, and thus the principal trading interests (mostly foreign) 
would not be sacrificed. I do not consider the rebels concentrated 
around Manila sufficiently strong or well enough organized to effectu- 
ally starve the Spaniards into surrender. The natives are fine soldiers 
when well led; so, if after the walled city is demolished the Spaniards 
still hold out, then the cooperation of the rebels will be invaluable in 
the final assault. 

Spain as a conquering nation has been a great success; but the days 
of conquest have long gone by. As a colonizing nation she has proved 
a great failure from the beginning, for wherever she has ceased to hold 
her own by sheer force of arms no merited gratitude of a prosperous 
people has been able to hold together those bonds originally created by 
the sword. Where military despotism has opened the way, generous 
intelligent administration has not followed in the wake to promote the 
happiness and well-being of the subjected races. The two great factors 
in the decline of Spanish rule have been religious despotism and greed. 
Liberty to till the land and take the produce thereof, to journey from 
place to place, to cull the wild fruits of nature, has only been wrung 
from the Spaniards bit by bit. Repressive measures, contrary to the 
spirit of the times and repugnant to the instincts of the people, never 
did succeed anywhere. The natural result is reaction, revolution, and 
social upheaval by force. The most loyal colony is that which yearns 
for nothing at the hands of the mother country. 

It seems almost incredible that statesmen of the caliber of the late 
Canovas del Castillo, himself a historian, accustomed to look back and 
weigh the consequences of statecraft, should have been so blind to the 
power of the will of the people. Historical precedent should have 
taught him how realizable was the theme of Cuba libre. But stubborn 
pride and a failure to act opportunely have left Spain with only tra- 
ditional glory. Unfortunately, this very glory has compelled her to 
pick up the gauntlet thrown down by the United States. Spaniards 
are so constantly chewing the cud of their past victories — ever patting 
each other on the back over the deeds of remote heroes — that they fail 
to see why the warrior of a hundred battles, now tottering with 
decrepitude, can no longer enter the lists and break lances with a 
more virile competitor. Spaniards can not tolerate being told the bare, 
distasteful truth. If the ministers, who, from behind the scenes, are 
able to appreciate the comparative forlornness of their resources and the 
futility of resistance, were to deny the popular romance, that what 
Spain has done she can do again, the first spark of revolution would 
be kindled. 

Undoubte'dly not a few of them go abroad and read, mark, and learn 
to their individual advantage; but who of them would have the cour- 
age to return to Spain and expose her fallacies, with no prospect of 
carrying conviction, and a certainty of being declasse — a social outcast 
with the epithet of anti-Espanol? 

So to the inspiring strains of the March a de Cadiz the youth, 
encouraged by the beauty of every town and village, has gaily gone 
forth to sacrifice its all for national pride and letters of gold in the 
annals of its country. 

Hamburg, June, 1898. 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDERS. 



[The Fortnightly Review, July, 1898.— By Lucr M. J. Garnett.] 

Both the great island possessions — in the West and East Indies, 
respectively — which are now the seats of war between Spain and tlie 
United States were, for a time during last century, possessions of 
the British Empire. Havana and Manila were both captured by 
Great Britain in 1762, and Cuba and the Philippines occupied. Avery 
rare and interesting plain narrative of the capture of Manila was 
published by Bear- Admiral Cornish and Brigadier-General Draper in 
reply to accusations of infringement of the capitulations made against 
these officers by the Spaniards. Their own allegations are sufficiently 
strong: "Through the whole of the above transactions the Spaniards, 
by evasions, avoided complying with the capitulations in every one 
respectexcept in bringing the money from the Misericordia and Ordenta- 
cara [ships], which it was out of their power to secrete. They base- 
fully and ungratefully took up arms against us after having their lives 
given them. They preached publicly in their churches rebellion," etc. 
At the peace of Paris, however (1763), which concluded the seven 
years' war, Canada, Louisiana, and various islands in the West Indies 
having been ceded by France, and Florida and Minorca by Spain, Great 
Britain on her part ceded to the latter power Cuba and the Philippines. 
Yet there is still to be seen — or was during my residence at Manila — at 
the mouth of the Pasig, and under the ramparts, a dilapidated brick, 
and stucco monument with an inscription celebrating the expulsion of 
the invading British by the noble and patriotic Don Simon de Anda — an 
inscription which afforded great amusement to British naval officers 
visiting the port. 

Few island clusters are so uniformly beautiful as the Philippine 
group, nor among these can any vie with its chief island, Luzon, in 
verdure-clad, cloud-capped mountains, fertile plains and valleys, wide 
fresh-water rivers, placid inland lakes, and sparkling waterfalls. Dis- 
covered by the great Magellan in 1521, and named twenty-one years 
later by Villalobos in honor of Philip II, then Prince of Asturia, this 
archipelago was finally won for the Spanish Crown by the intrepid 
Miguel de Legaspi. First obtaining a footing in Cebu, he, in 1564, 
subdued part of Luzon and founded Manila, gradually extending the 
Spanish dominion into the rest of the islands forming this group. 

The Philippine islanders comprise many races and tribes, presenting 
varied characteristics. They may, however, be classed generally into 
three chief groups: Ilocan Malays in the north of the archipelago, 
Tagals in the center, and Bisayans in the south. In the north, more 
particularly, there is an infusion of Chinese, Formosan, and Japanese 
blood; on the eastern shores are traces of Polynesian or Papuan admix- 
ture, while part of the population of the large southern island of Min- 
danao resemble the Dyaks of the opposite Bornean coast. But though 

595 



596 TREATY OF PEACE. 

the Philippines have been for over three centuries a Spanish possession, 
it is computed that, at the present day, one-fifth of the population of 
Luzon and one-fourth of that of the southern Bisayas islands are still 
unsubjected to Spain, while in Mindanao only small portions of the 
coast districts are occupied by the Spaniards. The only section of the 
native inhabitants which has been completely subdued, converted to 
Christianity, and domesticated are the Tagals and some of the Bisayans 
of the southern islands. 

The Tagals are of a markedly Malay type, having smooth black 
hair, prominent cheek bones, large lively eyes, and ilattish noses with 
dilated nostrils. They are, as a rule, of rather low stature, slightly 
built, and of a copper color, more or less dark. The absence of beard 
in the men gives them a, juvenile appearance, even when middle-aged, 
and their features generally are smooth, smiling, and unworn. 

Whatever may have been the original character of the Tagals, it has 
doubtless been greatly modified by their subjection to Spanish rule, 
and equally so by their conversion to Christianity; and they now pre- 
sent such a strange compound of contradictory qualities that their 
moral portrait is difficult to depict. The character of the domesticated 
native is, indeed, a series of surprises. Those who take the trouble to 
study him are every year led to some new conclusion. Perhaps it is 
best summed up in the words of one of their priests: "They are big 
children, whom one must treat as little ones." The Tagal's leading char- 
acteristics, however, doubtless depend less on himself than on natural 
laws; he is what his environment has made him. The old tribal cus- 
toms, which had the good of the community for their aim, and consti- 
tuted his primitive morality, are now, when not altogether forgotten, 
reserved for native intercourse; and the Tagal has no moral code to 
direct his dealings with his Spanish master save that which he himself 
has taught his servant. Before entering the palm-leaf hut of a friend 
he will spend fully three minutes in the interchange of courteous 
phrases; but he enters a European house without ceremony. 

A Tagal keeps his word, and yet he is a liar. Auger he holds in hor- 
ror, he compares it to madness, and prefers to it drunkenness, which he 
also greatly despises. Insult and injustice he can not brook, and will 
unhesitatingly use the knife to avenge either. He will never willingly 
confess a fault, but lie to hide it; yet he receives a flogging for it with- 
out a murmur. Debt he considers rather as an inconvenience than a 
calamity; when in pecuniary difficulties he will spend all his ready 
cash on a feast to his friends, to keep up appearances, and he never 
thinks of returning a loan unsolicited. He, on the other hand, never 
repudiates his debts, but transmits them to his heirs if, at his death, 
they remain unpaid. Misfortune he bears with stoical and fatalist 
indifference; concerned only with his immediate necessities, he is apt 
to let the morrow take care of itself. Under the eye of a master he is 
the most tractable of beings, and will go without food for hours, with- 
out complaint, if supplied with betel nut to chew. He gives himself 
no airs as a servant, and if hired as a coachman will raise no objection 
to being employed as cook, carpenter, or boatman, being ready to turn 
his hand to anything. He has a profound respect for the elders of his 
family, treats his children kindly, and extends his aid and protection 
to everyone claiming relationship, however remote. 

When, in the interior, he is called upon to offer hospitality to stran- 
gers, he not only refuses to accept payment from them in return, but 
places at their disposal his ponies, vehicles, and gun, and shows them 
every attention in his power. An intrepid climber and rider, he mounts 



TREATY OF PEACE. 597 

the tall forest trees like a monkey, using feet and hands equally ; he 
rides barebacked the most spirited pony, plunges without hesitation 
into shark-infested waters, and dives into alligator-haunted lakes to 
attack their occupants. Endowed himself with courageof this descrip- 
tion, he has the greatest admiration for bravery in others, and an equal 
contempt for cowardice. Under a leader in whom lie has confidence he 
makes an excellent soldier; but, losing him, he becomes at once demor- 
alized. Incapable of organization on any considerable scale, no revolt, 
if confined exclusively to the Tagals, would have a chance of success. 

Brigandage, which has long been common in these islands, first 
came into prominence about the middle of the eighteenth century. 
This profession has a great attraction for the Tagal, not so much on 
account of the gain he may derive from it, as of the life of freedom it 
offers him, and escape from payment of the tributo which, though by 
no means a heavy tax, he much disliked paying in the years before its 
repeal. I have heard of cases when the only reason for a native's tak- 
ing to the mountains has been his unreadiness with the few shillings 
demanded of him, probably lost in the cockpit on the preceding day. 
These outlaws are occasionally arrested by the guardia civile and 
lodged in prison, but by the connivance of the legal functionaries, who 
fear the vengeance of their comrades, they are either set free, allowed 
to escape, or are comfortably established in some penal settlement. 
The more ignorant Tagals of this class believe that certain persons are 
endowed with an uncanny power, called by them anting anting, which 
renders its possessor invulnerable. Brigands, when captured, are 
often found wearing a medallion with the image of the Virgin, or some 
saint, as a symbol of anting. The neighborhood of the famous shrine 
of Antipolo, to which I shall have occasion again to refer, and the hills 
of ISan Mateo, are favorite haunts of these marauders, though we cer- 
tainly saw nothing of them during a delightful excursion made to the 
latter region. Auother class of outlaws, known as remontados, are to 
be met with in the hills. As their name implies, they are natives who, 
weary of the thraldom of civilization, have cast it aside to return to 
the wild, free life of their remote ancestors, with no taxes to pay, no 
forced labor to perform, their wants satisfied with game from the hills, 
fish from the streams, berries and wild honey from the woods. 

Gambling may be said to be the one vice of the Philippine Islander, 
and takes chiefly the form of cockfighting — more ruinous for him in 
its effects than the earthquakes and cyclones by which his home is 
occasionally devastated. With the Tagal, even more than with the 
Malay generally, this pastime is a passion pushed to the extreme. In 
every native hut, in every craft floating on the Pasig, a cock is to be 
found undergoing training as careful as that bestowed in the west on 
a race horse — though perhaps to perish on its first appearance in the 
lists. A native at leisure is seldom seeu without his gamecock, a 
pretty creature, not much larger than a bantam, which he can it's under 
his arm; and should his hut take fire, his first thought is his favorite, 
which, having secured, he leaves the rest to fate. Cockfights are held 
regularly on Sundays and festivals, and, in Manila, ou one day in the 
week as well; and the laws regulating them, which contain as many as 
a hundred clauses, are very strict. The spectators stand, or squat on 
their heels — the favorite native posture — on a sloping floor, at the foot 
of which are the lists. The maximum stake is $50, and one spur only 
is allowed to each cock. The Chinaman, who farms the gallera, col- 
lects the bets, which, relatively to the wealth of the company, are 
enormous, Tagals of the poorest class often staking from three to four 
dollars and going supperless to bed in consequence. 



598 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Meantime the owners of the first combatants are arming their cham- 
pions with a sharp steel spur some 2£ inches long with as much care 
as is given to saddling a horse for the Derby. When all the bets have 
been collected, the cocks are faced. Should one run away without 
being injured, which does not often occur, he is declared beaten, and a 
new antagonist brought to face the victor. This time the combatants 
are probably more equally matched, and the excitement of the reeking 
crowd of Tagals and Chinamen increases. The cocks fly at one another, 
meeting breast to breast, their uplifted claws directing the points of 
their spurs at the adversary, again and again endeavoring to strike a 
fell blow, chance generally determining the victory according to the 
vulnerability of the part penetrated by the blade. At last one of the 
cocks reels, falls, and expires, and the victor executes a triumphant 
dance over the bleeding corpse of bis vanquished foe, while the shouts 
and exclamations in Tagoloc and Chinese, which have accompanied the 
struggle, increase to a perfect babel. 

Another form of gambling, to which the women are almost as partial 
as the men, is the purchase of tickets in the Government lotteries. 
These tickets are divided and subdivided until a share may be bought 
for a peseta (6d.), and much of the spare cash of the natives thus finds 
its way into the coffers of the hacienda. This gambling propensity of 
the Tagals is occasionally exploited in various ways. During my resi- 
dence in Manila a bazaar was organized for the benefit of the general 
hospital, but instead of the articles collected being sold in the usual 
way they were piled into a pyramid in the center of the temporary 
construction erected for the purpose, the lottery tickets disposing of 
them being sold in the numerous stalls held by the leading ladies of the 
Spanish and foreign communities. A five dollar packet of tickets con- 
tained one prize only; it might be of the value of a shilling or two, or 
of several pounds, and a single ticket at the price of a peseta had as 
much chance of winning one of the latter as a five-dollar packet one of 
the former. Accordingly, all ranks of natives, on three successive 
evenings, thronged to the bazaar, and spent their money liberally, 
patronizing, in preference, the stalls held by foreigners, apparently 
having more faith in the bona fides of these than of the Spaniards, with 
the result that at the combined British and American stall, at which I 
assisted, several hundred pounds were taken. 

The sixteenth- century colonizers of the Philippines had the wisdom 
to allow the natives they domesticated to retain, to a great extent, 
their own tribal government, the only change of any importance made 
in the existing system being the total abolition of the form of slavery 
practiced. While the Spanish Governor-General took the place of the 
sultans and greater chiefs, the datos, or feudal lords, were appointed 
gobernadorcillos, or petty governors of the villages and townships, 
which were termed, according to their importance, pueblos and visitas, 
or retained their native appellation of barangay. To these petty gov- 
ernors and their lieutenants and cabezas, as the head men are termed, 
were intrusted the duties of mayor, magistrate, and tax collector, 
respectively. They were made responsible for the poll tax, levied, 
until 1884, under the name of tributo, on every adult native ; for the 
proper performance of the statute labor, which consists of forty days' 
road mending and other municipal work, and some days' service as 
cuadrilleros, a kind of municipal and cantonal gendarmerie commanded 
by the gobernadorcillo. 

Such, in brief, is the internal organization of these islands, instituted 
at the conquest, and perpetuated till the present day, to the great 
advantage of their rulers. The mass of the population were probably 



TREATY OF PEACE. 599 

not long in coming to regard favorably a religion and government which 
abolished slavery and replaced by exact laws the former somewhal 
arbitrary rule of their datos. The latter, finding themselves abandoned 
by tbeir vassals, were naturally glad to secure what honors and power 
were left to them by the conquerors through the exercise of these new 
functions. Though nominally no longer hereditary, but elective, these 
offices probably continued for sometime to be the appanage of the feudal 
lords. At the present day there are living in Manila descendants of 
these former sovereigns of the archipelago, who enjoy a certain consid- 
eration, and have been invariably loyal to their Spanish rulers. 

The Philippine laws relating to the property of married persons are 
exceedingly quaint and interesting, being entirely in favor of the wife. 
The property of a bride is never settled on the husband. If a man is 
poor, and his wife well to-do, so they remain throughout their married 
life, he becoming simply the administrator of her possessions, but hav- 
ing no right to them. If a husband becomes bankrupt in a business in 
which he has invested some of his wite's fortune, she ranks as a second- 
class creditor under the commercial code. Even on her death, the 
husband can not, save under a deed executed by her in the presence of 
a notary, derive any benefit from her estate, as her children, if she have 
any, and if not, her nearest blood relatives, are her heirs. Thus it not 
unfrequeutly happens that the father of wealthy children is himself 
impecunious, and dependent on their generosity for support; though at 
the same time he is compelled by law to manage their affairs while 
minors, and, at their majority, to render a strict account of his stew- 
ardship. A married woman continues to use her maiden name, to which 
she adds her husband's with the prefix de. This she abandons when 
left a widow, save for purposes of business or convenience. Children 
also bear the names of both father and mother; that of the mother 
comes last, and is consequently the more prominent. It is, however, only 
since 1844 that the mass of the natives have adopted family designa- 
tions. In that year a list of Spanish surnames was sent to the priest 
of every parish, from which the head of each household chose the cog- 
nomen which best pleased him. Thus, one may find such noble names 
as Legaspi de Salceda, Lopez de Vega, etc., borne by the dusky-hued 
natives of the interior of Luzon. 

Such being the legal status of women in these islands, it naturally 
follows that they enjoy a considerable degree of personal independence, 
which, in some localities, economic conditions tend to increase, espe- 
cially among the working classes. The chief of these economic condi- 
tions has been the almost exclusive employment in the Government 
cigar factories of women. The staple industry of the city being thus 
debarred from men, various occupations and industries usually per- 
formed by women fall to their share. Into male hands has fallen to a 
great extent the manufacture and embroidery of the gauze made from 
the long silky fibers of the pineapple plant. By the men are also 
woven, on primitive handlooms, the dainty jusi-striped gauzes made 
from Chinese silk and the hempen abaca. In their homes, too, while 
the wife is earning the family bread — or rather rice, their staple food — 
the husband looks after the children and cooks the dinner. It is also 
very difficult to get women to act as nurses and maids in European 
families; and more than one English family of my acquaintance found 
themselves under the necessity of drafting into the nursery one or more 
of the muchachos or "boys" of the household, often finding these male 
nurses more satisfactory in many respects than the women. This ap- 
proximate "equality of the sexes" in the Philippines, not accorded to 



(300 TREATY OF PEACE. 

tliem by Christianity, but to a great extent merely a survival of their 
own ancient tribal customs, affords further evidence of the untruth of 
the assumption by the Mill school of the immemorial and world-wide 
"subjection of women." 

Marriages among the Tagals are usually arranged not by the princi- 
pals but by their parents. The father and mother of a marriageable 
youth visit the relatives of the maiden selected, and in conventionally 
flowery and allegorical language hint at the possibility of a matrimo- 
nial alliance between their respective families. The replies of the 
maiden's parents are equally vague and circumlocutory, and plain 
speaking is only resorted to when it has become evident that the par- 
ties are mutually agreed. Tagal mothers are mercenary to a degree, 
and when both parties are native, if a hitch occurs it is usually owing 
to a disagreement about dollars. If, however, the suitor is a half-breed, 
or European, he is unconditionally accepted, ambition and vanity get- 
ting the better of avarice. These preliminaries settled, the donations 
propter nuptias are paid by the youth's father to the bride's parents to 
defray the expenses connected with the wedding, and a settlement, 
termed in Tagaloc vigaycaya, is often made by him on the bride. The 
young couple then present themselves to the priest, though not neces- 
sarily together, hiss his hand, and inform him of their intention to 
marry. The cleric appoints the day for the wedding and publishes the 
banns in the church. The religious ceremony takes place at the con- 
clusion of the first mass, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the morning. 
When the eucharist has been administered to the wedding party, an 
acolyte places a kind of mantle on the shoulders of the couple. The 
officiating priest recites a formula, puts certain questions, receives the 
customary replies, and in five minutes the nuptial knot is tied. As 
they leave the church a bowl of coin is presented to the bridegroom, 
from which he takes a handful and passes it to the bride, who returns 
it to the bowl, thus symbolizing his endowment of her with all his 
worldly possessions. Conventionally stolid and impassive, the young 
couple are escorted to the home of the bride, where the day-long cata- 
pusan, as these family festivities are termed, are about to begin. If the 
parties are well-to-do, the vicar and headmen of the parish are invited, 
together with any Europeans who may happen to reside in the near 
neighborhood. A table is laid a la Eusse with dishes of all kinds, 
sweets predominating, such potables as bottled beer, gin, chocolate, 
etc., together with cigars and betel-nut, being liberally supplied. 

During the intervals of feasting, the company are entertained with 
native dances, such as the Balitao and Comitau. The former is per- 
formed by a couple who stand opposite to and dance round each other, 
keeping time to the slow plaintive air which accompanies their song. 
In poetic strain the swain bewails the rejection of his advances by his 
ladylove. She in her turn reproaches him for some imagined fault. 
Explanations follow, and finally all is harmony. The Comitan is a pas 
seul, performed by a girl who dexterously balances on her head a tum- 
blerful of water while she executes a variety of steps accompanied by 
writhing movements of the body. The guests residing in the parish 
retire to their own homes for the afternoon siesta, returning again 
toward sunset to take part in the evening festivities. If Europeans 
are present, the bride is with difficulty induced to remain in company; 
but however great her bashfulness may be, there is not the slightest 
trace of it on her countenance, which still maintains an impassive and 
unconcerned expression. Little privacy is, however, to be found any- 
where in the house of rejoicing, for a crowd of lower-class natives, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 601 

anxious to share in the good fare and amusements, fills every corner 
and obstructs every doorway and window. 

As before mentioned, it is usual for a settlement to be made on the 
bride by the husband's parents. If they have no dowry to offer, and the 
match is not otherwise objected to, the matter is sometimes arranged, 
amongthe villagers, by the youth undertaking to serve the bride's parents 
as capitad for a given number of years, alter the manner of Jacob and 
Laban. This custom is, however, open to grave abuse. For, alter his 
period of service has expired, the maiden may, after all, be refused to 
her suitor by her avaricious parents, and a second capitad taken on in 
his place. The old Leyes de Indias vainly tried to combat the abuse of 
this ancestral custom, and one of these native laws permits a promised 
bride to be deposited in safe custody while her parents are called upon 
to show cause why the marriage should not take place. 

Irregular unions are, however, extremely common, and for this, 
strange to say, the clergy are largely responsible. Though a regular 
tariff of marriage fees exist, the priests often set these aside, and 
demand a quite exorbitant fee calculated upon the supposed wealth 
of the parties. Tagals having a rooted aversion to being married 
elsewhere than in their own parish, this abuse of power is not easily 
evaded. The consequence is that, in village and town alike, many 
dispense altogether with the religious ceremony, and content them- 
selves with the old communal or family sanction, the customary gifts 
being presented to the bride's father, and the usual festivities held. 
Young couples seldom set up house at once, but reside with the wife's 
or husband's parents so long as there is room; and when the parents 
are old and past work, they in their turn are received into the homes 
of their married children. When a couple set up housekeeping in a 
bahay of their own, one or more poor relations are sure to attach them- 
selves to the new household in the capacity of permanent hangers-on; 
even Europeans, foolish enough to marry native women, immediately 
find themselves hopelessly saddled with at least one incubus of this 
kind, unless, indeed, they happen to be men of exceptionally firm 
character. 

The Tagals, while exceedingly jealous of their wives, appear to attach 
little importance to their irregularities before marriage so long as they 
are constant after, and are consequently somew 7 hat careless of the honor 
of their daughters. The now widespread custom of forming matrimo- 
nial unions without benefit of clergy naturally also facilitates irregular 
connections with Europeans. A present of money to a girl's parents 
suffices, from a native point of view, to constitute her the mujer — 
woman— wife of Senor So- and So, who installs her, as mistress, in a 
hut in some native quarter. When the connection comes to an end, 
the girl has no difficulty in finding a more permanent mate among her 
own people, especially if, as often happens, she is in receipt of a small 
pension. Infant mortality is very great in the Philippines. It is com- 
puted that 25 per cent of the children born of native parents die within 
a month, and death in childbed is also of very frequent occurrence. 
Both circumstances are in all probability greatly due to the traditional 
practice of closing up every aperture of a house containing a lying-in 
woman to prevent the entrance of an evil spirit called Asuan, much 
dreaded on such occasions. An illustration of the extent to which a 
European, on marrying a native woman, must adapt himself to native 
ways was afforded in the case of an Englishman married to a half breed, 
who allowed this ridiculous superstition to imperil the lives of his wife 
and child, to say nothing of the discomfort to which he was himself 



602 TREATY OF PEACE. 

subjected by its observance in a climate where, for Europeans at least, 
a thorough draft is indispensable for comfort. Another cause of this 
excessive infant mortality is that young children are very lightly clad, 
if clad at all, and a sudden fall of temperature often causes a chill on 
the stomach to which they succumb in a few hours. 

Mixed marriages have always been encouraged by the government 
of the Philippines, special advantages being granted to military men 
who marry the daughters of the country. Three centuries of inter- 
marriage between European men and native women, and also between 
the latter and the numerous Chinese immigrants, have consequently 
added to the original population a large proportion of half breeds 
representing every degree of admixture. The Chinese mestizos alone 
are said to constitute one sixth of the domesticated native population; 
and the Spanish mestizos, together with the Creoles, or "sons of the 
country" (hijos del pais), as they term themselves, form an iniiueu- 
tial body, the majority of whom are established as traders in Manila 
and the provinces. Owing to their European descent, more or less 
distant, the Spanish half-breeds are endowed with quicker perceptions, 
greater business capacity, and wider intellectual faculties than the 
pure Tagals. Many of them are well educated, but few display much 
natural talent. A certain number of mestizos, both Spanish and 
Chinese, have amassed large fortunes as middlemen between the 
native growers and the European merchants. 

Although in the Philippines no distinct line of demarcation is drawn 
between races and classes, the social position of these half-breeds and 
Creoles is somewhat equivocal, though vastly superior to that of the 
Eurasians of British India. As a class they are continually struggling 
to obtain the position and consideration accorded to the Peninsular 
Spaniards, who refuse to give them their daughters in marriage, while 
their dusky-hued connections form a perpetual reminder of their native 
origin. Vainly endeavoring to disown kinship with the latter and 
assert an equality with the Castilas, they bear a grudge against these 
for possessing so unmistakably European a birthright. The moral 
result of this is that they are, generally speaking, morose in disposi- 
tion, captious in temper, evasive and vacillating, dissatisfied with their 
lot, fond of litigation and political intrigue, and inclined to foster 
grievances against the Government. The better educated among them 
aspire to becoming reformers of their country's institutions; and, even 
previously to the late revolts, a certain number have been imprudent 
enough to give proof of the desire entertained by many to overthrow 
Spanish rule in the islands and establish instead a Philippine republic. 
But even in the exceedingly unlikely event of such a termination to 
the present rebellion, the new state of things could only be of very 
short duration. It is, I believe, an ascertained fact that the increase 
of energy introduced into the Philippine native by European blood 
lasts only to the second generation; and, left to himself, the tendency 
of the mestizo is ever to revert to the maternal type. The native is 
too indolent and the hold of civilization upon him too slight ever to 
make anything higher than municipal self-government possible in these 
islands. 

The Philippines being, according to the Plain Narrative, "maintained 
by the Crown of Spain at the request of the church for propagating the 
Christian faith among the Indians," the influence of the church has 
naturally here been always paramount. An archbishop at Manila, 
with various bishops in the provinces, constitute the hierarchy, and 
the spiritual needs of the people are administered to by a vast body of 



TREATY OF PEACE. 603 

friars of all orders, and secular clergy, both European and native. 
The Jesuits also occupied numerous important posts in the archipelago 
previous to their expulsion from Spain in 1767, and are now again 
reestablished in many parts, and particularly in Mindanao. The great 
majority of cures are served by Spanish friars, who, after their arrival 
in the country, remain for some years in the monasteries in order to 
complete their studies, and in particular to learn the special dialect of 
the district for which they are designed. Spanish secular priests also 
occupy some of the canonries in Manila and the interior, and a certain 
number of native priests, educated in the seminaries of the orders, fill 
the less important curacies. 

The progressive party in the islands are opposed to this predomi- 
nance of the monastic orders who, as a body, prefer the interests of the 
Government to those of their parishioners, and demand their retire- 
ment to their monasteries, or to mission work, leavingthe parish churches 
to be served by the secular Spanish and native clergy. The authorities 
are naturally opposed to such a change, as they have always found the 
cooperation of the friars essential in securing obedience to enactments 
affecting their flocks. No royal decree pronounced with sound of trum- 
pet would have a fraction of the effect produced on the ignorant and 
fanatical population by the fantastic threats and promises pronounced 
with uplifted cross by their spiritual guide. This has been proved 
again and again. During the British occupation of Manila in 17G2, 
"the priests and friars publicly exhorted rebellion, and preached it 
meritorious to take up arms and destroy us." l At the beginning of the 
campaigu against the Mohammedan Sultan of Soulou, in 1876, when it 
was found necessary to increase the native army, recourse was had to 
the eloquence of the friars in order to obtain willing and enthusiastic 
recruits. And there can not be the slightest doubt that at the present 
moment a crusade is being streuuously preached against the invading 
"infidels," statements calculated to excite the fiercest and most fanat- 
ical hatred being unscrupulously made from the pulpit to the ignorant 
masses. 

Roman Catholicism is undoubtedly the form of Christianity best 
calculated to impress native races. Their pagan idols reappear in the 
form of saints and martyrs, and gratify the instinctive want of anthro- 
pomorphic and visible objects of worship. The mind of the Philippine 
native is realistic to a degree, devoid of all conception of things 
abstract, and his ideas of religion are limited to its outward symbols 
and the rites connected with them. The mass does not greatly appeal 
to his religious emotions. Petty officials were formerly bound, under 
pain of the lash, to attend; but the want of a clean shirt is quite suffi- 
cient reason for a private individual to absent himself. No pressure is, 
however, necessary to secure the attendance of the women, many of 
whom pass half their lives between adoration of the images, Mariolatry, 
and the confessional. The dwellings of the majority of the natives are 
but slight and perishable constructions of bamboo and the leaves of 
the nipa palm, yet room is found in them for an oratory, while the 
churches which tower in their midst are solid stone edifices with mas- 
sive square or octagonal belfry towers, buttressed to withstand the 
frequent earthquake shocks to which these volcanic islands are sub- 
ject. The interior is a mass of rich ornament, the image of the Madonna 
and the high altar being often of solid silver, masterpieces of native 
workmanship, for even the poorest Tagal village possesses its platero, 
or silversmith. 

1 A Plain Narrative. 



604 TREATY OP PEACE. 

The great religious event of the year for villagers and townsfolk alike 
is the feast day of the local patron saint — fiesta de nosotros, in native 
parlance. All day long the parish is en fete. The quaintly picturesque 
wooden houses and nipa huts, with their high-pitched, thickly thatched 
roofs, which line the roadway, embowered in feathery bamboo clumps, 
tall betel palms, and spreading plantains, are all decorated for the occa- 
sion. Festoons of Chinese lanterns surmount the garden fences and 
swing between the trees, while triumphal arches span the roadway at 
intervals. Toward evening the great square in front of the church is 
crowded with holiday makers of both sexes, Tagals, Chinamen, many 
of whom are nominally at least Christians, and half castes. Most of 
the mestizas and many of the Tagal women are arrayed in full skirts 
of brightly checked, striped, or brocaded silk, and those among them 
who content themselves with cotton outvie their wealthier sisters iu 
vividly contrasting red, blue, and yellow. Over this the Tagals wear a 
piece of dark-blue stuff, fastened apron- wise tightly around the hips 
and descending to the knee. The bell shaped sleeves of their short 
loose jackets, made of pifia gauze, and the kerchiefs of the same mate- 
rial worn on the shoulders, and out-of doors on the head, have their 
borders decorated with elaborate lace like needlework. Their long 
black tresses, which when loose often reach to their ankles, are neatly 
coiled at the back of the head, where they are secured with gold- 
mounted pins and combs, often set with real diamonds, as are also the 
bracelets, earrings, and long watchchains which the Tagal elegante 
delights in wearing. The stockingless feet are protected from the dust 
by chiuelas, colored slippers, consisting merely of a sole and accommo- 
dation for four toes, the small toe remaining outside. 

The native dandies wear white duck trousers and a shirt, which latter 
may be more or less of the cut familiar to us when made of white calico, 
but the front is elaborately embroidered, tucked, or frilled, and the 
back is disposed iu full kilts, uuconfined by the trousers. Camisa 
fuera, " shirt outside," is the technical term for this native fashion, 
which greatly scandalized an elderly English lady on her arrival at 
Manila. " Emily, my dear, don't look ! " she exclaimed in a horrified 
whisper to her daughter, when this costume first met her shocked gaze. 
"Don't look! The servant has forgotten to dress himself!" The 
camisa fuera, however, takes rather the form of a blouse, and conse- 
quently strikes a European less oddly when made of pifia gauze, of the 
prettily striped jusi, or of the hempen abaca. With these the native 
pure and simple wears the salacot, a mushroom-shaped, sun proof hat, 
sometimes inlaid round the brim with a pattern in silver. This head- 
gear of his forefathers is discarded to a great extent by the townsman 
for a straw hat of European form, as he has discarded chiuelas for 
patent-leather boots. The children, boys and girls, are made up into 
quaint little miniatures of their elders, though, as above mentioned, 
their costumes are ordinarily either of the simplest kind or conspicuous 
by their absence. 

But the sun has now set, and after a few brief minutes of twilight 
the warm star-spangled night has drawn forth the whole population ; 
private festivities are for the time being suspended, attention being 
centered on the procession now about to leave the church. Every lamp 
and lantern is aglow throughout the parish; the whole facade of the 
church and the Temple Bar-like structure of the gates look as if an 
immense swarm of the fireflies flitting among the tree tops had sud- 
denly clustered over them; and forth from the sacred portals streams 
the great procession. First comes a group of children, dressed like 



TREATY OF PEACE. 6Q5 

early Christian martyrs, or fathers of the church, wearing miters and 
false beards, and bearing wooden crosses, thus fulfilling vows made on 
their behalf by their parents.. Then black-veiled, black-robed figures, 
with great garlands of feathery green leaves on their heads and tapers 
in their hands, representing .Jews in turbans and gaberdines. Next is 
borne past, on a litter, the recumbent figure of Christ on a couch of 
crimson velvet, almost hidden by gold ornaments. Other images follow 
at intervals, bedizened with velvet, satin, and lace, and sparkling with 
jewels, diamonds, rubies, and emeralds; between them march military 
bands, with groups of clergy in full canonicals, and officials in robes of 
office. The last image that figures in the procession is that of Our Lady 
of the Seven Sorrows, borne aloft on a magnificent litter, and eclipsing 
with the blaze of her jewels and the gorgeousness of her apparel not 
only all the preceding saints and saiutesses but also her Divine Son. 
The rear is brought up by a crowd of joyous natives, who follow in a 
double line, men and boys on one side, women and girls on the other. 

After perambulating the parish for an hour or so the procession 
reenters the church with its tapers, images, and band for the final 
benediction, and the rest of the evening is devoted to festivity. The 
chief inhabitants keep open house, and all entertain their friends from 
neighboring parishes according to their means. In the houses of the 
wealthy mestizas, which are of palatial dimensions and furnished hand- 
somely, balls and tertulias, or receptious, are going forward, most of 
the former being saya bailes, at which the native costume for both men 
and women is so strictly de rigueur that it is often assumed for the 
occasion by Spaniards and foreigners. For the public generally there 
are magnificent displays of fireworks and dramatic representations 
something after the manner of the miracle plays of the middle ages, 
from which the clown is never absent, the prompter being equally en 
evidence, and all the seats are free. 

The patron saint of the city of Manila generally is St. Francis the 
Tearful — San Francisco de las Lagrimas. According to the legend, an 
image of this saint in the house of a native at Dilao, near the capital, 
was on one occasion, when the city was in danger, seen to weep so 
copiously "that many cloths were moisteued," while with outspread 
hands it, for three hours' space, besought God's pity on Manila. As 
soon as this miracle was made publicly known, the sab t was, with one 
accord, declared the protector of the city and his image removed to 
the Franciscan Church within the walls, where it has since remained. 
The anniversary of this saint is naturally a general holiday. Toward 
sunset thousands of vehicles issue from the streets of Binondo, Tondo, 
and the other suburbs, and cross the bridges to the wide boulevard 
which encircles three sides of the fortifications, terminating at the 
mouth of the river Pasig. Elegant victorias and landaus, drawn by a 
pair of stout ponies, are filled with mantilla-veiled Spanish beauties 
and bejewelled Mestizas; light carromattas and calesas are brilliant 
with the trailing sayas of their dusky Tagal occupants; every available 
wheeled vehicle, indeed, in the city has been requisitioned to swell the 
stream of traffic flowing seawards. Military bands discourse operatic 
music, and greetings are interchanged while the Manileilas inhale the 
refreshing sea breezes blowing in from the bay. Ocean steamers lie 
out in the anchorage, outlined in shadow on the smooth waters, while 
the setting sun, disappearing behind the grand mountain mass of 
Mariveles, throws its dark serrated summits into clear relief against 
the glowing western clouds. The eye, dazzled by this blaze of natural 
splendor, turns for relief to the moss grown, mellow-toned walls of the 



606 TREATY OF PEACE. 

city — a city belonging in appearance to another age, with its moat, 
drawbridges, and old bronze canuon bristling on the ramparts from 
which now thunders forth the sunset gun. Every rein is tightened, 
every hat lifted in salutation to the Angelus, which simultaneously 
sounds from every convent and church in the city. The short succeed- 
ing twilight passes, the carriage lamps twinkle as far as the eye can 
reach, and the gay throng again wends its way homewards. 

The history of the miraculous shrines in these islands would fill a 
volume. The most popular, however, is that of the Virgin of 
Antipolo — Nuestra Seuora de Buen Viage y de la Paz — at which 
miracles are constantly reported to be wrought. Brought from Mexico 
in 1036, this Virgin was, in the Chinese rebellion thirteen years later, 
committed to the flames. When all around had been reduced to ashes, 
these infidels found the sacred image still intact and resplendent, her 
brazen body without a blemish. Again was she committed to the 
flames, and again found by the Spaniards, who had arrived in the 
meantime, unhurt, save for a wound in the face inflicted by the knife of 
a sacrilegious rebel. After helping to drive out the Dutch in 1630, the 
image was again taken back to Acapulco as protectress of the King's 
galleon. Having crossed the ocean six times, the Virgin was, in 1072, 
brought back to the Philippines, and finally, escorted by a joyous mul- 
titude, was deposited in her present resting place in the Church of 
Antipolo — "birds, beasts, flowers, hills, and waters greeting her as she 
journeyed." The annual festival of this Virgin, which is held in the 
month of May, is attended by thousands. The villagers, who number 
some 3,000, depend chiefly on these pilgrims for their subsistence, their 
land being too mountainous to be very productive. A large trade in 
rosaries, holy pictures, and sacred knickknacks generally is done by 
the priests, some $30,000 being annually spent there by visitors. Many 
make vows to climb the steep ascent to the church itself on their knees, 
in return for benefits vouchsafed. A very good-looking muchacha, who 
had been employed as nurse at the British consulate, enjoyed the repu- 
tation of having achieved this feat, in addition to that of being 
exceedingly inconstant in her affections. 

Other famous shrines are those of Our Lady of Casaysay, on the 
coast of Balangas, also brought from Mexico; a cross at Banan, vener- 
ated since 1595; and the Holy Child of Cebu, said to have been found 
on the shore of this island by a Basque soldier, Juan de Camus. The 
latter image is of ebony, 15 inches only in height, laden with silver 
trinkets and other offerings. When this object is exposed to view on 
its festal day, the 20th of January, the honors of a field-marshal are 
paid to it, and pilgrims from the remotest districts and islands cross 
the seas to purify their souls at the shrine of the Santo Mho de Cebu. 

I began this paper with recalling the former British occupation of 
the Philippines, and as it seems likely that they will soon be occupied by 
our American kinsmen, or possibly, by some arrangement with them, 
reoccupied by ourselves, I shall conclude by pointing out their exceed- 
ingly important geographical and political position. The eastern shores 
of the South China Sea are formed by the Philippines and Borneo, and 
are, therefore, one-half Spanish and one-half British; and the British 
Malay Peninsula and French Cochin China form the western shores, 
with Hongkong at the head of this narrow storm-tossed sea. Thus 
situated, I can not but agree with the politicians who think it would 
be impossible for Great Britain to allow these islands to come into the 
possession of any other great power than the United States or our- 
selves. Certainly the Spaniards have by their misgovernment hardly 



TREATY OF PEACE. G07 

less forfeited here than in Cuba all rightful claim to remain in posses- 
sion after defeat in the war which that misgovernment has provoked. 
The trade of the Philippines has long been chiefly in the hands of 
British and American firms. Under either British or American Gov- 
ernment these islands would undoubtedly have their immense material 
wealth developed as it has never yet been, or ever will be, under such 
an effete power as Spain. And, it may be added, that with the Philip- 
pines go the great islet, rather than island groups to the eastward, the 
Ladrones or Bobber Islands, a penal settlement, and the Oarolinas. 
May the near future bring better government to the rightly rebellious 
Philippine islanders. 



A SKETCH OF THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES. 



By Max L. Tornow. 



The general interest in the Philippines, which for a long time seems 
to have been all but forgotten by the rest of the world, was again thor- 
oughly awakened by the recent cannonade off Cavite. Andeven with 
the final settlement of the Philippine question, it is scarcely to be 
expected that the islands can again fall into forgetfulness. A glance, 
therefore, at the economic condition of the country would appear not to 
be out of piace, accompanied by a few more important statistics, for an 
exhaustive consideration of the subject would occupy far more space 
than the present pamphlet admits of. 

1. Commencing with the produce of the soil, two important points 
strike us as speaking to the varied and fertile character of the land: 
Tlie geographical position of the islands — embracing sixteen degrees of 
latitude — and the plentiful supply of water. On the other hand, in 
addition to smaller obstacles raised by the administration, particularly 
as regards large plantations, the want of labor militates seriously 
against industrial extension, so that of the arable land only a very 
small part is to day under cultivation. The result is that, notwithstand- 
ing the richness of the soil, we find that the total returns are nothing 
like what they should be. 

Not only do all tropical fruits flourish, but also the plants of the tem- 
perate zones, such as wheat, barley, and potatoes. Experiments were 
made with wheat and barley some years ago, and met with every suc- 
cess; and there is to-day a German planter in Benguet cultivating pota- 
toes. I am fully convinced that in certain parts the vine could be grown, 
and at all events those fruits which demand a mild climate. Attempts 
have been made with tea to a little extent, and the results have not 
been unfavorable ; but to all extensive planting (and this is the only way 
in which it is remunerative) the want of railways, good roads, and 
laborers offers the greatest difficulty. Not less annoying is the attitued 
assumed by the Spanish officials and the monks, unless the planter is 
ready to dance at their command. 

The principal agricultural products exported are sugar, hemp, and 
tobacco, and to some extent coffee, the cultivation of which, however, 
has of late greatly decreased. Indigo, sapanwood, and copra must not 
be left unmentioned, for they may certainly be expected to take a 
higher place in the Philippine trade in the future than to-day is the 
case. Pice and maize are only grown for home consumption, and even 
for tlnVpurpose the supply is not large enough. Pice is imported from 
Saigon and Bangkok and cocoa from Java, although the extremely 
fertile soil of the Philippines could produce all that is required at home 
and enough to admit of a large export trade as well. 

Formerly, in 1850 to 18G0, or even later, rice was exported from the 
islands, but the quantity gradually decreased until exportation ceased 
608 



TREATY OF PEACE. G09 

altogether, and finally the grain began to be imported. The blame lies 
with the miserable administration of the country. The planters can no 
longer compete with Rangoon, Saigon, and Bangkok, where the 
authorities know how to meet the fanners when necessary, and vrhere 
the ships are not exposed to endless chicanery, such as is practiced by 
the Manila customs-house officials. For this reason most foreign vessels 
are careful to steer clear of the latter port. Sugar is chiefly exported 
from the Visayas Islauds, and the trade is almost exclusively over 
Iloilo, the largest place after Manila, situated on the island of Panay. 
Cebu, the third largest port of the archipelago, does now but a small 
and steadily declining trade in hemp. 

The best tobacco grows in the north of Luzon, in the province of 
Isabella, and the south of Cagayan,the most northern province of that 
island, in the valley of the Rio Grande de Cagayan. The northern 
provinces of Luzon, from the gulf of Lingayen in the west to the Pacific, 
are separated from Manila by a range of high mountains, theCaraballo, 
over which there is, with the exception of a path and the telegraph, no 
road whatever, much less a railway. The tobacco, therefore, is sent on 
covered boats, so-called "barangaijanes," down the Rio Grande to 
Aparri, and there shipped by steamer to Manila. A flat-bottomed steam- 
boat also runs from Ilagan, when the water allows it, otherwise she 
only goes as far as Tuguegarao. In this way the transport from the 
most southern tobacco center, Echague, which, as the crow flies, is only 
about 150 miles, often takes quite three weeks. 

Tobacco has also been planted on the west coast of the northern part 
of Luzon, and also on the Visayas Islands. This, however, is of inferior 
quality and is mostly exported to Spain. In Manila it is not used, unless 
perhaps by the Chinese factories of inferior cigarettes. Regarding the 
tobacco monopoly, abolished in 1883, 1 shall have some remarks to 
make later. 

An important and world-famed article is Manila hemp, or abaco, a 
product of the Musa textilis. It is remarkable that, although there are 
the most varied species of the Musa flourishing all over the Tropics 
and in warm climates generally, the Musa textilis appears to thrive to 
the' best advantage only in the Philippines. Attempts to grow the 
plant in other places have been uniformly unsuccessful. Like its better- 
known relative, the edible banana (Musa paradisiaca), the stem of the 
plant is formed by the leaf-stalk, in the center of which again is the 
blossom-stem. The finest growth is obtained in the volcanic and rainy 
districts of the Philippines, especially in the Camarines Sur, Albay, 
Samar, Leyte, Marinduque, Cebu, and in some of the small neighboring 
islands, as well as on the South Negros and Mindanao. 

The valuable hemp fiber is found in the petioles, from which it is 
taken before the plant has borne fruit, as otherwise the fibers lose in 
elasticity and luster. In two or three years the plant is generally so 
far matured that it can be cut down, the leaves removed, the green 
epidermis stripped from the stem, and the bast strips either torn off 
lengthwise or the petioles separated singly, and the inner membrane 
with the pulpy portion of the plant as well as possible removed. The 
bast strips thus obtained are then drawn under a knife, in order to 
scrape away any pulp that may have remained on them. The product 
after having been dried in the sun is then ready for shipment. This 
process, though simple, involves a great loss of fiber, which might be 
avoided by the use of more efficient stripping machines. It is difficult 
to accustom the native to anything novel ; but when once progress has 
T P 39 



610 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



gained a general footing headway will soon be made in particular paths 
also. Manila hemp has so far been equaled by none, much less excelled. 

The principal article is fair current, with its higher and lower grades. 
Of less importance is quilot and the silk-like lupiz, which, besides their 
use in the manufacture of fine native fabrics, are also employed for supe- 
rior toilet articles in Europe, especially in the ladies 1 hat trade. From the 
current sorts excellent ship's cables and miner's ropes are made, and in 
America, where great quantities are consumed, they are used to make 
grain-binders for harvesting. Hemp comes on the market in bales of 
2 Spanish piculs (280 pounds, English). The price varied much, beiug 
subject often to great fluctuations, which naturally gave rise to specu- 
lation. About the middle of the present century the price varied 
between $4 and $5 (with high course of exchange), steadily rising; in 
the sixties we find it already at $7 to $9; in the eighties, $11 was the 
average. In 1890 it was artificially pushed up to $17 — an immense 
crash being the natural result — and all this at a high or even higher 
course (3s. 3£d. to 3s. lid. per $1). 

The course now began to fall steadily until, after the outbreak of the 
war, it stood at Is. lO^d. Of late the prices for fair current have 
been between $6 and $9 per picul, at a course of 2s.; and at the end of 
April the ton was sold in London at £19. During the blockade of 
Manila the price was pushed to nearly £40. At the end of the war it 
fell again to £28.10. The table opposite shows the fluctuation of the 
course and price of hemp from 'January 1, 1892, to April 21, 1898, when 
the war broke out. 

In 1818, 201 piculs at $4 were exported. There is no record of the 
exportation of hemp until 1840. In this year the amount exported is 
stated to be 130,034 piculs (8,502 tons). Thirty years later, in 1870, 
the amount had risen to 488,560 piculs (30,535 tons). The export then 
increased still more considerably. The following figures show how it 
has stood during the past six years: 



Tear. 


Piculs. 


English 
tons. 


1892 .. .. 


1, 581, 100 
1, 282, 942 
1,591,962 
1, 664, 590 
1,531,810 
1,689,754 


98, 818 
80 184 


189! 


1894 


99, 497 
104 038 


1895 


1896 


95 738 


1897 


a 105 610 







a From Manila only. 

The chief consumers are England and the United States. The rela- 
tive consumption by the different countries in 1896 is seen from the 
following table: 



Country. 


Piculs. 


English 
tons. 


England 


815, 044 
615, 554 
49, 494 
33, 892 
12, 166 
5,660 


50, 940 




38, 473 
3 093 






2,118 




760 












Total 


1,531,810 









TREATY OF PEACE. 611 

The difference between the large export to England and the small 
amount which goes to the Continent — the very last on the list — is 
striking. England, however, acts here only as middleman, selling 
extensively again to the Continent, which accordingly buys at second, 
or, rather, third, hand. 

Various species of the cocoannt palm are found dispersed throughout 
the whole archipelago, though the exportation has only been consider- 
able during the last few years. Under a more satisfactory state of 
affairs in the interior of the country, the export trade in copra prom- 
ises to increase still further, in spite of the large consumption of the nuts 
by the natives themselves. The meat of the cocoanut forms a staple 
article of food, both raw and prepared artificially. 

The archipelago is very rich in timber, notwithstanding that the 
exploitation for building purposes has been going on for over three hun- 
dred years, and exportation formerly, especially, was very large; nor 
have new plantations ever been thought of. Sapan wood for dyeing 
purposes is also a product of the islands, and there is a regular, though 
small, export done in it. 

That the Philippines are amongst the most fertile colonies on the face 
of the earth is well known, and has formerly been frequently men- 
tioned; it is less generally known that they are also amongst the most 
neglected colonies in existence. According to the Spanish authorities 
themselves, only one-tenth of the available arable land is under culti- 
vation; as a matter of fact, the amount is probably much less. What 
might not be made of this beautiful country, were this mismanagement 
but once and for all to cease! 

Cattle breeding has been carried on by some mestizos for many years, 
evidently with success, or the business would have died out. Of late 
it has been found more profitable to import the extremely cheap 
Queensland cattle; but the fact that cattle thrive nearly everywhere 
is a proof that cattle breeding on an extensive scale is possible. A 
small number of sheep are imported from China, for consumption by 
foreigners; it is by no means improbable, however, that in some prov- 
inces, at any rate, they would thrive well. There are but few goats; 
of swine and poultry, on the other hand, there is a surplus, the flesh of 
the former, especially, forming a favorite dish of the natives. 

In addition to the small but very tough horses, resembling those of 
Java, that most useful of domestic animals, the carabao, or black (gray) 
buffalo, thrives to the best advantage. The white species is also occa- 
sionally to be found. The buffalo is employed for many purposes — for 
working the pumps on plantations, for sugar presses, etc., and is also 
used as a beast of draft. In the mountains the buffalo is met with in 
the wild state; it is, however, undoubtedly only the domestic species 
which has been neglected. Nevertheless, in the course of years, the 
degeneration has been so great that there now exists a clear distinction 
between the wild and the domestic buffalo. The wild animal has a 
more compact head and short horns, while the domestic animal has a 
long head with long, broad horns. Neither horses nor buffaloes are 
indigenous to the Philippines ; they havebeen imported by the Spaniards. 

2. Nor is it alone the arable land which forms the resource of the 
country, little regarded as this source of wealth has unfortunately 
hitherto been. There is auother, and doubtless not less valuable, prop- 
erty, represented by the mineral riches now silently slumbering beneath 
the soil. 

The islands yield pit coal, iron, gold, silver, copper, etc., for the most 
part of good quality, and recently petroleum has been struck. Careful 



612 TREATY OF PEACE. 

and expert explorations have several times been undertaken by engi- 
neers, yet never to the extent necessary to start lucrative mining, nor 
yet over a sufficiently extensive area. The former "inspector general 
de montes," Don Jose Ceuteno, and Don Antonio Hernandez are deserv- 
ing of special mention for their exploration iu this direction. 

Coal is probably spread over the whole archipelago. It was first 
discovered in 1827 in the island of Cebu; then in Negros, Mindanao; 
on the island of Luzon, in Camarines and Albay, and in many other 
islands. The wealth thus appears almost inexaustible. The coal in 
Cebu is of the best quality, numerous experiments having shown it to 
be equal to Newcastle coal. Hernandez found four seams running 
parallel from north to south at a small depth, and 95 miles long. In 
1874 fonr further seams were found where Don Isaac Conui worked 
the Caridad and Esperanza collieries in a small way. In Albay, 1 mile 
southeast of the small harbor of Sugod, is one of the most extensive of 
the many seams which have been found in Albay. It is 5 or 6 yards 
deep, and runs for a long distance. From this mine, from different 
places over a distance of a mile or more, 130 tons of coal were dug and 
practically tried on some steamers. 

According to the reports of the man-of-war Berenguela and the 
steamships Butvan and Corregidor, which experimented with the coal, 
the latter resembles that of Australia, with the advantage of being 
less bituminous. This is an agreement with the scientific analyses and 
experimemts of the coal made in Madrid. Small workings were begun, 
but exploitation corresponding to the worth could not be looked for, as 
with the fickle Government and administrative mismanagement, capi- 
talists feared to finance such undertakings, especially in the way of 
foreigners, the Government put every possible hindrance, so that a 
profitable return seemed questionable, and the capital invested in dan- 
ger. The workings were consequently very limited, and up till this 
day Australia and Japan export coal to Manila, a state of things 
which, it may be hoped, will soon be changed. 

Iron, also, has been found in many of the islands. The best is that 
in Luzon, in the provinces of Morong, Laguna, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, 
Pampamga, and Camarines, which, according to Centeno campares 
most favorably in quality with that of Sweden. The ore contains from 
75 to 80 per cent pure iron, and is found in the midst of immense forests, 
so that there is thus a permanent supply of fuel, if properly used. In 
addition to this, there is often water power in the neighborhood which 
could be profitably utilized. In the above-mentioned provinces, Cen- 
teno discovered large masses of almost pure magnetic iron oxide 
(hierro oxidulado magnetico, casi puro). After what has been said 
above, it is not surprising that here, also, there has been no thorough 
exploitation. In the province of Bulacan the natives manufacture a 
very primitive iron plowshare and pots for cooking (carahays); but 
even here there has been a gradual decline since the commencement of 
this century. 

Copper exists in the provinces of Tayabas, Camarines Sur, and 
Antique and on Masbate; the best quality, however, in the district of 
Lepanto (Luzon) near Mancayan, Suyuc, Bumuan, and Agbao. Here 
mines were worked by the Compania Cantabro-Filipina, but abandoned 
after about ten years, in spite of the wealth of mineral, on account of 
the scarcity of labor. The first specimen of black copper was obtained 
in 1864. In 1867 the output was 2,464 quintales (2,231 cwt. 83 lbs.) of 
fine copper; in 1870, 4,020 quintales (3,641 cwt. 8 lbs). The want of 
workmen then caused the yield to decline, until in 1S75 the mines were 
closed altogether. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 613 

It is probable that gold occurs in every part of the archipelago. In 
a small way it has been extracted by the natives for many years in <er 
tain places, particularly in Luzon. It is found instratified, and m 
creeks, from which the natives prefer to wash it. The best known 
sources are in Gamarines Norte, the mountains of Mambulao, Paracale, 
and Labo, and the northern spurs of the Oarabello Mountains. Alluvial 
gold is said to exist largely in Nueva Ecija, near the village of (Japan ; 
in Tayabas the metal is found in the mountains in the neighborhood of 
the village of Autimonon. In Mindanao, where gold has likewise been 
discovered, it is believed to be present in particularly profitable quan- 
tity. Mindoro, Panay, as well as some other small islands, are also 
places where the precious metal has been found. 

It now remains to inquire into the question as to whether it would 
pay to work gold mines at all. For as yet, at all events, no positive 
proof has been furnished of gold mines being profitable, although dur- 
ing the last few years the subject has been discussed. In 1893 the 
Mambulao Gold Mining Syndicate was formed in London, engineers 
sent out, and workings actually commenced in Mambulao. Difficulties, 
however, arose, the principal no doubt being that a large part of the 
shares were uot allotted, and the working capital therefore too small. In 
general, the participators speculated on the advantageous sale of a 
part of their concession and the starting of a limited liability company, 
something of a gold fever broke out in Manila, and on all sides con- 
cessions were acquired by Englishmen, some Germans, and Swiss. Not 
one of these concessions, however, seemed the result of a sound bona 
fide project; the object in view was always the promotion of companies 
and disposal of the concession at a good profit, leaving all the risk to 
the shareholders. It is not impossible that this would actually, in 
some cases, have taken place, and a speculation in shares followed sim- 
ilar to that on a former occasion in Singapore and Hongkong, to the 
detriment of general trade. The rebellion of 1896 fortunately put an 
end to speculation; European capital for such purposes was not to be 
found during the disturbances, and methodical working in some 
provinces equally impossible, quite apart from the other difficulties 
mentioned above. 

Oenteno further states that mercury was formerly found in various 
places. At the end of the last century a bottle was sent to Manila 
from Mindanao, and a second from Capiz. In 1848 mercury was dis- 
covered in Casiguron, in the province of Albay, but the general opinion 
was that the find was altogether insignificant. At all events, none of 
these discoveries appear to have been of any importance. 

At the beginning of the seventies two beds of galena were discov- 
ered in Zebu, in the neighborhood of the village of Consolation. Spec- 
imens were analyzed at the mint at Manila, and showed, it is true, 
only 47 per cent of lead, but also 1 ounce gold and 2 ounces silver per 
hundredweight. Nevertheless, the beds were not of sufficient signifi- 
cance to assure profitable working even on a small scale, so the mines 
were again abandoned. The department of mines in Manila did cer- 
tainly recommend further exploration in Zebu, but so far as I am aware 
earnest steps were never taken. In Mambulao and Paracale the beds 
of galena and red lead ore have been got ready for working, and are 
probably very rich. The workings, however, have always been aban- 
doned again, presumably, chiefly, on account of these Spanish under- 
takings being insufficiently financed from the commencement, and 
because of the lack of the necessary circumspection. 

There is naturally an abundance of sulphur in this volcanic archi- 



614 TREATY OF PEACE. 

pelago. That which occurs on the Bulusan in Albay, the Taal in 
Batangas, and the Apo in Mindanao being of fairly pure quality. 
Keally extensive beds, worthy of exploitation, were found years ago in 
Leite, in the interior, not far from Dulag, and were worked on a 
small scale by the natives. In 1818 3,410 piculs, at $2.50, were 
exported, and Dr. Jagor states that the price paid in Manila for this 
sulphur in the fifties was from $1.50 to $4.50. For the last twenty 
years, however, the sulphur industry has been wholly dead. 

Alabaster is found in Camarines Sur, aud there is a beautiful marble 
at Bohol and Guimaras, near Iloilo. Granite of excellent quality is 
quarried at the other side of the Bay of Mariveles, opposite to Manila. 

Bock oil was found some years ago in Cebu and Paragua and prom- 
ises to be of importance. I have neither seen samples nor come across 
any official report in the matter, but I have received direct information 
from various trustworthy Indians and Mestizos. 

3. With the exception of the cigar manufacturing, which until Janu- 
ary 1, 1883, was monopolized by the Government, the islands are not 
of industrial importance. Manila possesses two large sugar refineries, 
some distilleries, and rope works. Lately rice mills and a flour mill 
have been set up in Luzon for the purposes of home consumption. The 
hats made by the natives of strips of reeds in Baliuag also play au 
important part in the export trade, being shipped largely to America 
and Paris. The cigar cases (petacas), likewise manufactured in Baliuag, 
are of less importance. Though of no great significance for the trade, 
the ilang-ilang essence should be mentioned, the Philippines being the 
only place where it is produced. The essence is made from the green 
blossom of the ilang-ilang tree, one of the Auonacea? (" Anona adora- 
tisirna," according to Blanco; " Cananga adorata," according to Hook), 
and finds its way principally to Paris. It forms the basis of all finer 
quality perfumes, aud has, indeed, become an almost indispensable 
article in the perfumery branch. The distillation of the essence, and 
the business in general connected with it, is carried on exclusively by 
Germans. 

Coach building is of great importance in Manila. The home demand 
is enormous, as every inhabitant of any standing has his carriage, and 
the wealthier mestizos excel in the luxury of their vehicles. 

That soap and other such articles of popular use are manufactured 
is scarcely necessary to state. There are also three lithographic estab- 
lishments, owned by Germans. 

Besides the Baliuag industry, above referred to, the natives manu- 
facture excellent homespun fabrics of cotton, hemp, silk, and pina (the 
fibers of the pineapple leaf) ; piml-cloth embroidery is also a domestic 
industry. These articles do not rank at all in the export trade of to-day, 
but they may certainly be expected to do so before long; the more so 
if the industry continues to advance as it has done during the past 
year or so, not only as regards the fabrics themselves, but also the 
designs and colors. Some coarse hemp textiles have already been 
exported within the last few years; the finer hemp and hemp and silk 
fabrics, though much prized by ladies for dressmaking, have not yet 
entered into the trade, not having so far found favor with the Parisian 
costumers. A most interesting exposition of the produce of the Philip- 
pines was afforded by the exhibition (Exposition Begional de Filipinas), 
which was held at Government cost at Manila in 1895. 

It is certain that the Philippines, whose position is already assured 
by the mineral wealth of the country, will also play a part in the in- 
dustry in the future equal to, if not surpassing, that of Japan. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 615 

4. There seems to me to be no doubt that even before the arrival of 
the Spaniards these islands had relations with the Malay Archipelago 
and China, and to a certain extent carried on baiter, particularly with 
the latter country. Regular trade, however, first began to develop in 
1572, when Legaspi established himself in Manila. The inhabitants of 
Cagayan related to Don Juan de iSalcedo in 1572 that their cotton 
fabrics were fetched every year by Chinese and Japanese vessels. 

Manila is without doubt the most advantageously situated port and 
trading place in the East, and forms the center of the trade between 
China, Japan, the Dutch archipelago, and Australia. The position of 
the Philippines is likewise extremely favorable for the west coast of 
America, and Manila should be the natural mart of eastern Asia. 
That 1l does not already occupy this position is owing to the bad sys- 
tem of administration on the part of the government. Had it been 
otherwise, I am exceedingly doubtful whether Hongkong could ever 
have reached its present state of importance in the face of Manila. 

During the northeast monsoon most ships going through the Straits 
to China run right across to Luzon, to get protection against the 
strong contrary winds. It would therefore be quite in their course 
to touch at Manila, but they avoid the port for the reasons stated 
above — the chicanery of the customs officials. For the same reason 
the regular steamers between Hongkong and Australia steam right 
past the Bay of Manila without running in. Passengers from Manila 
to Australia have, therefore, first to cross to Hongkong and then take 
passage Irom there, returning again directly past Manila and Zam- 
boanga (so close to the latter that the people may almost be recog- 
nized on the shore) to the first touching place — Thursday Island, or 
Port Darwin. 

After 1572 trade commenced also between Manila and New Spain, 
which for individual Spaniards in Manila proved very profitable. Be- 
tween 1590 and 1595, however, the citizens of Manila petitioned several 
times to the King for liberty of trade, but always in vain; the restric- 
tion on commerce remained as before. In 1610 the Seville merchants 
begged that the trade between Manila and New Spain might be closed, 
as they wanted to do business direct, by the Cape, with Manila, without 
the intervention of the American colonies. This was, nevertheless, 
impossible, on account, principally, no doubt, of the fact that the Aca- 
pulco silk trade gave occupation to over 11,000 persons in Mexico. 

Galleons were sent every year from Manila to Navidad, and from 1002 
to Acapulco, containing merchandise to the value of $250,000, maxi- 
mum admitted by the Government, and bringing back double the price. 
Later this maximum rose to $300,000, and in 1731 to $500,000. Finally 
the amount reached $600,000, and the home freight double the value. 
From Manila the galleons — called "nao" — took spices, cotton fabrics, 
silks, etc., and gold articles and other products of China, India, and the 
Philippines; 50,000 silk stockings are also especially mentioned. (Refer: 
Lord Anson's Journey Round the World, 1749, and the description of 
Spanish commerce by J. C. S., Dresden, 1763.) The home freight con- 
sisted chiefly of silver dollars; and there were also passengers, persons 
going to seek their fortune in the Philippines, and officials and soldiers 
sent out by the Madrid Government as substitutes. 

The merchandise yielded twice its value in Manila, and as is recorded 
sometimes even four times, which in certain cases may no doubt have 
been the case. The profit, however, did not all go into one pocket, but 
was divided among a number. The Government issued warrants 
(boletins) remitting the shipping of cargo to the monasteries, pensioned 



616 TREATY OF PEACE. 

officials, and other privileged persons, who then sold thein to merchants; 
in this manner the profits were distributed. The result was that iner 
chandise of very high value was shipped, and the nao often so packed 
with cargo that the guns had to be stowed away. On the home journey 
there was often over $3,000,000 value on board. As these ships were 
maintained at the expense of the -Government, it is natural that a por- 
tion of the shipping fees was reserved for the royal exchequer. 

Generally the well-laden nao sailed from Oavite in July, steering to 
northward to 30°, where, taking advantage of the western winds, they 
made for the shores of California, then coasting southward to Aca- 
pulco. The voyage was always most difficult and dangerous, and often 
very long, lasting sometimes six months or more. In later years the 
ships sailed more commonly through the Straits of San Bernardino, 
south of Luzon, though this did not shorten the voyage. Arrived at 
the Californian coast, they ran into San Lucas, where they took in pro- 
visions, and received information as to the movements of pirates in the 
waters, naturally a matter of great concern, considering the value of 
the cargo. The home voyage to Manila was easier and quicker, seldom 
occupying more than two months. The ship sailed southward from 
Acapulco till about 10° 1ST., taking the passage to the Marian Islands, 
and then farther, through the Straits of San Bernardino, to Manila. As 
the time arrived when the nao could be expected, nightly fires were 
lighted on two high rocks, so that the vessel might find her way through 
the islands. (In old works the islands Guam and Bota are mentioned.) 

The naos were vessels of 1,200 tons or even more, and were manned 
as war ships and armed with 50 or 60 cannon. Notwithstanding this, 
they sometimes, together with their costly cargo, fell a booty to priva- 
teers, pirates, and war ships of inimical powers. In June, 1743, Lord 
Anson, on board the Centurion, captured the Nuestra tSenora de Caba- 
donga, a much larger galleon, captained by Don Jeronimo de Montero, 
off Cape Espiritu Santo, on the Samar coast. 

The captain of the galleon, who bore the title "general," received 
on the Acapnlco trade a percentage of about $40,000 for each voyage; 
first officers, likewise, were paid commissions. 

Toward the end of the last century the profits began to decline, 
decreasing more and more; sometimes the ships even found the market 
in Acapulco perfectly flat, without any demand. This was because of 
American traders, and of English merchants supplying all the require- 
ments direct from Europe; smuggling also played its part. Thus it 
happened that the ships were often unable to return for long periods 
of time. The last nao which left Manila, in 1811, did not return from 
Acapulco until 1815. 

In 1785 the Beal Compahia de Pilipinas was started, having its seat 
in Cadiz, and with a capital of $7,000,000. This company more or less 
monopolized the whole trade, until on August 15, 1789, a decree was 
issued, permitting European vessels to import Asian produce, and to 
import only such Spanish, Philippine, and American produce as the 
compania had imported. A second decree, dated October 15, 1803, 
deprived the compania of still further privileges, and declared the 
harbor of Manila open to all nations. Certain rights the compania 
still retained, however. In 1814, absolute liberty of trade was allowed 
to the whole world. As the result of the introduction of the new Co- 
digo de Couiercie, July 15, 1833, the privileges of the compahia ceased 
altogether in 1834. A year later the exportation of manufactured 
tobacco and cigars was also permitted. 

Until the close of the preceding century, 1792, foreigners were not 
allowed to settle in Manila (although Laperouse, 1787, mentions the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



617 



French merchant Sebir in this town). As soon as the permission wa« 
granted the first foreign houses were established, the number continu- 
ally increasing so that to-day the external trade is almost exclusively in 
foreign hands; 1851 saw the establishment of the Banco Espanol Fil- 
ipino; but by reason of bureaucratic formalities and strict limits 
imposed, transactions were much impeded. It is only in recent years that 
matters have bettered, rendering fair and eas. banking business pos- 
sible. Up to I860 and still later, banking transactions were therefore 
done almost wholly through two large American houses. To-day we 
find branches of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, 
and of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, doing the 
principal business. 

The Consulado, established in 1772 and removed on January 1, 1834, 
and the Junta de Comercio, founded on January 1, 1835, have done 
practically nothing at all for trade and shipping. The export and 
import trade, as already remarked, lies almost exclusively in the hands 
of foreigners, principally English, Germans, and Swiss. The retail and 
intermediate trade is done by the Chinese. The Spanish, in addition 
to the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas — which, however, 
pays but a small dividend — and some inland traders, own a number 
of millinery shops for town costumes and cosmetic stores. 

How greatly the trade done by foreigners surpasses that of the Span- 
ish is seen from the tables below giving the external shipping trade and 
tolls. Since 1896 there has been no American house in Manila. 

The traffic between Manila and the provinces is carried on mostly 
by means of thirty-five steamers and a large number of smaller sailing 
vessels. The sole railway runs from Manila to Dagupan, the port of 
Pangasinan, a rice growing province, on the west coast of Luzon, on 
the Gulf of Lingayen. The only large line of ships touching at Manila 
is the Compania Transatlantica, from Barcelona to Manila, which, 
however, also has Liverpool as a shipping port, as the steamers would 
otherwise scarcely be able always to secure a full cargo. The chief 
profits of the line are no doubt earned from the enormous transport to 
and fro of officials and soldiers; in nearly every ship all berths are 
occupied. There is a brisk trade done with Hongkong, through four 
or five steamers under the British flag; for the largest part of the 
goods goes over Hongkong, being transshipped. A steamer runs to 
Singapore, meeting the French mail steamer, by which the principal 
European postal traffic is carried on. 

Despite the fact that the foreign flag was everywhere at a disadvan- 
tage, and the Spanish, on the contrary, privileged, the former has always 
been the really dominating. Though formerly foreign vessels were 
obliged to run in in ballast, nevertheless they took outward freight. 
The privilege shown to the Spanish flag died not ease till 1872, and con- 
sisted at that time in a reduction of 25 per cent on the custom-house 
charges. This was gradually diminished, every year by 5 per cent and 
in the last year by 10 per cent at once. 

The following table shows the state of the shipping trade in Manila 
in earlier years : 





1827. 


1828. 


1829. 




Incom- 
ing. 


Out- 
going. 


Incom- 
ing. 


Out- 
going. 


Incom- 
ing. 


Out. 
going. 




96 
34 


98 
29 


99 
31 


89 
38 


146 
41 












Total 


130 1 9/7 


130 


127 


187 


188 









618 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



In 1868, 112 foreign vessels with 74,054 tons, mostly in ballast, 
entered to take up cargo, and 93 Spanish vessels entered and sailed 
with cargo. To show a comparison of the trade during the past two 
years, I have compiled the following table: 





Incoming. 


Outgoing. 




Ships. 


Tonnage. 


Ships. 


Tonnage. 


1896. 


181 
47 


264, 868 
92, 541 


175 
49 


251 439 










Total 


228 


357, 409 


224 


347, 241 




1897. 


204 

48 


301. 199 
84, 326 


197 
50 












Total 


252 


385, 525 


247 


380, 868 





At the commencement of the century the imports were far greater 
than the exports; then the two became about equal, and finally the 
exported goods ranked first. In recent years the exports have always 
exceeded the import by some 30 per cent — a very promising sign of the 
productive capacity of the country. 

The imports to Aragon, in 1818, according to the duties paid, 
amounted to — 

Under foreign flag $1, 680, 200. 25 

Under Spanish Hag 616,071.85 



Total 

as against an exportation of — 



2, 296, 272. 10 



Articles. 



Quantity. 



Average 
price 



Total. 



Hemp piculs . 

Cordage quintals. 

Hemp rope do . . 

Coffee cavans. 

Sugar piculs. 

Indigo quintals. 

Liq uid indigo do... 

Sapan wood piculs. 

Shells do. . . 

Tortoise shell do . . . 

Sulphur do. . . 

Ebony do. . . 

Hulled rice do... 

Shark fins do... 

Beche demer do 

Birds' nests do 

White birds' nests do... 

Dried era bs do. - - 

Pure cotton do... 

Glue do... 

Rattan do 

Wax do... 

Gold taela. 

Timber trunks. 

Cowrie shells cavans. 

Salt do... 

Cocoa gantas. 

Bum gallons. 

Plowshares pairs . 

Carpenters' axes 

Buffalo hides 

Cowhides (tanned) 

Stag hides 

Mats 



Bnri mats 

Hats 

Various 

Riding horses . 

Total.... 



261 

555 

5 

84.5 

14, 405 

3, 200 

1,105 

18, 825 

236 

31 

3,410 

2,610 

1,532 

42 

2.266 

5.68 

94.24 

1, 332 

1,176 

310 

1,192 

1,280 

230 

1,391 

1,066 

1,000 

105 

1,348 

580 

420 

3,853 

3,153 

684 

1,280 

731 

748 

.... ... 



$4.00 
5.00 



6.00 

7.00 

60.00 

3.50 

1.25 

8.00 

350. 00 

2.50 

1.75 

1.50 

16.00 

24.00 

130. 00 

3200. 00 

6.00 

22. 00 

2.50 

4.50 

28.00 

13.00 

1.25 

2.00 

.25 

1.50 

.50 

.50 

.50 

.37* 

.75 

.13 

.30 

1.00 

.30 

56. 66 



$1,044.00 

2, 775. 00 
625. 00 
507. 00 

100, 835. 00 
192, 0U0. 00 

3, 867. 50 
23, 531. 25 

1, 888. 00 
10, 850. 00 

8, 525. 00 

4, 567. 50 

2, 298. 00 
672. 00 

54, 384. 00 

738. 40 

301, 568. 00 

7, 992. 00 

25, 872. 00 

775. 00 

5, 364. 00 
35, 840. 00 

2, 990. 00 

1, 738. 75 

2, 132. 00 

250. 00 

157. 50 

647. 00 

290. 00 

210.00 

1, 257. 37 

2, 364. 75 

88.92 

384. 00 

731.00 

224.40 

6, 433. 95 
600. 00 

806, 945. 29 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



619 



There was. therefore, nearly three times as much imported as ex- 
ported. The list of articles exported, with their prices, is interesting. 
Of the leading articles of to-day sugar was the only one of importance, 
but even this came after white birds' nests and indigo. Comparing 
with this the table of Dr. F. J. F. Meyen, on board the Prussian mer- 
chant ship Princess Louise, 11 years later, we find a great increase in 
exports — in the case of sugar tenfold the amount, though with hemp, 
again, not at all. 

He gives the exports as follows : 



Articles. 



1830. 



Sugar picul . . 

Indigo do... 

Sapan wood do... 

Hulled rice (114,793 cavan) do... 

Unhulled rice (30,830 cavan) paddy do... 

Bum gallons.. 

Cigars kilograms . . 



120, 274 
11,81)9 
11,675 

104, 357 
28. 027 
19, 551 
52, 843 



138, 387 
13, 863 
11,594 

a 179. 532 



b 48, 955 



a 197,486 cavan. 



6 4,257 arobas. 



The remaining less important articles are omitted. 

Since foreigners have no longer been so harassed by Spanish privi- 
leges, trade has steadily increased, even if not to the extent that it 
should. The trade of the Philippines should be twenty times what it is 
to-day. At the end of the twenties, imports and exports were practi- 
cally equal: 



Year. 


Imports. 


Exports. 


1827 


$1, 048, 680 
1,550,933 


$1, 093, 690 


1828 




1, 475, 034 









Up to the seventies both had been increased more than tenfold, and 
the exports considerably exceeded the imports; in round numbers: 



Tear. 


Imports. 


Exports. 


1870.. 


$14,000,000 
13, 000, 000 
17, 000, 000 


$16, 000, 000 


1875... 


19, 000, 000 


1880 . 


22, 000, 900 







The only exception is the year 1872, when the exports stood at 
$16,500,000 and the imports at $22,000,000. In 1892 the exports were 
$33,000,000, the imports $25,000,000. 

It is a difficult matter to give statistics of the imported goods, since 
the innumerable articles are not entered separately at the custom-house, 
but, for purposes of duty, are placed in certain classes. Some of the 
leading goods may be mentioned, however. From England, all Man- 
chester articles play an important part, together with a number of less 
significant wares, such as hardware and leather goods. From Germany 
come better class textiles, tricots, hardware, paper, leather, steel and 
iron, machinery, etc. From Switzerland, St. Gallen laces, muslins, and 
silks. From France, Lyon silks, machinery for cigarette making, and 
paper. 

From Austria, principally only Vienna furniture and Bohemian glass- 
ware. From Belgium is sent glass and glassware, iron, paper, cement, 



620 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



etc. From Eussia and America, kerosene, and - from the latter country 
also flour and tinned meats — as Spain exported formerly almost only 
preserved foods in tins — and wines. Within the last few years she has 
commenced to import into the Philippines other articles, to compete 
with the wares of other countries. The Spanish goods are in every 
way inferior to those of foreign manufacture, but on account of their 
being free from import duty the prices are considerably lower. 

In the following table the exports during the last five years are given. 
The minor articles have been omitted : 

X. — Principal exports from the Philippines from January 1 to Decembev 81, 1896. 



To— 


Sugar. 


Hemp. 


Coffee. 


Tobacco. 


Cigars. 


Sapan 
wood. 


Copra. 




Piculs. 
703, 165 
16, 000 

774, 852 


Piculs. 

815,044 

615, 554 

5,660 

33, 892 

61, 660 


Piculs. 
199 


Quintals. 

47, 816 

132 

154, 930 

62 

16, 076 


Thousand. 

35, 010 

180 

32, 610 

14, 850 

112, 540 

610 


Piculs. 
3,340 


Piculs. 
32, 200 








928 




548, 812 








China, Japan, India 


1, 379, 377 
97, 920 
526, 874 
3, 588, 188 
3, 694, 769 
3, 109, 108 
4,184,296 
3, 954, 060 


307 


50, 323 


3,895 




74, 370 
1,531,810 
1, 664, 599 
1,591,962 
1, 282, 942 
1,581,100 










Total in 1896 


i, 434 

3,287 

9,008 

5,102 

21, 801 


219,016 
225, 677 
194, 500 
230, 572 
254, 063 


195, 800 
198, 270 
140, 075 
133, 046 
133, 404 


53, 663 
38. 919 
75, 115 
76, 588 
52, 452 


585, 907 


Total in 1895 


594, 469 


Total in 1894 


510, 633 


Total in 1893 


188, 404 


Total in 1892 


292, 536 







Articles. 



Sugar 

Hemp 

Coffee 

Tobacco 

Cigars 

Sapan wood 

Copra 

Various 

Total. 



1896. 



$14, 000, 000 

11, 160, 000 

67, 500 

2, 630, 000 

1, 990, 000 

70, 000 

2, 630, 000 

224, 000 



32, 771, 500 



1895. 



$12, 239, 000 

13, 317, 000 

158, 000 

2,705,750 

1, 786, 200 

58, 400 

2, 898, 000 

60. 800 



1894. 



$12, 590. 000 

12, 750, 000 

412,000 

2, 310, 000 

1, 500, 000 
102, 000 

2, 500, 000 
115,000 



33, 225, 150 



32, 279, 000 



The exports from Manila alone, the most important place to be con- 
sidered, were, during the past six years, as follows: 



B. — Exports from Manila in the years 1892-1897. 



Tear. 


Hemp. 


Cordage. 


Coffee. 


Tobacco. 


Cigars. 


1892 


Piculs. 
1,408,444 
1, 154, 766 
1, 322, 000 
1, 446, 990 
1, 333, 118 
1, 689, 754 


Piculs. 
1,354 
2,200 
1,800 
3,774 
3,619 
3,873 


Piculs. 
21, 801 
5,006 
9,000 
3,080 
1,434 
4,947 


Quintals. 
254, 003' 
230, 5721 
194, 500i 
222, 5101 
212, 7061 
319,8831 


Thousand. 
133, 395 


1893 


130, 320 


1894 


138, 000 


1895 


198, 270 


1896 


195, 800 


1897 


183, 735 







Year. 


Sugar. 


Indigo. 


Sapan- 
wood. 


Copra. 


Shells. 


Dry. 


Wet. 


1892 


Piculs. 

921, 354 
1, 359, 737 
1, 200, 000 
1, 440, 000 
1, 456, 549 

839, 994 


Piculs. 

250, 369 
521,980 
295, 000 
285, 159 
272, 337 
82, 062 


Quintals. 
6,534 
971 
1,599 
26 
6,419 
4,468 


Piculs. 
29,314 
53, 767 
40, 000 
27,210 
14, 234 
16, 631 


Piculs. 
186, 519 
168, 122 
475, 000 
226, 626 
561,268 
749, 207 


Piculs. 
223 


1893 


254 


1894 .. 


350 


1895 


1,367 


1886 


1, 101 


1897 


1,180 







1 For the most part to Spain for the monopoly. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 621 

In the June (1898) number of the National Geographic Magazine, 
called " the Philippine number," are some articles about the islands. 
Although for the most part interesting, especially for anthropologists, 
they are, in economic matters, inaccurate. None of the statistics are to 
be depended upon, for even at the commencement, in mentioning the 
trade of 189(1, there is an error of about twenty-eight million dollars. 
In 1S90 the export alone was $32,771,500. The figures given by me are 
correct, as, indeed, statistics can only be correct. The trade is indeed 
small, compared to what it should be; but amounts, such as are given 
to the author of the magazine article, were reached twenty-five years 
ago. 

To give the statistics of the imports even only approximately cor- 
rect is impossible, wherefore 1 have refrained altogether from giving 
detailed statistics in this regard. The author of the article referred 
to tabulates the American goods, among which wheaten flour in par- 
ticular must strike the eye of anyone really knowing the conditions of 
the trade. He gives the value of the imports as lowest in 1893, with 
$7,800, and the highest in 1896, with $18,290, which figures are much 
too low. The value of the flour imported from America must be at 
least five or ten times as much. 

The terms in the produce market in Manila are always cash down. 
In business with the provinces the Manila house has frequently to make 
advances, which certainly means risk; but if one is cautious with whom 
one deals the business is safe enough here also. It is always the main 
thing in the case of transmarine places just springing up to know the 
state of affairs precisely, and to be in a position to form a sound judg- 
ment at a moment's notice. The business between the importers and 
the Chinese retail dealers is done either by means of acceptance (pagare) 
at six months, or, as is more general of late, cash within four to six 
weeks, with 5 per cent discount. Unfortunately the four to six weeks 
are very often exceeded. Insolvencies frequently occur among the 
Chinese. The creditors usually prefer to come to an arrangement, for if 
once the matter comes before a Spanish court it is the invariable rule 
that the creditors get nothing at all. 

Fines (multas), particularly in differences with the custom-house are 
imposed in a most annoying manner, on every possible occasion, since 
the officials receive a share of the fine imposed. A ship which, for 
instance, does not deliver precisely the number of bales in the manifest 
is fined for each bale more or less $100. In every bill of entry the 
weight must be stated beforehand, and if it is not correct a fine is 
inflicted. In this way there are a hundred kinds of chicanery practiced, 
all costing much unnecessary expenditure of money, the greater part of 
which goes into the pockets of the officials. 

The tobacco monopoly, with all its heartless severity and imposts, 
was introduced in 1781 under the governor, Don Jose Vasco y Vargas, 
as the Government again found itself in a critical financial condition. 
The population guessed at what was coming and opposed the introduc- 
tion, so that the law was only carried by force of arms. The law pre- 
scribed that every native might plant tobacco, but might only sell it to 
the Government. In the tobacco districts every native had to grow a 
certain number of plants and devote all his attention to them, without 
ever leaving them. The collecting of caterpillars was done by women 
and children, just as to-day. 

This would, however, all have been well enough had the people been 
able to enjoy the fruits of their labor, but the worst has still to be said. 
The tobacco was sorted — " aforado, " as it is technically called — and that 



622 TREATY OF PEACE. 

unfit for use burned so as to prevent fraud. The principal matter in 
sorting was tbe length — 18 inches and over was priraera class; 18 to 
14 inches, secunda class; 14 to 10 inches, tercera class, and 10 to 7 
inches, quarta class. Smaller but good leaves were sometimes classed 
as 5 and 6. 

For valuing the tobacco the officials used a scale according to which 
the planter received some 20 to 30 per cent of the real value. But he 
was not paid in cash. He received a certificate, a kind of treasury bond. 
Had the people had security for tbe payment of these bonds at an early 
date, the latter would soon, no doubt, have come into currency as paper 
money. But, far from this being so, no one would have them, knowing 
that five or six years might pass before they were redeemed. The 
tobacco planters lived under more miserable conditions than the worst- 
kept slaves, and were glad if some noble philanthropist, with an eye to 
usury, would give them half the value of their certificates. And such 
disgraceful usury it hardly was, for who could say whether the pur- 
chaser was not risking his 50 per cent? Frequently the bonds were 
practically given away. In the cigar manufactories in Manila 30,000 
work people were employed, and were always paid in cash, so that their 
lot was more envious than that of the planters. That under this sys- 
tem, in spite of the enormous army of officials, a profit of four or five 
million dollars was annually yielded can be easily understood. 

The savior of the unfortunate tobacco planter was one of those 
Spaniards in whom there was still the blood of the hidalgo the 
intendent-general, Don Jose Jimeno Agius. In his report in 1871 he 
relentlessly exposed the condition of affairs under the monopoly and 
strongly advised its abolition, unless the Government wished to de- 
stroy tobacco planting altogether and bring about the absolute ruin of 
the planters, living, as it was, in the greatest misery. Furthermore, 
he showed that the necessary new buildings and plant in the factories 
would pretty well absorb all the profit of the ensuing year. This very 
competent and energetic man could not, however, carry his wishes into 
effect at the time. Not until ten years later, in conjunction with the 
colonial minister, Fernando de Leon y Castillo, was he able to bring 
about the abolition, and on July 1, 1882, the planters were freed from 
their chains. 

On January 1, 1883, the free manufacture of tobacco was also allowed. 
Already at the commencement of July, 1881, the fact was known, and 
the tobacco report of my house, dated July 9, 1881, commenced: " We 
head our report with the joyful and most important news of the decreed 
abolishment of the tobacco and cigar monopoly." We entertained the 
fear, however, that the rate of duty would be raised, and such was 
actually the case. Tobacco and cigars paid an export duty, and the 
import duty was raised 50 per cent. At first, however, the treasury 
bonds had to be redeemed, and this was done by means of auctions, 
whereby $150,000 was redeemed monthly to those who offered their 
bonds at the lowest rate. The Government had even the impudence to 
declare that demands of over 80 per cent would not be regarded. The 
first bondholders were ready to take 45 and 55 per cent; but it was 
soon found that there was a number of holders who were prepared to 
take vigorous steps, and refused less than 80 per cent. This caused the 
Government to hasten the redemption, and at the close had cleared a 
balance of two and a half million dollars. 

Since January 1, 1883, various cigar factories have been-established, 
of which, however, only a few turn out a really first class article. The 
cigars manufactured by many Chinese factories and by the natives as a 
home industry are of very inferior quality. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 



623 



A new tariff of duties was introduced in 1891 which professed to be 
based upon a duty of 20 per cent. In reality, however, nearly all 
articles yielded more, some even over 100 per cent of the value. Then 
there were still various additional fees to pay on imports, and the 
export fees were also several times changed. To day the practice is as 
follows: To the importation tariff, which in the case of some articles is 
increased by 20 per cent, there are harbor dues amounting to 10 per 
cent added and 8 per cent of the value of the goods, which is fixed by 
law. Spanish goods pay only the harbor dues and the 8 per cent of 
the value, and thus get upon the market, to the disadvantage of other 
better and originally cheaper produce. 

Of the produce of the country, the principal pay export duties as 
follows : 

Per 100 
kilograms gross. 

Hemp $0.75 

Indigo 50 

Liquid indigo 05 

Rice 2.00 

Sugar 10 

Cocoanuts and copra 10 

Tobacco from Cagayan Isabella 3. 00 

Tobacco from Visay as Mindanao 2. 00 

Tobacco from other provinces 1.50 

Manufactured tobacco 3. 00 

And all produce pays $1.50 per 1,000 kilograms harbor dues. 

In 18S0 the harbor dues, on both exports and imports, were raised, at 
first by 20 per cent of the import duty and 1 per cent of the export 
value, for the purpose of building a new harbor, and this, with some 
few alterations, remains so to this day. The harbor is a long way from 
being ready, nor will it ever be finished if the present system continues, 
even though of late the work has been a little expedited. At a normal 
rate of work, what has been done could have been finished in one or two 
years. With the amount received through the increased dues ten har- 
bors could have been built, but probably the money no longer exists. 

The duty returns were, in — 

1828 $227,000 

1829 229,115 

1830 228,061 

In the last few years they have stood much higher, this being prin- 
cipally caused by foreign houses. For the past three years the returns 
were: 



1895. 



From foreign hotises. 
From Spanish houses 

Total 



$2, 818, 900 
361, 400 



$3, 106, 100 
425, 900 



3, 180, 300 



3, 532, 000 



3, 322, 500 
903, 000 



4, 225, 500 



Thus the foreign houses paid, in 1895, 87 per cent; 1896, 88 per cent, 
and 1897, 73 per cent of the indirect duties. 

During the recent years the Spanish figures have risen by reason of 
the increased export duties on tobacco, which the Coinpania General 
shipped for the Spanish monopoly. 

I now come to the question, What must be done in order to bring the 
production and trade of the colony into the condition in which they 
should be? The answer follows from what has already been stated. 



624 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Before all, the system of administration must be changed, and com- 
merce and shipping, industry and mining, as also planting, given free 
play, quite independent of the nationality of the persons concerned. 
On the contrary, if the natives are not numerous enough to supply suf- 
ficient workmen, Chinese coolies should be brought over under govern- 
ment supervision in the same way as is done in Sumatra. The export 
duties should be wholly abolished and the import duties put on a suit- 
able basis. The harbor works at Manila should be completed, and safe 
landing places also for larger steamers erected. And if not a free port, 
at all events a bonded warehouse is necessary. 

I mention firstly and principally Manila, which will always remain 
the center and principal emporium. A beginning must be made by 
opening up Luzon, by laying down good roads and constructing bridges, 
of which to-day there is an absolute dearth. The waterways should 
be controlled, particularly those which can be easily made navigable. 
The construction of railways should be continued, in order to connect 
the interior provinces with Manila. The most important line would be 
one from Manila through Nueva Ecija, the Caraballo Mountains, the 
province Nueva Viscaya, into the valley of the Eio Grande de Oagayan. 
Then a branch of the line, already existing, from Manila to Dagupan, 
to the natural naval port Subig, which was recently decided upon, but 
has not yet been constructed. Communication with the Pacific coast, 
and numerous branch lines, will also gradually be required. Only a 
few points can be touched upon here. 

A railway from Manila over Mariquina to Antipolo would be of 
great importance for Manila itself. It would pass through an extremely 
well-populated country which already supplies Manila with agricul- 
tural produce and articles for the native population, and finally, after 
about 20 miles, ascending with a pretty steep gradient, reach Antipolo. 

Antipolo, a famous place of pilgrimage in the Philippines, lies on 
the west spurs of the Cordillera, in the province of Moron g. It enjoys 
a cool, agreeable climate, and therefore would, without doubt, form a 
very suitable health resort for the inhabitants of Manila, and, indeed, 
perhaps a climatic health resort in general. For Europeans, working 
under great strain, such a place would be invaluable, particularly dur- 
ing the hot season, when the night temperature falls so little that 
refreshing sleep is often quite out of the question. Nor is it absolutely 
necessary that Antipolo itself be chosen ; a still more suitable spot 
might perhaps be found in the neighborhood; the chief point is to set 
about the matter in a practical way and properly carry through the 

Antipolo is frequently visited by foreigners. The route lies over what 
for the Philippines are tolerably good, but compared with those of 
English colonies miserably bad, roads to the Pasig. The river is then 
crossed, and a farther journey over bad, and sometimes worst possible 
roads brings us through Cainta, Taitai, in one afternoon to Antipolo. 
The effect of the journey is felt over the whole body for hours afterwards. 
I have had in April, whilst the heat in Manila was unbearable, to put 
on a summer overcoat in the evening in Antipolo. 

For such undertakings as I have mentioned, and which can only bo 
carried out by companies, it is absolutely necessary that concessions 
be granted with promptness and dispatch. Hitherto the custom has 
been to dally for years, uutil finally all interest in the matter was lost. 
Once a concession was actually granted for a railway to Antipolo, but 
the line was never constructed. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 625 

It would take us too far to (teal with everything which would serve 
to rapidly bring the country into a prosperous condition, and lead to 
lucrative undertakings. What should he done is, in general, to be 
gathered from a consideration of the present unsatisfactory state of 
affairs. If once the first step were taken, others would follow, ;md not 
only in Luzon, but over the whole archipelago. 

I must not neglect to give some particulars of Manila itself. 

At the place where the outlet of the inland sea of Bay (Laguna de 
Bay, called after the place Bay on the south shore of the sea, not after 
"Bahia Bay," as Dr. Meyen* wrongly infers), the river Pasig, flows into 
the bay of Manila, lies on the left-hand bank the real fortified town 
Manila, therefore also called Intramuros. It is inhabited by monks, 
officials, soldiers, and some shopkeepers; foreigners do not reside there 
nor have they property in it. Kunning southward along the shores of 
the bay is the promenade Luneta, where concerts are held every evening 
and where there are two suburbs, Ermita and Mai ate, much frequented 
by foreigners and containing many fine villas. On the right bank of 
the Pasig is the wholly unfortified Binondo, where are the chief busi- 
ness and warehouses, factories, custom-house, and harbor office. 
Further north, on the shore of the bay, is Tondo, which is really a 
native suburb containing native huts; to the east are Meisig andTrozo. 
These are the places lying on the beach. In the direction up the river 
on the right-hand shore are the suburbs Sta Cruz, Quiapo, San Miguel, 
Tanduai, and Sampaloc. 

The population to day is given at 300,000; but this is in any case not 
to be regarded as exact, as a proper census has never been taken. 
With the suburbs the number of inhabitants is probably higher. 

In the right sense of the word Manila can not be said to be unhealthy. 
On the contrary, it is one of the more healthy of tropical towns, though 
malignant and intermittent fevers do occur, even if more seldom than 
elsewhere. Cholera, which formerly was a frequent guest in the form 
of epidemics, has been completely driven away by the excellent water 
supply. The water comes from Santolan, about 9 miles distant, and 
is collected in the reservoir at San Juan del Monte and thence con- 
ducted to Manila. There has been no outbreak of cholera since 1889. 

For the water supply the general governors, Carriedo and Moriones, 
are to be thanked. Of these, the first, in his will, left a sum of money 
to the town for the purpose, and the second, some years later, had the 
work carried out, when no one else thought of troubling about it. 

Houses have to be erected according to certain rules laid down, in order 
to guard against the numerous earthquakes. They are for the most 
part two-storied dwellings, below of stone and above of wood, with 
galvanized iron roofing. If the roof is tiled the ceiling must be of 
planks strong enough to resist the fall of the roof. Since January 23, 
1895, the town has been lighted by electricity, and in a number of 
houses the electric light has also been introduced. The installation 
has been carried out partly by an American company and continued 
by a German company. So far there is no electric tramway, nor is 
electricity as yet used industrially. This is principally due, no doubt, 
to the company "Electricista," which has not been able to make its 
electric power station yield a good dividend as yet. 

There are horse tram lines in the city and a steam tram runs to 
Malabon, a large village situated to the north. 

*Reise des preussischei l Seehandlungsschiffes "Princess Louise." 
T P 40 



626 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Besides the private vehicles, there are in the city a large number ot 
hackney coaches. These are divided into three classes: The carruajes 
(landau with two horses), quiles (two-wheelers, closed, door behind, 
one horse), and carromatas (two-wheelers drawn by one horse). The 
latter are also used in the interior so far as there are any roads. The 
transport of goods is carried on by means of two-wheeled carts drawn 
each by a buffalo and holding some 1,000 kilograms. 

Life for foreigners upon the Philippines is quite agreeable, and, par- 
ticularly in Manila, there are comfortable residences; nor is there lack 
of company, excursions, and other sources of recreation. In other 
respects, also, creature comforts are by no means neglected, provided 
the requirements are not too high. If once the city and neighborhood 
were developed in the manner indicated, there would be little to be 
desired to make life there thoroughly agreeable. Manila would then 
soon surpass all other tropical towns as regards health and comfort. 

What the future may bring the rich and beautiful Philippine Islands 
it is difficult to say. It is, at all events, my sincere hope that this 
insular domain may soon blossom forth into that degree of importance 
to which it is by nature entitled. 

(Signed) Max C. Tornow. 

VlLLEN COLONIE GRUNEWALD, NEAR BERLIN (GERMANY), August, 

1898. 



PROTECTORATES, COLONIES, AND NON-SOVEREIGN 

STATES. 



THE PROTECTED MALAY STATES. 

Under this head are usually included (1) Perak; (2) Selangor; (3) 
Negri Sembilan, or Nine States, which in itself is a sort of federation, 
as the name implies, and (1) Pekang. On account of their proximity 
to the Straits Settlements, these native states and the colony bad vari- 
ous commercial and political relations, even before 1874. But in that 
year Sir Andrew Clarke, with the approval of the secretary of state, 
took steps to suppress the disorder in P£rak which was menacing British 
interests, and succeeded in concluding the Pangkor treaty. As a result 
of this compact a British resident was stationed in Perak, and later one 
in Selangor. These residents were nominally advisory officials, but it 
soon became understood that when their advice was volunteered it was 
necessary for the native rulers to take it, especially if it related to a 
matter of collecting revenue or incurring expenditure. On the other 
hand the residents showed no disposition to impose their "advice" 
upon the native rulers except where the interests of order and justice 
seemed to require it. The first British resident in Perak, Mr. J. W. 
Birch, was murdered by the Sultan in 1875. This event was followed 
instantly by the military occupation of the country and the banish- 
ment of the Sultan and his fellow conspirators. From that time, says 
the Colonial Office List (1898), the record of the State has been one of 
"remarkable progress." 

In 1880, a British agent, styled superintendent, was appointed for 
Negri Sembilan ; in 1881) he also received the title of resident. 

In 1887 the Raja of Pahang surrendered to the British Government 
the control of his foreign relations, and in the following year Pahang 
became a protected State on the same terms as Perak aud Selangor 
and Negri Sembilan. The Raja, or Sultan, himself requested the 
appointment of a British resident. 

In 1887 the sultan of the neighboring State of Johore placed his for- 
eign relations in the hands of the British Government and agreed to 
receive a resident. Johore, however, did not join in with the four other 
States when, in 1895, they signed a treaty constituting their countries 
a federation to be known as the protected Malay States, to be adminis- 
tered under the advice of the British Government. Each State agreed 
to assist the other States with men and money in case of need; pro- 
vision was made for a native militia for the common defense of the 
federation, and in return for the protection of Great Britain it was 
agreed that a certain number of these troops should be furnished for 
the defense of the Straits Settlements, on requisition by the governor 
thereof, in case of war between England and any foreign power. Under 

627 



628 TREATY OF PEACE. 

this treaty, which is now the supreme law of the federation, the system 
of government is as follows: 

Each of the three native States of P6rak, Selangor, and Pakang has 
its sultan, and Negri Sembilan, instead of one sultan, has a federation 
of chiefs. These native princes are nominally sovereign. But in each 
of the four States there is a British resident, appointed by the secre- 
tary of state, " whose duty it is to aid the native rulers by advice and 
generally carry out the executive functions." (Col. Off. List, 1898.) 
In each State there is a state council, consisting of the native prince 
and his advisers, together with the British resident and his staff of 
European assistants. This council is really the supreme authority. 

The four residents are subordinate to an official appointed by the 
secretary of state, under the provisions of the treaty of 1895, and styled 
resident-general of the Malay States. He in turn is subordinate to the 
high commissioner for the Federated Malay States, who is always the 
governor of the Straits Settlements. The treaty also provides for a 
sort of federal council, to meet periodically in one of the States, to dis- 
cuss the affairs of the federation. This council consists of the high 
commissioner (president), the resident general, the four residents, the 
native princes, and their most important chiefs. 

Besides the high commissioner and his private secretary and the 
resident general and his private secretary there are five other officers 
of the federation— a judicial commissioner, a legal adviser, a command- 
ant, a commissioner of lauds and mines, and a secretary for Chinese 
affairs. 

The European assistants of each resident consist of a secretary, an 
auditor, an engineer, a senior magistrate, a state surgeon, a superin- 
tendent of posts and telegraphs, an inspector of schools, and a junior 
or district magistrate for each administrative district. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Bay. 

No. 508.] American Embassy, 

London, August 21, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter I have 
received from Mr. Forbes, to whom it was written by Gen. Sir Andrew 
Clarke, who, as I have hitherto had occasion to mention to you, is one 
of the greatest living authorities in England on all subjects connected 
with the government of the islands in the Malay Archipelago. I may 
add that the letter was written with the expectation that it would be 
transmitted to you, and I send it in the hope that you may have time 
to glance at it before your departure for Paris. 

I am, etc., John Hay. 



Copy of private letter received from Lieut. Oen. Sir Andrew Clarice, 
B.K, G. CM. G.,etc. 



[Confidential.] 



42 Portland Place W., August 15, 1898. 
Dear Mr. Forbes: As the action which I took in 1874 for the paci- 
fication of the native states in the Malay Peninsula suggests a prece- 
dent for dealing with a somewhat similar condition now existing in the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 629 

Philippines, I, at your request, send a note in further explanation of 
that action, as described in general terms by me in the paper I read last 
May at the Royal Institution of Great Britain. 

Very full details of this action are given in the Blue Book presented 
to Parliament, but some are omitted or vaguely alluded to, one impor- 
tant omission being the measures I took, as soon as I had learned of 
their existence, to secure the cooperation and support of the people 
who were providing the means by which alone the then state of 
anarchy and confusion could be maintained. 

Opening communication with these persons, I undertook to secure 
for them, on the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace 
and order, an ample refund of the advances they had made and a pre- 
emption in the share of the prosperity which would be sure to follow 
the restoration of tranquillity to the disturbed provinces. 

Assure those who are now feeding the agitation in the Philippines 
that similar results will follow the adoption of similar means, and there 
will be no need of the thousands of troops which I see stated can alone 
put down Aguinaldo and the so-called rebellion. 

Aguinaldo, and the other leaders associated with him, learning that 
the sources from whence they draw their supplies would be no longer 
available, would at once come to terms, and the United States repre- 
sentatives in the Western Pacific would have the same experience as I 
had in the Malay Peninsula. 

As soon as this influence and cooperation had been secured, then, 
under the supreme authority and direct control of the U. S. A., the 
federation of the Philippines under their several chiefs and headmen 
would follow. This federation, as a protectorate of the U. S. A., would, 
under this designation, be administered under the advice and guidance 
of the United States officers, in accordance, as far as possible, with 
native manners and customs, and above all, with religion, Christian 
and Moslem. The laws hitherto enforced in the Philippines would 
remain operative for the time being, but a fiscal system similar to that 
of the Malay Protected States, and to that recently established at San- 
tiago, with practically free ports, will be adopted. 

The administration of a protectorate on the lines indicated, which 
in the application, as in the instances of the Malay States, have met 
with marked success, would give more elasticity and freedom in dealing 
with the very special circumstances now existing in the Philippines 
than direct annexation and the establishment of a Territory of the 
Eepublic of U. S. A. 

There were in 1874, as now, strong convictions that to restore order 
naval and military operations on a large scale would prove imperative, 
and that even then beneficial results in dealing with the Malay race 
could not be by any means assured. 

I had many warnings that nothing but failure and disaster could fol- 
low my proposed intervention into the affairs of the Malay Peninsula. 

Similar predictions are now made in regard to the assertions of 
United States influence in the Philippines. I believe the task would 
be no more difficult, and perhaps easier, than that which I accomplished 
in the Malay Peninsula. In some respects it is a manifest advantage 
to have to deal with islands which lend themselves to political grouping. 

No doubt the presence of moderate military force will be at first 
desirable at one or two important centers, but I attach more value to 
ample naval provisions, especially of gunboats able to move freely 
among the islands and to ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea. 

So to the fleet and its officers I would advise that the political and 



630 TREATY OF PEACE. 

civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first 
instance, be intrusted. 

Possibly it would be well to give the admiral commanding the aid of 
an able and experienced lawyer, as judicial adviser, to help in the reviews 
and settlements of civil and criminal cases dealt with by the existing 
courts of justice. 

I take it for granted that party patronage will not enter into the per- 
sonnel of the staff selected for service in the protectorate, and I have 
reason to believe that among officers of the United States Navy, active 
and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, 
and generous sympathy, well fitted to administer the affairs of the pro- 
tectorate. For a little while, the want of knowledge of the native 
languages will be found of some difficulty; this will necessitate great 
caution in the use of interpreters. 

Subject only to revenue demands the ports should be made as free to 
trade as are the Malay States of the peninsula; indeed, in this as well 
as in their financial and magisterial system, their practices should, as 
far as applicable, be followed. 

Though, from start to finish, all administrative and executive pro- 
ceedings should be conducted by and under the authority of the pro- 
tecting power, all public notices and documents should be in the name 
of the federated States. 

I anticipate little or no difficulty if the same spirit and sympathy as 
has ever ruled the English authority since its intervention in the affairs 
of the peninsula is followed in the islands with their Moslem popula- 
tion, but the large native Catholic population may present problems 
not so easy of solution. 

For the teachers and guides are of one race, while the disciples and 
flocks are of another. 

Much will depend upon what are the present real relations existing 
between the priests of the Eoman Catholic Church and their congrega- 
tions. On this there is much conflicting opinion. 

Whatever may be the situation, I am inclined to believe it would be 
both just and wise to treat the priests with full and generous consid- 
eration and secure their aid and cooperation. 

The priest or pastor of the native Catholic might be encouraged 
rather than otherwise by the protecting power to remain with their 
flocks; but the "orders," giving them fair compensation for their 
endowments, should be advised to return to Spain. 

Such a policy would secure the support of the Vatican. 

This assumes, of course, that, without calling upon them to surrender 
their nationality, they will accept loyally the altered condition of affairs 
and devote themselves to reconcile their flocks to the new circumstances, 
submitting themselves as examples of obedience to the administration 
of the protectorate. 

Of course, I assume there would be hesitation on the part of the 
United States authorities about deporting all, other than natives of the 
islands, who were known to oppose criminally the new order of things, 
and this should be applied to all priests who were known to use their 
influence and authority with their flocks in keeping alive agitation or 
disturbance. 

Much has been said and written of the oppressive conduct of the 
priests, and that the present rebellion is largely, if not wholly, due to 
this. 

This may be so, but I doubt if to any great extent. To the general 
lax and corrupt civil administration it must rather be attributed. 



TREATY OF PEACE. G31 

I do not anticipate any difficulty in dealing with the Chinese. They 
will be found at once on the side of a strong and just government. 

I am afraid these notes are very crude and incomplete, but as mere 
suggestions they may be of use. 

My view may, perhaps, be summed up in a single sentence. Enlist 
native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native 
agents supervised by carefully selected American residents. 

If this policy is fairly tried, I am convinced that in a few years the 
prosperity of the protected Philippine States will astonish the world. 
Believe me, my dear Mr. Forbes, yours very faithfully, 

Andrew Clarke. 
True copy. 

F. B. Forbes. 



[Private.] 



24 Cheniston Gardens, W. 

My Dear Mahan: As an earnest well-wisher of your country, I am 
following events very carefully just now. I gather that the President 
and many thoughtful Americans are somewhat alarmed at the idea of 
assuming responsibility for the future of the Philippines, and that this 
at the present moment is with you a great question. It is also a great 
question for us, and on the ultimate decision important issues depend. 
Now, may I give you my opinions, offered only with my best good 
wishes? Spanish rule in any form in the Philippines must end. On 
the whole, it has been worse in the East than in Cuba, because there 
was less publicity. If you take a waiting station and leave the islands 
to stew in their own juice, there will be anarchy first and a considera- 
ble annexation afterwards. 

Other powers will also want to look in, and of the general confusion 
which may arise there is only one thing that can safely be predicted: 
Spain will not benefit. This at least is certain. I fully see how difficult 
the present situation is, and I quite know how the solution may seem 
almost hopeless. It is most natural that Americans should feel chary 
of accepting responsibilities over the destinies of 8,000,000 people of 
somewhat mixed nationalities — people who can fight. 

Yet I venture to think that in our empire there is a close parallel to 
the conditions in the Philippines, and that we solved the problem, as 
it is certain, to my mind, that you can now solve it. If you will look 
up the past of the native states of the Malay Peninsula, you will find 
conditions closely approximating to those of the Philippines. Fighting 
was incessant; trade and development were at a standstill. There is 
no corner of the world in which the development has been so swift and 
so perfectly successful. These native states are now prosperous and 
contented. Their trade has increased by leaps and bounds. This is 
an advantage to us and to the rest of the world. Piracy, the joy of the 
Malay population, has disappeared. Civilization is making rapid way. 

How has this almost miracle been accomplished? Not by troops, 
not by force in any form, but wholly by a policy which I suggest is 
aow open to you. My namesake, Sir Andrew Clarke, inaugurated the 
policy which has led to the most astounding results. In the main it 
consisted only in admitting native rule, and placing by the side of each 
native ruler a strong and upright Englishman, who guides and restrains. 
If you can look into the facts, you will find that they are as I state. 



632 TREATY OF PEACE. 

There is a small Sikh police whose superior officers only are English- 
men. That is the only force applied, and in late years there has been 
absolutely uninterrupted and yearly increasing prosperity. As this is 
only a small corner of the earth, the facts are little known even here, 
and Americans can not know them. 

Well, here, I am convinced, lies your solution, and in some respects 
you have the advantage, because the Philippines break up easily into 
geographical groups, as the Malay States did not. Aguinaldo is a 
present difficulty, is he not ? I know nothing of him ; but he is evidently 
capable. Make him ruler of a portion of Luzon, with a fixed salary, 
and put by his side an honorable and a strong man. Select other native 
rulers for other groups, and treat them in the same way. You will at 
once rally all native feeling to your side. Americans have told me that 
you can not lay your hands on the right men, having no trained colo- 
nial officials. I have told them this is an illusion. You can find in 
your Navy and Army the few men of the right stamp who are needed. 
Our "trained officials" are not by any means the greatest of our suc- 
cesses. A soldier initiated the present system in the Malay Peniusula. 
Two sailors proved his most capable subordinates. 

Do turn this over in your mind and, if you can, get the President to 
look into our administration of the Malay States and its extraordinary 
success. Here is a protectorate in the best sense, and it does not cost 
.us a farthing. Have your naval stations and try this political experi- 
ment, I suggest. The results will surprise you, and they will be 
beneficial to the world. 

Yours, very sincerely, 

G. S. Clarke. 

(Make any use you like of my letter.) 



BEIT1SH INDIA. 

The present form of government of the Indian Empire is established 
by the act 21 and 22 Victoria, cap. 106, called an act for the better 
government of India, sanctioned August 2, 1858. By this act all the 
territories heretofore under the government of the East India Company 
are vested in Her Majesty, and all its powers are exercised in her 
name; all territorial and other revenues and all tributes and other pay- 
ments are likewise received in her name and disposed of for the pur- 
poses of the government of India alone. 

The secretary of state for India is invested with all the powers for- 
merly exercised by the company or by the board of control. By act 39 
and 40 Victoria, cap. 10, proclaimed at Delhi before the princes and 
high dignitaries of India, January 1, 1877, the Queen of Great Britain 
and Ireland assumed the additional title of Empress of India. 

The executive authority in India is vested in a governor- general, com- 
monly, but not officially, styled viceroy, appointed by the Crown, and 
acting under the orders of the secretary of state for India. The gov- 
ernor general's council is invested with power to make laws for all per- 
sons, whether British or native, foreigners or others, within the Indian 
territories under the dominion of Her Majesty, and for all subjects of 
the Crown within the dominions of Indian princes and states in alliance 
with Her Majesty. 

The government of the Indian Empire is intrusted to a secretary of 
state for India, assisted by a council of not less than ten members, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 633 

vacancies m which are now filled up by the secretary of state for India. 
But the major part of the council must be of persons who have served 
or have resided ten years in India and have not left India more than 
ten years previous to the date of their appointment; and no person 
not so qualified can be appointed unless nine of the continuing members 
be so qualified. The office is held for a term of ten years, but a mem- 
ber may be removed upon an address from both Houses of Parliament, 
and the secretary of state for India may, for special reasons, reappoint 
a member of the council for a further term of five years. No member 
can sit in Parliament. 

The duties of the council, which has no initiative authority, are, under 
the direction of the secretary of state for India, to conduct the busi- 
ness transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the government 
of India. Moreover, by the act of 1858, the expenditure of the reve- 
nues of India, both in India and elsewhere, is subject to the control of 
the secretary of state and council, and no grant or appropriation of any 
part of such revenues can be made without the concurrence of a major- 
ity of votes at a meeting of the council. In dealing, however, with 
questions affecting the relations of the government with foreign powers, 
in making peace and war, in prescribing the policy of the government 
toward native states, and generally in matters where secrecy is neces- 
sary, the secretary of state acts on his own authority. The secretary 
has to divide the council into committees, and to regulate the transac- 
tion of business. At least one meeting must be held every week, at 
which not less than five members shall be present. 

The government of India is exercised by the council of the governor- 
general, consisting of five ordinary members and a public works mem- 
ber, whose post may be left vacant at the option of the Crown. The 
commander in chief may be, and in fact always is, appointed an extraor- 
dinary member. Governors and lieutenant-governors become extraor- 
dinary members when the council meets within their provinces. The 
ordinary members* of the council preside over the departments of 
finance and commerce, home revenue, and agriculture, military admin- 
istration, legislation, and public works. The viceroy usually keeps 
the foreign department in his own hands. The appointment of the 
ordinary members of the council of the governor- general and of the 
governors of Madras and Bombay is made by the Crown. 

The members of the council, together with from 10 to 16 " additional 
members for making laws and regulations," formulate a legislative 
council; these additional members are nominated by the viceroy. In 
accordance with the new regulations under the Indian councils act 
(55 and 56 Victoria, cap. 14), four of the members so nominated are pre- 
viously recommended by the nonofficial members of the four provincial 
legislative councils, and the fifth is recommended by the Calcutta 
Chamber of Commerce. The proceedings in the legislative council are 
public. The lieutenant-governors and chief commissioners of the other 
ten provinces are appointed by the governor-general, subject to the 
approbation of the secretary of state for India. 

The governors of Madras and Bombay have each a legislative and 
executive council and a civil service of their own. The lieutenant- 
governors of Bengal and of the Northwest Provinces (with Oudh) have 
each a legislative council only; the other administrators of provinces 
have no councils and no legislative powers. Although the viceroy is 
supreme, the local governments of the various provinces enjoy a large 
measure of administrative independence. Each province is broken 



G34 TREATY OF PEACE. 

into divisions under commissioners, and then divided into districts, 
which form the unit of administration. At the head of each district is 
an executive officer (collector or magistrate or deputy commissioner), 
who has entire control of the district and who is responsible to the 
governor of the province. Subordinate to the magistrate, in most dis- 
tricts, there are a joint magistrate, an assistant magistrate, and one or 
more deputy collectors and other officials. In some cases the magistrate 
collector is also judge, while in others the two functions are separate. 
There are about 240 such districts in British India. 

India is administratively divided into British territory and native or 
feudatory States; the former is under the direct control, in all respects, 
of British officials. The control that the supreme Government exercises 
over the native States varies in degree; but they are all governed by 
the native princes, ministers, or councils, with the help and under the 
advice of the resident or agent in political charge either of a single 
State or a group of States. The chiefs have no right to make war or 
peace, or to send ambassadors to each other or to external States; they 
are not permitted to maintain a military force above a certain specified 
limit; no European is allowed to reside at any of their courts without 
special sanction ; and the supreme Government can exercise the right 
of dethronement in case of misgovernment. Within these limits the 
more important chiefs possess sovereign authority within their own ter- 
ritories; some of them are required to pay an annual tribute; with 
others this is nominal, or not demanded. 

LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 

There were, in March, 1895, 752 municipal towns, with a population 
of 15,500,000. The municipal bodies have the care of the roads, water 
supply, drains, markets, and sanitation; they impose taxes, enact 
by-laws, make improvements, and spend money, but the sanction of the 
provincial government is necessary in each case before new taxes can 
be levied or new by-laws can be brought into force. By the local self- 
government acts of 1882-1884, the elective principle has been extended 
in a large or small measure all over India. In all larger towns and in 
many of the smaller towns, a majority of members of committees are 
elected by the rate payers; everywhere the majority of town committees 
consists of natives, and in many committees all the members are natives. 
For rural tracts, except in Burma, there are district and local boards 
which are in charge of roads, district schools, and hospitals. 

AREA AND POPULATION. 

According to the census taken February 26, 1891, the total area ot 
all the British provinces was 964,993 square miles. This is the sum of 
the areas of 250 districts. The total population was 221,172,952, an 
increase of 22,312,346 over that indicated by the census of 1881. The 
average population per square mile was 229. 

In the census results the total population of India is divided into 118 
groups on the basis of language. But even the different native 
languages do not denote separate ethnical groups, many of them being 
only dialects, and nearly all of them capable of classification into a 
few groups. There were, however, 334 males and 29 females who spoke 
an unrecognizable language. The following table shows the chief lin- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 635 

guistic groups with a population (in millions and two decimals) assigned 
thereto : 

Aryo-Indio !95.46 

Dravidian ow 

Kolarian 2.9b 

Gypsy f 

Khasi -JJ 

Tibeto-Burman aa 

Mon- Annam 23 

Shan 1° 

Sinitic -71 

Ary o- Iranic *■• °° 

Semitio 05 

Aryo-European 25 

The following table gives all the languages or dialects which are more 
prevalent than English, with the population, in millions and two deci- 
mals, of those who speak them as parent tongues: 

Hindi 85.68 

Bengali 41-34 

Telugu 19-89 

Mahrathi 18.89 

Punjabi 17-72 

Tamil 15-23 

Gujarati 10-62 

K&narese 9. 75 

Uriya 9.01 

Burmese - 5. 93 

Malay alum 5. 43 

Urdu 3.67 

Sindhi 2.59 

Santali 1-71 

W. Pahari 1-52 

Assamese 1. 43 

Gondi 1-38 

Central Pahari 1-15 

Ma'rwadi 1-15 

Pushtu 1-08 

Karen 67 

K61 65 

Tulu 49 

Kachhi 44 

Gypsy 40 

Ovaon *>' 

Kond •- 32 

The English language is next in order with a population of 238,499. 

The British-born population of India amounted-, according to the 
census of 1871, to 64,061 persons, in 1881 to 89,798, and in 1891 to 
100,551. In 1891 the total number of persons not born in India, 
including the French and Portuguese possessions, was 661,637. Of 
these 478,656 returned as their birthplace countries contiguous to India ; 
60,519 countries in Asia remote from India, including China; 100,551 
the United Kingdom; 10,095 other European, American, and Austral- 
asian countries, while 11,816 were born in Africa, etc., or at sea. 

RELIGION. 

The most prevalent religion in India is that of the Hindoos, their 
number being nearly three fourths of the total population. Together 
with the Mohammedans, who number 57,321,164, they comprise over 
92 per cent of the whole community. The Buddhists are mostly in 



636 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Burmah, as will be seen from the following summary, which also shows 
that the number of Christians is a little over 2,250,000: 

Hindoos 207,731,727 

Sikhs 1,907,833 

Jains 1,416,638 

Buddhists 7,131,361 

Parsees 89,904 

Mohammedans 57, 321, 164 

Christians 2,284,380 

Jews 17,194 

Animists 9,280,467 

Others 42,763 

Of the Christians enumerated above (2,284,380) the following are 
the chief subdivisions, as given in the official returns: 

Roman Catholics 1, 315, 263 

Church of England 295,016 

Presbyterians 40,407 

Dissenters 296 > 938 

Other Protestants 63,976 

Syrians, Armenians, and Greeks 201,684 

INSTRUCTION. 

In 1891 there were 2,997,558 males and 197,662 females under 
instruction. There were 11,554,035 males and 543,495 females not 
under instruction, but able to read and write, and there were 118,819,408 
males and 127,726,768 females not under instruction and unable to read 
and write. In 1894-95 the total expenditure on public instruction was 
Rx. 3,327,448 against Rx. 67,100 in 1865 and Rx. 39,400 in 1858. Of 
the sum spent in 1894-95, Rx. 571,008 came from local rates and 
cesses, Rx. 146,237 from municipal funds, Rx. 717,260 from subscrip- 
tions, etc., Rx. 981,870 from fees, and Rx. 910,972 from provincial 
revenues. 

At the head of the national system of education in India there are 
five universities— Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, and the 
Punjab— which, though merely examining bodies, have numerous affil- 
iated colleges, in which a prescribed higher education is given than at 
the schools. There are normal schools in every province for training 
teachers, and a staff of inspecting officers visits all schools on the 
departmental lists. Medical colleges, engineering, and other technical 
schools have also increased, and there are a few art schools. In 1895 
2,293 students matriculated at the University of Calcutta, 918 at 
Madras, 934 at Bombay, 779 at Punjab, and 632 at Allahabad. 

In 1894 there were 457 vernacular newspapers published regularly in 
16 different languages. Only one daily vernacular newspaper circu- 
lates as many as 1,500 copies; only one weekly as many as 20,000. 
During the year 7,505 books and magazines, including many transla- 
tions and new editions, appeared, about nine-tenths being in native 
languages. 

JUSTICE AND CRIME. 

The presidencies of Madras and Bombay and the lieutenant- gov- 
ernorships of Bengal and the northwest provinces have each a high 
court supreme both in civil and criminal business, but with an ultimate 
appeal to the judicial committee of the privy council in England. Of 
the minor provinces, the Punjab has a chief court with five judges ; the 
central provinces, Oudh and Sind, have each one judicial commissioner. 
Burma has a judicial commissioner and a recorder. For Assam the 



TREATY OF PEACE. 637 

high court at Calcutta is the highest judicial authority, excepting in 
the three hill districts, where the chief commissioner of Assam is judge 
without appeal in civil and criminal cases. In each district the col- 
lector magistrate is judge, both of first instance and appeal. 

Appellate and original jurisdiction is exercised in the superior courts 
by about 450 judges. During 1890 there were 1,720 civil judges under 
the superior courts, nearly all of which civil judges were natives of 
India. In Bengal, Madras, and Bombay the proportion of natives sit- 
ting in appellate courts is considerable. 

FINANCE. 

The total revenue of India for 1896-97 (budget estimate) was, in tens 
of rupees, 97,020,700. It was derived as follows: 

Rx. 

From land revenue 26,093,300 

Opium 6,895,300 

Salt 8,700,000 

Stamps 4,732,700 

Excise 5,744,700 

Provincial rates 3, 669, 800 

Customs 4,481,900 

Assessed taxes 1, 843, 200 

Forests 1,732,300 

Registration 428,800 

Tribute - 892,200 

Interest 848,300 

Post-office, telegraph, and mint 2, 914, 300 

Civil departments 1,657,800 

Miscellaneous 975,900 

Railways 21,583,200 

Irrigation 2,883,300 

Buildings and roads 664,600 

Military departments 879, 100 

The most important source of public income is the land. The land 
revenue is levied according to an assessment on the estates or holdings. 
In the greater part of Bengal, about one-fourth of Madras, and some 
districts of the northwest provinces the assessment was fixed perma- 
nently one hundred years ago, while it was fixed periodically at inter- 
vals of from twelve to thirty years over the rest of India. In the 
permanently settled tracts land revenue falls at a rate of about two- 
thirds of a rupee per acre of cultivated land, and represents on an 
average about one -fifth of a rental, or about one twenty-fourth of the 
gross value of the produce. In the temporarily settled tracts the land 
revenue averages about one and one-half rupees per acre of cultivated 
laud, representing something less than one-half of the rental, and about 
one- tenth or one twelfth of the gross value of the produce. 

The total expenditure in 1890-97 (Budget estimate) was, in tens of 
rupees (Rx.), 97,157,600. It was incurred as follows: 

Ex. 

Interest 3,676,700 

Refunds, compensations, etc ,. 1, 835,000 

Charges of collection 9, 321, 900 

Post-office, telegraph, and mint 2, 733,500 

Civil salaries, etc 15,399,500 

Miscellaneous civil charges 6, 030, 300 

Famine relief and insurance 598, 500 

Railway construction 14, 500 

Railway revenue account 23, 857, 500 

Irrigation 3,203,600 

Buildings and roads 6, 140,600 

Army 25,174,900 

Defense works 57,500 



638 TREATY OF PEACE. 

It will be seen that far the largest branch of expenditure is that for 
the army. In the year before the great mutiny the expense of the 
army was 13,000,000 Ex., and afterwards it rose to 25,000,000 Rx. The 
regular army consists of 74,036 Europeans and 145,565 natives. 

Returns published in 1884 showed that the various feudatory states 
of India had armies numbering 249,835 men and 4,237 guns. A large 
proportion of these forces were little better than an undisciplined 
rabble, but in 1888, after the native chiefs had loyally offered large sums 
of money toward the cost of imperial defense, the Indian government 
elaborated a scheme for the training and equipment of picked contin- 
gents of troops in certain states, and measures are now in progress 
which will enable the chiefs to furnish contingents of troops fit to take 
their place in line with the regiments of the Indian army. These 
special contingents are known as imperial service troops, and they 
now number about 19,000. Sixteen British inspecting officers have 
been appointed. 

The health of the regular Indian troops has been so improved by bet- 
ter barracks, by quartering a larger proportion of the European soldiers 
at hill stations, and by attention to sanitary conditions that the death 
rate, which before the mutiny was 6.9 per cent for Europeans and 2 per 
cent for natives, has been reduced to 1.6 and 1 per cent, respectively. 

EAST AFRICA (BRITISH). 

British East Africa consists of a large area on the mainland (includ- 
ing the East Africa protectorate and the Uganda protectorate) under 
the immediate control of the foreign office, together with the islands of 
Zanzibar and Pemba, still governed through their Arab Sultan. 

By the Anglo-German agreements of November 1, 1886, and July 1, 
1890, the southern boundary of the territory extends in a northwest 
direction from the north bank of the mouth of the River Umba, going 
round by the north of Kilimanjaro to where the first parallel of south 
latitude cuts Lake Victoria. Thence across the lake and westward on 
the same parallel to the boundary of the Congo Free State. To the 
north and east the British sphere (which merges indefinitely with the 
old Sudan provinces of Egypt) is bounded, according to the Anglo- 
Italian agreement of 1891, by the Juba River up to 6° north latitude, 
by that parallel as far as 35° east longitude, and by that meridian 
northward as far as the Blue Nile. 

It is coterminous with the Italian sphere of influence and with 
Abyssinia as far as the confines of Egypt. To the west it is bounded 
by the Congo Free State, the line of partition being 30° east longitude 
northward to the Nile-Congo watershed, which then becomes the 
frontier as far as the northernmost point of that State (the source of 
the Mbomu). North of this the British sphere has at present no west- 
ern d elimination, and debouches on the independent Mohammedan 
states of that region. The total area thus embraced probably extends 
to over 1,000,000 square miles. Treaties have been made with almost 
all the native chiefs between the coast and the Albert Nyanza, and 
with the Semoli tribes occupying the interior between the Juba and 
Tana, whereby commercial access to the Galla country is now opened. 

In 1886 the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar were delimited, 
and were recognized as including a continuous strip of coast, 10 miles 
in depth, reaching from Cape Delgado to Kipini on the Ozi River. 
Outside this tract it was agreed that Germany should have as a sphere 
of influence the country stretching inland from the River Rovuma north- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 63 \) 

ward to the Umba Kiver, England's sphere of influence extending 
northward from the Umba. Northward of Kipini the Sultan of Zanzi- 
bar retained several stations where he had hitherto kept garrisons, 
viz, Lamu, Kismayu, Brava, Merka, Mogadischo, Warsheikh. Of these, 
however, the last four were ceded to Italy on August 20, 1892, and the 
Italian Government took over their administration on September 26, 
1893. 

The German East African Association, in virtue of a concession signed 
in May, 1888, acquired the right to administer the Mrima or mainland 
(including the customs of the Sultan's ports) from the Kovuina to the 
Umba River on the north, the Sultan of Zanzibar being subsequently 
paid the sum of 4,090,000 marks in return for the cession by him of all 
his rights to and on the coast line, which thus became an integral part 
of the German sphere, or, as it is now called, German East Africa. 
The Imperial British Africa Company acquired the right to administer 
the coast from the Umba to Kipini for fifty years on condition of an 
annual payment to the Sultan, and in 1889 further acquired the ports 
and islands (including Lamu, Man da, and Patta) to the north of the 
Tana. A further settlement of territorial questions in 1890 conferred 
on England the protectorate of Zanzibar, including the island of Pemba, 
and left to British influence the territory from the Umba north to the 
Juba Kiver, including the territory of Witu, which was for a time placed 
under the control of the British East Africa Company. 

By the end of 1892 the company had occupied the country as far as 
Uganda and between that and Lake Albert Edward and the river 
Semliki. By arrangement with the Government, the company retired 
from Uganda at the end of March, 1893, and on June 19, 1891, a British 
protectorate was declared over Uganda proper. On July 31, 1893, the 
company withdrew from the administration of Witu, which was tem- 
porarily placed under the administration of the Sultan. On June 15, 
1895, a British protectorate was proclaimed over the territories lying 
between and not hitherto included within the protectorates of Zanzibar, 
Witu, and Uganda proper, and the whole of this region has since been 
divided, for administrative purposes, into two districts, called, respec- 
tively, the East Africa Protectorate and the Ugauda Protectorate. The 
former extends, roughly speaking, some 400 miles inland, and the latter 
from that frontier to the interior limits of the British sphere. On June 
30 the company evacuated the territory leased from the Sultan, the 
administration being taken over by Her Majesty's Government. 

THE EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE. 

The East Africa Protectorate, which extends from the Umba to the 
Juba River and inland as lar as the borders of Uganda, is placed under 
the control of a commissioner and consul-general, who is also British 
agent at Zanzibar. It is divided for purposes of administration into 
four provinces, each under a subcommissioner: (1) The coast province 
(Seyyidieh), capital Mombasa; (2) Ukamba, capital Machakos; (3) 
Tanaland. including Witu, capital Lamu; (4) Jubaland, capital Kis- 
mayu. The total population is estimated at 2,500,000, including 13,500 
Asiatics and 390 Europeans and Eurasians. Mombasa (24,700) is the 
capital of the whole protectorate, and has a fine harbor, which has been 
much improved by the construction of jetties and other works. It is 
connected with Zanzibar by submarine cable and with Lamu by a tele- 
graph line, via Golbanti (Tana River). The principal other ports are 
Lamu and Kismayu, toward the north, and Vanga and Takaungu, 



640 TREATY OF PEACE. 

toward the south. A Jailway is in course of construction toward Lake 
Victoria, Uganda. In February, 1898, about 120 miles were in oper- 
ation. 

The customs revenue for the year 1896-97 amounted to 306,191 rupees, 
and for the previous year 230,507 rupees. The imports for the year 
1896-97 were valued at 3,925,597 rupees and exports at 1,172,020 rupees, 
and those for the year 1895-96 at, imports 2,653,995 rupees, exports 
1,106,461 rupees. Shipping entered, 1893, 100,602 tons ; cleared, 100,388 
tons. On June 30, 1892, the Sultan of Zanzibar withdrew his reserves 
under the Berlin act, thereby placing all his dominions within the Free 
Zone. At the mainland ports 5 per cent import duty is levied under 
the Brussels act. The principal exports are ivory, india rubber, cattle 
and goats, grain, copra, gum copal, hides and horns, etc. The imports 
are Manchester goods, Bombay cloth, brass, wire, beads, provisions, 
etc. Mangrove logs (borites) for building purposes are imported at 
Mombasa from other parts of the coast. Trade is at present princi- 
pally in the hands of East Indian merchants (Banians). 

Trade is steadily increasing, although it has lately been hampered in 
the southern parts of the Protectorate by the rebellion ol Mubarak, 
which was, however, successfully put down in April, 1896, and a hope- 
ful feeling now prevails. The Masai, who had given some trouble to 
caravans in the interior, seem likely, in future, to respect the British 
authority. The higher plateaus are largely covered with rich grass, 
and are considered particularly favorable for ranching operations. 

THE UGANDA PROTECTORATE. 

In July, 1896, this protectorate was extended so as to include, in 
addition to Uganda proper, Unyoro and other countries to the west as 
far as the boundary of the British sphere (see above), as well as Usoga, 
to the east. The protectorate is administered by a commissioner, but 
the infant son of King Mwanga nominally reigns in Uganda proper. 
Order is maintained by means of a trained force of Sudanese. Kegular 
criminal courts have been established, and there is a kind of native 
parliament. Bonds have been made since the British occupation, but 
outside trade will be impossible until the completion of the railway, 
the construction of which from the coast was begun in the latter part 
of 1895. The soil is exceedingly fertile and coffee is thought likely to 
succeed. The natives show much skill in iron working, pottery, etc. 
The capital is Mengo, close to which is the British fort Kampala. The 
commissioner resides at Port Alice, on the Victoria Nyanza. Port 
Victoria, further east, is to be the terminus of the railway, and is 140 
miles by road from Mengo and 100 by the lake. Forts have been 
established in Unyoro and other districts on the borders of Uganda. 

Both Protestant and Boman Catholic missionaries have made many 
converts, and the adherents of the two communions long formed antag- 
onistic factions, but their differences are now composed. 

ZANZIBAR PROTECTORATE. 

SULTAN AND GOVERNMENT. 

The Sultan, or, more correctly, the Seyyid, Hamoud bin Mohammed 
bin Said, about 44 years of age, nephew of the late Sultans Ali, Kha- 
lifa, and Burghash, succeeded to the Sultanate on the death of Seyyid 
Hamed bin Thwain on August 27, 1896. He was one of two claim- 
ants, and was selected by the British Government as being the most 
fitting. 



TREATY OF PEACE. G41 

Zanzibar dominions were gradually acquired by the Imams of Mus- 
cat at various dates between the years 1098 atid 1.S0 7, partly by con- 
quest from the Portuguese and partly from native chiefs. They were 
held as an appanage of Muscat until the death of Seyyid Said, when, 
on a dispute as to the succession arising between Seyyid Thwain, of 
Muscat, uncle of the present Sultan of Zanzibar, and Seyyid Majid, of 
Zanzibar (both being sons of Seyyid Said), the dominions in Africa 
were made independent of the present State, and con tinned under 
Majid by an arbitration of Lord Canning (dated 1801), then Governor- 
General of India. Besides the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and smaller 
islands, the Sultan's authority nominally extended along the coasts and 
indefinitely inland, from Warsheikh, in 3° north latitude, to Tunghi 
Bay, in 10° 42' south latitude; his influence, however, being exercised 
but a little way from the coast, except along a few trade routes. As 
mentioned above, the Sultan's dominions were gradually restricted in 
area between the years 1886 and 1S90, until they finally included only 
the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. 

In October, 1891, a regular government was formed for Zanzibar, of 
which Sir L. Mathews is prime minister. All accounts are now kept in 
English and Arabic, and are always open to the inspection of the 
British consul general, and no new undertakings or additional expendi- 
ture can be incurred without his consent. On February 1, 1892, Zanzi- 
bar was declared a free port, but the importation of spirits, arms, 
powder, and mineral oils remains subject to regulation. 

AREA, POPULATION, RELIGION. 

The island of Zanzibar has an area of 625 square miles, and Pemba 
360 square miles. The population of the island is estimated at 150,000, 
and that of the island of Pemba at 50,000. There is a considerable 
foreign population, mostly engaged in trading. There are about 50 
Englishmen. 50 Germans, a few Americans, Frenchmen, Italians, Gree> s, 
and Roumanians, the two latter nationalities being under British pro- 
tection. There are also about 7,000 British Indian subjects, through 
whose hands almost the whole trade of Zanzibar and of East Africa 
passes, directly or indirectly. The town of Zanzibar has a population 
estimated at 30,000. 

Mohammedanism is the religion of the country, most of the natives 
of the coast and islands being Sunnis of the Shad school, though many 
are heathen ; while the Sultan and his relatives are schismatics of 
the Ibadhi sect. There are Christian missions (Church of England, 
Wesleyan, Independent, and Roman Catholic) on the island and far 
into the mainland. 

There is a French hospital at Zanzibar, attended by French sisters 
of mercy, and a hospital at the Universities Mission. Sir Tharia 
Topan's hospital for Indians is now completed, but is not yet in use. 

JUSTICE. 

Justice among the Sultan's subjects is administered by various 
" Kazis," with an appeal to H. H. among Europeans by their consuls 
in all cases in which they are the accused or defendants. By a decla- 
ration signed December 16, 1892, the Sultan has delegated to the Brit- 
ish agent and consul-general his right to try all cases in which a British 
subject is plaintiff or accuser and the defendant or accused is a Zanzi- 
bar subject or the subject of a uonchristian state without a treaty, 
a: p 41 



642 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The British court lias also jurisdiction over all slaves originally freed 
by Her Majesty's agent and consul-general, but as tbe legal status of 
slavery was abolished on tbe 6th of April, 1897, the relations between 
master and slave are no longer recognized by the tribunals. Most of 
the civil cases are brought into the British court, from which there is 
an appeal to the Bombay high court. To it also pertains admiralty 
jurisdiction with reference to the slave trade, and it is a naval prize 
court, by virtue of the Zanzibar (prize) order in council, 1888. 

FINANCE AND COMMERCE. 

The revenue of the Sultan was mainly derived from customs dues 
and taxes on produce, chiefly cloves. Under the new arrangement 
with England the Sultan's privy purse, which will be kept separate 
from the general revenue of the country, has been fixed at about 120,000 
rupees annually, and the remainder of the revenue will be devoted to 
the charges for police, harbor improvements, and public works. All 
the public expenditure must receive the sanction of the Sultan and the 
British agent and consul-general. 

There is a regular army of about 900 men, including police, under the 
command of General Kaikes. 

In 1895 the imports amounted to £1,293,646, and in 1896 to £1,275,470, 
and were distributed as follows: 

From Great Britain a £118, 022 

British India 6385,537 

Sultan's dominions: Zanzibar and Pernba 6134, 331 

German East Africa a202,813 

Germany 564,597 

America a90, 975 

Holland a71,311 

Madagascar, Mauritius, and Comoro Islands & 42, 021 

British East Africa 645, 422 

Benadir ports 33,433 

France 17,566 

Other countries a 69, 848 

The exports in 1895 amounted to £1,119,841, and in 1896 to £1,158,- 
806. In 1896 the chief exports were: 

Piece goods a £336, 229 

Specie a 137, 557 

Cloves o 102, 045 

Ivory al27, 109 

Rice. 659,738 

Copra a64,802 

Rubber 617,569 

Gum copal 616.060 

Hides... oll,306 

Tortoise shell 68, 160 

Sim-sim 65,519 

Chillies 5,484 

Hippopotamus teeth «5, 285 

Other articles 6 261, 873 

In the year 1896 166 vessels (other than coasting vessels) entered the 
port, among which were included 59 vessels of 1)8,273 tons, British; 
60 vessels of 88,483 tons, German; 27 vessels of 49,9ii7 tons, French. 

There is a special coinage issued under the Sultan's authority, of 
which the Maria Theresa dollar is the unit; but the British Indian 
rupee is the coin now universally current, though in all business trans- 
actions the dollar is the standard of value. The dollar has a fixed 
value of 2 rupees 2 annas, and the rupee is worth 47 cents. 

a Increase as compared with 1895, 6 Decrease. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 643 

EGYPT. 

Egypt is nominally a province of the Ottoman Empire, but maintains 
an autonomous government, under the rule of the Khedive, subject to 
the annunl payment of a tribute of £082,092. The title of khedive, 
which is hereditary, was given by a firman of the Sultan of May 14, 
1847. The intervention aud practical occupation by Great Britain began 
with the revoltof Arabi Pasha, which the Khedive was unable to subdue. 
The revolution headed by Mohammed Ahmed, who proclaimed himself a 
mahdi, resulted in the extension and continuation of the British power. 
In October, 1892, the British army of occupation had about 3,500 men. 
It was increased in January, 1893, by two battalions. There appears to 
be a local military and police force of about 10,000 men. In 1890 the 
puolic revenue was upward of £10,500,000. The public expenditure 
amounted to nearly £10,000,000. The consolidated debt at the end of 
December, 1890, amounted to nearly £94,000,000. 

In 1875 the British Government acquired by purchase something less 
than a majority of tbe shares in the Suez Canal, i y a convention 
signed at Constantinople October 29, 1888, an agreement was made 
between the principal European powers to exempt the canal from block- 
ade, and to secure to the vessels of all the signatories, whether armed 
or not, the right of passage in war as well as in peace. 

The Statesman's Year Book 1808 says that, by a firman of May 27, 
1800, obtained on the condition of the sovereign of Egypt raising his 
annual tribute to the Sultan's civil fund irom £370,000 to £720,000, the 
succession to the throne of Egypt was made direct from father to sou 
instead of descending, after the Turkish law, to the eldest heir. By a 
firman issued June 8, 1873, the Sultan granted to Ismail I the rights 
of concluding commercial treaties with foreign powers, and of main- 
taining armies 

The administration of Egypt is carried on by native ministers, sub- 
ject to the rule of the Khedive, but from 1870 to 1883 two comptrollers- 
general, appointed by France and England, exercised considerable 
powers in the direction of the affairs of the country. (See Khedivial 
decree, November 10, 1879.) The intervention of England in 1882 was 
not participated in by France, and on January 18, 1883, the Khedive 
signed a decree abolishing the joint control of England and France. 
In place of this control the Khedive, on the recommendation of Eng- 
land, appointed an English financial adviser, without whose concur- 
rence no financial decision can be taken. 

The Egyptian ministry is com posed of six members : (1) The president, 
who has the department of the interior; (2) the minister of finance; (3) 
justice; (4) war; (5) public works and public instruction; (0) foreign 
affairs. By an organic law of May 1, 1883, representative institutions 
were created, including a legislative council, a general assembly, and 
provincial boards. The legislative council is a consultative body, con- 
sisting of 30 members, of whom 14 are nominated by the Government. 
It meets once a month and examines the budget and all proposed admin- 
istrative laws, but it can not initiate legislation, and the Government 
is not obliged to act on its advice. Of its members, 15 residing in Cairo 
receive an allowance of £90 a year for carriage expenses, and 15, being 
delegates from the provinces and provincial towns, receive £250 a year 
for residential expenses in Cairo, besides traveliug expenses to and from 
Cairo once a month. 

The general assembly, which consists of the members of the legisla- 
tive council, with the addition of the 6 ministers and 46 members popu- 



644 TREATY OF PEACE. 

larly elected, has no legislative functions, but no new direct personal 
or land tax can be imposed without its consent. It lias to be summoned 
at least once every two years. The members, when convoked, receive 
an eight days' allowance at £1 a day, with railway expenses. The 
council of ministers, with the Khedive, is the ultimate legislative 
authority. Since 1887 an Ottoman high commissioner has resided in 
Cairo. Egypt proper is administratively divided into six governor- 
ships (moafzas) of principal towns, and fourteen mudiriehs, or prov- 
inces, subdivided into districts or kisms. 

There are four judicial systems in Egypt: 1. The courts of the reli- 
gious law, concerned chiefly with the personal status of Mohammedans. 
2. The mixed courts instituted in 1875, dealing with civil actions between 
persons of different nationalities and to some extent with criminal 
offenses. 3. The consular courts, wherein foreigners accused of crime 
are tried. 4. The native courts for civil actions between natives, or 
crimes by natives. The Statesman's Year-Book, referring to these 
courts, says: 

The native courts, instituted 1884-1889, with both foreign and native, judges, now 
consists of 6 courts of first instance, an appeal court at Cairo, and 42 summary 
courts for cases of moderate importance. With special reference to these tribunals 
a British adviser was appointed in 1891. A committee of judicial surveillance 
watches the workings of the courts of first instance and the summary courts, and 
endeavors hy letters and discussion to maintain purity and sound law. 

There is an Egyptian procureur-general, who, with other duties, is intrusted with 
criminal prosecutions. The police service, which has been subject to frequent modi- 
fication, was, in 1895, put under the orders of the ministry of the interior, to which 
an English adviser and English inspectors were attached. The provincial police is 
under the direction of the local authorities, the mudirs or governors of provinces, 
and the omdehs or village headmen. To the latter, who are responsible for the good 
order of the villages, a limited criminal jurisdiction has been intrusted. 

On April 5, 1880, the Khedive issued a decree appointing an inter- 
national commission of liquidation to examine the financial situation of 
Egypt and to draft a law regulating the relations between Egypt and 
her creditors. The debt of Egypt is now administered by this commis- 
sion. The United States, while not represented in the commission, is 
always consulted in the arrangements respecting tlie debt, and has so 
far given a formal assent to whatever changes have been proposed with 
the concurrence of the powers represented in the commission. 

The United States, besides maintaining consular courts in Egypt, is 
a party to, and is represented in, the mixed tribunals. It has two 
judges in those tribunals. 

In 1882 the Egyptian army was disbanded by a decree of the Kedive, 
and in December of that year the organization of a new army was 
intrusted to a British general officer, to whom was given the title of 
sirdar. The present sirdar is Maj. Gen. Sir Herbert Kitchener. It 
is said that there are about one hundred English officers serving at 
present in the Egyptian army, which has a total strength of 18,000. 
As has been above stated, an English army of occupation has remained 
in Egypt since 1882. Its strength is over 4,000. The Egyptian Gov- 
ernment contributes £87,000 annually to meet the cost of the army of 
occupation. 

Egypt has practically no navy. 

TOtfKING. 

This territory, annexed to Fiance in 1884, has an area of 34,740 square 
miles and is divided into fourteen provinces, with 8,000 villages and a 
population estimated at 9,000,000. There are 400,000 Koman Catholics. 



TREATY OF PEACE. b'45 

Tbe King of Annam was formerly represented in Tonking by a viceroy, 
but in July, 1897, he consented to tbe suppression of the vieero.valty 
and the creation of a French residency in its place. Chief town, Hanoi, 
an agglomeration of many villages, with a population of 150,000. Includ- 
ing the region formerly claimed by Siam, but annexed in 1893, the total 
area is about 122,000 square miles and the population is estimated at 
12,000,000. There were 18,555 troops in L v 92, including 0,500 native 
soldiers. The chief crop is rice, exported mostly to Hongkong. Other 
products are sugar cane, silk tree, cotton, various fruit trees, and tobacco. 
There are copper and iron mines or' good quality. French companies 
work coal mines at Hongay, near Haiphong, and at Kebao. The chief 
industries are silk, cotton, sugar, pepper, and oils. In 1890 the imports 
of merchandise into Tonking amounted to 25,204,013 francs; exports, 
7,560,898 francs. Chief imports are metals and metal tools and 
machinery, yarn, tissues, and beverages; chief exports, rice (2,301,000 
francs) and animal products. The transit trade to and from Yunnan 
amounts to about 5,000,000 and 3,200,000 francs, respectively. In 1896 
there entered 1,407 vessels, of 401,151 tons. The Phulang-Thuong- 
Laugsou Railway is 04 miles long. It is proposed to extend it to 
Nacham, on the Chinese frontier. In Annam and Tonking in 1895 
there were 79 post-offices. Local revenue of Annam and Tonkiug 
(Budget of 1897), $7,902,000. The expenditure of France for Tonking 
in the Budget of 1898 was 21,450,000 francs. 

BULGARIA. 

Bulgaria is a protected State in the true sense, viz, it is a State 
which intrinsically is not strong enough to maintain its independence 
against the neighboring Ottoman Empire, and which owes its separate 
existence to an act of the powers, the object of which was to secure 
general tranquillity. 

The treaty of Berlin (1878) provided that Bulgaria should be an 
autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of the 
Sultan, having a Christian government and a national militia. The 
Ottoman army should no longer remain in it. The executive was to have 
the title of prince, and to be elected by the people and confirmed by 
the Sublime Forte, with the assent of the powers. No member of any 
reigning European house was to be eligible for the princeship. An 
assembly of notables was to draw up the constitution prior to the 
election of the first prince. In the interim the principality was to be 
provisionally governed by an imperial Russian commissary with the 
assistance of an imperial Turkish commissary and consuls delegated 
by the other powers. After the election of the prince the principality 
was to enjoy full autonomy except in the following particulars: 

(a) Its annual tribute to the Porte. 

(b) Its obligation to assume part of the Ottoman debt}. 

(c) Its being bound by the subsisting treaties between Turkey and 
other powers. 

(d) Its obligation to protect religious liberty in its constitution. 

(e) The prohibition to levy transit dues. 

In nearly all other respects Bulgaria was to be on the footing of an 
independent State. 

The treaty also provided for a separate government for Eastern Rou- 
melia, which was to be a "province" "under the direct political and 
military authority" of the Sultan, "under conditions of administra- 
tive autonomy." It was to have a Christian governor- general, nomi- 
nated by the Porte, with the assent of the powers, every five years. 



646 TREATY OF PEACE. 

He was to have the power of summoning the Ottoman troops when 
necessary, etc. Thus Eastern Roumelia was not a protected State, but 
simply a province with a certain amount of home rule in matters of 
civil administration. 

In September, 1885, the government of Eastern Eoumelia was over- 
thrown by a revolution, and the province became, for all purposes, a 
part of Bulgaria. 

Note. — The other "Dannbian principalities, "namely, Ronmania, Servia, and Mon- 
tenegro, present features of interest only in so far as they are eases of progress from 
the "protected" stage to absolute independence, instead of from the protected stage 
to that of complete colonialism — a reversal, in short, of the usual order of things. 
From very early times Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and Montenegro had been among 
the most unruly of the possessions of the Turkish Crown, and long and bitter strug- 
gles were frequently necessary to maintain even the semblance of the Imperial 
authority there. As early as 1829 Turkey had been obliged to recognize the separate 
existence of Servia, at least as a protected state; and Montenegro was certainly no 
more than a protected state after Russia, in 1851, had recognized Danilo I as Cos- 
podar, or Prince. The whole Danubian question, as to the exact extent of the pro- 
tectorate exercised by the Porte, was in a very unsettled condition until, by the 
Treaty of Berlin (1878), the absolute independence of Servia, Montenegro, and 
Wallachia-Moldavia, joined together as Roumania, was recognized. 

THE DUTCH EAST INDIES. 

Before 1798 the Dutch possessions in the far East were governed by 
the Dutch East India Company. In that year the East India Company 
was dissolved. At present the supreme law or constitution of the 
Dutch colonies is the " Regulations for the Government of Netherlands- 
India," passed by the King and States-General in 1854. 

Under this organic law the chief executive or governor general is 
assisted by an advisory council of five. He has residuary governmental 
powers, and may consequently make any law not specially reserved to 
the province of the legislature of the mother country or forbidden by 
the " Regulations." 

For purposes of internal administration Dutch East India is divided 
into residencies, each of which is presided over by a resident, who is 
accountable to the governor-general. Under each resident are several 
assistant residents and several controleurs. All these officers are 
appointed as the result of a kind of civil-service examination. Under 
them is a hierarchy of native officials, some of whom are paid salaries, 
but perhaps the greater number by percentages on the taxes they can 
gather from the natives. 

The Dutch East Indies are sometimes divided into (1) Java and (2) 
the Outposts. In Java the natives are forced to submit to the "cul- 
ture system" inaugurated by Van den Bosch in 1832, which amounts 
practically to forced labor, under Government supervision, in the cul- 
tivation of coffee. (Until 1870 the culture system extended also to 
sugar, indigo, pepper, tea, and tobacco.) The Outposts never had the 
culture system, with the exception of a few residencies. 

Religious liberty is provided for by the "Regulations." 

As to the administration of justice, the laws for Europeans are simi- 
lar to those of the mother country, and are interpreted by European 
judges. Natives are still governed by their own customs and institu- 
tions and are judged largely by their own chiefs. In 1895 the native 
population was about 32,000,000. There were also about 454,000 Chi- 
nese, 24,000 Arabs, and 27,000 other Orientals. The Europeans num- 
bered about 62,001. 



THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES— A SKETCH OF THEIR GROWTH 
AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, BY FRANCIS B. FORBES. 



The following sketch has been compiled exclusively from Parlia- 
mentary Papers and other English publications, the list of which is 
given below. It has been my aim, as far as possible, to tell the story 
in the words of the original reports and dispatches, which have some- 
times been reproduced without acknowledgment. If this has entailed 
a certain amount of repetition, I hope, on the other hand, that the 
narrative has gained in interest more than it may have lost in concise- 
ness, through the many side lights thrown upon the curious social 
system of the Malays and upon the methods by which it has been 
transformed under foreign influence. 

Francis B. Forbes. 

London, November 14, 1898. 

LIST OP DOCUMENTS CONSULTED. 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS. 

Correspondence relating to the affairs of certain native states in the 

Malay Peninsula in the neighborhood of the S. S CI 111. 1874 

Further ditto ditto C1320. 1876 

Ditto ditto ditto C1505. 1876 

Ditto ditto ditto - C1512. 1876 

Ditto ditto ditto C1709. 1877 

Ditto ditto ditto (maps and sketches re- 
ferred to in C 150."). 1876) . C1505. I. 1876 

Straits Settlements. Instructions to the British residents and other 

papers relating to the protected Malay States C2410. 1879 

Straits Settlements. Return for copy of treaty of 1855 between the 
Sultan of Johore and his Tumonggong and for the correspondence 
respecting Muar since the death of the late Sultan of Johore. ... 120. 1879 
Straits Settlements. Instructions to British residents and other pa- 
pers relating to protected Malay States . .... C2410. 1879 

Ditto Papers ditto C3095. 1881 

Ditto Correspondence respecting slavery in Malay 

States C3285. 1882 

Dittc Further ditto C3429. 1882 

Ditto Correspondence respecting protected Malay 

States C3428. 1882 

Ditto ditto C4192. 1884 

Ditto Agreement between S. of state forcolonies and 

Sultan of state and territory of Johore C4627. 1886 

Ditto Agreement between governor of Straits Settle- 
ments and Sultan of Pahang C5352. 1888 

Ditto Further correspondence protected Malay States C4958. 1887 

Ditto ditto C5566. 1888 

Ditto ditto C5884. 1889 

Ditto Papers relating to ditto C6222. 1890 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1890... C6576. 1892 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1891... C6858. 1893 

Ditto Reports on the ditto Repts. for 1892... C7228. 1893 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1893... C7546. 1894 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1894... C7877. 1895 

Ditto ditto Repts. for 1895... C8257. 1896 

Ditto Federated Repts. for 1896... C8661. 1897 

647 



648 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Correspondence respecting the federation of the protected Malay States, May, 
1893, to December, 1895. (Taiping, 1896.) 

Minutes of the session of chiefs of the federated Malay States held at Kuala 
Kangsar, Perak, on 14, 15, 16, 17 July. 1897. (Taiping, 1897.) 

London Chamber of Commerce Journal, December 5th, 1889. 

Address by Lieut. Col. Sir Andrew Clarke, G. C. M. G., C. B., C. I. E., on "The 
economic development of the Malay Peninsula." 

Royal Institution of Great Britain, May 27th, 1898. Paper by Lieut. General 
The Hon. Sir Andrew Clarke, R. E., G. C. M. G., on "Sir Stamford Raffles and 
the Malay States." 

INTRODUCTORY. 

In the early part of this century the British East India Company, 
chiefly through the enterprise of Sir Stamford Raffles, had acquired 
the so-called ' ' Straits Settlements " — Singapore, Malacca, Penang, 
and Province Wellesley. These settlements are dotted along the west 
coast of the Malacca Peninsula, and between them were small Malay 
States, in the affairs of which the East India Company had always 
declined to intervene, a policy which was continued when, later on, 
the Settlements were transferred to the direct authority of the Crown. 

These native States were, however, always in various stages of 
anarchy, and their perpetual quarrels became more and more intoler- 
able. Things reached a crisis in 1872, when, in addition to the squab- 
bles of the Malay chiefs, the Chinese miners in Larut divided them- 
selves into two camps and carried on organized warfare with piracy 
in the neighboring waters. By the end of 1873 the paralysis of trade 
and the decimation of the population had become a serious danger to 
the adjoining British settlements, as Sir Andrew Clarke has well 
described in his address before the Royal Institution on the 27th of 
last May. 

Years of guerrilla warfare [says Sir Andrew Clarke] between rival Malay chiefs 
and their adherents, on the one hand, and between various Chinese secret societies 
and factions, on the other, had put a stop to all legitimate work. Towns and vil- 
lages had been destroyed, mines closed, orchards wasted, and fields left unculti- 
vated for years. 

There was no safety for life and property, no money, no trade, and little food in 
the country. Lawlessness and oppression prevailed everywhere, and those who 
found it hard to live on shore took to the water and made the Straits of Malacca 
the scene of their operations, so that hardly a day passed but some small trading 
vessel would be attacked and burnt after the entire crew had been murdered. 
Probably at no time had the ill fame of the Malacca Straits so truly justified its 
reputation for acts of piracy as in the closing months of the year 1873. 

For particulars of the terrible sufferings and terrible oppression of the Malay 
working classes, men and women, it would be well to consult the reports written 
by the residents and forwarded to the colonial office. Brieily. it may be said that 
while the facts were more than enough to justify the interference of Great Brit- 
ain, far too long delayed, it happened that at this very time influential Malay 
chiefs in Perak, Selangor and Sunjie Ujong sought the assistance of the governor 
of the Straits Settlements to put an end to a state of affairs which had got beyond 
their control, and in Perak the claimant to the supreme power asked that a Brit- 
ish officer might be sent to aid him in the administration of the government of the 
country. 

This was the moment at which it was decided to interfere for this purpose, and 
what is known as the engagement of Pangkor was the result. The governor of 
the Straits Settlements went to Perak, taking with him the officers considered 
best qualified to assist in the difficult task of pacifying Malays and Chinese, put- 
ting down all violence with a firm hand, healing old sores, making, or attempting 
to make, reconciliation of quarrels, restoring to their homes women who had 
been captured and carried into slavery, and dividing the mining lands between 
opposing factions of Chinese. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 649 

IT.— The engagement op pangkor. 

3ir Andrew Clarke, who arrived in Singapore late in 1873, to take 
over the governorship of the Straits Settlements, had been instructed 
by the imperial Government to study the situation carefully, and to 
report as soon as possible. But he found affairs so critical that he 
decided to act at once, on his own responsibility. He had private 
negotiations opened with the headmen of the Chinese, the result of 
which was that all boats, stockades, and arms were delivered up to 
him. At the same time he communicated with the chiefs of Perak, 
whom he invited to meet him to concert about the British protectorate, 
for which they had been persuaded to apply, and in order that the 
disputed succession to the throne of Perak might be settled once for 
all. The last precautions taken by Sir Andrew Clarke before the 
meeting of the chiefs are characteristic of his humanity, his tact, and 
his energy. "I provided a supply of food," he reports, "as I had 
every reason to believe very great distress existed in the river, and I 
also made provisions for removing any troublesome or lawless persons, 
whom it might be necessary to get rid of, to Singapore or Penang." 

Finally, on the 20th of January, 1874, the chiefs of Perak, assem- 
bled at Pangkor at the governor's invitation, signed an engagement 
witnessed by him for placing their State under British protection. 
As this document was the model of others signed soon afterwards by 
the sultans of Selangor and Sunjie Ujong, the following summary will 
be of interest. 

I quote the preamble in full, and give an abstract of the principal 
articles. 

ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE CHIEFS OP PERAK, DATED JANUARY 20, 

Whereas a state of anarchy exists in the Kingdom of Perak, owing to the want 
of settled government in that country, and no efficient power exists for the protec- 
tion of the people and for securing to them the fruits of their industry; and 

Whereas large numbers of Chinese are employed and large sums of money 
invested in tin mining by British subjects and others residing in Her Majesty's 
possessions, and the said mines and property are not adequately protected, and 
piracy, murder, and arson are rife in the said country, whereby British trade and 
interests greatly suffer, and the peace and good order of the neighbouring British 
settlements are sometimes menaced; and 

Whereas certain chiefs, for the time being of the said Kingdom of Perak, have 
stated their inability to cope with their present difficulties, and together with those 
interested in the industry of the country have requested assistance: and 

Whereas Her Majesty's Government is bound by treaty stipulations to protect 
the said Kingdom and to assist its rulers. 

The document goes on to recite the articles of arrangement which 
Governor Sir Andrew Clarke has proposed "as mutually beneficial to 
the independent rulers of Perak, their subjects, the subjects of Her 
Majesty, and others residing in or trading with Perak," the more 
important of which may be summarized as follows: 

The disputes as to the Sultanate are settled by the recognition of 
Abdullah as Sultan, and of Ismail (then acting Sultan) as Sultan 
Muda, the latter to have a pension and a small territory assigned to 
him. Other arrangements as to chiefs are also recited. 

All revenues are to be collected and all appointments made in the 
name of the Sultan. 

The Sultan is to receive and provide a suitable residence for a 
British Resident, "whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all 
questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom." An 



650 TREATY OP PEACE. 

Assistant Resident is to be stationed at Larut, subordinate only to 
the Resident. The costof these Residents and of theirestablishments, 
to be determined by the Governor of the Straits Settlements, is to be 
a first charge on the revenue of Perak. 

A civil list, regulating the income to be received by the Sultan and 
other chiefs and officers, is to be the next charge on the revenues. 

The collection and control of all revenues and the general adminis- 
tration of the country are to be regulated under the advice of the 
Resident. 

As soon as order shall be restored in Perak, one or more British 
officers shall take immediate measures "for restoring, as far as prac- 
ticable, the occupation of the mines and the possession of machinery, 
etc., as held previous to the commencement of these disturbances," 
and the decision of such officers is to be final as to paj'ment foi 
damages. 

The remaining articles refer to boundarj^ adjustments and the paci- 
fication of the district so long disturbed. 

In an address to the London Chamber of Commerce (November 6, 
1889), Sir Andrew Clarke gives a graphic account of his method of 
handling the Malay chiefs and the Chinese : 

The principles on which I acted were very simple. Personal influence has 
always great effect upon natives of the type of the Perak chiefs, and this influence 
I endeavored to apply. Where it was possible, I sought interviews with them and 
pointed out the effects of the evils from which the country was suffering. Their 
real interests were peace, trade, and the opening up of their country. In place of 
anarchy and irregular revenues, I held out the prospect of peace and plenty. I 
found them in cotton. I told them that, if they would trust me, I would clothe 
them in silk. Their rule had resulted in failure. I offered them advisers who 
would restore order from chaos without curtailing their sovereignty. They were 
wiiling to listen to reason, as the vast majority of persons, whether wearing silk 
hats or turbans, usually are. 

The following extract from the same address is valuable on account 
not only of the intimate knowledge displayed of Chinese secret socie- 
ties in British colonies, but of the shrewd suggestions as to the best 
means of keeping them under control by Government. ' ' The troubles 
of the Peninsula," he says, "were largely due to the fighting procliv- 
ities of the Chinese, supported by secret societies, which were directed 
by influential Chinamen, even in Singapore itself. The Chinese secret 
society is a bugbear to some minds, and I may be pardoned for a brief 
reference to it. Secret societies are the natural and inevitable out- 
come of an arbitrary and oppressive government, such as exists in 
China, and the Chinaman, having acquired the hereditary habit of 
creating such organizations, carries it with him to the country of his 
adoption. In China the secret society is doubtless almost entirely 
political, constituting a danger to the State. Transplanted to another 
country, it entails no necessary political dangers and becomes practi- 
cally a species of guild for mutual protection, of the nature of a ben- 
efit or a burial club. 

"Such combinations do, however, frequently lend themselves to 
lawlessnes and crime, or even, as in Larut, to the civil war of rival 
factions. The main evil is the secrecy observed in the deliberations 
and proceedings of these societies. Try to suppress them altogether, 
and you will drive them deeper below the surface and render them 
really dangerous. On the other hand, recognize them so long as they 
keep within the confines of law, insist as far as possible upon open 



TREATY OF PEACE. G51 

meetings and publicity of accounts, and yon will then find a powerful 
lever ready to your hand. You will be able to hold the leaders respon- 
sible for illegality; you may even manipulate the secret society to your 
own ends. This was the course pursued with success in the case of 
the Malay States; and I am indebted to the chiefs of the Chinese 
secret societies for support readily accorded as soon as they under- 
stood the principles upon which my action was based." 

If, in studying the Blue Books of this period, one reads between 
the lines in the light of the above passage, it is possible to realize how 
much of Sir Andrew Clarke's success in calming the Chinese factions 
and in arbitrating their disputes was due to his personal influence 
with the heads of their secret societies. 

After the engagement of Pangkor was signed, more arms were sur- 
rendered, and a bond was executed by leading Chinese, binding them- 
selves "to keep the peace towards each other and towards the Malays, 
in a penalty of 50,000 dollars, as well as to observe certain articles set 
out in the arrangement, and, above all, to entirely complete the dis- 
armament of their stockades." 

Sir Andrew Clarke, in his report to the secretary of state for the 
colonies, just quoted, alludes to another question of grave importance. 
He adds: 

I found at the same time incidentally that women and children had been taken 
captive and were even then detained in slavery, while it was alleged, and posi- 
bly with truth, that the former were kept for the purposes of prostitution against 
their will. Common humanity alone demanded my action under such circum- 
stances, and judging from our past experience of all negotiations with Eastern 
nations, and seeing the evident desire that existed on all sides for impartial arbi- 
tration by British officers of their claims, I decided at once on appointing, with the 
full consent of the Sultan, a commission of three officers to settle the question of 
right to the mines, and to endeavor to discover and restore all women and children. 
I have little doubt, from the character of the officers I appointed, of their success, 
and I expect by the next mail to be able to assure your lordship that this part of 
the question is satisfactorily settled, and the more especially as the Chinese 
agreed to consider the decision of these officers as final. 

Sir Andrew Clarke concluded this dispatch as follows: 

I am perfectly aware, as 1 have already said, that I have acted beyond my 
instructions, and that nothing but very urgent circumstances would justify the 
step I have taken; but I have every confidence that Her Majesty's Government 
will feel that the circumstances at the time — the utter stoppage of all trade, the 
daily loss of life by the piratical attacks on even peaceful traders, and by the fight- 
ing of the factions themselves, and the imminent peril of the disturbances spread- 
ing to the Chinese in our own settlements — justified me in assuming the responsi- 
bility I have taken. 

In a dispatch, about a month afterwards, Sir Andrew Clarke gave 
at length his ideas as to the necessity of Residents in these native 
States, and of the character and scope of their functions. "The 
Malays," he says, "like every other rude Eastern nation, require to 
be treated much more like children, and to be taught; and this espe- 
cially in all matters of improvement, whether in the question of good 
government and organization, or of material improvement by opening 
means of communication, extending cultivation, and fostering immi- 
gration and trade. Such teaching can only be effected by an officer 
living on the spot, whose time should be devoted to carefully study- 
ing the wants and capabilities of each State, and to make himself per- 
sonally acquainted with every portion of the country, and thus fitting 



652 TREATY OF PEACE. 

himself for the post of counselor when the time for opening up the 
country arrives." Again, in the same dispatch, he says: 

By the ninth clause the Sultan, the Baudahara, the Mantri, and other officers 
are to be provided for by a regular civil list to be hereafter arranged; and of 
course the Sultan will be advised to appropriate the balance of his revenue, what- 
ever it may be, to public works and improvements. 

This watching the collection of the revenue and controlling its expenditure will 
form no insignificant part of a Resident's duties; and as far as bringing about a 
good system of government is concerned, will be about the most important por- 
tion of them. 

The collection of the revenue, from whatever source derived, and however 
legitimate, is carried on at present among these States with a perfect absence of 
all system and without any fixed rules or tariff, while it is at all times accom- 
panied by individual instances of extortioa or, as more familiarly known in the 
Chinese and Malay States, by " squeezing." 

To check this, and to induce the Sultan to select proper men for the collection, 
will be the Resident's special care, and the process will not be an expensive one, 
as the staff required will be comparatively small, since the country, intersected as 
it is by rivers, is admirably adapted for the collection of the royalty on the min- 
erals which must pass down these rivers to the sea. 

The revenue on grain and on opium and spirits, ail legitimate sources for rais- 
ing a revenue from, will require much consideration and care, but will. 1 have 
little doubt, hereafter form an important item in the resources of the country and 
afford ample means for its development. 

The dispatch closes with these earnest words: 

I have now endeavored to explain to your lordship all that has taken place in 
this last intervention in the affairs of Perak, as well as all the terms of the engage- 
ment then entered into between the chiefs, and my reasons for according to those 
terms my cordial assent. 

I trust your lordship will understand that by so giving my assent I have in no 
way bound Her Majesty's Government to any particular cause, and that it is per- 
fectly possible now to withdraw from the position I have temporarily assumed. 

But your lordship will, I feel sure, allow me at the same time to express my 
conviction and that of all the members of my councils that, looking to the long 
and intimate relations of Great Britain with the Malayan States, to the proximity 
of these settlements, and to the state of anarchy and misrule which has for some 
years prevailed in Perak and Selangor, the time has arrived when, as a nation, we 
shall be neglecting a great and paramount duty if we any longer delay that inter- 
vention which the causes of civilization and good order now so loudly demand. 

The governor's action was received with the greatest satisfaction 
by all his fellow-countrymen who had important interests in the 
Straits Settlements and vicinity, as was shown by published resolu- 
tions and letters from the chamber of commerce in Singapore and the 
Straits Settlements Association in London. And on March 11, 1874, 
the Times published a letter, giving to the English public a suc- 
cinct account of what had passed, and predicting the immediate 
advance in prosperous development which the protected States would 
show as the consequence of the new order of things. Under the sig- 
nature of "Malacca" was veiled the personality of a man well known 
for his familiarity with Malayan affairs, and I quote the following 
passage, which touches the crucial point of the whole question: 

The success of Sir G. Clarke's experiment, however, will depend materially on 
the personal character of the resident who is to represent British power and to 
exercise British influence. If he is liked and respected by the Malays, he will lead 
th«m easily, as the Brookes have done in Borneo. But to be liked and respected 
he must understand them, their language, character, and habits. He must be 
patient, cool, and firm, and he must be sober, truthful, and incorruptible. 

On September 24, 1874, Lord Carnarvon, secretary of state for the 
colonies, wrote to Governor Clarke, complimenting him on the ability, 
zeal, and tact which he had displayed, approving generally of his 



TEEATY OF PEACE. 653 

course and giving him a message for the native chiefs, in consequence 
of which the following proclamation was issued on the 2d of Novem- 
ber: 

PROCLAMATION OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE THREE SETTLEMENTS, SINGAPORE, 
PENANG, AND MALACCA, TO THE MALAY RAJAHS, ELDERS, AND PEOPLE, TO MAKE 
KNOWN TO THEM THE GOOD WISHES OF THE GREAT QUEEN OF ENGLAND. 

Whereas disturbances existed in several of the Malayan States in the neighbor- 
hood of the Straits Settlements, and the chiefs and rulers of the said States being 
unable themselves to keep the peace and protect the people under their rule, 
applied to this Government for assistance and protection, and 'this Government 
intervened to settle such disturbance and to aid the said chiefs and rulers to gov- 
ern their respective countries, and arrangements were made with them for that 
purpose; and whereas the said matters were referred to the Government of the 
Great Queen in England: Now, this is to make known to all that a letter lias 
been received from the Right Honorable Earl oi Carnarvon, of Highclere Castle, 
Newbury, high steward of the University of Oxford, constable of Carnarvon Cas- 
tle, doctor of civil law, principal secretary of state to Her Most Gracious Majesty 
Victoria, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, and 
Empress of India, minister of the Great Queen, in which the minister giving the 
orders of the Great Queen's Government says, in that letter about the engage- 
ment entered into at Pulo Pangkor. in Perak. on the 1 (J th of January, 1874, that the 
engagement is approved by the Great Queen: and the minister charges the gov- 
ernor of the three settlements to acquaint the several chiefs who have entered 
into these agreements that Her M ijesty's Government have learnt with nmch 
satisfaction that they have now combined under our advice to put a stop once for 
all to the reign of anarchy and piracy which has unhappily so long been allowed 
to prevail, and which naturally resulted in the cessation of all legitimate trade 
and the impoverishment of the country, and at the same time to inform them 
that Her Majesty's Government will look to the exact fulfilment of the pledges 
which have now been voluntarily given, and will hold responsible those who vio- 
late the engagement which has been solemnly agreed upon. 

The minister of the Great Queen also says that it is to be hoped that the wealth 
and material prosperity of the Malay Peninsula may largely increase, and that 
the chiefs and people may gradually be led to understand that their true interests 
are b st served by the natural and unrestricted growth of commerce which will 
surely follow upon the maintenance of peace and* order within their respective 
territories; and this we make known to all the rajahs, chiefs, and people that may 
be made acquainted with the wishes of the Great Queen's Government. 

By his excellency's command, 

T. Braddell, 
Acting Colonial Secretary. 

Colonial Secretary's Office, 

Singapore, November 2nd, 1874- 

This proclamation was communicated by Sir Andrew Clarke to Lord 
Carnarvon, who, on December 17, conve3 7 ed to the governor his formal 
approval thereof. 

At a meeting of the legislative council of the Straits Settlements, in 
September, Governor Clarke had made a long and carefully weighed 
statement of the late situation and of the measures he had taken to 
bring order out of chaos, for the successful prosecution of which he 
asked their approval, their advice, and their support. 

He appealed to history to show the evil results of the appearance of 
foreigners in Malaya, anxious only for gain and careless of any feel- 
ing of responsibility toward the natives, and he quoted the following 
extract from a recent paper by Mr. Braddell, the acting colonial 
secretary : 

Before the downfall of the Malayan Empire at Malacca the trade of the penin- 
sula was collected in certain depots, and there was then a recognized government, 
which, although low in the scale of civilization, afforded protection to producers 
and encouraged traders to visit the ports. The trade remained at Malacca, under 
the Portuguese, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, but gradually dec! ined 
with the authority of the Portuguese in these seas; and when the Dutch took 



654 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Malacca, in 1641, the evil effects of the system of European nations establishing 
themselves in the native States and monopolizing the trade of those States had 
become visible in the decrease of population, the loss of trade, and the growth of 
piracy. The effect of the establishment of Europeans in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was to destroy the power and the prestige of the native gov- 
ernments, and as the Europeans did not afford any protection beyond the walls of 
their factories, anarchy and confusion arose. The people were left without pro- 
tection for life and property: they were discouraged from agriculture and trade, 
not only by oppression and enforced monopolies on the part of Europeans in their 
neighborhood, but also from the want of protection before afforded by their own 
governments. 

Each petty rajah assumed independence of his former suzerain, and in his own 
district exercised, as far as he could, power at the expense of the people within his 
jurisdiction. It was to have been hoped that the establishment of British colonies 
in the Malayan Peninsula at the end of the last and the beginning of the present 
century would have been beneficial to the neighboring native States. And so per- 
haps it was at first: but the Indian government were early dissatisfied with the 
result of the establishment at Penang, and soon stringent orders were given to the 
local government not to interfere in the native States on any pretext whatever. 
The result has been unfortunate as encouraging the existence, by noninterference, 
of a state of misgovernment and anarchy difficult to describe, and which might in 
a great measure have been prevented by an intelligent fostering of the existing 
native governments, protecting them not merely from external aggression, but 
also from internal troubles. 

Governor Clarke impressed upon his council the important fact that 
the document signed at Pangkor was not a treaty, but an engagement 
voluntarily entered into by the chiefs among themselves; that the 
chiefs had practically come to the British authorities saying, "Give 
us people to open up our country; we are quite ready to take your 
advice and be guided by your influence." He thought that, even if 
this new policy might possibly entail some sacrifices at first on the 
Straits Settlements, the effect would be commensurate, and that, apart 
from their responsibilities as officials or as traders, or apart from their 
higher duties as Englishmen to their flag, their country, and their 
Queen, the success of the Malays themselves, whenever they had 
come under English influence and protection, was quite sufficient to 
justify the course he had adopted, or even a stronger and more deter- 
mined one. "This," he said, "is a great and imperial question to 
think out and consider. I do not ask you now to come to any final 
decision upon it, or to decide without thought and in haste; but, 
standing as we do here on the grave of ancient empires, let it be now 
our mission, gentlemen, to gather together their scattered fragments 
and form them into the cradle of a new and fair dominion, federated 
in justice and morality, and which will exceed in usefulness to man- 
kind, and in honor to our nation and faith, all that has preceded it on 
these shores." 

Such was the policy by which the British Government was guided 
in assuming a protectorate over the Malay State. If it was inspired 
by high considerations of humanity and morality; it was none the less 
statesmanlike and practical. And it may fairly be said that it has 
been unswervingly pursued by the Residents and other British officers 
during nearly a quarter of a century of successful administration. 

III. — Early Troubles. 

At the start Governor Clarke made only five British appointments, 
a Resident for each of the three States, with an Assistant Resident 
in Perak and one in Selangor. All of these gentlemen, whether as 
military officers, barristers, or members of the Straits Settlements 
civil service, had learned to speak the Malay language, were ac- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 655 

quainted with the country, and had experience in dealing with the 
people. 

To give an idea of the qualifications for which the governor sought 
in his officers I quote from his report of their appointment to the 
colonial office. Speaking of Mr. Birch, who was to be Resident at 
Perak, the governor had not selected him until — 

By the success which had attended one or more missions, with which he had 
been lately intrusted, he had given evidence of his ability, and still more, of his 
tact and judgment in dealing with natives. His experience, long and varied, as a 
settlement officer in Ceylon, as well as his intimate acquaintance with oriental 
life, customs, and habits, point out Mr. Birch as in every way eminently qualified 
for undertaking the task of initiating all the practical measures essential for the 
future administration of a semicivilized country. 

Mr. Birch further possesses in a remarkable degree untiring physical energy and 
endurance — powers of infinite value to one whose duties will necessarily entail 
upon him constant exposure to climate and. weather in a country which, the 
navigable rivers having once been left, affords as communication but ill-defined 
paths through swamps and through the thickest of tropical jungle, and as shelter 
from the sun and rain often no other protection than that given by a kanjang, or 
native mat. 

These few men, inspired by a high ideal of duty to their own coun- 
try, set to work to bring back settlers by restoring confidence, with 
such success that in the mining district of Larut, where the popula- 
tion had dwindled to 4,000, the steady influx of immigration during 
eleven months brought the number up to 33,000, of whom 26,000 were 
Chinese. The British officers tried to infuse some order into the col- 
lection of the revenue and, by starting roadmaking and other public 
works, to turn State expenditure into profitable channels. 

The Sultans, however, seemed indifferent or helped themselves as 
before to the taxes as collected, in defiance of the engagement of 
Pangkor, while the chiefs sulked, as their promised "allowances" 
could not be regularly paid until the collection of revenue was better 
organized. The Residents established courts, either following the 
Indian code or seeing that substantial justice was administered in a 
rough-and-ready fashion according to Malay law and custom, and took 
in hand the appointment of native headmen responsible for order in 
the villages and rural districts. Native police forces were organized 
and proper police stations built as fast as possible. 

Slow as progress was, and great as were the difficulties encountered 
among both Malays and Chinese, the reports at the end of 1874 never- 
theless showed that much good preliminary work had been accom- 
plished; but they were no sooner published in England than they 
became the target for criticisms which were probably focused by 
Lord Stanley, of Alderly, in a private letter to Lord Carnarvon. The 
main objection in each case seems to have been that the Resident had 
made too much of himself or his office, whereas his influence should 
have been kept in the background and the native ruler in question 
alone made to appear to decide and to order. 

Lord Carnarvon forwarded this document to Governor Jervois with 
a request for explanations and added: 

I desire clearly to impress upon you that, in my opinion, the British Residents 
should, in all ordinary cases, confine their action to advice tendered by them to 
the native rulers, under whose direction the government of the country should be 
carried on. 

The governor, in reply, showed that many of the criticisms were 
based on ignorance of the circumstances, and while admitting that in 
some cases the name of the native ruler ought properly to have been 
used, he insisted that no injustice had been done. 



656 TREATY OF PEACE. 

As a rejoinder to the claim that the Resident's policy should not be 
prominent enough to make the native ruler feel his dependent posi- 
tion too much, the governor adds: 

If the native chief once felt certain that the Resident was there only to "advise." 
and that in the event of his a4viee being refused he would simply say, " 1 wash 
rny hands of the affair," and then wait inactive till the next opportunity of offer- 
ing his advice occurred, from that moment his position in the native state would 
be worse than useless. Then the chiefs, whatever the Resident might say, would 
either ignore him completely or tell the people he was a party to and approved of 
their proceedings. 

Sultan Abdullah, of Perak, who owed his position solely to British 
influence, was the very one who threw most obstacles in the way of 
the new regime, and who seemed to take most pleasure in flouting 
the Resident's advice. Finally Governor Clarke addressed him a 
characteristic letter, from which the following are extracts: 

First, then, our friend* must never forget that our Resident in Perack is our 
representative, acting with our authority; and our friend will best consult his 
own interests and those of his country, by following the advice of the Resident; 
and our friend must also remember that by the sixth clause of the Pulo-Pangkor 
engagement, it is provided that the Resident's advice must be asked and acted 
upon by our friend on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and 
customs; and, again, by the tenth clause, it is provided that the collection and con- 
trol of all revenues and the general administration of the country be regulated 
under the advice of the Resident. 

Our friend, therefore, must not forget that by this engagement not only our 
friend, but the other chiefs of Perak, bound themselves not to collect any taxes 
whatever, such taxes and all revenues being entirely in the hands of the British 
Resident. 

We now send to our friend a copy of a proclamation which we have issued with 
regard to the collection of the revenue of Perak, and this proclamation must be a 
warning to everyone, whether rajah or ryot, never to attempt to collect any tax 
or any sort of revenue without distinct written instructions from the Resident 
of Perak, or the Assistant Resident at Larut. And it must also be a warning to 
persons not even to pay such tax to anyone unless they are sure that such persons 
are duly authorized by the Resident to receive it. 

In the same letter, after expressing his regret that a man had been 
killed in Perak by one of the chiefs, and that the Sultan had not 
moved, the governor called on Abdullah to do what was right and 
just without favor. But he adds significantly: 

We seriously caution our friend that in no case is he to exercise or give an order 
for the death of any man of any country, including Malays, without the order for 
his death being made after full and impartial trial and with the signature of 
approval of the Resident, and in cases for a sentence of death the law as given in 
the Koran is that which should be followed. 

As the year 1875 drew to a close, affairs in Perak became more and 
more involved. Ismail, who had been deposed by the chiefs at the 
time of the engagement of Pangkor, continued to be recognized by 
many as their ruler, the more so as he held on to the "regalia," 
which Malays consider to be the high symbol of sovereignty, lie was 
a weak man, wholly under the influence of the chiefs, who had once 
raised him to the Sultanate. On the other hand, Abdullah, the 
rightful Sultan, was in equally bad hands, and, already of vicious hab- 
its, had become a confirmed opium smoker. Between the two, the 
internal condition of Perak seemed to be relapsing into its former 
anarchy, and the " advice" of the Resident was practically unheeded. 
Finally, Governor Sir William Jervois, who had succeeded Sir 
Andrew Clarke in May, after making a tour of the States, and con- 

*The term "our friend" in Malay does not imply anything more than the pro- 
noun "you" in English, 



TREATY OF PEACE. 657 

f erring with the various chiefs, came to the conclusion that nothing 
remained but to have Perak governed by British officers in the name 
of the Sultan; that the policy of mere "advice" must at once be 
changed into one of "control." Accordingly, on October 15, he issued, 
on his own responsibility, a long proclamation, reciting the failure of 
the chiefs to observe the engagement of Pangkor, and their self-con- 
fessed inability to restore order or to govern the country, and 
announcing that, in compliance with the request of the Sultan and 
chiefs, the British Government had decided to administer Perak in 
the name of the Sultan through commissioners with full powers; that 
a council of Malays of the highest rank would assist the commis- 
sioners, and that all people were warned to conduct themselves 
accordingly. 

This proclamation was posted about Perak, apparently without inci- 
dent, until, on the 1st November, Mr. Birch, the British Resident, was 
murdered, and the situation at once became very critical. Troops 
were immediately brought from the nearest depots in the Straits and 
telegrams for reenf orcements sent to Hougkong and India. The secre- 
tary of state for the colonies telegraphed on the 14th that two regi- 
ments, with artillery, would leave Calcutta as soon as possible, but 
that the Imperial Government would in no case "sanction their use 
for annexation or any other large political aims." 

In a strong dispatch of December 10 to Governor Jervois, Lord Car- 
narvon expressed his surprise that a sudden and "serious departure 
from the policy which had been, after much consideration, sanctioned 
by Her Majesty's Government, and which, it must be remembered, 
was in the nature of an experiment to be very cautiously proceeded 
with, was being commenced or even contemplated." The first inti- 
mation to the colonial office had been the governor's dispatch, which 
arrived nearly three weeks after his telegram announcing the dis- 
astrous consequences of his action. Furthermore, this change of 
policy had been in opposition to the tenor of his instructions from 
time to time. 

Lord Carnarvon declined to enter into the question of how far gov- 
erning by British officers in the Sultan's name really differed from an 
assumption of actual sovereignty, or how far it is likely to succeed. 
But he pointed out that if the governor had been strongly convinced 
of the inefficiency of existing arrangements, and felt that he had 
devised a better system, he would have been right in submitting the 
ease to the colonial office, where it could have been considered. If 
Inhere had been urgent need of an instant change of policy, of which 
no evidence had been sent, the governor could have asked instruc- 
tions by telegraph. But it was difficult to understand the omission 
of this obvious duty, save by supposing that the governor had been 
so convinced of the soundness of his own judgment that he had acted 
in lamentable ignorance of the fact that he had no authority what- 
ever for what he was doing. Lord Carnarvon regretted, therefore, 
that, as at present advised, he was quite unable to approve the gov- 
ernor's action with regard to Perak. 

The murder of Mr. Birch had been committed just at the close of 
the Ramadan, or fasting month, when Mahometan intolerance and 
fanaticism are always at their worst. There is good reason to suppose 
that the crime itself may have been an act of private vengeance, but 
it is certain that the occasion was seized as a propitious moment for a 
revolt, for which certain chiefs were more or less prepared, and for 
kindling into flame all the smoldering embers of lawlessness. 
T P 42 



658 TREATY OF PEACE. 

The Imperial Government had never blinked the fact that with- 
drawal from Perak was impossible, nor did it lose a moment in dis- 
patching sufficient forces to quell the insurrection, to protect life and 
property, and to punish the guilty. 

The military operations were sharp and decisive, the chiefs were 
cowed by their severe lesson, and the people learned that "British 
protection " meant absolute security in the future against the ruin 
that had come from internecine war and piracy. 

When, therefore, after the disturbances, the Residents resumed 
their original functions of "advisers," their prestige had been so 
much increased by recent events that there was no further trouble in 
the gradual development of that policy of "control" which Governor 
Jervois had attempted to establish by a stroke of his pen. 

Three men, charged with the murder of Mr. Birch and of his attend- 
ants, were captured during the disturbances. They were tried before 
a rajah appointed by the Sultan of Perak, and two British assessors 
named by the governor. All were found guilty and sentenced to 
death, but on the advice of the governor, the Sultan commuted the 
sentence of two of them to penal servitude for life. The other, after 
confessing his own guilt, was hanged in the presence of the Sultan 
and of his principal chiefs. 

It was known that some natives of very high rank were not only 
directly concerned in the murder, but in the subsequent disturbances, 
and finally the Maharajah Lela, with six others, was solemnly tried 
before a court consisting of two rajahs, appointed by the regent of 
Perak, and two British assessors named by the governor. 

The prisoners were defended by an English barrister, and the pro- 
ceedings were in all respects like those of an English court, save that 
the trial was carried on in the Malay language, and that the examina- 
tion and cross-examination by counsel for the defense were made by 
him through the court. After a trial lasting eight days, which the 
English counsel for the defense admitted to have been very fair, all 
the prisoners were found guilty and sentenced to death; but again the 
governor and council intervened on the side of mercy, and only the 
Maharajah Lela, a district headman, and another were hanged. The 
others were sentenced to penal servitude for life. 

The ex-Sultan Ismail, who was suspected of at least connivance in 
the outrages and revolt, surrendered himself to the British authorities 
in Penang; but, after careful inquiry, was allowed to remain under 
surveillance in Johore. At the same time Ismail surrendered the 
"regalia" of Perak, and so put an end to an unpleasant question. 

The evidence of Sultan Abdullah's complicity with the whole con- 
spiracy seemed direct, and he, with several of his chiefs, was invited 
to go to Singapore, and to appoint a regent during his absence. With 
the approval of the secretary of state for the colonies, the executive 
council in Singapore, presided over by Governor Jervois, made a 
thorough investigation of the case, and decided that Abdullah's con- 
duct had been such as to preclude his being allowed to return to Perak, 
while it was equally undesirable that he should remain elsewhere in the 
Malay Peninsula, where he would be subject to intriguing influences. 
A proclamation was accordingly issued declaring that he was no longer 
Sultan, and he and the chiefs were detained in Singapore till their 
deportation as political prisoners to a more distant British possession. 

No troops were withdrawn until the death sentences had been 
executed under the orders of the courts. 



TREATY OP PEACE. 659 

IV. — The residents at work. 

During the disturbed period the future government of the protected 
States had continued to be the subject of anxious thought and corre- 
spondence both by the imperial authorities and those in the Straits 
Settlements. Governor Jervois suggested on more than one occasion 
that direct annexation might yet prove to be the simplest solution of 
the difficulty, but Lord Carnarvon continued to have faith in Sir Andrew 
Clarke's policy of a protectorate, which he insisted should at any rate 
be given a longer and fairer trial than had yet been possible. 

Writing in this sense on June 3, 1876, he recommended the governor 
to establish in each State a mixed council for the Sultan, as this would 
give a chance to some of the principal chiefs to take a useful part in 
the administration of the country. It would, moreover, give the Resi- 
dent and other officers on the council opportunity to gauge the strength 
of native feeling on questions of proposed reform, and such knowledge 
would tend to an exercise of greater discrimination in the nature of 
the advice given by the Resident. 

Whatever [Lord Carnarvon adds] may be the ultimate policy which it may be 
necessary to adopt in the Malay Peninsula, it is clearly our object to make the 
best use of existing materials, and with this view it should be our present poiicy 
to find and train up some chief or chiefs of sufficient capacity and enlightenment 
to appreciate the advantages of a civilized government, and to render some effec- 
tual assistance in the government of the country. 

In the same dispatch he repeats that he "thinks it undesirable that 
the British officers should interfere more frequently, or to a greater 
extent than is necessary in the minor details of government." 

On the other hand, he urges the expediency of fixing the allowances 
to the Sultans and chiefs with as little delay as possible, " so that the 
chiefs should understand their interest in supporting the system of 
revenue devised by" the Resident. The chiefs, moreover, should be 
clearly informed that any collection of revenue by them would entail 
the stoppage of their allowances. 

In the spirit of Lord Carnarvon's policy of making the best use of 
existing materials, local government in the villages and rural districts 
was left to the native headmen, as to whom in the State of Perak, 
Governor Jervois writes as follows to the colonial office . 

In every village of Perak there is a headman or "pungulu," who, subject to 
good behavior, generally holds his office by right of descent. The pungulus of 
villages are subject to the datu or headman of "the district, and under him collect 
the local taxes, receiving for their services a percentage thereon, arrest offenders, 
are responsible for the peace of their villages, and provide, on requisition from 
the datu, a certain number of men and boats for the public service. Such beinsr 
the custom of the country, the establishment of a police force, with duties similar 
to those performed by the datus and pengulus, would be regarded unfavorably, 
as subversive of former precedent and as antagonistic to the just influence of the 
headmen. Nearly all the villagers in a village in Perak are more or less related 
to each other, so that upon the commission of any crime or misdemeanor the 
police might have much difficulty in tracing and securing the offenders, while the 
pungulu, on the other hand, responsible as he is for the order of the village and 
anxious as the villagers would be to support their chief, would have no such diffi- 
culty. Taxes again would be paid more willingly to the pungulu than to the 
police officer, whom the natives might not regard as the rightful collector of their 
local imposts. 

At the same time Governor Jervois, in proposing his scheme for the 
Perak police force, says: 

The country then will be divided, as at present, into districts, over each of which 
will be a datu, reporting at stated intervals to the ruler of the state, and over 



660 TREATY OP PEACE. 

each village in a district a pungulu, responsible and reporting periodically to the 
datu. If a datu or pungulu be guilty of any misdemeanor, such as "squeezing" 
the people or collecting illegal taxes, he will be liable to be deprived of his office. 
Under this system I propose that the police shall be stationed in positions from 
whence they can readily be made available for the support of the datus and pun- 
gulus, and, when necessary, for the maintenance of law and order in the district. 

It will also be necessary to station police at the mines, the custom-houses, on the 
seacoast, and at the Residencies. 

The mines are the principal seats of Chinese labor, and here police stations are 
more especially necessary, to prevent faction fights among the Chinese and gener- 
ally to keep in order the Chinese population, which is beyond the control of a 
Malay headman. Such a population must be managed by a Chinese headman, 
and police are required to keep the peace between the Chinese and the Malays. 
Of course, the same applies to places having a mixed population of Chinese, Klings, 
and Malays. 

The presence of police at the mouths of rivers is necessary for the prevention 
of smuggling and in connection with the collection of excise dues. Police are 
also required at the custom-houses to act as excise men, to support the European 
collector of revenue and enforce his authority, and to guard the collections, 
especially from the Chinese population, which invariably collect around a custom- 
house. 

A force of police, irrespective of the guard, is necessary also at the Residencies, 
which will be at the centers of government, for the conduct of business, the trial 
of cases, the conveyance of messages, and to act as boatmen. 

Governor Jervois further recommended that the police force should 
he selected from the Malay race, but that natives of Perak should not 
be employed as police in their own state. 

Besides the police, a Resident's guard of about 200 Sikhs and 
Pathans was formed under a British commandant, who was also super- 
intendent of police, and responsible directly to the Resident. The 
guard and police were all armed with rifles and bayonets. A part of 
the force was also to be instructed in artillery drill. 

As to revenue, by far the largest item was the export duty on tin, 
the mining of which had been the main attraction of immigrants 
(chiefly Chinese) to the protected states. Next in amount came the 
import duty on opium, and the remainder was raised from various 
excise dues, land rents, harbor dues, and taxes on houses, vehicles, 
pawnbrokers, etc. Most of these taxes were, in kind, such as the 
people had long been accustomed to pay, but owing to the regularity 
and justice which British officers had introduced into their imposition 
and collection, not only was the revenue largely increased but the 
burden on the population was lighter than in the old days of arbitrary 
"squeezing." 

A treasurer at the headquarters of each state collected the princi- 
pal taxes, while districts were under collectors, who often acted as 
magistrates. All public expenditure was defrayed by the treasurer, 
and local current expenses were settled by the collectors, under sanc- 
tioned estimates. Where the revenues of any particular district were 
insufficient to meet the local expenditure, the necessary funds were 
supplied by the treasurer, in whose hands all accounts were centered. 
An officer appointed by the governor visited the various treasuries 
and offices throughout the States once a year, to audit the public 
accounts, to report thereon, and to inform the governor as to the 
general condition of affairs. 

Such were the essential features of the original revenue system of 
the protected States. There were early differences of detail in the 
three States, and modifications of practice have necessarily resulted 
from the experience gained as population and revenue grew together. 
But the principle of retaining the sole control both of taxation and 
expenditure in the hands of the Residents has remained unchanged 
to this day. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 661 

For the year 1877, the total revenue of the three States was in 
round figures $640,000 and the expenditure $622,000. Of the latter, 
rather less than $80,000 went in allowances to the sultans and chiefs, 
while the Residents, officers, and establishments cost nearly $250,000. 
The total police forces were about 800 men, who had cost only $112,000. 
These early figures are interesting. 

As tin mining was the great industry, and the Chinese immigrants 
were those who worked the mines to the best advantage, this class of 
the population became the mainspring of the country's prosperity, 
but at the same time required close attention from the rulers. 

Certain customs of land tenure and mining were found to exist be- 
fore the protectorate, and these, as far as possible, were allowed to 
form the basis of proper laws and regulations. The customs varied 
originally in the different States, and some perplexity arose in later 
years from their divergence, but uniform land and mining codes were 
finally adopted by the Federation. 

Efforts were made by the government to attract foreign capital and 
enterprise to the working of the tin mines, and considerable sums were 
invested in foreign machinery and plant. These enterprises can not 
be said to have met with very marked success, but with the improved 
means of communication so rapidly developed by the States, they may 
have a more prosperous future in store for them. 

The importance of the tin output is shown by the fact that about 
47,000 tons of this metal were exported in 1896, yielding an aggregate 
revenue to the Federation of over $3,100,000. 

Valuable, however, as the mining industry was, especially at the 
start, by attracting thousands of immigrants and by furnishing an 
ample and secure source of revenue, it was not considered prudent to 
allow the future prosperity of the States to rest on a single article of 
commerce, the supplies of which might fall off materially in time. 
Nearly the whole country was forest or impassable jungle, but the 
soil is rich and adapted for the cultivation of most tropical products. 

The attention of the Residents was therefore soon directed to the 
encouragement of agriculture. New districts were opened up as fast 
as funds were available, by the cutting of new roads. The govern- 
ment botanists in Singapore and the authorities in Kew Gardens 
studied the local flora and gave to the public information as to what 
was already there, and what might be made to grow there. The 
States made the acquisition of land easy for planters, and gave assist- 
ance by money and otherwise to infant agricultural enterprises. The 
cultivation of rice, coffee, and other staple articles has been fostered, 
and inducements have been offered to foreign settlers to cultivate 
large estates for which capital, the command of labor, and modern 
systems are indispensable. With wise foresight, the Residents have 
also endeavored to check the alienation for mining purposes of too 
much State land in any one district, and to bring forward agricul- 
turists, even though the immediate effect of this policy might be to 
retard much needed public works, through want of the new revenue 
which the mines would have afforded at once. It was believed that 
agricultural development, though slower, would be a greater boon to 
the people in the long run. 

A forestry department was also gradually established in Perak for 
the proper conservation and working of this great source of national 
wealth. A scientific officer, who has studied in the corresponding 
department in India, is in charge of this. 

In connection with agriculture, irrigation works were begun at an 



662 TREATY OF PEACE. 

early date, and are still being steadily carried on at a large cost to th6 
States. But State expenditure in this way insures a future revenue 
from the imposition of a water rate. 

In a country which was found destitute of any means of communi- 
cation beyond the rivers and an occasional native path or elephant 
track, road and bridge making was one of the first duties of the Resi- 
dents. The difficulties were considerable, the money was not always 
available, the staff was small, but their energy was great and their 
determination stubborn. The country is now traversed by a network 
of several thousand miles of roads and paths, the main routes being 
well graded and macadamized. The latest great road, completed at 
a cost of nearly $1,500,000, connects the Statesof Selangor and Pahang. 
It is about 85 miles in length, and is carried across the main moun- 
tain range of the peninsula at a height of 2,700 feet. 

Railways followed roads in due course, and about 150 miles were 
being operated in 1896 by the States of Perak and Selangor. In Negri 
Sembilan there is a short line of 25 miles, operated by a private com- 
pany, but with a State guaranty of interest on a certain capital. The 
total receipts from these railways in 18!)6 were $1,345,000. 

As to other public works, after dwellings for the Residents and their 
staff, the construction of police stations, barracks, hospitals, and 
prisons had first to be attended to. Custom-houses, courts, and other 
Government offices were put up by degrees afterwards. There is a 
good system of State telegraphs throughout the country. 

The question of native education has always been before the Resi- 
dents, and both vernacular and English schools were established at 
an early date. It was felt that the future success of the new regime 
depended upon a more intelligent appreciation of its advantages than 
was possible so long as the Malays continued to be proud of their 
childlike ignorance. Specially was education looked forward to as 
the only means of raising the character and status of the native head- 
men and of creating a larger class of Malays capable of taking part 
in local government. 

I find, however, in many of the reports expressions of discourage- 
ment and regret at the meager results which seemed to have been 
obtained. Notwithstanding this, the system was continued in a spirit 
of perseverance that was most creditable, and the education officer of 
the new federation must find the ground well prepared for his work. 
In the latest report before me (1896) from Perak the Resident writes: 

His Highness the Sultan takes much interest in Malay education, and on my 
return to Perak, after an absence of some years, he drew my attention to the 
advance that had been made, and pointed out how easily the Malays can be led in 
such matters by those who understand their character. At first the common 
Malays were opposed to education, as they were to vaccination; now they have 
faith in both, and this result has been obtained by patience on the part of the gov- 
erning authorities, and not by the enforcement of compulsory legislation. 

The staff of Europeans for all the administrative work which I have 
sketched has never been large, and while it has naturally been increased 
with the growth of population and the multiplication of duties, the 
Residents appear to have been almost always shorthanded. If so 
few Englishmen have been able to accomplish so much, it has been 
because they have been well selected at first, in respect of their apti- 
tudes, their character, and their physique; because they have been 
required to deal justly and sympathetically with the natives, and 
because, remaining for years in the service, they have had time not 
merely to acquire experience of their own but to win respect, perhaps 
affection, from the Malays. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 663 

As appears above, the Sultans have been advised to select State 
councils to act as legislative bodies and to assist in the general gov- 
ernment. These councils consist usually of the Sultan, the British 
Resident, the Rajah Muda (successor to the Sultanate), a few chiefs 
of high rank, some Datus, or district headmen, and often one or two 
Chinese headmen. Before federation the sultans in council also heard 
capital cases and acted as supreme courts of appeal from the magis- 
trates' decisions. 

The State council of Perak had another important function to per- 
form in 1886. The government of Perak, since the deposition of Sul- 
tan Abdullah in 1876, had been in the hands of Rajah Muda Yusuf as 
regent, and the Imperial Government decided that the time had come 
to revive the title of Sultan in his favor. 

The matter came before the State council on the 7th of October, 
1886, when the Resident presented and explained the instructions of 
the secretary of state for the colonies to the governor and those of the 
governor to himself. The native members of the council being invited 
to express their opinions, the Rajah Idris said that he was "altogether 
of opinion that the proposed measure should be carried out; first, 
because of the high birth and position of the regent; second, because 
of his age and experience; third, because, having excellent opportu- 
nities, he (Rajah Idris) has noticed that his highness is always of 
accord with Her Majesty's Resident, as the agent of his excellency the 
governor; fourth, because of the strong language of the telegram of 
the secretary of state, which he confidently believed will be insisted 
on; and lastly, because the regent is a wise prince and would never 
think of attempting to act contrary to the advice of the British Gov- 
ernment. 

It need not be suspected that the third, fourth, and last of Rajah 
Idris's reasons were given with any intention of sarcasm or irony. 
The Rajah had really reached the conviction that British "advice" 
would be good in the future as it had been in the past, and that it 
was simplj- an act of loyalty, no less than of self-interest, to vote for 
a man who could be trusted to follow it. 

The other chiefs expressed similar views in their own words, and it 
was unanimously decided to "recommend to his excellency the gov- 
ernor that His Highness, the Rajah Muda, be elevated to the dignity 
of Sultan and Yang-de-per-tuan of Perak, and that he shall at his 
installation be required to take an oath to govern the country accord- 
ing to the existing system of administration and under control of the 
British Government." 

On the proposal of the new Sultan, who had come to the council 
chamber after his election, the Rajah Idris was then declared by the 
council as "Rajah Muda, with the ancient right of succession to the 
sultanate." Both the Sultan and his successor were subsequently 
granted increased allowances, bringing the former's up to $1,500 and 
the latter's to $750 per month. 

V. — Slavery. 

It will be remembered that by the engagement of Pangkor the chiefs 
had bound themselves to abide by the advice of the British Govern- 
ment on all matters save those affecting the Malay religion and cus- 
toms. This proviso had been inserted by Sir Andrew Clarke, in order 
that the natives should at once feel assured that British protection 
would involve no interference with their hereditary institutions, and 



664 TREATY OF PEACE. 

there can be no question that the signature of the engagement was 
due, in great measure, to the existence of this clause. Sir Andrew- 
Clarke was perfectly well aware that many Malay "customs," having 
the force of law, were repugnant to Western ideas and prejudices, 
but he wisely trusted to time, influence, and education to modify or 
abolish them. 

The arbitrary manner in which Malay custom was interpreted in 
their own interest by the chiefs is well shown in the following note 
to a report by Mr. F. Swettenham, written in 1875: " Malay society 
professes to be governed by the 'Hukum Isharat' (the Divine law of 
the Koran), and the 'adat Malayu' (lit. Malay custom). This last, 
the 'adat Malayu,' when originally drawn up, was a just and equi- 
table code, under which, though occasionally severe punishments 
were given, yet in the main if acted upon might have fairly suited the 
people living under its influence. Successive rajahs in each native 
state have so altered this code that the custom actually in force now 
bears but the vaguest resemblance to it. Every alteration made has 
been for the worse, leaving out the good and introducing bad 'adat,' 
until now whatever is done by a chief consulting only his own incli- 
nation is justified by him as 'adat Malayu.' The very few upright 
chiefs now to be found say there is no longer any 'adat Malayu,' but 
that everything is done by 'adat suka hati,' i. e., the custom by 
which a man can best suit his own purpose and inclination." 

Of all these customs the most abhorrent to men of the Anglo-Saxon 
race was the practice of slavery in various forms, which liad long 
obtained in these states, although the population was Moslem, and the 
special practice of debt, slavery was condemned by all rigid Moham- 
medans. The Imperial Government took up the question seriously in 
1878, by calling on the governor and residents to make full reports, 
and by asking for suggestions "to secure the early alleviation of any 
specially prominent abuses, and the ultimate adoption of a social 
system consistent with those principles on which the general policy of 
this country on the subject is based." 

The Resident at Selangor at once reported that sometime previously 
a woman who had worked as a slave for thirty years in consequence 
of a debt of only $30 had applied to him for relief on hearing that 
slavery was not allowed on British territory. The Resident had at 
once gone to the Sultan, who, while admitting that the laws of Selan- 
gor did not acknowledge slavery in any shape, said that it had become 
a custom, but that the slaves were treated as members of the families 
with which they resided and worked. "His Highness, with great fair- 
ness and liberality, stated that it was his opinion that all slavery 
should be quietly dropped and ignored; that slave debtors should have 
the opportunity of appealing to the magistrates, who should decide the 
cases as they arose." The magistrates should require proof of the 
original debt and of the period during which the debtor had been held 
in servitude. The debtor's work during this time was to be calculated 
on a fixed scale, less a reasonable sum for food and clothing, and if 
the debt was found to be satisfied by services rendered the slave debtor 
was to be released. Should there still be a balance against the debtor, 
he was to have the option of returning to his creditor, to render serv- 
ice at a rate to be determined by the magistrate, or to accept judg- 
ment for the amount, to be enforced in the usual manner. This 
system, the Resident said, had become a rule very generally followed, 
notably by the Sultan, his family, and his near retainers. Thus, with- 
out active interference with the customs of the country and with no 



TREATY OF PEACE. 665 

public notice of the abolition of slavery, the practice was dying out 
and would certainly never be revived under the Sultan's rule. 

In 1882 the governor was able to inform the colonial office that slavery 
was then unknown in Selangor. In Sunjie Ujong also, the governor 
said, the custom might " almost be said to be as extinct as if it had never 
existed. It seems to have, some years ago, died a kind of natural 
death, instructions having been issued by the governor of the Straits 
Settlements to discourage it by all possible means." No proclama- 
tion had been issued, but the resident, by strict enforcement of a sys- 
tem similar to that of Selangor, had in a short time suppressed the 
practice. 

In Perak, however, the case was much more difficult, as appears 
from the reports rendered in 1875, in pursuance of Governor Jervois's 
instructions. Not only was the Malay population many times greater 
than in Selangor, but debt slavery was one of the chief customs, "one 
of the pillars of the State," to use Mr. Swettenham's words, " an abuse 
jealously guarded by the Perak rajahs and chiefs, and especially by 
those who make the worst uses of it." 

Debt slavery had always existed in some form or other in all the 
Malayan States, but the aggravated type which had been developed 
in Perak may best be shown by an abstract of Mr. Birch's report of 
July 28, 1875. 

Any man or woman owing money and unable to pay was liable to 
be taken up by the creditor, without process of law, and made to work 
at the pleasure of the creditor, the debtor's earnings becoming the 
creditor's property, while no wages were given and no credit was 
allowed in reduction of the debt. 

The only chance of freedom was through the payment of the debt 
by some one else; even then, the creditor might, and if a rajah prob- 
ably would, refuse the offer of payment. Sometimes, however, the 
debtor could better himself by getting payment made by another 
person, and by becoming the slave of his new creditor. 

This was the primitive custom of Perak, but a far worse system had 
been introduced, whereby a debt contracted by a married man bound 
his existing wife and children, all children born afterwards, and the 
children's offspring for generations. 

If an unmarried man or woman in debt slavery married, the person 
so taken in marriage and all offspring were equally bound. In these 
cases the wife and children, male or female, were bound to the cred- 
itor as master, forced to the severest kinds of drudgery, ill-treated, 
and punished, sometimes even with death. 

Not only was no allowance made for services rendered by the debtor 
or his family, but the debt was often increased by fines imposed for 
alleged misconduct, or for loss of or damage to the master's property. 

Prostitution was often forced upon the women and girls, but in 
every case was encouraged by the creditor or master, and often half 
the earnings were taken by his wives and concubines. 

Again, the numerous female nurses and servants in the Sultan's 
house were absolute slaves, acquired by force. The Sultan had only 
to send his sword or dagger to any house where there was a girl to 
whom he or any of his household had taken a fancy and the parents 
had to give her up. None of these women dared to attempt to escape, 
and, if one married, the husband and children became also slaves. 
The nurses were fed, but got no clothes. The rest got neither food 
nor clothes. All were believed to be prostitutes for their own support, 
and probably part of their earnings went to the Sultan's concubines. 



6G6 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Men and women belonging to a wild tribe in the interior were 
hunted down and sold into slavery, and Mr. Birch believed that they 
received the worst treatment of all. 

Finally, there had been an active trade in slaves from among the 
Batak tribe in Sumatra before the Dutch took possession of the island. 
The importation had ceased, but, including the children of the original 
captives, many still remained. 

Mr. Birch, however, reported that the mere presence of a British 
Resident had already had some little effect, although, under the Pang- 
kor engagement, he could only offer advice, which, on this subject, 
was almost sure to go unheeded. 

By 1878 not much change for the better was noticeable, save that 
the British officers in the country had not failed to make it clear that 
they objected to aid in the recapture of runaway slaves, and that, in 
one way and another, some fugitives had managed to find refuge in 
the European quarters. The Resident reported that on his arrival 
in 1877 he had found it necessary to refuse to allow the Pesidency 
grounds to be made a shelter for these poor people, feeling that the 
engagement of Pangkor forced him to consider the rights of the mas- 
ters. He had, however, consulted with the regent and the chiefs, who 
had agreed to the following proposals from him: 

1. That as Resident and a judge of the highest court in the country 
he should not be called upon to interfere to restore to their owners 
any slaves who had deserted before his arrival in Perak. 

2. That every person who, on his arrival, was an acknowledged 
slave debtor or slave in possession of his master should be recognized 
as legally in that position, and that the police and magistrates should 
assist in preventing them from leaving their masters, except on pay- 
ment of their debts or redeeming themselves at a fair price. 

3. That the master should be bound to receive the offer of payment 
or redemption and to free the slave forthwith. 

4. That no free person should be reduced to slavery after the day of 
the Resident's arrival in Perak. 

5. That the masters were to feed, clothe, and cease to maltreat their 
slaves, in order to retain their services; and 

6. That the Government, as soon as possible, would itself redeem 
the debts of both classes of slaves on terms to be arranged. 

Later on the Resident (Mr. Low) wrote as follows: 

I concur with the principal natives that the introduction of a measure which 
formed no part of the original contract would practically amount to a confiscation 
of their property, the value of the labor of this class of persons being scarcely 
more than nominal, and I adhere to the opinion that the just and politic course is, 
as has been done, to prohibit any extension or renewal of the practice, either of 
slave indebtedness or slavery, to secure good treatment of the servile classes under 
penalty of enforced manumission, to reduce claims when they come before the 
magistrates to the minimum which justice to the creditor will permit, to await 
the increased means of freeing themselves which must develop for the poorer 
classes upon the extensive introduction of European capital in agricultural indus- 
tries, and finally to purchase at a rate which, in consequence of the notorious dis- 
couragement with which every case is treated by the European officers and the 
courts and the pressure of other influences, will in time be " much diminished 
from what would probably be considered a fair equivalent. 

The secretary of state for the colonies seemed to be satisfied that 
nothing more could well be done at the moment, but he urged the 
Resident and his subordinates to exercise the greatest possible care 
to prevent the enforcement of slavery in any fresh case. 

In 1880, on Governor Weld's arrival at Singapore, he learned that 
cases had occurred in Perak in which Chinese prostitutes who had 



TREATY OF PEACE. . 667 

sold themselves, or been sold by others to the brothel keepers and 
who had tried to escape, had been given back by the police, under 
magisterial direction, to work out their debt by prostitution. This 
matter had been under consideration by the previous governor, who, 
however, had not instructed the authorities in Perak. As it was clear 
that the engagement of Pangkor about Malay custom had, at any rate, 
no application to Chinese, and as, in Governor Weld's words, " the law 
of nature, the law of civilization and true policy, all pointed in one 
direction," the Resident was instructed to stop immediately all recog- 
nition of brothel slavery. 
The following notice was accordingly issued in Perak: 

The government having had under consideration that contracts of an immoral 
character are made in some parts of the state, by which women are kept in 
enforced servitude to the owners of brothels, it is hereby notified that such prac- 
tices, being contrary to morality and to the laws of all civilized states, will not 
be countenanced by the government, nor enforced in the courts, nor by the police 
or other authorities of Perak. 

The law as regards contracts of this nature must be understood to be the same 
in all respects as that which prevails in Her Majesty's colony of the Straits Set- 
tlements, and all persons detained against their will are entitled to claim the 
protection of the magistrates. 

All the authorities concerned continued to make a most careful 
study of the best method of securing the manumission of all slaves at 
the earliest possible moment, and of averting at the same time any 
occasion for serious discontent among those of high rank, who were 
the principal slave owners. The matter was finally in shape to be 
laid before the Sultan of Perak in council on the 9th of October, 1882. 

Some of the native councilors then urged the great difficulty of 
such an early abolition of slavery as was desired by the British Resi- 
dent, and pleaded for an extension of the time over two rice harvests. 
This would give the slaves an opportunity to earn enough to redeem 
their own debts, without the necessity of any compensation money 
being voted by the Government. 

In reply to this, according to the official council minute — 

the Resident said that in his opinion the question of saving money to the State was 
not so important as that of freeing it as soon as possible from the obloquy under 
which it now stood in the eyes of civilized communities. He quite felt that some 
time ought to be given in which preparation might be made for the change which 
the abolition of slavery might be expected to bring about, especially in the house- 
holds where the services of females were indispensable, and with the permission 
of His Highness the Regent, he would suggest for the consideration of the chiefs 
whether it might not be arranged that the slaves and debtors should remain at the 
disposal of their masters untilthe 31st of December, 1883, their services being val- 
ued at half the amount of compensation which maybe decided as appropriate in 
each case, the Government at the end of that period making a free grant to each 
owner of the remaining half of the full value of the servant, and sc providing 
for his absolute manumission and freedom from all further liability at the date 
mentioned, power being reserved to the servant at any time to borrow the whole 
sum from Govermuent on condition of working out in labor on the public works 
that partonly for which he would have served his mastertillthe31stof December, 
1883. Such a measure could not be applied to women, as public employment 
could not be found for them; and the Resident feared that these must remain in 
their present condition until the end of 1883, when they will be entitled to com- 
plete freedom and the balance of the compensation, which might have been 
adjudged or agreed upon, be paid by the State to the master, as in the case of the 
men. 

Resolutions embodying the Resident's plan were then passed unani- 
mously, and on the following day the council voted a body of 
"Instructions for the guidance of courts and magistrates appointed 
to carry out the orders of His Highness the Regent in council for 
the manumission of slaves and bond debtors in Perak." 



668 • TREATY OF PEACE. 

The rest was only detail administrative work, and was completed 
without trouble. As early as May 3, 1883, Governor Weld wrote to 
the colonial office as follows: 

The manumission of the slaves is proceeding rapidly, but -very few freedmen 
will consent to leave their masters or mistresses, whilst th6y, on their part, almost 
universally say that they set them free " for the glory of God," and refuse to take 
the State's money. "How can we take money for our friends who have so long 
lived with us, many of them born in our houses? We can sell cattle, fruit, or rice, 
but not take money for our friends." Such expressions have been used in very 
many cases in different parts of Perak. Many slave children whose own mothers 
are dead always call their mistress "mother," and the attachment is reciprocal. 
In fine, this investigation has brought into notice many of the fine qualities of a 
most interesting and much maligned race, and affords conclusive proof that the 
abuses which are sure to coexist with slavery could not have been general, and 
bore no comparison with those often accompanying negro slavery in our own 
colonies. 

FEDERATION. 

As time rolled on the population of the protected States had rapidly 
increased, while their prosperity had advanced with comparative 
steadiness under the peaceful conditions of the new system. More- 
over, the old tribal enmities had died out, partly from the impossi- 
bility of the sultan of one State invading another without instant pun- 
ishment, and greatly through the new intercourse between the peoples 
which improved communication had made easy. 

On the other hand, while the principles of good government had been 
ingrafted on the natives, both chiefs and people, the British admin- 
istrators necessarily found the details more complicated with the 
growth of the States. The main lines of development had been the 
same in all of them ; but as each Resident had tried to " make the best 
use of existing materials" in his own province, many original differ- 
ences of native " custom," to which I have already alluded, had in time 
become inconveniently divergent. Moreover, other States, the largest 
of which was Pahang, had at intervals placed themselves under impe- 
rial protection. 

Pahang was more backward than Perak and Selangor, and having 
no immediate source of much revenue, pending the development of 
its rich mineral deposits, it had been forced, like the group of small 
States called Negri Sembilan, to obtain pecuniary aid from its 
wealthier neighbors. 

The Residents, the governors, and the colonial office had therefore 
been occupied for some years in elaborating a plan by which all the 
States might be welded together in such a way as to insure greater 
uniformity in their administrative systems, and to foster that higher 
sense of mutual interdependence which might turn them into a united 
nation. 

Finally, in July, 1895, a treaty, which took practical effect on July 
1, 1896, was concluded between the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan, and Pahang, and the governor of the Straits Settlements 
on behalf of the British Government, by which tlrese States agreed to — 

(a) Federation for administration purposes, with an undertaking 
to render mutual assistance. 

(b) The appointment of a Resident-General, as the agent and repre- 
sentative of the British Government, under the governor of the Straits 
Settlements. 

(c) The organization of a force of Indian soldiers for service in 
any part of the Malay Peninsula, or, if required, in the colony of the 
Straits Settlements. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 669 

The following is the text of the treaty: 

Agreement between the governor of the Straits Settlements, acting on the 
behalf of the Government of Her Majesty, the Queen, Empress of India, and the 
rulers of the following Malay States— that is to say, Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and 
the Negri Sembilan. 

1. In confirmation of various previous agreements, the Sultan of Perak, the 
Sultan of Selangor. the Sultan of Pahang, and the chiefs of the States known as 
the Negri Sembilan, hereby severally place themselves and their States under the 
protection of the British Government, 

2. The above-named rulers and chiefs of the respective States agree to consti- 
tute their countries a federation, to be known as the Federated Malay States, to be 
administered under the advice of the British Government. 

3. It is to be understood that the agreement hereby agreed upon does not imply 
that any one ruler or chief shall exercise any power or authority in respect of 
any State other than that which he now possesses in the State of which he is the 
recognized ruler or chief. 

4. The above-named rulers agree to accept a British officer, to be styled the 
Resident-General, as the agent and representative of the British Government, 
under the governor of the Straits Settlements. They undertake to provide him 
with such a salary as is determined by Her Majesty's Government and to follow 
his advice in all matters of administration other than those touching the Moham- 
medan religion. The appointment of the Resident-General will not affect the 
obligations of the Malay rulers toward the British Residents now existing or to 
be hereafter appointed to offices in the above-mentioned federated States. 

5. The above-named rulers also agree to give to those States in the federation 
which require it such assistance in men, money, or other respects as the British 
Government, through its duly appointed officers, may advise; and they further 
undertake, should war break out between Her Majesty's Government and that of 
any other power, to send, on the requisition of the governor, a body of armed and 
equipped Indian troops for service in the Straits Settlements. 

Nothing in this agreement is intended to curtail any of the powers or authority 
now held by any of the above-named rulers in their respective States, nor does it 
alter the relations now existing between any of the States named and the British 
Empire. 

The first main object of the federation was to give the governor an 
adviser — in the words of the first report of Sir Frank Swettenham, 
now Resident-General — "an adviser who should be in touch with the 
rulers and Residents of all the federated States; an adviser who, 
knowing the officials, the people, and the work that was everywhere 
proposed or going on, would speak in sympathy with the interests 
and aspirations of the Malay States and those engaged in developing 
them, whether as officials, planters, miners, or traders." The other 
main object was to secure continuity and uniformity of administration 
in all cases where the conditions were identical. The exceptions are 
"very few." 

Sir Frank Swettenham enumerated the following matters as to which 
either agreement had been already reached or it was hoped to take 
early action: Assimilation of detail in the management of State rail- 
ways, cooperation of all the states in the cost of assisting Indian immi- 
gration, management of savings banks on identical lines, identical terms 
in all the states for the survey, acquisition, and holding of lands, for 
cutting Government timber, and gathering jungle produce; similar con- 
stitution of sanitary boards, similar taxes for vehicles, general similar- 
ity of powers and their application, harbor regulations, boat and fishing 
licenses, etc. 

He ends the paragraph by saying: 

There is no lack of material, but there are hardly enough to deal with it, and 
high speed under a forced dra'ft is destructive to machinery and not perhaps the 
most economical and satisfactory in the long run. 



670 TREATY OF PEACE. 

FEDERAL ORGANIZATION. 

High commissioner. — At the head of this federal organization is 
the governor for the time being of the Straits Settlements, who is 
high commissioner and the direct representative of the Queen-Empress. 

To him, as such, the Resident-General reports and the sultans or 
chiefs of the states may consult with or appeal to him as occasion 
may arise. 

Federal council. — The federal council, meeting in different states 
by rotation, is presided over by the high commissioner, or, in his 
absence, by the Resident-General, or, failing him, by the sultan in 
whose state the council is assembled. The federal council is com- 
posed of the councils of the four federated states. 

In starting the scheme of federation it was not intended to give 
this council any power of legislation, but to make it a consultative 
and advisory body, whose deliberations should pave the way for uni- 
form legislation by the councils of the various states. Equally in the 
matter of finance it appears to be restricted to settling the main lines 
of federal responsibilities, which thereafter form a first charge on the 
different state revenues and are provided for in their budgets. 

Governor Sir C. B. H. Mitchell, in submitting his scheme of feder- 
ation to the secretary of state for the colonies, on May 1, 1895, said: 

The meeting of the. federal council should be attended with as much pomp and 
circumstance as possible. It should draw up. at its first meeting, its own rules 
for the conduct of business, and no efforts should be spared to show the Malay 
rulers that the federal bond would not have the effect of lowering the dignity and 
prestige which now attaches to each sultan and chief. 

The first and so far the only session of the federal council was 
accordingly held at Kuala Kangsar, in Perak, on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 
and 17th July, 1897; that is to say, after a year of federation, all 
the chiefs being present. No better material for indicating the scope 
and nature of the functions of this assembly can be found than in the 
report of its first sessions, of which the following is a summary: 

After short speeches by their highnesses, the sultans of Selangor and 
Perak, the high commissioner made an address, which was translated 
into Malay by the Resident-General. He began : " Sultans, rajahs, and 
chiefs of the Federated States, I rejoice to meet for the first time 
together, in this auspicious year of Her Majesty's jubilee reign, the 
heads of the four States that have, under Her Majesty's protection, 
federated for their common good." He then very briefly sketched the 
results of the first year, alluded to the more important questions of 
finance, and concluded by saying: 

I trust that our meeting in this way will have the effect of improving our knowl- 
edge of each other, and of the needs of the different States, so that we may together 
work for the common good of the federation, the object that Her Majesty and we, 
her agents, have had in view in the advice we have given to you, the heads of the 
States. I declare the meeting of chiefs to be now open. 

A salute of twenty-one guns was then fired. The Resident-General 
spoke of this assemblage of sultans as an unprecedented event. On 
the previous evening he had "heard one sultan congratulating another 
on the happy circumstances of their meeting and contrasting them 
with that of former years, before British protection had been sought, 
when fire and sword were the almost invariable accompaniments of 
a sultan's visit to a neighboring State." He then read a telegram of 
congratulation which the four sultans desired to dispatch to the Queen- 
Empress, and the high commissioner promised to forward it. 

The council, after passing standing rules of procedure, at once took 



TREATY OF PEACE. 671 

up the question of finance, and the debts of the States of Pahang and 
Negri Sembilan to Selangor and Perak and the colony of the Straits 
Settlements were assumed by the council as a federal liability. Selan- 
gor and Perak have no debts. The next important matter discussed 
was a loan on federal responsibility for railway and road extension, 
part of which was to aid by federal guaranty the poorer States, whose 
financial position did not allow of their borrowing money abroad alone. 
No final vote was, however, taken, the Resident-General pointing out 
that, as the federated States were under British protection, it was 
"necessary to obtain the apj)roval of the secretary of state in such 
matters." 

Irrigation schemes, harbor regulations, and a better adjustment of 
the export duty on tin, the staple product of the States, were gone into. 
The appointment, title, powers, duties, salaries, and emoluments of 
"penghulus" (Malay headmen of villages) were discussed at length 
by the chiefs and Residents, the aim being to secure more uniformity 
than had existed. With the same object, a long discussion also took 
place on the registration of Mahometan marriages and divorces; the 
administration of estates under the Mahometan law of inheritance; 
the regulation of the "attendance of Mahometans at mosque on 
Fridays;" the payment of a tax called "zakat," and a partial applica- 
tion thereof toward mosque expenses; the jurisdiction of "kathis;" 
and the punishment of certain offenses punishable under Mahometan 
law, but not provided for by the penal code. The Resident of Selan- 
gor was prepared to go so far as "to advocate that all the Mahometan 
laws and the Malay customs affecting them should be embodied in 
one code." But the Resident-General pointed out the great difficulty 
of drawing up such an enactment, desirable as it would be, and there 
was much diversity of opinion among the sultans and chiefs on nearly 
every point. The Sultan of Perak thought that "questions affecting 
the Mahometan religion should not be brought up for discussion in 
the federal council, but that such matters should be left for the con- 
sideration of the local councils." Finally, on the proposal of the 
Resident-General, it was agreed that the local councils should first 
consider the matter, and that an "orang-alim" should be appointed 
to decide what customs should be included in the enactment. 

The session ended with an address by the high commissioner, the 
Resident-General interpreting. 

Resident- General — Residents — State councils. — The Resident-Gen- 
eral resides in Selangor, and is to have a house and office wherever 
else it may be found necessary; but it is his duty to travel as much as 
possible in all the states, keeping himself in touch with the native 
rulers, the Residents, and all matters of administration. While 
traveling or residing in any state he can communicate directly with 
anyone on any subject, but he is to issue no instructions save through 
the Resident. Similarly, if addressed on any subject by any native or 
European, official or unofficial, he will only reply through the Resi- 
dent, after consultation with him. He is, however, to use his dis- 
cretion in cases of urgency, but must then inform the Resident at the 
earliest possible moment. 

Each Resident carries on the work of his state as was done before 
federation, except that the Resident-General has full powers to issue 
instructions to him. If there is a difference of opinion, the Resident 
may appeal through the Resident-General to the high commissioner, 
but pending the result of the appeal must act on his instructions. 

The various state councils meet and conduct their business as 



672 TREATY OF PEACE. 

formerly. They are legislative and advisory bodies and have no con- 
trol over public expenditure, but they may, as formerly, decide on 
the selection, remuneration, removal, and retirement of native officers, 
subject always to the sanction of the Resident-General and high 
commissioner. 

Each Resident furnishes the Resident-General for transmisssion to 
the high commissioner drafts of the legislative measures proposed 
to be laid before the state council in sufficient time to allow of their 
consideration by the high commissioner before the meeting, and no 
legislative enactment can he published or acted upon until the high 
commissioner's sanction has been given to it. 

Annual reports are prepared by the Residents for the Resident- 
General, in duplicate, before April 15. They are drawn on something 
like one model furnished by the Resident-General, who forwards them 
to the high commissioner, with a concise report of his own upon the 
progress of all the states. 

Civil service. — All the officers serving the government of the native 
states form one service and are eligible for promotion from one state 
to another, their service counting as continuous; but each state is 
liable for pension in proportion to the period passed by an officer in 
its service. 

There is one pension order for all the native states and a widow* 
and-orphan fund compulsory on all those who join the service. 

Within certain limits of salary appointments and promotions are 
dealt with by the Residents, but the approval of the Resident-General 
is required in case of posts carrying somewhat higher salaries. All 
other cases must be referred, through the Resident-General, to the 
high commissioner. 

No dismissal of an officer on the fixed establishment whose salary 
exceeds $300 can be made without reference to the Resident-General, 
and if the salary exceeds $600, without the sanction of the high com- 
missioner. 

In the case of officers on the provisional and temporary establish- 
ment, or paid out of open votes, reference to the Resident-General is 
only necessary if the salary exceeds $1,200 per annum. But in all 
cases of dismissal it is absolutely. necessary that the officer concerned 
shall be first called upon to give a written reply to the written charge 
of which he is accused. 

Vacation leave may be given by the Residents, up to six weeks only. 
Beyond that, up to three months, the Resident-General may grant 
leave of absence, either vacation, or on half pay, or without salary. 
Applicants for more than three months' leave must be referred to the 
high commissioner, as also all leave for even a shorter period, should 
the officer be proceeding to Europe and desire to draw salary from the 
Crown agents. 

In place of the "junior officers" who were appointed without being 
called upon to pass a competitive examination, cadetships were estab- 
lished with federation, open to natural-born British subjects, who are 
selected by competitive examination, held by the civil service com- 
missioners simultaneously with the examinations for the civil service 
of India. The initial salary of cadets is somewhat higher than that of 
the former junior officers, but the emoluments of the latter, on passing 
the prescribed native language, have now been improved. 

Justice. — The powers of magistrates, the practice of courts, the 
scales of fees, and all judicial procedure are being, as far and as fast 
as possible, assimilated in all the States. 



TREATY OF PEACE. 673 

I A judicial commissioner was appointed and assumed his duties in 
July, 1896. He goes on circuit to headquarters of each State to hear 
appeals, which formerly came before the various sultans in council. 
He also tries capital cases. 

A very important federal officer is the legal adviser, who, among 
other duties, drafts the enactments which it is desired to have passed 
by the different State councils. The scope of the legislation which 
was at once undertaken will appear from the following list of the 
more important measures drafted by the legal adviser during his first 
ten months' work : 

I. To provide for the appointment of a high commissioner. 

II. To provide for the appointment of a judicial commissioner. 

III. To amend the law relating to banishment. 

IV. To provide for a widow's and orphan's pension fund. 

V. To amend the law relating to limitations of suits. 

VI. To enable sentences of imprisonment imposed in any one of the federated 
Malay States to be carried into effect in any other of the said States. 

VII. For shortening the language used in enactments and other written laws. 

VIII. To prohibit the importation and circulation of foreign coin (in certain 
states). 

IX. To provide penalties for the nonpayment of customs duties in the Negri 
Sembilan. 

X. To amend the rates charged for the survey of State lands in the Negri 
Sembilan. 

XL The land code. 

XII. The mining code. 

XIII. To provide for the recognition of certain Chinese laws and customs. 

XIV. Criminal procedure code. 

XV. Companies enactment. 

XVI. Stamp enactment. 

The Resident-General, who reported the above on May 13, 1897, stated 
that the civil-procedure code was also in preparation. 

In each state there is a corps of English magistrates for districts 
regulated according to area and population, and Malay headmen also 
hold courts for petty cases throughout the Federation. Many officers 
already in charge of other departments also act as magistrates. 

Advocates are admitted to practice before the judicial commissioner 
and in the courts of the senior magistrates of the different states, and 
sooner or later they will probably be allowed to plead in all courts. 

Military and police. — By the treaty of federation the Sultans have 
engaged to maintain a body of Indian troops, and by September 1, 
1896, the regiment of " Malay State Gudies" was practically formed 
and up to its full strength of 18 officers, 600 noncommissioned officers 
and men, and 53 noncombatants. These soldiers, who are Sikhs, are 
distributed as needed in the different states, and, in many cases 
relieve the local police from military duty which they had to perform 
in earlier days. 

There is a commissioner of police for the Federated States, and at 
the beginning of 1897 the strength of the police forces was reported 
as follows by the different Residents : 
Perak: 

European officers and inspectors 15 

Sikhs and Pathans — native officers, noncommissioned officers, and 

constables 472 

Mounted orderlies— Indian 14 

Malays— noncommissioned officers and constables 302 

Detectives and charge takers 39 

Total 842 

T P 43 



674 TREATY OF PEACE. 

Selangor: 

European officers 8 

Patkans 32 

Malays — noncommissioned officers and constables 535 

Total. 575 

Negri-Sembilan: 

European officers 3 

Malays— noncommissioned officers and men . 250 

Total 253 

Pahang: 

European officers. 3 

Malays — noncommissioned officers and men 304 

Total 307 

Total officers, noncommissioned officers, and men for Federation 1, 977 

The colonel of the Regiment of Guides is also federal inspector of 
prisons, and a uniform system of prison regulations is going into force 
in all the States. The object of Government being to concentrate the 
prisoners as far as possible, legislative authority was obtained for the 
transfer of prisoners from one State to another. It is considered that 
the strict discipline necessary is best assured by the supervision of 
military officers. 

The military and police forces are under the absolute control of the 
Residents, subject to instructions from the Resident-General or High 
Commissioner. 

Lands and mines. — A federal commissioner of lands and mines was 
at once appointed, as the paramount question of land tenure, under- 
lying that of mining privileges, was one upon which most divergent 
views were held by the Governments of the different States. The 
Resident-General, however, during the first year of federation, sum- 
moned in conference the Residents, the legal adviser, and the com- 
missioner of lands and mines, and a uniform land code was framed, 
which was accepted by all and approved by the High Commissioner. 
This measure had to pass through the councils of the States before 
the mining code, also drafted, could be submitted. 

Chinese affairs. — The Chinese are considered as the most important 
part of the working community, and the federal secretary for Chinese 
affairs holds an office of great responsibility, which calls for very high 
qualities and great experience. 

In Perak and Selangor, where great numbers of Chinese have always 
been attracted by tin mining and other industries, Chinese protector- 
ates have existed from the first. Disputes in connection with labor 
and immigration contracts, the protection of women and girls from 
the worst kind of slavery, sanitation, hospitals, the supervision of 
friendly and the control of secret Chinese societies, give constant work 
to these officers. In each place,- as far as possible, they secure the 
cooperation of the headman, called " Capitan China," and other lead- 
ing members of the Chinese community, from whom numerous in- 
stances of loyal support and assistance are recorded in the reports. 
At least one of these influential Chinese is usually to be found ia 
every State council. 

Other administrative departments. — In the scheme of Federation, 
drawn up by Governor Mitchell, in 1895, provision was also made for 
a chief engineer of public works, a chief railway engineer in charge 
of the construction and working of all the State railways, a chief sur- 



TREATY OF PEACE. 675 

veyor, a chief accountant, a chief surgeon, an inspector of schools, 
and an inspector of posts and telegraphs. None of these had, How- 
ever, been appointed at the end of the year 1896, the latest date to 
which published reports have been available to me. 

Division of general expenses. — The cost of all charges common to 
the States and the salaries of all federal officers and establishments 
are divided proportionately among the four States, each State con- 
tributing in proportion to its revenue. 

Taking the figures for 1896, the amount payable by Perak, the most 
highly developed State, in proportion to revenue, is about identical 
with what would have been chargeable in proportion to population. 
Selangor, however, with only four-sevenths the population of Perak, 
has so large a revenue from her tin mines, while Negri-Sembilan and 
Pahang are as yet so little advanced, that she has to pay nearly as 
much as Perak. Negri-Sembilan and Pahang, with 28 per cent of total 
population, are together called upon to bear less than 9 per cent of 
federal responsibilities. But, as has already been seen, one of the 
declared objects of Federation was to have the poorer and backward 
States aided to develop their resources by their more prosperous sisters, 
who advance money on the general federal guarantee, repayable by 
the debtor State as soon as its surplus of revenue over expenditure 
will permit. 

As the Resident-General says in his first report: " Hitherto Pahang 
has been only a drain on the resources, first, of the colony (Straits 
Settlements), and then of the western Malay States, because it had 
very little revenue of its own to meet the cost of improved adminis- 
tration and had no reserve funds to pay for the expensive luxury, by 
putting down two risings against British control on the part of discon- 
tented Malay chiefs. If almost nothing is done to open a country, 
by roads or other public works, the natives may be excused for failing 
to realize the advantage of British interference, and the remedy in 
Pahang, as has been proved elsewhere under somewhat similar cir- 
cumstances — in Egypt, for instance — is to spend a great deal more 
money to secure the return of what has gone already. It is an excel- 
lent example of what is called 'throwing good money after bad,' in 
the sense that what was gone was bad, for it was spent on nothing 
that could give a return, while the much larger assistance now being 
given by the solvent States is being expended in works of the utmost 
utility." 

Statistics. — This sketch of federation may be closed by a few figures 
for 1896 showing the revenue and expenditure of the four States, as 
given in the Resident-General's report to the secretary of state for 
the colonies: 

The total revenue was $8,434,083, of which the more important 
items were — 

Export on tin $3,126,974 

Land.... 511,237 

Posts and telegraphs 140,230 

The total expenditure was $8,598,147, out of which there was spent 
on — 

Works $974,843 

Roads 2,065,950 

Railway construction '- - - - 984, 774 

Total 4,025,567 



676 TREATY OF PEACE. 

As Sir Frank Swettenham says: "These figures speak for them- 
selves, and show that last year the Malay States devoted practically 
half their income to 'improvements.' It is this expenditure which 
mainly accounts for the past and continued prosperity of these States." 

The value of trade for 1896 was returned at rather less than 
$50,000,000 (imports, $21,050,480; exports, $28,426,633), and the popu- 
lation was estimated to number 610,000, spread over an area, accord- 
ing to Whittaker's Almanac, of nearly 29,000 square miles. 

As regards the revenue derived from the above-mentioned foreign 
trade, it is evident that the export duty on tin is only the most con- 
venient method of collecting a mining royalty. In the matter of 
imports, if the trade has grown to comparatively large proportions 
and continues to develop steadily, it is because, with the exception of 
opium and spirits, all merchandise imported has been subject to such 
light ad valorem duties that free trade may be said practically to 
exist. 

No wonder that the Resident-General was encouraged to believe 
that the prospects of the Federated States were never brighter than 
at the close of 1896. "But," he insists, "we can not afford to sit 
still. The country is, to a great extent, an unpopulated jungle; 
money must be spent in developing its resources, and men of energy 
— miners, planters, traders, and Government servants — must be 
encouraged to drive the work along. That, at least, is the only way 
to secure the continuance of advancement at the rate come to be 
expected of these States. Some properties are not worth develop- 
ing; but, if nothing else has been done, there is proof here of how 
well the country repays intelligent administration." 

VII. — Conclusion. 

It is time to sum up the results which have been obtained during 
twenty-four years from the simple but statesmanlike conception of a 
protectorate which Sir Andrew Clarke first evolved in the engagement 
of Pangkor — an administrative experiment which stood alone at the 
time and had no parallel in British control over alien races elsewhere. 

All piracy and land fighting, whether by Chinese or Malays, has 
been absolutely stamped out. Taxation has been made very light, 
and yet very productive. Slavery has been suppressed. Roads and 
railways have been constructed in pathless forests and jungle. 
Prisons and hospitals have been built and maintained. Above all, 
the chiefs have been reconciled to the new life, and the equality of 
all races and classes before the law is everywhere recognized. All 
this has been done, as Sir Andrew Clarke says, "by the Residents 
laying down and insisting on the constant recognition of the principle 
that the interests of the people they were sent to govern should be the 
first consideration of Government officers. By learning their lan- 
guages, their prejudices, their character, and by showing them that 
consideration which alone can secure sympathy and a good under- 
standing between government and people, their respect and, to some 
extent, their affection has been won. The natural tendencies of our 
race are not exactly inclined to these lines and what has been done, 
and the present feeling as to how the natives should be treated is due 
to the personal influence of a succession of Residents who gained 
their knowledge by their own intelligence and experience." 

In all this, as has been seen, there has been very little direct inter- 
ference by the Imperial Government. It is true that in the earlier 



TREATY OF PEACE. 677 

years the secretary of state for the colonies felt obliged to draw back 
a governor or Residents within the main lines of the policy which 
Great Britain had deliberately adopted, and which she was deter- 
mined to see carried out. But this policy has now taken root and 
developed into a well-understood and working constitution, which 
might by chance be wrongly interpreted at times, but which it is 
hardly conceivable that any British officer would attempt to override. 

On the other hand, no native has an object in plotting for a change. 
Each sultan sees his own flag flying in his kingdom and every law or 
decree promulgated and enforced in his name. He lives in greater 
state and receives more honor than ever before. His civil list is 
assured to him, and the public revenues, many times greater than 
could have been exacted by the foulest oppression of the old regime, 
are now largely spent in permanent improvements, which add an 
" unearned increment" to the value of his private estates. The same 
is true of the chiefs in their degree, and as long as the people are 
contented under a just and beneficent administration none can ever 
find means to organize a revolt, for the Residents have absolute 
control both of the sword and of the purse. Indeed, for some years 
past there has been no imperial interference at all, nor is any prob- 
able under normal circumstances. If the power is ever exercised it 
will perhaps be in the direction of restraining the federation from 
unduly pledging its credit by foreign loans. But this contingency is 
still remote. 

Those who have done me the honor of reading thus far will, I am 
sure, have been impressed like myself by a striking fact in connection 
with this protectorate. I allude to the marvelous elasticity of the 
original organization, which has not only created a prosperous nation 
out of warring tribes of Malays, but, with no sharp shock to native 
customs or feelings, has been strong enough to exercise such acts of 
dominion as the deposition of a sultan, the settlement of his succes- 
sion, and a general manumission of slaves. 

I may fitly conclude by quoting a few eloquent words from Sir 
Andrew Clarke's address before the Royal Institution : 

Not by wars involving the slaughter of native races, not by drafts upon the 
imperial exchequer, not by the agency of chartered companies, which necessarily 
seek first their own interests, has the development of the Malay States been 
attained. Their present peace and marvelous advance in prosperity have been 
due to a sympathetic administration, which has dealt tenderly with native preju- 
dices and sought to lead upward a free people instead of forcibly driving a sub- 
ject race. 
















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